Niger

Command and control among Boko Haram factions operating in Nigeria’s Borno state and adjacent territories remains obscure. One faction appears to be led by Abubakar Shekau, well-known for his taunting, bloody videos, and his kidnapping of the Chibok school girls in 2014. Another, the Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), apparently backed by the Islamic State (IS), was once led by Abu Musab al- Barnawi, though Mamman Nur was understood to hold real power. Last year, Nur appears to have been assassinated because he was too “soft.” In March 2019, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was replaced by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar al-Barnawi. (Al-Barnawi denotes that the person is “from Borno,” so the current and former ISWA leaders do not necessarily have any blood relationship.) The report of a leadership change is based on IS audio recordings, though the extent of IS control over the leadership struggle with ISWA is not entirely clear. If, indeed, Abu Musab and Mamman Nur were “soft,” it is likely that Abu Abdullan Ibn Umar will be “hard.” However, what “hard” and “soft” actually means is obscure, as is the relationship between the Boko Haram factions and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Northeast Nigeria and adjacent regions continue to be the center of Islamist jihadist extremism. Scores of civilians were targeted and killed in southeast Niger by Boko Haram in early April, forcing thousands to flee to Diffa, a Nigerien border city. With the collapse of the IS in Iraq and Syria, some observers are characterizing Borno as the “largest remaining Caliphate,” though how and to what extent it is a direct successor to IS remains unclear.  The Nigerian army, in conjunction with the Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF), continues to claim military success against Boko Haram. In neighboring Chad, officials are claiming that Chadian forces killed sixty-three “terrorists” in a mid-April attack on a military facility. But, the number of Boko Haram incidents has not declined. In early April, the Islamic State West Africa released a video showing its execution of five Nigerian soldiers; subsequently, it was determined that three of the soldiers were members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, an informal militia that assists the regular army. In the past, such videos have had a deleterious effect on military morale. The factions, for now, appear relatively distinct. The original split in 2016 had to do with, among other things, Shekau’s leadership style, his understanding of Islam, and his targeting of Muslim civilians. ISWA, according to experts, has been more focused on winning hearts and minds, and has even developed a tax base. Especially since leadership changes over the past year, ISWA has attacked a number of military targets with success, overrunning military bases and stealing equipment. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, military casualties have increased significantly since July 2018. The Shekau and al-Barnawi factions of Boko Haram continue to evolve and even grow. Changes in leadership and tactics raise questions about the extent of their affiliation with IS and overall stability, but they also indicate that the movement is far from defeated.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 23 to 29, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1554126554847'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 23: Boko Haram killed seven Nigeriens and kidnapped two in Diffa, Niger. March 24: Herdsmen killed two in Akwanga, Nassarawa. March 25: A Catholic priest was kidnapped in Kachia, Kaduna.  March 25: Sectarian violence resulted in "many" (estimated at ten) deaths in Izzi, Cross River. March 25: A Boko Haram landmine killed thirteen soldiers in Gwoza, Borno.  March 26: A North Korean doctor was abducted in Tsafe, Zamfara.  March 26: Boko Haram killed ten and lost two militants in Diffa, Niger. March 27: Kidnappers abducted a policeman and four others in Esan South, Edo; the policeman was later killed.  March 27: Gunmen abducted the former Nigeria Bar Association Chairman in Jalingo, Taraba.  March 27: Boko Haram killed one policeman and one civilian in Biu, Borno.  March 27: Gunmen abducted four in Akwanga, Nassarawa.  March 27: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Omala, Kogi. March 28: Police killed five kidnappers in Ikwerre, Rivers. March 28: Boko Haram killed one in Chibok, Borno.  March 29: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) killed five Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno; another two militants were killed by a landmine planted by Boko Haram. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 16 to 22, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1553522795339'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 16: Sectarian violence resulted in ten deaths in Sanga, Kaduna. March 17: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Owerri West, Imo. March 17: A landmine killed eight in Gwoza, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. March 17: Sectarian violence resulted in four deaths in Biase, Cross River. March 18: Boko Haram killed five in Michika, Adamawa; Nigerian troops repelled the attack and killed "many" (estimated at twenty) Boko Haram militants.  March 18: Sectarian violence resulted in "many" (estimated at twenty) deaths in Agatu, Benue. March 18: Boko Haram killed four farmers in Askira/Uba, Borno.  March 19: A cult clash resulted in eight deaths in Lokoja, Kogi. March 19: A policeman killed a civil defense officer in Abuja.  