Kenya

In Kenya and around the world, anxiety is mounting about the potential for violence following the August 8 national elections. Incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta is leading opposition candidate Raila Odinga by 55 percent to 45 percent, or more than one million votes. Odinga is characterizing the still-unofficial election results as a “sham, fictitious, and fake.” He claims that Kenyatta’s Jubilee party hacked the computers of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. Already, there are reports of violence and killings during post-election protests across many parts of the country. The voting itself, however, appears to have gone well, and there was little or no violence. This follows a frequent African pattern of peaceful voting. Violence tends to break out only after the results are announced or leak out. Even though the Kenyan voting went well, there were enough irregularities—late delivery of ballots, late opening of polls, and instances of failure of the biometric technology—to raise questions. At this point, however, Odinga is not questioning the voting. Rather, he is claiming that the ballot counting has been compromised by “hacking”. For his followers, the pre-election murder of the election official responsible for technology will lead credence to his accusation. Elsewhere in Africa, notably Nigeria, election rigging occurs most successfully during the ballot counting process, rather than at polling stations. The future depends on whether the general Kenyan public accepts the results of the election or if it splits largely along ethnic lines corresponding to party affiliation. Much will also depend on how Kenyatta and Odinga respond. The two leaders can inflame their followers through rhetoric, or they can urge calm and the peaceful resolution of election disputes through the courts. Kenyatta has said that he will accept the results, and has urged his supporters to return home after voting. The Odinga camp, on the other hand, has been more ambiguous; Odinga has urged his supporters in Nairobi to gather at a downtown park, while his vice presidential running mate has urged calm. The personal and political stakes are particularly high for Odinga, who, at age 73, has likely run his last presidential campaign, win or lose. During the campaign, both assured their followers of the inevitability of their victory, and did nothing to prepare them for the possibility of defeat. Indeed, pre-election polls showed the two candidates neck-in-neck, which may raise doubts about Kenyatta’s very large lead.  The behavior of the Kenyan army and police will also be crucial, neither of which Kenyans hold in high esteem. The police appear to be especially corrupt, as they demonstrated in their response to the 2013 Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack. Neither is known for subtlety. Some Odinga supporters saw the deployment of military units to polling stations as part of a Kenyatta effort to intimidate them.  Kenyans will pay close attention to the conclusions of international observers, such as the Carter Center delegation led by former Secretary John Kerry and the African Union observers led by former South African president Thabo Mbeki. On August 7, former president Barack Obama, in a rare public statement, inter alia, called on Kenya’s political leaders to reject violence and the security services to behave professionally. He urged election disputes to be resolved in the courts according to the rule of law. For many Kenyans, Barack Obama has a unique standing because his father was a Kenyan Luo (as is Odinga), and because of his administration’s emphasis on human rights and democratic governance.  These are dangerous times for Kenya. Too often international attention to high-profile African elections wanders as soon as the voting concludes. Observer delegations quickly draft a report and then leave. In the United States, North Korea is the current focus, not Africa. There is still no Assistant Secretary of State for Africa to sustain attention on Kenya or other African issues. Yet the stakes for the United States in the successful conclusion of the Kenyan elections are considerable. Kenya is the east African nation with which Washington has an important dialogue, especially on security and counter-terrorism, not least with respect to Somalia, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Post-election violence in Kenya could seriously disrupt that conversation, while successful elections in Kenya would be an important, democratic example for its neighbors, notably the Great Lakes countries.  

