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  • Elections and Voting
    Religion and Voting Rights
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    Kelly Brown Douglas, dean of the Episcopal Divinity School at Union Theological Seminary, and Jonah Dov Pesner, director of the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, discussed the history of the fight for voting rights by religion leaders and current interfaith efforts to protect the right to vote. Shaun Casey, the T. J. Dermot Dunphy senior fellow of religion, violence, and peace building at Harvard Divinity School, moderated. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. CASEY: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Shaun Casey and I’m the T.J. Dermot Dunphy senior fellow of religion, violence, and peacebuilding at Harvard Divinity School.  As a reminder, this webinar is on the record. And the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on CFR’s website, which is CFR.org, and on the iTunes podcast channel Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, the Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted today to have two remarkable experts. We have Dean Kelly Brown Douglas and Rabbi Jonah Dov Pesner with us, and we’ve shared bios with you but I’m just going to highlight from their august list of accomplishments for your own interests. Dean Kelly Brown Douglas is dean of the Episcopal Divinity School at Union Theological Seminary and she’s a professor of theology. She also serves as the canon theologian at the Washington National Cathedral, and theologian in residence at Trinity Church Wall Street. Dean Douglas has taught religion at Goucher College, Howard University School of Divinity, and Edward Waters College. She’s the author or co-editor of several books, including Sexuality and the Black Church: A Womanist Perspective, and that was the first book to address the issue of homophobia within the Black church community. She’s considered a leader in the field of womanist theology, racial reconciliation, social justice, and sexuality in the Black church. Kelly, it’s great to have you. Welcome. Rabbi Jonah Dov Pesner is director of the Religion Action Center of Reform Judaism. He’s also the senior vice president of the Union for Reform Judaism. Rabbi Pesner has been named one of the most influential rabbis in America by Newsweek magazine for his leadership in social justice activism. His work is focused on encouraging Jewish communities to reach across lines of race, class, and faith in campaigns for social justice. In 2006, Rabbi Pesner founded Just Congregations, which engages clergy, professional, and volunteer leaders in interfaith efforts in the pursuit of social justice. Over the course of his career, he’s also led and supported campaigns for racial justice, economic opportunity, immigration reform, LGBTQ equality, human rights, and a variety of other causes. He serves on a number of boards, including the NAACP and the National Religious Partnership for the Environment, among others. Welcome, Jonah. So let’s begin by—I’m going to ask Kelly a question and then Jonah is going to provide his answer to the same question and then we’ll talk together. But I guess my larger question that maybe you can help us frame the history and context here is really how big are voting rights today in our current environment? How big a problem are we facing? DOUGLAS: Yes. First of all, thank you for inviting me to be a part of this discussion and this conversation, which is a very important conversation and one that I think is an urgent conversation for faith and religious leaders to be having and so that we can engage in the kind of action that will help us to protect our vision for a society and a democracy where everybody has equal voice and is treated as a sacred human being, and it’s always nice to be in conversation with my friend and brother, Rabbi Jonah Pesner. Let me begin to answer your question this way, Shaun. Of course, we are seeing not an unprecedented reality but, perhaps, unprecedented in our twenty-first century times, a number of states—I think some thirty-three states or more—passing a record number of, or trying to, and passing a record number of voting suppression bills and as opposed to voting rights, trying to find ways to suppress and strip people of their right to vote. This is not unprecedented or unusual, particularly as these bills are aimed particularly at communities of color, more specifically, aimed toward the African-American community, which, by and large, in our current context typically votes Democratic, and so even as people want to talk about the political divides in these bills we really have to reflect on the wider context of what’s going on historically in this country. So this has occurred—this pattern, if you will—began with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment and, of course, we know that the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870 and that amendment told us that—or barred states from depriving citizens—at that time, male citizens—of the right to vote based on race. As soon as that amendment was ratified, we saw Southern states, in particular, beginning to enact a series of measures, be it poll taxes, literacy tests, all-white primaries, measures that would, in fact, prevent or keep African Americans from the polls, whether be it through them not being able to pass such tests, meet such standards, or through sheer intimidation. Nevertheless, what we began to see is that after the passage of that bill, more than a half million Black men joined the voting ranks and the voting rolls, particularly, during, of course, this period of Reconstruction. When that occurred—and then, of course, we saw record numbers of Black men elected to public office. It was no accident that as more and more Black people began to take advantage—and, of course, earlier on that meant men—began to take advantage of their right to vote, began to exercise even what limited power they may have had, their power through the right to vote, you began to see the backlash.  This was a backlash, of course, that we talk about the backlash to the sort of Reconstruction era amendments. This cycle would continue. What we saw in relationship to this backlash to the Fifteenth Amendment and Black people entering into the ranks of voting, Black men—(laughs)—entering into the ranks of voting and entering into elected political offices, Jim Crow, poll taxes, the rise of these white supremacist groups—the Klan, et cetera—trying to keep Black people from the polls and, by and large, they were. And so it would be from, really, this era of post-Reconstruction backlash, all efforts, by the way, let’s keep in mind that these were efforts to protect a white electorate, to protect the sort of underside of our country’s foundation, though the truth of our country’s foundation that it was, in many ways, founded to be a democracy that reflected white supremacist power, that lived in contrast to its projected vision of being a nation where there’s freedom and justice for all. And so this vote—all of this backlash in regard to other than white men being able to exercise their power, and right to vote, is a part of this wider narrative of what kind of democracy we want to be, who this democracy is for, what we mean by American exceptionalism, which has always been equated with white supremacist exceptionalism and who can be a citizen. What we saw then, really, it was not until the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act that we began to see, really, this response to, and turn back away from these various Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, et cetera, that kept Black people from the polls. Let’s fast forward in history. In 2008, of course, we had the election of the first African-American president. In 2012, he was reelected. In 2008 and in 2012, you saw record Black turnout. I think, in 2012, that turnout was 66 percent. It exceeded, in 2012, the turnout of white Americans and that was an unusual situation. I think the turnout of white Americans was somewhere around 57 percent or so, and I may be wrong on those numbers. But we saw record turnouts. Again, in 2020, in the midst of a pandemic, we saw record Black turnout. Didn’t quite reach the 66 percent level of 2012 but it was in the 60 percent—high 60s (percent). It is no accident, and, of course, we know that that turned the election, right, in these key states. It turned the election. We saw local organizing, whether it be in Georgia through the work of Stacey Abrams and others, whether it be in Michigan, Missouri, the Soul to the Polls, which began in the 1990s in Florida and became a national movement, really became energized and that is getting Black people to the polls after church services.  All of these things began to really emerge, become reenergized, and we saw a major impact on the national election as a result of the turnout—we’ve got to be clear—of Black voters and the activity that happened on the ground and in relationship to Black churches. It is no accident, therefore, that we began to immediately see these voting suppression laws being enacted.  Let me add one more thing and then I’m sure my brother will reinforce because there’s so much that can be said. So this is in a nutshell. But I must say that this could not occur with such success if in 2013 the Supreme Court had not gutted the 1965 Voter Rights Bill Act, because what they gutted—what they took away was that section of the bill—I think it was Section Five and I may not be recalling that specific right—but they took away the section that required states to get permission, particularly the states who had a long history of discriminating against certain groups, particularly, Black Americans, to get permission to change their voting procedures.  When that was taken away, immediately after that was taken away by the Supreme Court, you began to see this influx of legislation by states trying again to enact and suppress the Black vote, and even—and not only doing that in ways with the laws which they were passing, be it voter ID, closing polls, et cetera, but changing—closing polling places and changing the voting districts. They no longer needed federal permission to do that. And so what we now have, really, is an open attack on the voting rights of Black Americans once again. Why? Because it indicates the power of the Black vote and how that Black vote began to not simply change the balance of power, if you will, in this country but, really, what we fail to recognize is that what—when we allow more people to come to the polls and what has historically been the case in terms of the Black struggle for the vote, and Black struggle for freedom, that when Black people progress in that regard, guess what happens?  Our democracy grows, and we grow into the vision that we proclaim is ours, that we want to live in into. And so what we’re fighting here when we fight and enact these voting right measures we are also saying something about the kind of democracy we really want to be.  And so I’ll stop there simply by saying it is a major problem, it is not a new problem, and we could have predicted this if we recognized the historical pattern that every time Black people seem to progress in any way toward freedom there is a proportional backlash. CASEY: Thank you, Kelly. That was an amazing introduction. Thank you so much. So, Jonah, how about you? What is your take on how big the problem is today? PESNER: What she said. Kelly Brown Douglas, I was absolutely right. You needed to go first, provide that incredible grounding of our history and the challenges to really confront how we got here. So thank you for that, and thank you, Shaun Casey, and Irina Faskianos from CFR for hosting this important conversation. And I’m keenly aware we are a multi-faith panel—there are Christians and Jews—but in the audience, I know, watching—I saw the registration—we have our Muslim family, our Sikh family. We are people across the racial and religious divide, which really is a great reminder about this multi-religious multiracial democracy we’re trying to create and the challenge of anti-Black racism and white supremacy in the center of not only voting suppression, Shaun, but anti-democratic tendencies. And as just a kind of metaphor for how I think about these things, and then I’ll kind of give the Midrash, the, like, rabbinic interpretation of Kelly’s wonderful Torah, the Biblical text. I’ll give the rabbinic interpretation. I want to just share a kind of—a picture of where we are at this moment. So on January 6, 2021, the whole nation watched as a bunch of white supremacists, Confederate flag-waving goons, terrorists, took over the nation’s capital in an insurrection of violence, and not only were they waving their Confederate flags and they were, basically, saying we don’t like the outcome of this election—we’re going to change it—in the long tradition of Jim Crow and voter suppression, they were wearing “Camp Auschwitz" and “Six million are not enough” t-shirts. There is this incredible intersectionality of anti-Black racism, white supremacy, and anti-Semitism, which, of course, shows up around anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim bigotry as well.  So that same day, the first Black senator and the first Jewish senator were elected to the state of Georgia, the site of some of the worst excesses of enslavement, of Jim Crow, and voter suppression. And it happens that that white senator, Jon Ossoff, was bar mitzvah(ed) at the temple, the place that was bombed by the Klan during the civil rights era because Rabbi Rothschild, famously, worked with King and the other luminaries of the civil rights movement, and the temple in Atlanta’s sister church is Ebenezer Baptist, which wasn’t only King’s church but was also Reverend Warnock’s church, who became the first Black senator.  So that split-screen moment, right, of the white Jewish—majority white Jewish community in allyship with the Black community fighting for the transformation of the Old South into the multiracial multi-religious democracy they yearn for, with this gasp of backlash of violence to steal the election is where, I think, we are at this moment. So I want people to kind of hold that because it puts into context the four hundred years of history that Kelly so beautifully articulated.  So the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism that I’m honored to lead is actually famous—it’s part of the story that Kelly told because it’s the site of the drafting of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that was eviscerated in Shelby v. Holder in 2013. It was, in fact, Section Five that was eviscerated by the Court, the pre-clearance, which would have prevented a lot of states from passing these voter suppression laws. And why was it that it was at a majority white Jewish institution that the Voting Rights Act was written?  It was because of a bunch of white Jews who understood the threats to all minorities, including to Jews, because of the ways in which anti-Black racism was so foundational to this country and white supremacy was such a threat to all minorities, and so it was that people like Jack Greenberg, Arnie Aronson, A. Philip Randolph, gathered the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, that was housed in our Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism and they drafted and strategized around the Civil Rights Act of ’64 and the Voting Rights Act of ’65. The founder of the RAC was a white Jew named Kivie Kaplan, who was born in Boston and was the child of immigrants who started with nothing, built a business, became incredibly wealthy, and then when he became wealthy he paid it forward through philanthropy. He became the president of the NAACP, which, when he retired, he was the last white Jewish president of the NAACP, and I trace by board seat to Kaplan, and he donated the RAC to the Reform Jewish—and why?  Because when he was a young man on his honeymoon to Florida with his wife, Emily, he was being driven around Florida by a Black taxi driver and they kept seeing the same sign over and over again, “No Jews, no dogs.”  Now, coming from the Northeast he had never experienced Jim Crow. He turns to the Black taxi driver and says, “is this common down here? What is this?” And the Black driver just looked at him and said, “they don’t even bother with us.” And Kaplan understood what King was trying to teach, that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere, that if you oppress one minority you oppress all minorities, and as I think about Kaplan’s legacy, having donated the Religious Action Center to the Reform Jewish movement, with the caveat that we would host the luminaries of the civil rights movement, which is why the Leadership Conference was housed there, which is why Dr. King, when he used to come to Washington, he would use our offices because Kaplan understood what has become a maxim for me during this current struggle for civil rights, that our safety in this country is in our solidarity.  When Muslims, and Christians, and Jews, and people of Asian heritage, and brown, and Black, and people across the whole spectrum are in deep solidarity we become safe, and we will only finally have redemption as a nation when we have democracy, right.  Core to the civil rights movement was understanding that the only way to finally throw off the hundreds of years of systemic racism, to finally end Jim Crow, really, would be through voting rights because if we actually had a democracy that reflected the reality of the mixed multitude, then our government would look like our people and we would actually all be able to flourish, that we would all be represented.  That’s why John Lewis got his head bashed in on the Edmund Pettus Bridge, and he was marching not only with Dr. King but Rabbi Dick Hirsch, my predecessor as the leader of the Religious Action Center. So then we get to where we are now. I won’t repeat everything that Kelly Brown Douglas articulately said. I would lift up, though, another white Jewish voice, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, her memory for a blessing, in Shelby v. Holder in her withering dissent, which I urge everybody to read her dissent—it’s incredible, almost scorcher at this point—when she said the logic of the Court—and by the way, the majority opinion was written by none other than Chief Justice Roberts—whose logic was, in essence, well, things are better now. And I don’t—I’m sure there are lawyers and jurists on this call who are now offended by my oversimplifying Roberts’s logic. But if I read it that’s kind of what it says, is things are better now. To which Ruth Bader Ginsburg said, that logic is like standing in a torrential rainstorm and saying, gee, I don’t need my umbrella anymore because I’m not getting wet. And so we saw, as Dr. Douglas said, hundreds and hundreds of pieces of legislation, voter suppression, passed state by state by state, and I’ll just land with the where do we think we are now with this incredible challenge.  My community, along with the Muslim community, and the diverse Christian community, and other religious communities, mobilized so powerfully not only in the 2020 election to do that overwhelming turnout that made history in a nonpartisan and 501(c)(3) appropriate way, but to make sure, that as we say in Hebrew, kol kolot. There’s a wonderful double entendre. The word kol in Hebrew can mean voice, it can mean vote, and, spelled differently, it can mean every. So we say, kol kolot—every voice, every vote—because we know that you really don’t have a voice if you don’t have a vote.  We had 15,000 Reform Jewish leaders who worked across lines of difference with the interfaith and multiracial community that turned out eight hundred and 875,000 voters alone, targeting communities that are the site of the historic voter suppression targeted by these laws, working across lines of difference, and then worked so hard to pass the Freedom to Vote Act, which failed, which would have rolled back lots of this voter suppression. And if you talk to anybody from the luminaries of the civil rights era of the ’60s into the civil rights moment we’re in today, it is about turnout, turnout, turnout. The single biggest antidote to voter suppression is overwhelming voter education, voter engagement, and getting people to the actual polls, and then watching those polls to make sure that their vote is counted, that their ballot is cured if it isn’t counted, and to actually reclaim the democracy for which we have fought so valiantly for. And with that, I will stop talking. CASEY: Well, thank you, Jonah. That, too, is a remarkable introduction. I was going to ask you to react to one another but the clock is not our friend here.  So I’m going to exercise what little power I have as the mediator here to really follow up what you closed with, Jonah, and tell us—Stacey Abrams’s name was mentioned by Kelly—tell us what is working now in terms of local tactical work to do the kinds of work you were just talking about, Jonah. So we’re going to pivot to Q&A from the audience soon. So if you’ve got questions, please put those in the chat or the Q&A button at the bottom and we’ll get to those after our panelists really tell us at the grassroots level. So, Kelly, tell us, in your experience and in your view, what are some of the organizations or what are some of the tactics that are really doing the kind of work that need to be done with respect to voting rights today? DOUGLAS: Yes. First of all, thank you, Jonah, for that and I’d like—and I want to affirm that our safety is in solidarity, and our salvation as a nation and—is in solidarity with one another. I think what we have to begin to focus on is what’s working, right, at the grassroots level and in our local communities because that’s where it really matters and this is where faith communities can really begin to be more and more engaged, and it’s a model that the Black church community has, throughout its history because the church has always been that place, that institution, that Black people could rely upon when other social institutions have failed them and failed our community. So what works? I think it is important, one, to—before we could get people to the polls, get them registered, and so what we’ve seen working even as a part of the Souls to the Polls movement, whether we’re talking about Black Vote Matters, whether we’re talking about the PAC of twenty-five Black—and I’m speaking from African-American context—of Black religious leaders, the—and I can’t now think of the name of Stacey Abrams’s organization in Georgia. But these were all centered, first and foremost, around getting people registered, also getting people to check their registrations, because there’s legislation that has been aimed, of course, at purging the polls and people are finding themselves purged from the polls not knowing it and then they get to the polls and they can’t vote.  You can do that through your local faith communities and begin to have movements that move through, go through neighborhoods, or voter rights to get people registered and provide easy access to registration, helping them to get registered, taking them to get registered, helping them. You can’t fill it out for them, but helping them to get registered.  The other thing that worked moving into the 2020 election was voter education and one—and I say this more broadly is that we have to begin to educate our communities on this—what we are saying in this conversation, what’s going on, because we know there is so much false information out there, and purposefully targeted to certain communities.  And so one of the things that Black churches conduct are voting education weekends and seminars, et cetera, to begin to educate them on the importance of this moment that we find ourselves in as well as to the issues at hand and what’s really going on. I think—and then I’ll be quiet—one of the most effective measures that we’ve seen in the run-up to elections, and that’s why this is being targeted—this is why early voting is being targeted, this is why reduction on weekend voting has been targeted—because of the Souls to the Polls campaign, and Black churches across the country ensuring that Black voters can vote by taking them to the polls on Sundays. Here’s the thing we have to recognize, and this doesn’t simply impact the African-American community—I only speak out of that context right now—is that for the most part, particularly poor communities and communities of color, they cannot afford to be standing at a poll all day in line trying to vote.  They’ve got to work, and so we have to understand the racist logic and exclusionary logic of these voting suppression—voter suppression bills. They know people can’t stand in line all day because these people have to work. They know that people can’t miss a day of their job so they—a lot of people—that’s why you have disproportionate numbers of people of color, in poor communities, voting prior to election day because they take advantage of the early voting so they can vote and engage in the, quote/unquote, “democratic process.”  And so I think that we have to continue to not simply attack these bills on the local level because that’s where they’re playing out, on the local level, at the same time—that’s one thing, that’s the reactive part—and then the proactive part, even as we do that, proactively we’ve got to get more, and more, and more people engaged and signed up and registered to vote, especially looking at—I don’t know what are they, Gen Xers?—but our new voters and getting new voters to the rolls. So I think there’s a reactive and a proactive role that has to happen simultaneously, and it is a moral—if you will, we have a moral reason as leaders of faith leaders and faith communities to, in fact, do this because what we are trying to do is create a society that is more reflective of the sacred creation that we are—with everybody having equal voice, equal respect, and equal participation. CASEY: Thank you so much, Kelly. Jonah, from your perspective what should be happening at the local tactical level? PESNER: Yeah, again, amen to everything that Kelly just said, so I just want to put a pin in that. But I won’t repeat it. I will do a little bit of just kind of building off of it. I want to frame this piece with emphasizing the local nature of this work with a very haunting reminder that I carry with me whenever I do this work. We first started getting deep back into voting rights because my movement had historically been in—but we got deep back in after Shelby v. Holder, and we were invited down to North Carolina by none other than Reverend William Barber—who is the cochair of the Poor People’s Campaign: A National Call for Moral Revival—that has tried to breathe a kind of new life into King’s original vision. And he was the head of the NAACP of North Carolina, and he called us and he said, what’s happening on the ground in North Carolina is antidemocratic and it is putting the nation at risk because of the voter suppression tactics that were unleashed by Shelby v. Holder. And he invited the Reform Jewish Movement in with our people, to ally with his church, and with his NAACP chapter to do the work that Kelly Brown Douglas just described, and it was an incredible education. Number one, in the depth and impact of the tactics of voter suppression and how it impacts mostly low-income communities, rural communities, and communities of color, and the way in which allyship is really about listening to the people who are impacted by voter suppression, hearing from them, and then taking the lead from what they actually need, and what the strategy is to actually change the dynamic. So we mobilized thousands of Reform Jews in allyship with Barber’s church, and others, to do the work in 2016, but one of the things that Barber said—after I got up, gave the sermon at church, and we did a whole mobilizing thing, and I told the story of the Voting Rights Act being written in our conference room—and he said, “Rabbi Pesner, let me issue a correction—a Talmudic emendation, if you will”—and if people know Barber, you know what I’m talking about—he said, “the Voting Rights Act was not written in your conference room. It was written in blood in Selma and transcribed in your conference room.” And I carry Barber’s teaching with me all the time because it’s happening in Atlanta, it’s happening in South Florida, it’s happening in Houston. This is where voting rights either happen or are suppressed. This is where democracy either happens or is suppressed. So the good news is, Shaun, there’s great work happening all across the country. I see that my friend Ruth Messinger posted—the former head of American Jewish World Service—she referenced Fair Fight Action—I just would lovingly say, Ruth, we actually don’t work with Stacey because she is partisan and running for governor. We’re a religious body; we’re a 501(c)(3). So we work with Nse Ufot—the name people don’t know, but you should know. Nse runs The New Georgia Project and has built a coalition with Natasha Brown, who does Black Votes Matter, and a whole range of local grassroots groups—some in the churches. As Kelly Brown Douglas said, we’ve got to leverage the power of the Black church, and the synagogues, and the mosques, and also the folk who are not in church but who are really impacted by voter suppression, and do the deep hard work of voter mobilization. What I would say to folks, every state that is dealing with this has a coalition. These coalitions are multiracial; they are multi-religious. One last one that I’ll just lift up, Shaun, and then turn back over the mic. We just had a big victory in Pennsylvania. A project—I want to get the name of the project exactly right—PA Voice and the Keystone Counts Coalition. This coalition of churches, mosques, and synagogues, advocacy groups, and other coalition partners were not OK with the gerrymandered, partisan redistricting that was racialized, and basically trying to bunch up and package all Black folk and other people of color into one or two districts. And they mobilized across the state. They acted in solidarity. They built a broad network of folks, and they were able to put enough pressure on the legislature, and on the governor, to actually get new maps that are much more democratic, and much more reflective, and much more protective of communities of color. So I actually am very hopeful and optimistic. As much as this stuff is and feels horrible, this work is a generational project. If Stacey Abrams were here, she would say it was a decade of effort. To me, this is not just about a decade. It’s not about the midterms or about the presidential—it’s about a generational commitment to democracy. CASEY: All right, thank you, Jonah.  We have gone longer than we anticipated before we pivoted to Q&A, but that’s okay because what Kelly and Jonah have given us is quite remarkable, and every second of it has been important. So we’re going to transition to audience question and answer, and I know we have some, so let’s go ahead and turn to those. And so we’ll let our two panelists field those questions. So go ahead and read one of those. OPERATOR: Great. (Gives queuing instructions.) We will take the first live question from Bruce Knotts of the Unitarian Universalist Office at the United Nations.  KNOTTS: Thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation. One thing that I think is true is that every election since Richard Nixon, the majority of white people have voted Republican, and if we suppress the Black vote in this country we will have Republican government, and we will not have a two-party system. And for us to maintain a two-party system, we need to have everybody voting regardless of who it is. And so I’m referring to Susan Neiman, who wrote the book, Learning from the Germans, and she resists the idea being an ally. She says, I’m an affected party, and yes, Black people are more effected. I have a Black husband. I know the danger he lives with. I know the privilege I have as a white man. But we’re all in this together, and we all face living in a one-party dictatorship if we don’t have everybody voting. And so we all have skin in the game. And one last comment, I was part of the consultative group that Shaun organized at the State Department, and I’m wondering if that’ll ever happen again because that was really a good consultative group. Thank you. DOUGLAS: I guess I will affirm what—thank you, Bruce, for your comment—what you said, and just add a couple little things. One, yes, this goes back to what Jonah said in terms of solidarity, and I’d like this word—perhaps Jonah—I’ve said to Jonah, I like this word solidarity much more than I do ally because when we say ally, we are suggesting that it’s your problem and I’m joining you and helping you to solve your problem, and I say, no, no, it’s your problem. This is our problem. It’s our problem, as we have to really determine what kind of nation we want to be, and what kind of people we want to be. And for those of us who are members of religious and faith communities, regardless of what those religious and faith communities are, it is a question of whether or not we really believe what we claim to believe as people of—representing our particular traditions, and that is a belief that we are all sacred human beings. And to be valued, valued equally, and if we really believe that, then we are fighting and struggling to live into that vision, into that claim. And so it’s our moral responsibility, and so it’s not about being allies with anybody. It’s about recognizing that this for us reaches a level of moral urgency because it says something about who we claim to be, and something about who we want to be, and it also says something about the integrity of our very religious and faith claims. And so I agree, and until we create voting rights, or just one layer of this, but a very important foundational layer that will help us move a little bit closer to who we want to be. PESNER: Yeah, amen to that. And I just want to reflect a little bit, Kelly Brown Douglas, on the deeper layer, and you and I have been in the anti-racism business together, and the multi-faith solidarity business for a while. So voting rights is the presenting crisis. There’s deeper, right? So I love the reference, Bruce, to we’re all impacted. Of course, we’re all impacted by white supremacy. White Christian people are impacted by white Christian nationalism, but we’re impacted differently. Kivie Kaplan understood that. As a white Jew, he had enormous privilege that he only understood was conditional privilege when he saw that sign, “no Jews, no dogs,” but he’d been fine up until that point. His solidarity with the African-American taxi driver was a recognition that we’re all impacted but differently, and so we have to just recognize that. Part of that then means doing the internal reckoning, and part of our campaign around democracy and voting rights is a racial equity, diversity, inclusion campaign inside the American Jewish community. We’re asking all of our activists, all of our organizers, all of our rabbis to do their anti-racism work within the synagogues, to ask ourselves, how have we actually been racist with the 10 to 15 percent of Jews in America who are not white? What ways are we perpetuating systems of oppression within the synagogue impacting Black and brown Jews, and Asian Jews, and Jews of all hues, even as we’re doing these external public fights for the common good, which make a lot of sense? And then, the only other thing I would say about the whole partisan thing, which I think really matters, because Bruce really lifted this up, the Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act were passed by bipartisan majorities. The Voting Rights Act was reauthorized into law by presidents whose names were Reagan and Bush, not just Clinton and Carter, so there was a time there was a bipartisan consensus around democracy and voting. We need to reclaim that. CASEY: All right. Can we take our next question? OPERATOR: Our next question is a written submission from Tiffany Hartung from Interfaith Power & Light. She says: Interfaith Power & Light recently launched our 2022 Civic Engagement Campaign, the Faith Climate Justice Voter Campaign—and she provides a link—to mobilize faithful voters to turn out and vote their values for caring for our common home and loving our neighbors. We are focused heavily on Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. In addition to voter registration and voter education, do you have suggestions on how our campaign can support the faith-led efforts in those states to counter the voter suppression efforts that might occur during voting? PESNER: Kelly, do you want me to jump in on that one? DOUGLAS: Because I jumped in it first, I was going to let Jonah jump in on that one. PESNER: All right. I will do just because immediately Dr. Barbara Williams-Skinner comes to mind. She is the head of the African American Clergy Network and the Skinner Institute, and partners with Adam Russell Taylor—formerly of the World Bank now of Sojourners—in an interfaith strategy called Lawyers and Collars—said lovingly as a guy who doesn’t wear a collar, I wear a kippah. So, we—but we have a lot of lawyers in the Jewish community, so it kind of evens out. But it’s an effort to mobilize religious leaders together with lawyers to do election protection work, and what Dr. Skinner has done brilliantly, has figured out who are the local clergy state-by-state that are influential, and has the relationships that can build up the coalitions and networks now—do the training and do the support—so that we’re ready months ahead of the 2022 midterms. So to Interfaith Power and Light, who I love, I would say it would be a good idea—in addition to the voter mobilization coalitions in your state-by-state effort—to really look at what Dr. Williams-Skinner has set in each of those states where there is an influential pastor, an influential rabbi, and then a whole group of other religious leaders and lawyers who are getting set as we speak. But I don’t know, Kelly, that’s just one very specific answer. DOUGLAS: No, actually, yeah, I was going to say Lawyers and Collars, and—(laughs)—because what I wanted to point to—and you’ve just done it, so I’ll just reinforce it—is that it’s not only about building partnerships with people within the interfaith community et cetera, but what has become very significant in the finest partnerships with lawyers and even what we found—one of the things that happened on voting day was certain organizations made sure that they had lawyers there—(laughs)—ready to help people through the process if their right to vote had been challenged on that day. So I think that—yes, that was the organization that I was going to lift up. CASEY: All right. Great. We have time for more questions, so what’s up next? OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question live from Guthrie Graves-Fitzsimmons from Center for American Progress. GRAVES-FITZSIMMONS: Hello, everyone. Thank you for this great panel. Given the specific attacks on the Black church, I wonder if each of you thinks it’s strategic to frame this, partly, as a religious freedom issue? Thank you. DOUGLAS: Well, thank you, and good to see you in this conversation. Thank you for that question. And I’m going to answer quickly in light of the time. One, we have to understand the attacks on the Black church in relationship to the wider history and significance of the Black church. To attack the Black church—this is, again, nothing new—but to attack the Black church is to attack the center of the Black community, to center—to attack the institution that signals the survival onus, freedom of the Black community. As W.E.B. Du Bois said in 1903—I believe he said, the Black church is the religious center as well as the social center for the Black community. So to attack the Black church in essence is to attack the Black community, equivalent to attacking Black HBCUs. These are stronghold institutions that reflect the wellbeing, the future of the Black community. Is this an issue of religious freedom? I think Jonah said it best—all of these things go together. And so what we have to understand is, what is it that when we are trying to suppress the vote, when we are attacking certain communities? What do we mean by protecting white supremacy, and what does that look like? What you’re actually trying to protect is a particular understanding of what it means to be a citizen, and so, when you understand that, then it is about religious freedom in the sense of what it means to be a multicultural, inter-religious, multiethnic community. And so what’s really at stake here is trying to protect a particular notion of what it means or who is accepted as an American, and that has to do with religion, color, et cetera, et cetera—gender realities, et cetera. PESNER: I can only add—I mean, it’s a really interesting question, and I appreciate Kelly centering the Black church as another—the church fire is just an example of what this looks like. Religious freedom issues feel very complicated to me, and we keep—as a religious minority, where my predecessor Rabbi David Saperstein was famously part of the coalition that passed the original RFRA, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which really was to protect religious minorities—suddenly has become weaponized as a way to oppress to LGBTQIA folk, to take away women’s right to control their bodies. So I guess it’s a really interesting idea. Although I feel like religious freedom at this point just mucks everything up, and as a person who really treasures religious freedom, I wish it were less weaponized. It would help all of us who are religious minorities feel safer, frankly. DOUGLAS: Amen to that. And I just want to say for me it depends on who’s talking about it. (Laughs) And I mean, really it depends on who’s talking about it. CASEY: All right. We have time at least for one more question, I think. OPERATOR: Great. Next is a written submission from Emma Petty Adams from the Mormon Women for Ethical Government. She asks, “voting rights have historically been a point of bipartisan agreement. Thank you for your acknowledgement of that, Jonah. Do you have any specific advice for those conservative Americans who have watched their party walk away from this issue and instead pivot towards voter fraud as the most pressing issue? How can we or they speak persuasively to friends and family about the collective positive impact that comes when all Americans have access to the polls? For example, is there a collection of individual stories that help demonstrate the personal impact of voter suppression?” DOUGLAS: I think it was directed to you, Jonah. PESNER: Oh, no, I just heard a thank you for that. DOUGLAS: Oh. (Laughs.) CASEY: (Laughs.) PESNER: I mean, all right, I’ll just say a word briefly, and then kick it to Kelly. I mean, there’s a wonderful emerging organization called the One America Movement, which is trying to combat the kind of polarization that leads to the mess we’re in without doing just kind of touchy-feely reconciliation work, but actually deep. How do you get people who come out of very different traditions, kind of the—and I hate to use, white Evangelical Christians, right, as a basket as if they’re all the same, right—talking to Muslim American, coming at immigrant communities, et cetera—like an actual conversation where we rebuild the fabric of the One America? I have a critique because One America, if you ask somebody who lived under Jim Crow, what is that One America? Is that the One America we want? But it is an aspirational vision, let’s say, of what could be, and I think its theory of change is around relationship and conversation, where people who are reacting to what they see in disinformation, whether it’s mainstream media disinformation or online disinformation, humanizing the reality of people’s lives and getting them to talk to people who are not like them. But I must admit I feel like this is the great challenge of our day, is how will we invite in folk who see the world differently into—they respect and very Talmudic—you remember in the Talmud it’s all about the dissenting opinion, Hillel and Shammai. The minority opinion was always published and celebrated even as the majority won the day. We have to find a way in this country to celebrate the majority and the minority, but stay one sacred dialogue, and I don’t have any deep words of wisdom on how to do it. DOUGLAS: Yeah, neither do I, except to say this, that we have to—it begins with changing the gaze and helping people change their gaze. And that means engaging with those who are different than themselves, and because the more we can open up our perspective, the more we are able to even see the limitations, perhaps, of our own perspective. I don’t want to open up another can of worms, but best to open it up when we’ve got to close. That’s why not unrelated to this—because all of this is so inter-related—not unrelated to this is the attack on quote/unquote, “critical race theory,” because that’s about changing our gaze. That’s about hearing other people’s stories. That’s about engaging other histories and what it looks like from other perspectives to be in this struggle to become the democracy that we claim we want to be. And so I think we cannot see disconnected from voter suppression and what we’re seeing going on in this country—this whole critical race theory discussion—because it’s all about protecting a vision, protecting a gaze, protecting a view of America. And so we just have to find ways—and to the person who asked the question—in our local communities and congregations. If we believe that these things have to be opened up, we have to engage that in our local communities and not allow these various forms of legislation about voting suppression and controlling a particular—protecting particular views of truth and history. We’ve got to find ways to open those things up, and I think if we do then we will find ourselves moving closer, closer to understanding that we are all in this together, and that there is salvation and solidarity. CASEY: I would just simply add, as we come to our close here, I think that the struggle for people who are working for voting rights today—and really, it’s throughout our whole polity—is how you live in proximity with people who do not agree with you. Too often in my experiences having worked on some national campaigns, it’s all about turning out the base—that you try to turn out the people who agree with you. And the notion of trying to persuade and interact with all of American citizens has become really rare today and really, frankly, harder to sit down and live in proximity with somebody who does not share your particular political or theological views. And I would add a historical footnote, Jonah, when you were talking about January 6—those insurrectionists were also fueled, frankly, by white Christian theology, and I would simply argue, from my perspective as a Protestant theologian who is Anglo, we bear a greater burden in this. We have not engaged, in this case, Evangelical or fundamentalist Christian theology with any success. In fact, again, we don’t really live and work in proximity with the generators of that alternative theological view that fueled those folks we saw on January 6. So I think all religious communities, whether—no matter what the community of origin—have a duty to try to engage, and it’s much harder today than it was ten years ago. And I think that’s part of the key of preserving voting rights today. It’s more than just rallying our bases. It’s about how do we engage with people who are actually opposing and working against voting rights. Let me simply say, I think we’re going to actually end on time, which I’m not noted for as moderator, so let the record show. First of all, thank you so much, Kelly and Jonah. This was a remarkable conversation, and it will be posted. The transcript will also be posted. I think this is certainly a sharable hour that you can circulate among your friends. So look for that—look for those posts at @CFR.org. Thank you, too, to the audience for your excellent questions and comments. Let me also do the moment of advertising. You can follow Kelly’s work on Twitter at @DeanKBD, and you can follow Jonah’s work at @JonahPesner—all one word. And we encourage you to follow CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program on Twitter at @CFR_religion for announcements about upcoming events and information about the latest CFR resources, and you can reach out to Council on Foreign Relations at [email protected] with any suggestions or questions. I’d like to thank Irina and her team at the Council on Foreign Relations for putting together this absolutely superb panel. Thank you, all, for coming. I look forward to your participation in future discussions. Take care. Thank you, everybody.
