Southeast Asia

There was no way that Pope Francis’s trip to Myanmar and Bangladesh last week was going to be uneventful. The trip came in the midst of a massive spasm of violence in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State—one that the UN’s human rights chief, many rights organizations, and U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have all called ethnic cleansing. The pope has built a reputation as a defender of the poor, of the powerless, and of refugees and migrants, and so it seemed natural that, in Myanmar and Bangladesh, he would speak out on behalf of the Rohingya. Not only have over 600,000 Rohingya fled into Bangladesh since August, but conditions in the refugee camps inside Bangladesh are increasingly dire. In a recent report by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group on conditions inside Bangladesh for the Rohingya refugees, it noted that: One of the camps [where Rohingya are living] has become the largest and fastest growing refugee camp in the world, where approximately half a million people are living extremely close to each other without access to basic services such as toilets or clinics. The pope also reportedly was pressured, before the trip, by Catholic leaders in Myanmar not to openly criticize the Myanmar government’s handling of Rakhine State or even use the word Rohingya. They may have done so for fear that, if the pope did criticize the country’s military and civilian leaders for their roles in the ethnic cleansing, Catholics in Myanmar would be targeted for violence because of the pope’s words. In addition, some Catholic leaders may have feared that anything the pope did to upset Myanmar leaders could threaten relations between the Vatican and Naypyidaw; the two sides only established diplomatic relations last May. Pope Francis is politically savvy, but this was always going to be a very delicate trip. Pope Francis ultimately did not issue any open criticism of the Myanmar government, or even use the word Rohingya, until he had left Myanmar for Bangladesh to meet Rohingya refugees and discuss the crisis with Bangladesh leaders. (Myanmar military and civilian leaders refuse to even use the word “Rohingya,” as a means of denying the existence of targeting the Rohingya as supposed outsiders in Myanmar.) Amidst international criticism, the pope then defended his approach to the trip on his way back to Rome and suggested to reporters that he was frank in private with Myanmar leaders about the nature of the Rakhine crisis and their responsibility for it. He further suggested to some reporters that he did indeed use the word Rohingya in private discussions with Myanmar leaders. He may well have been frank in private. Surely, in dealing with civilian, military, and even some religious leaders in Myanmar, the pope must have faced the biggest obstacle all foreign leaders, rights activists, and diplomats address in addressing the Rakhine crisis: the vast majority of Myanmar people either seem to support the government’s approach to Rakhine or are untroubled by it. This is not a reason for outsiders, including the pope, to avoid criticism of Myanmar for the crisis in Rakhine or sanctions for leaders abetting ethnic cleansing. But, the fact that a majority of Myanmar citizens seem to support the brutal campaign that has driven as much as two-thirds of the Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh means that outsiders’ words and actions seem to be pushing most Myanmar leaders and citizens into a bunker mentality. Increasingly, Myanmar citizens seem to be supporting the Myanmar military, no matter how abusively it acts in Rakhine State. Many Rohingya already seem to accept that they have been ethnically cleansed, and have no future in Myanmar, even if Naypyidaw and Dhaka eventually forge some real agreement on repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar. (Dhaka and Naypyidaw reportedly have agreed on a memorandum of understanding about some kind of repatriation, but it is hard to imagine repatriation going forward while conditions for Rohingya inside Rakhine State are still so dire.) “The Rohingya are finished in our country,” Kyaw Min, a Rohingya man living in Yangon, told the New York Times in a story published over the weekend. “Soon we will all be dead or gone.” In addition, although Pope Francis has said that he is a strong supporter of Myanmar’s democratic transition—and there is no reason to doubt that he indeed supports the transition—his decision to go along with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing’s demand that the pontiff meet the top general before meeting civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is not helpful to the democratic process. (In the meeting, the general reportedly told the pope that there is “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar.) Min Aung Hlaing already has been bolstering his power, and the military’s popularity, through a series of high-profile visits to foreign countries and through the brutal campaign in Rakhine State. Getting the pope to meet him first sends another signal to the Myanmar populace that Min Aung Hlaing wields the power in Myanmar, and that foreign leaders should treat him as the country’s real ruler. To be sure, on his return to Rome, the pope indicated to reporters that he did not see his meeting with the top Myanmar general as akin to his meeting with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whom he had sought out and who he actually wanted to meet. In response to a question on his plane about his meeting with the top general, the pope noted: I would distinguish between the two meetings, two types of meetings. Those meetings during which I went to meet people [i.e, with Suu Kyi] and those in which I received people. This general asked me to speak. And I received him. I never close the door. Yet, few people in Myanmar will have read this press conference transcript, while many will have read or heard about Pope Francis meeting with Min Aung Hlaing and then, only later, with Aung San Suu Kyi. The pope was his usual forthright self again with Rohingya refugees he met in Bangladesh. Again, he showed his humble, human touch by apologizing to the refugees for the “indifference of the world” to their plight and appearing to hold back tears hearing their stories.

