Niger

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 17, 2015 to October 23, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 17: Five Boko Haram killed twelve in Madagali, Adamawa and lost two of their own. October 18: Nigerian troops killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents in Madagali, Adamawa. October 18: Cameroonian troops killed ten Boko Haram insurgents and lost one soldier in Wambache, Cameroon. October 20: Nigerian troops killed one-hundred and fifty Boko Haram insurgents in Madagali, Adamawa. October 21: A suicide bomber killed two Nigerien soldiers in Diffa, Niger. Boko Haram is suspected. October 21: Boko Haram killed twenty in Maiduguri, Borno. October 22: Boko Haram killed twelve in Kerawa, Cameroon. October 22: Fulani herdsmen killed seven in Wukari, Taraba. October 23: A suicide attack on a mosque killed the suicide bomber and twenty-seven others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. October 23: A suicide attack on a mosque killed the suicide bomber and forty-nine others in Yola, Adamawa. Boko Haram is suspected.

President Barack Obama’s announcement that the United States is establishing a drone base in Cameroon and will deploy up to three hundred military personnel has been enthusiastically welcomed by Cameroonian President Paul Biya and Nigeria President Muhammadu Buhari. The drone base will provide intelligence support to the multilateral coalition fighting Boko Haram, the radical, jihadist group that seeks to destroy the Nigerian state. The drone base in Cameroon will be the thirteenth surveillance base established by the United States on the African continent. Eight of them are in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and the Seychelles). They are likely to have a focus on the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean as well as Africa. The drone base in Uganda is part of the effort to destroy the Lord’s Resistance Army, a central African terrorist group, as mandated by Congress. In West Africa, there are U.S. surveillance facilities in Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and now Cameroon. The establishment of U.S. military facilities in Chad and Cameroon is not without risk, even though the mission is, apparently, intelligence gathering only rather than “boots on the ground.” However, a fire-fight with Boko Haram is always possible, with the risk of subsequent deeper involvement. Perhaps more serious, a U.S. military presence strengthens the partnership with two authoritarian dictators long in power. Chad’s Idriss Deby has ruled for twenty-one years, Cameroon’s Paul Biya for thirty-three. In Cameroon there are certain parallels with Nigeria in that Boko Haram in both countries is active in Muslim areas traditionally marginalized by their respective capitals. A difference is that Biya’s government is Christian, while Muhammadu Buhari in Nigeria is a Muslim. For good or ill, with the establishment of surveillance bases in West Africa, the United States is becoming more involved in the struggle against Boko Haram, a movement which we know remarkably little about beyond its penchant for bloodshed and its Salafist theological outlook that is widely shared in the Sahel by many who are not adherents. Notwithstanding its “pledge of allegiance” to the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram appears decentralized and local in focus. The evidence that its attacks are coordinated within Nigeria and across national boundaries is not compelling.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from October 3, 2015 to October 9, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   October 4: Four Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and six others in Diffa, Niger. October 5: Three Boko Haram insurgents accidentally killed themselves when a bomb they were transporting exploded in Bosso, Niger. October 6: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked a mosque in Gubio, Borno, killing themselves and eighteen others. October 6: Boko Haram killed eleven Chadian soldiers and lost seventeen of their own in Kaiga Ngouboua, Chad. October 7: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and fifteen others in Damaturu, Yobe. Boko Haram is suspected. October 7: Nigerian soldiers killed one hundred Boko Haram militants and lost seven of their own in Gujba, Yobe. October 9: Unknown gunmen killed four in Jos South, Plateau; police killed one of the gunmen.