  • Religion
    Religion and Conflict Resolution
    Play
    Lisa Sharland, senior fellow and director of the Protecting Civilians in Conflict program at the Stimson Center, and Sukhsimranjit Singh, the Judge Danny Weinstein managing director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law, discuss the United Nations’ role in peacemaking and how religion leaders contribute to conflict resolution around the world. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you, and welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record. And the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. So we’re delighted to have Lisa Sharland with us today to talk about “Religion and Conflict Resolution.” Unfortunately, Dr. Singh could not be with us. He might be able to join us later. We’re not exactly sure, so we will just roll with it. But we’re happy to have Lisa with us to talk about this important topic. Lisa Sharland is a senior fellow and director of the protecting civilians in conflict program at the Stimson Center. She was previously the deputy director of defense, strategy, and national security, and the head of the international program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Her research has focused on UN peace operations reform, peacekeeping effectiveness, protection of civilians, preventing and countering violent extremism, and women, peace, and security. She served as the defense policy advisor at the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations from 2009 to 2014; and represented Australia in multilateral negotiations in the UN Security Council and General Assembly bodies, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. So, Lisa, it’s great to have you with us to talk about this, given your experience, the research you’ve done, and the positions you’ve held. If you could give us an overview of the UN’s role in peacekeeping, especially the approaches that the UN has taken to deal with religious conflicts, and what you’ve seen over the trajectory of your career, and your prediction for or your thoughts on how we should be dealing with conflicts as we look out. SHARLAND: Thanks so much for the kind introduction, Irina. And it’s a pleasure to be here with the Council on Foreign Relations and those that are on the call today. As Irina has noted in my sort of biography, I’m by no means a religious scholar to comment on any of these topics. But what I’d really like to do in my introductory remarks is, I guess, offer a bit of some context in terms of the spectrum of different tools that the UN has available to it to engage in peacemaking and conflict resolution efforts, and then pivot a little bit to what this means for what we may term as religious conflicts. So what do we mean by peacekeeping—sorry, peacemaking in the context of the UN? So there’s a spectrum of different tools that are available to the international community through the UN when it comes to resolving conflict and addressing threats to international peace and security. Although, I think really at the outset of this conversation it’s really important to note that many of those tools may appear out of reach when we look at the context of what’s happening with the war in Ukraine at the moment, and the intractability of any action in the UN Security Council. So what are some of these tools? And I think I have no doubt we’ll come back to some of the challenges around utilizing them in the conversation. So we have at hand—and many of these tools have been around for seventy years; they came out and emerged from the UN Charter—conflict prevention, which is diplomatic measures that are focused on preventing tensions or disputes from escalating into conflicts. So, really, trying to target some of these tensions before they escalate into a context where civilians may be impacted by violence or those tensions maybe escalate into military conflict. We have peacekeeping, which is well-known around the world for those blue helmets that you see on personnel that are deployed to different mission contexts—at the moment across twelve in the globe, including contexts such as Mali and the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and many that have been in place for decades including within the Middle East. Further along that spectrum we have peace enforcement, which is really more direct intervention, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in terms of military action. And then we also use this terminology around peacebuilding, this idea of preventing the relapse into conflict, and how do we ensure that efforts to build peace don’t fall apart when some of these tensions emerge. So these processes are not necessarily linear and may be required upon during the different stages of conflict for intervention. Now, one of those that I didn’t mention in that spectrum was peacemaking, and this is sort of a terminology that has been explored for decades. We can go back to 1992 and An Agenda for Peace by the then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. And that noted that peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as were seen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. So, really, what we’re talking about here is diplomatic action to bring parties to an agreement, often while hostilities are underway. And it may be used in conjunction with other tools or facilitated by the actions of others, including peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and so on. In this context the UN secretary-general may exercise their good offices to facilitate the resolution of conflict, and a lot of that may involve consultation behind closed doors. And I have no doubt this is an ongoing conversation in terms of another conflict—a number of conflicts that we see around the world at the moment. It may involve the appointment of different envoys who act on behalf of the secretary-general, and it may indeed be undertaken by individuals who have no official affiliation with the UN in terms of supporting those conflict-resolution efforts. What I think is notable at the moment is there is discussion about A New Agenda for Peace currently being driven by the secretary-general as part of his common agenda, recognizing that the world faces a new range of challenges and evolving threats to peace and security—climate change, cyber, information warfare—and I think these are all important to highlight in the context of what they mean when the intersect with religion and conflict. So, very briefly, I wanted to go through how has the UN engaged on conflict and religion. And I think a really important question here to ask at the outset is: What are we talking about when we refer to religious conflicts? Religion itself can be both a driver of conflict and a mechanism for fostering peace. Some of the comments that I’ll make here will draw on some of the research that the Stimson Center and the Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program undertook back in 2020 looking at the issue of violence based on religion or belief, and this was spearheaded by colleagues of mine, Aditi Gorur and Julie Gregory. Some of the things that this research noted that—is, in terms of geography, the Middle East and North Africa region has the highest level of violations based on freedom of religion or belief, followed by the Asia-Pacific, and Europe. And this is drawing on research by the Pew Research Center. These include violations by state and non-state actors. And there remain, of course, ongoing concerns about religious-related terrorism and violent extremism. Religious-related atrocities have been highlighted and amplified of particular concern by the UN special rapporteur on this topic, in relations to violence targeting Muslims in the Central African Republic, for instance; the Muslim Rohingya communities in Myanmar; and Yazidi communities in Iraq. Other areas of concern that have been noted generally by researchers in the international community focused on the forced internment of predominantly Muslim Uighurs in China, and the targeting of Christians by Boko Haram. In this context, in terms of UN engagement there has been a range of different interactions and tools that have been utilized. However, I should note that they have not focused explicitly on the issue of the religious nature of this conflict, although they have been reflected, obviously, in a number of the debates and discussions. So, for instance, dependent on some of the countries that are being looked at, some of the countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council at the moment where there are different levels of religious-related violence include Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In the context of UN peacekeeping and peace operations, which I previously referred to, we see it in the Central African Republic, the DRC, and Mali. And we also see it in relation to efforts to prevent conflict and violence by and the work of violent extremist groups, and in discussions around sanctions that the UN may employ under that peace-enforcement mechanism in relation to different ISIS affiliates, or al-Qaida affiliates, and so on. The research that was undertaken by Stimson found that the issue of violence based on religion or belief was an underexamined issue in the Security Council. It was not an issue of thematic focus, unlike the discussions that have taken place in the broader membership within the UN in the General Assembly, and in the Human Rights Council. The Security Council has recently indicated that it may be willing to engage more actively on the issue of freedom of religion as a security matter. Indeed, back in August 2019 it hosted what they call an Arria-formula meeting, which is a more informal meeting of the Security Council, looking at the issue of advancing the safety and security of persons belonging to religious minorities in armed conflict. And I should note that a number of those country contexts that I outlined do indeed consider or refer to the issue of religious intolerance and violence and how it can drive conflict in the resolutions that have been adopted on some of these issues. But one of the key findings that emerged from Stimson’s research was the need for further analysis of some of these issues and to explore whether or not there is any further causality between the issues related to conflict. I want to refer to briefly some of the points that were mentioned in the research that looked at how perhaps religion may be related to the way that conflict develops, and I should note again this remains an underexplored area of research. But it may relate to, for instance, the identification of targets; to exclude individuals, making clear who is socially and politically included and who is not; to demarcate lines between those that may be perceived as the other and those that may not fall within that group. It may present risks that can trigger conflicts due to high levels of inequalities between different groups—that is, economic disparities, access to justice, access to different services that may exacerbate grievances. However, what I should note here is that it is likely a reflection of the overlap of different identity markers that are associated with religious belief or identity, and where politicization can enhance grievances and stoke conflict. So what I want to draw out here is a comment that was made by the special rapporteur in their recent report on this issue in the UN, and I quote: “A number of these crises and conflicts have a religious dimension, sometimes involving adherents of diverse faiths or adversaries within the same religious tradition. However, it is essential not to unduly overestimate the role of religion in either conflict or peacemaking to the exclusion of other factors and motivations involved. This approach is often reductive, concealing the complexities affecting the lives of peoples affected by conflict and crises, including members of religious or belief minorities.” So I think it’s important to note there that while religion may have a really important role in terms of, I guess, intersecting with some of these different issues of discrimination or marginalization, that there are, obviously, a range of different factors to consider. So what I want to conclude on before we have a chance to hear from our other panelist is, I guess when we’re looking at this role of the UN in peacemaking and engaging in some of these conflict scenarios and efforts to resolve conflict, what is the role of religious actors and faith-based organizations in these contexts? And again, I defer a little—a bit back to what the special rapporteur within the UN system has reflected on. And importantly, in looking at civil society engagement, they note the importance of promoting interfaith engagement, the importance of opposing narratives that may essentialize different parts of religious or belief communities, and the importance of faith-based leaders in terms of being influencers who can promote inclusive, peaceful, and just conflict resolutions. And I’m quoting directly there from that special rapporteur. So I think that’s a really important note to conclude on when we consider the role of the UN in this peacemaking space and the vast array of tools that are available, that there is a really important role for civil society and faith-based communities in those conversations depending on the nature of the conflict. And I’ll leave my comments there. Thanks, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much, Lisa. And thank you to Sukhsimranjit Singh for joining. We’re so happy you could be with us. As we have laid out in his bio, he’s the Judge Danny Weinstein Managing Director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University Caruso School of Law, where he’s also an associate professor of law and practice, and directs the LL.M programs. His practice, teaching, and scholarship focuses on cross-cultural dispute resolution, faith-based mediation, and utilizing modern theories, science, and technology to devise creative solutions for global disputes. Dr. Singh has resolved disputes in countries throughout the world, including Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, and U.S. states across the country. And he most recently published Best Practices for Mediating Religious Conflicts for the American Bar Association. So we’re really looking forward to your perspective, Dr. Singh, to talk about what religious leaders have historically contributed to conflict resolution, how they can continue to do so, and to talk about your Best Practices for Mediating Religious Conflicts as you have done and what you could offer to the group. So I’ll turn it over to you. SINGH: Absolutely. Thank you. Can you all hear me well? Good. All right. Thank you for inviting me. An honor to be here. And such a good pleasure to hear Ms. Lisa Sharland speak from her perspective. And, Ms. Irina, wonderful to be in your presence as well. Folks, let me tell you my specialty, or expertise, or experience, rather. Years of thinking has been on the idea of dispute resolution, so my lens will be more towards conflict resolution and how religion plays a role there. Besides religious leaders, I’m going to make some comments also on culture and cultural identity besides religion and religious identity, because I think both are intertwined in many ways. In fact, I’ll start with an example. In some countries, there’s a cultural practice of arranged marriage. People get arranged marriage. When it comes to—when it’s time to get married, their children, their grandchildren, people prefer to do arranged marriages. And I’ve been studying that for a few years. And I look—in those countries what is fascinating is the cultural trend of arranged marriages transcends across religious lines. So I’ve seen Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, Christians all doing arranged marriage in that part of the village that I’m talking about. This one is in India. My interest in this area of international diplomacy came most likely when I started studying for my master’s degree in 2005 and ’06. But I published a piece in Cardozo Journal of Dispute (sic; Conflict) Resolution on international nuclear negotiations and the impact of culture and religion on them. To me, it’s fascinating to see how sometimes we miss this beat that religion can play a big role in negotiations. And I’m fascinated by this. So again, I’m a practitioner as well as a scholar, so I’m going to give examples from both sides. Let me start quickly with my scholarship there and then I’ll give you example from a practical part of the world. My scholarship looked into India and how India chose not to sign CTBT—Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—when U.S. was negotiating with India on the signage of the treaty and that moment in time. And what’s fascinating to me is the impact played by religion in it, which is very, to my knowledge—my limitedness; sorry if I’m wrong—understudied topic, at least in that part of the region. Two things. There is national identity involved whenever you involve international diplomatic negotiations involving at least two states. There is organizational identity involved, speaking from a cultural lens. And then there is the personal identity of the specific negotiators who are negotiating. So there are three things involved. Let’s quickly talk about all three. National identity. I think national identity in this sense is what’s the major religion of the nation. Let’s say India: It is Hinduism. Some negotiator ought to—should have asked what is a Hindu’s mind about conflict resolution. Where does nuclear negotiation fit with the majority faith in India? Now, these are interesting questions. Here is one data I found out that I’m going to read for you, all right? Let me read this—quote this for you: “Some displays in the annual Ganapati Festival in Maharashtra, India, celebrates India’s technological progress”—and I’m quoting it—“which is seen as a force for the betterment of people as a whole. The progress is equated with nuclear weapons. You could see vignettes of electricity, dams, satellite dishes, fighter planes, and Agni missiles sitting in temples right next to the gods.” What’s fascinating here is this idea, why should India not be fighting or not be as strong to enter into nuclear power that other countries were at that moment, and how religion is supporting that idea. I don’t plan to go too deep into it. I just wanted to touch the surface, a fascinating idea how missiles could be prayed, could be blessed upon in a temple, and how religion and international foreign policy can be connected. Here is my general statement on this. How much do we study the impact of national culture? My article was published on India-U.S. nuclear negotiation. You can find it. I’m not going to go too deep into it. But my question is, when we negotiate, let’s say, with Iran, how deeply are we looking into the impact of religion, impact of cultural identity, impact of saving face for those negotiators who are at the table but who are also representing a national identity? And that is what fascinates me. So when I travel abroad—and I’ve done work in New Zealand, and I’ve worked with Māori community—I have looked at how religion and culture is playing a role before I become successful in those mediations. That’s point number one. Point number two. You asked about religious leaders. I think that is such a fascinating question, and I totally agree with that. Religious leaders are revered in most of the world, if not all of the world. People look up to them because they can lead a group of people, right? That’s what a culture is. Culture is a pattern of thinking followed by a group of people over time based on some values. So religious leaders can actually lead a group of people. That means they can lead a culture. They can lead a culture of people, culture with capital C. Any times you see resistance in the world, the first resistance you see is culture because cultures have a unique way of functioning. They have a unique way of working because that’s what makes culture. Culture is a software of mind. So come back to practical point: Can religious leaders play a role? I think they already play a role. I think in many ways they already have underserved for many of us around the world. My institute, Straus Institute, for example, had a blessing, privilege to work with Archbishop Desmond Tutu many years ago, and we have—we have it on tape. We had a wonderful meeting with him. We interviewed him. And we—part of my question—our question to him was, looking at—Professor Tom Stipanowich, my colleague, asked the question—was looking into the intersection of faith and dispute resolution, how faith is playing a role. And Archbishop Mr. Tutu’s comment was very powerful. He said faith not only plays a role in peacemaking; it plays a role in the daily lives of people, in everyday choices we make, in how we live, how we decide, who we talk to, how much we talk to. And I’m expanding on that. He didn’t go that far, but I’m trying to fill in the words, if you may. So this is a fascinating concept, then. The question you are raising in this important webinar—thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations—is, are we not only using religious leaders, but are we underusing them? Do they have a role to play to do two things, influencing a culture of people within a country—because negotiation has to happen in two ways. One is external. One is internal, right? There’s always an internal audience. And externally, can they represent that faith or be a leader on a world stage? And my colleague mentioned UN and the negotiations at the UN level. I was just with Ambassador David Carden two days ago—(inaudible)—who served under President Obama for ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations—and we were discussing how Indonesia, Philippines, many countries in that region are heavily influenced by faith, by religion, and how negotiations change the phase, how negotiations are different diplomatically when you’re dealing with a group of people that are emotionally intertwined with faith. My last comment’s my third comment. So, one, let’s take a look at culture and religion, how culture is bigger sometimes than religion—not always—and how we can influence this idea of culture—involvement of culture in different nations, and why we should not ignore it, especially the idea of saving face, the idea of gender, the idea of minorities in culture, the idea of just involving people as to where they are. Because people can be way more impactful when they’re emotionally involved in a negotiation. The second thing I spoke about is this idea of not just utilizing world leaders, faith-based leaders, but I think we have underutilized them. Yes, we have—we have the Vatican, as we all know, playing an influential role internationally in diplomatic negotiations with many connections, with many missionaries around the world, and with a powerful presence. But can there be more representation of faith in a neutral setting, in a strategic setting, where leaders from a country like India and China? Of course, we have to manage how the diplomatic heads of those states feel about it, how they are including it, and how can they be in consensus that this is the right way to go. We cannot ignore the diplomatic heads. And then, moving on from there, my last comments—and I want to go to more into Q&A—is going back to my piece on nuclear negotiations between India and U.S. in Cardozo Law Journal. I want to talk briefly about this idea of awareness, and I want to go personal for a second. My religion is Sikhism. A day ago, I spoke at a symposium at my own university and we looked at how—what we have learned from the pandemic. What I have learned is, first of all, on a—on a light note, I love people, so what I learned is I don’t want to be away from people. It’s good to be back, good to be without masks, good to be with people. On a more serious note, I hope it made us all self-reflect—self-reflect as to how we define meaning to life. What is meaning to life? What is it that motivates me on a daily basis? So we’re sharing on this panel that what motivates me is this idea from Sikhism, which is sarbhat dah phalla, which is “may everyone be blessed”—not just one group of people, one idea of people. So there are two ways to look at religion. One is religion separates us. The other is religion combines us or brings us together because you are believing in a common major force in life. Whichever you believe in, one thing is clear: religion is here and it’s going to exist. It’s a powerful force. So the next question for us is: How do we utilize people’s emotions? Because everyone wants to have meaning to life. Everyone wants to live through providing meaning to life, which I think is powerful from a macro perspective to a micro perspective around the world. I just wanted to share those opening thoughts, but I’m happy to take any questions going to any one of those three topics further. But thank you for being—inviting me here. Please. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much to both of you. And now we’re going to go to all of you for your questions and comments. You can either raise your hands and when I call on you please say your affiliation; or you can type your question in the Q&A box, and also if you could add on your affiliation there that would be great. And I think the first question is—do you see that question from Adem Carroll? Question to Professor Singh: Since high caste or other political elites make policies and shape popular views through mass media, isn’t there a risk in generalizing about religious culture? Isn’t the media the main filter? In India, for example, one sees the diverse—sorry—divisive policies like the discriminatory Citizen Amendment Act, promoted by the BJP. Should we be blaming Hindu religious culture for this, or specific politicians? SINGH: Very good question. Wow. Thank you for asking a difficult question. I thought you will start with a softball, but no, this is not an easy crowd. I would—this is a very, very good question. What we have to be aware of is the following: Every nation, to my knowledge, has a major religion that dominates, right—if not one, two religions. You can’t just focus on India. You can look at around you and you’ll see religious politics being played around the world. The question is, can you—let me rephrase the question. Can you ignore that religion and be friends with those politicians, or with the religious leaders, or involve them in a way in which we can have a peaceful dispute resolution? Let me ask you this way, a different way: The way to change, I believe, is first through trust-building, connection, involvement, listening, understanding people, trying to build empathy, and then, once you have built that channel, then pushing them slightly, then challenging them, right? I mean, let me give you quickly, from being a devil’s advocate for a second, what will their response be if you challenge India’s idea of whatever the idea is, a nationalist Hindu movement that you are mentioning in your comment, which many people, especially minorities will agree with, right? And one of the things you will hear back from—you may hear back—is who are you again to tell us to reform? Oh, OK, so you just did this in this country and you’re telling us to stop doing it? OK, so you did 1,130 nuclear bomb tests and you’re a nuclear power, but you don’t want us to be nuclear power? Oh, I see. And I address that in my article as well, it’s amazing that some countries have conducted more than twelve hundred, more than two thousand nuclear tests but when one country does five, we have issues, we have problems, we have judgment. So you have to be very careful in not going in as an outsider and telling them, here is how you fix your country and these are three problems you have. I believe in the other side of diplomacy, which is, how can I work with you, how can I involve you, and leave the issues that are local to them to be fixed but I’ll start by building trust. Long answer. Sorry about this, but that’s just a diplomatic way of involvement of religion because, again, I missed your name, but you have to see one thing: You’re dealing with one billion people who probably belong to that faith. Let me repeat the number: one billion people. Will they be open to lecture, or will they be open to working with us if you involve them? So great question. Sorry for my indirect answer. FASKIANOS: Great. So we are—we have several hands raised now, so I’m going to Katherine Marshall. MARSHALL: Good afternoon, and thank you for the presentations. I’m at Georgetown University and the World Faiths Development Dialogue. I think there are two dimensions that you’ve highlighted; one is understanding the religious dimensions, and then the other is the active involvement of groups that are specifically with religious roots in the very complex controversies that we have in the world—I think of DRC, or South Sudan, or the Rohingya-Myanmar issue. So I’m interested in more comments on the formal or the visible roles that religious actors, ranging from the Vatican, or Sant’Egidio, or maybe the OIC might play in working through the UN channels but through others in moving forward on what seemed to be perpetual and intractable problems. SINGH: Do you want to take this first? SHARLAND: Happy to, Professor Singh. Look, thanks, Katherine. I think that is a really important question and one that goes to the crux of, I guess, where some of the gaps are in terms of addressing conflict resolution and peacemaking, about the inclusivity of those processes. As you say, a lot of this work is undertaken informally and there is quite a bit of engagement by different actors on the ground. If we take the example of peacekeeping missions, for instance, working with faith-based communities, working with different civil society organizations, recognizing that they have an important and influential role, I think, in garnering support for peace processes, for ensuring that different grievances are addressed. But I don’t think perhaps that those roles are as formalized as perhaps there is capacity for them to be. Now, some of this may be indeed due to misunderstanding or sensitivities around the role of religion in some of these conflict environments, and therefore, perhaps there is an assessment that a lot of that work being undertaken at the grassroots is really important, and pivotal, and beneficial when there isn’t a very strong watch shined on the work that is being undertaken. But there is no doubt that in some contexts, particularly as Professor Singh had noted there about the visibility at the national level of religion, and identity, and culture, that there may be a greater role for highly visible religious leaders to be engaged in these processes to bring different parts of the community into those processes. And I think this is particularly important when we consider concerns about relapse into conflict. There is a tendency for international actors, the UN and others, to depart, sometimes on a timetable or sometimes when the Security Council decides that its appetite for engagement in a conflict is no longer there, and then really, at the end of the day, it is the communities, and it is the different leaders of those communities who are involved in picking up the pieces and trying to identify how to resolve those grievances and concerns about conflict and identity that have not been resolved. So I think, to go to your question there, there is capacity and I think it’s an important consideration that at times is perhaps overlooked a little bit in terms of engagement in these processes. SINGH: I’ll make a quick comment. I 100 percent agree with the comment of my co-panelist. And I think, Ms. Marshall, Professor Marshall, that’s a very good point you raised is the question of active groups, right—active groups is the word you used—and how religion—but the point I’m going to say—I just want to include a new thing, thought here, if you may allow me. We have to be careful how some groups use religion and manipulate religion for popular votes, and for popularity in their local regions, and how international actors and religious leaders can just do a bigger role—play a bigger role through still coming back and saying, OK, hold on, don’t blame religion for this; religion is not the cause, but the politicization of religion, the abuse of religion, the use of religion, the strategic ways in which you have used religious votes to gain power, and to manipulate local society has to blame. I think sometimes that slight distinction can help raise more awareness, as my colleague mentioned—that’s the word—raise more awareness locally as to how one may have to distinguish oneself from a group or from what they may be calling a religious political party but it might be just a political party who’s using religion. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Mark Webb. WEBB: Hello. Thank you for your remarks and for including me in this discussion. I’m a philosophy professor at Texas Tech University and I was very interested to hear about the idea of trust-building. It’s something I last heard when I was talking to some people at the EastWest Institute, and their idea was that there are already people who trust each other across these lines and if they are not the leaders, then perhaps former military leaders, former politicians, businesspeople who trust one another and have contacts, that those kinds of lines of connection can be used to build trust, to sort of get you out of the prisoner’s dilemma of international problems. (Laughs.) And I wondered, is there any reason why religious leaders can’t be used across borders for that same kind of track to diplomacy track 1.5 diplomacy, whatever it is. Is that some—that strikes me as a very promising sort of avenue. SINGH: Can I quickly comment, Lisa? SHARLAND: Yes, absolutely. SINGH: Thank you. I think that’s a very good—thank you, Professor Cook, for that question—Professor Webb. I think what—you almost gave the answer within your question, right? I could hear the answer within your question, but—if I’m right. Absolutely yes. The simple answer is absolutely. The question is how, right? And the very first question that was asked today—let me see if I can get the name here and that was by Caroll, if I’m not wrong, P. Carroll. FASKIANOS: Adem Carroll with the Burma Task Force. SINGH: OK, wonderful, by Mr. Carroll. Now, the question is connected in some ways. What we have to be careful is, when you appoint a religious leader, does that religious leader represent the diversity of religions of a state? That’s the question, right? Because some people may feel marginalized because religion has a very powerful force, is OK, who appointed that leader? So just a simple theory there, or suggestion there is I really enjoy being on interfaith panels, on interfaith conversations, on interfaith dialogues, on interfaith—that’s one of my best days—if you put me and ask my students and my clients, my best day would be when I’ve just attended a one-hour, two-hour, three-hour interfaith discussion. The reason is it challenges me. The reason is that I end up learning more about myself and others by being with friends who are from a different faith than myself. I think there’s a power there in appointing multiple—what I’m going there are religious leaders within a culture, someone who can represent, let’s say, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism, and so forth and so on, just saying it quickly, from a religion, from a country to be on a panel, and that would be wonderful. In fact, let me give you an example, though it is interesting. Indian Supreme Court tried to come up with an interfaith panel for a very controversial case in Delhi. I’m not going to go into the case. I’m not going to talk about it or the panelists because I know a couple of panelists, but I will tell you that at least the approach, the idea that we can have this interfaith leadership was, I think, something we should remark about. Now, coming back to your other point, I think you made an amazing point about trust-building and there are people, you said, who already have trust. That’s an excellent, brilliant point, not only, I think—totally agree with you; I think that’s what you’re alluding to—not only they’re underused. We don’t ask, we don’t have awareness. Have we gone to Iran? I’m just saying it loudly—forgive me, I don’t want to be on record for this point. Have we gone to a people in Iran and asked, how do you get persuaded? Who is your leader? Can we work with your leader? How can I work—or a village in India, or a village in China. This idea of involving people who already have trust either from my side, or your side, or a global side, and utilizing them for peaceful negotiations, diplomatic negotiations is a brilliant idea. I think it’s truly underserved, and here’s a quick answer why. It takes time. It takes effort. And our international diplomacy, we all know, sometimes we do things, then we think about them, or we’re a little behind, or we don’t have time, as we say, or we have to be quick because we don’t have time because things change, especially now with social media, things change in an instant. Great question. I hope this was some help. (Laughs.) I don’t know if I was much but I’m going to stop here. SHARLAND: I might just jump in there briefly with a slight pivot to the point—(inaudible)—because I do not have the exceptional expertise of my current panelist on some of these issues, but the point about trust-building there and I refer back to my—(laughs)—native Australia in terms of the context, and the importance of building relationships that we saw around defense counterparts, for instance, between Australia and Indonesia when it came to the intervention in Timor-Leste, and the importance and fruition of those relationships twenty years later when it came to de-escalating hostilities in different contexts, purely because there had been that engagement, that trust, that building of relationships, so I think that is an incredibly important point when it comes to conflict resolution. And I think, on a related point to the inclusivity of different, I guess, groups, I really take the point there that Professor Singh made there around the representation of different religious groups in these processes, and ensuring that it’s not just one associated with identity or culture. And I think I would extend that to say that this applies obviously not just to religious leaders, but ensuring that different marginalized groups—traditionally, women we highlight in peace process is the fact that they are often not at the table, often not taking part in these conversations, and that that actually is to the detriment of being able to resolve the conflict and the sustainability of those efforts going forward. So I think there’s some related points to what you just made there, so thank you so much. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. And I’m going to go next to Tereska Lynam, who raised her hand and also wrote the question, but I would prefer you to tease it out, Tereska. There you go; you’re unmuted. LYNAM: OK, thank you. Sorry about that. Yeah, so I did write the question down, but, one, fantastic presentation. Thank you all so much; this is great. And I wanted to say, I just attended a Judeo-Christian meditation group before this call and we were talking about Adam and Eve and the tree of knowledge and how it brought about many negative feelings and estrangement. And then later in the call we were discussing how much of the information, as just regular people, as citizens of the world, how much information we receive today, especially by anything broadcast media, creates anxiety within us, and that there are so many media outlets and sources; it’s not like  in the ’70s, ’80s, and even the ’90s when people would watch one—there was a consensus about what we were all watching, so we were reading the same newspapers, we were watching the same news programs. That’s not happening anymore, even within, among closest friends and families. We’re just getting constantly different information. And so this unregulated, if you will, information gathering compounds our own anxiety and creates divisions within our tightest community because we’re asked to be outraged or we’re asked to do—I almost got sick reading about what’s going on in the Ukraine the other day. And if someone’s—when you have that and then you have someone who has a totally different perspective, it creates divisions, right? So what I’ve noticed, bringing it back to what religious leaders can do, is that if they create safe spaces within the congregation for information sharing and arriving at peaceful consensus, we come together and, possibly more importantly, are optimistic about the future and/or the ability to effect positive change. And then, I didn’t write this down, but all the wonderful conversations you’ve been having, I think that we can—what I have been trying to meditate on is how I can be a spiritual leader for those not involved in my own congregation, or not involved in things, to kind of help them create a safe space for information sharing and optimism. And to that end, Irina, I feel like this—what you’ve done here with this community is, for at least me, you’ve created a spiritual congregation for information sharing and arriving at, if not consensus, at peace and optimism. So thank you all so much for it and I’ve been—I look forward to hearing your comments. Thanks. SINGH: Can I comment quickly? Can I, please? Yeah. This is beautiful. Thank you for that comment. I think it’s deep. It’s deep. (Laughs.) We can go into logistics. I always say, as a lawyer, we can go into legal arguments all the time, but the question is seeing the bigger picture, and I think what you just saw, ma’am, is a bigger picture. I want to comment on two things. Imagine we are all—I know it’s not an amazing analogy; forgive me for this—but imagine we are about to die and you’re closing your eyes. Are you going to think about your loved ones or are you going to think about your enemies? What matters to you in life is more love, and compassion, and the memories we create around it, not people we fight with. We’re not going to take them to our deathbed. I hope not. The question that we all have something in common is we’re going to die, right? The question here is the following—that’s why I took the example; forgive me—love has always sustained. Peace has always sustained. Wars start, wars end, but this mutual cooperation—if this ends, we will end as a civilization and that’s exactly the comments like you, I believe, people who will lead us into remaining believers, that at the end of the day we believe there are more people who believe in peace than of people who believe in war. That’s my comment on that. Thank you. SHARLAND: Just a very quick reflection. I think it’s such an important point that you’ve raised there, Tereska, in terms of information that we consume, and information that we obtain, and it’s something that really drives consent in the work that we’re doing in our organization, because there is a lot of divisiveness created out of that, and it’s very easy to manipulate and to polarize different populations. And how do you break down those divides? And I think a really important part of that is being open to contested ideas and debate, and conversations around some of these issues, and ultimately, the shared goal of—as Professor Singh has noted there, about peacefulness and trying to bring these into the conversations, but unfortunately, I feel like so much of it—it is much easier to weaponize some of these ideas and to cut off information, which, I will say, is such an important precursor to different levels of conflict. We see this playing out at the moment in terms of the war in Ukraine and other things as well, unfortunately. So I think having that ability to have contested ideas and to have those conversations in spaces where people are open and receptive to collegial debate is so, so important. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And thank you, Tereska, for your shout-out there. We really appreciate it. I appreciate it. So I’m going to go next to Victoria Strang, who has written a comment. She is the first faith advocate at Human Rights Watch. “It is very rare for secular human rights organizations to have specialists who are skilled in engaging faith leaders and communities, which I think can be a detriment due to some of the examples that have been provided.” And she’s hoping that both of you can speak more to the importance of secular organizations in taking faith partnerships seriously and investing in that kind of work. SHARLAND: I’m happy to jump in here to start. Thank you for the question, Victoria. I think it’s a really important point, and I think one of the risks that emerged or was highlighted in the research that we were doing, particularly in the context of UN at Stimson, was around one of these tensions, and often you may see this in terms of different religious or faith organizations when it comes to efforts to advocate for different human rights within the UN system. And we do see a lot of the tensions that emerge there in terms of advocacy around whether it be women’s reproductive rights, or whether it be the rights of different marginalized groups. And again, some of this comes back, I think, to the conversation we were just having there about the polarization of different ideas and what’s—how these ideas may compete with one another. So I think part of that conversation in terms of the benefits that may exist to bring faith-based leaders or those, at least, with an understanding of it into some of the work of these organizations, is to have really frank and open conversations around what some of these different issues and tensions are, because we do see them playing out in a very polarized manner in the UN environment and, of course, in a number of other contexts. So I think that would really be a first step to that conversation, because there is a lot that different organizations and those with different backgrounds can learn from one another, and it may be that some of the tensions cannot be entirely resolved, but I think we need to draw on our strengths where we can in these conversations, particularly when it comes to conflict resolution. SINGH: I will quickly comment that sometimes we need alliances with different partners, strategic partners who can do more persuasion in their groups, so your point about partnering with secular organizations who take faith partnerships seriously. And the rest is absolutely spot-on because what you then do is you invite people who may or may not believe in faith or who may have a different take on faith, and if you believe in faith, you’ll accept them too, right, and everyone is the same. So the idea of how do we—the idea you’re going at is persuasion. How do we persuade more and more folks to come to belong to this peacemaking mission? And the idea of persuasion is to go through alliances, to go through connection, to go through the bridges that have already been built instead of starting a new bridge. And I think that’s exactly where your comment—again, you provide an answer to us within your question—is absolutely right and it’s needed, and needs to be more studied. And there is some really good work done on it already, as you can see, you can find, by terrific scholars, but still, we can do more implementation of that work in the practical field. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Thomas Walsh, who’s the Universal Peace Federation. He’s written the question: Today we heard from the Security Council special session on atrocities that are horrifying. I would like to hear your thoughts on how religions can contribute to conflict resolution in Ukraine—obviously not simple or easy—and how can we support the UN in its efforts? SHARLAND: Here’s my short answer to this very challenging question that you’ve raised there—(laughs)—and I’m certainly not going to do justice to it in the few minutes that are remaining. I think the one major point I would make here is the need to avoid having religion weaponized in a way to stoke the conflict further. And I—we have seen in terms of the misinformation around the rationale for Russia’s invasion and other things sort of on different precursors or different information around what was happening in Ukraine. But I think the key point I would make here, as a starting point is that this context is not manipulated to the advantage of different groups to stoke the conflict further, and indeed, I think we have seen some instances where that has occurred. I think, obviously, in terms of—we talked early on, and indeed, Professor Singh mentioned early on in his comments—one of the notes that I made here was the importance of, I don’t want to say saving face in this context, but a lot of people have talked about what’s the off-ramp, how do we de-escalate the conflict, how do we come to some political resolution? And I think core to that is trying to understand what the motivations, and the different identities are that are attached to different groups that in no way, in our line of work in the program that I work in at Stimson, we are very much focused on the atrocities and what sort of is coming out of this conflict, which is absolutely abhorrent. But I think that gives us more impetus to really focus on, well, how do we de-escalate this, how do we ensure there are justice and accountability mechanisms when it comes to the atrocities that have been committed, and how do we ensure that the civilians that are being impacted by the conflict right now have the protection that they require, and unfortunately, we are falling incredibly short in that right now and we need to continue looking at how we mitigate some of the impacts of this conflict going forward. FASKIANOS: Dr. Singh, I’ll let you conclude. SINGH: OK, totally agree with my esteemed colleague there, beautifully stated. So let me say, in addition now, after—in consensus with her comments. In addition, I would say, I think from a young age we should teach empathy and listening as two skills. Imagine some of the world leaders right now if they know what empathy is. That’s so totally missing. It’s bizarre how much some people have no idea what empathy is. Seeing children dying on the street—I mean, you just got to not have a heart, right? The connection is missing. The empathy is missing for—of course, the idea that who you are. And the other thing is you’re not being heard. You’re feeling—but you don’t know how to listen to other people but you’re also crying to be heard. So the idea, now, to come back to the role of UN: My quick idea there is we have faith communities. The word is community. What builds a community? What is a community? Can communities be powerful? I think every faith-based communities are very well connected. You can look at my community, look at other faith-based communities. We have a unique way of connecting, which also means we can use that as a power tool. We can use it as a tool to make good influence in the world. But we haven’t done that. We haven’t gone there. We haven’t used systemically faith-based communities to lobby whatever we need to lobby at the UN level, but also to give more prestige to UN, the work that UN has been doing. So two things. Last thing I’ll say is, I think we need more focus outside of UN—whatever it is, schools, colleges, everywhere else, in spaces like this one, so I’m so thankful you’re doing this—on peace. Why is peace important? Is peace a culture? When peace is missing, what are we losing? How can we teach peace and idea of peace from a young time, and what happens when humanity loses peace? If these concepts are explored from a young age, at a young mind, I think we’ll be able to create more sustainable—because our time is going, right? We’ve already seen the disaster in the last few weeks on earth. The question is, how do we not make it happen again, twenty, thirty, fifty, hundred years from today? FASKIANOS: Thank you. A very powerful way to end and we really appreciate you both being with us today to share your expertise, and insight, and analysis, and to all of you for your questions and comments. So I encourage you to follow Lisa Sharland’s work on Twitter at @LJSharland and Sukhsimranjit Singh’s work at @Sukhsimranjits, and his website, singhadr.com. So we will circulate resources as well as a link to this webinar so you can reference it, as well as the Stimson report that Lisa mentioned. And I hope you also follow us, CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program, on Twitter at @CFR_religion. And as always, we encourage you to reach out to us to send your suggestions, comments, questions to [email protected]. Thank you all again. Our next webinar will be on Thursday, April 14 at 12:00 p.m. for a Social Justice and Foreign Policy Webinar on Religion and Voting Rights. So thank you both again for being with us today, and to all of you, stay safe.
  • Ukraine
    Understanding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
    Play
    Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow at CFR, and Oxana Shevel, associate professor of political science at Tufts University, discuss what is happening in Ukraine, the religious component to this conflict, and how the United States and its allies are responding. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record, and the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on our website, cfr.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Thomas Graham and Oxana Shevel with us to talk about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. So I will just give a few introductory notes. Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a co-founder of the Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies Program at Yale University and sits on the faculty steering committee. He is also a research fellow at The Macmillan Center at Yale. Dr. Graham was special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, during which time he managed a White House-Kremlin strategic dialogue, and he was a foreign service officer for fourteen years. Assignments included two tours of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the late Soviet period. Oxana Shevel is an associate professor of political science at Tufts University. Her research and teaching focuses on post-communist regions surrounding Russia and issues such as nation and state building, the politics of citizenship and migration, memory and religious politics, and challenges to democratization in the post-Soviet region. Her current research projects examine the sources of citizen policies in the post-communist states, church-state relations in Ukraine, and the origins of separatist conflict in Donbas. She is published in a variety of journals and is the author of Migration, Refugee Policy, and State Building in Post-Communist Europe. So thank you both for being with us today. As we all know, the invasion of Ukraine began on February 24. So we are now over a month into this war. So I thought we could begin, Dr. Graham, with you to talk a little bit—give us an update on where things stand with the war in Ukraine and, as far as you can divine, your analysis of Putin’s intentions right now, and how the United States and allies are responding, and what more they can be doing. GRAHAM: Thank you very much, Irina. And it’s a real pleasure to be with all of you here today. Just three sort of brief points. First, as we all know, the Russian military operation in Ukraine has stalled. The initial goal was to take Kyiv, but the Kremlin thought they could do that in three or four days. That clearly isn’t going to happen. The Russians now are in the process of regrouping. They have said that they will concentrate their forces in the east, that is in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, and try to make progress there. They have withdrawn some of their troops up from the vicinity of Kyiv, although they’re digging in for defense purposes. And then in addition, despite the claims that they’re going to concentrate in the east, air strikes continue across the country. So there really hasn’t been a significant lessening of the Russian military assault on Ukraine at this point. Second, there are negotiations underway between Ukraine and Moscow. They had a session in Istanbul yesterday. You will read in the press that progress has been made, that the Ukrainians have made certain proposals as a way of reaching a ceasefire and a resolution of this conflict. The point I would stress is that the two sides are still very, very far apart on this. There’s not going to be a ceasefire or, indeed, a resolution of this conflict anytime in the near future. And for all that we can see at this point, the Russians haven’t backed down from their maximal demands. They still want to see Ukraine as a neutral. They still want to see Ukraine demilitarized. They want the Ukrainian government to recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and also the independence of these two statelets in eastern Ukraine. Independence that Russia recognized in the very eve of the invasion. This, in fact, is demanding that Kyiv capitulate. And I would also underscore that nothing in the Russian proposals say that even if Ukraine agrees to these demands that Russia is prepared to withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. So the conflict is going to continue. What Putin wants ultimately is very difficult to divine at this point. He has Russian troops on Ukrainian soil at this point. I think at a minimum he does want to retain the Donbas within the confines of the two provinces in that region, which is a bit more than the separatists occupied at the beginning of the conflict. He’s also intent on building what we call a land bridge between the separatist region and Crimea. That will facilitate the movement of all sorts of things, including military forces, but also commercial traffic between Russia and Crimea. And he also wants very much that Ukraine takes on a neutral status, that it move—that it not move away from Russia into a European orbit at this time—irretrievably, from Russia’s standpoint. Third, on the Western reaction,  what we have seen from the very beginning of this conflict is the letting over very severe sanctions by the United States and the European allies. Those countries have made an effort to try to escalate the sanctions over time to keep the pressure on Russia. The impact is very difficult to divine from the outside. It’s clear that it has had some bite on the Russian economy. After all, the Kremlin is complaining about them. They would like to see them ease. But there’s nothing that indicates that the sanctions are of such severity that the Russian government, Putin in particular, is reconsidering his conduct of this conflict in Ukraine. He’s still pressing ahead. And that, I think, is going to be true for many weeks into the future. My own read on this is that we’ll see a significant change in Russian conduct only when the casualties mount to levels where the Kremlin can no longer conceal those from the Russian public. The Russians are taking heavy casualties. The Kremlin narrative is only admitted some fifteen hundred. The numbers are much larger than that at this point. But when the Russian population begins to realize the cost of this to their sons, their husbands, and brothers, I think that that will lead to a change in public opinion and a time when Putin will have to reconsider what his ultimate goals are vis-à-vis Ukraine. So let me stop there, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Tom. And, Dr. Shevel, let’s go to you to talk about how or if religion is playing into this conflict. And especially vis-à-vis the split of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from its Russian counterpart, I think, four years ago. SHEVEL: Thank you, Irina. Thank you for inviting me to join this conversation. So let me say a few words about the religious landscape in Ukraine and how it has been affected by war. I’ll put it in a little bit broader perspective, because I think one interesting and sort of tragic or paradoxical thing that we see in Ukraine as a result of Putin’s aggression is that Ukrainian society is getting unified even in areas where it has been divided historically for quite some time. And ironically, it’s really Putin that can take credit for that. So it’s very peculiar irony because, I mean, his quest to keep Ukraine closer to Russia to  kind of weaken the pro-Western sentiment within Ukraine actually has achieved the opposite. We saw that already starting 2014 on issues—anything to do with NATO membership to EU membership. And the religious divide, actually, it’s one of the few remaining divides now in the Ukrainian society, as you said, between the two Orthodox Churches. Just for the listeners, I mean, probably everybody knows, but in Ukraine there has been two competing Orthodox Churches that are the same as far as kind of the set of beliefs, rituals, and so forth. But one church is in unity with the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate. And the other one is the one that was received—(inaudible)—from the patriarch in Constantinople in late 2018. And since early 2019 there has been a transfer of some of the parishes, by different counts anywhere between sort of five hundred-plus to seven hundred parishes that switched, or at least tried to switch. I mean, the process itself has been very complicated. If there is time, I can go into that maybe in the Q&A. But basically, this divide has remained. And what happens now that it was started, unfortunately, the patriarch in Moscow has essentially endorsed the war. And that puts Ukrainian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate Church which is unity with Russian Orthodox Church, in a very difficult situation. Because, obviously, in Ukraine there is this great sense of national unity, opposition to aggression. And the parishioners of that church, by and large are, obviously, not in support of the war, and they volunteer to fight in the armed forces, and so forth. So the church has basically put them in this very difficult situation. So the hierarchs—the leader of this Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate even appealed to Putin to stop the war. Of course, that didn’t work. And now the question becomes, what happens to this church? Does it keep its ecumenical kind of organizational unity with Moscow—with the Church in Moscow, Russian Orthodox Church? It’s essentially basically been kind of keeping its traditional religious affiliation, but now really in opposition or in very kind of confrontational relationship with a big part of its own flock in Ukraine, including some of the lower-level hierarchs. So we see this situation where the church leadership essentially took kind of a moral wait and see position. So they have spoken against the war. They have appealed to Putin to stop it. But they have not left. They haven’t made a decision to leave the Russian Orthodox Church, break affiliation and join this Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which is independent. That’s the one that received the—(inaudible). So this is the development that I think we need to watch and see what happens. I just want to kind of suggest a few ways it might go, and what we already see happening. So, for one, what we see happening, there is not a massive but certainly some movement within the lower-level hierarchs and the parishioners, individual parishes, of this Moscow-affiliated church to break ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. By different accounts, as many as a hundred parishes—there is no exact statistic but that’s sort of the higher estimate—but there are certainly dozens of parishes that since the war started broke affiliation with the Moscow Patriarchate Church and asked to join the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. What is interesting, what’s happening now, which was less prevalent in 2019, that now in many of these parishes it’s not just the people who want to switch, but the priests as well. Because what was happening before in 2019, some parishioners wanted to switch, but the parish leadership by and large did not want to switch. We can sort of talk about reasons for it. Some of it was political. Some of it was religious. Some of it—there are accounts that people were basically paid. There were sort of unofficial civil society groups, for lack of a better word, on both sides, and sometimes these confrontations were violent. And the legislation was kind of ambiguous. This is another aspect we don’t have time to go into in detail now but, again, if there are questions. The very process of sort of what constitutes a switch of affiliation under Ukrainian law is very, very complicated. It basically meant that all of these attempts to switch in 2019 ended up in courts because there it was sort of not clear who has the jurisdiction to make this decision, who doesn’t. And essentially it has been—there are hundreds of cases pending in Ukrainian court over this. So what we see the difference now, so it’s not just the parishioners but also oftentimes the priests and even the hierarchs at the regional level. There are, again, different estimates, but among the eparchies—I think that’s the English word that they—sort of organizationally, the church is divided into these eparchies, like regional centers, and about a dozen of these regional centers now in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate have asked the leadership to break ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. And the leadership of the church remains, again, kind of undecided. So I think once the war ends, that might be—it’s a little bit too early to say—but it might be another area where Putin’s aggression against Ukraine might actually end the division that existed for many years, if indeed these two churches might unite. I don’t think it’s a predetermined outcome, because there is a lot of sort of, you can say, bad blood in the relationship between these churches. The position of the Moscow Patriarchate Church has been that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is essentially schismatic, that they cannot perform rites with them and so forth. So they, in a way, put themselves in a situation that sort of outright joining together would be very difficult. But they don’t really have many other good options, because one possibility, of course, would be to ask for autocephaly, independence, from the church in Moscow. And that’s obviously clear to everybody that the Russian patriarch will not give its Ukrainian Church autonomy. So to have two autonomous churches that would not be in unity with Moscow in Ukraine would be very strange, because there is already one that received autonomy from the Constantinople patriarch. So the Moscow Patriarchate Church is really—the leadership is in a very kind of difficult situation, I think. They are trying to kind of weigh their options. There are some reports, again, in the social media, in local press, that they essentially tell the priests that, we want to wait and see how this war ends because, of course, if Russia, if they were to win somehow, that would be different political playing field and  different references in the church. Last thing that I would mention that so far there hasn’t been much violence as far as parishioners trying to take over the parishes. There are some isolated instances of the priests being kicked out of the churches, but now in Ukrainian parliament there is draft legislation to ban the Moscow Patriarchate Church all together, exactly because it’s sort of perceived as collaborating with church affiliated with the so-called aggressor state. That draft bill has not passed. I personally don’t think it’s a great idea to have this law. It would violate some principles of religious freedom. But sort of emotionally, I mean, if, say, such a law is passed, I think it might receive kind of emotional support among many in the society. So that’s also something to watch. But so I’ll end, again, with a smaller point, another paradox, really. This creation of unity within Ukraine and ending many long-term divisions as a result of Putin’s policies and exactly his goal to actually keep the divisions and kind of increase the Russian sentiment in Ukraine that produces the opposite results. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much to both of you. Let’s go now to your questions and comments. You can either raise your hand by clicking on the “raise hand” icon, or you can write your question in the Q&A box. We would love to hear from you live, though. But I will start with Martin Raffel of—and if you could, when you—if you’re going to write a question, if you could put your affiliation, that would be great. But I will try to raise affiliations as well. So, Martin is with the Jewish Council for Public Affairs. And his question is: Could Russia’s pullback from Kyiv be preclude to use of WMD? Is Putin chastened by Biden’s threat of severe consequences if WMD is used? So, Tom, do you want to take that one? GRAHAM: Making sure I understood the question correctly, does he say—is it that the pullback precludes the use of WMD, or? FASKIANOS: Could Russia’s pullback be to—I believe to stop the use of WMD? Martin, do you want to unmute and you can ask it? Because I also think we need a little more clarification. GRAHAM: There’s Martin. RAFFEL: Yeah. I was asking could it be a prelude— GRAHAM: A prelude, OK. (Laughs.) RAFFEL: To the use of WMD. Moving Russian troops out of harm’s way. GRAHAM: Right. That’s what I thought. FASKIANOS: OK. GRAHAM: It’s a different type of question. The short answer to that question is we really don’t know. The defensive—withdrawing the troops, I think, is an indication that the Russians want to transfer some of the forces to the east in order to intensify the struggle and their operations in that part of Ukraine right now. All that said, the Russians have, as you know, for the past several weeks talked about the possibility of biological weapons, chemical weapons being used by the Ukrainians. But they’ve made much of these biological labs that have been discovered in eastern—or, in Ukraine. They’ve been there for years. The Russians were well aware of them. They’re well aware of what the United States was doing at those labs, in part because the United States did similar things in Russian labs in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. We have always been concerned that Russia might use biological or chemical weapons. After all, they have used chemical weapons before against individuals—most famously against the opposition leader Alexei Navalny, a little over a year and a half ago. It also used them on the ground in Syria as part of that conflict. So, again, whether withdrawing the troops is a prelude to using these weapons, we don’t know for sure. All that—but what I would say is this is always a possibility. We are watching this very closely. And I think you probably notice that President Biden spoke about that issue very forcefully on his European trip, that there will be some sort of response. But he left out the particulars of how the United States would respond to that type of use by the Russian Federation. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Let’s go next to Azza Karam, who has raised her hand. KARAM: Well, lovely. Thank you so much for unmuting me. And thank you very much for the speakers, Dr. Shevel and Dr. Graham. My question is really more for—to Dr. Shevel. And it has to do with thanking you for the way that you elaborated the tensions between and within the various Orthodox Churches. I’m just curious, I hear you very clearly that in a sense the aggression has brought so many of the Ukrainian people together, including the religious communities. I’m just curious to understand two things: If the Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox Church in Ukraine hasn’t yet made up its mind, and there seems to be different positions inside as you described so eloquently, then where is the unity in that? I mean, either they’re united or they’re disparate. But the other question also has to do with everyone’s focus on the Orthodox Church, which I fully understand. But had the situation been elsewhere in the world, in a Muslim majority country, the question on everybody’s mind would be what about the religious minorities? So can you perhaps just share something about the other religions in the Ukraine, and that particular dynamic? Thank you. SHEVEL: Yes. Thank you for the question. Let me address that—address all of these briefly. So on the unity part, I think what we see, what I’m—again, I think the end result, that’s if I were to make some sort of educated guess  where it would end—I think the end result would be these two churches, or at least most of the—of the Moscow Patriarchate Church uniting with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Because you’re right, at this point the leadership is essentially fence sitting. But among the lower-level hierarchs, we see quite substantial movement. So I think at the very least if the Moscow Patriarchate Church were to survive as an institution in Ukraine, it will be much smaller. They are going to lose a lot of parishes. They are going to lose whole eparchies. And sort of, somewhat paradoxically, it’s in the areas where people are more religious because, as you may know, in Ukraine, say, people in the east of the country generally are less religious than people in the west, and this is kind of western-centered. That’s where we see the whole eparchies, not just individual parishes, trying to basically break institutional affiliation with this church that’s affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. Now, as far as the other minorities, I think here what I would first of all point out, that if Russia gets to keep any of the territory—additional territory that it’s seized so far—where its troops are stationed—I think we’ll see a lot of persecution of so-called nontraditional religious minorities, because we already saw that happening in Crimea. We saw that happening in Donbas, that has been occupied with these pro-Russian separatists since 2014. So various Protestant denominations, Crimean Tatars, right? The accusation of Islamic militants and so forth. But certainly, a lot of Protestant communities have been quite severely persecuted. Priests sometimes are forced to leave, some of them disappeared. So we will see, I think, religious minorities really suffering in the territories if Russia is able to sort of exert control over the long term over a greater part of Ukrainian territory. So I think, I would say, is important to keep in mind for the religious minority. And also if I can—Irina, if it’s OK if I jump in—because there was a question in the chat I saw about Russkiy Mir, sort of this ideology of the Russian world and the Holy Rus. And I think that’s very important. I’m glad to whoever wrote this question, because that’s essentially what Russian Orthodox Church leadership kind of presents as ideological or spiritual justification for this war, right? So it really dialogues with Putin’s claim that Ukrainians and Russians are really ultimately one people, right? His is sort of more primordial, if you want to call the argument, but here the patriarch offers, of course, an ideological/religious argument that there is really this civilization, right, of Holy Rus, of Russkiy Mir that extends to Ukraine, right? And then it is threatened by Western civilization, by gay pride parades, or whatever sort of these threats come from. So the Russian Army here is just on a civilizational mission to essentially uphold the spiritual purity and so forth, so this is Russkiy Mir. And I think this narrative is essentially failing, certainly failing in Ukraine. So, again, it remains to be seen to what extent—sort of how Russian Orthodox Church survives this war, what happens within the global orthodoxy. But I think as far as this narrative of essentially being many—not a lot of people. I mean, we can sort of look at different statistics, how it’s evolved over the years. But there were certainly people in Ukraine who broadly maybe were OK, especially among the religious parishioners of the Moscow Patriarchate Church. I think that narrative is basically going to lose any potency in Ukraine. So Russia might try to continue to propagate it. It certainly offers justification for the military aggression. But as far as it being—resonating among the people who supposedly belong to this Russkiy Mir, right, the Russian civilization, the Holy Rus, in Ukraine I think it’s failing majorly. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Let’s go next to Saffet Catovic, who has a raised hand. CATOVIC: Thank you. Thank you very much for a wonderful program. Very much appreciate it. Saffet Catovic, the imam and head of Office of Islamic Society of North America in D.C., interfaith and community alliances and government relations. I wanted to follow up on something that our dear sister Professor Azza Karam said with regard to both the minorities and the reach of the Orthodox Church, specifically with regard to the Balkans, and the Republika Srpska and Serbia itself, and Montenegro, and their open alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church in support of what is going on in Ukraine. And of course, both Ukraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina have Muslim populations there. A couple weeks ago we were fortunate to have a call with the head of the Muslim community—one of the heads of the Muslim community in Ukraine, Sheikh Zayed, who said there were 10,000 Ukrainian Muslims that have been killed in the fighting thus far of the 1.5 million-plus, primarily Tatar Muslims, in Ukraine. And the streets in Banja Luka in particular were livid with protests in support of Vladimir Putin and specifically the Orthodox Church. So my question is, how does this pan-Orthodoxy play itself out in the Balkans, especially given that some of the nations in the Balkans are on track to become part and parcel of NATO, and Russia’s possible influence through those nations into NATO policies. So I wanted to ask that. Thank you very much for your—once again allowing me to share. FASKIANOS: Great. Oxana, do you want to take that? SHEVEL: I’ll try. I mean, I should say right away I’m not an expert on the Balkans or sort of global religious issues, kind of, in that part of the world. But I think the idea that there is now among different religious—including global orthodoxy. So the decision has to be made, right? Like, what do you do? Do you continue business as usual with the Russian Orthodox Church? Do you take a position, right? There have been some statements made. Somebody mentioned in the chat that it’s quite unprecedented that religious leaders globally try to weigh in on political processes and appeal to the Russian patriarch. So I’m not sure kind of what happens—what would happen within the Balkans. But I think the question, could the Russian patriarch be somehow swayed by these religious leaders outside Russia who are appealing to him to maybe weigh on Putin, I personally remain very pessimistic. I don’t think that’s likely. I think we see this—sort of this whole so-called symphonia, or symphony between political and religious leadership in Russia. I can’t imagine kind of under what circumstances, short of maybe really major defeat of Russia on the battlefield, and it’s sort of clear that  Russia lost the war and there is no way to present it otherwise, maybe under those circumstances we could see something. I think that would also go back to what Graham was saying earlier. Each day there are many Russians coming home in body bags, right? Could that change something, because, again, presumably people receive religious services, like last rites and so forth. Maybe that might begin to kind of—the process, maybe. But, again, from what we’ve seen so far I think the propaganda remains very strong, including the parents of these killed Russian servicemen, either because they’re scared or because they really believe it, kind of continue to maintain that that was the right—their sons died for something, to save Ukraine from Nazism and so forth. So we do see some processes within the Russian Orthodox Church, again, individual priests who spoke against the leadership. But here, again, to my mind, the question is, would that make a difference at the institutional level? The centralization or this power vertical—vertical command-and-control method within the Russian Orthodox Church has been established, it’s very strong. So kind of the autonomy of individual priests is not really there. So I—again, I realize I’m not really answering the question about the Balkans. I just don’t know. But this broader question, could these processes, and pressures, and appeals from religious leaders in different parts of the world somehow persuade the Russian patriarch to change his position and therefore try to pressure Putin to change his position? I don’t think so. So that’s what I would say. FASKIANOS: Tom, I know that—do you want to say anything about the Baltic states, or should we go onto the next question? GRAHAM: I think we should go onto the next question. FASKIANOS: Great. So there are two chats from Nancy Ammerman, who’s at BU, and Donald Tinder with the Zinzendorf School of Doctoral Studies. And essentially both are talking about the role of other religious groups in Ukraine—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, other. How present are they? Do they have any public or civic role? Donald Tinder’s is focused specifically Protestants. Does the reality of three distinct groups of Orthodox/Greek, Catholic make society increasingly acceptance of religious tolerance and freedom? SHEVEL: Yeah, I can try to comment just briefly on this. I mean, definitely I think other—all religious groups in Ukraine, and this also answers another of the questions, there is really great sense of unity. I mean, one can’t say to what extent it will last after the war, but I think at this point people have put aside their—be they linguistic differences or  religious differences. And we certainly see Protestants—for example, there were reports that the Protestant—the preachers helped the evacuation efforts of civilians from Irpin north of Kyiv, and, very actively supporting humanitarian aid and all these things. Ukraine historically has been a very tolerant society religiously. It’s very religiously diverse. Of course, the Orthodox Church is sort of the bigger—and the Catholic Church would be the biggest ones. But there are dozens if not hundreds of different  religious denominations, groups in Ukraine. There is also this council in Ukraine that unites all religious leaders. They have also issued statements. So I think what sort of I would say, again, given that this law that’s now tabled in the Ukrainian legislation—in the Ukrainian parliament to ban the Moscow Patriarchate Church, they might see, again, if this law were to pass, you would say that’s probably a sign of religious toleration becoming lessened by the war, but specifically aimed at the church that is seen—at least its leadership is seen as not having sufficiently broken ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. But I think as far as all of the other religious groups—from Muslim groups, to Protestant groups, to various other minority religions, I think there are—at least from what I can say—I don’t think there are any tensions. As I mentioned before, they would be in danger, many of them, under Russian occupation, for sure. But within Ukraine government-controlled territory, I think there is great unity and different groups working together for what they see as a common goal of defending the country. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Let’s go to Jim Wallis, who has a raised hand. And if you could unmute yourself, Jim. There we go. WALLIS: Can you hear me? OK. FASKIANOS: We can. WALLIS: This may be more asking you to do a reflection than a question. We were one of those many groups. I’m with the Georgetown Center on Faith and Justice. But we got a big ecumenical, a hundred church leaders here writing to the patriarch our concerns. But we’re talking, again, this week, this same group of church leaders. And the question is, you would describe—we see the holy mother Russia religion, sort of a conversation, is its own kind of nationalist religion. And in the U.S., white Christian nationalism, specifically, is the biggest obstacle, I think, to democracy in this country. So there’s a parallel here of nationalist—this is our conversation for Friday—nationalist religion around the world versus more independent kind of faith that is critical of the state. As King would say, reminding churches that we are not the master or servant of the state but, he would say, the conscience of the state. That’s an ecclesial question about faith and politics. So we’re having a conversation on Friday about that question. And what parallels do you see? And there’s people in this country, the people who are most supportive of Putin are from the white nationalist tribe here in the U.S. And what’s the parallel here? Underneath the conflict there’s a battle between autocracy and democracy we all see. And the religious part of that is what kind of global Christianity are we talking about here? The nationalist kind or the more kind in the more prophetic, Dr. King tradition that’s critical of the state wherever it is? What parallels do you see between the Russian, you might call, nationalist religion and our own white Christian nationalism in this country? FASKIANOS: Oxana, I think that might be one for you. SHEVEL: I was going to say, maybe Tom has some thoughts on that. I honestly have—I think it’s an excellent question. I’m kind of thinking on my feet here. I haven’t really given it much thought before. It’s—I mean, there is this white Christian nationalism certainly is a phenomena. Again, if I think of the region that I study, I think there I would not even describe it as nationalism but more of like imperialism, right? Because really the sort of people who support this narrative in Ukraine, in Russia, about this Holy Rus and how there’s this civilizational struggle, and Russia and Ukraine are one people, and so forth, it is not really nationalism in the way that you sort of keep political borders, but within these borders you want to have white supremacy, or something like that. It is essentially about erasing these borders, right, and to have Russian empire, in some way, some sort of greater Russian state, and so forth. So I think in the post-Soviet space white religious nationalism is not really nationalism but more like imperialism. Thatkind of was my first thought. And maybe that would be the difference with countries elsewhere because, again, if we’re talking about white religious nationalism in the U.S., or in Western European countries, right—again, maybe I’m wrong here. I’m just kind of thinking out loud. It doesn’t seem to me—it’s really imperialist, right? It’s really about autocracy, an authoritarian form of government, denying rights to the minorities, so-called traditional values, racist underpinnings. But it sort of operates within the borders as they exist, as opposed to aiming to change the borders. Maybe I’m wrong on that, but that sort of the thought that comes to mind to me. But maybe Tom has other ideas. GRAHAM: No, no, look, I think that’s absolutely right. For the Russian Orthodox Church, I mean, clearly it is the former Russian empire is the space that they think of. So it’s not limited simply to Russia. And the whole idea of the Russian world extends beyond the borders of Russia as well, and there’s some overlap between that and the Russian Orthodox viewpoint as well. One other point I would make is that it’s clear there’s an affinity between the white Christian groups here in the United States and perhaps the Russian Orthodox Church or the—or even Putin’s ideology, at this point. I mean, Putin has made a very specific point of defending what he calls traditional values, something that resonates with the white Christian churches here in the United States. It is anti-modern. It is opposed to what Putin and, I’m sure, the white Christian nationalists here in the United States see as the decadent elements of modern Western civilization. And that, I think, explains some of the support that you’re seeing here in the United States for Putin over the years that hasn’t been erased by this very violent act of aggression against Ukraine over the past several weeks. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Dr. Mary Nyangweso, who is at East Carolina University. The response to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has been very revealing. The absence of the United Nations’ serious action is even more revealing. What do you think this says about security organizations around the world, especially when policies get in the way of protecting human lives? And what more can be done to protect the children, the elderly, and pregnant women from the line of fire? GRAHAM: I guess that’s a question for me, right, Irina? FASKIANOS: I think so, Tom. GRAHAM: Look, I mean, that’s a very good question. What we have seen during this conflict is that the UN Security Council is not really a very good forum for working out these issues, in part because of the way it’s structured. Russia is one of the five permanent members. It does have a veto. And that limits what the Security Council can do in terms of voting resolutions and either to condemn or to propose certain ways forward in this conflict. All that said, the auxiliary organizations at the United Nations are going to play a significant role on the ground in and around Ukraine. Refugees, for example, High Commissioner for Refugees has a role to play in helping to deal with this tremendous outflow of Ukrainians over the past several weeks. The latest numbers are four million. As this conflict continues, we will expect even more. There are probably six million or more internally displaced people in Ukraine because of this conflict. And that will require the work of the United Nations and its auxiliary organizations in dealing with this challenge going forward. There will be working in cooperation with a number of other relief organizations as well. So this is a massive effort. It’s only beginning. Much greater thought needs to be given to the longer-term settlement of these refugees. I think there is a hope that the conflict will end quickly, that these people will return. After all, the overwhelming bulk of them are women and children, and old people. The men are staying back in Ukraine, along with some of the women, to continue the fight against Russia. But this is not going to be a problem that is going to go away quickly. as the conflict continues and even after the conflict there’s going to be tremendous need to deal with refugees outside of Ukraine, and then the even more important task of rebuilding Ukraine after this devastation that we’ve seen, particularly of its major cities over the past several weeks. FASKIANOS: And—yes, please. SHEVEL: Can I just co-opt just to add to this? I agree with everything Tom said. One thing that I would mention, kind of talking about the UN role, I think they’re really in a crisis of sort of world government, for lack of a better word, because we have a country that is one of the permanent members of the Security Council that’s supposed to guarantee world peace that’s totally gone rogue. So I think this is something to think about, that Putin basically is able to hold onto power. And that’s quite possible, I think. It’s also possible he will not be, but he is, right? What is it—so what is UN’s role? Is this still a stable system with the UN Security Council as it exists now, with Russia and the role that it plays there? I think that’s something that would be a question for world leaders to think about as far as international relations. There was a question also I saw in the chat about the destruction of sacred sites, and I just wanted to comment on that. Unfortunately, this is going on. The statistics I just read this morning in one of the Ukrainian cultural—officials from the Ukrainian culture ministry is saying on average two holy sites get destroyed in the war every day by the shelling. So there is—and most of them are churches, but not only, right? So there is definitely, again, going to sort of this narrative that there is Holy Rus, that there is Russian Army bringing together this Russian world as they are bombing the churches, including Moscow Patriarchate Churches. So that’s also something, I think, going to the point of how that narrative of the Russkiy world, Russkiy Mir, is going to be perceived, how credible is it, especially with the people in Ukraine. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Let’s go next to a raised hand from David Adams. ADAMS: Thank you, Irina. And thank you to our panelists. It’s a very interesting, if depressing, presentation that you’ve given. I’ve got kind of a two-part question linked together. One has to do with the ability of the international community to track where the Ukrainians who have been spirited out of Ukraine into Russia are being taken, and what—how many of them there are and what they’re being forced to do. I’ve read or heard that  manual labor in Siberia, for example, may be the destiny of some of them. But I don’t know if that’s empirical data-based or not. And the other thing is, conversely, do you see the Russians—unless there is a peace agreement, I would imagine the Russians bringing migrants, Russian migrants, into Mariupol and areas such as that, that are being absolutely devastated and possibly depopulated, if the refugees are able to—or, displaced persons are eventually able to get out of a place like Mariupol. GRAHAM: David, those are two very good questions. Oxana may have more information on this than I do. I think in answer to your first question, the simple answer is we don’t know at this point. We’ve heard there’s reports. Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, himself has talked about two thousand children or so being taken out of Mariupol into Russia. Their whereabouts are unknown. Unfortunately, we have very little insight into what is happening inside Russia at this point. And part of that is a consequence of the drawdown in our—in the American embassy in Moscow. I think the less travel across the country, fewer people who are prepared to talk willingly to Westerners about what’s going on inside Russia because of the consequences of that, this fear that has been conveyed across the country by the Kremlin at this point. So the short answer is we don’t know. There are a lot of rumors. And it’s something that we will want to track, but it’s also something—a question of which we should be demanding answers from the Russians at this point. This would be a role for the UN Security Council, for example, to raise those types of issues and hear what the response is from the Russian government. On the second question, clearly if Russia does conquer this territory in eastern Ukraine, the city of Mariupol in particular, there’ll be questions of reconstruction and repopulating those areas. How the Russians will go about doing that I think is an open question. Yes, there may be a certain number of migrants that they would—from Russia itself that they would want to move into that area. Perhaps people from the Donbas, people from Crimea, for example. But I think you’re right, they would hesitate to return to that city people who they saw as anti-Russian, who had been in opposition and fought against the Russian forces at that point. And so the preference would be for Russians elsewhere who might be more loyal to Moscow. But in any event, I think that’s way down the road. This conflict is continuing. Mariupol has been destroyed. And before anybody’s going to move back to Mariupol there’s going to have to be a large reconstruction effort undertaken. SHEVEL: Let me just add to that. I think it’s a very important question. I’m glad you brought up these forced disappearances and forced removal of the population. I think it’s really tragic. And, first of all, the numbers we really don’t know at this point. I mean, I’ve seen estimates as high as thirty thousand people altogether. We really don’t know. But I think what we do know, this is part of the Russian playbook of the so-called de-Nazification that Putin claims to be pursuing in Ukraine, and who counts as a so-called Nazi needing to be de-Nazified is anybody who seemed to be in opposition to Russian goals, and Russian plans, and Russia ideals. So it's not just sort of you’re original, so to say, Nazis, right? Like the Azov Battalion is fighting in Mariupol, right? It has about a thousand membership or so forth. But they’re really going after—and that what they’re saying—that they have blocked humanitarian corridors to Ukraine-controlled territories, so when people leave through the Russian checkpoints they are being essentially vetted. Especially men, but also women. They check their phone communications. Sometimes they have actual lists, like in Kherson and elsewhere, where they’ve occupied. So it goes to civil society activists, certain religious leaders, local government, bloggers—anybody who’s perceived to be in opposition and disagreement with Russia. And we have now dozens of cases of forced disappearance, from local government officials, to journalists, to these unknown number of thousands of people who have been moved to Russia. And what’s going to happen with them? And I think, first of all, we don’t know. But I think there are very good reasons to be very concerned because certain sinister things can be happening, and are likely happening, given, again, what we saw in Donbas in 2014. These so-called basements where people were held, sort of like filtration camps. There are books written about it. This infamous Izolyatsia prison in Donbas where people have been tortured and held for many months incommunicado. Many died. So we could see some of that. Or, again, we could see removal of people to far regions of Russia, from which they may not be able to come back again. We have these unconfirmed reports that people who were taken from Mariupol, their Ukrainian documents were taken, they were given some sort of piece of paper that only allows them to move to some farming town, and then it’s sort of unclear what happens to them after that. And as far as reconstruction and repopulation of Mariupol, I think—I mean, I think Tom is right. It’s kind of down the road. We don’t really know. But I would mention just two things here. So, first of all, if Russia does hold onto these territories and doesn’t pull its troops back, I think that basically means that the sanctions will continue, the Ukrainian government will not agree to give up any additional territory, right? They may have reached some agreement over Crimea. Zelensky was proposing maybe a fifteen-year referendum, what have you. But certainly not giving additional territory. That would have to be imposed by Russia by force. Right, then it means, again, that there would be a continuation of sanctions and all the economic problems it creates in Russia. So to think that they would have the money to rebuild this territory, which is now—Mariupol is like 90 percent destroyed—I don’t think so. I think that would be essentially wasteland. Probably militarized, right, again, given its strategic location on the Black Sea, like we saw in Crimea. And again, if we look at Donbas, the region—the so-called separatist republics, their, economy has been very depressed, and there wasn’t nearly that scale of destruction there. So this sort of idea of moving more Russian people to Mariupol in particular, I think is unlikely given how destroyed the city is and how Russia will not have the funds to rebuild it. But certainly deporting or disappearing or otherwise dealing with people who, quote/unquote are “Nazis,” not just in Mariupol but also in Kherson and these other parts of southern and eastern Ukraine, I think that’s very possible. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Wesley Granberg-Michaelson of the Reformed Church in America, general secretary emeritus. And the question is, to follow the discussion of the theological vision of Russia’s role and destiny, are these dimensions generally overlooked by Western policymakers who are focused on geopolitical issues and diplomatic compromises, but don’t take account of the underlying religious dimensions of the conflict? Tom, I think you can start on that one, since you’ve been at the table. GRAHAM: (Laughs.) I’ve been at the table. I think the short answer to that is that there is a tendency inside, certainly inside the U.S. government, not to pay sufficient attention to these underlying sort of ideological, theological issues to see how they might play in the process. The focus is largely on geopolitical matters, military forces, and so forth. That isn’t to say that there aren’t people inside the government that focus on these things very clearly. And within the State Department, within our intelligence community they can provide information on those matters. But I would say that there is, inside the U.S. government, a certain amount of hesitation to get engaged in these issues because of the separation of church and state in the United States. And people are concerned about crossing those lines. So even if we’re aware of it, the extent to which we would get engaged or try to exploit it in some way to our advantage is quite limiting because of those constitutional restrictions inside the United States. Now, whether that’s the right way to approach it or not I think is an open question. But it is a factor when the issue of religion comes up as part of a larger geopolitical crisis or conflict. FASKIANOS: Oxana, do you want to weigh in? SHEVEL: No, I would agree. I think it’s fair to say—(inaudible)—that that’s probably not the main priority, right, for the Western policymakers, when they actually formulate policy. But at the same time, I think there is awareness, and sometimes the sort of religious underpinnings or divisions might be actually a very—could be very consequential for, say, military or political outcomes. And I think that they are, or they’re perceived to be. I think that’s probably when they receive more attention. You put this more on the historical level, right? Like you say in the case of this war, Putin says Russia and Ukraine are one nation, even though all evidence from Ukraine shows that they aren’t, right? And then the patriarch is basically saying the same thing but now he has more  religious justification or narrative. Is this changing anything? Kind of. I think if you’re saying something different, that probably would be something for policymakers to maybe pay more attention to, because here there is conflicting narrative or something along those lines. But when we have political narrative being reinforced by religious narrative, both on the same point, reality on the ground is something different. Maybe that’s why it’s not getting that much attention. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’ll take the next question from Father Thomas Zain. Do you think the center of Kyiv is somewhat safe from the type of destruction seen elsewhere because of the especially sacred sites there, like the Kyiv Caves Monastery? SHEVEL: Yeah, I don’t think anywhere in Ukraine is safe at this point because we have seen  places bombed west, and north, and south, and everywhere. The idea that, say, the Caves Monastery would be purposefully protected, I mean, you might think so. But then again, given that many Orthodox Churches, including there are some historical ones in Chernihiv, which is a very ancient town north of Kyiv—also, again, I’m not a military strategist, but from what I read the sort of precision-guided missiles in Russia are maybe kind of getting in short supply, and they’re using less precision, especially when they bomb the cities. So even if, say, there may be an intent—or, not an intent to, say, to target the Caves Monastery, right, if you’re using the kind of munition that is not particularly precise, it could be damaged without intent. So my short answer would be that I don’t think it is safe, just because there is this religious site there. FASKIANOS: Great. So I want to try to get in Don Frew, Covenant of the Goddess. I’m in communication with Pagan groups in Ukraine—Slavic, Greek, Scandinavian, and Celtic. As one might expect, they’ve been discriminated against in Ukrainian society, but people have been putting aside religious discrimination in the face of a greater enemy. And do you think this greater acceptance is likely to continue after the war? SHEVEL: Yeah, it’s a good question because, for me, I mean, I agree that people have put aside many differences, including religious differences. Would that continue after the war? I think it partially depends on how the war ends, right? I think if the war ends in a way that Ukraine gets its territory back that Russia has occupied since February of this year, there is reconstruction effort, there is support—great support from the West, eventually maybe even prospect of EU membership. So there is kind of enthusiasm, I think we can expect this unity to continue. Again, just on the point of refugees, most refugees come out, they want to come back. I have a lot of friends and family there, and everybody’s talking about how they will rebuild. This is what people talk about, right? And you can say it’s in part kind of a psychological self-defense mechanism, but there is this great optimism, right? Some, over 90 percent, of the population, according to opinion polls, believe that Ukraine can win, right, and sort of good things can come. So I think if there is this, we can say, sort of positive end to the war in Ukraine, then I think this continued cooperation and greater unity would probably continue. Not to say that some of the old differences, or discrimination, or animosity may not—would be completely erased. But it probably, it would be my guess, would be that it won’t be the dominant sentiment, right? Now if, say, Ukraine somehow loses, and so it becomes, who’s to blame, which groups maybe didn’t do your right share, if the government did this or should have done that. So I think that then we might have more divides in the society, right? Sort of this finger-pointing, blaming, right? And the question is, we have to live under new reality. Do we keep fighting, do we not? So there I think we may see maybe potentially in looking for groups to blame, right? Again, I’m not sure it’s going to attack Pagan groups specifically, but sort of broader, looking for internal enemies or people to blame, finger-pointing, and therefore more divisions. FASKIANOS: Great. And I’m going to give the last question to Nathan Hosler, who’s with the Church of the Brethren Office of Peacebuilding and Policy. What are the possibilities for, or risks associated with, bodies such as the World Council of Churches engaging with either of the Orthodox Churches regarding the present situation? So, Oxana, why don’t you start and maybe— SHEVEL: Let me see. So I’ll just—so the question is about the World Council of Churches doing what? Sorry, I missed the beginning of— FASKIANOS: That’s OK. Let me just—it was basically how can bodies such as the World Council of Churches engage with either of the Orthodox Churches regarding the present situation. So essentially, what can religious leaders do to help, to do their part in this conflict? SHEVEL: Yeah. I don’t know. I mean, it’s—I think condemning the war and calling on the Russian patriarch to not endorse it is certainly the right kind of acts that these groups already are doing. Would it have any effect? I remain somewhat skeptical. I think one thing that, again, maybe we haven’t seen that yet—and I don’t know, I haven’t really followed it that closely so maybe there have been some reports—about how, say, other Orthodox Churches feel about recognizing—(inaudible)—because—which has now only been recognized by four churches—Orthodox Churches, this Ukrainian independent Orthodox Church. I’m not sure if that’s something now that’s a discussion within global Orthodoxy, sort of what role the World Council of Churches plays in, right? So there is—yes, I see the question in the chat. The World Council of Churches, right, that the Russian Orthodox Church is a member, so there is kind of a conflict since the World Council is against the war. So I’m not sure if the Russian Orthodox Church can—its leadership in particular—can be somehow persuaded to take different position. I honestly don’t think so. Sorry, that’s not a very satisfying answer. FASKIANOS: No, that’s fine. And, Tom, I just wondered, from your perspective, what you think religious leaders can do or— GRAHAM: So it’s not beyond what Oxana has said already. I mean, they should be condemning the war. They should be condemning the aggression. They should be condemning the unwarranted and indiscriminate attacks against civilians. That is what is a fundamental precept of most world religions. Is it going to have an impact on the Russian Orthodox Church, the leadership? I think Oxana is absolutely right: No, at this point. But it—this is a case where people ought to stand up for their principles and their faith. And I think that makes it incumbent upon religious leaders to condemn the violence in the most forceful terms possible. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. Well, we did not get to all the questions. I apologize for that. We are at the end of the hour. So we will have to leave it here and come back. Alas, I think that, as you both have said, this is not going to end any time soon. So we will continue to focus on it in our discussion. So thank you to Tom Graham and Oxana Shevel for being with us today. We really appreciate it. You can follow Dr. Graham at CFR.org and Dr. Shevel on Twitter at @oxanashevel. And I also hope you’ll follow us, CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program at @CFR_religion. And of course, as always, please visit CFR.org and ForeignAffairs.com for the latest policy analysis on this crisis, as well as other regions and topics around the world. And as always, please send us your suggestions of topics, speakers, feedback to [email protected]. We love hearing from you and want to continue the dialogue. So thank you all again. Our next session will be on Tuesday, April 5, at 1:00 p.m. And we will be discussing religion and conflict resolution. So, again, thank you both. SHEVEL: Thank you. GRAHAM: Thank you.