On Tuesday, August 8, Kenyans will vote to fill about 1,880 positions. The highest profile race is for the president. The leading candidates are the Jubilee party’s Uhuru Kenyatta and the opposition National Super Alliance’s Raila Odinga. Both are scions of family and political networks that have dominated Kenyan politics since independence. Polls indicate that the race is very tight. Both presidential candidates, however, have assured their supporters that they will win; they have not prepared their followers for the possibility of defeat.  The 2007 elections in Kenya were very violent and reflected the important role of ethnic rivalries in politics, notably between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. In the aftermath, Kenya adopted a new constitution designed, in part, to mitigate the winner-take-all electoral culture that promoted violence. It also delegated significant power to forty-seven newly-created counties, each of which has its own governor, thereby reducing the role and power of the presidency. The elections of 2013 were subsequently significantly better. In 2013 Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and William Ruto, a Kalenjin, ran on the same ticket as president and vice-president, respectively, rather than against each other as had been the case in 2007. This, combined with the new constitutional arrangements, certainly mitigated instances of violence. In 2013, Kenyatta’s chief presidential opponent was Raila Odinga, who comes from the country’s second largest ethnic group, the Luo. The election of 2017 is a rematch between the two. The continued alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto continues to reduce the likelihood of violence between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. What is less known is how the Luo will respond if Odinga is defeated. A recent study shows that violence occurs in about half of all elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of it is before the polling date, but when it occurs after the results are announced, it tends to be more severe. In Kenya, under the new constitution, governorships are fiercely contested. It is likely that much, perhaps most, of the violence has accordingly been de-centralized and received less international media attention than would have been the case in Nairobi. Indeed, there has already been violence in the lead-up to August 8, notably the kidnapping and murder of Chris Msando. He was in charge of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) Data Centre, which is responsible for the management of computer systems for voter identification and vote counting. If there is a wave of violence after Election Day, it may well be some days before the extent of it becomes known. The IEBC is trying to implement an incredibly complex electronic voter registration and vote-counting system, for which Msando was responsible. However, according to the International Crisis Group, similar systems have failed in other African elections.  Levels of anxiety about the elections are high in Kenya and in neighboring states which are closely tied to the Kenyan economy. Credible polling results will be crucial to avoiding violence and system failure would pose a risk to that credibility. The post-election stance of Kenyatta and Odinga will also be of great importance if widespread violence is to be avoided. If the loser concedes (as incumbent Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan did to Muhammadu Buhari in 2015), the prospect of violence is much reduced. However, the contrary is true if the initial loser contests the results, especially outside the courts and in the streets.  

The very tight race between Uhuru Kenyatta and his Jubilee Party and Raila Odinga and the National Super Alliance (NASA) reflects growing food insecurity that, in turn, is the product of drought, which may also be related to climate change. Spring rainfall is down 75 percent from the its five-year average, bringing Kenya’s staple food crop, maize, down 70 percent from its five-year average, according to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization. In response to the drought, food prices are much higher than normal. According to local observers, the price of maize flour is up 50 percent, milk is up 12 percent, and sugar, 21 percent. Food agencies estimate that 2.6 million of 48  million Kenyans are now “food insecure,” with estimates that the number could increase by one million by August. In certain remote areas, food agencies are describing the situation as “one step away from famine.”  The incumbent Kenyatta administration has introduced price controls on maize flour and lifted tariffs on imported maize. The opposition, NASA, sees these steps as too little too late. It is also critical of alleged white-elephant prestige projects, general corruption, and government policies that benefit big farmers and millers, often with close ties to Jubilee. Election Day, August 8, will show the extent to which voter anger at high food prices is directed at the Kenyatta administration. As the incumbent, Kenyatta would normally be the favorite, not least because of the administration’s patronage networks. But that advantage could be undercut by the price of maize.  

Kenya’s elections are scheduled to be held on August 8, exactly two weeks from today, and the race between the two leading presidential candidates is tightening. According to opinion polls, opposition leader Raila Odinga has a slight lead over incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta. The two leading political parties, Kenyatta’s Jubilee and Odinga’s National Super Alliance (NASA), are hiring elections expertise. NASA alone is planning to station up to one hundred thousand observers at the roughly forty thousand polling places.  There is the possibility that the elections might be postponed because of ballot-printing contract issues. Postponement would probably help the Jubilee as it has deeper pockets than the NSA, and therefore could better sustain a longer campaign period. Some measures put in place in the aftermath of the violent 2007 elections appear to be working. There have been prosecutions for politicians resorting to hate speech and, more broadly, the decentralization measures put in place by Kenya’s new constitution have reduced somewhat the winner-take-all climate that marred Kenyan—and other African—elections in the past. Nairobi, for example, is governed by the NASA coalition. Nevertheless, observers are concerned that hate speech may be occurring at the local level below the national and international radar. Politics remain dominated by tribal identities, and elections have usually been the occasion for violence.    Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party is supported by the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin are likely to support current vice president and Kenyatta running mate, William Ruto. Odinga’s National Super Alliance is a coalition of opposition parties that enjoys the support of many Luo and Lukya, while the Kamba support Kalonzo Musuyoka, vice president from 2008 to 2013 and Odinga’s running mate. Political lines are drawn in part based on ethnic conflicts over water and land use.    Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga are long-time fixtures of Kenyan national life. On balance, both are pro-American and pro-western, though they have been in public life so long that their public statements can be mined to show the contrary. Kenyatta is the son of Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of Kenya’s independence movement and its first president. Odinga is the son of Oginga Odinga, Jomo Kenyatta’s first vice president. Raila Odinga, 72, was educated at the university level in the former German Democratic Republic and Uhuru Kenyatta, 55, graduated from Amherst College in Massachusetts. Both have extensive business interests and are very wealthy. Uhuru Kenyatta and his current vice president, William Ruto, were indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), but the case against them collapsed because of alleged Kenyan government intimidation of witnesses, according to the ICC prosecutor. Odinga, on the other hand, has a reputation as a human rights activist. Some observers think that a Kenyatta victory will be a victory for the status quo, while, despite his age, an Odinga victory might open new political possibilities, especially with respect to fighting against patronage-fueled corruption.  

