Kenya

Many friends and observers of Africa, including myself, see shortcomings in governance as key to the slow rate of economic, social, and political development in some African countries. The converse is also true. Where governance is better, development can be rapid. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has published its annual ranking of African states. The top five in descending order are Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, Seychelles, South Africa, and Namibia while the bottom five, going from bad to worse, are Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Somalia. For a second consecutive year, the Foundation has announced that there is no winner of the Ibrahim Prize for outstanding leadership by a chief of state. Established in 2006, the prize’s independent and highly distinguished judges have awarded the prize only three times, to the former chiefs of state of Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. They have also recognized the work of Nelson Mandela, out of office long before the prize was established, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, both of South Africa. Subsequently, I will be blogging on the Ibrahim Index and the Ibrahim Prize. Here I cite them to support the point about the relationship between good governance and social and economic progress, and to point out that poor governance remains a significant challenge for Africa. Essential to good governance is accountability, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) promotes it. In an interview with Radio Netherlands, retired Archbishop Desmond Tutu, an icon of South Africa’s liberation movement, said, “The ICC has been a powerful force for justice, peace and accountability not just in Africa but around the world. Far from targeting Africa, it has served and protected Africa.” Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and deputy president William Ruto have been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 elections. Though they are cooperating with the court, they are seeking to avoid standing trial, either until their time in office ends, or forever. Accordingly, at a special summit of the African Union (AU), Kenyatta argued that the Western countries, especially the UK and the United States, had turned the court into a neocolonialist tool. He called for a mass walkout from the Treaty of Rome that established the court and which thirty four African countries have ratified. He argued that the ICC was contemptuous of the African Union, and the African Union accordingly resolved that the two should not appear before the ICC. London’s Daily Telegraph is reporting that “European diplomats” are seeking to have the UN Security Council direct the ICC to put the Kenyatta and Ruto trials on hold. A British Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman, however, says that there has been no change in the government’s support for the ICC. It remains to be seen whether African states will follow the AU resolution. Adherence to the Treaty of Rome is a matter for individual sovereign states. Kenya’s parliament has already called for Kenya to withdraw, and I believe there is a good chance this will happen. If so, it is difficult to see how the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto can proceed. Legally, their indictments still stand and their trials should go forward. It also remains to be seen whether the efforts by “European diplomats” to seek the trial’s postponement by the UN Security Council will be serious.

Significant African opinion appears hostile to the International Criminal Court at The Hague (ICC). In Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, both under ICC indictment for crimes committed during post-election violence in 2007-2009, included in their campaign rhetoric that the ICC was a tool of Western imperialism. This view is shared by many. Others argue that the ICC is somehow “unfair” because its current cases all involve Africa. In Kenya, the parliament has called for the withdrawal from the Treaty of Rome that established the ICC. The African Union has called for the Kenyatta and Ruto cases to be referred back to the Kenyan judicial system. A special African Union (AU) summit meeting is convening in Addis Ababa on October 11-12 to discuss the Union’s relationship with the ICC. Some hope that the AU member states will withdraw as a block from the Treaty of Rome, though few expect that will actually happen. Misunderstandings, even outright lies, about the ICC and the Kenyatta and Ruto cases in particular are underpinning much of this current anti-ICC sentiment in Kenya and elsewhere. Under those circumstances Human Rights Watch (HRW), a distinguished non-governmental organization based in the United States, has performed a service by publishing a short primer on October 7 entitled Perceptions and Realities–Kenya and the International Criminal Court. It sets out eight common perceptions about the Kenyatta and Ruto ICC prosecutions–and then demolishes them. Along the way it shows that the Kenyan judicial system does not have the capacity to prosecute Kenyatta and Ruto and that it has failed to hold perpetrators of electoral or political violence accountable throughout its post-colonial history. It also exposes a lack of substance to the Kenyan government’s cooperation with the ICC in the Kenyatta and Ruto cases–despite the two’s formal cooperation with The Hague court. The HRW primer is the first place to go when looking at the alleged legal arguments for delaying the trials, either by transferring them to Kenyan jurisdiction or through UN Security Council action. HRW also discusses the consequences for the future of Kenya’s failure to hold accountable perpetrators of human rights violations. Impunity in the past implies impunity in the future. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has also weighed in on the key role of the ICC in ensuring that perpetrators of violence are met with justice not impunity. In an op-ed published in the New York Times on October 10, Tutu states that “without this court, there would be no brake on the worst excesses of these criminals.” He also highlights the fact that while the ICC has so far prosecuted only African cases, the ICC could also “not be more African if it tried.” The United States is also a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, but it has never been ratified by the Senate. U.S. policy is, however, highly supportive of the International Criminal Court. In light of non-ratification, many African critics view U.S. support for the ICC as fundamentally hypocritical.