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 18, 2015 to July 24, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   July 18: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Obi, Nasarawa. July 19: Fulani mercenaries killed two in Kokona, Nasarawa. July 20: Five Boko Haram bombers killed themselves and three soldiers in Damaturu, Yobe. July 22: Suicide attacks killed twenty in Maroua, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. July 22: A suicide bomber and a separate, second bomb killed thirty-seven in Gombe. Boko Haram is suspected. July 22: Sectarian violence in Barkin Ladi, Plateau led to eight deaths. July 22: Boko Haram killed eight in Biu, Borno. July 23: Land disputes in Ebonyi, Abia result in one death. July 24: Boko Haram killed twenty-five in Madagali, Borno. July 24: Boko Haram killed fifteen in Askira/Uba, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 4, 2015 to July 10, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   July 4: Two students were killed by herdsmen in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. July 4: Cattle rustlers killed forty in Birnin Magaji, Zamfara. July 5: Boko Haram killed twenty-six over two nights in the towns of Merom and Tiskra in Chad. July 5: A suicide bomber killed six in a church in Potiskum, Yobe. Boko Haram is suspected. July 5: Boko Haram killed fifty-one in Jos North, Plateau. July 6: A suicide bomber killed one near a mosque in Kano. July 7: A bomb killed twenty-five in Kaduna. Boko Haram is suspected. July 7: A suicide bomber killed herself and forty others in Sabon Gari, Kaduna. Boko Haram is suspected. July 7: A suicide bomber killed herself and four others at a military checkpoint in Borno. July 7: Boko Haram killed thirteen in Bordo, Cameroon. July 9: Boko Haram killed five in Dagaya, Niger. July 10: Boko Haram killed eleven in Kaga, Borno. July 10: Boko Haram killed eight in Ngala, Borno. July 10: A suicide bombers killed him/herself and three others in Maiduguri, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 23, 2015 to May 29, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     5/23: Boko Haram killed forty-three in Gubio, Borno. 5/23: The Nigerian military killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents in Mafa, Borno. 5/24: Sectarian violence over several days in Logo, Benue resulted in the deaths of ninety-six. 5/27: Chadian soldiers killed thirty-three Boko Haram insurgents, and lost four of their own on Choua Island in Chad. 5/28: Gunmen killed five in Gokana, Rivers. 5/29: A twin bomb attack at a wedding in Hawul, Borno killed seven. Boko Haram is suspected. 

After almost five years of reverses, the Nigerian federal government largely cleared Boko Haram fighters from the territories they occupied in Borno state–in about five weeks. The Nigerian government has given most of the credit to an allegedly invigorated Nigerian army. There has also been some acknowledgement of the contributions of Chadian and Nigerien forces. There has, however, been little recognition of the role of South African mercenaries, though they are likely to have been crucial to military success against Boko Haram. In a series of blog posts on SOFREP.com, Jack Murphy interviews Eeben Barlow, the South African “proprietor” of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection (STTEP), and provides more detail than had previously been seen on the involvement of the South African mercenaries. Apparently, the Nigerian authorities contracted with STTEP in December to train a Nigerian unit to find and rescue the kidnapped Chibok School girls. But that mission soon morphed into an “aggressive strike force,” with STTEP personnel participating in combating Boko Haram. Colin Freeman, in the Telegraph, concludes that the mercenaries “proved decisive in helping the military turn around its campaign against Boko Haram.” Barlow does not say how much the Nigerian authorities paid his company. Earlier, unsubstantiated reports have said it was $400 per person per day. According to the SOFREP blog, STTEP numbered about 100 in Nigeria. Barlow was a founder of the mercenary force Executive Outcomes, which was dissolved in 1998. In the six blog posts, Barlow is at pains to defend STTEP against charges of racism, and emphasizes that his force includes white, “browns,” and blacks. Barlow claims that his employees are multiracial, and included Namibians as well as South Africans. Some, he said, had been part of the apartheid-era South African Defence Force (SADF). Others, however, had fought against the SADF in Namibia and Angola. Barlow’s interview helps–if tentatively–shed light on an issue that has been largely avoided by the Jonathan administration. There has long been anecdotal evidence that the Nigerian military was demoralized, under-equipped, and under-trained. How did it turn itself around in only five weeks? The South African mercenaries would indicate that it did not. What changed is the presence of well-trained, well-equipped fighters that are skilled in warfare. No doubt, too, that the Chadian and Nigerien militaries played an important role, though Barlow’s posts say nothing about coordination with the two. There are speculations that in recent months, Jonathan’s administration, unsuccessful in countering Boko Haram, panicked. Hence, the recruitment of mercenaries fits that time frame. In early February, the military postponed the elections, ostensibly because it was about to begin a campaign against Boko Haram. And, indeed, it did, only now with South African mercenaries. Barlow observes that Boko Haram has retreated with some of its forces intact and equipped. He implies that the fight is not over. It remains to be seen whether the incoming Buhari administration will retain the South Africans. It might be argued that the mercenaries are under the direct control of the Nigerian government. That might make them more attractive to Nigerian nationalist Buhari than “foreign” troops from Chad or Niger.