Kenya

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On December 8, the Duke of Cambridge, Prince William, announced the creation of the United for Wildlife Task Force at the World Bank in Washington, DC (you can see the full speech below). The task force aims to work with the private sector to reduce illegal wildlife trafficking globally, it hopes to “identify ways that the sector can break the chain between suppliers and consumers.” video platformvideo managementvideo solutionsvideo player The vast majority of consumers of African wildlife products, like ivory and rhino horn, are based outside of the continent. As such, it is likely that the task force’s goal of tightening restrictions on the supply chain could put an end to the illicit trade. A recent report, Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Ivory, released by Washington-based nonprofits Born Free USA and C4ADS, may help assess how achievable the task force’s objective is. The report sheds light on the two main flows of the illicit international ivory trade: seaborne and airborne. By disrupting trafficking at major hubs specified in the report, it may be possible to achieve the task force’s goal and break the chain between suppliers and consumers of African wildlife products. According to the report the airborne flow of ivory accounts for the majority of ivory seizures and in turn trafficking incidents. However, most of the airborne flow is conducted on a relatively small scale. Typically, seizures involve small, finished pieces and weigh less than 10kg (22 lbs). Most airborne ivory flows through four airports in Africa: Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Ethiopia’s Bole International Airport, South Africa’s OR Tambo International airport, and Angola’s Quatro de Feveiro Airport. All of these airports have direct flights to Asia, the largest consumer of ivory. Ivory not transported through these African hubs often flies through two other international airports on their way to China: France’s Charles de Gaulle Airport and the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai International Airport. The task force could help improve the screening of material transported through these airports. With better screening, airports could prevent these products from crossing national borders and interdict much of the international trade in wildlife. The report also documents the size and scale of the seaborne flow. Between January 2009 and December 2013, 72 percent of seized ivory by weight was seaborne. There are three major seaborne points for the international transport of ivory: the port of Mombasa in Kenya, the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and the port of Zanzibar off the coast of Tanzania. (The Biera and Pemba ports in Mozambique are the largest hubs for rhino horn and could serve as hubs for ivory transport as elephant poaching increases in southern Africa.) It is estimated that all seaborne ivory is transported in less than 200 cargo containers a year, each container carrying an estimated one to two tons of ivory. Until 2013 most ivory seizures were made in east Asia. Historically, traffickers have counted on African ports being porous. Enforcing stricter screening procedures at African ports could stem the tide of the illicit ivory and rhino horn trade at the source. The Out of Africa report shows that the illicit trade nests itself within licit patterns of trade. Traffickers have not developed separate trade routes. Instead, the report suggests that traffickers have primarily made use of Africa’s busiest trade networks. Based on this information, it would appear that by working with the transport industry, airlines to shipping lines, and improving the inspection process in African trade hubs Prince William’s task force has the opportunity to strike a significant blow to the illegal wildlife trade.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, a journalist and adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. Last week, two “firsts” occurred in Africa: Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta became the first sitting president to appear before the International Criminal Court (ICC) where he faces charges of crimes against humanity for allegations that he instigated the ethnic violence that erupted after the December 2007 elections killing over 1,000, the worst violence in Kenya since its independence. President Kenyatta invoked a never-before-used article of the constitution, handing over power temporarily to his deputy president so that he could attend the two day hearing that will determine whether the ICC grants the prosecution more time to gain evidence or to possibly halt the case. Were these the moves of a truly democratic leader, or are they the schemes of a crafty politician who stepped down so he could be tried as a private civilian in a court with the authority, but not the power, to collect evidence? President Kenyatta knows that the ICC has no army or police to seize evidence. He is well aware that the prosecution is struggling to keep its case alive in the wake of two setbacks: witnesses recanting their testimony and a failure to secure Kenyatta’s phone and bank records that prosecutors claim would show he paid collaborators to take part in the post-election violence. Thus far seven witnesses for the prosecution have dropped out, allegedly through intimidation and bribes. The prosecution has already asked once for the trial to be postponed. And judges are under pressure from other African leaders and the African Union to discontinue the case claiming that their heads of state should not be prosecuted by the ICC, which thus far has only brought indictments against African leaders, a state of affairs created by the ICC’s limited jurisdiction and authority. Given the ICC’s difficulty, Kenyatta might expect the judges to feel compelled to drop the case. But perhaps the judges might consider postponing it indefinitely in an effort to delay justice so that it is not denied. Such a decision might have the collateral benefit of preserving the nascent ICC’s credibility as an impartial body. Here’s how: A suspension would acknowledge that while there is no evidentiary cooperation now, the judges convey that it would be a mistake to dismiss the case entirely. It would allow the ICC to sidestep the growing diplomatic conflict with the African Union and effectively punt the future of the case to the ICC’s ruling body, the Assembly of States Parties, a political body that would be deciding the very political issue of when and how to try a case against a sitting leader. While a deferral is at least a temporary win for Kenyatta, the ICC has already made a mark: The Kenyatta indictment sent a signal that the violence of 2007 would not again be tolerated and indeed it was not repeated after the last election. Moreover, leaders don’t often rule forever and thus witnesses may still come forward in the future, as they did after atrocities like the Holocaust. Strong-men like Kenyatta can only continue to hoodwink their citizens with optics over evidence for so long. His grand gesture to step down to stand for a trial that can’t occur does not mean that he is innocent, but it may mean the ICC needs to be patient until Kenyatta’s time and options run out.