The basic narrative of what unfolded at the Westgate Mall still stands. An undetermined number of al-Shabaab operatives entered Nairobi’as upscale Westgate Mall on Saturday, September 21 and killed at least seventy persons, including women and children. The murderers apparently questioned some shoppers, killing those they thought to be Christians while sparing Muslims. At other times they appear to have indiscriminately killed as many as they could. Many, most, or perhaps all of the murderers then slipped away, some apparently after changing clothes. Initial reports claimed that the murderers numbered less than a dozen and included non-Africans, however there remains no hard evidence as to the attackers numbers nor composition. It is also unclear when the murderers vacated the mall, though nominally the “siege” lasted for four days. Film footage has emerged showing Kenyan army soldiers engaged in widespread looting. According to shopkeepers, expensive merchandise went first. Numerous witnesses say that the murderers took nothing except the occasional soft drink. Customers–fleeing the premises as fast as they could–took nothing. Yet the mall appears to have been picked clean and was littered with liquor bottles, leaving the onus of suspicion on the Kenyan army. According to the New York Times, one survey shows that 77 percent of the participants believe the Kenyan Army was responsible for the looting. The Kenyan army, like most in Africa, is poorly trained and poorly paid. Military and police accountability is low. Many Kenyans appear to be outraged by the looting, and President Uhuru Kenyatta has launched an official inquiry. But official inquiries in Kenya usually do not result in concrete action. Meanwhile, members of the Kenyan parliament are calling for the government to shut down the Somali refugee camps. Blame the victim? Perhaps. But the killings do appear to have been the work of al-Shaabab, even if the looting was done by Kenyans. It is worth remembering that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on New York’s Twin Towers, and in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there were accusations that police and fire personnel engaged in looting. Looting also appears to be ubiquitous in war zones. Sometimes mankind is “a little lower than the angels.” Sometimes, much lower.

Whether the United States should fear Boko Haram is a big question, and one that perhaps has even greater urgency in the aftermath of the massacre in Nairobi perpetrated by another jidahist group, al-Shabaab. I have written a piece for CNN that explores this question in the aftermath of the horrific massacre last weekend at a northern Nigerian agricultural college of some sixty-five students, many while they slept. While Boko Haram has not yet claimed responsibility, it is the likely perpetrator. My CNN piece is intended as a brief primer on Boko Haram, which remains a mysterious organization in many ways, even after some four years of carnage. The Council’s Nigeria Security Tracker has tracked the violence since 2011. My conclusion is that while Boko Haram poses a serious challenge to the Nigerian state, an historical partner of the United States, it does not pose a threat to the American homeland. Further, American interests in northern Nigeria where Boko Haram operates are few. However, should ties between the United States and the Abuja government strengthen under the guise of a common “war on terror,” Americans could become a Boko Haram target.

