Kenya

This is a guest-post by Andrea Crosta, co-Founder and Executive Director of Elephant Action League (EAL). The Elephant Action League (EAL) is appreciative of this opportunity to justify our findings on al-Shabaab’s involvement in the ivory trade and our decision to not share certain details gleaned from confidential sources due to security and confidentiality reasons. The professional investigative team that conducted the investigation – including myself – considers the safety of our sources nonnegotiable. As such EAL will not release sensitive details until our sources are safe. However, we hope that more information supporting our work will be published in the coming months. The figures presented in our 2013 report, Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory, are based on an investigation into the potential role of al-Shabaab in the trafficking of ivory conducted between 2011 and 2012. At the time, African governments, international governmental organizations, and law enforcement agencies were apathetic and often unaware of the magnitude of elephant poaching and the large quantities of ivory trafficked through East Africa. Especially prominent was the port of Mombasa, through which an estimated 188,170 kg of ivory was smuggled between 2009 and 2015, as outlined by our newly released report (based on an estimated 10% seizure rate). In Tanzania, between 2009 and 2014, over 85,000 elephants have been poached, which is equal to roughly 200 tons of ivory smuggled every year from Tanzania alone, often through Kenya. In that period, we began picking up information about large quantities of ivory being trafficked by Somalis, either through Somalia or directly from Kenya. The fact that Somalis were involved in ivory trafficking was not new, as they have been historically linked to elephant poaching. What was unique was the alleged involvement of al-Shabaab, as also reported by Jeffrey Gettleman in an article for the New York Times in September 2012. Over the subsequent eighteen months, thanks to personal introductions by trusted individuals coming from the same clans and sub-clans (crucial in the Somali culture), the investigators met several Somali traffickers and businessmen who were doing businesses with al-Shabaab who confirmed and explained how the terrorist organization had positioned itself as an important middleman in the trafficking of ivory, making hundreds of thousands of dollars every month through their direct involvement in this illicit activity. At that time al-Shabaab still controlled vital points on the border with Kenya, as well as key ports in Somalia such as Kismayo and Merca. EAL has never denied the importance of other far more substantial sources of profit for al-Shabaab - such as charcoal - but through this investigation, we simply exposed an important regional player that contributed significantly to ivory trafficking. Terrorism and terrorist organizations do not drive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking,  but they certainly do play a role. The magnitude of al-Shabaab involvement in the illegal ivory trade at the moment is unknown although occasionally through our on-going field activities, we receive information about ivory continuing to be smuggled through Somalia by various entities.

The Kenyan military has announced that it killed a British subject, by appearance ethnically English, during an al-Shabaab attack on a military base in Lamu county. The Kenyan police have issued a $100,000 reward for the capture of a German national who appears to be ethnically German who also took part in the al-Shabaab attack. Al-Shabaab has long attracted foreign fighters, both in Somalia and in Kenya. But, nearly all of them have been ethnic Somalis. Unlike the self-proclaimed Islamic State , which has attracted significant numbers of ethnic Europeans to its cause, al-Shabaab, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, has not. The appearance of western nationals among al-Shabaab ranks is unusual but not unique. In the aftermath of al-Shabaab’s attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013 parts of the media had a field day with speculation about the role of “the White Widow” as a leader of al-Shabaab. Identified as Samantha Lewthwaite, an English widow of a Somali al-Shabaab fighter, who is wanted in Kenya for charges of possession of explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony. However, the stories of her leadership had little credence, and she was never credibly linked to the Westgate Mall attack. There is also the case of Omar Shafik Hammami, an American of Irish descent, who is believed to have been an al-Shabaab commander until his death at the command of the now deceased al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane in 2013. The media is also reporting that the Islamic State is attempting to recruit al-Shabaab fighters. There might be a link between that effort and the appearance of European fighters in al-Shabaab’s ranks. It is too soon to say whether the appearance of a German and a Brit among al-Shabaab fighters is a new development. There is always concern that Europeans or Americans who join radical jihadi groups will return home and carry out “lone wolf” attacks. Hence the need to carefully watch for signs that al-Shabaab is recruiting non-Somali Europeans and Americans.