  This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last week, the United States conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab target in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia. Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in the attack. This is certainly good news for Somalia and the rest of East Africa. Godane was the mastermind of the Westgate Mall Attack and numerous other bloody operations. Some will use Godane’s death to support the narrative of a waning al Shabaab. The argument is that as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to deny al Shabaab territorial control, the group will weaken. Mogadishu is more secure than it has been in years. Now is the time for the economy to blossom and for the central government to take full control. But while al Shabaab’s capabilities have certainly degraded, attacks continue and illustrate the group’s resolve to destabilize the country. The loss of geographic control does not necessarily mean the group has been defeated. In truth, this shift may make al Shabaab more dangerous and less predictable. This group, in its various forms since the 1990s, has absorbed setbacks and leadership losses before. It will likely survive the loss of Godane. The U.S. airstrike reaffirms the United States’ principle policy concern in Somalia: the dissolution of al Shabaab. The United States is concerned with al Shabaab’s global ambitions. American and British citizens have been recruited by al Shabaab in the past, and recruitment does not seem to be waning. Western jihadis training abroad and returning home is a concern. The United States would also like stability in East Africa. Al Shabaab threatens this stability by continuing to strike targets outside of Somalia such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and perhaps even Tanzania. Somalia’s challenges do not diminish. Few other countries around the world have seen the tempo of drone strikes and Navy SEAL assaults. The country is under constant threat of famine, the federalism process creates violence and disenchantment, and Kenya’s anti-terror policies continue to create new recruits for al Shabaab on both sides of the Somali border. The United States has done relatively little to help counter these realities. Eventually AMISOM will leave. Instability and increased violence will likely follow. In the ensuing vacuum, it is likely that al Shabaab, or a new form of the group, will be waiting to reclaim what it has lost. Taken together, the United States and its allies should remember that the only way to definitively achieve its goals in Somalia is to remove the economic and societal conditions that allow extremism, and groups like al Shabaab, to survive. Godane’s death is significant and it is important to continue to disrupt al Shabaab activities with direct U.S. action. But for lasting solutions, the United States will have to do more than intervene militarily.

This is a guest post by Sarah Madden, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations, Department of Studies. Sarah is currently a student at Santa Clara University studying business economics and entrepreneurship. Her interests are in Africa, economic development, and emerging markets. In December 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice levied a $1.9 billion fine against HSBC Holdings PLC. The bank’s failure to enforce money laundering controls had allowed illegal organizations to maneuver around U.S. banking laws to launder money for decades. HSBC’s fine and the recent tightening of international finance restrictions have led several financial institutions to reevaluate the security of accounts (many in Latin America and Africa) that do not have the “proper checks in place to spot criminal activity and could therefore unwittingly be facilitating money laundering and terrorist financing,” according to a Barclays’ statement. This development will have a particularly serious impact on Somalia. Money transfer operations (MTOs) and access to accounts held with multinational banks are particularly important in Somalia, where MTOs are used for remittances, the “financial lifeline” for many Somalians. Remittances in Somalia channel almost $2 billion, making up over a third of the counry’s GDP with 80 percent of new business ventures in Somali territories funded or supported by remittances. For a country still struggling to recover from a decades-long civil war, famine, and continuing violence, Somalia lacks any form of banking or institutionalized financial system. In effect, MTOs with accounts through Barclays, Moneygram, and Western Union are the financial system. Following in the footsteps of several large banks, Barclays announced in May 2013 that by July 10, the company would shut down accounts to almost two hundred and fifty MTOs in North and East Africa. Dahabshiil, Barclays’ premier partner in East Africa and largest MTO in the Horn of Africa, brought Barclays to the British High Court to protest the closures that would effect millions of their clients. In April 2014, Dahabshiil won an injunction to delay the account closures until October 2014. Barclays’ precautionary actions to avoid inadvertently channeling money for illegal activity will have devastating effects on Somalia’s already “fragile economic recovery.” The closure of these MTO accounts will destabilize any progress made over the past decade. With the injunction’s expiration date rapidly approaching, and few viable options for Dahabshiil, the money transfer industry might soon be pushed underground, where it will be nearly impossible to monitor or track illegal activity. OxFam International claimed it was “a bleak day for Somalis” when Barclays announced their closures last May. In Somalia, 4.2 million citizens rely on money transfers as a substantial portion of their income for basic needs like food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care. Annually, the amount of transferred remittances from displaced Somalians far exceeds the amount of international aid sent by foreign governments to Somalia. International aid organizations and NGOs rely on MTOs for their finances. If they cannot receive their funds or can only access capital at a higher cost, the need for humanitarian aid will skyrocket. It is likely that nations with high Somalian populations (United States and United Kingdom) will burden taxpayers with the cost of dispensing foreign aid to address education issues, food security, and economic growth. The humanitarian, academic, and political outcry all reiterate—“Somalia is different.” The country cannot afford to lose the Barclays partnership. Barclays, and other enormous institutions are positioned to promote transparency and stability in the Somalian financial system. With the cooperation of many African nations and Western governments, these banks have the opportunity to not only strengthen money transfer channels and bolster the African financial system. Achieving that would ensure the livelihood of an estimated 40 percent of Somalians who rely on MTOs as the country “begins to see the light at the end of the tunnel.”