March 19: Herdsmen killed ten in Guma, Benue. March 20: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Itu, Akwa Ibom. March 20: Bandits killed a policeman and abducted six in Anka, Zamfara. March 21: Herdsmen killed one in Ezeagu, Enugu. March 21: Boko Haram killed eight in Diffa, Niger. March 22: Boko Haram killed twenty-three Chadian soldiers in Dangdala, Chad. March 22: Election-related violence resulted in one death in Ussa, Taraba.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 2 to 8, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1552312878493'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 2: Gunmen killed seven in Giwa, Kaduna.  March 2: Herdsmen killed sixteen in Gwer West, Benue.  March 2: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Akuku-Toru, Rivers. March 3: Bandits killed forty in Shinkafi and Anka LGAs in Zamfara.  March 3: Bandits killed twenty-three members of the CJTF in Tsafe, Zamfara.  March 5: Bandits killed thirty members of the CJTF in Shinkafi, Zamfara.  March 6: Five were killed by a landmine suspected to have been planted by ISWAP in Maiduguri, Borno.  March 6: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Shani and Mafa LGAs in Borno.  March 7: Sectarian violence led to twenty deaths in Bassa, Kogi.  March 7: Election-related violence resulted in two deaths in Lagos State, Lagos. March 7: Election-related violence resulted in one death in Ifo, Ogun.  March 7: Bandits killed twenty in Bukkuyum, Zamfara. March 8: Election-related violence resulted in two deaths in Ojo, Lagos.  March 8: Seven soldiers and thirty-eight Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash in Diffa, Niger. March 8: Nigerian troops killed "many" bandits (estimated at twenty) in Bukkuyum, Zamfara.  March 8: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack in Mafa, Borno, killing "scores" (estimated at twenty-four) of militants. 

There is extensive media attention given to migration from North Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean. These stories are accompanied by regular reports on the rescue of migrants from sinking boats, issues concerning their reception in Europe, and their impact on European politics. The BBC usefully has called attention to the likely larger and more deadly flow of migrants across the Sahara. The report is primarily based on anecdotes obtained from on-the-ground reporting. Statistics are thin, but the BBC’s conclusions are credible. The BBC cites data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which are probably the best available. According to IOM, in 2015 there were 6,000 traffickers in the Agadez region of Niger who transported some 340,000 migrants across the Sahara to Libya. The migrants were eventually bound for Europe. They came from all over West Africa to Agadez, long a center of the cross Sahara trade. In one of the poorest parts of the world, the profits from trafficking were huge; the BBC quotes one trafficker as saying that he earned as much as $6,000 per week. In 2015, according to the BBC, the Nigerien government, banned trafficking of people across the Sahara under pressure from European countries. The BBC ascribes some of the drop in migration to the law. Perhaps. But it is not clear what capacity the Nigerien government actually has to enforce such a law. The BBC provides anecdotes from wily traffickers who find new and different ways across the Sahara, though such routes are often far from water sources and presumably result in higher mortality rates. The BBC also notes that stories about the dangers of migration and the harsh conditions in holding centers in Libya and even in Europe are trickling back to villages all over West Africa, convincing would-be migrants to stay put. Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which permits the free movement of people across borders; the trafficking was therefore probably legal, at least until the Nigerien border with Libya, which is not a member of ECOWAS and could therefore presumably have blocked the trafficking.  That country, however, is wracked by civil war. Migration across the Sahara is also far more dangerous than across the Mediterranean. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Niger, Alessandra Morelli, estimates that for every migrant death in the Mediterranean, there are at least two in the Sahara.  Trade across the Sahara is an old song. Estimates are that the slave trade across the Sahara lasted longer than the Atlantic slave trade and involved nearly as many victims. But, trafficking from West Africa to Europe is still poorly understood, and it is not clear the exact numbers of migrants and traffickers involved, nor what is primarily driving such migration. For whatever reasons, the numbers appear to have indeed dropped.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 29, 2018, to January 4, 2019. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1546870186220'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   December 29: Boko Haram killed eight soldiers in Gujba, Yobe. December 30: Herdsmen killed seven in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  December 30: Nigerian troops killed three would-be suicide bombers in Dikwa, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.  December 30: Gunmen killed four in Kajuru, Kaduna.  December 31: Five Nigerien soldiers, five Nigerian soldiers, and eleven Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Maradi, Niger.  December 31: Robbers killed seven in Owo, Ondo.  