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. On October 16, 2011, the Kenyan army, in an ostensibly joint operation with the Somalian and Ethiopian militaries, crossed the border into Somalia and attacked the insurgent group al-Shabaab. In response to the October 16 offensive, al-Shabaab launched an attack in Kenya on October 24, 2011. The attack killed one person. Nearly four years later, al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University in Kenya last month, which killed nearly 150, underscores that despite military success in Somalia the group’s threat in Kenya is far from contained. Al-Shabaab violence against civilians in Kenya doubled between 2012 and 2013 and then again between 2013 and 2014. Already, the death toll of the recent Garissa attack alone has surpassed al-Shabaab’s 2014 civilian targets. Not only are al-Shabaab campaigns in Kenya increasing, but the group is recruiting native Kenyan members, sympathizers, and allies, rather than just importing operatives from Somalia. Indeed, the AFP reports all four gunmen involved in the Garissa attack were Kenyan – a testament to the group’s successful local recuiting campaigns. Critics such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and Kenyan human rights groups have criticized government treatment of ethnic Somalis in state counterterrorism efforts – a major factor pushing ethnic Somali and Muslim Kenyans toward al-Shabaab. This treatment includes ethnic profiling, mass arrests, and extrajudicial killings. It is feared that the Kenyan government will only step up these activities in the aftermath of the Garissa attack. Meanwhile, this heavy handed response has been counterproductive at best. It has bred mistrust of the government and disillusionment with the broader concept of national unity. Even the staunchest anti-Shabaab Somali community in Kenya feels alienated by the security forces’ brutal counterterrorism tactics. And, as a recent International Crisis Group report confirms, al-Shabaab exploits Kenyan Muslims’ grievances over discriminatory and abusive security tactics in recruitment campaigns. If Kenyan forces continue to isolate Somali and Muslim communities, they will push them into the open arms of al-Shabaab recruiters. In the face of rising pressure to combat al-Shabaab and the failure of their existing strategy, the Kenyan government has proposed a new plan: to close the Dadaab refugee camp. They fear that the camp, home to 350,000 Somalis and located in northeast Kenya close to the Somali border, serves as a hideout for al-Shabaab militants. Notwithstanding that there is not enough information to confirm such suspicions, closing the camp and resettling Somali refugees would be disastrous. As the United Nations, UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Amnesty, and HRW, point out, conditions in Somalia are inappropriate for repatriation: the country is still insecure, and the life, freedom, and health of refugees would be threatened, if repatriated. Additionally, and perhaps more problematic for the Kenyan government, resettlement could play right into the hands of al-Shabaab, handing the group a population presumably disillusioned with the Kenyan government and defenseless against radicalization and conscription efforts. Kenya needs to rethink its strategy against al-Shabaab. Only by working with local Somali and Muslim populations can the Kenyan government undermine al-Shabaab’s rise in Kenya.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. In the past five years, the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab has lost most of its senior leadership, surrendered its control of southern Somalia, and seen its cash flow shrink. The group has certainly seen better times. But as the success of recent attacks in Kenya and Mogadishu indicate, the group is regaining some of its previous stature but as a fundamentally different group. Al-Shabaab is now more decentralized and has a larger geographic focus. Given regional dynamics, an inept Kenyan security response, refugee flows from Yemen, and a diminished United States presence, this new embodiment of al-Shabaab is becoming increasingly difficult to counter. Internal shifts began in 2013. Infighting among various factions coupled with a series of catastrophic military defeats at the hands of international forces caused the group to change its structure and priorities. Al-Shabaab evolved from an organization with clear leadership to a more decentralized, diffuse organization, in part thanks to a degradation of core leadership due to U.S. drone strikes. With the shift in leadership, the organization’s goals became more ambiguous. Instead of seeking to rule Somalia, it is principally seeking to spoil the political process in Somalia and disrupt governance in East Africa. The emergent version of al-Shabaab no longer engages in traditional warfare, instead it focuses on asymmetric warfare, showing willingness to conduct audacious and horrific attacks. As it loses ground in Somalia, it has started to look to targets in Kenya, and even Tanzania. Despite the fact that al-Shabaab’s reorganization was largely reactive and unplanned, it has positioned the group well to effectively disrupt Somali politics. Beyond the structural changes of the group, Kenyan domestic policies have helped al-Shabaab. Anemic responses to the West Gate Mall and Garissa University attacks by the authorities vividly illustrate how inept Kenya has been at responding to al-Shabaab’s updated tactics. More importantly, however, the Kenyan domestic security reaction has been counterproductive. In the wake of recent attacks, the Kenyan government announced that it plans to forcibly displace several hundred thousand Somali refugees from northern Kenya by closing the Dadaab refugee camp. They also plan to erect an Israeli style wall on the Kenya-Somalia boarder. Provocative policies like these will likely exacerbate tensions between the government and the two million ethnic Somalis living in Kenya. Al-Shabaab will, as it always has, take advantage of such a golden recruitment opportunity. The broader global context is also benefiting al-Shabaab’s cause. News on the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Boko Haram has dominated media headlines and captured the world’s focus. This not only gives al-Shabaab breathing room to continue its resurgence, but it incentivizes al-Shabaab to conduct more shocking attacks to compete with these groups for foreign recruits and airtime. Refugees fleeing renewed conflict in Yemen may also provide a boost to al-Shabaab. The influx could destabilize Somalia, potentially allowing al-Shabaab to return to previous strongholds. In a worst-case scenario, al-Shabaab could have a fresh population to terrorize and recruit. Perhaps most worryingly, the United States has probably lost the willingness to alter events in the Horn of Africa. The Islamic State and Boko Haram pose a greater geopolitical threat compared to al-Shabaab which operates in East Africa, an area where the United States has fewer vital interests. Even comparatively low cost countermeasures, such as drone strikes, will become less useful as the group becomes more decentralized, diffuse, and covers a wider geographic area. Al-Shabaab will continue its current pattern of attacks, likely undeterred by the United States. Coupled with Kenya’s inability to deter the group and a favorable global context, al-Shabaab looks like a more dangerous threat than even at the height of its power.