Southeast Asia

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh face serious risk during upcoming monsoon season, warns the UN Refugee Agency. 

Over the past five years, Vietnam has become the Southeast Asian state that has most assertively challenged China’s regional strategic ambitions. To push back against Beijing’s growing regional power, Vietnam also has built closer strategic ties with the United States—moving so close to Washington that Hanoi appeared ready, before 2017, to possibly end its traditional approach of hedging between China and the United States. In the first year-plus of the Donald J. Trump presidency, however, Vietnam has at times appeared less sure of a bet on ties with the United States. Together, these actions have led some Vietnam watchers to conclude that Hanoi, feeling the pressure of its giant neighbor’s military power and sizable trade relationship with Vietnam, is swinging toward warmer ties with China. More likely however, is that Vietnam will not move much closer to Beijing, even if Hanoi feels it cannot trust Washington’s long-term strategic and trade commitment to America’s Southeast Asian partners. Instead, Vietnam will find new ways, working with regional partners, to defend itself from China and to stake out Vietnam’s own ambitions. For more on how Vietnam’s strategic thinking in the Trump era, see my new World Politics Review article.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis traveled to Southeast Asia this past week, and during his first stop in Indonesia signaled a desire to improve strategic aspects of the U.S.-Indonesia relationship including on the South China Sea, training, and defense modernization.

The ongoing crisis in Rakhine State, where the Myanmar armed forces have credibly been accused of ethnic cleansing and where the Myanmar military recently admitted that the security forces were involved in a massacre that left a group of Rohingya dumped in a mass grave, shows no signs of resolution. It is extremely unlikely that many Rohingya will voluntarily return to Myanmar, where they are disenfranchised, have few civil rights, and face a situation in Rakhine State in which many of their towns have been torched. Taking advantage of potential Rohingya anger, a Rohingya militant group continues to launch attacks into Myanmar, making the situation along the border and in Rakhine State even more tenuous. The latest attacks, which came in early January, suggest the Rohingya militants are active and may been gaining skills. The situation in Rakhine State—and in the camps in Bangladesh—is the worst humanitarian crisis in East Asia. But at the same time, Myanmar actually confronts multiple other ticking time bombs. These demonstrate that Naypyidaw’s military/civilian government is failing not only in western Myanmar but also in other parts of the country. In Kachin State in the north, for instance, an excellent new article from IRIN News details how that area’s long-running conflict has gotten worse this dry season, while Aung San Suu Kyi’s peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups have produced no concrete results in the Kachin State battle. In fact, the military appears to be waging a tougher fight in Kachin State now than it had several years ago. As IRIN News reports, more than one hundred thousand people have been displaced in Kachin State and northern Shan State, and aid organizations have little access to many of these suffering people. As IRIN News notes: Rights groups say government restrictions have squeezed humanitarian access to a trickle, leaving tens of thousands of displaced people [in Kachin and Shan States] without aid, caught in the crosshairs between the military and rebel groups. In Shan State, violence is picking up again too, further suggesting a failure in Suu Kyi’s peace plans. In fact, as Anthony Davis notes in Asia Times, the dry season violence in Shan State, in which insurgent groups are getting bolder and the most powerful insurgency remains unchecked, could kill Suu Kyi’s peace plan completely. He writes that “this year could finally derail a government sponsored peace process that has already been stalled for months.” As Davis notes, small insurgent groups like the Paluang have in recent years gained recruits and become more aggressive, and the number of groups fighting in parts of Shan State has expanded. The spread of more armed groups into Shan State makes it highly likely that some of these armies could battle each other this dry season—and that the Myanmar military will initiate a large-scale offensive in Shan State as well. Meanwhile, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a heavily armed insurgent group with over twenty thousand fighters (and historically linked to narcotrafficking), roams free in portions of Shan State it controls. The UWSA has mostly disdained the government’s peace efforts, and has increasingly supported and armed other insurgent groups operating in Myanmar’s northeast. Its support has helped make the other ethnic armies even more powerful. Suu Kyi’s government seems to have no plan for how to deal with the UWSA in the long-term; the insurgent group has for decades essentially run its own independent statelet in Myanmar’s northeast. The government has little to offer the UWSA to disarm and accept central power, and Myanmar’s military is loath to take on the UWSA directly. Rakhine State is certainly a catastrophe. But in other parts of Myanmar, the government and military face severe challenges as well—and ones that they do not seem to have answers for.