Over the last year, Cambodia’s ruling party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), has dramatically increased its pressure on its political opponents and civil society. Democracy in Cambodia has always been fraught, and elections are not completely free and fair. But the current crackdown is much greater in scope, and far more concerning, in part because it is being enabled by American apathy. To see more about the interplay between U.S. policy and Cambodia’s crackdown, read my new Project Syndicate piece.

In an earlier post today, I noted that there remain many questions about the memorandum of understanding that Dhaka and Naypyidaw have supposedly negotiated, allowing at least some Rohingya to return to Myanmar, after years of a scorched earth campaign in Rakhine State. As I noted in my earlier post, the memorandum of understanding remains vague. It does not answer important questions like how the Rohingya would be protected if they returned to Myanmar, what types of legal and civil rights they would enjoy back in Myanmar, and whether they would be moved into camps in Myanmar once they crossed back across the border. On Pope Francis’s visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh this week, perhaps the most politically charged trip on the pontiff’s career, the pope is walking a fine line in his meeting with senior Myanmar and Bangladesh officials. He has already apparently met with Myanmar commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, though he may meet with the general again. He also plans to meet with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, top political leaders in Bangladesh, and prominent religious leaders as well. The Pope is reportedly trying to be careful to highlight the suffering of Rohingya refugees—the result of a massive, military-managed campaign in Rakhine State—while not taking any actions that might turn the rage of Myanmar’s Burman, or Bamar, majority, against Christians as well. Several questions should be raised about the trip. Here are some questions to ask to assess how Pope Francis has handled his trip: Is Pope Francis actually going to call the Rohingya “Rohingya,” or will he use some kind of compromise terms—like “they refer to themselves as Rohingya.” Calling the group “Rohingya,” without qualifications, would send a powerful message of how Pope Francis views the Rohingya, and how they should be treated in Myanmar. Will Pope Francis push both Dhaka and Naypyidaw to present a clearer, more obviously feasible plan for how Rohingya could actually ever return to Myanmar without facing the threat of renewed violence against them, or being confined to camps within Myanmar itself? Right now, the repatriation plan is only sketchily detailed, and likely would not protect returning Rohingya from a wide range of abuses if they returned to Myanmar. Will the Pope actively rebut obvious falsehoods by top Myanmar leaders? Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing today apparently told the Pope that there was “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar, which is clearly false. How forcefully will the Pope highlight continuing discrimination against Christians in Myanmar, which has been overshadowed by the ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State? Christian minorities, especially outside of central Myanmar, often face discrimination and even violence, according to extensive reporting including a report released last year by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.  