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Lately, conservationists and lovers of Africa’s diverse wildlife have been hard pressed for good news. From South Africa’s difficulty tackling rhino poaching to Zimbabwe’s sale of baby elephants to foreign countries, it often seems that African governments are either ill equipped to protect their animal populations or simply don’t care—or worse. However, it is important to remember that there are park rangers who are working tirelessly to protect and save Africa’s biodiversity. In the face of the ever increasing threat of poaching, these rangers have shown great ingenuity, embracing innovative technology and new strategies to safeguard Africa’s wildlife. More and more, these ranger organizations have been looking to the sky in order to combat poaching on the ground. The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust (DSWT), which has raised orphaned elephants and rhinos in Kenya since 1977, uses aircraft  to find and identify at risk animals and discover potential poachers. The Namibian government, Kruger National Park, and the Kenya Wildlife Service have all begun using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These organizations believe that by using aircrafts and UAVs they will be able not only to catch poachers in the act, but also to deter potential poachers before any animals are harmed. Working a bit more down to earth, many conservancies and wildlife services have embraced the use of trained dogs. Groups in Kenya, South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have begun using dogs to aid in anti-poaching operations. The most popular breeds tend be bloodhounds and malinois/shepards. These dogs offer comparative advantages based on the mission and region: the hounds, which are trailing dogs, have been very successful in the forests of Kenya and in the DRC while the malinois/shepards, air-scenting dogs, are more widely used on the open terrain of South Africa. In South Africa’s Kruger National Park, one private reserve, the Bulele nature reserve, has formed an all female team of rangers to conduct anti-poaching operations. The group, known as the Black Mambas, are unarmed and meant not only to stop poachers but to also change communal perception of rangers in local communities, who are often seen as playing the villain to the impoverished poachers’ Robin Hood. As a result, more women want to participate in anti-poaching and to help the Black Mambas. As one member of the organization put it, “I am a lady, I am going to have a baby. I want my baby to see a rhino, that’s why I am protecting it.” Over the last ten months, there hasn’t been a single rhino killed in their section of Kruger Park. Compare this to last year, when 827 of the 1215 rhinos reported poached in South Africa last year were in Kruger. It is important to remember that despite all of the alarming trends of increased animal poaching over the last few years, there are people on the front lines continuing to fight to protect animals. However, the poaching epidemic is far too large and too international for rangers on the ground to counter it alone. Governments and international organizations must assist rangers in their fight by implementing and enforcing stricter laws against poaching and the trade of wildlife goods.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. In mid-December, the Kenyan parliament passed counterterrorism legislation that has since been hotly contested by politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, and ordinary citizens alike for its alleged infringement on basic civil liberties. Since al Shabaab’s bold and bloody siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping center in September 2013, the government of President Uhuru Kenyatta has been under pressure to upgrade its security and counterterrorism framework. Al Shabaab’s campaign against civilians, government officials, and police and security forces across Kenya has continued, culminating last month in two assaults in the northeast that left sixty-four dead. The newly passed Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014--President Kenyatta and his supporters’ response to al Shabaab--grants government agencies and security forces expansive powers to enhance counterterrorism efforts. Yet, these security measures have incited intense criticism. Leaders of the opposition coalition, the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), view the law as a bid to consolidate political power and an attempt to roll back hard won democratic gains in Kenya. CORD’s Raila Odinga petitioned Kenya’s high court to suspend the bill for its unconstitutionality and spoke out publicly against the law, arguing this is “how dictatorship and collapse all begin.” Certain aspects of the bill have also prompted serious scrutiny from outside the political arena. Notably, the law expands the powers of security forces, which Human Rights Watch fears will violate citizens’ right to due process. It extends the length of time terrorism suspects can be detained without charge from ninety days to almost a year, and it enables National Intelligence Service officials “to stop and detain suspects, search and seize private property, and monitor communications without a current warrant.” Additionally, the law imposes restrictions on the press, requiring journalists to receive approval before beginning investigations or publishing stories on issues of domestic terrorism and security. Journalists, civil society organizations, and activists fear the government will