As I noted late last year, 2017 was a disastrous year for democracy in Southeast Asia. Democratic rights and freedoms already have been in decline in Southeast Asia for more than a decade, but 2017 was perhaps the worst year for the region in that decade. Cambodia’s semi-democratic system collapsed last year, the Philippines’ rule of law deteriorated, Myanmar witnessed ethnic cleansing, Thailand remained ruled by a military junta, and Indonesia faced rising populism and Islamism. Freedom House’s latest version of Freedom in the World, released today, in fact chronicles a global collapse in democracy, with global freedoms regressing for the 12th consecutive year, and democracy threatened nearly everywhere in the world. (I worked with Freedom House on some Asia chapters of Freedom in the World.) So far, however, in just the initial weeks of the year, 2018 is looking like it could be even worse for Southeast Asia. Most notably, press freedom is increasingly threatened across Southeast Asia. In some countries, like the Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaysia, even periods of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule did not in previous years halt the creation of powerful, independent news outlets. In fact, in Cambodia, independent news outlets and other civil society groups continued to operate, over the past two decades, even at times of severe repression by the Hun Sen government. But in recent months, even some of the most groundbreaking, independent news outlets in Southeast Asia have faced possible mortal peril, as increasingly autocratic rulers try to shut down media groups. Several of these Southeast Asian leaders, like Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, have openly celebrated the U.S. administration’s war on “fake news,” and tried to associate their own crackdowns on the media with the White House’s approach to the press. The number of press outlets and reporters facing severe consequences is growing. In Thailand, the government has detained multiple reporters and increasingly just refuses to deal with the media—Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha last week installed a cardboard facsimile of himself to “answer” media questions of the government. Last year, Hun Sen oversaw the shuttering of the Cambodia Daily and multiple independent radio outlets in Cambodia. The prime minister could well come after more news outlets in Cambodia this year, before national elections. At the end of last year, in a case similar to other cases brought against Myanmar journalists from local publications, the Myanmar authorities arrested two Reuters journalists, under the Official Secrets Act. Reuters noted that “The Ministry of Information has cited the police as saying they were ‘arrested for possessing important and secret government documents related to Rakhine State and security forces.’” The military and the civilian government in Myanmar have indeed become increasingly repressive in trying to crack down on reporting of events in Rakhine State, where a wave of ethnic cleansing has been going on. The two Reuters reporters allegedly had gotten documents showing a site in Rakhine State where a mass grave was located. The military has since admitted that there was a mass grave found in this village, but the two reporters are still under arrest. Now, last week another major blow was struck against Southeast Asian press freedom. Rappler, one of the most prominent independent news outlets in the Philippines—and one that has aggressively investigated the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte and been called “fake news” by the Philippine president—now faces government action that could force its closure. On Monday, Philippine officials confirmed that the Duterte government had revoked Rappler’s license to operate, although Rappler is appealing the decision. Duterte has in fact been at war with the press since he took office in 2016, and he has no love for Rappler. As the Guardian notes: In March [2017], Duterte described top newspaper Philippine Daily Inquirer and leading television broadcaster ABS-CBN as ‘sons of whores’ and warned them of karmic repercussions over their criticism of his drug war... Four months later, the Inquirer announced its owners were in talks to sell the publication. A business tycoon who backed Duterte’s 2016 election bid later disclosed he was planning to buy the Inquirer. Duterte in 2017 also threatened to block ABS-CBN’s application to renew its operating franchise, a permit that requires congressional approval. The ongoing war against the press in the Philippines, and the sale of the Daily Inquirer, has made Rappler even more central as an independent voice. But Rappler too may face so much pressure that it might close.

There is plenty of blame to go around for the current humanitarian crisis in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the worst in East Asia. Both the United Nations’ human rights chief and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have now affirmed that Myanmar’s security forces are engaged in ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, attempting to wipe out the Muslim, ethnic Rohingya group. Myanmar’s top generals, still in control of the security forces, bear the ultimate responsibility for the bloodshed, but de facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi, who has done nothing to stop it, bears responsibility as well. Outside powers, too, are accountable. Yet one group’s responsibility for the Rakhine crisis has not been as fully explored: nationalist Buddhist leaders in Myanmar. In my new review for the Washington Monthly, I examine the new book by Francis Wade, Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim “Other”.