The United States and Kenya have a long standing military relationship. They are allies in the “war on terror,” of which Kenya has been a major victim. Notable attacks on Kenyan soil include the 1998 Al-Qaeda led bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi where twelve Americans and hundreds of Kenyans lost their lives, and the Westgate Shopping Mall bombings of 2013 by Al-Shabaab, which claimed the lives of nearly seventy Kenyans and expatriates. In addition, Kenya has been embroiled in a war against al-Shabaab in Somalia. U.S. forces are involved in training exercises with the Kenyan Defense Forces. As a result of this conflict, the insurgency has spilt over into Kenya’s northern (Turkana) and Coastal regions (Mombasa and Lamu). This has sparked numerous successful, and unsuccessful terrorist operations throughout the country. In this context, the Obama administration approved a $10 million drone sale to Kenya in 2016. In early 2017, the Obama administration also approved a $418 million sale of armed aircraft to Kenya. This would be the largest sale of U.S. military material to Kenya. Ted Budd the Congressman from North Carolina, led fellow members of Congress in questioning the procurement and contracting dimensions of the sale, however, observers think that the sale will be approved. The Trump administration has yet to signal whether it will continue the close relationship between Kenya and the United states as characterized by the Obama administration. Based on regional security partnerships and the “war on terror,” an early reading is that the Trump administration is likely to maintain, and perhaps even enhance, security cooperation with Kenya. However, human rights advocates will be concerned about Kenyan military abuses, especially with regards to the country’s Somali minority. In Congress, questions remain over the appropriateness of the equipment that the Kenyans wish to buy. The human rights record of the current administration of Uhuru Kenyatta is hardly unblemished. He was accused of gross human rights abuses in the context of the 2007 presidential elections and was indicted by the International Criminal Court. The indictment was later dropped, and the prosecutor claimed that the Kenyatta government refused to cooperate and intimidated witnesses. Kenya faces national elections at the end of 2017, which could again turn violent.

At the end of the recent 28th African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa on January 31, a recommendation emerged that collectively member states should withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC). The AU is not a party to the Treaty of Rome, which established the ICC, and its recommendation cannot compel individual states to withdraw. According to the media, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania opposed the AU recommendation and other states declined to commit themselves. In the aftermath of the recommendation, on February 1, Nigeria publicly reiterated its intention to remain within the ICC. The most vocal advocates for withdrawal have been Kenya, Burundi, and South Africa. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto were both indicted by the ICC for crimes connected to their 2007 elections. Both cases collapsed, with the Kenyan government declining to cooperate with the ICC and, possibly, tampering with witnesses. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has been widely censured for his failure to hand over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir when he visited South Africa in 2015 for an AU heads of state summit. Al-Bashir has been indicted by the ICC. As a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, South Africa was obligated to hand him over for trial. Zuma failed to do so and even helped facilitate al-Bashir’s travel back to Sudan. This is apparently a violation of both the Treaty of Rome and South African law. As such, there is currently a case against him still making its way through the South African courts. The Burundian government took steps to withdraw from the ICC following a credible UN investigation of systematic human rights abuses, including the discovery of mass graves. However, in Kenya legislation to bring about withdrawal from the ICC has lapsed. Similar legislation has not been introduced in South Africa. Further, according to Deutsche Welle, both the Kenyatta and Zuma governments appear to be exploring possible amendments to the Treaty of Rome – which implies their continued membership. Nevertheless, sentiment in sub-Saharan Africa is widespread that the ICC “unfairly” has focused on the continent, and ignored abuses elsewhere. Some African intellectuals complain that the ICC has ignored the human rights abuses committed by western nations, including those alleged against the George W. Bush administration with respect to Iraq. African nations often cite the United States as an example of why they should not be beholden to the ICC: the U.S. position is that it supports the ICC while declining to sign the Treaty of Rome. On the other hand, African elites also recognize that there is at present no alternative to the ICC for holding the chiefs of signatory states accountable. Most of the ICC cases brought against Africans have been at the request of African governments at the time, including those involving Kenyatta and Ruto.