African elites generally do not like the International Criminal Court (ICC) that sits in the Hague. There is a widespread view that the ICC engages in selective prosecution and holds African leaders to a higher standard than others. Africans ask why the ICC prosecutes Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, but not former vice president Dick Cheney or former prime minister Tony Blair for Iraq-related issues, for example. There have been calls for immunity for African heads of state that are wanted for international crimes. The ICC cases against President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto have particularly focused the debate, and Kenya may withdraw from the Treaty of Rome, which established the ICC. For many Africans, the solution is a specifically African court that would, in effect, replace the ICC. The African Union is moving to establish an African Court of Justice and Human Rights, commonly called the African Court. But, at an African heads of state summit in Equatorial Guinea on June 26 and 27, the decision was made to grant African heads of state and senior officials (not further defined) immunity from prosecution for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious crimes. Under this provision, the African Court could not try al-Bashir, Kenyatta, or Ruto. This step, obviously self-serving for sitting heads of state and their associates, would appear to eviscerate the African Court before it even starts to function. It certainly reduces the African Court‘s credibility as an alternative to the ICC. As Amnesty International (among other civil society voices) said, the decision “is a backward step in the fight against impunity and a betrayal of victims of serious violations of human rights.” The Institute for Security Studies notes the absence of protest from Africa’s “liberal voices,” especially South Africa; observing that “only little Botswana has raised objections.”

On June 25, there was a bomb blast at a shopping center in Wuse 2 in downtown Abuja. According to the police, twenty-one persons were killed. While no group has claimed responsibility, the Nigerian media (and everybody else) points to Boko Haram, the Islamist insurrection, as the most likely perpetrator. There are now bombings in Abuja every month. Previously, they have been in the outskirts at transit points. This time, the bomb attack was in the commercial heart of the city. The shopping center is described as “luxury.” It is patronized by government officials, business people, diplomats, and other expatriates, although it is not as luxurious as Nairobi’s Westgate Mall, the scene of an attack in September 2013. Deutsche Welle is reporting anger among citizens in Abuja at the government’s inability to provide security. Nigeria is now highly bifurcated. On the one hand, the Lagos-Ibadan corridor is booming, with the skyline marked by construction cranes. Conspicuous consumption is evident—condominium prices appear to approach those of Washington, DC, (if not Manhattan), and luxury cars choke the roads in the best parts of town. The Lagos state government appears to function better than any other in the federation. Boko Haram has mounted no attacks, and Islamist terrorism seems to be far away. On the other hand, death and destruction are ubiquitous in the northeast where Boko Haram killings are now daily—no longer weekly or monthly. Abuja seems to be between the two extremes. In the case of the June 25 Abuja bombing, a spokesman for the Department of Security Services told the media that suspects have been arrested and that there is an ongoing investigation. But in Abuja, popular confidence in the government’s ability to provide security is eroding.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. When al Shabaab, the violent Islamist group in Somalia, took control of the capital city Mogadishu, it actively destroyed buildings and overt displays of Western institutions and influences. This included outlawing soccer. The group destroyed cinemas and viewing centers in Mogadishu during the 2010 World Cup to stop residents from watching the matches. Their first successful international attack was the twin explosions in Uganda’s capital Kampala at viewing stations during the tournament. When regional and international forces ousted al Shabaab from the city in 2011, the city’s soccer stadium was one of the first things to be restored. Al Shabaab had dug trenches in the field and used it as an operations base. Soccer is played and enjoyed throughout sub Saharan Africa, and is not commonly associated with Western or colonial influences, but is seen as thoroughly African. Al Shabaab’s condemnation of soccer as haram is also not a commonly held categorization among Islamist groups or nations with conservative Muslim governments. In Afghanistan under the Taliban, the game was discouraged but not outlawed for example. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran all have national teams. The Iranian team is playing in the World Cup in Brazil this year; they tied in their match with Nigeria on June 16, and lost to Argentina on June 21. Al Shabaab continues to hold territory in central Somalia and soccer is outlawed in those areas under its control. The proscription against the so called “beautiful game” is however not complete. Al Jazeera journalist Hamza Mohamed published on June 11 an article on al Shabaab’s “halal soccer.” The jihadi group even has their own team. The rules of this “new” game appear to be the same as in “haram” soccer, the conduct of the players however must conform to al Shabaab’s sharia guidelines. Players must wear trousers that reach past their knees and jerseys that cover their elbows. Hamza noted however that many of the jerseys were the same as the “haram” national teams, such as Arsenal, Real Madrid, Manchester United, and Chelsea. Successful goals are celebrated with statement making or calls of "Allahu Akbar" (God is great). No one over the age of forty can play because it is “unsightly seeing an old man chasing a small ball,” and neither are commanders permitted on the field. This is apparently to prevent their command being undermined. If a player swears on the pitch, their tongue is removed. Most other offenses are met with flogging and a ban on playing. All games end fifteen minutes before prayers. The tradition of sharing and spreading a game across cultural and national boundaries is ancient, and using that arena of friendly competition as a platform of diplomacy is just as old. While many fans and players outside al Shabaab would not react well to a flogging for misbehavior, perhaps al Shabaab fighters’ continued passion for the “beautiful game” presents an opportunity for rapprochement and reconciliation in the future.

This is a guest post by Amanda Roth, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program. She is a graduate student at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where she studies international security policy. Earlier this week, at least forty-eight people were killed while watching the World Cup in Mpeketoni, Kenya. Less than twenty-four hours later, fifteen people were killed in the nearby town of Poromoko. Combined, the two attacks were the deadliest in the country since the Westgate mall attack in September 2013. The militants allegedly attacked a video hall where viewers were watching the games before going door-to-door, asking residents if they were Muslim and shooting or slitting the throats of men who were not. The day after the attack, Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta declared that the violence was not the work of militant group al Shabaab, but rather “local political networks” within the country. This seems unlikely. Al Shabaab immediately took credit for the attack, and the violence is consistent with previous al Shabaab threats and actions—for example, the group bombed two World Cup viewing parties in Uganda in 2010 as retaliation for the Ugandan military’s involvement in Somalia. Threats of similar attacks against Kenya have been made since the Kenyan military invaded Somalia in 2011. And as Matthew Bryden, former head of the UN monitoring group on Somalia, has observed, al Shabaab has never claimed responsibility for attacks they didn’t commit. Kenyatta’s allegations are most likely political posturing, a continuation of his longstanding battle with political rival Raila Odinga. But even if the attacks were the result of “well planned, orchestrated, politically motivated ethnic violence” incited by “reckless leaders,” Kenyatta should be cautious as his administration responds to this most recent wave of violence. As Paul Hidalgo recently noted in Foreign Affairs, the Kenyan government’s own recklessness may be its greatest enemy as it seeks to counter the growing al Shabaab threat. Retaliatory attacks on ethnic Somalis and scapegoating of Muslims have contributed to growing radicalism in Kenya and a rise in homegrown terrorism. Moderate Muslims feel unjustly targeted, and the increase in violence has made residents of all religions increasingly fearful for their safety. The country’s security forces are largely ineffective, accused of summary executions and indiscriminate human rights violations. Kenyatta himself accused police of having information on this week’s attacks and failing to act. Furthermore, the rise in terrorist attacks has led to foreign government warnings against travel to Kenya, leading to a precipitous drop in tourism numbers. The accompanying loss of revenue and employment may further incentivize desperate youths to join radical groups. President Kenyatta’s accusations are a continuation of the ongoing politicization of the crisis, but now is not the time. The Kenyan government should be focused on strengthening and professionalizing the security services, securing the border with Somalia, and closely examining its policies toward Mogadishu and al Shabaab. It should also be cautious not to exacerbate the ethnic tensions that led to widespread violence following the 2007 elections. At this crucial time for Kenya, the government’s leadership is more important than ever, and Kenyatta should choose his words carefully.