January 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  January 1: Bandits killed eighteen in Chafe, Zamfara.  January 2: Gunmen killed six in Jos South, Plateau.  December 28–January 2: Nigerien soldiers killed 280 Boko Haram militants around Zoumba, Niger (location estimated).  January 3: Nigerian soldiers killed six Boko Haram militants in Mafa, Borno.  January 3: Nigerian military helicopters killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara. January 3: Boko Haram killed two Nigerian soldiers in Bama, Borno. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 1 to 7, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1544469063259'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   December 1: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. December 1: Eight soldiers and ten Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Gujba, Yobe. December 2: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Apa, Benue.  December 3: Sectarian violence led to "dozens" (estimated at twenty-four) of deaths in Biase, Cross River. December 3: Boko Haram fought Nigerian troops in Abadam, Borno, leading "to deaths on both sides" (estimated at five militants and five soldiers). December 4: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped eight from Osun College in Obokun, Osun.  December 4: Nigerian soldiers killed one Boko Haram militant in Damboa, Borno.  December 4: Boko Haram killed one soldier in Kukawa, Borno.  December 4: Gunmen abducted three health workers and two lecturers in Owo, Ondo.  December 6: Boko Haram killed five in Kala/Balge, Borno.  December 6: A communal clash resulted in eight deaths in Lavun, Niger. December 7: Boko Haram killed two soldiers in Kaga, Borno. 

Niger officials have announced that Boko Haram kidnapped eighteen girls from two villages, Blaharde and Bague, on November 24. Media is reporting that as many as fifty Boko Haram operatives were involved. The region of Niger where the kidnapping took place is ethnically and religiously diverse, but authorities have not yet identified the girls and their ethnic and religious affiliation. Factions of Boko Haram have frequently conducted kidnapping of girls, notably over 270 from Chibok in 2014, and more recently, over one hundred from Dapchi in February 2018. While the Dapchi girls were soon released, the lone Christian among the girls, Leah Sharibu, is still in captivity after reportedly refusing to convert to Islam. Boko Haram faction leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi has said that the kidnapping and enslavement of non-Muslim people is justified, while doing the same to Muslims is not.  The Blaharde and Bague kidnapping followed the November 22 killing of seven employees of the French drilling company Foraco at the village of Toumour, Niger. The nationality of the victims has not been identified, but they are likely to all have been Nigeriens. Local security services believe the killers were Boko Haram.  Increased Boko Haram activity on the Niger side of the border parallels its greatly increased activity on the Nigerian side. Chad and Niger reportedly removed troops they had stationed in northeastern Nigeria over the summer, owing in part to a lack of resources. The border between Niger and Nigeria was established by the French and the British during colonial times. It is largely irrelevant to the people who populate the region, and therefore highly porous. It seems possible, even likely, that greater Boko Haram activism reflects the upcoming Nigeria national elections in February 2019.

The New York Times reports that the CIA is expanding its presence at a recently established drone base at Dirkou, Niger, an oasis town in the Sahara that has a small airport. Over the past two years, the U.S. military has been building another drone base in Agadez, central Niger, to conduct reconnaissance. It will have an expected ten-year price tag of over a quarter-billion dollars, is run by the U.S. air force, and will host armed Reaper drones. The CIA has already used the expanded base in Dirkou for surveillance missions, but now the drones are likely to be used on lethal ones. For now, the targets are militants in southern Libya. The U.S. Army’s Africa Command has also carried out lethal drone strikes against al-Qaeda and Islamic State operatives in Libya from bases in Sicily and Niamey, the capital of Niger. Dirkou is hundreds of miles closer than either to southern Libya. The Nigerien government, according to the Times, is supportive of the U.S. use of drones. President Barack Obama transferred responsibility for drone attacks from the CIA to the U.S. military, in part in response to civilian casualties, and in part to manage better the public relations aspect of what are supposed to be clandestine operations. President Trump reversed that decision at the urging of then-CIA director Mike Pompeo in 2017. Now, it would appear that both the CIA and AFRICOM are, or are about to be, operating lethal drone strikes from bases in Niger. As U.S. Special Forces are preparing to reduce their footprint in Africa, lethal drone use is ramping up. As experience in Afghanistan and Yemen have shown, drones are by no means immune from causing unintended civilian casualties and their effectiveness against enemy terrorists is subject to debate. For now, there appears to be little Nigerien or local opposition to expanded drone use. If casualties, intended and otherwise, are restricted to Libya, that is likely to continue. This could change if local militants are targeted. In fact, U.S. Special Forces, including those killed at Tongo Tongo, were fighting and targeting militants in Niger.