use the law to diminish the free flow of information and to protect security forces from public scrutiny. Foreign governments and international organizations have also criticized the security law. In particular, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International denounced the bill’s infringement on basic rights and called attention to articles restricting the freedoms of assembly and association. U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Jen Psaki echoed similar sentiments and expressed particular concern over the provisions that “appear to limit freedom of assembly and media, and access to asylum for refugees.” In light of recent events, Kenya needs to mount a robust counterterrorism campaign against al Shabaab, but this security bill is far from the answer. While internal critics see it as a threat to democratic governance and freedoms, the bill also has important security implications. The expanded surveillance, search and seizure, and detention powers in the new bill will allow the security forces to escalate one particularly controversial aspect of current counterterrorism efforts: collective targeting of Muslims and ethnically Somali communities. From indiscriminate arrests and mass round-ups to assassinations of Muslim clerics, security forces’ use of collective punishment has been well documented. Already, this strategy has fermented a sense of injustice and exclusion among Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Continuing on this trajectory will only further alienate these communities and exacerbate radicalization by driving marginalized citizens into the open arms of al Shabaab recruiters. While it may seem that the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill is purely a domestic Kenyan issue, Kenya’s national counterterrorism strategy affects the entire region. Kenya’s efforts could either help curb al Shabaab or provide them fertile recruiting ground, and thus have profound implications for U.S. interests in maintaining regional security in the horn of Africa and preventing Somalia from turning into a hotbed of terrorist activity.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On December 8, the Duke of Cambridge, Prince William, announced the creation of the United for Wildlife Task Force at the World Bank in Washington, DC (you can see the full speech below). The task force aims to work with the private sector to reduce illegal wildlife trafficking globally, it hopes to “identify ways that the sector can break the chain between suppliers and consumers.” video platformvideo managementvideo solutionsvideo player The vast majority of consumers of African wildlife products, like ivory and rhino horn, are based outside of the continent. As such, it is likely that the task force’s goal of tightening restrictions on the supply chain could put an end to the illicit trade. A recent report, Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Ivory, released by Washington-based nonprofits Born Free USA and C4ADS, may help assess how achievable the task force’s objective is. The report sheds light on the two main flows of the illicit international ivory trade: seaborne and airborne. By disrupting trafficking at major hubs specified in the report, it may be possible to achieve the task force’s goal and break the chain between suppliers and consumers of African wildlife products. According to the report the airborne flow of ivory accounts for the majority of ivory seizures and in turn trafficking incidents. However, most of the airborne flow is conducted on a relatively small scale. Typically, seizures involve small, finished pieces and weigh less than 10kg (22 lbs). Most airborne ivory flows through four airports in Africa: Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Ethiopia’s Bole International Airport, South Africa’s OR Tambo International airport, and Angola’s Quatro de Feveiro Airport. All of these airports have direct flights to Asia, the largest consumer of ivory. Ivory not transported through these African hubs often flies through two other international airports on their way to China: France’s Charles de Gaulle Airport and the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai International Airport. The task force could help improve the screening of material transported through these airports. With better screening, airports could prevent these products from crossing national borders and interdict much of the international trade in wildlife. The report also documents the size and scale of the seaborne flow. Between January 2009 and December 2013, 72 percent of seized ivory by weight was seaborne. There are three major seaborne points for the international transport of ivory: the port of Mombasa in Kenya, the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and the port of Zanzibar off the coast of Tanzania. (The Biera and Pemba ports in Mozambique are the largest hubs for rhino horn and could serve as hubs for ivory transport as elephant poaching increases in southern Africa.) It is estimated that all seaborne ivory is transported in less than 200 cargo containers a year, each container carrying an estimated one to two tons of ivory. Until 2013 most ivory seizures were made in east Asia. Historically, traffickers have counted on African ports being porous. Enforcing stricter screening procedures at African ports could stem the tide of the illicit ivory and rhino horn trade at the source. The Out of Africa report shows that the illicit trade nests itself within licit patterns of trade. Traffickers have not developed separate trade routes. Instead, the report suggests that traffickers have primarily made use of Africa’s busiest trade networks. Based on this information, it would appear that by working with the transport industry, airlines to shipping lines, and improving the inspection process in African trade hubs Prince William’s task force has the opportunity to strike a significant blow to the illegal wildlife trade.