This post is co-authored by Sungtae "Jacky" Park, research associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Since its establishment in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has fostered unprecedented levels of regional economic, political, and security cooperation. Yet despite these accomplishments, effective regionalism in Southeast Asia faces constraints. The process of regional integration is limited by the emphasis on economic cooperation rather than on forming effective mechanisms to resolve crisis spots such as the South China Sea. In a new CFR discussion paper, Developing U.S.-ROK-ASEAN Cooperation, Binh Thai Lai, deputy consul-general of Vietnam in Houston, argues that the United States should take advantage of South Korea’s increasing diplomatic and economic capacity and seek to improve the state of U.S.-South Korea-ASEAN relations to promote regional security and stability in Southeast Asia. South Korea stands out as an ideal non-ASEAN Asian power that has the potential to work with both the United States and ASEAN to foster greater regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Japan, while a major U.S. ally and economy, has geopolitical, historical, and territorial disputes with China and would have difficulty adding to regional cooperation. The author recommends that the three countries should: Enhance discussion on regional security and development issues in bilateral and trilateral mechanisms. The United States, South Korea, and ASEAN countries should host discussions in their respective countries on topics such as responses to nontraditional security issues.   Seek resolutions to security and development issues at regional forums. Forums focused on ASEAN should not shy away from discussing sensitive issues such as the South China Sea.   Promote maritime security cooperation. In addition to calling for enhanced maritime security in general, the United States, South Korea, and ASEAN need to strengthen joint patrol activities, promote cooperation in avoiding clashes, and cooperate in responding to disasters at sea.   Increase contributions to the Lower Mekong Initiative. Based on the existing framework of the initiative, the United States should call for South Korea to contribute more (together with Japan and Australia) to the LMI to address the increasing challenges facing ASEAN countries along the Mekong.   Strengthen infrastructure and information connectivity in Southeast Asia. Providing affordable rural internet connectivity and enhancing land, maritime, and energy infrastructure will strengthen ASEAN connectivity and reduce the disparity in the levels of development among ASEAN countries.   Enhance cultural connectivity. The three parties should organize more cultural activities.   The Asia-Pacific region lacks an effective mechanism to promote international cooperation, particularly in resolving controversial issues. The United States, ASEAN, and South Korea can help to remedy this situation by strengthening their bilateral and trilateral coordination on economic and security policies. The three parties can demonstrate a new model for group collaboration among countries that share common goals despite being at different levels of development. This post is a summary of the discussion paper, Developing U.S.-ROK-ASEAN Cooperation.  

Over the past six months, debates have grown in Australia and New Zealand about whether China is wielding more political influence within their borders than at any time in recent memory. In September, a New Zealand academic, Anne-Marie Brady, released an exhaustive report detailing Beijing’s efforts to influence the country’s politics. Tactics included trying to control organizations representing the ethnic Chinese community in New Zealand and channeling money to politicians and educational institutions. But these widely reported cases of Chinese influence abroad are just a fraction of the total story. In fact, in Southeast Asia and Africa, China already has developed more advanced tools of influence than those exposed in Australia and New Zealand—or even the United States. In these regions’ developing nations, where there are weaker checks on outside interference, leaders will have to make tougher choices about which Chinese influence activities are dangerous and which are not so different from the types of projection to sway domestic politics other states, including the United States, have engaged in for years. For more on this challenge, see my new piece for World Politics Review.

