Kenya

In late April, I spent several days in Taiwan as part of a Council on Foreign Relations delegation. We met with a wide range of officials from the major political parties, including President Ma Ying-jeou, President-elect Tsai Ing-wen, President of the Legislative Yuan Su Jia-Chyuan, and Kuo Chang-huang, a first-term legislator. It is a period of political transition from eight years of Kuomintang (KMT) leadership under President Ma to a government led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with Tsai at the helm. And waiting in the wings is the brand new New Power Party (NPP), which was born out of the 2014 Sunflower Movement, and earned itself five seats in the most recent Legislative Yuan elections. Our meetings made three things clear to me. First, officials from each party have their own distinct set of priorities, but all share a finely-honed pragmatism. For Ma and the KMT, the priority is preserving and extending the legacy of cross-strait peace and stability that it believes derives from its success in enhancing ties with Beijing.  Even as it begins the process of winding down, the KMT is still committed to seeing through agreements with Beijing on issues such as trade in goods and services.  The road ahead will be tough given its losses in both the executive and legislative branches. The DPP and Tsai, in contrast, were all about domestic politics—pushing forward on grand-scale job training and affordable housing programs, and seeking to tap into the energy and capabilities of the island’s young people.  Reinvigorating Taiwan’s economic presence on the global stage is also front and center for the next administration, although, here too, the path forward is somewhat murky. The New Power Party was represented by a trio of young, dynamic, and edgy politicos, seeking to consolidate and expand their gains, while pushing for greater independence of action from Beijing. No one is calling for Taiwanese independence tomorrow. Second, China is succeeding in its aim of influencing politics in Taiwan during the transition, but not in the way it desires. Beijing began the year by reversing its eight-year tacit understanding to not establish diplomatic relations with countries that recognize Taiwan (thereby giving the island nation a semblance of sovereign international status) and resuming ties with Gambia. Next, it successfully pressured Kenya to deport as many as forty-five Taiwanese (the number is in dispute) to the mainland as part of a larger set of arrests of suspects in a telecom fraud ring. Despite Taiwan’s vehement protests (and a previous agreement between Taipei and Beijing to manage their own citizens in such cases), Beijing has not relented. Taiwan has sent a ten-member delegation to Beijing to try to negotiate their release. (Notably, Malaysia, which faced a similar demand from Beijing, repatriated the Taiwanese citizens back to Taiwan not to the mainland.) Beijing may think that it is firing a warning shot across the bow to Tsai by demonstrating just how much Beijing can take away if the president-elect doesn’t toe the line. Instead, however, Beijing’s actions are undermining its best partner in the Taiwanese government, President Ma, making it nearly impossible for him and his team to claim that under KMT rule Taiwan made real and sustainable progress in its relationship with the mainland. After all, if the presumed gains of the past eight years can be wiped out in the space of three months, it only reinforces the sense among many in Taiwan that Beijing cannot be trusted. Finally, after falling off the American radar screen over the past eight years, Taiwan is quickly edging its way back on. The next administration needs to keep its eye on the final objective—“that cross-Strait differences be resolved peacefully and according to the wishes of the people on both sides of the Strait.” This means we don’t help stir the pot on Taiwan and we don’t sell-out Taiwan for some ephemeral grand bargain with Beijing. Taiwan may be small but it is not a small matter. At stake is not only our relationship with Beijing but also American values and principles, which are exemplified by Taiwan’s vibrant and determined democracy.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. In early April, South Africa issued its first sovereign bond in over two years. The ten-year, $1.25 billion bond was oversubscribed by a factor of two. This is the first international bond issued by a sub-Saharan African nation in 2016. It is likely to be followed by Kenyan, Nigerian, and Ghanaian issuances. The past two years were the most active in the history of sub-Saharan Africa’s sovereign bond issuances. But, due to the state of international markets in 2016, the price of issuing bonds has been too high (near and above 10 percent) for most African countries. These sub-Saharan countries are now trying to take advantage of an momentary upswing in emerging markets, translating to potentially cheaper issuances. Because these ‘cheaper issuances’ are still high comparative to current U.S. rates, there is significant interest in sub-Saharan markets. South Africa took full advantage of this interest, and issued its bond during what might be a brief calm in the storm. After months of political uncertainty, including the potential impeachment of South African President Jacob Zuma, the rand (South Africa’s national currency) rallied to a four-month high. The bond was also issued before a potential rating downgrade. (It is feared that Standard & Poor may soon lower South Africa’s rating to junk status). These factors allowed the South African Treasury to issue their recent bond at a relatively low rate (for sub-Saharan Africa) of 4.875 percent. Other sub-Saharan nations are not likely to get such a low rate. The Kenyan Treasury was recently in London trying to gauge interest in a potential $600 million Eurobond issuance. It is rumored that they are looking to obtain a coupon rate of 8.25 percent (nearly twice that of South Africa). Along with this possible bond issuance, Kenya is concluding a $600 million loan agreement with China. Ghana has also recently met with