The weekend’s horrific al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall is still not over, and the context and consequences of the attack are uncertain. Despite Kenyan authorities’ claim of “full control” of the building , at last report the militants were still “hiding” and many hostages remained unaccounted for. Westgate is upmarket, and the victims are also up-market, including the nephew of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his fiancé. There are also many unanswered questions, such as: -Who exactly are the attackers?  There are competing twitter feeds with lists of names that are promptly withdrawn or repudiated by al-Shabaab in Somalia. -Was the attack directed from Somalia, or did it originate within the large Somali community in Kenya, some of whom support al-Shabaab? -Presumably the motivation for the attack was the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia.  But were there other motivations as well, such as an attack by the poor and dispossessed from the Nairobi slums on the rich? Perceptions of apparent progress in Somalia may be seriously compromised by the Nairobi attack. The Nairobi attack marks the continuation of a disturbing trend in a growing number of countries and regions in northern and sub-Saharan Africa. The last year or so has seen an intensification of the “Boko Haram” insurgency in Nigeria, an Islamist jihad in Mali, and attacks on a natural gas facility in Algeria. Authorities in countries as diverse as Senegal and Niger express concern about the potential for jihadist movements to take root. All these insurgencies use the protest language of Islam—there isn’t really any other available. All have elements of millenarian religion—the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth—and use that to justify horrific violence against innocent people. Some have a criminal dimension. Others may be supported clandestinely by marginalized politicians. Insurgencies and terrorism appeal to the victims of bad governance in the context where “Africa rising”—especially the boom in commodities—has made a few very rich, the construction of upmarket shopping malls possible, and many others poor. Jihadis brag about cross-border links and drawing on an international pool of fighters, though how significant such links are remains unclear. Yet despite these commonalities, each jihadist group appears to have been formed by the unique circumstances of the country or locale where they operate. Actors appear to be part of a movement, but not of an organization. Their activities are not coordinated by a politburo operating out of an Afghanistan cave. Nor is there a charismatic leader such as Osama Bin Laden to unite and inspire the faithful from highly diverse backgrounds. Each insurgency must be understood in its own terms and context; facile generalizations mislead. The consequences of terrorism and insurgency, such as what is currently unfolding in Nairobi, is devastating for the African states affected by it. Mali had to be rescued by outsiders led by France and parts of northern Nigeria are currently ungovernable. It remains to be seen what the consequences will be for Kenya, though the drawing together of that country’s fractious political class in the aftermath of the tragedy has been encouraging. For several years “Africa rising” has been an important narrative, especially in the Western investor and business community. How credible that narrative remains will be clarified over the coming months, especially given chronic political and social issues yet to be resolved. But, a decline in outside investment would be bad for most African countries. The jihadist and millenarian movements in sub-Saharan Africa remain so diverse and so rooted in particular local circumstances that it makes a future “twin towers” style attack on the United States highly unlikely. However, that does not preclude a small band of the home-grown disaffected actors from wrecking mayhem and appealing to an international context, as has already happened in the United Kingdom. But, any such attack would be a criminal matter, rather than the political and millenarian challenge that jihadist insurgencies pose for African states.

Deputy President William Ruto’s International Criminal Court (ICC) trial for crimes against humanity associated with the 2007 elections opens September 10 in The Hague. President Kenyatta’s trial is scheduled to open November 12. On September 5 the Kenyan National Assembly passed a motion calling for Kenya to withdraw from the ICC; the passage of the necessary legislation is expected by the end of the month. As the date of the start of the trial approaches, two more witness have withdrawn from the Ruto case, citing “mental anguish” and “pressure from the family.” Fatou Bensouda, the ICC prosecutor, has complained on numerous occasions of witness intimidation and of the Kenyan authorities’ failure to cooperate in their protection. With respect to President Kenyatta, in the Kenyan press there is a lively debate on whether the immunity conferred by the Kenyan constitution on a sitting president trumps the ICC. The general sentiment is that it does, and that Kenyatta’s trial cannot go forward so long as he is in office. The debate also features a rehash of familiar arguments about the alleged bias of the ICC against African leaders despite the fact that the prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda is a Gambian who received her university and legal training in Nigeria. (She also studied maritime law in Malta.) There are eighteen ICC judges. Five are from Western Europe, five from Africa, three from Latin America, three from Asia and two from Eastern Europe. Kenya’s withdrawal from the ICC appears inevitable. With respect to the Ruto and Kenyatta trials, it changes nothing–and it changes everything. As human rights activists and legal experts point out, Kenyan withdrawal can take place only after a year. Further, withdrawal has no legal impact on the indictments now standing against Kenyatta and Ruto. But, Kenyan withdrawal also changes everything because, in effect, the ICC trial will not be able to function without Kenyan government cooperation. Ruto is required by the ICC to be in The Hague on September 10. He previously pledged to cooperate with the court and therefore is obliged to appear. We will see if he actually goes. The entire dreary episode appears to be a setback for holding African leaders accountable.