Part Two Read Part One here. In addition to several crucial elections, other events in 2018 will shape Southeast Asia’s economies, security, and regional politics. Some more events to watch in 2018: 1. The ongoing crisis in Rakhine State Bangladesh and Myanmar supposedly have discussed plans for repatriation of Rohingya back to Myanmar, and Bangladesh news outlets have reported that Dhaka has drawn up a list of one hundred thousand Rohingya to be repatriated first. Still, any repatriation seems unlikely anytime soon. Bangladesh’s government has made clear that it does not want Rohingya to leave the camps, and hopes to draw down the population of the refugee camps as soon as possible. The camps are in dire shape, with massive overcrowding and a high risk of disease. But given that the Myanmar government seems unwilling to make any real reforms in Rakhine State, provide some guarantee of security for Rohingya, or even admit any culpability at all for the massacres in Rakhine State, the only way Dhaka will be able to repatriate Rohingya, probably, is to force them back across the border. Many Rohingya rightly fear that, if they do return to Rakhine State, they could easily be interned in the state by the army and local police, detained in one of the internment camps dotting Rakhine. And without any real repatriation from Bangladesh, the large number of people in the camps inside Bangladesh well could grow in 2018, with no real long-term solution in sight—and with militant groups seeking recruits in the camps. Meanwhile, in Myanmar there is a strong possibility that journalists and rights organizations could reveal other atrocities that have been committed in Rakhine State, like the recent revelation of a mass grave, which seems to have prompted the authorities to jail two Reuters journalists. Such revelations would put further pressure on outside actors to take stronger measures against Naypyidaw, and would further isolate major democratic leaders from Aung San Suu Kyi, who has refused to engage with international interlocutors regarding any evidence of major crimes in Rakhine State. 2. Singapore as chair of ASEAN With the most skilled diplomatic service in the region, Singapore is often the most effective chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (The chair rotates from country to country each year.) After a year in which ASEAN, with the Philippines as chair, again failed to address the biggest issue collectively confronting Southeast Asian states—how to deal with China’s South China Sea strategy—Singapore is the organization’s best hope for developing some common South China Sea approach that all members can sign onto at regional meetings. Unlike the Philippines, which is increasingly aligned with Beijing’s South China Sea policy, Singapore is at least likely to make ASEAN states discuss the South China Sea at ASEAN meetings—to put the South China Sea high up on meetings’ agendas. In addition, if any concrete progress is to be made on the ASEAN-China talks on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, Singaporean officials stand the best chance of actually achieving such progress toward a legally binding code. (I am doubtful that such progress will be made, however.) In addition, Singapore could work to ensure that tools being put into place to prevent tensions between South China Sea claimants from escalating into dangerous encounters—such as the planned Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea—are actually finished and utilized. 3. Southeast Asia forging its own path on trade With the United States having pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the White House reportedly gearing up to impose new trade actions against China, Southeast Asian states are trying to take their own trade paths. Several states, including Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia, have pushed forward with the TPP. Other states in the region, including the Philippines have become increasingly open to, and are touting, China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Southeast Asian states will more closely embrace RCEP in 2018 if the TPP is not finalized—Canada seemingly is not ready to finalize the TPP. And despite the Trump administration’s touting of the potential for bilateral trade deals between the United States and Asian states, no Southeast Asian nations seem eager to explore a bilateral deal with Washington. 4. The Islamic State in Southeast Asia Although the Philippine government has ended the siege of Marawi, in Mindanao, the threat from self-proclaimed Islamic State-linked actors in Southeast Asia has not receded. Islamic State-linked groups will continue to recruit in the southern Philippines, in Indonesia, and in other parts of Southeast Asia. In addition, the rise of larger, conservative Islamist groups as major players in politics in Indonesia will potentially bolster militant organizations’ recruiting efforts.