investors in London. There is talk that it is hoping to raise up to $1 billion. Though the rate for this potential offering is unknown, Ghana’s last bond issuance in October 2015 was at a coupon rate of 10.75 percent. Nigeria, facing an $11 billion budget deficit, needs to raise money, but with the drastic decrease in oil revenue, it can’t afford to issue bonds at such high rates. In addition, the decreasing value of the naira (Nigeria’s national currency) makes it impractical to issue debt in the stronger dollar and euro markets. But, despite the obstacles, the Nigerian government believes that it must build out the country’s infrastructure if it is to develop a more diverse economy. As a result, the Nigerian government is looking for the “cheapest possible money” and turning to other markets—such as those of the Japanese and Chinese—to issue debt. There is talk that Nigeria may issue a renminbi (China’s national currency) denominated bond on the Chinese domestic market, a so-called ‘panda’ bond. If this were to happen, Nigeria would be the second country, after South Korea, to do so. Despite the current reprieve in emerging markets, the majority of sub-Saharan countries are facing a financial market that makes it extremely costly to borrow. At the same time many of these countries are at a critical juncture where they must invest in public works and infrastructure projects to further develop their economies. Because of this, we are likely to see other African states emulate Nigeria and turn to new and innovative ways to raise capital.

Contrary to misleading headlines, the International Criminal Court (ICC) did not acquit Kenyan Deputy President William Ruto and radio personality Joshua Arap Sang of charges related to violence in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. (Amnesty International cites an estimate that there were 1,200 deaths and 350,000 persons displaced by the violence.) Instead of acquittal, the ICC vacated the charges and discharged the accused, but without prejudice to the prosecutor’s right to reprosecute in the future. In 2015, the ICC prosecutor dropped charges against Ruto’s codefendant, President Uhuru Kenyatta. In both the Kenyatta and Ruto cases there have been credible allegations of witness bribery and intimidation, and the Kenyan government has not cooperated with the ICC. Hence, the ICC justices appear to have concluded that the trials cannot go forward at this time, though they could in the future. Uhuru Kenyatta and the Kenyan government has been a leader of the more general African effort to discredit the ICC. It is hard to see the outcome of the Kenyatta and Ruto cases as anything other than a major setback for the ICC and the effort to hold leaders, including a chief of state, accountable. In a press release, Michelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s deputy regional director of Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes said, “This decision could be seen as a major setback by thousands of victims who have waited so long for justice. However, this is not the end of the road for the victims. In fact, victims should be able to seek justice for these crimes in the future as the accused have not been acquitted and can be reprosecuted for these charges either by the ICC or domestically.” Nevertheless, the Kenyatta and Ruto cases show the limitations of the ICC when the relevant government refuses to cooperate with it.

It is no secret that bad leadership at the top has long been a brake on the economic, political, and social development of certain African countries. Many years the Mo Ibrahim Prize for leadership by an African president who leaves office at the end of his term goes unrewarded. There have been numerous, egregious examples of bad presidential leadership over the past few weeks. Yoweri Museveni was recently elected to another five-year term as Uganda’s president. Consequently, he will likely be in office until 2021; he came to power in 1986. The just concluded electoral process was marred by the harassment and arrest of opposition candidates and there are numerous charges of voting irregularities. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta promptly became the first head of state to congratulate Museveni. He was followed by Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza. Kenyatta successfully stonewalled an International Criminal Court prosecution for his role in the violence associated with the 2007 elections in Kenya; his vice president is still under indictment. Nkurunziza’s political machinations to remain in office form the backdrop to the current bloody crisis in Burundi. Kenyatta, Nkurunziza, and Museveni are an East African trio. They are joined by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, who appears to be trying to ensure that his wife, Grace Mugabe, becomes his successor as president. He celebrated his ninety-second birthday on February 21 lavishly, notwithstanding the drought that threatens famine. Posters proclaimed “Mugabe’s birthday is like that of Jesus Christ.” Meanwhile, Bloomberg is reporting that South African President Jacob Zuma’s son is a major shareholder in the firm buying a colliery from Glencore. Glencore has said the colliery cannot make a profit because of a coal supply arrangement with the state-owned power company, Eskom. Another big shareholder is Rajesh Kumar Gupta, a businessman whose family enjoys close ties to Duduzane Zuma. Both are widely thought to be corrupt, and their relationship is frequently described as the worst type of cronyism. The finance minister has, apparently, ordered a probe of Eskom’s coal supply contracts. Such behavior can always be excused, and much of the rhetoric in the current U.S. presidential primary season provides little basis for holier-than-thou criticism. After all, Museveni did have an election. African chiefs of state routinely congratulate each other. Mugabe’s tasteless lavishness pales in comparison with that of certain other chiefs of state, and Zuma’s son may have done nothing illegal. The fact remains that all too often Africans are ill-served by their leaders.  