Doctors Without Borders announced that it is leaving Somalia. The French-founded, Nobel prize winning non-governmental organization, known by its French acronym MSF, provides medical care in war zones. It has operated in Somalia since 1991. In 2012, MSF “provided 624,000 medical consultations, admitted 41,100 patients to hospitals, cared for 30,090 malnourished children, vaccinated 58,620, and delivered 7,300 babies” according to its August 14 statement. It is leaving Somalia because of accelerating attacks on its staff “in an environment where armed groups and civilian leaders increasingly support, tolerate, or condone the killing, assaulting, and abduction of humanitarian workers.” In Somalia, MSF negotiated with war lords and other “actors” for the “minimum guarantees to respect its medical humanitarian mission.” On that basis, MSF was willing to accept very high levels of risk. However, the same “actors” with whom MSF negotiated agreements have been directly involved in violence against its personnel–so much so that the organization, which is famous for its willingness to tolerate risk, judged that the situation has “created an untenable imbalance between the risks and compromises our staff must make and our ability to provide assistance to the Somali people.” This is a tragedy all the way around: for the Somali people and for MSF, which is rightly celebrated for the effectiveness of its humanitarian interventions. What happened? Only a few months ago there was optimism that Somalia had turned around, that the jihadist terrorist group al-Shabaab had been driven out of Mogadishu and Kismayo by Kenyan and Uganda troops (part of an African Union mission) and a new Somali civilian government was establishing itself. Abdihakim Ainte provides an overview in his African Arguments article, “Reorganization and Rebranding Make Terrorist Group a Force to be Reckoned with Again.” He concludes that a reorganized al-Shabaab under the leadership of Ahmed Godane is internally more united and operationally more diffuse. He argues that al-Shabaab is “dialing up its domestic attacks and dialing down its external operations.” He also highlights the recruitment of youths with Western exposure, and cites an al-Shabaab video that features three Somali-Americans: “The Path to Paradise: From the Twin Cities to the Land of Migration.” He also highlights the continuing fiscal and military weakness of al-Shabaab, concluding that it still needs al-Qaeda support. But, as he says, the Somalia government is also very weak. The lesson here may be an old one: failed states in an environment of religious fanaticism fueled by clan and other rivalries, take a long time to recover.

Now overshadowed by 9/11, the August 7, 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in retrospect also crossed a new terror threshold. Two hundred and one Kenyans as well as twelve American diplomats were killed in Nairobi. Eleven Tanzanians were killed in Dar es Salaam. Many more Kenyans and Tanzanians were wounded in the attacks, which were carried out by al-Qaeda operatives. The United States continues to be responsible for their medical care and rehabilitation. There were fresh reminders this week that terrorist attacks against diplomatic missions remain a threat; since August 4, most U.S. diplomatic establishments in the Middle East and North Africa have been closed as a precaution against a new terrorist attack. Security of U.S. diplomatic facilities had been a concern since at least the mob attack abetted by the Khomeini regime on the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, which led to scores of U.S. diplomats being taken hostage for 444 days (the subject of the recent film, “Argo”). At the time of the Nairobi and Dar attacks, the Department of State prioritized diplomatic facilities for renovation or replacement according to the perceived threat level, but, as always, the chronic underfunding of the diplomatic function limited what could be accomplished. By the summer of 1998, Nairobi and Dar were way down the list as neither city was seen as the venue of a serious security threat. But the twin assaults demonstrated that no place is immune from attack by international terrorist organizations. Since then, enormous resources have been devoted to rebuilding diplomatic facilities and increasing security. The surge in such spending has far exceeded that of traditional diplomatic activities—it accounts for much of the growth in funding over the past decade. In the Department of State’s proposed 2013 budget, 37 percent is to counter threats to U.S. security and advance civilian security around the world. Even during the Cold War, diplomatic facilities were designed to be welcoming and to project the American values of openness and individual liberty. No more. Now, diplomatic facilities sport huge setbacks from roads, high walls, and highly sophisticated technical security devices. Access is strictly controlled, and even windows are rare. The reality is a fortress, ideally outside of town, too often with a rigidly controlled line of visa applicants snaking around it. The current shut-down of U.S. diplomatic facilities in the Middle East is no longer exceptionable, though the scope this time is especially broad. According to press reports, it is the result of credible intelligence that al-Qaeda was about to launch a terrorist operation against a diplomatic facility. While I was ambassador to Nigeria (2004-2007) we closed the embassy in Abuja once and the consulate in Lagos at least twice, each for several days (if I remember rightly) because of credible intelligence about a possible attack. At the time, the Nigerian government was highly cooperative and supportive. It provided increased security personnel and closed adjacent streets. However, we were criticized in the media because, the argument ran, closure somehow implied that the Nigerians could not provide adequately for the security of diplomatic facilities. That is an obligation of any host country under the various Geneva conventions that govern diplomatic behavior. Once diplomatic missions are closed, governments proceed with caution to reopen them. But, diplomatic facilities fill an essential function and prolonged closure is not really an option. Hence, the response has been to make them more and more impregnable, from Nigeria to the Middle East and beyond. And diplomatic facilities increasingly showcase “Fortress America.” Though impossible to quantify, the need to subordinate so much to security diminishes U.S. soft power by undermining its traditional message of openness and welcome.