This is a guest post by Caila Glickman, volunteer intern for the Council on Foreign Relations’ department of Global Health. Caila is currently a pre-med student at Oberlin College studying chemistry and international relations. Her interests are in medicine, environmental science, and international law. In a vicious dispute over water allocation of the Nile River, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are wading through uncharted waters of international law. The dispute begins in Ethiopia’s attempt to regain control of its contributory river, the Blue Nile, by building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). However, the dam’s legality is being questioned by both Egypt and Sudan—two downstream Nile states eager to maintain the status quo of water allocation. Many believe the Nile River is sourced in Egypt, but it actually stretches from Burundi to the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt receives well over half of the river’s water because the river flows north; however, its two biggest feeders—the White Nile and the Blue Nile—are located in Uganda and Ethiopia, two southern but upstream Nile states with limited access to the Nile’s water. Historically, Egypt and Sudan have exploited the Nile through exclusive treaties that failed to include the upstream countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. The main treaty, known as the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement, called for the unimpeded flow of Nile waters, but only included Egypt and Sudan in its negotiations and ratification. Egypt uses this treaty to object to the construction of the GERD. Sudan has essentially piggybacked off of Egypt’s objections, as the current system of water allocation benefits the Sudanese. Ethiopia’s right to the dam lies in the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was adopted by Nile Basin Initiative member states, or all states that have some claim to the Nile. The CFA says that each Nile state is, “entitled to a reasonable share in the beneficial uses of water resources of the Nile system.” Ethiopia, a contributor of over 86 percent of the Nile River’s flow, receives only 5 percent of the Nile’s water, which is not enough to kick start its development. An electricity deficiency currently ails upstream Nile states and stifles their economic growth capability with constant power shortages. Ethiopia sees the GERD as the answer to the country’s stifling electricity issues. This dam will be used to create the continent’s largest hydropower plant that will fill all demand, generating three times the country’s current electricity production and providing neighboring states with all surplus power. Within the GERD dispute context, the greater issue at hand becomes clear—current international law does not reflect the less-developed riparian countries’ rights to water. In fact, many are cheated out of their water and the power it gives them to develop. As Zadig Abraha, deputy director of the dam’s public mobilization office, said, “To regain our lost greatness, to divorce ourselves from the status quo of poverty… we need to make use of our natural resources, like water.” The dam is a declaration of the country’s determination to pull itself up by its bootstraps. Ethiopia has convinced Egypt and Sudan to sign a declaration of principles that approved dam construction under the condition that studies be done to assess the impact the project will have on Egypt and Sudan. Despite this compromise, the issue will be continually present as developing countries around the world seek to reclaim their water rights to the dismay of developed countries banking on their silence.