For the past decade, the narrative of “Africa Rising” has been dominant. In hindsight, it was largely the product of high prices for Africa’s export commodities, especially oil, the continent’s rapid urbanization, an over-estimation of the growth of a middle class, over-reliance on dubious statistics, and more than a dollop of wishful thinking. “Africa Rising” was also a useful marketing tool for those seeking to raise capital for investment on the continent. With the collapse of oil and other commodity prices, the slow-down in China’s economy, and second thoughts about urbanization without the necessary infrastructure, especially electric power and schools, the pendulum is swinging the other way. The risk is that overoptimism will be replaced by undeserved pessimism, especially in the United States, where the economic links with Africa are less developed than those with Europe and Asia. Norimitsu Onishi makes the point that excessive pessimism can be as misleading as overoptimism in his thoughtful “African Economies, and Hopes for a New Era, Are Shaken by China,” in the January 25 New York Times. The current economic woes of Nigeria are largely the result of falling oil prices, the inability of the government to tax the non-oil wealth of the country, and structural corruption. In South Africa, falling commodity prices exacerbate the effects of the region’s worst drought in many years, itself perhaps a consequence of climate change. However, South Africa has a robust institutional and economic infrastructure, and its economy is likely to recover relatively quickly, especially with the return of rain. Onishi also makes the point that East Africa is likely to weather the current economic downturn better than other regions because its economies are not dependent on a single commodity such as oil. The point is that sub-Saharan “Africa” is a region of countries that no more lends itself to generalization than any other part of the world. In big countries, such as Nigeria and South Africa, there are huge regional differences as well, with plenty of economic opportunites even if the “Rising” narrative is discredited.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Earlier this month, al-Shabab attacked an African Union (AU) base deep into AU controlled territory. This was followed up last week with an attack on civilians in AU controlled Mogadishu. The attacks reminded the world, again, that although al-Shabab has lost some of its previous stature, it remains resilient. But, a new threat looms. Recently, al-Shabab has been struggling to counter the new threat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s growing influence in East Africa. As the Islamic State gains momentum, and the rival groups compete for recruits and jockey for position, they may both use attacks on AU troops and civilians to prove their legitimacy.  Paul D. Williams recently pointed out that al-Shabab has mutated in the past several years after the AU Mission in Somalia pushed al-Shabab out of Mogadishu. The terrorist group, which Williams calls “an increasingly extremist and transnational network,” uses large scale, isolated, and sometimes international attacks to maintain relevance. The Westgate Mall attack, the attack on Garissa University, the 2010 bombings in Uganda, and the AU base attack last September are all part of this pattern. He also noted al-Shabab’s increased interest in destabilizing parts of Kenya. As the Kenyan government has often overreacted to al-Shabab attacks by targeting ethnic Somalis in Kenya, whom it blames for supporting al-Shabab, it seems likely that al-Shabab will continue attacking Kenyan targets in the hope of pushing disenfranchised Somalis toward their cause. What is perhaps more worrying is the introduction of a new power struggle within al-Shabab’s ranks. Al-Shabab is no stranger to infighting, purges, and leadership changes. But this round of infighting is unique in that it centers on the question of al-Shabab’s allegiance. Long an al-Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic State has aggressively pursued al-Shabab. Given the Islamic State’s global claims and recent expansions into Yemen and West Africa, it is not surprising that it wants to gain a foothold in East Africa. With the exception of a small number of fighters who have defected to the Islamic State, al-Shabab has thus far resisted this merger. Although it is dangerous to generalize, the group is predominately regionally focused. It lacks the global ambitions of the Islamic State. It is possible that this is one area of global jihad that the Islamic State cannot penetrate. But there are factions within al-Shabab that think the group should operate more internationally. If groups sympathetic to or aligned with the Islamic State do begin to emerge and compete for recruits and prestige in Somalia, the tempo of attacks against civilians and AU troops seems likely to increase, potentially thwarting the progress that has been made in the country. Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups will use these attacks to prove themselves. All of this is bad news for the Somali people trying to rebuild their country. Al-Shabab will continue to see these types of attacks as necessary to bolster and support its narrative and legitimacy. Upstart Islamic State groups will see the attacks as necessary for the same reason. In early December 2015, President Hassan Sheikh Mohammad wrote after the Paris attacks that Somalia would “battle against the global phenomenon” that al-Shabab and the Islamic State represent. Unfortunately, Somalia may soon be facing both.