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, a journalist and adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. Last week, two “firsts” occurred in Africa: Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta became the first sitting president to appear before the International Criminal Court (ICC) where he faces charges of crimes against humanity for allegations that he instigated the ethnic violence that erupted after the December 2007 elections killing over 1,000, the worst violence in Kenya since its independence. President Kenyatta invoked a never-before-used article of the constitution, handing over power temporarily to his deputy president so that he could attend the two day hearing that will determine whether the ICC grants the prosecution more time to gain evidence or to possibly halt the case. Were these the moves of a truly democratic leader, or are they the schemes of a crafty politician who stepped down so he could be tried as a private civilian in a court with the authority, but not the power, to collect evidence? President Kenyatta knows that the ICC has no army or police to seize evidence. He is well aware that the prosecution is struggling to keep its case alive in the wake of two setbacks: witnesses recanting their testimony and a failure to secure Kenyatta’s phone and bank records that prosecutors claim would show he paid collaborators to take part in the post-election violence. Thus far seven witnesses for the prosecution have dropped out, allegedly through intimidation and bribes. The prosecution has already asked once for the trial to be postponed. And judges are under pressure from other African leaders and the African Union to discontinue the case claiming that their heads of state should not be prosecuted by the ICC, which thus far has only brought indictments against African leaders, a state of affairs created by the ICC’s limited jurisdiction and authority. Given the ICC’s difficulty, Kenyatta might expect the judges to feel compelled to drop the case. But perhaps the judges might consider postponing it indefinitely in an effort to delay justice so that it is not denied. Such a decision might have the collateral benefit of preserving the nascent ICC’s credibility as an impartial body. Here’s how: A suspension would acknowledge that while there is no evidentiary cooperation now, the judges convey that it would be a mistake to dismiss the case entirely. It would allow the ICC to sidestep the growing diplomatic conflict with the African Union and effectively punt the future of the case to the ICC’s ruling body, the Assembly of States Parties, a political body that would be deciding the very political issue of when and how to try a case against a sitting leader. While a deferral is at least a temporary win for Kenyatta, the ICC has already made a mark: The Kenyatta indictment sent a signal that the violence of 2007 would not again be tolerated and indeed it was not repeated after the last election. Moreover, leaders don’t often rule forever and thus witnesses may still come forward in the future, as they did after atrocities like the Holocaust. Strong-men like Kenyatta can only continue to hoodwink their citizens with optics over evidence for so long. His grand gesture to step down to stand for a trial that can’t occur does not mean that he is innocent, but it may mean the ICC needs to be patient until Kenyatta’s time and options run out.

  This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last week, the United States conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab target in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in the attack. This is certainly good news for Somalia and the rest of East Africa. Godane was the mastermind of the Westgate Mall Attack and numerous other bloody operations. Some will use Godane’s death to support the narrative of a waning al Shabaab. The argument is that as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to deny al Shabaab territorial control, the group will weaken. Mogadishu is more secure than it has been in years. Now is the time for the economy to blossom and for the central government to take full control. But while al Shabaab’s capabilities have certainly degraded, attacks continue and illustrate the group’s resolve to destabilize the country. The loss of geographic control does not necessarily mean the group has been defeated. In truth, this shift may make al Shabaab more dangerous and less predictable. This group, in its various forms since the 1990s, has absorbed setbacks and leadership losses before. It will likely survive the loss of Godane. The U.S. airstrike reaffirms the United States’ principle policy concern in Somalia: the dissolution of al Shabaab. The United States is concerned with al Shabaab’s global ambitions. American and British citizens have been recruited by al Shabaab in the past, and recruitment does not seem to be waning. Western jihadis training abroad and returning home is a concern. The United States would also like stability in East Africa. Al Shabaab threatens this stability by continuing to strike targets outside of Somalia such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and perhaps even Tanzania. Somalia’s challenges do not diminish. Few other countries around the world have seen the tempo of drone strikes and Navy SEAL assaults. The country is under constant threat of famine, the federalism process creates violence and disenchantment, and Kenya’s anti-terror policies continue to create new recruits for al Shabaab on both sides of the Somali border. The United States has done relatively little to help counter these realities. Eventually AMISOM will leave. Instability and increased violence will likely follow. In the ensuing vacuum, it is likely that al Shabaab, or a new form of the group, will be waiting to reclaim what it has lost. Taken together, the United States and its allies should remember that the only way to definitively achieve its goals in Somalia is to remove the economic and societal conditions that allow extremism, and groups like al Shabaab, to survive. Godane’s death is significant and it is important to continue to disrupt al Shabaab activities with direct U.S. action. But for lasting solutions, the United States will have to do more than intervene militarily.