Part One Southeast Asia, like many parts of the world, had a turbulent 2017, with many of the biggest challenges related to a rollback in rights and democracy, and the strength of populism in the region. The crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, which dates back to 2012 in its current iteration, exploded into the biggest humanitarian disaster in East Asia, with little prospect now of Rohingya safely returning to homes in Rakhine State, even though the Bangladesh government is clearly uneasy with the massive numbers of refugees who have crossed into Bangladesh. Still, it is unlikely many Rohingya will return—not while the Myanmar armed forces continue to attack parts of Rakhine State. In other 2017 events, Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao and oversaw a brutal siege in the southern city of Marawi, while continuing aspects of his lawless drug war. Duterte’s popularity ratings remain quite high. Indonesian politics was rocked by the upset of Jakarta governor Ahok. Ahok’s loss demonstrated, in part, the rise of conservative and Islamist groups as forces to reckon with in national politics—especially when these groups have patrons among Indonesia’s business and political elites. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen unleashed the most brutal crackdown on opposition in that country in two decades. Thailand mourned King Rama IX and witnessed Rama X seemingly grasp for more open power for the monarchy. Southeast Asian states reckoned with the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and new concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” as well as with China’s growing regional power. In 2018, Southeast Asian politics will be dominated by important elections in a number of countries, as well as the run-up to 2019 presidential elections in Indonesia, the region’s giant. In addition, the continuing crisis in Myanmar, the fact that Singapore will be chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this year, the success or failure of multiple regional trade deals, and an increasingly hardline U.S. approach to both China and North Korea will have significant effects on Southeast Asian stability. Some events to watch in 2018: 1. National elections in Malaysia The Malaysian government must call new elections, per law, before August 24 of 2018, although it may call an election sooner, since it probably feels like it is on strong footing for a national election. Although few would have predicted it two years ago, as scandal engulfed the prime minister, Prime Minister Najib tun Razak has built a solid foundation for a victory for the ruling coalition and his continued stay as prime minister. To be sure, Najib’s image has been battered, at least among some voters and in the international community, by the 1MDB scandal and his years of crackdowns against opposition politicians and civil society. Yet Najib and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) party look well-placed to win the election. The opposition is still foundering, with Anwar Ibrahim in jail and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad an unlikely and divisive figure to lead the opposition coalition. Najib and UMNO are savvy in using government funding (as well as extreme gerrymandering) to keep their base loyal. What’s more, the prime minister and his party also have effectively—if unfortunately—worked to capture the Malay “heartland” by using dog whistling rhetoric about the Chinese ethnic minority and increasingly positioning Najib as the biggest defender of conservative religious values and ethnic Malays. It is a tactic that might undercut Najib’s international reputation as a moderate, but one that could well help UMNO peel off Malay voters from the opposition, and secure Najib’s re-election. 2. National elections in Thailand (probably) Thailand’s ruling junta has promised to hold elections in November 2018, which would come more than four years after the imposition of military rule. In December, the junta announced that it would allow political parties to prepare for the upcoming elections, according to reports in Reuters. So, it seems likely that the military will actually hold the election, after postponing it for several years. Why finally hold the election? The armed forces may feel confident that they have so defanged the Shinawatra family, with former prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra having fled Thailand and Thaksin Shinawatra’s son Panthongthae allegedly facing money laundering charges, that the Thaksinite Puea Thai party will do poorly in national elections, since the Shinawatra family will be unable to play a central role in the election. The military also may feel confident that it has so changed the Thai political system, since its coup in May 2014, that no one party will ever be able to control the country again—that any party who wins a plurality in the lower house of parliament will be forced to share power with pro-military bureaucrats, senators, and other unelected officials, and that the armed forces can ensure that the lower house is factionalized and ineffective, and that important decisions are taken by unelected actors. In all likelihood, the junta is right. Still, it is not impossible that Puea Thai could win an outright majority in the lower house of parliament, further scrambling Thai politics. Beyond the Shinawatra family, Puea Thai has in the past shown adaptability and flexibility, an ability to put forward non-Shinawatra candidates and still win elections. (To be sure, some of those potential candidates for the 2018 elections themselves face charges from the junta government, further sapping Puea Thai’s bench.) If Puea Thai did win a majority, would the military allow it to actually control the lower house? 3. National elections in Cambodia (but don’t expect them to be free) Cambodia also will hold national elections in 2018—Cambodia’s are scheduled for July. But in 2017, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) demonstrated that they would not allow the 2018 elections to be free or fair. Hun Sen’s crackdown has found a wide range of targets—leaders of the opposition party, independent media voices, civil society organizations, foreign NGOs, and other critics of the prime minister. This is clearly the toughest crackdown on opposition since the late 1990s. Even if Hun Sen responded to U.S. visa sanctions, and measures taken by other outside actors, and backed off his pressure on the opposition—which seems unlikely—it is already probably too late for the opposition to regroup and effectively contest the July elections. Many opposition politicians have fled Cambodia and would be wary of returning no matter what Hun Sen says publicly. Still, even Hun Sen must be careful not to push too far; despite Chinese aid and investment, which is helping power the Cambodian economy, the prime minister does not want to alienate Europe and other democracies like Japan even further. If the European Union froze Cambodia’s preferential trade access, it could have severe ramifications for the Cambodian economy, which has otherwise been performing strongly. So, in the run-up to the July election, the savvy prime minister, a master of alternating between repression and co-option, might make some cosmetic attempts to reconcile with Brussels, Tokyo, and Washington, while ensuring that the opposition has no chance of seriously contesting the July election. The question is, if the CPP and Hun Sen win an obviously unfree election, what does the prime minister do next? Such a scenario would leave a large number of young, urban Cambodians alienated from politics and the political system—and they could eventually revolt if the prime minister tries to hand off power to one of his sons after the July 2018 election, a move that would be highly unpopular throughout Cambodia. 