In November during a Nairobi, Kenya slum visit, Pope Francis used plain language to express home truths about African elites. According to UK media the Pope ascribed the “injustices” suffered by the slum residents to “wounds inflicted by minorities who cling to power and wealth, who selfishly squander while a growing majority is forced to flee to abandoned, filthy, and rundown peripheries.” He also talked about the unjust distribution of land, a particularly sensitive issue among Kenya’s poor, where the perception is that the elites have helped themselves to the most productive land. The elites, he said, have established “new forms of colonialism.” He urged them to be more responsive to the peoples they rule. Indeed, the indigenous “colonialism” described by the Pope is to be found throughout Africa, not least in Kenya and Uganda, two of the three countries he visited. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has ruled for 24 years and estimates of his net worth range from $1.1 to $11 billion. (According to the UN Development Program gross national income in Uganda is $1,335 a year). Uhuru Kenyatta, has been president of Kenya for less than two years. However, he is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, who ruled Kenya from 1964 to 1978. The son’s estimated net worth is $500 million. (Gross national income in Kenya is $2,158 a year). Gross inequality of income, with links between power and money, is to be found elsewhere: by comparison, Donald Trump’s estimated net worth is $4.5 billion according to Forbes. But, the direct relationship between the poverty of most and wealth of the few is particularly stark in Africa. The celebrated Nigerian author, Chinua Achebe, wrote that there is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. Instead, he wrote, “The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, the challenge of the personal example, which are the hallmarks of true leadership.” In Nairobi, the Pope was describing something of the same reality.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The government of Kenya is tapping the country’s digital finance prowess to raise critical infrastructure funds. The National Treasury has teamed up with a local mobile money pioneer, Safaricom, to launch the so-called M-Akiba bond. It is the first government security carried exclusively on mobile phones. M-Akiba is a national economic solution that has the potential of filling-in for foreign investment. This is especially important in light of Standard & Poor’s recent lowering of Kenya’s credit rating outlook to negative due to depreciation of the Kenyan Shilling and a growing budget deficit. M-Akiba, like M-Pesa, which was developed in response to Kenya’s retail banking shortcomings, is another African tech-based solution to a regional finance challenge. This initiative is also significant in the aftermath of J.P. Morgan’s recent dropping of Nigeria from its local-currency emerging market bond index. That move could signal a waning of international interest in African bond markets, which have become more important to African government infrastructure financing over the last several years. Despite the continent’s rapid economic growth in the past decade, investors may be worried by the recent fall in commodity prices and China’s cooling economy, both of which are having secondary effects in Africa. In the midst of this potential downturn, African countries must find new ways to create investment. Kenya is seeking to do that with the M-Akiba bond, an original way to raise capital through its citizens while leveraging East Africa’s large, and ever-growing, mobile markets. Mobile platforms such as M-Pesa have been extremely successful in Kenya, where 75 percent of its citizens own cell phones and 60 percent of its population transact payments via M-Pesa. The Kenyan government argues that M-Akiba will not only help them tap into local investors for government bonds, but that it will allow more Kenyans to build personal savings (Akiba is the Swahili word for savings). M-Akiba lowers many of the hurdles to citizen investors purchasing government bonds. They no longer have to go through a financial intermediary (just their mobile phones) and the 3,000 Shillings ($29) entry price makes M-Akiba bonds more accessible than typical government bonds, priced at 50,000 Shillings (approximately $475). Similar to M-Pesa, which has become a leading example for digital payments providers around the world, the M-Akiba concept could become a model for developing economy government finance.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs candidate at the University of Toronto. In a report titled “Fighting Terror with Terror,” the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights confirmed over a hundred allegations of human rights abuses committed by Kenyan security forces since 2014. Meanwhile, recruitment in Kenya for the Somali extremist group al-Shabaab is at an all time high, suggesting a link between state-sponsored repression and growing radicalization. The report details twenty-five confirmed extrajudicial killings by Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), incidences of torture, the discovery of several mass graves, and over eighty arbitrary arrests and detentions. The targets of these abuses are disproportionately young Muslim and Somali men. In December 2014, The Kenyan National Assembly passed draconian legislation known as the Security Laws Amendment Act. The act limited oversight of the ATPU while giving it sweeping new powers. It allowed for the curtailing of civil