This is a guest post by Sarah Madden, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations, Department of Studies. Sarah is currently a student at Santa Clara University studying business economics and entrepreneurship. Her interests are in Africa, economic development, and emerging markets. In December 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice levied a $1.9 billion fine against HSBC Holdings PLC. The bank’s failure to enforce money laundering controls had allowed illegal organizations to maneuver around U.S. banking laws to launder money for decades. HSBC’s fine and the recent tightening of international finance restrictions have led several financial institutions to reevaluate the security of accounts (many in Latin America and Africa) that do not have the “proper checks in place to spot criminal activity and could therefore unwittingly be facilitating money laundering and terrorist financing,” according to a Barclays’ statement. This development will have a particularly serious impact on Somalia. Money transfer operations (MTOs) and access to accounts held with multinational banks are particularly important in Somalia, where MTOs are used for remittances, the “financial lifeline” for many Somalians. Remittances in Somalia channel almost $2 billion, making up over a third of the counry’s GDP with 80 percent of new business ventures in Somali territories funded or supported by remittances. For a country still struggling to recover from a decades-long civil war, famine, and continuing violence, Somalia lacks any form of banking or institutionalized financial system. In effect, MTOs with accounts through Barclays, Moneygram, and Western Union are the financial system. Following in the footsteps of several large banks, Barclays announced in May 2013 that by July 10, the company would shut down accounts to almost two hundred and fifty MTOs in North and East Africa. Dahabshiil, Barclays’ premier partner in East Africa and largest MTO in the Horn of Africa, brought Barclays to the British High Court to protest the closures that would effect millions of their clients. In April 2014, Dahabshiil won an injunction to delay the account closures until October 2014. Barclays’ precautionary actions to avoid inadvertently channeling money for illegal activity will have devastating effects on Somalia’s already “fragile economic recovery.” The closure of these MTO accounts will destabilize any progress made over the past decade. With the injunction’s expiration date rapidly approaching, and few viable options for Dahabshiil, the money transfer industry might soon be pushed underground, where it will be nearly impossible to monitor or track illegal activity. OxFam International claimed it was “a bleak day for Somalis” when Barclays announced their closures last May. In Somalia, 4.2 million citizens rely on money transfers as a substantial portion of their income for basic needs like food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care. Annually, the amount of transferred remittances from displaced Somalians far exceeds the amount of international aid sent by foreign governments to Somalia. International aid organizations and NGOs rely on MTOs for their finances. If they cannot receive their funds or can only access capital at a higher cost, the need for humanitarian aid will skyrocket. It is likely that nations with high Somalian populations (United States and United Kingdom) will burden taxpayers with the cost of dispensing foreign aid to address education issues, food security, and economic growth. The humanitarian, academic, and political outcry all reiterate—“Somalia is different.” The country cannot afford to lose the Barclays partnership. Barclays, and other enormous institutions are positioned to promote transparency and stability in the Somalian financial system. With the cooperation of many African nations and Western governments, these banks have the opportunity to not only strengthen money transfer channels and bolster the African financial system. Achieving that would ensure the livelihood of an estimated 40 percent of Somalians who rely on MTOs as the country “begins to see the light at the end of the tunnel.”

African elites generally do not like the International Criminal Court (ICC) that sits in the Hague. There is a widespread view that the ICC engages in selective prosecution and holds African leaders to a higher standard than others. Africans ask why the ICC prosecutes Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, but not former vice president Dick Cheney or former prime minister Tony Blair for Iraq-related issues, for example. There have been calls for immunity for African heads of state that are wanted for international crimes. The ICC cases against President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto have particularly focused the debate, and Kenya may withdraw from the Treaty of Rome, which established the ICC. For many Africans, the solution is a specifically African court that would, in effect, replace the ICC. The African Union is moving to establish an African Court of Justice and Human Rights, commonly called the African Court. But, at an African heads of state summit in Equatorial Guinea on June 26 and 27, the decision was made to grant African heads of state and senior officials (not further defined) immunity from prosecution for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious crimes. Under this provision, the African Court could not try al-Bashir, Kenyatta, or Ruto. This step, obviously self-serving for sitting heads of state and their associates, would appear to eviscerate the African Court before it even starts to function. It certainly reduces the African Court‘s credibility as an alternative to the ICC. As Amnesty International (among other civil society voices) said, the decision “is a backward step in the fight against impunity and a betrayal of victims of serious violations of human rights.” The Institute for Security Studies notes the absence of protest from Africa’s “liberal voices,” especially South Africa; observing that “only little Botswana has raised objections.”