This is the title of a short, thoughtful–and thought-provoking–article by Brian Raftopoulos, Solomon Mungure, Nicky Roussea, and Masheti Masinjila that originally appeared in Solidarity Peace Trust blog and has been reprinted in “African Arguments.” The authors look at the similarities and differences in the forms of governance and the nature of violence in three of the most prominent former “settler-colonial” states in Africa. For me, a central insight is that the forms of violence that characterized colonial rule and the anti-colonial struggles “haunt” politics and violence in these three countries even today. Zimbabwe is the most affected, South Africa the least, and Kenya is in between. In Zimbabwe and Kenya the violent anti-colonial struggle played a central role in achieving independence. In South Africa, however, the military wing of the “struggle” played a much smaller role than internal protest and regional and international pressure in ending apartheid and the advent of “non-racial” democracy. It should also be recalled that Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first black president, was one of the founders of the ANC’s military wing, but he had little or no direct contact with it during his twenty-seven years in prison. Out of prison, he was the champion of a nonviolent transition to “non-racial” democracy. The authors conclude that in Zimbabwe, a consequence of colonialism and the anti-colonial struggle is that “legitimacy and sovereignty lie not in elections but in the legacy of the armed struggle.” The state is conflated with the ruling party, Zanu-PF. The Zanu-PF-dominated military also now has a major stake in the national economy and mineral resources, because of the state-sponsored land redistributions. In Kenya, colonial “indirect rule” emphasized ethnicity. Governance in Kenya accordingly has often revolved around ethnic balancing. Ethnicity plays an important role in violence when that balancing fails and in the aftermath of elections. In South Africa, where democratic institutions are strong and, unlike in Zimbabwe and Kenya, elections since 1994 have been largely peaceful, “free and fair,” the governing Africa National Congress–the inheritor of the liberation movement–has accepted electoral losses. But, current protests in South Africa, especially since 2007, are returning to the repertoire of anti-apartheid protest. This article is especially timely in the aftermath of the 2013 elections in Kenya, where the consequences are still being played out, in anticipation of the Zimbabwe elections at the end of this month, and for providing a context for the current wave of demonstrations in South African townships and work sites.

Omar Hassan al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, is under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has a warrant out for his arrest. He briefly attended a July 13-14 African Union (AU) health summit in Nigeria, but left when Nigerian human rights groups called for his arrest. The ICC justices in The Hague also issued a statement reminding Nigeria of its obligation to “honor its warrants” and hand over Bashir. A Sudanese government spokesman was quoted by the New York Times saying that Bashir’s departure had nothing to do with fear of arrest but that “he had matters to attend to in Khartoum.” Reuben Abati, Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan’s press spokesman, said that Nigeria had not invited Bashir to come. Rather he was present for an AU event and that “Nigeria is not in a position to determine who attends an AU event and who does not attend.” This Day, a Nigerian newspaper, reported that the Abuja government was not even aware that Bashir would be attending until a few days before the conference. While President Jonathan had personally invited some of the other African leaders, Bashir was not one of them. Moreover, if Nigeria had stopped Bashir from attending, it may have risked losing the honor of hosting the summit altogether. According to Bashir’s spokesman, while in Abuja Bashir met with the presidents of Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The president of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, is also under ICC indictment. However, the court has not issued a warrant for Kenyatta’s arrest because he is cooperating with the court–unlike Bashir. The ICC is awkward for the AU. Two of its chiefs of state are now under indictment. But, the court is unpopular among many Africans who think that it unfairly targets Africa for its prosecutions. The U.S. position on the ICC is not straightforward; U.S. policy is to support the court, and the United States signed the founding Treaty of Rome. But no administration has ever sought Senate ratification of it. There has been some speculation that Nigeria’s welcoming of Bashir was somehow intended to distance itself from the United States. I think that is highly unlikely. Bashir’s visit seems to have posed quandaries for the Jonathan government, which must be mindful of its relationship with the AU. Nigeria has provided the largest number of peacekeepers in Sudan’s Darfur. Like Charles Taylor, the former Liberian warlord, Bashir is also deeply unpopular among many in Nigeria, not least because of his alleged human rights violations in Darfur and South Sudan. Under these circumstances, I find Abati’s explanation credible: Nigeria admitted Bashir because he had been invited by the AU to its summit that Nigeria was merely hosting. I also find it credible that Bashir bailed out essentially without notice because he feared being arrested.