This is a guest post by Mrs. Joan Sikand, Esq. She has served as development coordinator of the Wildlife Foundation since its inception in 2000. She has been a member of Friends of Nairobi National Park since 1995, and served as its vice-chairwoman from 2004 to 2007. Her articles on conservation have been published in the Kenyan daily, "The People.” Kenya has been a sanctuary for wildlife and a model for community based conservation for decades. However, conservation initiatives are now diminishing in the face of rapid and volatile socio-economic change and growing ethnic and clan conflicts. The Wildlife Foundation (TWF), through its continued collaboration with local communities, has worked to contain Nairobi’s urban sprawl. It supported an open-ecosystem biodiversity corridor for the Nairobi National Park. TWF began in 2000 with a simple lease scheme, paying local community landowners still maintaining traditional lifestyles a sum to keep their lands open and unfenced. This practice resulted in over fifty thousand acres being added to the twenty-three thousand acres of Nairobi National Park (NNP) under conservation protection. More than a protected area, NNP represents a standard for effective local government. As an intensely fragile ecosystem, NNP is subject to protection under the Physical Planning Act and also the Environmental Management Coordination Act. In January 2014, Kenya signed into law an updated Wildlife Policy Act, also known as the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, to strengthen conservation and make it sustainable. Under the new law, community conservation committees are set up to ensure communities benefit from wildlife. However, lifestyles are changing rapidly; where once nomadic pastoralists had enough land to follow rain and grasslands and co-exist peacefully with wildlife, now intense population pressures impact traditional wildlife habitats. Without compensatory benefits, landowners can resent and destroy wildlife. The sale of ivory and rhino horn through poaching is also compromising Kenya’s wildlife conservation efforts. Kenya has lost 25 percent of its elephant and rhino populations in the past five years due to poaching. It is widely expected that without drastic measures, the elephant and the rhino will become extinct within this generation. The revised Wildlife Policy Act outlines responses to poaching through fines and enforcement measures. The act on its own, however, may not be enough. China recently signed an agreement with Kenya to rebuild its moribund railways, utilizing soft loan terms. As Kenya pursues extraction industries, this should be welcome. However, to the conservationists, this news is also foreboding. China’s ivory industry is a healthy and vibrant trade, which is rapidly eradicating Africa’s elephant populations. The proposed railway line will run through important biodiversity areas including Tsavo National Park, which provides greater access for poachers and middlemen. There is also strong evidence to connect the ivory and rhino horn trade to terrorism, something Kenya is increasingly worried about. The latest wave of terrorist violence in Kenya has meant that tourists are shying away from Kenya’s parks and beaches. The result is a continued decline in the sector, as infrastructure is decaying and revenues for wildlife protection are falling. One example is the Mwaluganje Elephant Reserve in Kwale, which was set up in 1995. Community landowners contributed their land to the Mwaluganje Elephant Reserve. Now, the entire area is defunct; the gate locked. The local community has wiped out all the elephants through poaching; visitor numbers and revenue have collapsed. Kenya is attempting to counteract these conservation challenges through the new Wildlife Policy Act. The act establishes stronger institutions for wildlife management with a particular emphasis on community involvement, sustainability, and anti-poaching. It remains to be seen when and how the new legislation will be implemented.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, program coordinator, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Last month, in the wake of the kidnapping of the schoolgirls from Chibok in Nigeria by the Islamist organization Boko Haram, President Francois Hollande of France convened a security summit in Paris. Heads of state from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger attended. The main result was the creation of a “central intelligence platform,” which will serve as a place for West African nations to coordinate their responses to Boko Haram. The United States and its partners in the Horn of Africa should endeavor to copy a form of this strategy to counter al Shabaab in the Horn. Despite some insinuations to the contrary, al Shabaab remains a serious threat to stability in the Horn, and it has started to undertake a more international campaign, employing shocking attacks. These attacks began with the 2010 bombings in Uganda, continued with attempted bombings in Ethiopia, peaked with the audacious Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, and recently included a well-planned attack on the Somali Parliament building. Sensationalist attacks are likely to continue and will extend beyond Somalia, as they did to Djibouti last week. As previous al Shabaab strongholds in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region are continually lost to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces’ advance, the group will likely become even more desperate. The fight against al Shabaab is already an international effort, which includes AMISOM, the United Nations (UN), and U.S. assistance to the Somali Federal Government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which is the Eastern Africa trading bloc, sent troops into Somalia in 2006 before a UN Security Council resolution replaced the IGAD force. The United Kingdom has also held several conferences focused on discussing stability in Somalia. But in its present form this international response to al Shabaab has been ineffective. The conflict continues to leak out of the operational jurisdiction of AMISOM, and into countries that will rightfully protect themselves. After a series of attacks