liberties, most notably the increase of arrest without trial time to 360 days. What is more, as a result of the legislation, hundreds of civil society organizations have been listed as potential sources of funding for terrorism, including the Muslim Human Rights (Muhuri) organization and Haki Africa, which work to protect and promote human rights in Kenya. Muhari suggested they were targeted due to their work exposing abuses by the security services. Kenyan police targeting of Somalis, many of whom are Kenyan citizens whose families have resided in Kenya for generations, is hardly a new phenomenon. After the terror attack on Westgate Mall in 2013, the Kenyan police increased the frequency and invasiveness of home sweeps in Eastleigh, a predominately Somali neighborhood in Nairobi. By April 2014, over a thousand Somalis were being held without charge in a football stadium in the outskirts of Nairobi, and hundreds of others had disappeared. The combination of heavy-handed tactics and ethnic discrimination discouraged reporting of missing family members lest they became targets of the security forces. Young Somalis in Kenya face challenges common to youth in other developing countries, and then some. If rampant unemployment, poverty, and lack of opportunity disproportionately affect youth, Somalis face the added challenge of ethnic discrimination, police brutality, and in the case of refugees, barriers to formal sector employment. Of Kenya’s half a million refugees, over 400,000 are those who have fled Somalia’s protracted conflict. In a context of marginalization and fear, young Somali men become ideal targets for al-Shabaab recruiters, who offer them security, monetary compensation, and a sense of purpose and belonging. As Somali youth are increasingly victimized by Kenyan security forces and marginalized from mainstream Kenyan society, it is possible to see the appeal of joining the al-Shabaab insurgency. The rise of homegrown terror in Kenya must be interpreted in the context of the country’s security policy, and international funders of anti-terror programs should use their leverage to ensure that parties responsible are held to account. Rather than increasing security in Kenya, the ATPU is adding to the discontent that fuels participation in the extremist groups in the Horn of Africa.

This is a guest-post by Andrea Crosta, co-Founder and Executive Director of Elephant Action League (EAL). The Elephant Action League (EAL) is appreciative of this opportunity to justify our findings on al-Shabaab’s involvement in the ivory trade and our decision to not share certain details gleaned from confidential sources due to security and confidentiality reasons. The professional investigative team that conducted the investigation – including myself – considers the safety of our sources nonnegotiable. As such EAL will not release sensitive details until our sources are safe. However, we hope that more information supporting our work will be published in the coming months. The figures presented in our 2013 report, Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory, are based on an investigation into the potential role of al-Shabaab in the trafficking of ivory conducted between 2011 and 2012. At the time, African governments, international governmental organizations, and law enforcement agencies were apathetic and often unaware of the magnitude of elephant poaching and the large quantities of ivory trafficked through East Africa. Especially prominent was the port of Mombasa, through which an estimated 188,170 kg of ivory was smuggled between 2009 and 2015, as outlined by our newly released report (based on an estimated 10% seizure rate). In Tanzania, between 2009 and 2014, over 85,000 elephants have been poached, which is equal to roughly 200 tons of ivory smuggled every year from Tanzania alone, often through Kenya. In that period, we began picking up information about large quantities of ivory being trafficked by Somalis, either through Somalia or directly from Kenya. The fact that Somalis were involved in ivory trafficking was not new, as they have been historically linked to elephant poaching. What was unique was the alleged involvement of al-Shabaab, as also reported by Jeffrey Gettleman in an article for the New York Times in September 2012. Over the subsequent eighteen months, thanks to personal introductions by trusted individuals coming from the same clans and sub-clans (crucial in the Somali culture), the investigators met several Somali traffickers and businessmen who were doing businesses with al-Shabaab who confirmed and explained how the terrorist organization had positioned itself as an important middleman in the trafficking of ivory, making hundreds of thousands of dollars every month through their direct involvement in this illicit activity. At that time al-Shabaab still controlled vital points on the border with Kenya, as well as key ports in Somalia such as Kismayo and Merca. EAL has never denied the importance of other far more substantial sources of profit for al-Shabaab - such as charcoal - but through this investigation, we simply exposed an important regional player that contributed significantly to ivory trafficking. Terrorism and terrorist organizations do not drive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking,  but they certainly do play a role. The magnitude of al-Shabaab involvement in the illegal ivory trade at the moment is unknown although occasionally through our on-going field activities, we receive information about ivory continuing to be smuggled through Somalia by various entities.