This is a guest post by Kyle Benjamin Schneps; a dual master’s degree candidate at Columbia University and junior fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies in Dakar, Senegal. On 2 April 2013, Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto was arrested by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in international waters off the coast of West Africa. He was arrested for his role in a transatlantic narco-trafficking operation in which he agreed to receive, store, and ship thousands of kilos of cocaine in exchange for millions of dollars and a cut of the product. Moreover, he agreed to this arrangement with DEA informants who were posing as members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), a guerilla organization classified as terrorists by the U.S. government. Mr. Na Tchuto is the former chief of the Guinea-Bissau Navy and a lauded veteran of his nation’s war of independence against Portugal. Since gaining independence in 1974, the tropical nation of Guinea-Bissau has devolved into a narco-state where a perpetual cycle of coups, desperate poverty, and a countless array of natural inlets and islands make it a drug trafficking hub for South American syndicates. The latest coup, on 12 April 2012, placed the country under the de facto control of the military leader, Antonio Indjai, despite his perfunctory concession to a transitional civilian leadership. A recent U.S. Department of State assessment reports that serious human rights abuses afflict the country, including “arbitrary killings and detentions; official corruption, exacerbated by government officials’ impunity and suspected involvement in drug trafficking; and a lack of respect for the rights of citizens to elect their government.” The Na Tchuto sting may be indicative of the expanding U.S. drug enforcement presence in West Africa. U.S. counter-narcotic assistance for the region has soared from U.S. $7.5 million in 2009, to $50 million in 2012. The United States is currently funding and training elite counter-narcotic police forces in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya. Additionally, the U.S. government has been increasing its military and intelligence capabilities in West Africa. In early 2013, the U.S. Air Force finalized an agreement with the government of Niger to conduct drone operations from a new U.S. base in the country. The operations aim to collect intelligence on terrorist activity and illicit trafficking in the region, two issues that are often interrelated. With respect to Guinea-Bissau—considered the most central link between South American cocaine and the European market—the United States has no diplomatic presence in-country and has terminated all foreign assistance due to Indjai’s illegitimate takeover of power. This lack of presence could prove detrimental to U.S. intelligence collection, especially considering the large Lebanese community in the country and its proven financial ties to Hezbollah. In Guinea-Bissau, the United States continues to be a global policeman and leader, promoting the democratic ideal in places where elections may be a distant consideration to the prospect of affording the next meal.

In April, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported the new presence of wild polio virus type 1 (WPV1) in the Banadir region of Somalia. The initial victim was a thirty-two month old girl. By the end of May, there were four polio cases in Somalia. The WHO has also announced a confirmed case of polio at Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, the world’s largest, housing 424,000 people from central Africa and the horn, close to the border of Somalia. This is Kenya’s first polio outbreak in two years. Somalia had been re-infected with wild polio virus from Nigeria in 2005, resulting in 228 documented cases. That outbreak was eradicated in 2007. The governments of Somalia and Kenya and the relevant UN agencies are moving quickly to respond. WHO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have launched a campaign to vaccinate 288,000 children under the age of fifteen in the Dadaab refugee camp. The Kenya government and WHO have launched a polio vaccination campaign in the country’s North East Province. A WHO spokeswoman also announced a campaign to vaccinate 400,000 children in Somalia. Polio can spread quickly, particularly in the crowded conditions of refugee camps or in territories ravaged by war. The WHO spokeswoman observes, “polio is a virus that spreads silently. One case presents between 200 and 1,000 people infected. It’s the tip of an iceberg.” Accordingly, The U.S. Center for Disease Control is advising polio vaccination for all travelers to Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Benin, Cameroon, and Tanzania. Polio was never entirely eradicated in Nigeria, but it has revived from a low level after the Islamist rebellion in the north ended the polio vaccination campaign. Similarly, in Somalia poor security has precluded a polio vaccination campaign in the south-central part of the country since 2009. Testing for the origin of this new polio outbreak is still underway, but preliminary evidence indicates Nigeria. Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are the only countries in the world where polio remains endemic. This most recent polio episode highlights the importance of thorough and ongoing vaccination campaigns. But, in Somalia and Nigeria fighting has resulted in the curtailment of planned vaccination campaigns. In Kenya, the overcrowding characteristic of refugee camps is a direct result of the fighting in Somalia. As in so many other areas, governance and security are proving to be essential to the elimination of a disease.