by al Shabaab, Kenya started a draconian counterterrorism campaign called “Operation Usalama.” It includes forced internment, mass deportations, and other human rights abuses against Somali refugees and Kenyans that are ethnically Somali. At best this is counterproductive, and at worst it creates new recruits for al Shabaab within Kenya and Somalia. Similarly, Ethiopia has repeatedly intervened in Somalia to eradicate al Shabaab, which has exacerbated resentment among Somalis. The problem is that these countries’ domestic counterterrorism strategies are reactionary, nearsighted, and counterproductive to what is needed regionally to defeat what has become an international terror group. These countries do not operate in a vacuum, and should recognize that their domestic actions have consequences across the region. A new platform is needed to better coordinate responses and share intelligence. This is not a novel concept. Kenya and Somalia agreed to start sharing intelligence more effectively after the attack on Westgate, but the agreement didn’t include any of the other international partners involved in Somalia. Also, for whatever reason, it currently isn’t working. To assist, the United States might lead an international cooperation effort in East Africa to create a platform for intelligence sharing and the dissemination of best practices in tactics, similar to what was proposed to counter Boko Haram. Moreover, there should be greater emphasis on ensuring that domestic counterterrorism strategies are not driving greater support to al Shabaab. U.S. involvement would give the platform legitimacy and would allow the United States to share its own intelligence. It would also allow for increased cooperation across all actors currently operating in Somalia. This is, indeed, a tall order, and one that none of the countries are likely to enjoy as each have their own interests in Somalia. But the United States and Somalia’s neighbors should keep this in mind: large amounts of troops and material are not currently designated to counter al Shabaab, and the threat isn’t going away. To effectively counter al Shabaab, there needs to be better coordination and use of the resources currently available.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, program coordinator, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. In a recent article on the Daily Maverick, Simon Allison identifies the “surprisingly perceptive” core message of al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane’s recent propaganda audio message. In his message, Godane urges his Somali comrades to throw out their Kenyan and Ethiopian occupiers. Allison notes that, although unsettling, Godane is, in certain respects, correct and tapping into widespread sentiments. Despite operating in Somalia under the authority of an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to rid the country of al Shabaab, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are, in fact, occupying Somalia. Their goals are not altruistic, and are largely informed by their own national security and political considerations. Thus, instead of celebrating the foreign troops’ efforts to stem al Shabaab, Somalis are worried about the outsized influence being wielded by foreign powers in their country. Although troubled by these developments, the United States and its partners have other goals in the region that will prevent any intrusion into Kenyan or Ethiopian plans. Godane’s message is particularly striking when considering the formation of federal states in Somalia. In the absence of strong leadership from the Somali Federal Government (SFG), Kenya and Ethiopia have assumed leadership positions as state builders and negotiators in southern Somalia. In practice, this means that Kenya and Ethiopia have been able to influence the formation of new federal states, and create governments that will benefit their own national security concerns. As an example of this influence, Kenya and Ethiopia had an important role in the creation of the Interim Jubba Administration (IJA), a new federal state consisting of the Somali regions (Gedo, South Juba, and Middle Juba) bordering Kenya. Effectively, the IJA acts as a buffer state between Kenya and the threat posed by al Shabaab in Somalia. Ethiopia is involved as a negotiator for the creation of the IJA because it wants to maintain involvement and influence in the region as it deals with its own ethnic Somali population. Despite disagreements regarding the proposed make-up of this federal state from other regions and conferences in southern Somalia, the SFG has endorsed the IJA because it must maintain Ethiopian and Kenyan support as it battles al Shabaab. This competition for influence over land in Southern Somalia is not likely to lead to a sustainable governance model for Somalia moving forward, and is already causing regional strife. Somalia would be wise to ensure that whatever governance plan, or federal state organization, is put in place is durable enough to last after AMISOM forces have left, regardless of current security concerns. Due to AMISOM’s recent successes against al Shabaab forces, proxy states and vigorous counter terrorism operations by foreign forces seems likely to continue. Unfortunately this means the pattern of Kenyan and Ethiopian meddling in Somalian political affairs is likely to continue. Godane’s message is dangerous because it taps into that fact. The U.S. is interested in long term stability of Somalia, but the immediate concerns are to stabilize the Horn of Africa and to exterminate al Shabaab. Therefore, despite feeding al Shabaab’s propaganda machine and potentially destabilizing Somalia in the future, the United States will likely turn a blind eye to Kenyan and Ethiopian influence in Somalia.