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 2, 2015 to May 8, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   May 2: In retaliation for the killing of the six soldiers by suspected Fulani gunmen in Karim Lamido, Taraba, Nigerian soldiers killed as many as eighty civilians in Wase, Plateau. May 3: Sectarian violence in Takum, Taraba led to the deaths of twenty-one. May 3: Soldiers repelled a Boko Haram attack in the Sambisa Forest in Gwoza, Borno."Many" insurgents (estimated at twenty) and one soldier were killed. May 4: Fulani gunmen killed thirty in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. May 5: Cultists killed four in Oredo, Edo. May 6: Boko Haram killed five in Koukodou, Niger. May 6: A vigilante group killed twenty-nine Boko Haram insurgents in Hawul, Borno. May 8: A suspected Boko Haram insurgent attacked a school in Potiskum, Yobe. After firing on the school, he detonated a suicide bomb, killing himself, fourteen others were injured in the attack.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 25, 2015 to May 1, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   Unknown Date: Over 400 bodies were found in Damasak, Mobbar, Borno. The civilians were killed by Boko Haram prior to Damasak’s liberation on 3/9/2015. (This is not reflected on the weekly NST map.) April 25: Boko Haram attacked an army base in Karamga, Niger, killing forty-six Nigerien soldiers and tweny-eight civilians. In the fighting 156 insurgents also died. April 25: Sectarian violence in Guma, Benue resulted in the deaths of nineteen. April 25: Sectarian violence in Keana, Nasarawa resulted in the deaths of nineteen. April 25: Boko Haram killed four in Riyom, Plateau. April 25: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and three civilians in Mafa, Benue. "Many" insurgents were also killed (recorded as ten). April 25: Boko Haram killed twenty-one in Gujba, Yobe. April 27: Unknown perpetrators bombed a radio station in Adavi, Kogi, killing four. April 28: Cult clashes in Ikpoba Okha, Edo, resulted in the deaths of five.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 18, 2015 to April 24, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   April 18: Gunmen kidnapped the chairman of Rivers LGA. April 18: A soldier killed one civilian at a checkpoint in Ushongo, Benue. April 18: Sectarian violence in Agatu, Benue resulted in the deaths of sixty. April 19: Boko Haram killed two soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. April 20: Sectarian violence in Donga, Taraba resulted in fifteen casualties. April 21: Nigerian troops killed a top Boko Haram commander and a "number" of other insurgents in Kaga, Borno. April 21: Gunmen killed a campaign coordinator for Kaduna State’s governor-elect, el-Rufai, in Jema’a, Kaduna. April 22: Nigerian forces invaded the Boko Haram stronghold in Sambisa Forest, Borno. The casualty count is unknown.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 28, 2015 to March 6, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   February 28: A female suicide bomber accidentally detonated, killing herself, her accomplice, and two civilians in Kaga, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. February 28: Sectarian violence in Ibi, Taraba resulted in twenty casualties. March 2: Nigerian troops killed seventy-three Boko Haram insurgents and lost one soldier in Konduga, Borno. March 2: A video showed Boko Haram beheading two men they accused of being spies. The video was published on March 2, and one of the victims identified himself as being from Baga, Borno. The exact date and location of the beheading is unknown. March 2: Chadian soldiers recaptured Dikwa, Borno, killing "many" Boko Haram insurgents (estimated as twenty) while losing one soldier. Boko Haram is suspected of killing "hundreds" of civilians (estimated as 200) during the battle. March 3: Boko Haram killed ninety-four civilians in Njaba, Borno. March 4: Boko Haram detonated a remote-controlled bomb in Diffa, Niger. Two Nigerien soldiers were killed, but the two insurgents were also caught and killed. March 4: Boko Haram killed nine in Shani, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 7, 2015 to February 13, 2015. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https:&#47;&#47;public.tableau.com&#47;static&#47;images&#47;NS&#47;NSTWeeklyFeb7-Feb13&#47;WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard&#47;1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a> February 7: The Nigerian military killed "scores" of Boko Haram terrorists in Damboa, Borno. February 8: Boko Haram attacked Kerawa, Cameroon, abducting thirty civilians from a bus and killing seven of them. The Cameroonian military killed eleven of the insurgents. February 8: Fulani herdsmen killed eighteen in an attack on Logo, Benue. February 8: The Niger army repelled a Boko Haram attack on Diffa, Niger. Ten civilians reported dead. February 9: The Niger army repelled a Boko Haram attack on a prison in Diffa, but Boko Haram successfully detonated a car bomb in the town, killing five. February 11: Boko Haram attacked Chadian troops in Gamburu, Borno, but the Chadian military killed thirteen insurgents. February 11: Two suspected Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked the Niger town of Diffa, but only killed themselves. February 12: Two teenage female suicide bombers attacked Biu, Borno, killing themselves and nine others. February 13: Boko Haram attacked Ngouboua, Chad, killing eight civilians, one policeman, and lost two of their own. February 13: Boko Haram attacked two towns outside of Maiduguri, Borno, killing twenty-one.

Rukmini Callimachi has a chilling story on the front page of today’s New York Times, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror.” It is a must-read. The story is based on a wide range of interviews with victims, government officials, counterterrorism experts, and thousands of pages of internal al-Qaeda documents found in Mali. Callimachi reports that according to the Times’ own investigations, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have taken in at least $125 million in revenue from ransoms since 2008. The U.S. Treasury Department estimates the total at $165 million in the same time period. The story outlines a carefully organized business, centrally directed by al-Qaeda in Pakistan, that outsources the actual kidnappings to local criminal gangs and uses intermediaries for the ransom negotiations—the latter receive ten percent of the takings. Ransoms have increased from an average of $200,000 per hostage in 2003 to up to $10 million now. Hostages are so valuable that the Times estimates that only 15 percent have been murdered or died since 2008, some as part of failed rescue attempts. The story outlines the perpetrator strategies for pressuring European governments to pay. Apparently, it is a remarkable success. Callimachi reports that since 2008, France has paid $58.1 million; Switzerland, $12.4 million; Spain, $11 million; and Austria, $3.2 million. All have signed agreements to end ransom paying, and all officially deny doing so, but with winks and nods. Ransom payments appear as “development assistance” line items in national budgets. Citing American and European counterterrorism experts, she reports that al-Qaeda now targets the nationals of rich European countries that will pay. Of the fifty-three hostages seized by ‘official’ al-Qaeda branches over the past five years, one third were French, while Austria, Spain, and Switzerland together account for 20 percent of victims. Only three hostages, 5 percent of the total, have been American. The United Kingdom and the United States do not pay ransoms. Callimachi reports that accordingly, kidnappers have little interest in Americans or Brits. But because this is known, when nationals of those two countries are captured with others from countries that do pay, they are likely to be murdered. The article cites Edwin Dyer, a British man who was killed in 2009, as a tragic example. This story is focused primarily on the Sahel, especially Mali, Niger, and Algeria, not west Africa. Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram are not close. It seems to me unlikely that al-Qaeda is orchestrating the wave of kidnapping in northern Nigeria, or the much more lucrative kidnappings in the oil patch or around Lagos. But, the Sahelian kidnappings surely inspire Boko Haram, Ansaru, and, no doubt, purely criminal gangs, and inform their tactics. If the story’s premise is accepted, ransoms are now a major driver of al-Qaeda terrorism. European democracies are unable to resist the popular pressure to pay ransom in order to spare the lives of their citizens. Under these circumstances, should the European countries, along with the United Kingdom and the United States, ban travel to the region by their nationals? Attractive though that approach might be, there would likely be significant legal challenges and such a ban would be almost impossible to enforce.