The Kenyan military has announced that it killed a British subject, by appearance ethnically English, during an al-Shabaab attack on a military base in Lamu county. The Kenyan police have issued a $100,000 reward for the capture of a German national who appears to be ethnically German who also took part in the al-Shabaab attack. Al-Shabaab has long attracted foreign fighters, both in Somalia and in Kenya. But, nearly all of them have been ethnic Somalis. Unlike the self-proclaimed Islamic State , which has attracted significant numbers of ethnic Europeans to its cause, al-Shabaab, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, has not. The appearance of western nationals among al-Shabaab ranks is unusual but not unique. In the aftermath of al-Shabaab’s attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in 2013 parts of the media had a field day with speculation about the role of “the White Widow” as a leader of al-Shabaab. Identified as Samantha Lewthwaite, an English widow of a Somali al-Shabaab fighter, who is wanted in Kenya for charges of possession of explosives and conspiracy to commit a felony. However, the stories of her leadership had little credence, and she was never credibly linked to the Westgate Mall attack. There is also the case of Omar Shafik Hammami, an American of Irish descent, who is believed to have been an al-Shabaab commander until his death at the command of the now deceased al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane in 2013. The media is also reporting that the Islamic State is attempting to recruit al-Shabaab fighters. There might be a link between that effort and the appearance of European fighters in al-Shabaab’s ranks. It is too soon to say whether the appearance of a German and a Brit among al-Shabaab fighters is a new development. There is always concern that Europeans or Americans who join radical jihadi groups will return home and carry out “lone wolf” attacks. Hence the need to carefully watch for signs that al-Shabaab is recruiting non-Somali Europeans and Americans.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. On October 16, 2011, the Kenyan army, in an ostensibly joint operation with the Somalian and Ethiopian militaries, crossed the border into Somalia and attacked the insurgent group al-Shabaab. In response to the October 16 offensive, al-Shabaab launched an attack in Kenya on October 24, 2011. The attack killed one person. Nearly four years later, al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University in Kenya last month, which killed nearly 150, underscores that despite military success in Somalia the group’s threat in Kenya is far from contained. Al-Shabaab violence against civilians in Kenya doubled between 2012 and 2013 and then again between 2013 and 2014. Already, the death toll of the recent Garissa attack alone has surpassed al-Shabaab’s 2014 civilian targets. Not only are al-Shabaab campaigns in Kenya increasing, but the group is recruiting native Kenyan members, sympathizers, and allies, rather than just importing operatives from Somalia. Indeed, the AFP reports all four gunmen involved in the Garissa attack were Kenyan – a testament to the group’s successful local recuiting campaigns. Critics such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and Kenyan human rights groups have criticized government treatment of ethnic Somalis in state counterterrorism efforts – a major factor pushing ethnic Somali and Muslim Kenyans toward al-Shabaab. This treatment includes ethnic profiling, mass arrests, and extrajudicial killings. It is feared that the Kenyan government will only step up these activities in the aftermath of the Garissa attack. Meanwhile, this heavy handed response has been counterproductive at best. It has bred mistrust of the government and disillusionment with the broader concept of national unity. Even the staunchest anti-Shabaab Somali community in Kenya feels alienated by the security forces’ brutal counterterrorism tactics. And, as a recent International Crisis Group report confirms, al-Shabaab exploits Kenyan Muslims’ grievances over discriminatory and abusive security tactics in recruitment campaigns. If Kenyan forces continue to isolate Somali and Muslim communities, they will push them into the open arms of al-Shabaab recruiters. In the face of rising pressure to combat al-Shabaab and the failure of their existing strategy, the Kenyan government has proposed a new plan: to close the Dadaab refugee camp. They fear that the camp, home to 350,000 Somalis and located in northeast Kenya close to the Somali border, serves as a hideout for al-Shabaab militants. Notwithstanding that there is not enough information to confirm such suspicions, closing the camp and resettling Somali refugees would be disastrous. As the United Nations, UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Amnesty, and HRW, point out, conditions in Somalia are inappropriate for repatriation: the country is still insecure, and the life, freedom, and health of refugees would be threatened, if repatriated. Additionally, and perhaps more problematic for the Kenyan government, resettlement could play right into the hands of al-Shabaab, handing the group a population presumably disillusioned with the Kenyan government and defenseless against radicalization and conscription efforts. Kenya needs to rethink its strategy against al-Shabaab. Only by working with local Somali and Muslim populations can the Kenyan government undermine al-Shabaab’s rise in Kenya.