On June 25, there was a bomb blast at a shopping center in Wuse 2 in downtown Abuja. According to the police, twenty-one persons were killed. While no group has claimed responsibility, the Nigerian media (and everybody else) points to Boko Haram, the Islamist insurrection, as the most likely perpetrator. There are now bombings in Abuja every month. Previously, they have been in the outskirts at transit points. This time, the bomb attack was in the commercial heart of the city. The shopping center is described as “luxury.” It is patronized by government officials, business people, diplomats, and other expatriates, although it is not as luxurious as Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, the scene of an attack in September 2013. Deutsche Welle is reporting anger among citizens in Abuja at the government’s inability to provide security. Nigeria is now highly bifurcated. On the one hand, the Lagos-Ibadan corridor is booming, with the skyline marked by construction cranes. Conspicuous consumption is evident—condominium prices appear to approach those of Washington, DC, (if not Manhattan), and luxury cars choke the roads in the best parts of town. The Lagos state government appears to function better than any other in the federation. Boko Haram has mounted no attacks, and Islamist terrorism seems to be far away. On the other hand, death and destruction are ubiquitous in the northeast where Boko Haram killings are now daily—no longer weekly or monthly. Abuja seems to be between the two extremes. In the case of the June 25 Abuja bombing, a spokesman for the Department of Security Services told the media that suspects have been arrested and that there is an ongoing investigation. But in Abuja, popular confidence in the government’s ability to provide security is eroding.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. When al Shabaab, the violent Islamist group in Somalia, took control of the capital city Mogadishu, it actively destroyed buildings and overt displays of Western institutions and influences. This included outlawing soccer. The group destroyed cinemas and viewing centers in Mogadishu during the 2010 World Cup to stop residents from watching the matches. Their first successful international attack was the twin explosions in Uganda’s capital Kampala at viewing stations during the tournament. When regional and international forces ousted al Shabaab from the city in 2011, the city’s soccer stadium was one of the first things to be restored. Al Shabaab had dug trenches in the field and used it as an operations base. Soccer is played and enjoyed throughout sub Saharan Africa, and is not commonly associated with Western or colonial influences, but is seen as thoroughly African. Al Shabaab’s condemnation of soccer as haram is also not a commonly held categorization among Islamist groups or nations with conservative Muslim governments. In Afghanistan under the Taliban, the game was discouraged but not outlawed for example. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran all have national teams. The Iranian team is playing in the World Cup in Brazil this year; they tied in their match with Nigeria on June 16, and lost to Argentina on June 21. Al Shabaab continues to hold territory in central Somalia and soccer is outlawed in those areas under its control. The proscription against the so called “beautiful game” is however not complete. Al Jazeera journalist Hamza Mohamed published on June 11 an article on al Shabaab’s “halal soccer.” The jihadi group even has their own team. The rules of this “new” game appear to be the same as in “haram” soccer, the conduct of the players however must conform to al Shabaab’s sharia guidelines. Players must wear trousers that reach past their knees and jerseys that cover their elbows. Hamza noted however that many of the jerseys were the same as the “haram” national teams, such as Arsenal, Real Madrid, Manchester United, and Chelsea. Successful goals are celebrated with statement making or calls of "Allahu Akbar" (God is great). No one over the age of forty can play because it is “unsightly seeing an old man chasing a small ball,” and neither are commanders permitted on the field. This is apparently to prevent their command being undermined. If a player swears on the pitch, their tongue is removed. Most other offenses are met with flogging and a ban on playing. All games end fifteen minutes before prayers. The tradition of sharing and spreading a game across cultural and national boundaries is ancient, and using that arena of friendly competition as a platform of diplomacy is just as old. While many fans and players outside al Shabaab would not react well to a flogging for misbehavior, perhaps al Shabaab fighters’ continued passion for the “beautiful game” presents an opportunity for rapprochement and reconciliation in the future.