According to U.S. media, the Pentagon plan to withdraw nearly all American Special Forces from West Africa is accelerating. The New York Times, citing Pentagon officials, reports that if approved by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, the United States would close military outposts in Tunisia, Cameroon, Libya, and Kenya, and end the operations of seven of eight counterterrorism units operating in Africa. If these plans are approved by the Secretary of Defense, there would remain a “robust” military presence only in Somalia and Nigeria.  Winding down the U.S. military presence in West Africa reflects the Department of Defense’s new National Defense Strategy [PDF]: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” Explicit reference is made to China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. On September 7, the New York Times reports that the United States and India signed agreements to strengthen bilateral military relations, allowing New Delhi to buy sophisticated military technology. Both countries have been concerned about China’s expansionist policies, especially in the Indian Ocean. American media is also reporting that U.S. armed drones in Niger will be used to attack militants in the Sahel. It looks like drones will replace American boots on the ground. Short-term U.S. training programs of African forces, lasting between thirty and sixty days, would continue.  Meanwhile, there is a resurgence of Boko Haram activity in northeast Nigeria, while in Mali a peace agreement between militants and the government appears to be breaking down. The Norwegian Refugee Council reports that up to fifty thousand Malians have fled their homes because of communal clashes and military operations.  Broadly speaking, U.S. security engagement in Africa and the Sahel more specifically has been designed to develop the capacity of states to defend themselves. While the degree to which this goal has been achieved is controversial, most states in the region remain weak, with ruling elites often disconnected from the people they ostensibly govern. The line between trade and smuggling is thin, and there has always been criminal activity. Insurgencies, often low level, are endemic. The land area involved is immense. A question to be asked is whether the U.S. effort has been anyway near large enough to be transformative. The Times reports that there are a total 1,200 Special Operations Forces in all of Africa. If Pentagon proposals go forward, this number will be greatly reduced.   

The New York Times, citing U.S. military sources, identifies the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara as responsible for the October ambush that killed four American soldiers in western Niger. The U.S. Department of State has already designated it to be a “foreign terrorist organization.” The name of the organization conjures association with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but caution is required. Evidence that the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara is somehow an extension of the Islamic State in the Middle East or even in Libya is sparse. The leader of the ambush is identified as Doundoun Cheffou, allegedly a “lieutenant” of Adnan Abou Walid al-Sahraoui. (The spelling of names is variable.) Cheffou is, among other things, a cattle herder and a member of a largely marginalized ethnic group. Al-Sahraoui was deeply involved in the 2013 temporary Islamist take-over of northern Mali. He merged his group with Mokhtar Belmokhtar to form al-Murabitoun. He pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s al-Baghdadi in 2015, thereby splitting al-Murabitoun. In addition to being an Islamist terrorist, Belmokhtar is also known as Mr. Marlboro for smuggling, among other things, cigarettes. Cheffou appears to be part of a constantly shifting kaleidoscope of personalities, ethnic grievances, and criminal activities that uses Islamic rhetoric in a largely lawless region. This “ungoverned space” includes the disputed Western Sahara, southern Algeria, Mali, Niger, and even parts of Nigeria. These groups are deeply hostile to government authority and economic enterprises supported by France or the United States. Hence, they will attack the U.S. military whenever they can. But, it is unclear whether the pledges of allegiance to ISIS and al-Baghdadi have any meaning beyond the aspiration of association with an organization that for a time dominated large parts of Syria and Iraq. The Times cites Nigerien and French security sources who estimate that ISIS in the Greater Sahara has forty to sixty core members but can draw on villagers sympathetic to it in part because of unresolved ethnic and other grievances. This estimate fits a pattern of constantly shifting criminal groups that exploit local grievances and use Islamist rhetoric, but less is known about these groups than, for example, Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria.