Last week, it was reported that the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for a plan to eventually repatriate large numbers of Rohingya from Bangladesh back to Myanmar. Over 600,000 Rohingya reportedly have fled into Bangladesh since August 2017 alone. In August, Rakhine violence—which has been severe in Rakhine State for five years now—spiked once again. That number of refugees in camps inside Bangladesh does not include the many Rohingya who had fled into Bangladesh before August 2017. Reporting about the details of the memorandum on return remain sketchy. CNN reported that “So far, no official details have been released on the agreement, what it would entail and under what circumstances the Rohingya would return.” The New York Times reported that “Neither side [Dhaka or Naypyidaw] gave many details, apart from a vague commitment to beginning a repatriation process within two months’ time.” Still, before any Rohingya return to Myanmar, both countries would need to adequately answer several questions. First, is it really safe for Rohingya to return? There is little evidence that the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, reportedly overseen by the security forces and encouraged by many hard-line Buddhist nationalist religious and political leaders, has even stopped. Human rights organizations are still recording details of refugees fleeing into Bangladesh saying that ethnic cleansing remains underway in Rakhine State. Much of the northern part of the state is still often inaccessible to monitors and journalists. Who will determine that it is safe for Rohingya to leave Bangladesh and go into Myanmar? According to some reports, Dhaka and Naypyidaw have agreed to allow UNHCR to oversee repatriation of Rohingya back to Myanmar. But how can UNHCR do so while violence is still going on in Rakhine State? What’s more, the Myanmar government reportedly has not agreed to allow UNHCR full access to Rakhine State. Second, where would Rohingya who returned to Rakhine State be housed? Many have not only been driven out of their homes by a campaign of violence but also witnessed their dwellings burnt to the ground or seized by local police or Buddhist residents. It seems highly unlikely that the Myanmar army, Rakhine politicians, and the national government would allow Rohingya to return to their homes; Naypyidaw seems uninterested in some kind of program to resettle Rohingya elsewhere in Rakhine State. Instead, as Amnesty International has warned, Rohingya who did return into Myanmar could wind up in camps that are already established in Rakhine State. Those camps, which have held Rohingya since the violence first broke out five years ago, have been condemned by rights organizations as little more than open-air jails or concentration camps. Third, even if international monitors were allowed to travel in Rakhine State freely, and there was a real opportunity for Rohingya to return and rebuild communities in Rakhine, what rights would they have—and who would pay for their resettlement? As it currently stands, most Rohingya are disenfranchised, and are viewed by most national, ethnic Bamar politicians as aliens to the Myanmar state—as people who are not one of the state’s recognized groups and thus do not enjoy the rights of Myanmar citizens. Meanwhile, hard-line Buddhist nationalism is on the rise in Myanmar, and no prominent politician, including Aung San Suu Kyi, will risk alienating Buddhist nationalists. If the Rohingya return, to Rakhine State or other parts of the country, but they do not have citizenship rights, they will remain complete outsiders to the Myanmar state-building project, and will live outside the rule of law. They will have few legal protections, and no protectors in government If Rohingya return to Myanmar without getting such legal rights, what guarantees will they have that there won’t be pogroms against them in the future? This is a question that Pope Francis, who is visiting Myanmar and Bangladesh this week on one of the most difficult trips of his papacy, should raise with Myanmar’s military and civilian leaders.

On November 9, South Korean President Moon Jae-in unveiled his “New Southern Policy,” aimed at deepening relations with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Moon’s announcement, made on a state visit to Indonesia, came amid a flurry of diplomatic activity in the region ahead of the latest ASEAN summit in the Philippines and U.S. President Donald Trump’s trip to Asia. In an email interview, Scott Snyder, a senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming book South Korea at the Crossroads, discusses what is behind the New Southern Policy and what it means for South Korea’s allies and neighbors. Read the interview on WorldPoliticsReview.com.