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. In the past five years, the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab has lost most of its senior leadership, surrendered its control of southern Somalia, and seen its cash flow shrink. The group has certainly seen better times. But as the success of recent attacks in Kenya and Mogadishu indicate, the group is regaining some of its previous stature but as a fundamentally different group. Al-Shabaab is now more decentralized and has a larger geographic focus. Given regional dynamics, an inept Kenyan security response, refugee flows from Yemen, and a diminished United States presence, this new embodiment of al-Shabaab is becoming increasingly difficult to counter. Internal shifts began in 2013. Infighting among various factions coupled with a series of catastrophic military defeats at the hands of international forces caused the group to change its structure and priorities. Al-Shabaab evolved from an organization with clear leadership to a more decentralized, diffuse organization, in part thanks to a degradation of core leadership due to U.S. drone strikes. With the shift in leadership, the organization’s goals became more ambiguous. Instead of seeking to rule Somalia, it is principally seeking to spoil the political process in Somalia and disrupt governance in East Africa. The emergent version of al-Shabaab no longer engages in traditional warfare, instead it focuses on asymmetric warfare, showing willingness to conduct audacious and horrific attacks. As it loses ground in Somalia, it has started to look to targets in Kenya, and even Tanzania. Despite the fact that al-Shabaab’s reorganization was largely reactive and unplanned, it has positioned the group well to effectively disrupt Somali politics. Beyond the structural changes of the group, Kenyan domestic policies have helped al-Shabaab. Anemic responses to the West Gate Mall and Garissa University attacks by the authorities vividly illustrate how inept Kenya has been at responding to al-Shabaab’s updated tactics. More importantly, however, the Kenyan domestic security reaction has been counterproductive. In the wake of recent attacks, the Kenyan government announced that it plans to forcibly displace several hundred thousand Somali refugees from northern Kenya by closing the Dadaab refugee camp. They also plan to erect an Israeli style wall on the Kenya-Somalia boarder. Provocative policies like these will likely exacerbate tensions between the government and the two million ethnic Somalis living in Kenya. Al-Shabaab will, as it always has, take advantage of such a golden recruitment opportunity. The broader global context is also benefiting al-Shabaab’s cause. News on the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Boko Haram has dominated media headlines and captured the world’s focus. This not only gives al-Shabaab breathing room to continue its resurgence, but it incentivizes al-Shabaab to conduct more shocking attacks to compete with these groups for foreign recruits and airtime. Refugees fleeing renewed conflict in Yemen may also provide a boost to al-Shabaab. The influx could destabilize Somalia, potentially allowing al-Shabaab to return to previous strongholds. In a worst-case scenario, al-Shabaab could have a fresh population to terrorize and recruit. Perhaps most worryingly, the United States has probably lost the willingness to alter events in the Horn of Africa. The Islamic State and Boko Haram pose a greater geopolitical threat compared to al-Shabaab which operates in East Africa, an area where the United States has fewer vital interests. Even comparatively low cost countermeasures, such as drone strikes, will become less useful as the group becomes more decentralized, diffuse, and covers a wider geographic area. Al-Shabaab will continue its current pattern of attacks, likely undeterred by the United States. Coupled with Kenya’s inability to deter the group and a favorable global context, al-Shabaab looks like a more dangerous threat than even at the height of its power.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Lately, conservationists and lovers of Africa’s diverse wildlife have been hard pressed for good news. From South Africa’s difficulty tackling rhino poaching to Zimbabwe’s sale of baby elephants to foreign countries, it often seems that African governments are either ill equipped to protect their animal populations or simply don’t care—or worse. However, it is important to remember that there are park rangers who are working tirelessly to protect and save Africa’s biodiversity. In the face of the ever increasing threat of poaching, these rangers have shown great ingenuity, embracing innovative technology and new strategies to safeguard Africa’s wildlife. More and more, these ranger organizations have been looking to the sky in order to combat poaching on the ground. The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust (DSWT), which has raised orphaned elephants and rhinos in Kenya since 1977, uses aircraft  to find and identify at risk animals and discover potential poachers. The Namibian government, Kruger National Park, and the Kenya Wildlife Service have all begun using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These organizations believe that by using aircrafts and UAVs they will be able not only to catch poachers in the act, but also to deter potential poachers before any animals are harmed. Working a bit more down to earth, many conservancies and wildlife services have embraced the use of trained dogs. Groups in Kenya, South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have begun using dogs to aid in anti-poaching operations. The most popular breeds tend be bloodhounds and malinois/shepards. These dogs offer comparative advantages based on the mission and region: the hounds, which are trailing dogs, have been very successful in the forests of Kenya and in the DRC