The New York Times reports that the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is taking concrete steps to ensure that its troops operating in Niger “plan missions to stay out of combat or do not go.” The Times also reports that the Army Special Forces Group that has been in Africa since 2016 may close two outposts, one in Niger, the other undisclosed. In addition, U.S. military operations now must be approved at a higher level than in the past. AFRICOM is taking these steps following an extensive investigation of the ambush and death of four U.S. troops in western Niger in October 2017. Coming out of the investigation is public acknowledgement for the first time that there were ten additional attacks on U.S. troops in West Africa from 2015 to 2017. The location of those attacks has not been made public.  Niger is in a rough neighborhood. Radical Islamist groups operate in Chad, Mali, Nigeria, and Libya. Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou is following a policy of close security cooperation with the United States. This year, Niger hosted a major AFRICOM military exercise, Operation Flintlock, involving some two thousand special forces from some twenty countries, eight of which are African. Niger also hosts U.S. drone bases. However, under Issoufou, Niger is subject to much of the same domestic instability found elsewhere in the Sahel. There is public anger over rising taxes and rising prices in what is one of the poorest countries in the world. There is also the perception that official corruption is on the rise, and Issoufou uses security forces to arrest human rights activists. World Politics Review notes that Western countries are so concerned about “regional security” that they pay little attention to poor governance in Sahelian countries. In fact, repression is even worse in Chad than it is in Niger. Internal instability could reduce Niger’s viability has a security partner in the future. AFRICOM’s decision to rein-in U.S. participation in actual fighting is wise. Though there is little public information, the U.S. military presence at present does not appear to be transformative. Furthermore, public and congressional uproar in the United States over the October ambush and deaths of four American soldiers show that there is little stomach for military involvement in a remote part of the world that many Americans see as peripheral to their concerns.   

An attack on Green Berets in southwest Niger has reignited a debate over U.S. policy in the region that stretches back decades.

With the increased media attention to the Sahel in the aftermath of the killing of four U.S. soldiers in western Niger, U.S. commentators (especially on radio) sometimes confuse Nigeria with Niger. For example, some commentators linked the notorious kidnapping of the Chibok school girls in northern Nigeria to the Niger killings, episodes perhaps a thousand miles apart by road. This apparent confusion is understandable. Both countries are fighting jihadist insurrections and movements in the Sahel, the region that borders the Sahara on the south. The two countries share a long border, and Niger and northern Nigeria are predominately Muslim. The Niger-Nigeria border is artificial; it was drawn in the colonial period by London and Paris, a process driven in part by the desire to check German expansion in West Africa rather than recognition of ethnicities or other indigenous factors. Border crossings are also impossible to control, as a practical matter. In many ways, Niger and northern Nigeria have much in common culturally and the lingua franca of both regions is Hausa. Reflecting their respective colonial experiences, however, elites in Niger are Francophone, while those of Nigeria are Anglophone.  Nevertheless, the contrast between Nigeria and Niger is, in more ways than not, stark. While Niger is geographically larger than Nigeria, 80 percent of its land area is covered by the Sahara desert. Its population, at a World Bank-estimated 20.67 million, is perhaps one tenth the size of Nigeria’s. Niger’s people are very poor, and the country consistently is ranked either last or next to last by the United Nations Human Development Index. Elected in 2011, President Mahamadou Issoufou presides over Niger’s weak governance and limited bureaucratic capacity. Though both Niger and Nigeria have a long history of military coups, in the case of the former, military intervention has been much more recent.  Nigeria is the giant of Africa, with an estimated population of more than 200 million. One out of every four or five sub-Saharan Africans is a Nigerian. It also trades places with South Africa as sub-Saharan Africa’s first or second largest economy and it is usually Africa’s largest producer of oil and gas (depending on theft and vandalism). While the country is mired in corruption and most of its citizens are poor, Nigeria is on a positive governance trajectory. In 2015, for the first time in its democratic history, the leader of the opposition became head of state through credible elections, in which the defeated incumbent conceded. U.S.-Nigeria bilateral ties are close, with traditional cooperation on a host of regional issues of mutual concern. For Washington, as for most other world capitals, Nigeria is much more important than Niger. With respect to jihadi movements, those operating in Niger appear to have close links with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, with a heavy overlay of criminality associated with narcotics trafficking, smuggling, and kidnapping. While they enjoy some domestic support, jihadi movements in Niger tend to be largely influenced from abroad. In Nigeria, by contrast, Boko Haram is much more indigenous, and its persistence indicates greater domestic support. Boko Haram operates in Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, but primarily in areas that are ethnically linked to northern Nigeria. For members of these militant groups, as for most people, the Niger-Nigeria border is largely irrelevant.  The United States partners with Niger in the fight against terrorism, and there are perhaps eight hundred U.S. military personnel from the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the country. A large percentage, however, are support personnel rather than boots-on-the-ground. U.S. military personnel in Niger are almost entirely involved in the training of the Niger military and the maintenance of drone bases for surveillance purposes. Hence, U.S. forces in Niger are small in number and do not have a combat role. The military-to-military relationship between the United States and Nigeria is less developed. There are fewer U.S. military personnel stationed in Nigeria than in Niger. The Trump administration is in the process of selling sophisticated military aircraft (A-29 Super Tucanos) to the Nigerian military. That transaction, however, is cash-and-carry. It is not a form of military assistance. Historically, the Nigerian military has been stand-offish about a closer relationship with the United States.  