Kenya, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and, by extension, the international community currently face the dilemma of dealing with a president and a deputy president, freely and fairly elected (more or less; many questions remain) that are charged with crimes against humanity associated with 2007 election bloodshed. Africa Confidential has an excellent review of the current state of play. Kenya’s permanent representative to the UN, Kamau Macharia, on May 2 sent a thirteen-page letter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) asking it to end the ICC cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto. He argued that Kenyatta and Ruto were duly and democratically elected and could not perform their duties in the face of “an offshore trial that has no popular resonance and serves no national or international purpose.” A variation of this argument is heard among Kenyatta’s supporters; “peace” is more important than “justice,” and the ICC process should somehow go away. But, Ruto promptly disavowed the letter on the basis that the UNSC lacks the legal authority to stop the ICC proceedings. Ruto’s lawyer reaffirmed his client’s cooperation with the ICC. The attorney general of Kenya, Githu Muigal also disavowed the letter saying Kenya is not a party to the cases and has reaffirmed Kenyan cooperation with the ICC. On May 13, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, rejected the Kenyan government’s claim that it is cooperating with the court. Specifically, she said that the government failed to provide certain financial records and has not facilitated interviews that could provide her with information about the role of the police in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. Earlier, she said that the government failed to provide adequate protection for potential witnesses and that bribery and intimidation played a role in the withdrawal of potential witnesses. The ICC charges against Kenyatta and Ruto were an issue in the 2013 Kenyan elections and popular backlash against the Court probably helped them. Many Kenyans seemed to think the charges would be dropped in the aftermath of an election victory, probably at the instigation of the United States and the United Kingdom because of the importance of their ties with Kenya and Nairobi’s crucial role in Somalia. In fact, UK prime minster David Cameron hosted Kenyatta in London at the May 7 Somalia conference. The UK argued Kenyatta’s presence was “essential,” and, in effect, trumped British policy to have only “essential contact” with Kenyatta and Ruto. However, Africa Confidential credibly speculates that President Obama will skip Kenya during his next Africa trip and suggests, also credibly, that there will be a cooling of relations between Kenya and the UK and the U.S. The ICC has agreed to postpone Ruto’s trial until October. Many observers think that the ICC case against him is stronger than that against Kenyatta. If the ICC were to convict one and acquit the other, there could be serious political consequences in Kenya. Kenyatta is a leader of the Kikuyu, Ruto of the Kalenjin. The two ethnic groups have long been rivals, and fighting among them was an important element in the 2007 violence. Then, Kenyatta and Ruto were on opposite sides. For 2013, they made a political alliance, and there was little fighting between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, a factor in the largely peaceful elections. A Ruto conviction and a Kenyatta acquittal might put at risk the current truce between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu.

While violence broke out sporadically, post-election Kenya is far from the domestic Armageddon that followed the 2007 elections. Uhuru Kenyatta, under indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity in the aftermath of those elections, will be sworn-in as president this month following the 2013 elections judged credible by the Supreme Court. His chief rival, Raila Odinga, has accepted the Court’s ruling, and has conceded. Why has 2013 been so difference from 2007? Perhaps most important has been the thorough-going political reforms enshrined in a new, post 2007, constitution that significantly decentralized government authority. It replaced a unitary state with something approaching federalism. This significantly modified Kenya’s hitherto winner-take-all political culture. It also established multiple venues for political competition. For example, in 2013, Kenyatta won the presidency, but Odinga’s party won the county (state) government of Nairobi. Second, Kenyans have not forgotten the horrors of post-election 2007. There was a remarkable consensus among Kenyans that it should never again be repeated. This imposed a new degree restraint on rhetoric and behavior that is difficult to quantify, but was nevertheless real. Third, both Kenyatta and Odinga have from the beginning said they would accept the Supreme Court’s ruling on contested election results, and urged their followers to do the same. Sporadic violence after the Supreme Court ruling on March 30 indicates that Kenya is not altogether out of the woods. Nevertheless, the longer Kenya avoids a conflagration, the less likely one becomes. Though Kenyatta’s ICC indictment is an overhanging cloud, these are hopeful time for Kenya.