South Africa’s Jacob Zuma administration’s notice to the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the International criminal Court (ICC) has been received with consternation by civil society organizations such as Amnesty International. However, it is unclear, even unlikely, that the Zuma administration can take such a step without a parliamentary vote. It is also unclear whether parliament would go along. The administration’s move should be seen in the context of South African domestic politics, and as an effort for a politically weakened Zuma to shore up his ‘African’ credentials domestically. Meanwhile, the South African Constitutional Court will rule in November whether the Zuma administration broke domestic and international law by failing to turn over Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir to ICC jurisdiction as required when he visited South Africa for an African Union Summit. (The Court’s ruling will be based on the law at the time of al-Bashir’s visit; South Africa’s moves to withdraw from the ICC will be irrelevant.) The Zuma administration’s ‘respectable’ argument for withdrawal is that the ICC has failed to ‘consult’ on the issue of whether head-of-state immunity trumps an ICC indictment. (Head of state immunity would, of course, emasculate the ICC and largely defeat the purpose of its establishment.) Led by Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta and other African heads of state of dubious reputation, claims are regularly made that the ICC is ‘biased’ against Africa and hold Africans to a higher standard than elsewhere. At the most recent African Union (AU) summit, Kenya proposed “… a roadmap for the withdrawal of African nations” from the ICC. Though this proposal failed to pass, the AU interministerial committee is likely to present reform demands at the next meeting of ICC members. Just days before the South African announcement, Burundi became the first African nation to announce its withdrawal from the ICC. Accordingly, Zuma’s moves to withdraw from the ICC will be welcomed by the likes of Sudan’s al-Bashir, Kenya’s Kenyatta, Burundi’s Pierre Nkurunziza, and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe—but not necessarily by South African public opinion. Following a string of scandals and court decisions against him, Zuma is a wounded political figure. The African National Congress’s poor performance in the August local government elections increases his vulnerability. South African civil society, well-organized and articulate, will ensure that administration efforts to withdraw from the ICC is vetted first by parliament and then by the courts. South Africa was one of the founders of the ICC, and the Treaty of Rome has been incorporated into South African domestic law. Hence, withdrawal would be difficult.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Bloomberg Markets’ Michael Cohen and Helen Nyambura-Mwaura have analyzed the current state of Africa’s economies in a very interesting article. They point out that despite the current poor performance of Africa’s larger economies (particularly Nigeria and South Africa), some of the continent’s smaller economies, especially in East Africa, are doing well and will likely continue to do so. Unlike Nigeria and South Africa, such East African countries as Kenya and Tanzania have avoided a reliance on commodities. Focusing on agriculture and manufacturing, these economies are poised to continue growing at over 5 percent this year. These countries have also continued to work together toward greater regional regulation and cooperation, as well as committing significant investment in transportation links and telecommunications. The article highlights a home truth about how the continent is treated by international business: Africa is too often painted with a broad brush. They quote economist John Ashbourne, “The narrative of 6 percent growth as far as the eye can see and Africa as a new China is dead, or at least dying, but it was always a bit overblown… At the end of the day Africa is still huge, has a growing population, and massive natural resources. There will always be opportunities.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that many businesses will stop viewing Africa in a homogenous light anytime soon. As the authors points out, the current disinterest in Nigeria and South Africa is likely to negatively affect investor and business interest in other African economies still showing promise. Those countries can continue to grow their own economies by practicing sound business practices, limiting corruption, and continuing to build regional economic ties.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs graduate from the University of Toronto, where she currently researches justice reform. You can follow her on twitter at @claireLwilmot. On July 18, Kenya’s high court charged four police officers in connection with the murders of lawyer Willie Kimani, his client Josephat Mwenda, and their driver Joseph Muiruri. The three men were reported missing after a court hearing on June 23, and their bodies were recovered from the Ol-Donyo Subuk River in Machakos County a week later. Kimani, a lawyer with the International Justice Mission, was acting as Mwenda’s legal defense in a battle over charges laid against him by a police officer during a traffic stop. Mwenda alleged that the officer shot him in the arm during the encounter, and chose to file a complaint with the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA). Mwenda was subsequently harassed and threatened by the officers involved in the incident until his death on July 1, 2016. The IPOA is a new oversight authority that investigates deaths and injuries caused by members of the Kenyan National Police Services, and can recommend prosecution. It also monitors, reviews, and audits police performance. IPOA was convened in response to Article 244 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which requires police to behave in a transparent, accountable manner consistent with Kenya’s human rights standards and fundamental freedoms. The Kenyan police have a poor record in this regard, which has contributed to high levels of mistrust between police and civilians. A recent report on Kenyan police accountability found that residents of Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighbourhood are more trusting of non-state security groups than they are of the police. Kenyans of Somali ethnic heritage in Eastleigh have been disproportionately victimized by police, who routinely "disappear" young men suspected of being affiliated with al-Shabab. Similarly, a World Bank survey found that 70.6 percent of residents from Nairobi’s Korogocho neighborhood trusted vigilante