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Allen is currently an officer in the Army National Guard. His interests are in Africa, conflict, and conflict resolution. Since 2003, The African Union Peace and Security Council has sought to establish an African Standby Force, whose purpose would be to rapidly respond to conflicts and emergency situations in Africa. Since then the Council has proposed several structural versions of a standby force to fill this rapid reaction role, none of which have yet yielded results. In the meantime it appears that the Ugandan government is using its own military to fill this role. The inability of the AU to deploy a rapid reaction force has impaired its ability to implement policy in East Africa. And after years of fighting rebel threats throughout the region, Uganda’s well trained military seems to have the strength to fill this vacuum. In December of 2013, fighting broke out in South Sudan between government and rebel forces. While the AU and UN were debating intervention the Ugandan government sent soldiers into South Sudan in support of the sitting government. Uganda then threatened the rebels with further military intervention if they refused to negotiate a peace with the South Sudanese government. The Ugandan military unilaterally acted as a “peace enforcing” force; doing so without UN or AU approval. The two South Sudanese parties reached a ceasefire agreement in January. It is clear that the rebel forces and the AU want Ugandan forces out of South Sudan. The AU now plans to deploy a stabilization force to South Sudan in order to “phase out” the Ugandan military and begin “peacekeeping operations.” It appears that Uganda’s military intervention has given impetus to building the new stabilization force. On March 13, East African nations announced that this stabilization force will be deployed to South Sudan by mid-April. The member countries will include Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and possibly Djibouti. This force, however, still needs to be approved by both the AU and the UN. It seems that the Ugandan military will not be included in this stabilization force. This is noteworthy as it may be seen as a biased actor by the rebel parties, which could be counterproductive to stabilizing the situation. However, the AU must tread carefully, if it seems that the peace has not improved in South Sudan it may be dangerous to send a coalition of troops that has not previously trained together into such a complex operating environment. Though if the peace in South Sudan is at least somewhat stabilized, this could be a good opportunity for AU nations to begin building the operating relationship necessary to produce an effective African Standby Force. By working together African nations can increasingly develop the capacity for international interventions among their neighbors, and it will be crucial that the AU and regional bodies maintain and expand their roles as the legitimate leader in these interventions. Uganda’s unilateral action, though rapid and effective in the short term, is not as constructive to long term stability as the intervention of forces, such as the African Standby Force, led by international organizations.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, program coordinator, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies program.  Even before the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya last September, the Kenyan government was wary of the threat posed by Somali terrorist organizations, especially al-Shabaab. After the attack, Kenyan lawmakers heightened their focus on the terrorist organization, and swiftly retaliated. There was also an almost immediate backlash against the nearly 500,000 Somali refugees currently in Kenya. Many Kenyans suspect the Westgate Mall attackers came from a refugee camp, and the presence of the camps has long been a source of tension for the communities around them. Kenya would be wise, however, to not disproportionately blame Somali refugees for security issues within Kenya. In November, Somali and Kenyan governments signed an agreement with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to begin repatriating Somali refugees. This move is largely seen as a reaction to the allegations that al-Shabaab used the Dadaab Refugee Complex, located in north-eastern Kenya, as their logistical base before the attack. To help repatriation, the Kenyan government has offered Somali refugees two hundred dollars to cover the costs of the move. Coupled with increasingly strong rhetoric from Kenyan politicians about Somali repatriation, this money represents an increase of pressure against Somali refugees. Hawa Noor and Emmanuel Kisiangani from the Institute of Strategic Studies recently released an article arguing that Kenya and Somalia should not force, or unnecessarily expedite, what is supposed to be the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees. The authors rightly note that Kenya has human rights obligations to asylum seekers in their country, but they also acknowledge Kenya’s right to ensure its own national security Al-Shabaab certainly recruits from the ethnic Somali population in Kenya, but it is likely that repatriation of this group will prove counter-productive to Kenya’s national security. Kenya’s involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the repeated strikes on al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia have cemented Kenya’s position as an enemy of the terror group. Serious internal problems with uneven economic growth, poverty, and structural inequality also ensures that Kenya will remain an excellent recruiting ground for al-Shabaab. Essentially, the threat from al-Shabaab would not leave with the Somali refugees. Forced repatriation of Somali refugees, or even the perception of such, could build resentment among affected individuals and boost al-Shabaab’s appeal and recruitment efforts. It is also unlikely that either the Somali or Kenyan governments have the ability or political will to actually guard the porous border between them. Despite the two hundred dollars, many refugees, or newly minted al-Shabaab operatives, are likely to return to Kenya. The influx of people into southern Somalia is also likely to destabilize the country, which would prove more problematic to Kenya. Kenya should be less concerned about repatriating Somali refugees. Instead the focus should be on handling internal problems. It is unfortunate that Kenya shoulders a large amount of the refugees from their neighbor’s decades-old conflict, but it is actually in Kenya’s best interest to be patient in dealing with Somali refugees.