while the malinois/shepards, air-scenting dogs, are more widely used on the open terrain of South Africa. In South Africa’s Kruger National Park, one private reserve, the Bulele nature reserve, has formed an all female team of rangers to conduct anti-poaching operations. The group, known as the Black Mambas, are unarmed and meant not only to stop poachers but to also change communal perception of rangers in local communities, who are often seen as playing the villain to the impoverished poachers’ Robin Hood. As a result, more women want to participate in anti-poaching and to help the Black Mambas. As one member of the organization put it, “I am a lady, I am going to have a baby. I want my baby to see a rhino, that’s why I am protecting it.” Over the last ten months, there hasn’t been a single rhino killed in their section of Kruger Park. Compare this to last year, when 827 of the 1215 rhinos reported poached in South Africa last year were in Kruger. It is important to remember that despite all of the alarming trends of increased animal poaching over the last few years, there are people on the front lines continuing to fight to protect animals. However, the poaching epidemic is far too large and too international for rangers on the ground to counter it alone. Governments and international organizations must assist rangers in their fight by implementing and enforcing stricter laws against poaching and the trade of wildlife goods.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. In mid-December, the Kenyan parliament passed counterterrorism legislation that has since been hotly contested by politicians, civil society leaders, journalists, and ordinary citizens alike for its alleged infringement on basic civil liberties. Since al Shabaab’s bold and bloody siege of Nairobi’s Westgate shopping center in September 2013, the government of President Uhuru Kenyatta has been under pressure to upgrade its security and counterterrorism framework. Al Shabaab’s campaign against civilians, government officials, and police and security forces across Kenya has continued, culminating last month in two assaults in the northeast that left sixty-four dead. The newly passed Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014--President Kenyatta and his supporters’ response to al Shabaab--grants government agencies and security forces expansive powers to enhance counterterrorism efforts. Yet, these security measures have incited intense criticism. Leaders of the opposition coalition, the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), view the law as a bid to consolidate political power and an attempt to roll back hard won democratic gains in Kenya. CORD’s Raila Odinga petitioned Kenya’s high court to suspend the bill for its unconstitutionality and spoke out publicly against the law, arguing this is “how dictatorship and collapse all begin.” Certain aspects of the bill have also prompted serious scrutiny from outside the political arena. Notably, the law expands the powers of security forces, which Human Rights Watch fears will violate citizens’ right to due process. It extends the length of time terrorism suspects can be detained without charge from ninety days to almost a year, and it enables National Intelligence Service officials “to stop and detain suspects, search and seize private property, and monitor communications without a current warrant.” Additionally, the law imposes restrictions on the press, requiring journalists to receive approval before beginning investigations or publishing stories on issues of domestic terrorism and security. Journalists, civil society organizations, and activists fear the government will use the law to diminish the free flow of information and to protect security forces from public scrutiny. Foreign governments and international organizations have also criticized the security law. In particular, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International denounced the bill’s infringement on basic rights and called attention to articles restricting the freedoms of assembly and association. U.S. Department of State Spokesperson Jen Psaki echoed similar sentiments and expressed particular concern over the provisions that “appear to limit freedom of assembly and media, and access to asylum for refugees.” In light of recent events, Kenya needs to mount a robust counterterrorism campaign against al Shabaab, but this security bill is far from the answer. While internal critics see it as a threat to democratic governance and freedoms, the bill also has important security implications. The expanded surveillance, search and seizure, and detention powers in the new bill will allow the security forces to escalate one particularly controversial aspect of current counterterrorism efforts: collective targeting of Muslims and ethnically Somali communities. From indiscriminate arrests and mass round-ups to assassinations of Muslim clerics, security forces’ use of collective punishment has been well documented. Already, this strategy has fermented a sense of injustice and exclusion among Muslims and ethnic Somalis. Continuing on this trajectory will only further alienate these communities and exacerbate radicalization by driving marginalized citizens into the open arms of al Shabaab recruiters. While it may seem that the Security Laws (Amendment) Bill is purely a domestic Kenyan issue, Kenya’s national counterterrorism strategy affects the entire region. Kenya’s efforts could either help curb al Shabaab or provide them fertile recruiting ground, and thus have profound implications for U.S. interests in maintaining regional security in the horn of Africa and preventing Somalia from turning into a hotbed of terrorist activity.