During his meeting today (Myanmar time) with senior Myanmar leaders including the head of the military and de factor civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson struck some important themes. Tillerson declared that there were “credible reports of widespread atrocities committed by Myanmar’s security forces and by vigilantes who were unrestrained by the security forces during the recent violence in Rakhine State.” He did not try to downplay the credibility of such reports. He also called upon the military and Myanmar’s civilian leaders to allow investigators full access to Rakhine State, including northern Rakhine State. He did not call the violence “ethnic cleansing,” but left open the possibility that Washington would indeed label it that. Tillerson also suggested that the crisis in Rakhine State should be met with targeted individual U.S. sanctions, probably on military leaders involved in overseeing atrocities. As I have noted, the threat of targeted sanctions would have been a more effective deterrent in October 2016, before this latest round of violence began in August 2017. Such a threat against the Myanmar military’s top leadership might indeed have served the purpose as a deterrent. But still, Tillerson is right to consider targeted sanctions now. He did not, however, give any timetable for targeted sanctions. The visit also included several important missed opportunities. First, the joint appearance allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to (again) basically say nothing about the severe rights abuses in Rakhine State. Instead, she once again deferred, telling reporters in a press conference, “It’s important to bring peace and stability to this country and that can only be done on the basis of rule of law and everybody should understand that the role of theirs is to protect peace and stability, not to punish people.” It was yet another missed chance for Suu Kyi to make any kind of tough public statement on the crisis and the role of the military in it. Other top members of the NLD have, in recent weeks, offered similar stonewalling about the crisis in Rakhine State, publicly supporting the military’s theories that no abuses have gone on there. Suu Kyi went on to praise Tillerson for “keeping an open mind,” a phrase that seems to appear like the Myanmar leader was praising him for not condemning the Myanmar military more harshly. The New York Times further reported that: At the news conference on Wednesday, Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi defended her statements [in which she has said little about Rakhine State], saying, ‘I don’t know why people say I’ve been silent’ about the Rohingya, and suggesting that perhaps what she has said was not ‘interesting enough’ or ‘incendiary.’ In addition, Tillerson used the visit to call for what Reuters called a “credible investigation” of human rights abuses in Rakhine State. This formulation suggests that there has not already been a credible investigation, which is hardly the case—and it potentially gives Naypyidaw the chance to buy more time. Tillerson did not specifically call for a UN-led, fully independent investigation into the situation in Rakhine. And in reality, multiple rights organizations, as well as the United Nations, have completed extensive investigations and concluded that severe rights abuses, even ethnic cleansing, are taking place in Rakhine State. (In response, on Monday the Myanmar military put out its own “investigation” into the situation in Rakhine State and basically absolved itself of all blame.)

During his marathon visit to Asia earlier this month, U.S. President Donald J. Trump at least demonstrated to Asian allies that he is not going to ignore the region. His trip was the longest by a U.S. president to Asia in over twenty-five years. In several stops on his trip, the U.S. president also had pleasant interactions with Asian leaders, clearly trying to use charm to build personal ties. He also (at least at times) offered somewhat reassuring rhetoric about his administration’s position on the most dangerous regional challenges, like North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Unfortunately, the White House did not deliver many substantial accomplishments from the president’s trip. This is not necessarily a fault of Trump’s personal diplomacy or deal-making—although in several instances, he made concessions to Asian leaders that seemed to make no sense. Rather, much of the trade, strategic, and political measures for Asia envisioned by the Trump administration simply does not mesh well with Asian nations’ desire for greater trade integration, and many Asian nations are hedging away from the United States on strategic issues, though they are looking to their own mechanisms to prevent being dominated by China. In addition, with Trump almost completely ignoring human rights throughout his visit, and in his policies toward Asia, he risks alienating large, pro-democracy segments of the population in many developing Asian nations. For more on my assessment of Trump’s trip, see my new World Politics Review article.