4. Politicking for Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Election Although Indonesia’s elections will not be held for another year, Indonesian politicians are already gearing up for it. The demise of former Jakarta governor Ahok, who lost after massive street protests led by conservative Islamist groups, demonstrate that a populist-Islamist alliance, backed by influential political elites, could shape the presidential contest in 2019. Such an alliance could help former Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, if he decides to run, or it could be deployed by the man who beat Ahok, current Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan. According to most polling, President Joko Widodo seems to remain in the lead for re-election, but to be re-elected he may have to win over some of the conservative Islamist groups that otherwise could be major factors against him. More worryingly, as Matthew Busch has noted for the Lowy Institute, the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial race raised the question of whether Indonesia’s elites necessarily will accept the results of an election in which their candidate loses—a problem that could have emerged if Ahok had won, and could emerge again in the presidential election. The Jakarta gubernatorial election was preceded by rallies that did not just criticize Ahok but engaged in vicious, anti-Chinese conspiracy-mongering. These virulent rallies, which went far beyond criticizing Ahok’s policies and instead portrayed him as a kind of demon, seemed to raise the question of whether these mobs, and their backers among Indonesia’s elites, would accept an Ahok victory as legitimate after so much time demonizing. Ahok indeed lost the gubernatorial election, and conceded, but Busch—and others—wonder whether Baswedan would or could have conceded if Ahok had actually won, given the public animosity stirred up against Ahok. The question will come up again if Prabowo runs in 2019, and uses massive street protests to amplify his message—and then loses. Indonesia’s elites—at least the ones backing Prabowo—are not a sure bet to transfer power peacefully after a national election loss. Read Part Two here.

The rise of populist leaders and parties in Europe and the United States over the past two years has reshaped the political landscape from Budapest to Washington. Challenging elites as corrupt and disconnected from common concerns, these populists claim to derive their legitimacy from the supposed will of the people and usually use their influence to blame some “other” for the country’s ills. They have tried to upend post-Cold War norms on everything from free trade to the integration of Europe, raising fears in the West about the strength of the rule of law and even democracy itself. But this intense focus has overshadowed the growing threat of populism in another major region of the world that is already susceptible to a higher chance of conflict than the West: Asia. Unlike in the West, where populism is still constrained by strong democratic institutions and norms, institutions in Asia are weaker and most Asian populists have little concern for the rule of law, so populism could actually prove more dangerous to democracy.  For more on the challenge of populism in Asia, see my new World Politics Review article.

Over the past year, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and his ruling party have gone from simply repressing civil society and opposition parties to taking steps that are creating a fully authoritarian, one-party state. These steps have included jailing co-opposition leader Kem Sokha for treason, tossing multiple NGOs out of the country, overseeing the shutdown of multiple independent radio and print outlets, and, ultimately, presiding over the dissolution of the main opposition party. There now appears little chance that Cambodia’s 2018 national elections will be free and fair. In fact, Hun Sen, who in the past had often allowed elections to proceed with some degree of openness and fairness, appears ready to win an election that would be a totally undemocratic farce. In a piece for Project Syndicate last week, I noted that Hun Sen was cracking down not only because he feared that the opposition, which performed well in 2013 national elections, might actually win in 2018, but also simply because Hun Sen can crack down. I argued that he can crack down because, in 2017, there are few outside actors willing to take a tough stance against Hun Sen’s approach. Southeast Asia is, overall, experiencing a democratic regression, so Hun Sen’s repression is somewhat overshadowed by the drug war in the Philippines, the massive crisis in Rakhine State, and the continuing repression by the Thai junta. But most notably, I argued, Hun Sen could crack down because the Trump administration has made human rights a low priority in U.S. foreign policy, instead focusing on sovereignty. Indeed, Hun Sen, like multiple other world leaders, has used the U.S. president’s attacks on the media as an example for his own attacks on journalists. As I noted, when Hun Sen met President Trump in Manila in November, he seemed to praise the U.S. president’s sovereignty-first, noninterventionist style of politics. To be fair, then, earlier this week the administration, pushed by supporters of Cambodian human rights on Capitol Hill and by human rights groups and the opposition in Cambodia, has taken some important steps to demonstrate that it is willing to address Hun Sen’s severe rights violations. The administration on Wednesday announced it was placing visa restrictions on a group of Cambodian officials who have played a role in the ongoing crackdown on democracy in that country. The State Department also issued a tough statement calling on Hun Sen to release jailed co-opposition leader Kem Sokha, to allow the political opposition to function, and to stop repressing civil society. Still, overall, I do not think these steps make up for the broader enabling effect that U.S. policy in 2017 on democracy and rights has had in Southeast Asia, and in Cambodia specifically. That said, the steps taken this week are important signals to Hun Sen, and might help slow him down as he guts the country’s institutions and prepares for an unfree national election next year. In addition, other major actors in Cambodia, such as China, probably do not really want the country to spiral into economic chaos, or for Hun Sen to force Western donors to cut off aid. So, there are still points of leverage in the Cambodian crisis.