groups to reduce crime and violence, while only 4.4 percent trusted the Kenyan police. This degree of mistrust should come as no surprise. The Kenyan police force was designed as a tool of British colonial rule. After independence, Kenya’s presidents retained a centralized, opaque police force to suppress opposition. During Kenya’s 2008 post-election violence, police were believed to have been responsible for 36 percent of civilian deaths and over half of all incidences of torture that occurred. Proponents of IPOA, and police oversight more generally, believe that effective accountability mechanisms help deter police excesses and build trust between civilians and police. Trust is necessary for police to investigate and prevent crimes, which is thought to contribute to community safety. IPOA’s ability to build trust through accountability is hindered by police reluctance to cooperate with investigations, constraints on resources, and a lack of public awareness regarding IPOA’s function. Recognizing the magnitude of its challenges, IPOA recently chose to limit its investigations to only the most serious categories of deaths and injuries caused by police. Despite facing considerable challenges, IPOA has made notable strides. Numbers of complaints reported to IPOA are increasing each year, which may indicate greater public awareness of the institution. Last year, an IPOA investigation led to charges against a Nairobi police officer for the murder of two brothers, and, in 2014, it released a report on Operation Sanitization Eastleigh publicizing civilian accounts of police abuse during anti-terror operations. Kenya has a dire need for empowered and accessible oversight mechanisms that ensure police uphold, rather than undermine, the rule of law. IPOA is a new institution tasked with holding to account a police force used to operating with impunity. Demonstrating its ability to fulfill this function through successful investigations and charge recommendations may encourage more victims to file complaints and cooperate with criminal proceedings. While the Kimani murders are indicative of the severity of Kenya’s problem with police brutality, the outcome of the case could constitute a watershed moment for IPOA, and a meaningful step towards police accountability in Kenya.

This piece has been co-authored by John Campbell and Nathan Birhanu. Nathan is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. International attention is focused on Brexit, the resulting turmoil in the international financial markets, and the resignation of UK Prime Minister David Cameron. There is the risk of overlooking a dangerous confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea that could lead to war and further destabilize the Horn of Africa. After sixteen years of cease-fire from a border war, Eritrea and Ethiopia clashed on June 12. Hundreds have been reported dead. Both countries are pointing fingers at the other as the original instigator of the incident while maintaining a tenuous, tactical stalemate position. The border war Eritrea and Ethiopia fought against each other from 1998-2000 left approximately 80,000 dead. The war over claims to border towns was largely due to cultural and historical differences between the two states in the aftermath of Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. The disputed border towns had no significant economic value, with the fight once described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.” After a final attack by Ethiopia, the war came to a halt, and the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement to implement a ceasefire. The Algiers Agreement was the vehicle for establishing an independent adjudicator titled the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). Both countries agreed to accept the decision of the EEBC. The EEBC ruled in favor of Eritrea’s claim over the main border town; Ethiopia was unsatisfied with the decision and requested a political dialogue before withdrawing from the disputed territory. The disputed territory thereupon became in effect a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea with sporadic skirmishes over the past sixteen years, until Sunday’s significantly larger clash. What could have caused the recent clash to occur, as either country has little to benefit from a renewed conflict? Ethiopia’s Information Minister, Getachew Reda, has speculated that the attack came from Eritrea to divert attention away from a new UN report that claims Eritrea is guilty of crimes against humanity, including indefinite forced conscription. Reda’s comments also insinuate Eritrea initiated the border incident to legitimize its need for mass conscripts and to win enhanced domestic support. In a similar vein, Eritrea’s Ambassador to Kenya, Beyene Russom, alleged the attack came from Ethiopia in hopes of taking advantage of the negative spotlight focused on Eritrea from the UN report. Ambassador Russom has denounced the UN report as false. In addition, Eritrean Presidential Advisor Yemane Ghebreab told the UN Human Rights Council that Ethiopia is preparing to start a full scale war. In fact, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has recently stated publicly several times that he was prepared to use military force against Eritrea in response to its “provocations.” Investigation of the clash is still underway. Ambassador Russom has acknowledged that satellite imaging could help identify the initiator of the clash, as any large-scale motion of military equipment would be observed. Eritrea has requested the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene to prevent escalation of the border conflict and to initiate dialogue. What is clear is that little, if any, would be gained by either country from continued escalation of conflict. Ethiopia’s current administration is proud of the growth of Ethiopia’s economy over the past fifteen years. Part of Ethiopia’s growth strategy is attracting additional international investors, which renewed conflict would undermine. On the other hand, many in the Ethiopian political class have never really accepted Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. As for Eritrea, it currently faces a loss of youth fleeing the country: Eritreans account for a sizable percentage of refugees arriving in Europe. The hemorrhaging of the youth would likely escalate if a border war were to restart. The Eritrean government appears to wish to avoid a renewed border war. Eritrea’s approach to the UNSC indicates Asmara’s willingness to work for a diplomatic resolution. The sooner communication and dialogue is started, the better. Even in the aftermath of Brexit, Washington needs to keep this potentially nasty conflict on its radar screen.