On December 19, International Criminal Court prosecutor Fatou Bensouda asked the judges to adjourn the trial date of Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta because one of the prosecution’s witnesses is now declining to testify and another has confessed to giving false evidence. She is asking for the adjournment to give her more time to seek other evidence before proceeding with the trial. She said: “Having carefully considered by evidence and the impact of the two withdrawals, I have come to the conclusion that currently the case against Mr. Kenyatta does not satisfy the high evidentiary standards required at trial. I therefore need time to complete efforts to obtain additional evidence, and to consider whether such evidence will enable my office to fully meet the evidentiary threshold required at trial.” Kenya’s President Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto have been indicted in connection with the bloodshed surrounding the 2007 presidential elections. At that time, Kenyatta and Ruto were on opposite sides. Kenyatta was a leader of the Kikuyu ethnic group, while Ruto was a leader of the Kalenjin ethnic group. The two ethnic groups have long been bitter enemies. The origin of the enmity appears to be dispute over land in the Rift valley. However, political figures on both sides have previously fanned the enmity in pursuit of their own agendas. It looks like that might have happened in 2007. At least 1,200 people were killed, and the international community, led by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan intervened. In 2013, however, Kenyatta and Ruto reconciled their personal differences and led a united ticket against Raila Odinga. Kikuyu and Kalenjin found themselves on the same side. They won in elections that most Kenyans decided were credible. That victory means that Kenya’s president and vice president are both under ICC indictment. Since the elections–and even before–ICC officials, including prosecutor Fatou Bensouda have complained of witness intimidation and general Kenyan non-cooperation. Kenya has sought Africa Union support against the ICC, and the Kenyan parliament has called for withdrawal from its jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, as the years go by, it is likely that it will be increasingly difficult for Bensouda to make her case against Kenyatta. However, Ruto’s case, generally regarded as the stronger of the two, started in September 2013, and is going forward. Should the ICC case against the Kikuyu Kenyatta go away, and should the Kalenjin Ruto be convicted, it is unclear whether that would re-ignite the ethnic conflict between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin, up to now held in abeyance by the Kenyatta/Ruto alliance.

This is a guest post by Diptesh Soni. Diptesh is a master’s degree candidate at the Columbia University School of International Public Affairs (SIPA) studying economic and political development. You can read more by him at: https://dipteshsoni.contently.com/. Recent statistics by the Economist Intelligence Unit forecast growth in sub-Saharan Africa–specifically South Africa, Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria–to increase from 3.7 percent to 6.0 percent within the next five years. Indeed, there are many reasons to be chirpy about the continent’s growth trajectory: improved fiscal management, sustained crude oil prices, and the high start-up costs for mining ventures mean that the slow shift from export-led to consumer-led growth in China will not be devastating to African economies. Others have cited rapid urbanization and a “demographic dividend” as further reasons to expect big things in upcoming years. But much of the optimism surrounding future growth rests on weak assumptions. The “demographic dividend,” for example, caused by a “youth bulge” that will provide cheap labor is a huge hypothetical. African economies already suffer from a severe shortage of adequate skills in the labor force, and while countries have made strides in increasing access to basic education, the quality of the instruction that students receive in the classroom remains poor. As the 2013 Human Development Report highlights, high fertility rates within Africa were likely a direct consequence of expenditure cuts in education. If Africans are not given a proper education, fertility rates will remain high and the “demographic dividend” will become a youth burden. The belief that rapid urbanization will yield rapid development is also suspect. While it may be true that “large urban centers allow for innovation and increase economies of scale,” as Wolfgang Fengler of the World Bank claims, African urbanization has been ad hoc and chaotic. Governments and donors across the continent have been unable to provide growing urban populations with basic services, let alone viable employment, and as a result many of the poor are stuck in slums. Khayelitsha in South Africa and Kibera in Kenya serve as merely two examples out of far too many. The purported rise of the African “middle-class” also warrants clarification: The African Development Bank deems as “middle-class” anyone earning between $2 and $20 a day, 60 percent of whom fall into the “floating” middle-class between $2 and $4. These people could easily slip back in to poverty. Others such as Citigroup’s David Cowan cite high levels of inequality, which leaves opportunities for businesses to cater either to the emerging wealthy elite or the consuming poor, with little room for a middle-class. American giants such as IBM, WalMart, and General Electric are making inroads into African markets, to say nothing of Chinese investors. While these movements might be harbingers of growth to come, the danger of assuming big growth figures lies in the possibility for complacency. Demographic trends will not yield dividends, nor will large urban centers yield attractive economies of scale, if governments and donors do not step up to Africa’s problems of human and physical development. Africa is well positioned for a grand takeoff, but transforming deeply agrarian economies into global manufacturers will entail transforming large urban and youth populations into productive assets. This will require greater and more innovative investments in infrastructure, energy, education, and social services.