This post is co-authored by Sungtae "Jacky" Park, research associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific, such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula or disputes over the South China Sea, consistently attract the attention of policymakers within the region and abroad. But their consequences for ordinary people are often dwarfed by the fallout from nontraditional security (NTS) events, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and maritime safety. In a new CFR discussion paper, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security, Jaehyon Lee, senior fellow in the ASEAN and Oceania studies program at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, gives an overview of how the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea could cooperate to bolster NTS security in Southeast Asia. There have been bilateral and multilateral attempts at cooperation on NTS in the Asia-Pacific, but they have been insufficient. Between the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea, cooperation on NTS issues is currently limited to just a few exceptional circumstances. For instance, the United States and South Korea are partners in the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise and they work together on the Lower Mekong Initiative. These efforts, however, are not trilateral among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea, since each country joins as a member of the ARF or as one of many countries in each project. Trilateral cooperation among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea would benefit not just the participating parties, but also the region as a whole. Such cooperation would allow South Korea to contribute to the region and is consistent with the Moon Jae-in government’s foreign policy. It would also advance the U.S.-South Korean alliance and give South Korea experience that could be used in future NTS crises in North Korea such as famines, natural disasters, or pandemics. The author recommends the following: Focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Natural disasters are the most serious concern in the region, resulting in disproportionate casualties and economic losses. Working on HADR issues will also pave the way for cooperation on issues such as climate change, the environment, public health, and pandemics. Fix the reverse hub-and-spoke system. Economically and technically capable ASEAN countries should be donating aid instead of receiving it. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are candidates for this shift. Effectively coordinate policy among donor countries. The United States, Australia, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea should all join in strengthening government-to-government cooperation. These countries are already individually active in NTS cooperation with ASEAN. Expand the U.S.-ROK alliance to cover cooperation on regional NTS threats. The first step in this direction should be to assess the current state of knowledge and capacity on both sides. The United States and South Korea have to share what they have in order to address regional NTS threats. Create an institution to handle U.S.-ASEAN-ROK trilateral NTS cooperation. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Department in the ASEAN Secretariat is a promising institution that could take on this role. In addition, Lee argues that South Korea should review its NTS ties with its neighbors in the region. Particularly for HADR, military participation is unavoidable. The South Korean military has been reluctant to take on responsibilities outside of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Moon Jae-in government is emphasizing South Korea’s regional contributions and responsibilities, this is a good time for the South Korean military to expand the scope of its operations and be more active in managing regional NTS threats. The United States can use its political, military, and economic capabilities to deepen its involvement in the region to deal with NTS threats, filling a space between hard U.S. military power and soft cultural and developmental assistance power. In this area, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK trilateral cooperation could bolster efforts to counter NTS threats and open a new chapter for the U.S.-ROK alliance, which so far has been narrowly defined as an arrangement on Korean Peninsula issues. Nontraditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific are as important as—or more important than—traditional security issues. More people’s lives are threatened and more economic losses are incurred by various NTS threats than by traditional security threats in the Asia-Pacific. Addressing NTS threats can enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. This post is a summary of the discussion paper, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security.