In the March 5 New York Times, Eric Schmitt’s article “U.S. Takes Training Role in Africa as Threats Grow and Budgets Shrink,” reviews U.S. military assistance and training to the weak states of the Sahel that are confronting jihadi militants. He discusses the constraints on what the U.S. is willing and able to do in a context of domestic budget cuts and a general war-weariness in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. is increasingly focused on “partnership” and “capacity building” rather than boots-on-the-ground. Schmitt also describes the “soft” assistance that the U.S. military can provide, such as medical services, and partnerships with European allies on such training schemes. Much of the focus of Schmitt’s article is on Niger. But, he includes a potentially fateful sentence about Nigeria: “American officials are putting the finishing touches on a plan for United States Army instructors to help train an 850-member battalion of rangers as part of Nigeria’s new special forces command.” This is not a good idea. There has long been a small-scale relationship between American and Nigerian militaries, mostly focused on training regional peacekeepers. In the past, it was the Nigerians who were reluctant to expand this relationship out of a mixture of national pride and a dislike for the transparency and accountability upon which the U.S. insists. Things are different now, apparently. Human rights groups have credibly accused the Nigerian security forces of gross human rights violations in the North, and disturbing reports have appeared in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Because of the frequent rotation of Nigerian military units in the North many, even perhaps most, are likely infected by human rights abuses and therefore are ineligible to receive U.S. military training under U.S. law (the “Leahy amendment”). According to the State Department, Secretary of State John Kerry raised human rights abuses with Nigerian officials in May, 2013. President Barack Obama did the same with President Goodluck Jonathan on the margins of the 2013 UN General Assembly in New York, according to the White House. These very high level demarches appear to have had no effect. It could be argued that U.S. training of a Nigerian battalion might be a way of countering human rights abuses. As the battalion to be trained is new, it should be free of allegations of those abuses. Nevertheless, U.S. involvement in ranger training would tie the U.S. ever closer to the Jonathan administration in an increasingly polarized pre-election period in which northern Nigerian alienation from Abuja is widespread and accusations of official corruption on a spectacular scale by former governor of the central bank Lamido Sanusi remain unanswered. We should anticipate that northern public opinion—whether Islamist or not—is likely to become even more thoroughly alienated from the United States, which will likely be held responsible for on-going Nigerian military abuses. There is also the risk that U.S. involvement may encourage jihadis to move away from their current largely domestic focus and toward greater involvement in international terrorism. The security forces’ abuses will almost certainly continue. U.S. training of 850 rangers will be hardly sufficient to change a deep seated culture of security service abuse of civilians and the resorting to extra-judicial killings.

Earlier this week I blogged on the arrest of 320 Muslim traders of northern origin in Rivers state on allegations that they were “Boko Haram.” According to the media, the traders had lived in Rivers state for many years, traveled to the north to buy vegetables to sell and returned home in a bus convoy because of poor security on the roads. Now, in adjacent Imo state, there is a media report that the authorities have sent home to Katsina state in northern Nigeria eighty-four Muslim students taking a skills acquisition course at the Imo College of Advanced Professional Studies. The local branch of the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) had “raised an alarm that they might be Boko Haram insurgents.” According to the media, the authorities sent the students home for their own protection. Like Rivers, Imo state is mostly Christian and Boko Haram has never operated there. However, over the past week in the northern states of Borno and Adamawa, Boko Haram has killed more than 138 people in attacks on churches, according to the media. This set off a new wave of refugees crossing over to southern Niger and Cameroon. So, sensitivity in the south to Boko Haram killing of Christians is particularly high. But, all may not be what it seems. The governor of Imo state, Rochas Okorocha, is in opposition to President Goodluck Jonathan’s PDP. Now that the Independent National Electoral Commission has announced that national presidential elections will take place in February, 2015, the country is rapidly moving into a partisan political mode. It could be that the PDP denunciation of Muslim students from the north is part of a local political struggle. Nevertheless, the apparent resumption of Boko Haram attacks on Christians in the north, and the singling out of Muslims in the south in Rivers and Imo may be the start of a worrisome trend.