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    Refugee Resettlement and Faith Communities
    Play
    Kelly A. Gauger, deputy director of refugee admissions at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, and Rick Santos, president and CEO of Church World Service, discuss U.S. responses to refugee resettlement and the role faith communities play in refugee assistance. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record, and the audio, video, and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Kelly Gauger and Rick Santos with us today. Kelly just learned that she needed to do this, to step in for Nancy Izzo Jackson, who has gone overseas, given the events that are unfolding over there. So, Kelly Gauger, thank you for being with us. She is the deputy director in the Office of Refugee Admissions at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Her work includes oversight of the administration’s annual report to Congress on proposed refugee admissions, development of the bureau’s budget for the Refugee Admissions Program, and managing oversight of its seven resettlement support centers worldwide. She also helps manage the bureau’s relationship with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, and refugee resettlement colleagues in governments around the world. And she joined the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration in 1999 and has served in a variety of positions, obviously, before becoming deputy in 2011. Rick Santos is the president and CEO of Church World Service. He previously served Church World Service as a program officer in Vietnam, then as a coordinator of strategic planning and evaluation. He has held positions as director of communication and advocacy at International Relief and Development, and as the president and CEO of IMA World Health. He has more than two decades of experience working for and with faith-based organizations, including more than a decade of living and working in Asia. So thank you both for being with us to talk about refugee resettlement and faith communities. And, Kelly, let’s begin with you to talk about—give us some global contexts for resettlement work, the trends that you’ve seen over the course of your time at the bureau, and the role that the United States is playing and can play. GAUGER: Sure. Thank you. Can you hear me OK? FASKIANOS: Yes. GAUGER: Great. OK. All right. Thank you to the Council on Foreign Relations for the invitation to join today, and my apologies that Nancy Izzo Jackson can’t be here nor that Sarah Cross, who was supposed to fill in for her, couldn’t be here, who fell ill in the last twenty-four hours. So it’s my privilege to be able to speak with this group, along with Rick Santos from Church World Service, and to have this opportunity to talk about recent trends in refugee resettlement, and reflect a bit on the long-standing and unique role of the faith-based community in advancing refugee resettlement in the U.S. This conversation is, of course, a timely one amidst the historic effort that’s been underway to resettle the tens of thousands—actually, seventy-four thousand people, to be exact—who were evacuated here last August and who have been sheltering in domestic military installations for the last six months, awaiting final resettlement to their destinations. As Rick will discuss, the engagement of the faith-based community has long been the foundational hallmark of refugee resettlement in the United States, prior even to the Refugee Act of 1980, which formally established the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, which we refer to as the USRAP. As we know it today, diverse, wide-ranging, and grassroots coalitions of local faith groups across the country were some of the most active and prominent actors engaged in refugee resettlement. The Refugee Act of 1980 formalized the State Department’s partnership with the nine national nonprofit organizations, which lead on providing initial reception and placement to newly-arrived refugees resettled in the United States through the USRAP. The faith-based communities’ lasting role in resettlement is evidenced by the fact that six of our nine resettlement agencies, including Church World Service, are faith-based organizations, as well as additional organizations, reflecting the diversity of America’s faith traditions. Since the creation of the USRAP in 1980, our resettlement agency partners have enabled the United States to resettle over 3 million refugees from more than a hundred countries, who have made a tremendous economic and social contribution to communities across the country. You all probably know that each year the president sets an annual ceiling for refugee admissions, which we work diligently to meet, sometimes under very challenging circumstances. Although the annual ceiling for refugee admissions to the U.S. historically has fluctuated with highs well over a hundred thousand during parts of the 1980s and early ’90s, and then a fairly consistent ceiling in the range of seventy (thousand) to eighty-five thousand during most of the 2000s, the ceiling hit historic lows in the last four years, in the last administration, including just eighteen thousand in 2020. And as arrivals plummeted in those recent years, so did our international and domestic capacity to resettle refugees, which we’re now working intently to build. With our new admissions target of 125 thousand for this fiscal year, we are setting an ambitious goal for ourselves, recognizing the difficulty we face in reaching it due both to the diminished capacity and the operational challenges that COVID continues to pose. Knowing these challenges, we established an initial operating level of sixty-five thousand for fiscal year 2022 when funding our overseas and domestic partners. At a month shy of halfway into the fiscal year—so as of today, we’re at the five-month mark in the fiscal year—we have, unfortunately, admitted just north of eight thousand refugees so far this year, largely, due to the continued impact of COVID overseas where, for the last two years, our operations at both—at all of our resettlement support centers have been challenged, and USCIS went about eighteen months of not conducting any overseas interviews at all, which has seriously impacted our overseas pipeline. USCIS—we are now back into the field. Most of our resettlement support centers are operating on a nearly full in-person basis except for Ukraine, which I’ll talk about in a little bit, and USCIS is heading back out into the field doing interviews, but just not at the levels that we would like them to, given the number of cases we have queued up for interview. USCIS lost a lot of staff, mostly through attrition, during the last administration, and they are assiduously hiring new staff to beef up their refugee corps to be able to resettle—to be able to interview more people. Over the last several months, in particular, our resettlement partners have stepped up in extraordinary ways to support the historic effort to resettle newly-arriving Afghans who relocated to the United States. As I said, to date, more than seventy-two thousand Afghans have been resettled into local communities across the country through Operation Allies Welcome, which is the largest influx of arrivals at one time in such a short period in over fifty years, not seen since the Vietnam War. Resettling this many people in such a short period of time is unprecedented and involves significant efforts from local faith groups and other community partners to welcome refugees at a historic scale and pace. Over the course of OAW, we have welcomed the engagement of additional faith-based organizations who have helped to expand our capacity to resettle Afghan(s) by entering into new institutional partnerships at a national level with our existing resettlement agency partners. We’re particularly excited about the new partnership, that I’m sure Rick will speak about, between Islamic Relief USA and Church World Service, marking a significant engagement by the USRAP with an organization grounded in the Muslim faith. The work of OAW has been taking place against the backdrop of this administration’s efforts to rebuild and expand our domestic resettlement infrastructure, which was significantly decimated in the previous four years. We have made good progress over the last year of this administration with 272 resettlement affiliates currently in operation and supporting the resettlement of refugees through the USRAP—an increase from 199 affiliates just a year ago. Factoring in the capacity that was rapidly stood up to welcome Afghan newcomers, there are around a hundred additional community partners supporting the resettlement of Afghans. This expansion of our affiliate network is a true testament to the commitment and dedication of faith-based groups alongside our broader range of community and resettlement agency partners to grow resettlement capacity to meet the challenge of resettling tens of thousands of Afghans in a few months while also welcoming refugees from some seventy to eighty different nationalities globally. And before I turn it over, let me just say a few words about Ukraine because I know that’s of intense interest to a lot of people. The U.S. government is working closely with European allies and partners who will be at the forefront of any response, as well as international organizations and NGOs, to support those displaced internally within Ukraine and those who may seek safety in the neighboring countries. We commend our European allies and partners for keeping their borders open to Ukrainians who need to seek international protection and for implementing a three-year EU temporary protection directive for Ukrainians. Our cooperation with our European allies and partners allows us to provide immediate assistance on the ground for those who are fleeing Ukraine. The United States is and will continue to be a global leader in international humanitarian response and including in refugee resettlement. The Department of State—my bureau—will work with UNHCR in our overseas post to determine whether Ukrainians who have fled to another country require resettlement to a third country because they are not safe in their current location. I will say that we have been—as I think I’ve hinted, we have been incredibly impressed and humbled by the welcome that the neighboring countries to Ukraine have welcomed Ukrainians fleeing to their countries. So we do not anticipate at this time that we will be doing any large-scale refugee resettlement at this stage. We rarely turn to refugee resettlement in the early stages of a conflict. But we will remain open to particularly vulnerable cases who either may be a target of the Russian regime and others who cannot find safety in Poland or Romania or Moldova or any of the neighboring countries. Let me just—finally, I’ll just finish by saying unrelated to the current conflict, the United States has a long history of resettling Ukrainian and other FSU religious minorities processed under the Lautenberg Amendment, which was first passed in October 1989. As such, we have the capacity both overseas and domestically to process Ukrainian refugees who meet requirements of the eligibility. Lautenberg cases are processed by our regional resettlement support center based in Kyiv, which we refer to as RSC Eurasia. A lot of their international staff have been evacuated. A lot of the Ukrainian staff, which are an incredible group of young people that I met when I was in Ukraine about two and a half years ago—a lot of them are still in Ukraine and are continuing to work from home, believe it or not, to continue their work on our program. At this time, we’re not currently departing individuals from Ukraine due to the closure of Ukrainian airspace. We had to cancel about 170 people’s flights this week and we’re looking at another, I believe, 84 next week. The office that we have enlarged in Chișinău, Moldova, can arrange departures for approved Ukrainian Lautenberg applicants who are USCIS approved and who have completed all USRAP processing requirements. So we have tried to widely publicize the fact both on our website—the RSC website—and all email communications, that those Lautenberg cases which were being processed in Ukraine, and who have changed location are instructed to write to the RSC in Eurasia at [email protected] to update their location and contact details, and if the cases are ready for departure and in a location where we can organize their departure, they’ll be informed of next steps. So why don’t I stop there? And I’ll save anything else for the Q&A. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Kelly. That was a great context for us in what’s happening today. So, Rick, let’s go to you to talk about the role that faith communities have and continue to play in refugee assistance and what you’re doing at CWS. SANTOS: Great. So thank you, Irina, and I appreciate the Council inviting me today to talk about faith communities and resettlement. Maybe I’ll start by going backwards a little bit, creating a little bit of context for this conversation and, frankly, my experiences over the last twenty-five years of doing not just humanitarian work, but relief and development work over—across the globe with faith-based communities and partners. I think one of the first things I just want to say—I think it gets lost in so much of our conversations today—is, actually, the faith community historically has been, actually, a very innovative group. We’ve been on the forefront and cutting edge of a lot of different things, including refugee resettlement. One of the experiences I had very early on in my career, I was based in Thailand from 1987 to 1990. I was there when the first Burmese—Myanmarese refugees came over the border after Aung San Suu Kyi won and was imprisoned the first time, and, actually, a colleague of mine, a friend, somebody I knew named Jack Dunford, organized a group of about a dozen faith leaders, church leaders, to go to the border. These are European, American, and, actually, a local Thai church. So we always—I think one of the things I like about the way the faith community responds is we almost always have some type of local component or local relationship there as well. So Jack led a group to the border, essentially, with private dollars. The faith community began, essentially, the first response to those refugees. UNHCR, of course, and then other multilateral and bilateral groups came in after that. But we were—the faith community was, really, one of the first to respond to that situation. If we go back—I’m going to go back seventy-five years to World War II. In fact, the faith community was probably one of the largest groups of people supporting refugees as they came out post-World War II. Church World Service itself, we had what we called freedom trains where we would send grain over to Europe in terms of the response feeding post-war—the situation there, and then those trains would, literally, bring back folks—refugees—back into the country and to the communities where that grain came from. So the faith community has, really, been, I think, at the forefront of refugee resettlement since the very beginning. And one of the things that, for me that’s, really, I think, important to realize is that for us—for example, for Church World Service, we started with seventeen-member denomination. So Church World Service is an organization that has the Mainline—what we would call the Mainline Protestant churches as our founding members. Today, it includes historic Black churches, the Anglican, and Orthodox communities as well. But in those first few years after World War II, refugee resettlement was very—it wasdifferent than it is today, as Kelly mentioned. Before the Refugee Act of 1980, it was, essentially, a private enterprise and people would—it was faith communities and other private groups that would bring refugees into the country and then resettle them. And so for Church World Service, in our first ten years we resettled over a hundred thousand refugees in the U.S., so during that 1946 to 1956 time period. I think that’s really, frankly, stunning. I mean, I think, when you think about what was behind this, and I think, at least, I know for Mainline Protestant communities it was the service impulse of these communities, that they wanted to reach out. They wanted to support—it’s considered part of—if you read the Bible and you interpret it in a certain way, the theology of welcoming the stranger, welcoming someone who is not from where you are, is a really big part of some of the stories and some of the scripture passages. And so our core group—our core constituency—was really motivated to do refugee resettlement. And, frankly, in that—in, I think, that early period it was predominantly faith-based organizations who were doing this work. I’m just going to speed up a little bit and talk about  the period, I think, from—really, from 1955 through, let’s just say, 1980, especially the ’60s and ’70s. If you take refugee resettlement aside, if you look at some of the other sectors—the international humanitarian sector and development sector—with the advent of the U.N., there’s, actually, increased secularization of, essentially, the work that faith communities had done kind of initially post-World War II. And I think in fact, many—I always find it interesting because I think in the refugee world it’s very different. The faith communities have been part and parcel of this work for—since the very beginning, and I find, for example, in the public health space where I spent a decade, that you find that people look at the faith communities, and faith organizations, and faith-based approaches sometimes as—with a little bit more suspect, though, not understanding that, in fact, actually, faith communities and faith-based organizations have been doing this work ever since the beginning. So, as I would say, the work became more secularized, I think, as I look back, and I look at the Refugee Act of 1980 and the involvement of—really, the much bigger involvement of the U.S. government in terms of refugee resettlement, looking at basically aligning to UNHCR’s definitions, creating more controls and systems around who comes in, how people come in. Of course, it’s the presidential determination each year, adding that piece to it; so organizations like Church World Service had to adjust and I would say that’s probably another feature of what we did as an organization, and as I know many of our other colleague organizations have done, how we’ve addressed and resettled refugees has changed over time as well. Kelly mentioned six of the nine resettlement agencies either being faith based or faith founded. I think all of us have gone through some—different types of evolution of how we’ve addressed refugees and resettlement. And so for Church World Service for a period in the ’80s and early ’90s and maybe even early 2000s, it was really dependent upon our main institutional denomination. So the larger denominations we had a refugee committee and we would resettle through, essentially, those networks. So there was denominational representatives. They were in contact with their array and networks of local churches, and refugees would be apportioned to whichever church and community could best support them. I would like to say, also during this time, I think, for me, and one of the things I always find, really, I think, important about Church World Service and our work is we’ve always been—we’ve always tried to do what’s in the best interests of the refugee and the refugee family. So we went through a period where now—we went through this period where it was really dominated by, essentially, national bodies, and then over time that’s changed. And so, in fact, Church World Service, through our twenty-three affiliates and our nine national offices, that we actually resettle folks through more of a community sponsorship model today and that includes individual churches. That includes also national bodies. But, frankly, it really looks at the community as a whole. So not just the faith-based part of the community but how can we bring different elements and different players in the community itself to help support refugee and refugee families. And I think maybe another feature kind of post-1980 that I think it’s really important to say is that Church World Service has always looked at the work, especially post-1980, as a public-private partnership, that we, as the nonprofit community, as, essentially, NGOs, are really the private side and that we bring a lot of value—that the faith communities and our relationship to the whole refugee process has created a lot of value, whether that be through support of individual churches, co-sponsorship with churches. We have many different ways for the community to be involved in the co-sponsorship of refugees and, really, bringing refugees into the community. And I would say probably another piece of that that’s really important to me is that as a faith-based community it’s not just the looking—specific service issue for us. We, of course, are part of the resettlement grouping and we try to do the best we can and we bring in different, like I said, community sponsorship. But, really, a part of it for us, too, is also the—essentially, the advocacy side of refugee resettlement. We believe in welcome. We believe in welcoming your neighbor, and we believe that there’s been a lot of misinformation about refugees and what they add to our communities and to our country. Even though we’ve had these huge waves of refugees coming in post-World War II, post-Vietnam War, of course, Cubans, so we’ve had a different—different waves, this—now, of course, Afghans coming in most recently. But, really, the idea that we want to—as we build community support for refugees, we also feel it’s really important to build within the mind space of American people that this is a really important thing. It’s important for us as a country. It adds value to us as a country. But it also is, really, part of who we are. And so the ability to go out and do community organizing around refugee admissions, to be able to do advocacy on Capitol Hill, to do state-level advocacy. I think you saw, coming off the previous administration, a tremendous amount of faith-based actors going into their State Houses and actually having them make really clear pronouncements and give funding support. I know, for example, our affiliate in Portland, the Ecumenical Ministries—their group, SOAR—actually lobbied their—the Oregon House and actually got funding directly from the State of Oregon. So, really, the ability for us to do advocacy alongside the service is really critical, and the faith community has been doing that for many years and I think that’s one of the, really, truly, added values that we have as a community and we, as Church World Services, have done. As we look at the current crisis—I think Kelly mentioned the new types of partnerships—I think the reality of what we faced over six months ago when the fall of Kabul—when Afghans were coming in great numbers in a very compressed period of time was the ability to look at the way that we resettle refugees and try to innovate what that might look like. So for Church World Service, one of our historical strengths has always been working in coalition or working in partnership, and so when we started something called an Institutional Partners Program, we invited groups that we felt really strongly about who could really be helpful to this situation and one of them was Islamic Relief. I’ve known and been in partnership with Islamic Relief in different ways over the last decade. I know some of the leadership, and when we started talking to them they were really just more than willing to get involved and they were just looking for the opportunity to get involved. So the Institutional Partnership Program allowed for them to really to begin to be part of the solution. We also have partners like Lions Club, so we have secular partners, and also Samaritan’s Purse, and Samaritan’s Purse has been a really good partner in this program. And I think on a couple of levels, I’ve appreciated, one, their absolute ability to reach out and to resettle people in their communities, but also their ability to really speak forcefully for the need for refugees in this country. So I feel some of the programs that we’ve done recently have, really, actually strengthened the entire refugee resettlement network. We also started a program—a Community Partner Program. It’s similar to our Community Sponsorship Program. But we really were looking at—because some of the rules changed when Afghans were coming in—the ability to resettle someone within a hundred miles of either a—one of our offices or one of our affiliate offices was loosened, and that we were able to really partner with things like individual congregations, businesses, sports teams, people who were really interested. I got a call from a guy I’ve known for twenty years who was actually a refugee from Vietnam and he’s, like, how do I—how do I help resettle an Afghan refugee? So, really, the ability to reach out to a larger group of community players was—is, really, I think, frankly, just one of the real benefits of this moment of crisis that we responded to. So, finally, I’m just going to end. I know we’ve covered a lot of ground, a lot of time—period of time. But I just want to say that, for me, there’s—we, as a faith—we are a Protestant Christian organization but I know our fellow agencies, whatever their religious leaning, we have a consistent—we have a consistency across faith traditions about how we live that faith and how we’re inspired by it, how we—how welcome is a part of these different traditions. And I’m just, really, just grateful that we have such—kind of a similar approach and, really, a similar set of beliefs and that we’re all rowing in the same direction on this issue. And just, finally, I want to end by saying that  Don Kerwin wrote an article in 2018 where he really outlines just what do refugees mean to this country, and in that article he really goes into depth about  essentially the benefit that refugees have brought us as a country. So not just economic benefit but, I think, cultural benefit, bringing a fresh perspective, keeping us connected to the rest of the world. Church World Services has resettled refugees from over eighty-six countries. Just the richness that comes from that enriches all of us. And so I’m just really grateful for the work that we do, and our ability to be involved in this, and to be innovative in different ways in refugee resettlement. So, thank you, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much, Rick. And now we’re going to go to all of you for questions and comments. You can either raise your hand or you can type your questions in the Q&A box and I’ll read it, and we already have questions lining up. I’m going to, first, go to Simran Jeet Singh, who’s with the Aspen Institute Religion & Society Program. “We’re seeing so much racist and religious bigotry in the unfolding refugee crisis in Ukraine. There’s a strong and explicit preference for white and Christian refugees. What can we do to ensure equal treatment for refugees of all backgrounds?” GAUGER: Rick, do you want to start? SANTOS: Yeah. Maybe I’ll start with that one. I would say, this is really, clearly, unfortunate and there has, clearly, been a trend. I think one of the most important things  in this—for example, in the most recent situation with Afghanistan that, really, we’ve had such a broad-based support. We’ve had U.S. military. We’ve had, as I mentioned, Samaritan’s Purse, Islamic Relief. We’ve been able to create a coalition across many different organizations that will—that, basically, say that people who come here are people of worth and value and they can help the United States, and I think part of this is a message in terms of advocacy. We have to continue to reinforce that message and we have to make sure that people see all refugees, all people in need, as equal and of equal worth. Thanks. GAUGER: I think I would just add that for—in many of the years where we have had a robust refugee resettlement program and, actually, even during the last administration the majority or, at least, the plurality of our refugees have been from Africa. So I think that the U.S. does a very good job of having an extremely diverse Refugee Admissions Program, even more so in recent years. I mean, in Africa alone, I think, we admit twenty-five nationalities per year. This year, African arrivals are not as high as they have been in recent years, partially because COVID has really impacted even more so our operations in Africa than elsewhere. But I think that the welcome that African refugees and also the seventy-two thousand Afghans who have arrived in the United States, the welcome that they’ve received in our communities around the country, I think, is really a hallmark that, yes, we are all aware that there is racism in the way that refugees are treated in many locations. I would argue that it’s a bit different here in the United States. And I’m not trying to be a Pollyanna here, but I think that our communities have done an exceptional job in welcoming refugees of all faiths, and colors, and ethnicities to the United States. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go—next raised hand from Azza Karam. KARAM: Thank you very much, indeed, for this opportunity, and a very quick note of appreciation for what Ms. Gauger was speaking about and the work that they’re doing, but a very special note of appreciation for Church World Service. Rick, I know that you’re one of the institutions that has delivered so much and you have garnered plenty of wonderful attention but, honestly, not half as much as you deserve. So hats off and shout out to the work that you do that, I think, is exemplar to many other faith-based organizations. I was delighted to hear of the different partnerships that you spoke about, including with Islamic Relief and others. I just wondered at something that—I just want you to give your own read on something that we’re encountering in Religions for Peace when we set up our multi-religious humanitarian fund, how difficult it was—it still is—to get different religious institutions and organizations to commit even a nominal amount to this kind of a(n) effort that is intentionally geared at multi-religious service, multi-religious collaboration, pooling together the resources at the national level not only here in the United States but actually in the developing context where you know that that’s—faith-based organizations can often be the first responders to all of these spaces of refugees and internally-displaced and forced displacement. Why do you think it still remains so challenging for faith-based organizations to contribute to a multi-faith mechanism that is, ultimately, aimed at actually ensuring that the response is exactly along the lines of what you’ve been describing—that it’s not just one organization but several representing different religious traditions coming together to serve in exactly the same space, exactly the same communities, at exactly the same time? What do you think their—where do you think their reticence comes from, and what would you suggest to help get over that particular reticence so that we’re actually doing social cohesion as we are delivering our respective services from our respective institutional religious spaces? Thank you. SANTOS: Yeah. So, thank you, Azza. So just, really, thank you for all you’ve done. I mean, you—I know, you’ve been a leader in interfaith space and bringing different groups together. I think it’s a great question. I think a lot of groups, especially historically, have a certain way of working and, I think, maybe it might just be this historical inertia that sometimes it’s hard to overcome. Church World Service is part of something called the ACT Alliance. We’ve been part of the World Council of Churches for a very long time. And so the ACT Alliance is an ecumenical group that, basically, I would say, sister agencies across Europe belong to—for example, Christian Aid in the UK would be an example, or Bread for the World in Germany. And so, I think, one of the historical problems is that people have a historical relationship with these other groups and then just trying to open those up and making them a wider forum, I think, is sometimes difficult. I’ve known Anwar from Islamic Relief for years and, really, I feel one of the reasons why we were able to work well together with Islamic Relief is that we knew each other and we were able to kind of break down some barriers very quickly with that. And so I think maybe that’s another way, just the ability to maybe bring a table together—a multi-faith table together to have this conversation. I know there are different versions of that out there. But very specifically that we are talking about I don’t know if there’s one, and I would say that Church World Service would be willing to be a part of that if someone was to try to call that together. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to pull together two written questions from Shannon McAlister and Eleanor Ellsworth, respectively, from Fordham and the Episcopal Diocese of San Diego. And just for clarification from you, Rick, notice that the list of collaboratives named for resettling refugees did not include the Catholic Church. Has the Catholic Church been involved in refugee resettlement as well or have you reached out to the Vatican and/or National Catholic Bishops Conferences about collaboration? And then from Eleanor, if you could also talk about the Orthodox, how they’re engaged with CWS. Does this reflect American Orthodoxy only or are they international—Eastern Orthodox bodies—are they involved? SANTOS: Great. Yeah. So on the first question, the Catholic(s) have their own resettlement agency and they’re one of the nine. And so we all collaborate, in a sense, together as those nine agencies to do resettlement. I mean, off the top of my head, I know in terms of the faith based includes LIRS—Lutherans. It includes the Episcopal Migration Services. So they’re definitely including—and also the Catholics as well. World Relief, of course, is more representative of the Evangelical family. So there are—the Catholics do participate and are very active. I would say—I’m sorry, Irina. The second question that you asked? FASKIANOS: About the Orthodox. SANTOS: Yeah. So we have two levels—I would say, two layers of relationship with the Orthodox Church. One is, Orthodox Churches are, of course, a member of Church World Service as well as we partner with the Orthodox Churches globally through this ACT Alliance that I was mentioning. And then, finally, just individually. I’ve known Dean Triantafilou for twenty-five years. Dean is the CEO of International Orthodox Christian Charities—IOCC—and we don’t specifically work with them on these types of resettlement issues but we actually have been in collaboration over the years in terms of humanitarian response overseas. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. And, Kelly, I don’t know if you also want to take that on. But I’m going to throw another question to you. You can answer that as well as this one from Hamelmal Kahsay. GAUGER: The— FASKIANOS: Go ahead. GAUGER: Oh. Sorry. I was just going to add, if I could, that for many years the Catholics actually had the largest—they resettled more refugees than any other of our domestic partners for many years. I think the International Rescue Committee has overtaken them recently. But, yes, for sure, the Catholics are a very strong partner on refugee resettlement. FASKIANOS: Right. And people should just pay attention to the chat where there’s some interesting commentary. Donna Markham—Sister Donna Markham—talks about Catholic Charities is resettling thirteen thousand Afghan refugees this year and they’ve resettled refugees and migrants for a hundred and ten years. There is a written note from Hamelmal Kahsay from the Ethiopian Development Council specifically about the Tigrayan refugees in Sudan. There are a lot of stats there in the chat about 70 thousand refugees in Sudan, 2 million internally-displaced people, 5.2 million people facing famine. How do we—how would you open the siege that was imposed on the 7 million people of Tigray and save lives? I mean, what policy can happen in terms of resettling as well? GAUGER: I’m going to say that some of that question is above my pay grade and out of my expertise. So I’m the deputy director in the Refugee Admissions Office so my mandate is refugee resettlement, and I will just say that, yes, we have been tracking the plight of Tigrayan refugees for some time now. Sudan is one of those countries in which it has long been extremely difficult to operate. We have tried over the years to launch larger resettlement programs of Ethiopians, of Eritreans. I guess those would be the top two nationalities in Sudan. But it’s just been extremely difficult to operate there. And I will just say that in terms of resettling refugees out of Ethiopia, so not Ethiopians but other refugees in Ethiopia, has long been one of our larger areas of work in Africa. But we have had to halt most resettlement operations in Ethiopia because of the current conflict. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Steven Paulikas, who has a raised hand. PAULIKAS: Hi, there, Rick and Kelly. Thank you so much for your presentations. I’m the rector of All Saints’ Episcopal Church in Brooklyn. I really appreciate all the work you’re doing. We are in the process of resettling an Afghan refugee family here in New York City, and just at a sort of  ground level perspective, I have to say that the system looks incredibly broken. Basically, we are working with a faith-based partner who is a refugee resettlement agency. They received the one-time payment of—I think it’s 2,275 dollars per refugee—and then, basically, the onus is on us to take care of everything else and to deal with all of the other—sort of navigating everything from housing discrimination, which is real, against refugees, especially in many different parts of the country but even in New York City, to finding adequate health care providers. Benefits don’t really kick in from the government until after a certain period of time. And we’ve been—it’s a true blessing to work with them and they’re wonderful. The agency is wonderful. The family is wonderful. But I’m just wondering, just if we zoom out a little bit, do you really think that the system as it is now is tenable to continue this way? And, Rick, you used the term public-private partnership, which is a great way of describing it. But I’m just sort of wondering if  an issue that is as important, the humanitarian and national security issue, if a public-private—PPP model is really appropriate for it, going forward? Thank you so much. Really appreciate it. GAUGER: Thank you, Steven, for that question. I’ll start and then I’ll ask Rick to chime in afterwards. I’m sorry to hear that your perspective from the ground has been that the system—I think you used the term broken—I’m sorry to hear that that has been your experience. I would, I guess, just urge you to consider that the just incredibly huge number of Afghans who have had to be resettled in such a short period of time, immediately coming upon a very difficult period for the resettlement program, both between the last administration—the policies of the last administration, which were, really, to shrink and diminish the program, and COVID, which has really—as I said, really impacted our ability to operate overseas but also domestically. Although things are getting better domestically COVID wise, it’s still not the case overseas. And so I guess I would just—while taking your criticism, I’d urge you to consider that this is—this was an extraordinary kind of confluence of events, kind of a perfect storm that, I think, really taxed the domestic refugee resettlement program. We— FASKIANOS: Kelly, you just muted yourself. There you go. GAUGER: I’m sorry. My screen keeps going black and then—OK. So it’s just been an unprecedented effort, and I think Rick and I both spoke about some of the new partnerships that we’ve brought online. We recognize that we still have a lot of work to do. In terms of your last question, I mean, I think I know how Rick will answer but I’ll answer for myself to say I don’t think that these challenges would lead me to say that this program is too important to leave to a public-private partnership. I would say that that aspect, that public-private partnership, is one of the things that sets the U.S. resettlement program apart from a lot of other programs in the world—a lot of other resettlement countries in the world—and I think it’s been one of our strengths. It comes with challenges and, yes, it comes with less funding than, I think, any of us would like. But I think—I would not say that I would want to jettison the public-private partnership, despite the challenges that we’ve faced. SANTOS: Yeah. So thanks, Steven. I mean, I’m sorry that you’ve had that experience. I think we use a community sponsorship model where we try to get as many actors involved in the resettlement process, local actors to help with different parts. As you’ve realized, resettling a person and a family is actually really hard and it’s complicated, and there are things that we have to make sure we do for them. So it’s in their best interests getting them settled, getting them homed, getting the furniture, health checks, enrollment in school—all these different things that take a lot of time. And so, I think  the best way to do it is, of course, working, I think, from my perspective, as many community actors as possible to help out with that to lighten the burden. I really think, actually—I would say, for me, and I’m going to echo what Kelly said—I think the advantages of the public-private partnership that we have just are—far outweigh maybe some of the limitations that we have in them. And I think one of the biggest pieces is just getting a larger set of stakeholders who really see that actually resettling a refugee in their community is a good thing. And so by getting as many touches on it from different community members as possible allows that to expand. We faced in this country—it’s just shocking to me. My mother is an immigrant—not a refugee, but an immigrant—and so I know—I’ve seen how immigrants—a lot of my cousins, and aunts, and uncles were also immigrants, so I saw how they were not always treated with, I would say, the best of intentions. And so, for me, just making sure that this is really, really such an important part of who we are as a country. We’re not going to achieve that if it’s just solely, I would say, a government program. And so, for me, I would argue very strongly that not only do we need to continue this public-private partnership, but actually try to include more people from the private side. Thanks. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Alan Bentz-Letts, who also wrote his question. But I think if you could just ask it and identify yourself, that would be great. (Technical difficulties.) FASKIANOS: Oh. Alan? There you go. (Technical difficulties.) FASKIANOS: OK. (Laughs.) We’re getting some distortion so we don’t understand. So I’ll read it. Alan Bentz-Letts is from the Riverside Church in New York City and—oh, let’s see. Hold on a minute. I’m looking for the question, which was in the chat, actually, about climate change. Sorry. I have a lot of inputs. OK. We haven’t talked about climate refugees. The IPCC report just released on Monday warns the climate crisis is accelerating and societies may be collapsing in the future. Questions are what do you anticipate in terms of climate refugees in the future, and what is the government and CWS doing to prepare for these refugees? GAUGER: I will start and say that this is, obviously, a monumental question for the United States and other resettlement countries. I don’t profess to be someone who has a great deal of knowledge about this topic. Other than that, I will say the United States this year is the co-chair of a process called the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, which is a forum for all of the—so the thirty or so resettlement countries around the world to get together and share best practices or strategies—that sort of thing. The ATCR has been, largely, virtual for the last couple of years because of COVID. But, normally, it results in one meeting in the hosting country. So we’re hoping to host a meeting here in Denver later this month, COVID permitting, and we have a large meeting that we’re hosting in Geneva with UNHCR in June, and this topic will be on the table for discussion. I am told that we need to proceed carefully with this discussion because there are many countries in the world who fear that there may be interest in kind of reopening the refugee definition that’s been in place since 1951 to include climate refugees, which could just absolutely overwhelm the system, which is already overwhelmed by the number of refugees in the world facing one of the five protected grounds of persecution. So, I think, I’ll just say we acknowledge it’s a looming and huge challenge and it’s something that we’re all—all of us are going to have to work together to address. Rick, I don’t know if you have something you’d like to add to that. SANTOS: Yeah. There are a few things. There’s a lot of conversation going on now about this issue, migration and climate change. The Biden administration invited a Blue Ribbon Panel that included RCUSA members. Mark Hetfield from HIAS was on that with me along with others, and we gave a set of recommendation(s) to the administration on how to begin to address these issues. I don’t have a link with me right now but at Church World Service we’ve done some preliminary research on, basically, adaptability and climate change and migration and what are coping strategies that people are using right now, and, actually, if you go to the website you’ll be able to find that piece of information. But I think there’s a couple of steps before we, really, talk about the number of climate-affected refugees and possibilities. I think what we found in our initial research is that communities want to stay close to where they are from—that they don’t actually want to move to other countries if they don’t have to—that they want to do—they want actually to be supported with adaptive strategies to be able to stay in place. And so this includes agriculture, new agricultural techniques or seeds that can deal with climate change or more arid conditions. It includes strategies on WASH. It includes a lot of different strategies. And the final strategy would be either kind of internal migration or a refugee status. So I think, I know the issue of climate change is really high in people’s minds, and I know that there’s a lot of organizations that are trying to figure out other strategies, including adaptability—how do we become more adaptive, where we are, and how do we do that first. So I would just suggest that if you look at some of the stuff that’s out there, look at the Blue Ribbon Panel report, the Biden administration actually adopted a lot of what we had put forward, including this idea of disaster risk reduction as kind of a key strategy for climate migration adaptation. So that’s all I’ll say for now. But I think there’s going to be a lot more work on this and a lot more conversation. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And Ali Khan with the American Muslim Council asks if there’s an update on resettling Syrian refugees. GAUGER: Yes. Syrians were a population that we, of course, resettled a fairly good number of toward the end of the Obama administration. Their numbers fell off significantly during the last administration. We do have a good number of Syrian refugees in the resettlement queue, largely, located in Jordan and Turkey. I will say that what we have found, since many of these cases had very little movement on them for a number of years, a lot of them are very difficult to try and contact, especially those who had been living in Turkey. We assume that many of them have moved to Europe. So I don’t have any specific figures to give you other than that for cases that were in our pipeline and in the process during the Obama administration, they’re—if they can be contacted they’re still in the queue and they—their cases can be reactivated. But, again, some of them have been very hard to contact. But we are contacting them. I don’t believe that we’re getting new referrals of Syrians from UNHCR. But we are working with an existing caseload. And I’m sorry, I don’t have the figures in front of me. FASKIANOS: And, just quickly, there’s a question from Tsehaye Teferra from the Ethiopian Development Council, and also had their hand raised, but I want to just get to it. Do you think the influx of Afghan refugees and now Ukrainian refugees will have an impact on African refugees—on the numbers? GAUGER: On African refugees. Hi, Tsehaye. Good to hear from you. I don’t believe so because I believe there is room for all three. First of all, I don’t expect, at least in the near term, an influx of Ukrainian refugees, given, again, what we’ve seen in terms of countries in Europe showing them hospitality. Of course, most of the Afghans who have been resettled came in through humanitarian parole so they don’t count against the refugee ceiling at all. I think there’s room for all three. Of course, one challenge is, as I noted earlier, there is a limited number of USCIS refugee officers who can conduct interviews overseas. And so right now we work on a quarterly basis and we submit kind of a request to USCIS every quarter and we have to—sometimes we’re told we have to pick and choose which are our priorities. And, for instance, when they came—when USCIS came back to us and said, we can actually probably do a second set of interviews in the second quarter, so coming up soon, we did ask for circuit rides not entirely in Africa but we—I think we kind of increased the African circuit rides the most. And then the number will go down in the third quarter. So it’s kind of a constantly shifting scene. But I guess my answer to your question is no, I do not. I believe that we will continue to resettle a good number of African refugees and I know that for some in the administration it’s a priority. FASKIANOS: Great. I just want to give you, Kelly, thirty seconds for closing, and then I’ll go to Rick just to make any last point. GAUGER: Thank you. So my screen has gone black so I don’t know if you can see me. I can’t see any of you. But so I’ll— FASKIANOS: We can. We can still see you. (Laughs.) GAUGER: OK. OK. I’m staring at a black screen right now. I’m glad you can hear me. I guess I would just say thank you so much for having me. Thank you for the interesting questions. It was nice to speak and hear from a different cast of characters. We often talk to a lot of the same people in Washington about refugee resettlement so it was a pleasure to get some questions from people that I have not encountered before. Thank you, all of you, for the work that you’re doing to—if you are, to help Afghan and other refugees to resettle and I look forward to more such communications—conversations in the future. FASKIANOS: Rick? SANTOS: Yeah. Irina, I just want to thank you and the Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to this conversation, and thanks, Kelly, for, really, just a lot of really good information. I’m really—I feel, in some ways, very privileged to be sitting in this spot where any of the other six, at least, of the nine, if not all of the nine, other resettlement agencies easily could have been sitting in my space. I’m so grateful for them. We really work as a collaborative group and the work that all of them do is just as important as everything that we do, and so just really appreciative. I just want to give them a shout out for that. Just finally, just really happy to be able to, really, have a conversation around faith and resettlement. I think sometimes people think of this as a, really, secular approach to things, and I have that in all the other development work that I do. So, really, just grateful for the Council and you for having this session. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you. Thank you both. Thank you, Rick Santos. You can follow Rick’s work at @ricksantoscws. And Kelly Gauger for stepping in at, really, the eleventh hour. What is the Twitter handle for the bureau? GAUGER: Oh, my gosh. I don’t know. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: OK. GAUGER: I’m sorry. I will send—I will send it to you. FASKIANOS: Great. And we will—I think the office Twitter handle is @stateprm. But we will circulate links and some information to follow up for this conversation. Thank you both, and thanks to everybody on this call for the work that you’re doing in this space. It really does take a lot of hands to tackle this really enormous problem, and as we can see, it’s going to get even bigger as more crises come—are happening and the climate change that’s barreling down on all of us. So thank you again. Please follow us on Twitter at @CFR_religion and you can always email us suggestions, feedback, to [email protected]. We look forward to hearing from you and to continuing the conversation.