Today, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced a bill that would not allow certain types of military cooperation with the Myanmar armed forces, and would place sanctions and travel restrictions on top members of the Myanmar military linked to the Rakhine State violence. These restrictions would continue as long as the violence continued. The bill is an important, although belated, first step in pushing the Myanmar military to end the violence in Rakhine State, and to demonstrate that foreign countries will demand a degree of accountability from the Myanmar government for actions toward the Rohingya, which the United Nations has called “ethnic cleansing.” It also puts back on a U.S. ban on jade and rubies from Myanmar, a sanction that had been lifted. The crisis in Rakhine State shows no signs of abating; refugees continue to pour into makeshift camps in Bangladesh, while military actions appear to be continuing. De facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi this week made her first visit to the center of the violence, northern Rakhine State, but she barely said anything about the crisis at all. Medicins Sans Frontiers and other aid organizations are warning that there is a high risk of major disease outbreaks in the understaffed and overcrowded camps in Bangladesh. It would have been better if the Senate, other parts of the U.S. government, and other key foreign actors like the European Union, had taken action sooner—such as by imposing such restrictions on the Myanmar military after an earlier round of violence that began in October 2016. Earlier action might have served a warning, a deterrent effect, to top Myanmar leaders that foreign countries would not stand by and do nothing if the Rakhine violence continued. This deterrent effect would have been multiplied if other foreign actors, from whom the Myanmar army seeks recognition, training, and possibly arms deals, had imposed such restrictions and sanctions in October 2016 as well. But they did not. As I noted in a recent Atlantic article, Myanmar commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing in 2016 and much of 2017 was a welcomed visitor in Europe and Japan. He made high-profile visits to Austria, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Japan. On several of his stops, Min Aung Hlaing apparently made side visits to defense and aerospace companies. Still, the senators’ action is a step. Now, other parts of the U.S. government, and other important actors with leverage over Myanmar, should take action as well. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who has expressed concern about the situation in Myanmar but has not been as prominent a voice on the crisis as UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, plans to visit Myanmar this month, according to the Associated Press. He should use his trip to warn top military leaders of tougher, multinational sanctions on the Myanmar military if the violence continues, and to warn the NLD as well that civilian leaders are not necessarily exempt from a re-imposition of targeted sanctions either. In addition, Tillerson should press the Myanmar government to allow aid workers, journalists, and UN monitors real access to the most devastated parts of Rakhine State. He also should warn top Myanmar officials that, ultimately, the United States and other actors could push for the United Nations to refer the Rakhine crisis to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a move called for by Fortify Rights and other rights organizations. The ICC could potentially investigate the Rakhine crisis for evidence of crimes against humanity. Other international actors can play a role as well. They could hold a major aid conference to help refresh funding for camps in Bangladesh, to improve the quality of conditions there and prevent major disease outbreaks. The European Union also should impose a travel ban and targeted sanctions on all top members of the Myanmar armed forces, until the violence is resolved and there is some path forward to reconciliation and peace in Rakhine State.

Southeast Asia’s democratic regression has taken a dramatic turn for the worse in the past few years. In Thailand, the military junta, which seized power in 2014 from an elected government, oversaw the trial of ousted Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra this year. In Myanmar, the military has reportedly rampaged through western Rakhine State against ethnic Rohingya Muslims, creating the biggest humanitarian crisis in East Asia, with the tacit support of de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling party have driven half the opposition members of parliament out of the country. Even the region’s freest nations, like the Philippines and Indonesia, face significant threats to their democracies. The White House’s “America First” policy is significantly facilitating this democratic regression. For more on Southeast Asia’s rollback, the president’s trip to Asia, and how “America First” is undermining democracy in Asia, see my new Expert Brief.

President Trump’s administration appears little troubled by the sharp democratic decline in Southeast Asia—but it should be, for economic and security reasons.

As Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte moves into 2018, the third calendar year of his time in office, the tough-guy leader’s policies on many critical issues remain unclear. Sure, Duterte is known for his straight-talking rhetoric, which has helped keep his popularity high—a September poll by Pulse Asia showed that about 80 percent of Filipinos have trust in Duterte, an impressive figure. Yet on three important issues, his talk and actions have been muddled and contradictory. What does 2018 hold for these three important areas? For more on Duterte’s approach to the economy, the relationship with the United States, and militancy in the southern Philippines, see my new column in World Politics Review.

At the United Nations last month, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley called for a tough international response to alleged atrocities against Rohingya by security forces in Myanmar’s western Rakhine State. Haley, who said that “We cannot be afraid to call the actions of the Burmese authorities what they appear to be: a brutal, sustained campaign to cleanse the country of an ethnic minority,” demanded that all nations stop sending arms to the Myanmar military. Congress was on the same page. A week earlier, Senator John McCain had already declared that he would pull language in the annual defense authorization bill that would have boosted military to military ties with the Myanmar army. Other countries, too, have laid into the Myanmar military in recent weeks, as the horrific exodus from Rakhine State continues—over 500,000 Rohingya have reportedly fled into Bangladesh since late August. But the tough words today about the Myanmar army leadership are a sharp reversal for most developed democracies.  For more on how countries have recently—and perhaps unwisely—courted the Myanmar military, see my new piece in The Atlantic.