The American military presence in Niger is attracting increasing attention in the United States following an ambush that killed four American soldiers. The tone of President Donald Trump’s condolence call to the widow of one of the victims has become a major—if likely ephemeral—domestic political issue. Little appears to be known about the circumstances of the ambush. Senator John McCain, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has even threatened to hold up judicial nominees until he gets satisfactory answers from the Trump Administration. American officials have praised the response of the French military, who drove off the attackers, and the Department of Defense has sent a team to Niger to investigate. Despite the recent publicity, the U.S. military presence in the Sahel is relatively small, mostly comprising small units training local militaries.  As to the identity of the perpetrators, the usually well informed French media reported that the attack was likely carried out by the Islamic State of the Sahel, led by Adnan Abu Walid. Based on accounts by local witnesses, the attackers were light-skinned, spoke Arabic and Tamashek, and were unknown to local people. Tamashek is the language of the nomadic Tuareg people, who are also described as light-skinned. Adnan Abu Walid is a prime example of the fluidity of adherence to various radical movements in the Sahel. At one point, he was the chief spokesman for the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), one of the groups that attempted to establish a radical jihadi state in Mali in 2012, with links to al-Qaeda. After the French drove the jihadists out of northern Mali’s cities, MUJAO and its jihadi partners went underground, far from defeated. In 2013, Abu Walid merged MUJAO with Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his followers. The consolidated movement was called al-Mourabitoun. Belmokhtar is Algerian by birth, a smuggler who has become rich, not least through kidnapping Westerners and ransoming them. Notoriously he and his men took eight hundred hostages in 2013 at the Tigantourine Gas Facility in Algeria. They murdered thirty-nine of the captives before the Algerian military dislodged them. Belmokhtar’s operations and rhetoric indicate he continues to fight the Algerian state. He strategically married four Tuareg and Berber wives, thereby grounding himself among the local clans where he operates. Less is known about Abu Walid, including his nationality, but his rhetoric is directed at the destruction of the Kingdom of Morocco. Belmokhtar and Abu Walid appear to have split in 2015 when the latter swore allegiance to the Islamic State. There are reports, not verified, that Belmokhtar tried unsuccessfully to kill Abu Walid. Local security services periodically report, with little credibility, that they have killed Belmokhtar (much like the numerous times Nigerian security services reportedly killed Abubakar Shekau of Boko Haram). Jihadis in the western Sahel appear to shift their ideological identities quite easily. Most of those who are prominent appear to be first and foremost smugglers and kidnappers, in addition to ideologues. Though bitterly divided, adherents to al-Qaeda (Belmokhtar), the Islamic State (Abu Walid), and others all appear to be hostile to state authority of any kind and to support the establishment of an Islamic state. To a greater or lesser extent, the sub-Saharan states in which they operate—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—are weak and dominated by elites that are unresponsive to their populations. In many cases, government authority hardly exists outside cities. Hence, without improved governance and responsiveness, these groups are likely to be around for a long time. ‘Sahel’ is the Arabic word for ‘shore,’ reflecting the sense that the Sahara is like an ocean. Like the ocean, it can be crossed, and has been by caravans for millennia. The preoccupations of Abu Walid and Belmokhtar are examples where events in North Africa, across the ‘ocean,’ can be influential in sub-Saharan, West Africa.