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Robert F. Kennedy’s “Ripples of Hope” speech at the University of Cape Town, a congressional delegation (codel) visited South Africa the last week of May. It was led by Representative John Lewis, Democrat of Georgia and an icon of the American civil rights movement; Senator Chris Coons, Democrat of Delaware; and Kerry Kennedy, daughter of the late Senator Kennedy and the president of Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, a U.S. based non-profit organization. After the codel returned to Washington, Senator Coons delivered a speech on the Senate floor that is deeply thoughtful, a meditation on the parallels between South Africa and the United States, especially with respect to centuries of racism and the still-incomplete efforts to address its consequences. It is a must-read for those who care about the United States and Africa. Senator Coons’s reference point is a quotation from Robert Kennedy’s 1966 speech, delivered during the zenith of Apartheid, which began by describing “a land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; …a land which was once the importer of slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out the last traces of that former bondage.” Senator Kennedy paused before delivering the punchline: “I refer, of course, to the United States of America.” Senator Coons then proceeded to highlight and analyze the shared history and challenges of the two multiracial democracies. Senator Coons’s bottom line builds on a quotation from Nelson Mandela: “I am not a saint, unless you think of a saint as a sinner who keeps on trying.” He went on to say: “The peoples of the United States must keep on trying. The people of South Africa must keep on trying.” That the codel visited South Africa at this particular time is important and significant, beyond the commemoration of the 1966 speech. South Africa faces a historic drought, near-zero economic growth related to the world-wide decline in commodity prices, and a presidential administration seemingly riddled with corruption. Many South Africans fear that the country’s liberal democracy is under assault from forces that include some close to the president. Further, at present, formal relations between Washington and Pretoria are correct but hardly cordial. In February 2016 the Secretary General of the governing African National Congress – the party of Nelson Mandela and current president Jacob Zuma – accused the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria of plotting “regime change” through the Obama administration’s Young African Leaders Initiative. In fact, the embassy had consulted in advance with the Secretary General on suitable South African candidates for the program. The codel’s visit is a reminder of the shared civil rights heritage of both countries and is a recognition and encouragement of South Africa’s rule of law based on institutions rather than personalities and a constitution with among the most sweeping protections of human rights in the world. Senator Coons has had a particularly close relationship with Africa. He has been a volunteer relief worker in Kenya, studied at the University of Nairobi, and worked for the South African Council of Churches; in his speech he recalled his deep admiration for Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Anglican archbishop of Cape Town and former president of the South African Council of Churches.  

British Prime Minister David Cameron gathered government officials, civil society advocates, and business leaders in London for a one-day summit on corruption, a global “cancer” hindering economic development and growth. Forty countries signed a Global Declaration Against Corruption, promising to prevent, uncover, and punish corruption “wherever it exists.” Many countries followed up the lofty rhetoric with concrete commitments: twenty-one pledged stronger legislation for returning stolen assets, fourteen will open public contracts to scrutiny for the first time, and the UK and five other countries will jointly launch a new anticorruption center to help investigate and prosecute cross-border cases. Yet even with the Panama Papers as a backdrop, pledges to rein in shell companies and tax havens fell short, facing resistance from UK territories and the United States. In the lead up to the event, three hundred prominent economists issued a demand to end the use of tax havens, jurisdictions that legally enable financial secrecy. The biggest resistance came from British overseas territories, home to hundreds of thousands of shell companies; over 450,000 based in the British Virgin Islands alone. The territories snubbed Cameron on publicizing ownership, though the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the Isle of Man, and others acquiesced to sharing their lists with British and other authorities. The summit made more progress on bringing greater transparency to real estate. Cameron announced the UK will create a public registry for all properties owned or purchased there, requiring companies to reveal the true or ‘beneficial’ owners. The move will affect the 100,000 properties in the UK—40,000 in London alone—owned by foreign-registered companies, making it less amenable to stashing ill-gotten gains. Afghanistan, France, Kenya, Nigeria, and the Netherlands promised to set up similar public registries of company owners, while six other countries are considering it. That is too few for transparency advocates, and one of the biggest enablers of corporate secrecy—the United States—declined entreaties to join.