This is a guest post by Amanda Roth, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program. She is a graduate student at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where she studies international security policy. Earlier this week, at least forty-eight people were killed while watching the World Cup in Mpeketoni, Kenya. Less than twenty-four hours later, fifteen people were killed in the nearby town of Poromoko. Combined, the two attacks were the deadliest in the country since the Westgate mall attack in September 2013. The militants allegedly attacked a video hall where viewers were watching the games before going door-to-door, asking residents if they were Muslim and shooting or slitting the throats of men who were not. The day after the attack, Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta declared that the violence was not the work of militant group al Shabaab, but rather “local political networks” within the country. This seems unlikely. Al Shabaab immediately took credit for the attack, and the violence is consistent with previous al Shabaab threats and actions—for example, the group bombed two World Cup viewing parties in Uganda in 2010 as retaliation for the Ugandan military’s involvement in Somalia. Threats of similar attacks against Kenya have been made since the Kenyan military invaded Somalia in 2011. And as Matthew Bryden, former head of the UN monitoring group on Somalia, has observed, al Shabaab has never claimed responsibility for attacks they didn’t commit. Kenyatta’s allegations are most likely political posturing, a continuation of his longstanding battle with political rival Raila Odinga. But even if the attacks were the result of “well planned, orchestrated, politically motivated ethnic violence” incited by “reckless leaders,” Kenyatta should be cautious as his administration responds to this most recent wave of violence. As Paul Hidalgo recently noted in Foreign Affairs, the Kenyan government’s own recklessness may be its greatest enemy as it seeks to counter the growing al Shabaab threat. Retaliatory attacks on ethnic Somalis and scapegoating of Muslims have contributed to growing radicalism in Kenya and a rise in homegrown terrorism. Moderate Muslims feel unjustly targeted, and the increase in violence has made residents of all religions increasingly fearful for their safety. The country’s security forces are largely ineffective, accused of summary executions and indiscriminate human rights violations. Kenyatta himself accused police of having information on this week’s attacks and failing to act. Furthermore, the rise in terrorist attacks has led to foreign government warnings against travel to Kenya, leading to a precipitous drop in tourism numbers. The accompanying loss of revenue and employment may further incentivize desperate youths to join radical groups. President Kenyatta’s accusations are a continuation of the ongoing politicization of the crisis, but now is not the time. The Kenyan government should be focused on strengthening and professionalizing the security services, securing the border with Somalia, and closely examining its policies toward Mogadishu and al Shabaab. It should also be cautious not to exacerbate the ethnic tensions that led to widespread violence following the 2007 elections. At this crucial time for Kenya, the government’s leadership is more important than ever, and Kenyatta should choose his words carefully.

This is a guest post by Mrs. Joan Sikand, Esq. She has served as development coordinator of the Wildlife Foundation since its inception in 2000. She has been a member of Friends of Nairobi National Park since 1995, and served as its vice-chairwoman from 2004 to 2007. Her articles on conservation have been published in the Kenyan daily, "The People.” Kenya has been a sanctuary for wildlife and a model for community based conservation for decades. However, conservation initiatives are now diminishing in the face of rapid and volatile socio-economic change and growing ethnic and clan conflicts. The Wildlife Foundation (TWF), through its continued collaboration with local communities, has worked to contain Nairobi’s urban sprawl. It supported an open-ecosystem biodiversity corridor for the Nairobi National Park. TWF began in 2000 with a simple lease scheme, paying local community landowners still maintaining traditional lifestyles a sum to keep their lands open and unfenced. This practice resulted in over fifty thousand acres being added to the twenty-three thousand acres of Nairobi National Park (NNP) under conservation protection. More than a protected area, NNP represents a standard for effective local government. As an intensely fragile ecosystem, NNP is subject to protection under the Physical Planning Act and also the Environmental Management Coordination Act. In January 2014, Kenya signed into law an updated Wildlife Policy Act, also known as the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, to strengthen conservation and make it sustainable. Under the new law, community conservation committees are set up to ensure communities benefit from wildlife. However, lifestyles are changing rapidly; where once nomadic pastoralists had enough land to follow rain and grasslands and co-exist peacefully with wildlife, now intense population pressures impact traditional wildlife habitats. Without compensatory benefits, landowners can resent and destroy wildlife. The sale of ivory and rhino horn through poaching is also compromising Kenya’s wildlife conservation efforts. Kenya has lost 25 percent of its elephant and rhino populations in the past five years due to poaching. It is widely expected that without drastic measures, the elephant and the rhino will become extinct within this generation. The revised Wildlife Policy Act outlines responses to poaching through fines and enforcement measures. The act on its own, however, may not be enough. China recently signed an agreement with Kenya to rebuild its moribund railways, utilizing soft loan terms. As Kenya pursues extraction industries, this should be welcome. However, to the conservationists, this news is also foreboding. China’s ivory industry is a healthy and vibrant trade, which is rapidly eradicating Africa’s elephant populations. The proposed railway line will run through important biodiversity areas including Tsavo National Park, which provides greater access for poachers and middlemen. There is also strong evidence to connect the ivory and rhino horn trade to terrorism, something Kenya is increasingly worried about. The latest wave of terrorist violence in Kenya has meant that tourists are shying away from Kenya’s parks and beaches. The result is a continued decline in the sector, as infrastructure is decaying and revenues for wildlife protection are falling. One example is the Mwaluganje Elephant Reserve in Kwale, which was set up in 1995. Community landowners contributed their land to the Mwaluganje Elephant Reserve. Now, the entire area is defunct; the gate locked. The local community has wiped out all the elephants through poaching; visitor numbers and revenue have collapsed. Kenya is attempting to counteract these conservation challenges through the new Wildlife Policy Act. The act establishes stronger institutions for wildlife management with a particular emphasis on community involvement, sustainability, and anti-poaching. It remains to be seen when and how the new legislation will be implemented.