For decades, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, the longest-serving nonroyal ruler in Asia, has played a delicate political game. While using a wide range of tactics—co-option of opposition party leaders, the use of state funds to promote the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), laws and lawsuits to reduce the influence of civil society and political opponents, and reportedly sometimes outright election fraud—he also has tried to maintain at least an appearance of some political freedom in Cambodia. As a result, for decades Cambodia existed as a kind of pseudo-authoritarian state, but one in which there were greater freedoms than in neighboring nations like Vietnam, Laos, and even to some extent Thailand. The country held contested elections, even if the electoral process was highly biased against opposition parties, and the CPP used a wide range of threats and other tools to try to divide and harass the opposition. Civil society, which had been rebuilt in the 1990s, continued to flourish despite the CPP’s tough tactics toward environmental groups, some media outlets, campaigners for fairer electoral processes, and other NGOs. Foreign civil society organizations like the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute continued to operate in the country. Reporters faced harassment—and worse—but in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s a young generation of Cambodian journalists emerged, and tough, independent radio, online, and print outlets investigated government activities and posed tough questions to policymakers. In 2013, the main opposition party even nearly won national elections—the true result will never be known, although some opposition figures believe it did actually win, but the election commission did not allow the CPP to lose. In the past year, however, Cambodia’s politics have slid farther backwards than probably any other country in East Asia. (Thailand is a close competitor, but the Thai military took power in 2014, not 2017.) Hun Sen and the CPP this year have launched an all-out attack on political opposition and civil society. The prime minister seems to have decided to take no risks ahead of 2018 national elections—no repeat of the possibility that his party could lose. He also appears emboldened by a new geopolitical situation in Southeast Asia in which the United States government, which historically had been one of the major critics of Hun Sen’s abuses, has chosen to mostly ignore human rights issues. Most recently, last week the Cambodian government filed papers that seek to dissolve the main opposition coalition, which would leave the opposition shattered before national elections in 2018. The proposed dissolution of the opposition is just the capstone on a year of turbulence. One of the main opposition leaders, Sam Rainsy, remains in exile. If he returns to Cambodia, he will have to face defamation charges. The other opposition leader, Kem Sokha, was arrested in September on dubious charges of treason and is reportedly now in prison. The crackdown has extended more widely as well. The Cambodia Daily, one of the most important media outlets, shut down in September. NDI had its program shuttered earlier this year, and top Cambodian government officials are now warning other NGOs that their events could be shut down if they do not get government permission in advance. Hun Sen’s government also has closed a number of independent radio stations, and is reportedly eying an even broader crackdown on politicians and civil society. The Los Angeles Times reports that about half of the opposition’s members of parliament have fled the country. With good reason: As the Los Angeles Times reports, earlier this month Hun Sen warned that “rebels” in Phnom Penh were supposedly plotting to overthrow the government, and suggested action needed to be taken against them. Hun Sen, in fact, has been issuing dire warnings all year of how bad it could get. In June, he delivered a speech in which he warned opposition politicians and other critics to “prepare coffins” if his party happened to lose in 2018. The prime minister is certainly using every tool possible to make sure his party wins.

Since late August, when attacks by Rohingya insurgents on police posts in Myanmar led to a massive reprisal by the army and other security forces in Rakhine State, the country has witnessed some of its worst violence in years. The armed forces, and apparently local vigilantes, have driven over 400,000 Rohingya out of Rakhine just since August. The plight of the Rohingya has captured significant international attention. It has been covered in major news outlets and at the top of the agenda at the United Nations, but the discussion has focused on Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s de facto head of government—and not on the top generals. Suu Kyi has come in for withering criticism (including from me here) from other Nobel laureates, rights groups, and foreign officials for downplaying the crisis in Rakhine State. Suu Kyi is hardly without blame, but not nearly enough focus has been placed on the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. To read more on Min Aung Hlaing and his role, see my new article in The National.