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  • LGBTQ+
    Global LGBTQ+ Rights
    Play
    Michael Vazquez, independent policy advisor, discusses LGBTQ+ rights around the world and the Biden administration’s efforts to promote and defend these rights at home and abroad. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Social Justice and Foreign Policy webinar. I am Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record and the audio, video, and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Michael Vazquez with us today to talk about LGBTQ+ rights around the world. We have shared his bio with you, so I will just give you a few highlights. Michael Vazquez is a public theologian, community organizer, and communications strategist. He serves as an advisor to government institutions, political candidates, religious and spiritual leaders, and nonprofit organizations on issues at the intersection of religion, politics, and social justice. Mr. Vazquez served as communications director at the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships at USAID, the religion and faith director at the Human Rights Campaign, and as a fellow at Faith and Public Life, and founder of Brave Commons. He was also an advisor to the faith engagement team for the Biden-Harris campaign. So, Michael, thanks very much for being with us. I would like it if you could set the table and talk a little bit about what is being done to promote LGBTQ+ rights in the United States and around the world, and how faith communities can contribute to this. VAZQUEZ: Absolutely. Thank you again for having me. Hi, everyone. Want to wish everyone a happy Lunar New Year to everyone who celebrates, and a happy Black History and Black Futures Month. I want to begin by talking about the role that faith communities, particularly faith leaders, have always held in communities throughout history as truth tellers and storytellers, right? That’s one of the principal roles that faith leaders have held, and not just clergy but cantors, singers, choirs, artists. Their role has been to disseminate truth and to tell a story about community in order to edify a community towards a particular end. Typically, throughout faith traditions, that’s towards the common good. How do we ensure that every member of our community and those that serve the communities that surround us experience equity, experience justice, safety, and security? And storytelling is a means of achieving that, and truth telling is a means of achieving that. One of the truths most religious traditions hold as central and core to their faith is that every individual has inherent dignity and value. You find that Islam. You find that in Christianity. You find that in Judaism. You find that in Hinduism. Across traditions, you find this core belief that every individual in the entirety of creation has inherent dignity and value. And so while there might be disagreements about policy, while there might be disagreements about positions on gender and sexuality broadly speaking, every tradition has maintained that there is dignity in every human person. And I think that’s a critical thing for us to set the table with because as we look at how faith leaders and faith communities both domestically and globally can engage in advancing LGBTQ rights, we need to go back to the core tenets that these communities hold and uphold and call on them to draw out of those traditions in order to advance justice for the LGBTQ community and, as a result, advance justice and equity for all communities. Pope Francis speaks on this by saying that disagreements of a philosophical or theological nature between faiths or between particular groups and people of faith are not obstacles to uniting to pursue shared goals as long as everyone involved shares a concern for the common good. And so I think the first and foremost thing that religious leaders and faith communities can do is tell the truth, right? Tell the truth that I might have my own thoughts and beliefs that I was raised in, that I learned in my church, or in my synagogue, or in my temple, but I do believe  that every person has dignity; thus, if everyone has dignity, then everyone should have the same rights ascribed to them and those rights should not be taken away. That should be the foundation, right? I think that what we have seen, is as this story has been told both in the U.S. and abroad, as this—the reality that LGBTQ people—lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer people—have human—basic dignity, and thus have—should have access to the full diversity of human rights available to everyone else. As this has been shared, we have seen an increase—the data has shown—Pew shows there’s been an increase of acceptance globally for LGBTQ people and rights that should be afforded to us. Likewise, the Public Religious (sic; Religion) Research Institute has shown that the majority of people of faith in the United States support comprehensive protections against discrimination for the LGBTQ community. So I think the beginning is just tell the truth. Tell the story, right, that people—everyone should have access to rights. That should be foundational, right? And thus, if we start with the fact that I have inherent dignity, and you have inherent dignity, and everyone listening to this call has inherent dignity, then the immediate response that should be, then, we need to make sure that our policies reflect that we all have that dignity, that we all should have access to rights. So this begins with looking at the hard truths—the hard truths and then the hopeful things, right? The hard truth is that there has been a campaign globally by the religious right based in the United States and elsewhere, but primarily in the United States, to advance anti-LGBTQ policies, to support—whether that’s the anti-sodomy laws that we see in the Middle East and Africa; that’s—or we see throughout Africa some other anti-LGBTQ laws that are promoted by Catholic bishops, particularly in Uganda as an example. Throughout the world we see these, first, colonial holdover laws, colonial anti-sodomy laws that were left behind by European colonial powers and that have remained on the books ever since these colonial powers left these regions. And then you see, right, outside groups—outside conservatives—conservative religious groups pushing for the maintenance of these anti-LGBTQ laws, whether that’s banning relationships, whether that’s making being LGBTQ against the law and punishable by imprisonment and incarceration, or by death. We see that a lot of the advocacy for these laws come from minority religious groups in the United States and elsewhere. And we saw in order to help sustain this, in the previous administration we saw Secretary Pompeo—Secretary of State Pompeo institute the Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, right? There’s a close connection between this idea that LGBTQ rights must be prevented that these conservative religious groups are pushing, and this idea that religious freedom must be protected from, over, and against LGBTQ rights; that religious freedom, particularly I would say conservative religious freedom, was under threat globally and must be protected by—against or from the advancement of LGBTQ rights. And so the Ministerial on Religious Freedom elevated religious freedom above other rights or made a claim  contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that gives us a broad array of equal—coequal human rights, this ministerial and the previous administration claimed that there was—there’s religious freedom and then there’s all other rights, right? And we need to reframe that. Now, part of that comes from religious leaders coming into the room and saying, no, we believe that all rights are equal. The new secretary of state, Secretary Blinken, refers to this and says religious freedom is coequal with other human rights because human rights are indivisible, right? We need religious leaders to stand in that also, not to say that our rights as religious people or people of faith are greater than the rights of other people. In order to safeguard LGBTQ rights and to advance LGBTQ rights globally, we have to get to the heart of this debate that there is religious freedom and religious rights in opposition to LGBTQ rights. What we see, again, is that the growing—the data shows a growing support amongst people of faith for LGBTQ rights. And we also have to recognize that LGBTQ people are also, they, themselves, people of faith, right? Myself, as a person of faith, have worked alongside a lot of other people of faith who identify, who are also LGBTQ. And so when we come into the conversation, we’re often forgotten as people who have value to add to this conversation on human rights. And we’re forgotten as, it’s only religious people over here and LGBTQ people over here when, in fact, there’s a greater diversity in humanity, and thus our rights should be contextualized in that way. Religious freedom is a major global issue. I will say that. It is a major global issue that we have to address with the rise of anti-Semitism, with the rise of Islamophobia, with the crackdowns on religious minorities around the world, there’s work that we have to do. There’s critical work that we have to do to ensure that religious minorities are protected, but we need to be able to distinguish between protecting religious freedom for religious minorities who are actually being persecuted, and the attempts by certain communities to use religious freedom as a weapon against other minority groups, which is what I believe we see in this battle for LGBTQ rights both domestically and abroad. There are two major policies I want to speak to briefly and then we can get into it a little bit more later. But we have the GLOBE Act introduced by Senator Markey and we have the Equality Act, which passed the House for the second time last February. So we’re coming up—it was at the end of last February, so we’re coming up on the one-year anniversary of the Equality Act, which would provide comprehensive civil rights protections in matters of public accommodation, housing, employment, credit, et cetera, for LGBTQ people. Passed the House last February. We’re still waiting to see what its fate will be in the Senate. But I want to speak to this one first before getting to the GLOBE Act because I think what we’ve seen is a large group of religious support for comprehensive LGBTQ civil rights protections in the United States. And as the United States has pushed forward LGBTQ rights domestically, we have seen a direct correlation to the expansion of civil rights and human rights for LGBTQ people around the world. Passing the Equality Act would provide a foundation for nations around the world that have not advanced comprehensive rights either to just look at, here’s a blueprint for what we can do to ensure that our own people are protected, right? Regardless of what some of our neighbors might believe and think about gender and sexuality broadly speaking, we want to ensure that our neighbors who are LGBTQ are protected and afforded the same rights as everyone else. And so the Equality Act provides—simply by saying, the United States wants to be a leader, which is what the Biden administration has said. It wants to be a leader in the advancement of LGBTQ rights both domestically and globally. What we need to do as a country is to enshrine civil rights protections by passing the Equality Act, which would ultimately put LGBTQ people under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other civil rights legislation. The GLOBE Act, on the other hand, would make preventing and responding to discrimination and violence against LGBTQ people a foreign policy priority. It would permanently create a special envoy within the State Department to protect the human rights of LGBTQ people, which we did see. The Biden administration appointed Jessica Stern as that special envoy, and Jay Gilliam, a former colleague of mine, as the senior LGBTQI coordinator at the USAID. And so these two appointments, outside of the passage of the GLOBE Act, are indicators of the work the Biden administration is doing to move along our foreign policy priorities, but passing the GLOBE Act would cement the rights of LGBTQ people globally as a major foreign policy priority for the country beyond the Biden administration, which is critical. There’s a lot of issues that we’re facing globally in the rights of LGBTQ people who are being persecuted. Whether it’s those anti-sodomy laws I alluded to earlier or the global fight to finally end HIV/AIDS, there’s a lot of work that remains to be done. And so what we need is legislation that religious leaders can stand behind, as they have for decades in the United States and globally, to push these pieces of legislation forward. “In the long run”—I’m quoting Marie Juul Petersen from the Danish Institute for Human Rights—“In the long run, the insistence on incompatibility between freedom of religion or belief in gender equality has the potential to destabilize and delegitimize the broader human rights system.” Agreeing with her, I believe that the work that we have to do as religious leaders, as theologians, as religious communities is to speak up and tell the story, tell the truth about the fact that we are people who comprehensively and overwhelmingly support the rights of LGBTQ people in policy and within our communities, and allow that to help move these critical policies forward and cement human rights for our community. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much, Michael. That was terrific, and apologies for the technical recording prompts. VAZQUEZ: That’s OK. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: And not prompts. So, in any case, we’re going to turn now to all of you for your questions and comments. And if you want to raise your hand, I will call you. Don’t be shy. And you can also write your question in the Q&A box. If you do that there, please say who you are so we know where you’re coming from. There is a written question right now, which is by an anonymous attendee, and it’s very long. I’m going to first go to Bruce Knotts. He has raised his hand. Bruce. And please say who you are and unmute yourself. KNOTTS: Hi. My name is Bruce Knotts, and I direct the Unitarian Universalist Association office at the United Nations. And we’ve been working on LGBT rights at the United Nations for a long time. And I’m just wondering if you have any ideas or thoughts about what the United Nations can do to better protect LGBT rights. And let me just further say that it’s my impression that I’m noticing somewhat of a diminishment of energy around LGBT rights lately than we had in earlier years. So I’m somewhat concerned in that way. Thank you. VAZQUEZ: Yeah, no, thank you. I appreciate that question, Bruce. I think that there are a couple things. I want to speak to the second thing you mentioned first, is that I think when you look at the broad spectrum of issues, even just domestically, that we’re facing in the United States, I believe there’s a lot of passion and desire to move, let’s say, the Equality Act forward, to move LGBTQ rights forward. Last year was the highest year on record again for violence against the transgender community, for fatal violence. So we’re in a critical moment where we need action. But I do think that with the issues threatening American democracy, with the shaky foundations that we’re facing, with the divisions in the country, a lot of what are also LGBTQ issues are democratic issues. Preserving American democracy protects LGBTQ people in the United States. And so I think there is some of that that I’ve seen. Let’s shift our focus as advocates to preserve voting rights so that therefore we can ensure the Equality Act does pass. Let’s ensure that LGBTQ rights have a right—LGBTQ people have a right to the ballot box, et cetera. So I do think there’s some of that dynamic, but I do think there are a lot of ways—if you look at some of the polling numbers, a lot of people think when it comes to the Equality Act that these rights already exist. And so part of the public education that needs to take place is reminding folks that just because we got marriage equality in the United States, or in certain countries around the world, doesn’t mean that we’ve achieved the pinnacle of human rights, and LGBTQ people are just happy and throwing parties and everyone’s just content, and everyone can go home now, we’re fine. I think there’s a reframing, right? We have this—a victory today, but we have all these losses the next day. And how do we continue fighting? And part of that is the way that we message, right? We still have work to do. And I think some people have gotten exhausted, and they thought—and some people think we’ve achieved it. I think on the matter of what the UN can do, I believe the United Nations have for some time a working group of faith leaders partnering with the UN to advance LGBTQ rights globally, and how to navigate the complexities that can arise in those conversations. And so I think having a greater foundation of religious engagement on the matter would support the work that the UN is trying to do around the world to advance LGBTQ rights. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. All right, so just looking now, I’m going to call upon Julie Schiwal, who is at the—she’s a program specialist at the Religion and Inclusive Societies Program at U.S. Institute of Peace, USIP. So, Julia, can you unmute yourself and ask your question? SCHIWAL: Yeah, for sure. I guess I’m just curious because I deal with religious actors very frequently at the religion team at USIP. And we are working on an approach to include gender and sexual minorities in peacebuilding. And pretty much I agree with you that many religions have a sense of universal dignity, right? But I think that in our work when I talk to people about this who have disparate views on GSM inclusion—and I just use GSM for LGBTQ because it internationally works. Dignity is not the ground I’ve made progress on. It’s not even really about that. It’s more about cultural history and the needs of people. And I feel like you can kind of circumvent that whole theological debate and work with religious actors a little bit more effectively if you kind of take  a more pragmatic approach that doesn’t get into the grounds of, like, dignity in Islam, right? You just talk about public health and HIV, right? You talk about women’s groups in Pakistan that are already working with trans women. You just stick with the local, pragmatic approach. So I guess have you had success using this sense of universal dignity in a global LGBTQ context? Because I haven’t. And second off, I guess, I’m just looking for  your thoughts, since you’re familiar with me, on  how are we going to be doing global LGBTQ rights in the future? Especially considering that this human rights approach has largely failed over the past decade? It doesn’t get enough pull. VAZQUEZ: Oh, absolutely. I agree with you 100 percent, Julia. I think if we had more time I could have gotten into that some more. I think for me, I think I’ve seen dignity, both in the U.S. and in Latin America, be a strong motivating factor in these conversations. But even Latin America is a good example of where recontextualizing the language has been hugely successful. In communities where language around family and community is more important than dignity, we shift the dignity conversation to that. It doesn’t mean we stop talking about the inherent dignity in every person, but we use localized language. And so I think some of the struggle I saw at USAID, and I think remains in a lot of global development work outside of federal government, is that folks are not willing to do the historical work—some of what you’re referencing, the cultural contextualization work you’re referencing—to be able to get—be in community, and talking in a way that makes sense for folks. It doesn’t shift us away from dignity, but we still contextualize, right? A lot of our global human rights and development work has been incredibly Western. It’s been very much, white folks show up elsewhere and say: This is how this should pan out, and this is what this should look like, because it worked in Ohio. And that’s not helpful, right? I think Administrator Power has been a good example of trying to push for more localized development, but some of the bureaucratic issues we face in government is limiting the ways that I think we can achieve what you’re talking about, right? I still think it’s critical, because I think ultimately if we don’t address dignity and the inherent value of individuals, we end up having is, OK, we addressed—and this has happened. I’ve seen this with the ways in which certain Catholic actors have engaged globally, is we might work and push for access to the right HIV preventative measures and medications, et cetera, but not engaging in the fundamental theological conversation around, these people have inherent dignity, even though the Catholic—the catechism of the Catholic Church says that you’re intrinsically disordered, right? And this gets, in part, to mental health issues and mental health crises for people who maintain their faith traditions even alongside their LGBTQI+ identities. We need to be able to say, no, you still have worth and value, right? It's not like we’re helping you in spite of gender sexual minority status. We’re helping you because you are human, you’re my neighbor, you’re my community, you’re my family. Thus, you are worthy of the support we’re giving you. So I think it’s both/and. I think a lot of religious actors need to be able to have that framing to get to some of the core issues that are proliferating a lot the issues we’re facing. FASKIANOS: I think—just to follow up on that—do you have the stats on the mental health issues for the community? It is very significant. VAZQUEZ: Yeah, I don’t have them off hand. I can tell you that the suicidality rates are somewhere around four to eight times higher for transgender individuals in the United States than for non-transgender folks. The number shifts depending on race and ethnicity. But it’s drastic, right? And a lot of times—I mean, when you look at youth homelessness in the United States, for example, 40 percent of homeless youth identify as LGBTQ. The majority of those folks—of those kids, right, babies—are on the street because they come from a highly conservative religious family who has kicked them out because of identifying as LGBTQ. And so I don’t have all of the data, but that’s the one that’s most striking to me. The mental health issues  amongst homeless youth are majority LGBTQ—or, close to majority LGBTQ, is exacerbated by conservative religious ideology. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Steven Paulikas of All Saints’ Episcopal Church of Park Slope. So, Steve, if you can unmute yourself. PAULIKAS: Hi, Irina, great to see you. And thank you, Michael, so much. I really appreciate your theological framing and the idea of dignity of the human being. And it’s really great. There was a group of faithful mostly LGBTQ-affirming folks in the Republic of Georgia, in Tbilisi, who formed an Episcopal community there. And you might be aware that over the summer during Tbilisi Pride, the Georgian Orthodox Church organized a mob which attacked the Pride celebration and ransacked the offices of Tbilisi Pride. And our community went into hiding because it was so dangerous. It was really totally heartbreaking. But the thing we kind of learned from that was that the Orthodox folks were consulting—actively consulting with American religious actors, who sort of helped them organize this. And I’m sure you’ve seen this pattern around the world. And it kind of occurs to me as you’re speaking that kind of to get to the nut of the problem, I think that the main parties that need to be given this message are actually American religious organizations who project and export a sort of colonial-based anti-LGBTQ agenda. So that’s kind of the incredibly difficult thing to do. But have you found any successful strategies for being able to engage with the actual American religious actors who are sort of fomenting hatred around the world? VAZQUEZ: Yeah, absolutely. A couple things that immediately come to mind—first, thank you for that. I feel like that gets right into  a little bit of what I shared earlier about the issues of religious freedom globally being much more dynamic and complex than particularly the previous administration attempted to paint, and what conservative—primarily Evangelical and conservative Catholic American groups attempt to paint, right? This idea that Christianity globally is under assault, and we must protect Christianity at all costs, and that this fight for LGBTQ rights is an assault on Christianity, to summarize. I was grateful, for example, to Administrator Power, who issued a statement in response to not what happened in Georgia, but what happened referencing what was taking place in Ghana in recent years. Her quote is: That we also call attention to government crackdowns on LGBTQI-affirming faith communities in Africa, listing that among other religious minority groups that need to be protected. And that was on International Religious Freedom Day this past October. I think some of what, first, passage of the GLOBE Act would do is make it possible to—in the United States sanctions regime to include the protection of LGBTQ rights, being able to sanction foreign governments for not protecting their own citizens from these kinds of assaults that you’re referencing, what took place in Ghana, et cetera. I think when it comes to engaging with U.S. actors who are the—I agree with you—are the principal players pushing forward this anti-LGBTQ agenda globally, what I’ve—the thing I found most interesting is private dialogue, which is in a lot of ways, I’ll just be absolutely honest with you all, is incredibly annoying, right? We don’t all have the time to sit down and have one-on-one conversations with every individual conservative faith leader in the country in an attempt to persuade them to do otherwise. But that is part of what I’ve seen to be successful, seeing Catholic bishops move from far-right to center-right.  I’ve seen some Catholic bishops move from center to center-left, some issuing—like Bishop Stowe of Kentucky—issuing a statement in support of the Equality Act, the first time a Catholic bishop in U.S. history has supported LGBTQ rights legislation. That has come as a result of these kind of private dialogues with these leaders. That is not, in and of itself, sufficient enough to achieve what we need to achieve. But I do think we need to have a greater conversation about how much power is afforded to these groups. On the contrary, I think we don’t give enough attention to the religious left. The religious left is incredibly powerful and active. The Center for American Progress Faith Initiative released a report, I believe it was, last year, if not it was 2020, on the ways in which this conversation and this dialogue is portrayed in the media. And oftentimes the data’s shown that while there is an overwhelming support for LGBTQ rights amongst religious people, that when this conversation is portrayed by major news networks and print media, et cetera, what you see is conservative religious people and secular LGBTQ people. So part of what we need to do is a communications and messaging strategy, and shifting the dialogue. Actually, the majority of people of faith, the majority of religious people actually support LGBTQ rights. So let’s stick to that. But that also means working with media partners and encouraging them or pressuring them, exhorting them, whatever language you want to use, right? Whatever fits your approach, to shift the conversation from one of this false dichotomy between religion and support for LBGTQ people, and showing as one as, no, the majority of people support and identify and recognize the dignity of LGBTQ people and their rights. That, again, is not the whole picture, but I think passing legislation, changing the way that we message, helps reframe and thus remove power from these institutions—conservative religious institutions that are proliferating here and around the world. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the written question from Luciano Kovacs, who is the area coordinator for Middle East and Europe at the Presbyterian Church and a member of the Presbyterian Mission Agency LGBTQIA+ working group. And his question is: What is your suggestion of how to navigate our affirming advocacy work for queer people across the globe, and the need to not harm partners globally where anti-LGBTQ laws may affect them, if they were associated by their governments to our advocacy work? VAZQUEZ: Absolutely. On the first issue, I think what—one thing that I would love—I would personally love to see, and I think would be incredibly effective and helpful, is providing more resources to affirming LGBTQ faith groups, both domestically and abroad. Some of the biggest issues they face—even though we see a larger population of both—particularly domestically, we’re seeing a locus of issues, an export of hate, et cetera. I think if we were able to fund, support, resource more affirming LGBTQ faith groups that already exist, right? We don’t need to create new ones. We don’t need to start another nonprofit, create another NGO, create a new bureaucracy. What we need to do is resource those that exist to do the work they’re already doing. So a lot of these groups are incredibly under-resourced. When compared to an organization within the infrastructure of the religious right that are incredibly well-funded, incredibly well-established and -resourced, both in media, financially, et cetera, we need to be able to shift and redistribute resources to support what is the majority opinion in protecting the human rights of LGBTQ folks. And I’m not seeing the question in the chat. Do you want to— FASKIANOS: Sure. I’m sorry, I dismissed it because I asked it. VAZQUEZ: It’s OK. FASKIANOS: And so it—how to navigate our affirming advocacy work and then need to not harm partners globally where anti-LGBTQ laws may affect them if they were associated by their governments to our advocacy work. VAZQUEZ: Right. I think that, again, not to harp on legislation, because the legislation isn’t the end-all, be-all, it is a critical component of our advocacy work. It is one piece of broader human rights organizing globally. I think, again, the GLOBE Act would provide the provisions for the U.S. government to respond in scenarios where, let’s say, it’s the Republic of Georgia cracking down—or, supporting the crackdown on LGBTQ-affirming faith groups or other LGBTQ groups. Being able to respond in any number of ways, sanctions regime, et cetera, would—those are tools that we currently don’t have and are not equipped to respond to. And so it’s often—you see attempts to support advocates on the ground, advocates globally. But we can’t, because those resources aren’t in place. I think it is more critical, right—in particular regions it is critical that we support in private as much as possible. I’ve seen a lot of advocates even in the United States that work particularly with transgender individuals and transgender groups needing to work in secret. And we need to continue to provide that safety net to those groups. We cannot—there is, thankfully, a lot of freedom now which did not exist even twenty years ago in the United States. There’s a lot of freedom now to be  out and proud in a lot of spaces in the United States. There are parts of the country where that’s still not the case. That is not true elsewhere. That is not a blanket statement we can say for everywhere. That there are just Pride parades that have happened—y’all know this, right? And so I’ve seen a desire of certain advocates. We want to be out, and proud, and be free. In places where that is a threat to the life and safety and dignity of the individual, we can’t, right? And so work in secret needs to continue to happen. And finding ways to provide the resources necessary, whether that’s educational resources, financial resources, asylum resources for these individuals and communities should be on our priority list before trying to push folks into a more public setting. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to go next to Ani Zonneveld, who has her hand raised. Ani, president of Muslims for Progressive Values. Oh. OK. It looks like she lowered her hand. All right. So moving on— VAZQUEZ: Hi, Ani. (Laughter.) An old colleague. FASKIANOS: OK. That’s too bad. I’m going to go next to Dominic Bocci, who is at CFR, and also at the Council for Global Equality. So, knowing that there’s a significant amount of work that needs to be done about domestic and international LBGTQ+ rights, what would you suggest the Biden administration focus on in terms of their global approach? Decriminalization, increased funding for LGBTQ+ civil society groups? And what is the likelihood of the passing of the GLOBE Act, given the gridlock that we’re seeing in Washington? VAZQUEZ: Right. The likelihood of the GLOBE Act passing is right alongside the likelihood of the Equality Act passing. I think it’s caught up with a lot of critical civil rights legislation beyond LGBTQ rights. It’s similar—in a similar situation as voting rights reform, criminal justice reform, et cetera. And so I’m not a pessimist, though. I believe that anything is possible, right? And so I’m hopeful that we will still be able to push along, right, these critical pieces of legislation to transform the experience and lives of LGBTQ people, both in the United States and abroad. I think in terms of what the Biden administration can focus on globally, I think decriminalization is absolutely a priority and is the global fight to end HIV/AIDS. I think those two come immediately to mind, because those are things that are threatening the literal lives of our community. And so before we can get to—I think there’s—as a case study perhaps, I think a lot of attention was given the marriage equality battle in the United States and in other countries around the world. Unfortunately, I think, marriage was least of our priorities. It was important. I think marriage equality is a critical right. It’s a victory that we achieved, and we celebrate. It’s critical that folks around the world are able to access that same right. But compared to other issues, like when folks—when trans folks are under assault in the United States and around the world, right? There are folks living in countries that have criminalized just simply existing as an LGBTQI person. That is a major issue and those should be major priorities. And so I think making sure that the—we look at victories like marriage equality is yay, great, awesome, amazing. But then we truly refocus on what is threatening the actual lives of individuals and how can we protect them and end those things? So more investments—which we’ve seen the Biden administration make some significant moves towards particularly the fight on HIV/AIDS. And I think some more work under criminalization should really shift this battle globally. And I think also the way in which—Secretary Blinken has already done this in the reframing of the religious freedom language, but additional work to reexamine and shift how we’re engaging in the conversation around religious freedom globally will significantly help some of these issues that we’re facing when it comes to LGBTQ rights as it pertains to religious actors being involved. I think you’re still on mute. I’m sorry. FASKIANOS: How long have I been doing this? OK. VAZQUEZ: It happens to all of us. (Laughter.) FASKIANOS: Barbara McBee has written a question on—Barbara, would you like to ask it yourself? MCBEE: I think there might be two there. Hi. FASKIANOS: There are. (Laughs.) That’s why we’d like you to ask it. (Laughs.) MCBEE: Which one? Thank you. I’m Barbara McBee. Soka Gakkai Buddhist Organization. And I think what’s pressing and marvelous is that you started off your dialogue with the inherent dignity of life. That is literally written into our core values. But if you really don’t feel that, which I think is at the core of the justification for abusing GLBTQ people. I am also gay, so I have a particular interest in your thoughts about how in our dialogues—and I have done much of that—how in our dialogues, one-to-one, they are helpful, they are not the be-all, end-all. And perhaps they affect a larger scope. In some cases, they are negated. But my questions are two: If you sincerely do not believe in the inherent dignity of—and value of all, how, particularly faith-based people, can we encourage further the development of that across all religions, Abrahamic included? And what are the current laws? If last year was the worst year in our history of trans murders, what are the laws on the books? And what is being done to protect trans men and women? Thank you. Nice to see you, Irina,you look great. And thank you, Michael. FASKIANOS: Thank you. VAZQUEZ: Thank you, Barbara. I appreciate that so much. I think absolutely. I think I will come back—I always come back to this. I know a lot of folks in the field always come back to, we have inherent dignity and value. And I think the Abrahamic traditions absolutely have this in their core value. You look at Genesis, which is a text shared by Jews and Christians, as saying that God made humanity in God’s image, right? And so that’s page one, right? That’s on the first page. Every individual created reflects the image of their creator. That’s the theological assertion on page one. And so that means you share the image of God. I have the image of God. My neighbor has the image of God. That person that cut me off this morning, they have the image of God in them too. Or even the people that frustrate us most, people who are the most different from us, they all have in them—the bear the image of God. That’s one example of many that we could point to. And thus, if someone bears the image of God, no matter how different they are from me, I have a duty and responsibility as someone who cares about the common good to protect them, right? And there are myriad of examples of folks with this text as a core text and tenet of their faith, who have done horrific things. Who have used that same—these same scriptures to advocate for slavery, to advocate for the forced removal of indigenous people throughout the world, and particularly in the North and South America. There are a lot of folks who will twist their scriptures and their sacred texts in order to support these horrific atrocities that they’ve committed later on. I think the same goes here. I think there are some folks that we absolutely can engage with and shift from a position of, no, we need to be—we need these anti-sodomy laws globally, or we need to not pass anti-discrimination protections for LGBTQ community, et cetera. There are folks that can be moved from that position to a position of support, or even a position of neutrality, which is progress, right? It’s not perfect, but it’s progress, right? It gets us closer to where we’re trying to go. And I do absolutely believe that there are people who cannot be convinced, unfortunately, or who refuse to be convinced. But when the majority of people of faith in the United States have arrived at a point where, even amongst the most conservative people, it is in the—or 50-something percent—sorry for the not precise number off the top of my head—50-something percent of Evangelical Americans, white Evangelicals, the most conservative group in the United States, support LGBTQ rights like the Equality Act. If the most conservative group—where it goes up to 81 percent of Latino/Hispanic/Latinx Catholics who also support LGBTQ comprehensive civil rights protect for LGBTQ people. So we’re seeing a broad spectrum of support moving that direction. If we still have a small subgroup of people who disagree with that but are not able to influence policy to the degree to which it takes away your rights or my rights, I’m fine with that. I want to keep working on those issues, and I’ll get to that in a second, but I’m fine with that, as long as our rights are protected, the rights of our neighbors are protected, the rights particularly of transgender women of color, who are the most targeted and the most victimized by fatal violence in this country, Puerto Rico being one of the biggest epicenters for violence against the trans community. What I think that communities of faith can do beyond legislative advocacy, beyond media messaging, communications, beyond  the global advocacy work that we’re talking about, is intercommunal dialogue. Which does take place, right? You will find pockets of that. I think there just needs to be more of that. I want to see more progressive Christians sitting down with more conservative Christians and pressing the issue. Those conversations need to continue to happen. But in the meantime, while those conversations are happening, we’re trying to bring more people along. We deserve civil rights. We need our human rights. So that conversation will happen while the work is happening. In the long run, we need to continue educating our faith communities. And that starts from the beginning. Early childhood education is the locus where this all begins. You can see this. The data will show this. Research will show this, whether it’s on issues of racial justice, or LGBTQI justice, and gender equity and justice. Across the spectrum, when you start with children and you begin educating children from an early age about the inherent dignity of all people, the rights of all people, and why we secure those rights, that’s where we win. Which is why we see legislation around—at the state level around the United States—trying to prevent conversations, to ban conversations around racial justice and LGBTQI justice in schools. Because we know people who want to prevent this from happening know that if you teach children from an early age that when they become adults, they will advocate for legislation that reflects the dignity and human rights and civil rights that we’re pressing. And that is what we need. That kind of legislation is what we need to protect trans folks. I think to get to that last piece of the question. There’s minimal—when you look at—or, last year there were over thirty state legislatures around the United States that were pushing forward anti-trans bills, whether that was anti-trans sports bills, anti-trans medical bills. Several were successful. This year we’re seeing a new slate of hate across the legislatures trying to achieve the same ends. Trying to prevent trans kids from playing in sports. Trying to prevent trans folks from getting access, particularly trans children, from getting access to the right kind of medical attention and care that they need, that affirms them and their gender. Fighting against those and pushing for the right kind of hate crime legislation at the state and federal level will help protect trans folks in the long run, but it does come back, I think, to how do faith communities educate their own communities to stop this kind of violence from taking place? FASKIANOS: Thank you, Michael. Let’s go to Bud Heckman. Bud had written a very long question. So, Bud, if you could ask it yourself, I would appreciate it. And he’s with the Interfaith Funders Group. And it would be great to hear from, Bud. HECKMAN: Thank you. I just will make it shorter. I understood when there was a success in making a change in the U.S. context with regard to how people felt about LGBTQ issues, that there was a concerted effort on the part of LGBTQ rights organizations to stop framing things in terms of rights, and to start framing them in terms of trying to build empathy on a one-on-one basis. And that it was only when that sort of shift happened that there was a seismic shift in U.S. culture around LGBTQ issues. I’m wondering about your sort of understanding of that, and how that plays out in other contexts now. In terms of the use of language, how do you frame the issues both here in the U.S. and then in other countries? Assumingly so it’s on a country-by-country and culture-by-culture basis in terms of the tactics and the ways you go about doing it. VAZQUEZ: No, absolutely. I think part of the issue is that the United States for a long time, there has been this false idea that if you afford rights to a group that has previously not be afforded those rights, that in order to do so you must take away the rights of another group, right? Which is why you often see the pushback against movements for racial justice and equity for racial minority groups around the United States. The pushback often in white communities  there is a fear—there is a real, felt fear—a documented fear that giving Black people basic fundamental human rights is going to take away from the rights of white folks, right? I think the same thing has happened with LGBTQ rights similarly. In that if we give LGBTQ people rights then straight people aren’t going to have the same rights. Or if we let you—if we let y’all get married, then my marriage means something different,  or it means something less than. And so I think of the issues around the rights language and messaging has been around this fundamental idea—this pervasive idea that I need to give up rights in order for someone else to gain them, instead of being, if we all get human rights, or if we all get fundamental human rights afforded to us, then we all have that. No one is losing out on civil rights protections because someone else was given them, right? And so the empathy languages worked significantly because it reframed some of that for folks. And I, as a communications specialist and strategist, I absolutely support shifting our language and our—the ways in which we message things in order to achieve our ends. As much as necessary. As long as we don’t miss the heart of the matter. I don’t think that shifting our language to soften it—which is not what I’m saying what you’re suggesting here—but softening our language or shifting it that gets away from the point, that people deserve rights is ultimately helpful. Because I think we need to—I think America in particular needs to grow up and understand that giving human rights to all people is not a threat to American democracy, but it is what upholds America and what makes America the nation that it claims to be. And I think that—again, recontextualizing that for a global context, I think that’s a particular issue in the United States, where in other countries it’s going to be significantly different. We were talking about earlier with Julia’s question, where pragmatic and contextualized, 100 percent. But at least when it comes to the United States, I think we need to hold onto this language because of rights advocacy, because if we don’t, we lose the heart of what we’re pushing for. Not just for LGBTQ people, but our broader spectrum of advocacy for civil rights protections. FASKIANOS: Great. Waiting for additional questions, but, Michael, as we’ve seen what’s gone on in this country  around Black Lives Matter, the killing of George Floyd, that has really affected our credibility and our standing in the world, that we’re—we are not abiding by human rights here at home. And so what should we be doing to put us back or try to take back this space as a leader on the stage in promoting human rights, and the fundamental rights and dignity of all people? VAZQUEZ: Yeah. Thank you. I love that question because I think we’ve always—the United States has for a long time tried to position itself as a leader on human rights globally, while we see an epidemic of violence against transgender people, specifically transgender women of color. An epidemic of violence against the Black community. State-sanctioned police violence that continues to take the lives of our community. And yet, we’re sanctioning, or condemning foreign governments for their human rights abuses. And I think what has allowed other human rights abuses to take place globally, even when the United States has condemned them, is these nations look back and are, well, look at what you do to the Black community in the United States. How dare you come and tell us what to do with our minority groups, or with these people that we don’t like? Because y’all don’t like a whole list of people, right? And you treat them like you don’t like them, or you treat them horrifically, right? So, again, I’d say legislation is not the end-all, be-all, right, cure for our advocacy work. It’s not the end-all, be-all of our organizing work. But I do think legislation like the Breathe Act, which would reimagine—which reimagines and reframes criminal justice and how we respond to the needs of our communities,  that would help end, again not the end-all, be-all, but that would help shift and end in some ways the violence we see—police violence we see against the Black community, and move forward an agenda of justice and equity. Likewise, the Equality Act would do the same for LGBTQ people of color, LGBTQ people more broadly. And what it does—when we say, I’m going to make sure that everyone has voting rights, or I’m going to make sure our criminal justice system is not one that arbitrarily murders people in the street for no reason and no justification, and then gets away with it. I’m going to make sure that LGBTQ people aren’t kicked out of housing simply for being LGBTQ, right? When the United States itself does that, it sets a standard for the rest of the world in what it means to be a nation that upholds human rights. I think the United States could be that. I absolutely think that this could be the place. But there are other nations that are beating us out on this. There are other nations in Europe that achieved LGBTQ human rights before we did and are pushing the human rights for LGBTQ people much faster and more comprehensively than the United States is. And so if we want to be a leader in the world of human rights, not just on LGBTQ rights but broadly speaking, we need to make sure that our legislation, our practices, reflect the same rhetoric that we are pushing on other countries. We cannot in good faith—this is my opinion, I welcome pushback here—but we cannot in good faith condemn Ghana, or the Republic of Georgia, or other countries that have cracked down on LGBTQ people when we have our own epidemic of violence against transgender people, when we have states where it is legal to kick someone out of housing, or it has been legal to fire someone simply for being transgender. Where in matters of public accommodation people can be denied services simply for being LGBTQ. What right do we have to condemn foreign governments when we ourselves have not gotten our act together? And so I’m absolutely with you. I think if we can move these pieces of legislation forward and reframe our own human rights and civil rights practices at home, then we could actually become the human rights leader globally that we claim to be. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And we’re coming to the end of our time. And I just, as you know, we have a lot of religious leaders on this call and have faith-based organizations. You started talking about the power of the storytelling and truth—being the bearers of truth in this community. So as we close, what would you say to this group about the most important information they share with their communities to safeguard the rights of the LGBTQ+ community? And maybe even just how to work across faith traditions and really reach out to the religious right, who may be pushing the anti-LGBTQ+ agenda? VAZQUEZ: Absolutely. For folks—I mean, the first thing that comes to mind, particularly for the folks here who have been in this work for quite some time—probably longer than me—I want to thank you. First and foremost, thank you for the work that you’ve done in your particular context, within the U.S. or around the world, thank you. And please don’t stop. That’s the most critical thing I’ve often told folks. We need people to keep going, which means if there are any funders on the call, please fund the people who are trying to do this work. The resources necessary to continue this work is essential. I’ve often seen folks leave this work particularly because the resources to do it don’t exist. Which is why—the battle against the religious right’s advocacy against LGBTQ people domestically and globally has been so successful. That is something that they’ve invested in heavily. What we need to do is invest heavily  in what is the majority opinion that LGBTQ people have inherent dignity and value, and thus are worth having their rights safeguarded and enshrined in legislation, et cetera. To other folks who are maybe thinking about getting into the work—like, oh, I just came here to find out a little bit more, maybe. Please do it. Or please mobilize your community. Please challenge your more conservative partners and colleagues, or folks across the aisle, or across the pews from you. And encourage them. Have the challenging conversation  I have often heard from folks who say, well, I know so-and-so is a prominent conservative leader and they’re teetering on their opinion, but publicly they’re still anti-LGBTQ, et cetera. I’m, like, well, did you challenge them? Have you pushed them? Have you pressed them? It’s, like, no, it’s just so sensitive. I’m like, what is sensitive is the fact that there are so many transgender deaths that we have to report annually. What is sensitive is the fact that there are still countries around the world that will execute an individual for being LGBTQ. What is sensitive is that it is a crime still places, or there are domestic issues that are still at hand. That is a sensitive issue. Someone who is not LGBTQ feeling a type of way and shaking on their position is not sensitive. They need to be encouraged, and challenged, and pressed forward to change their opinions and to advocate publicly for a shift on human rights, both domestically and abroad. FASKIANOS: That is a great way to end. Thank you very much. We really appreciate your taking the time to be with us today. It was a rich discussion. Thanks to all of you for your comments and questions. I encourage you to follow Michael Vazquez on Twitter at @mvsebastian. So please go there. And as always, follow our Religion and Foreign Policy program on Twitter at @CFR_Religion. And please go to CFR.org for research and analysis on other issues. So we look forward to reconvening again. But as always, send us your suggestions for future webinars to [email protected], and other feedback you’d like to provide. We look forward to your continued participation. And again, Michael Vazquez, a big thank you for doing this. VAZQUEZ: Thank you. Thank you, everyone.
  • Religion
    The Future of U.S.-Middle East Relations
    Play
    Vali R. Nasr, the Majid Khadduri professor of Middle East studies and international affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Affairs, discusses the prospects and consequences of U.S. disengagement from conflicts in the Middle East, as well as Sunni and Shiite relations in the region.  Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record, and the audio, video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Vali Nasr with us to talk about the future of U.S.-Middle East relations. Vali Nasr is the Majid Khadduri professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and a non-resident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. He served as the eighth dean of Johns Hopkins SAIS. And prior to that he was senior advisor to U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke between 2009 and 2011. Dr. Nasr is the author of several books, four of which focus on politics, Islam, and the Middle East. His latest book is entitled, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. And Dr. Nasr is a member of CFR and he also was a fellow several years ago, where we first met. So, Vali, thanks very much for being with us. It’s great to have you back to talk about the Middle East. And I thought you could begin by just giving us your analysis of the Biden administration’s position on disengaging in the Middle East, as well as the sectarian resurgence that we’re seeing in the region. NASR: Well, first of all, thank you very much, Irina, for inviting me back to this forum. It’s really great to be here. The Middle East poses a very particularly peculiar challenge to the Biden administration. It is not at the forefront of its geostrategic outlook, which is now focused on China, on climate, on building back at home, and then to a lesser extent on transatlantic relations and Russia. And Middle East is largely, in the Biden administration’s view, was a problem that it has to reduce. It has to recalibrate America’s position in the region. And I have to say, in this regard this is now the third U.S. administration that is basically following this policy, since President Obama started the pivot to Asia, saying that Asia is more important than the Middle East, you are dedicating too much resources, blood and treasure, to this region. And then President Trump followed basically on the same theme, at least a higher level, and initiated U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, reduced our footprint in Syria, and started the conversation about withdrawing from Iraq. And now President Biden actually did come out of Afghanistan, and he did—he is talking about reducing our footprint in Iraq as well. But the problem is that it’s not as easy for the United States to shift its focus to Asia. The Middle East, we not only have a lot of interest in the region, a lot of issues, but it’s a region that has some fundamental problems for the United States. And also, these problems were aggravated by the Trump administration, particularly with regards to Iraq. So writ large, it’s the only region of the world that actually does not have any kind of region-wide mechanism for dealing with problems internally. There is no equivalent of organization to African Union, Organization of American States, ASEAN, NATO, EU. That is the only region in which the countries of the region in their totality don’t sit around the same table. And some of the bigger ones, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, actually don’t even have diplomatic relations at this point in time, or Iran and Israel, are at loggerheads. Secondly, the most important issue in this region for some time has been Iran. It’s the issue that really irks Israel. It’s the issue that irks Saudi Arabia and UAE. We forget that the entirety of our relationship with the Persian Gulf monarchies is built around the idea of containing Iran. So there is no such thing as leaving the Middle East without dealing with Iran. And that was—President Obama started dealing with Iran by first taking off the table the most dangerous thing about Iran, which is its nuclear program. Although immediately as he did that, everybody said, well, you need to fix everything with Iran, which is not—which is a much taller order. You need to change the regime. You need to take their missiles. You need to deal with Hezbollah. That wasn’t enough. But Obama started essentially by taking care of the most dangerous thing about Iran. So that would make a war with Iran not imminent. And then we go to Asia. President Trump reversed this. He came out of the nuclear deal in the belief that Iran would very quickly capitulate, come to the table, and he could do what everybody criticized Obama for not doing—get a bigger nuclear deal, but get everything from Iran. Literally, kick it out of the Arab world, get its missiles, get all of that. It didn’t work. I mean, Iranians weren’t about to surrender. They survived maximum pressure strategy, and they became far more dangerous.  They began to walk back their nuclear agreements with Obama, which we didn’t want, and they also began to become more dangerous regionally. They started attacking tankers. They attacked oil installations. They did not fold in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, as everybody had hoped. And that escalation ultimately got them into a conflict with the U.S. When the U.S. assassinated Iran’s top regional military commander General Soleimani, almost a year ago, the Iranians retaliated with hitting an airbase in Iraq that has American personnel, with over one hundred missiles. It’s the single largest missile attack U.S. forces have ever suffered in their history, going as far back as you want. And there was a forty-eight-hour time period where the two countries were very, very close to war. So Trump’s strategy actually did not undo Iran in the region, did not end Iran’s nuclear program, did not end Iran’s aggression, but made Iran far more dangerous. So then comes in President Biden. He says he wants to go back to the nuclear deal, but he dilly-dallies, and he doesn’t take this on right away. And the Iranians decide that, actually, the way to get the United States back to the table is for them to become more aggressive. And so Iranians began to apply their own maximum pressure on the U.S. Iran’s supreme leader said, we’re going to go to 60 percent enrichment. We’re going to go to 90 percent enrichment. And we’re going to become—we’re going to get really, really close to bomb. And it was at that point that the U.S. gets together with Iran. So right now we’re at the moment where Iran remains the only issue in the Middle East, in a way. I mean, the United States, if it doesn’t—if it gets a deal with Iran it can diffuse tensions in the Middle East sufficiently to actually focus on a war in Ukraine, or to focus on China. Or, if it doesn’t get a deal in the Middle East, the Iranians are not going to tolerate being choked economically to death. They’re going to start screaming and scratching and causing trouble on the nuclear front and then also on the regional front. So right now, we’re sort of in eye of the storm, where actually things look calm. But if the storm doesn’t pass, we’re going to get into the thick of it. And the reason this ties in with the sectarian issue is that when you look at Lebanon, you look at Iraq, you look at Syria, you look at Yemen, you even look at Afghanistan, and you look at the relationship of Iran and Saudi, et cetera, these are about power relationships. It’s about politics—internal politics, regional politics. It’s not about religion. But because there is a—because the identity of these protagonists is sectarian—Hezbollah is Shia, its oppositions are Christian and Sunni. In Iraq, the Shias are more pro-Iran, the Sunnis are not. In Syria, the government, which is an offshoot of Shiism and is supportive of Iran, or Iran supports it. The Sunnis are the backbone of the opposition to Assad. In Yemen, the Saudis constantly say the Houthis, which are supported by Iran, are Shia, the rest of Yemen is Sunni. Iran is the spokesman of Shiism, Saudi Arabia that of Sunnism. So by default this sectarian division that exists in the region between people whose identities are tied to politics and power is likely to erupt again. In other words, what happened in Iraq in 2006 was never really resolved completely. It’s still dormant. It’s still part of the language of the region. It’s part of the way the Saudis talk about Houthis. It’s the way that the Arabs talk about Hezbollah. It’s not just Arab versus Iran. It’s Shia versus Sunni because the Shia Arabs themselves are in a struggle with their Sunni brethren over power, and they understand this Iran-Saudi relationship bears on it. So if the nuclear deal collapses, what is the United States going to do, try to kick Iran by force out of Lebanon, out of Syria, out of Iraq, out of Yemen? But that’s going to inflame this sectarian conflict. And the Iranians, how are they going to put pressure on the United States in the region, to get it back to the table? They’re going to use their proxies to do so. So in a way, these talks that are going on in Vienna—as we are speaking they’re going on in Vienna. Everything, I think, for the Biden administration hinges on that. And I think the worry I have is that we’re near war in Ukraine. We are in an escalatory situation with China. And then we may end up in a much greater conflict in the Middle East. And that’s going to tax, if you would, the capacity of this administration to deal with it. So my argument has been that if the United States doesn’t want to see the worst in the Middle East, it has to try to get a deal with Iran. That’s not going to solve our overall, long-term Iran problem, but it’s going to reduce the temperature sufficiently for the U.S. to be able to manage some other very urgent things that are on the table as well. FASKIANOS: Vali, that was great. Thank you very much for giving us that context and the analysis. Let’s go to all of you now for your questions and comments. You can click on the raised hand icon and I will call on you. Please unmute yourself and state your name and affiliation. Or you can write a question in the Q&A box. And if you do put a question there—we’d love to hear your voice—but if you do put a question there, please include your affiliation. Right now we have no questions, which I cannot believe—(laughs)—because this group always has questions. So let’s see. I will— NASR: I think you have a couple. FASKIANOS: Do I? I’m—oh, it just popped up in the Q&A box. Fantastic. So from Don Frew: to what extent are Middle Eastern governments cynically using religion to manipulate their populace? NASR: To a good extent. I mean, there’s no question that governments use any tool of power in order to manipulate their population. That could be, promise of economic benefits, nationalism, but also religion. Although, I have to say, not all governments are doing it. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s following a very secular foreign—domestic policy. Prince Mohammad bin Salman is trying to extricate religion from politics and social life in Saudi Arabia. But generally, the Middle East is an area in which religion still matters to the population enormously. So how could the governments use this, whether against another country or adversary or in order to put stability, is important. And I also have to say that the Taliban victory in Afghanistan is like a slow death charge that has been lit in the region, and we haven’t seen its full impact yet. I mean, end of the day it’s the victory of an Islamic insurgency against the United States. And it came after a period where we thought, with the defeat of ISIS, that Islamist—Islamic insurgency movements, opposition movements, have got a bloody nose and were no longer relevant to the region. And now the Taliban victory has sort of recharged this issue. And so it’s very much part of the political fabric of the region. FASKIANOS: Thank you. The hands have come up now, which is great, and questions. So I’m going to go next to Laura Alexander. And please unmute yourself and say your affiliation. ALEXANDER: Hi. Yeah, Laura Alexander. I’m at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The, I think, simple question I have—although the answer may not be so simple—is when you talk about a deal with Iran, in your view does the deal that the Obama administration had made with Iran, was that the right deal? What do you think would have or could have happened with that deal? And do you think if the U.S. were to try to go back to something, would it be something that looked like that? Or would it be something different? NASR: I mean, I think it’s the best deal that we could have got. I mean, the deal was not ideal for Iranians. They didn’t get much out of it. I mean, we forget, for instance, that the United States did not—maybe lifted only a fraction of the sanctions that it was supposed to under that deal. What Iranians signed onto, they implemented. And the criticism was that why didn’t you get a bigger deal? And why didn’t you address all the issues that were there? But that’s like any kind of a deal you make. Like, whether you’re buying a house or something. It’s the more expansive you make it, the more you got to give in order to get what you want, and the more you’re going to have to talk. I mean, the United States very early on decided that if it was going to talk about a permanent denuclearization of Iran, it would be talking with Iran forever. And he also decided, if you’re going to talk about everything with Iran, then you’re also going to be talking for a very long time, because they—and when you sit at the negotiating table, things begin to narrow to what’s your top priority? So for the Iranians, it was a list of these sanctions they needed lifted, and for the United States it was that this program will be mothballed at least for ten years, on the assumption that if the trust is built then you go to another deal. It’s not possible to go back to that deal. On paper it is but, look, the Iranians are also once bitten, twice shy. They’re not going to trust the United States. I mean, the whole point about these nuclear deals is that they give up really hard stuff, like factories, centrifuges, et cetera. We give a piece of paper, which President Trump showed that you can very easily re-impose. So there’s no scenario which Iran is going to abide by a deal within six months, like it did last time. It wants guarantees. It wants to make sure that the next American president won’t pull the same stunt again. It’s—they also have deliberately built a bigger program so they now would have more negotiating room. On this side, we have a situation where the United States Congress and the Republicans are not supportive of the president. The Iranians are watching Biden and say: You’re not going to be able to lift a single sanction. It doesn’t matter what you’re saying at the table. So the deal has become much more complicated in that sense. And there was a cost really to withdrawing from the deal. But ultimately people criticize on a sort of Monday morning quarterbacking. But in reality, the deal was effective. It did take Iran out of the nuclear game, far more so than now. As we are talking, Iran’s centrifuges are far more advanced, and it has accumulated a lot more material. When President Trump became President, the weight of Iran’s low-enriched uranium was roughly the weight of the President of the United States. When Trump left office, the weight of Iran’s low-enriched uranium was three tons. So the—so you see, without the deal it was—it’s become more and more and more dangerous. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So we have a few written questions, which kind of I’ll put together. So, Adam Porter: The last issue of the Economist had an article about the Arab world reembracing the Jews. Can you comment on what you think the future of Jews in the Arab world might be? And then as part of that, from Salam Al-Marayati and Richard Morrison, one issue Iran uses is support for the Palestinian issue. How would the U.S. manage that? And then what is Israel’s role in helping to get a deal with Iran? NASR: Right. So these are all sort of combined. You’re right. In reality Israel and Iran, and to some extent Turkey, are the really big boys in the Middle East. I mean, the Arab world has become diminished and diminished over time, for varieties of reasons, including our engagement of Iraq, which knocked out Iran—which is a very major Arab country—out completely. The Arab Spring knocked out Syria and Egypt completely. Saudi Arabia and UAE are not real strong military powers. They’re checkbook, if you would, powers. And they 100 percent rely on the United States essentially for their own—for their protection. So in a way, without the United States, they’re not a match for Iran. So the Iranian threat has brought Israel and the Persian Gulf monarchies close to one another. This is a strategic alliance that benefits both of them. But it does not necessarily change the street view of the Palestinian issue, of the place of Jews in the Arab world. I mean, these are not the same thing. In other words, because the princes in the Middle East have, very logically, decided that your enemy’s enemy is your friend. And similar, Prime Minister Netanyahu made that calculation. But that automatically means that the Palestinian issue is completely dead. And actually, that’s exactly what Iran is banking on, that the support for the Abraham Accords at the street level, without a Palestinian deal, is soft. And as we saw when the Gaza event happened and when the settlements issue happened, very quickly you could see that the mood in the Arab world was not supportive of Israel. Now, I would say Israel—I would make a difference with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Prime Minister Netanyahu, in my opinion, needed Iran to be a bad regional boy. The reason is, it allowed him to pose as the Churchill of Israel, as the one man who can defend Israel’s security. It allowed him to deal with corruption issues. It was Iran that allowed him to be prime minister for as long as he was, in my opinion. It also allowed him to follow a policy of having both land and peace with the Arabs. If there was no Iran, if Iran was not playing the kind of negative role for the Arabs, there would not have been the Abraham Accords and it would not have been as easy for Israel to continue the settlements and yet have a positive relationship with the Arabs. So Iran, in a way, has made it simple for Netanyahu to follow that policy. And then personally, Netanyahu drove Israel to oppose the Iran nuclear deal. He came to Congress. He,  under my president, Obama, with the U.S. Congress, et cetera. Now that he’s gone, senior Israeli security officials are saying this was a mistake, that Iran is far more dangerous now than it was under the nuclear deal. Coming out of the nuclear deal did not lessen Iran’s support for Hezbollah, for Hamas, Syria, all the things that threaten Israel. It—and at the same time, when there was the nuclear deal, Iran did not—Iran was much farther away from the bomb. The nuclear deal kicked Iran to at least a year or more than a year from having enough uranium—enriched uranium to build one bomb. Now Iran is only two weeks away from having enough enriched uranium to build a bomb. Doesn’t mean they’re going to build a bomb, but in no way—the nuclear deal did not solve the Iran problem, but it was better than not having it. So I think that’s what it is. Israel is putting a lot of pressure on the U.S. right now. But at the same time, I think because Netanyahu played the role that he did, Israel does not have the same kind of influence in Washington to prevent a deal that it had before. So I think Israel and—Iranian-Israeli rivalry is going to be very central to the future of the Middle East. But again, I think if Iran is under a nuclear deal, its danger to Israel won’t go away, but it will be less of a danger than if it goes completely rogue. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Mona Yacoubian. YACOUBIAN: Thanks so much, Irina. And great to see you, Vali. Mona Yacoubian, from the U.S. Institute of Peace. So I very much agree with the way you framed the issue of sectarian identity driving the contestation of power in the region. But I’m curious, Vali, as to your thoughts on this dynamic we’ve seen across sectarian protests in places like Lebanon and Iraq, as pushback against corruption, bad governance. It was very notable, of course, in 2019 prior to the pandemic. And we’re even seeing it reemerge in both places. And I’m wondering kind of how do you evaluate those sorts of cross-sectarian dynamics within the frame that you’ve raised? Thanks. NASR: No, I think a very—you’re quite right. And they’re very important, particularly because the youth of the Middle East means there’s a lot of recycling of population. I mean, Iraq already has a population, majority of whom don’t remember Saddam, or don’t remember sort of what the Shias suffered under Saddam. There are real issues on the ground in Lebanon and in Iraq that—lack of electricity, financial collapse, bad government, corruption, that need to be addressed. And I do think that if there’s a nuclear deal—in other words, in a sense that there is some degree of reduction of tensions between U.S. and Iran—so that a confrontation between U.S. and Iran doesn’t play out in the region, these kinds of nationalist, bread and butter issues that brings people of the country together irrespective of sect, et cetera, will become more prevailing. I mean, the Middle East’s politics could become more “normal,” quote/unquote, around bread-and-butter issues. But if Iran and the U.S. go to war with each other in the region, not that these issues will go away, but the sort of divisions will get inflamed. I mean, if you took the case of Lebanon, if the U.S. and Israel then really want to go after Hezbollah, or Iran really wants to use Hezbollah, then that sort of defines the opposition. And for a period, you’re going to have violence, and conflict, and confrontation that is around the identity of these groups that are there. Or, similarly in Iraq, when you have reduction of those sorts of tensions, Iraq—you have more likelihood of people congregating around national issues. So I think those issues are there partly because Lebanon and Iraq have become dysfunctional exactly because they’ve become playgrounds or fighting ground between Iran and his rivals and the United States. So there is—there are these cross currents, kind of like a Persian carpet. You have different threads running through it. And my argument is that if there is a nuclear deal, if there’s a reduction of tensions, I think the social issues are going to become more prominent. And if there isn’t, then for a period the sectarian issues are going to become more prominent. And that could be very damaging. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Vali. So I’m going to take the next written question from Farah Pandith, who is a fellow at CFR. Great to have you on this call. If you could do anything right now with U.S. policy in Afghanistan, what would you do? And obviously, given your experience there, we’re very interested to hear that. And Richard Morrison, who’s from the Episcopal Diocese of Arizona, also asks: Does the Taliban have aspirations outside of Afghanistan? So maybe you could take both of those together. NASR: Well, I mean, I think if Taliban have aspirations outside of Afghanistan, it’s really directed at their neighbors right now when they get there, which is Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. And I think the greatest aspiration as a national government of Afghanistan will be directed towards Pakistan, because there’s a very large Pashtun population in Pakistan. And no Afghan government, secular or religious, has ever recognized the Durand Line as a legitimate boundary line between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And even Karzai, when he was president of Afghanistan, he saw himself essentially as president of Afghanistan, but king of all Pashtuns. So Afghans will be most dangerous to Pakistan, I think, immediately. That doesn’t mean that we can’t end up in a scenario like pre-9/11. But right now I don’t think the Taliban are interested in a situation that would invite the United States back in the region, after having fought two decades to get us out. This is just illogical. To Farah’s point, the problem is that we don’t have a policy, actually. What we have is sanctioning the Taliban and denying them money, which is a way of avoiding domestic criticism from Republicans and varieties of other groups. Which means that we are actually willing to starve the people of Afghanistan in the middle of winter, when we ourselves are saying that they are innocent—they have nothing to do with the Taliban coming to power. They are suffering under the Taliban. But it’s a politically safe policy because you’re not going to get criticized at home with some Republicans saying: Oh, the Biden administration gave money to these former terrorists. To me, it’s a morally bankrupt policy, absolutely. And it’s going to be—in a humanitarian sense, it’s going to be disastrous. And we can’t have talking about caring about people or having these summits on democracy but literally be willing to inflict malnourishment, and death, and destitution on a country. And it undermines, if you would, our foreign policy. And then in the long term, what do you think is going to come out of a completely broken country, where there is no alternative to the Taliban right now? And so we’re setting up Afghanistan for becoming a total failed state, and then we’re going to complain about why are there drugs there, why are there terrorists there, why is it not playing ball with us? So I think a better policy would have been to work with neighbors and other stakeholders and essentially provide funding and hoping that the Taliban, even though we don’t like them, would succeed at least in terms of providing fundamental governance to Afghanistan. But I don’t see that happening, because our foreign policy is really our domestic policy. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from a raised hand. Ronald Stone. You need to unmute yourself. STONE: There we go. FASKIANOS: There you go. Thank you. STONE: I’m Ronald Stone, retired professor from Pittsburgh Seminary and the University of Pittsburgh. Thank you very much, Professor. Would you speak on your perception of the mutual interest between Iran and Russia, and also their conflict of interest? NASR: So, and it’s not just Russia. It’s China. I mean, I would say at some level the fundamental interest between them all is that they all see the United States and the international liberal order that the United States supports as being directed at their regional interests. All three of them believe that they should be recognized as a great power, with tremendous sway over their neighborhood, and that the United States is denying them that. The United States is denying China that kind of middle kingdom status in Asia. It’s coming to the borders of Russia through NATO in Ukraine. And with Iran it’s trying to sort of deny Iran great-power status in the region. So to that extent they all sort of see themselves as subject, if you would, of the way in which the United States sees its own global role and envisions how much these countries should have a say in their own arenas. With Russia, Iran has much more direct interests. It’s in the Caucasus, it’s in Central Asia, and then to some extent now in Syria, and as part of Russia’s presence in the Middle East. Ever since the Soviet Union withdrew from Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia and Iran have basically had an understanding on stability, role of religion, economic issues. When it comes to the Caucasus, both of them have supported Armenia against Azerbaijan. So there is some common ground between them. And our policy essentially has not really drawn a wedge between them. In fact, as we’re going down the path of more sanctions on Russia, Russia and Iran are going to see more common ground between them, similarly between China and Iran, and China and Russia. So there is a kind of a loose triple axis, if you would, of these countries that we see as disruptors and rivals in the world, and the fact that they will see that they’re fighting the same fight against the United States. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Rebecca Cataldi, who’s at the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy. How would you advise the current administration to deal with the conflict in Yemen? NASR: Well, there’s no—there’s no other way other than some kind of a diplomatic process. It’s not going to be easy, largely because there is a domestic issue in Yemen. I mean, this—Houthis were not imported out of Yemen—into Yemen by Iran. The Houthis are a major tribe in northern Yemen. They are followers of what is known as the Zaydi religion, which is an offshoot of Shiism, and which is comprised of about 45 percent of the population in Yemen. They have political grievances. They have political aspirations. And, yes, the Houthis use Iran and Iran uses Houthis, but they’re not just the creations of Iran. So any kind of a political settlement in Yemen would require some kind of an understanding on power sharing that is going to change the dynamics of the way power was shared in Yemen. So the Saudi approach to Yemen—which initially was that the Zaydi—that the Houthis have to just leave Sana’a, go back in their mountains, and we go back to the way thing were—has not worked. There has to be a political process that arrives at some kind of a final political settlement, which is going to be, glass half full for Houthis compared to before the war, and glass half empty for those who held on power before. And then on top of this is now the Iran-Saudi, Iran-UAE dimension, because each side has supported one side of the war. And the way that Yemen War unfolded has actually played to Iran’s advantage, because it has shown Iran to have much more regional capability. And by failing to defeat the Houthis, the Saudis have shown themselves to be militarily weak, not being able to win a war next door. So any kind of a settlement will also have implications of the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A war like the war in Yemen is not going to end with one meeting. It’s going to be a process. And the United States needs to support the process. The Biden administration, to its credit, has done so. It needs to hold Saudi Arabia’s hand as the Saudis need to make serious concessions and revise their strategy. And they need to persuade Iran, maybe through other countries and as a follow-up to the Iran nuclear deal, to also bring that conflict to an end. So unfortunately, there’s not a simple solution to Yemen. The war has gone too long, the bloodletting’s been too long, and the stakes for all sides are too high. But that doesn’t mean that there’s not an end to the war. Now, I would also say that when you see that a conflict cannot be settled by war, ultimately it has to be settled by talking. But sometimes the different sides have to fight long enough to come to that conclusion. And we may not be there on Yemen, but I think soon we’re going to get there, that I think the Saudis, UAE, U.S. will realize that there’s not going to be an outright victory against the Houthis, and they need to support a serious political process. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to a raised hand from the Boston Islamic Seminary. I don’t know who is going to ask the question, but—so please identify yourself, and unmute yourself. Waiting for you to unmute. OK, that is—seems not to be happening. So I’ll go next to Charles Randall Paul, who’s raised their hand. I think you also had a question in the chat, so why don’t you just ask it? Thank you. PAUL: Hi. Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes. PAUL: Yes. Would an interreligious track two diplomacy ever be possible between Iran and the Sunni states? And if it were possible, do you think it would be able to build trust between rivals that could influence stability in the political realm? NASR: Well, there has been—I mean, there have been conversations between senior Islamic and—I’m sorry—Sunni and Shia leaders. But  much like Protestants and Catholics, or the Catholics and the Orthodox, they have been—they have a very long history together. And I remember a number of years—right after sectarianism reared its head in Iraq, the king of Jordan had sort of a big congregation, invited many different Sunni leaders, and invited Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq to the same gathering. And Ayatollah Sistani didn’t go, but sent a message. He said: We don’t need a conference. What you need is the Sunni world to accept Shia law essentially as a legitimate school of Islamic law. Part of the issue, which—and you raise a very important issue—is that you know the Islamic world for a number of years, even before the Iranian Revolution, has become the scene of much more hardened Islamic fundamentalism, much more hardened view of Islam, right? Now Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism, that kind of hardened view of Islam, is essentially Sunni. So it’s also—Islamic fundamentalism is even—is intolerant of diversity in interpretation of Islamic law and Islamic practice. Salafis, if you’re familiar with them, or Islamic fundamentalists even sometimes don’t recognize other Sunnis, or Sunnis who practice Islam in a way that is not what they preach, as Muslim, let alone Shias. So part of the problem with Islamic fundamentalism is that it has made Sunnis far more narrow, if you would, in toleration of Jews, Christians, as well as other denominations of Islam, or mystical practices of Islam like Sufism. So there is—in other words, the Sunni world would have to expand its acceptance of minority views of Islam. And that basically is a different approach of ecumenicalism that right now many schools of Islamic fundamentalism could actually accommodate. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Mufti Nayeem Ahmed, who got an up-vote on the question. Teaching at the—in the IR Department at NYU. The theme of it is political economy. How does the political economy of each individual state in the Middle each affect U.S.-Middle East policy decisions and/or principles at a macro level? NASR: So, I mean, we—it’s a very good question. So at a very high level, I would say we’re interested in Iran’s political economy because we’re using sanctions against it. So sanctions are about disrupting a country’s economy with the hope that it will impact its politics. So it’s a way of trying to micromanage a country’s political economy from afar. With our Persian Gulf partners—Saudi Arabia, UAE, et cetera—it’s been largely about oil and wealth. In other words, we have become very integrated into not only energy consumption there, but also how do those countries spend their money, and what kind of impact it has on American exports. So behind this security conversation there’s very different kinds of thinking about the region’s economy. But in reality, the United States is not really engaged with the broader political economy of the region, namely rate of job growth, unemployment, demographic change—all of those things that caused the Arab Spring. And now again, after COVID, are a danger to the region. And Mona suggested some of these in at least—in Iraq and Syria. As people don’t have good government, they don’t have jobs, they don’t have electricity, they don’t have water, young people don’t see a future, and then on top of it you have authoritarian regimes that are not allowing the social dynamic to play itself out. So we really don’t have a policy towards that, in a sense. We’ll react to it when it happens, but we are not engaged in a way to help the Middle East create resilient, viable economies that addresses the social needs of the population. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from a raised hand. David Bynum, who’s a chaplain in the U.S. Navy. BYNUM: Can you hear me? Over. NASR: Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. BYNUM: So back to Iran, and I think back to Thucydides, who wrote The Peloponnesian War, who said that countries go to war for one of three reasons: fear, honor, or interest, and perhaps a combination of those three. Thinking about the Iranian regime, how would you characterize their actions based on what Thucydides wrote about fear, honor, and interest? NASR: So I would say honor is not—honor is not a part of it. It’s really about fear and interest, in the sense that—and I say, important to think that the Iran—at least a segment of the Iranian government thinks that they are already in a war with the United States. That economic sanctions, particularly at the level that President Trump imposed on Iran, is war by other means, if you were to say, is directed at sort of completely crippling a country’s abilities, interests, capacity, infrastructure, and fomenting domestic trouble. So the question is, how would you pursue your interest in that context, and how do you create deterrence against the U.S.? How do you back the U.S. off? So to them—and, as you know, one man’s offense is another man’s defense. Most countries of the world always claims that they are engaged in self-defense. Even that’s what Putin is claiming vis-à-vis Ukraine, that somehow he’s defending against Western aggression into—against Russia, by encroaching closer to its borders. So I think Iranians are—want to push back against the U.S., if you were to say, to dissuade the U.S. from continuing to pressurize them, or divert attention from themselves, or to give U.S. reason to pause. But I don’t think Iran is interested in a way with the United States. It very well knows that that’s not a war that they ultimately would win, and it will have to pay a higher cost. But what it wants is to also convince the United States that it doesn’t want to go to war with Iran either. I mean, if I were to say, what is the one reason why Iran engaged in a campaign of IEDs, et cetera, in Iraq after 2003? It was not ideological. It was largely that they saw that the U.S. military and the U.S. government may come to a conclusion that the Iraq War was so easy that they may just go into Iran as well. And that the U.S. has to come to the conclusion that the Iraq War was more costly than it thought, and therefore think twice about invading Iran. And so it basically started a campaign of supporting the Sadr militia, and supporting putting IEDs all over the place. As I said, it was very pragmatic decision they made to raise the cost of the war, if it’s looked as its totality, not until the U.S. arrived in Baghdad, which just took a few days to get there. But for the U.S. to think that, look, Iran is multiple the size of Iraq. And if Iraq is this difficult, Iran is going to be much more difficult. And so it’s a very calculated measure of what they do. And it’s exactly for that reason that also when President Trump became very aggressive with Iran after he came out of the nuclear deal the Iranians started escalating. Again, why did they hit the oil installations in Saudi Arabia? It was to say, yeah, you can attack us, but we can also disrupt the flow of oil around the world. We can also hit you. And what’s the level of your sensitivity about casualties, right? So before you decide that, you could just walk into Tehran over a two-week period, think about what’s the total cost. So I think fear is a big part of it. And the interest of this regime is to survive and to assert Iran’s national interest in the region. And the United States is the main obstacle. I mean, let me put it this way. Iran is not afraid of Saudi Arabia. It’s not afraid of UAE, right? Israel and Turkey are different, but it’s not afraid of those countries. They’re not its equal, let’s put it that way, at least in the Iranian mindset. So that’s why they hit the Saudi oil facilities, right? It was a message to them as well, that you better not be lobbying with Washington against us to go to war with us. So I would say fear and interests. I actually really don’t believe ideology is a big driving force in the Iranian decision making these days. FASKIANOS: So there are a couple— BYNUM: Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you. There are a couple questions in the Q&A box again on Iran, which I’m going to combine. From Esmaeil Esfandiary: Some Trump supporters say Iran could not stand the pressure if Trump had had four more years. Do you agree or disagree? And then with that, from Iris Bieri, who’s with The Iran Project: Can you talk about how even restoring some version of the JCPOA would affect Iranian domestic politics as this point? Is there a meaningful way for Biden to roll back sanctions by executive order that doesn’t face the same rollback in that possibly Republican administration in 2024, which I think you touched upon, Vali. And how does the U.S. not lose its credibility at this point? NASR: Well, I mean, the U.S. has lost credibility. Any deal you sign with anybody, it’s about trust. I mean, Reagan said trust, but verify, right? So because the United States has shown itself to be untrustworthy, any deal, not only with Iran—with North Korea, with Russia, with China; don’t forget, there are other audiences around the world that are watching this—is now going to demand a lot more from the United States in order to compensate for the loss of credibility. And that’s really where Trump damaged American foreign policy. Any deal we make with anybody is now going to be more costly, because we have to compensate for that, for the fear that what’s going to happen in two years, four years, that there is no such thing as America. There are administrations, right? You sign a deal with an administration, and the next administration no longer feels that it’s compelled to abide by the deal of the previous administration. So there is no more such thing as the U.S., put it that way. Unless one party ends up being in power indefinitely. As to what Biden can do to, to Iris’s point, it’s the question of how much political capital is he willing to put in, all right? Iran is unpopular. We know that. There’s going to be not only Republican but a host of other institutions, vested interests, foreign and domestic, that are going to go against this deal. They’re going to second-guess it. Is he willing to put political capital over this issue or not? It’s a choice he has to make, right? So it’s up to him. It’s possible to get a deal. And if he gets the deal, some infusion of money into the Iranian economy will be important in stabilizing it. Some things in Iran are not going to be reversed. The conservative control of the country that was facilitated by the maximum pressure strategy is not going to be reversed. But the issue with Iran is not just the government. It’s the Iranian society. It’s the Iranian people, right? The nuclear deal, Iranians had calculated—the government that signed the nuclear deal had calculated that over a ten-year period the nuclear deal would grow the Iranian middle class by 35 percent. And because the middle class tends to vote more moderate, they believed that was Iran’s way out of where it is. But maximum pressure not only didn’t grow the middle class, but actually pushed 10 percent of Iran’s middle class below the poverty belt. The country’s infrastructure is atrophying. Iranians are becoming poorer and poorer and poorer. And in the long run we’re going to end—that’s going to produce a country that’s much worse. So some money going into Iran can stop that, or at least slow that process. But it’s not going to get us back to where we were in 2015. To Ms. Esfandiary’s point, we really don’t know. I mean, it’s possible that Iran would not have been able to survive more pressure. It may very well be that Trump, which would have been relieved from calculations every president has to make about reelection, had he won he would have been willing to cut a deal with Iran, and the Iranians would have cut a deal with him. That’s also a possibility, that there might have ultimately been a deal. But I would say that under maximum pressure Trump’s sort of war basically deployed all of the United States’ economic might. Iran in the long term could not survive that. But in the shorter term, it could. But also, Iran had not yet begun to deploy all that it could. It started doing that under Biden, when he saw that Biden is not coming to the table. Don’t forget, Biden didn’t go to the table until the supreme leader said we’re going to go to 60 percent. That’s when Biden agreed to go to Vienna. So as we’re talking, the Iranians still have more to deploy, the United States has pretty much plateaued. Short of a military blockade of Iran and going to war, it’s stopped. But, counterfactual, I think if Trump had been reelected, there would have been negotiations with Trump, because the Iranians would have concluded that America is now Republican, and he doesn’t need his donors, and he controls the Senate. He could even sign a treaty, for all practical purposes and get away with it. FASKIANOS: So we don’t have much more time. We have lots of questions I’m trying to put together. Robert Leikind from the American Jewish Committee would ask: To what degree do you think Israel would accept ongoing nuclear weapons project? And Don Smedley from Yale’s Chaplain Program at the Rivendell Institute focused in on your Foreign Affairs article, which we sent out in advance, called “All Against All,” and your arguments there. There are lot of questions in this, but I think the most salient one would be: You say Tehran has so far been able to come out in the regional struggle for influence. What are your metrics for these assessments? There are a lot of questions here. And Israel’s—how do you see what should be done to strengthen Israel and Gulf State relationship, including the Abrahamic Accord? What kind of strong hand do they hold? NASR: So on the mention of Iran’s influence. It’s not about popular perception. It’s not about polling. It’s about where do they hold the cards, or are their clients are the stronger player? In Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, and in Yemen, Iranian clients hold the most powerful, if you would, positions. Iran’s influence in the Arab world has expanded since 2003, and maximum pressure has not rolled it back. Iran is paying a hefty price for it, but even the Arab world’s attempt to leverage Washington to kick Iran out of the region sort of didn’t work, even under maximum pressure. And that’s why Saudi Arabia and UAE are also talking to Iran. Israel, as I said, is a different ballgame. Israel is a powerful military force, much like Turkey, and it has a strategic standoff with Iran. Just like Iran is investing in Hezbollah, Israel is using UAE or Saudi Arabia, basically. The Abraham Accords is not really a peace treaty because these countries were not—Bahrain, and Sudan, and UAE—were not military combatants against Israel. There’s not an issue of land. If you read Martin Indyk’s book about Kissinger, and Egypt and Syria, you could see the fundamental issue is about land for peace. That Israel has a vested interest in that barter, as does Egypt. That’s not at play here. Essentially, it’s an expansion of Israeli influence in the Persian Gulf in response to Iranian expansion in the Levant. For UAE, it’s a way of trying to supplant diminishing American influence in the region with Israel, and also it does play to a UAE’s interest in Washington and the West as well. So the big—I think the big partner in the Abraham Accord is Israel, not UAE, even though it’s marketed that way. The regional power that’s calling the shots is Israel, in effect. Just like Iran is when you talk about Hezbollah, or Hamas, et cetera. So I think in that kind of a context there is a military competition. There is a diplomatic competition. There’s a technological competition going on between Iran and Israel. And it may go in different directions as we go forward. Post-Iran nuclear deal, Iran may not be incentivized to absorb Israeli assassinations and bombings the way it has done so far, because they don’t want to  complicate the current nuclear talks. And after the nuclear talks, there may not be the same kind of assassinations. My thinking is that Israel is very, very worried about Iran’s nuclear program, and it will not accept Iran having—being very close to a bomb. But Netanyahu played his hand creating this mess. I mean, the point is that—and in fact, some of his own security people are saying—is that the game that Netanyahu played has brought Iran closer to a bomb than where it was. And ultimately, Netanyahu and the Arabs betted on Trump solving the problem. And Trump didn’t. The reality is that Trump had four years to do it. At the end, the Islamic Republic was standing and, short of war, there was no way to take its nuclear goodies away. So I think Israel will try to influence what the United States is going to agree at the table, and it will fuss a lot about it, and it will not be accepting of an Iranian nuclear program. And it will continue to try to sabotage the program every which way that it can, to knock it back. But it also has to live with the consequences of the decisions that Netanyahu made, which is that Netanyahu helped create a more nuclearly aggressive Iran. And I think the Biden administration’s message to Israel is that I’m trying to put the genie back in the box, the genie that you helped, Netanyahu, helped get out of the box. But Iran-Israel tensions are extremely significant to the future of the region. And there’s not an easy way to see how this is going to go away. FASKIANOS: And with that, I’m sad to say we are out of time. And I apologize to all the questions that still remain. But that just means we’re going to have you back, Vali, because we always love hearing your analysis. So thank you very much for being with us today, to all of you for your questions and comments. You can follow Vali Nasr on Twitter at @vali_nasr. Very easy to remember. And we encourage you to follow CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program on Twitter at @CFR_Religion. And obviously please send us your feedback, suggestions. You can email us at [email protected]. So thank you all again for being with us. And, again, thank you, Vali. NASR: Thank you for inviting me. FASKIANOS: Take care. NASR: Bye.
  • Israel
    Israel, Iran, and the Archbishop of Canterbury
    In recent weeks the Iran nuclear talks restarted, and the Archbishop of Canterbury delivered himself of a statement criticizing Israel's treatment of Christians. Herewith, comments on both matters.  
  • Religion
    Religion and Populism in the United States and Europe
    Play
    The University of Birmingham's Jocelyne Cesari and Pembroke College, Oxford's Tobias Cremer discuss the relationship between religion and populism, and how this relationship is affecting the politics of Europe and the United States. This meeting is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Happy new year to all of you. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record and the audio, video, and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have Jocelyne Cesari and Tobias Cremer with us to talk about religion and populism in the United States and Europe. We’ve shared their bios with you, so I will give you a few highlights. Jocelyne Cesari holds the chair of religion and politics and is director of research at the Edward Cadbury Centre for Public Understanding of Religion at the University of Birmingham. She’s also a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, and teaches religion in the Department of Government. Since 2018, she has been the T.J. Dermot Dunphy visiting professor of religion, violence and peace building at Harvard Divinity School, and served as the president-elect of the European Academy of Religion from 2018 to 2019. She’s written several books, including When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States. She also has a forthcoming book entitled We God’s Nations: Political Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in the World of Nations (sic; We God’s People: Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in the World of Nations). So, Jocelyne, we’ll have to have you back when that’s out. Tobias Cremer is a junior research fellow in the Religion and the Frontier Challenges Programme at Pembroke College, Oxford. He was a visiting research fellow at the Berkley Center from October 2019 to January 2020 and was a McCloy Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Cremer’s doctoral research focused on the role of religion in national populist movements in Western Europe and North America in order to understand the ways in which these movements employed Christianity as a cultural identity marker, and how believers and church authorities react to this. He is also the assistant director for the Transatlantic Policy Network on Religion and Diplomacy. So thank you both for being here. Jocelyne, I thought we could begin with you to talk about—give us a historical context on the ways religion and populism are combining to shape society and politics in the United States and countries in Europe today. CESARI: Thank you. Thank you, Irina. And thank you all for joining on this very symbolic day, which is the anniversary of the attacks on the Capitol. And I would like to start here with the difference in approach between the U.S. and Europe. Everything I read about the attacks or the Trump followers in the U.S. is qualified as white Christian nationalism and very rarely as populism. And in Europe, all the extreme right-wing movements are, indeed, called populist. And I would like to make here a disclaimer and pushback on the non-discriminatory qualification of Christian nationalism to define the specific group that is more than that, in the case of the U.S. And that’s why a huge difference emerged between Europe and America. Indeed, if I—if I may give you a very succinct approach of what is populism. (Laughs.) There is no consensus on the definition. To make it simple and shorter, I would say that usually we look at two different axes of populism. First of all the horizontal one, which is conception of the people as a unified group. Most of the time it’s anti-plural or antagonistic to either internal or external enemies. And on the vertical act, it’s also willingness, desire to destroy the traditional political elite and to have a direct relationship with the leader. So this is, again, a very simplified approach, but when it comes to religion I think to keep in mind these two axes, the horizontal and the vertical, is a good way to understand where religion plays a role. And most of the work that has been done, including in the U.S., looks only at the conception of the people. Meaning we know now that populists in Europe and populists in the U.S. tend to define the people, the population by one qualifying marker or trait. And in Europe, it’s the Christians against the Muslims internally and externally. And in the U.S., it’s a little more complicated, I would say—(laughs)—than the Christians against Muslims. It’s also against liberal, against people with different sexual orientation, against religious diversity at large. So we agree that this is shared on both sides. What we do not pay attention enough—and I think it will come clear in the trials that are going to come from the riots of a year ago—is that unlike the European, the American populists have also a clear project on the political elite, which is not the case of the European. The Europeans are presenting symbolic conception of the people and are calling for a unified, purified population. But they are not calling for religious motivated political elite. And I think that’s a major difference we are not paying attention enough. And it shows clearly in a few markers or indicators I would like to highlight with you. The first one, of course, is [the] march, [on the] 6th. We all look at when the march committed full amplitude and attacked the Capitol. But before that there is a whole gathering where the Florida televangelist, the White House advisor at the time Paula White, called on God to give us holy boldness in this hour. And crucifix were on the same level as American flags. So this is a vision that is not only the people, but also what kind of political leaders do we want? That is very strong in the American case. It came also very clearly in the continuous attack during the Trump administration against the media and the liberal establishment. It was not only the media. It was the fact that the political establishment was seen as too liberal and too secular. Again, a critique which has not been articulated this way in Europe. The second influence of religion, and it’s even more deeper and worrisome, it concerns a moralization of politics. And this goes beyond rhetoric. It is not only rhetoric. It is a deliberate effort to change the law to create what I call this moral policing of the public space and of the behaviors of citizens—again, something that is very far from what the, I would say, average person in Europe would expect from a political system—in fact, far from it. They would be horrified by what the populists in America asked to their political elite or public figure. And in this sense also, this approach of the moral politics in concrete acts, and legislations, and initiative is possible because of the support of a segment of religious groups and organizations in America that does not exist in Europe. The religious elite in Europe doesn’t, for most of—especially in continental Europe—doesn’t support the populist movement. In America, you have a segment of religious organization that supports this kind of political approach and conception. Of course, it’s part of the Evangelical. I would not say it’s all of them. I mean, let’s also be nuanced here. And actually, you see lots of discussion among Evangelicals on this issue. But it’s clear that the Christian nation is not only the symbolic identification, it is to be implemented in laws. And we know it’s laws against abortion, against sexual minorities, against contraception, against something that would not be possible today by the European populist group. And this support of key religious figures is the major discriminatory element between Europe and the U.S. It is also a sign or an indicator that this kind of anti-pluralist, anti-tolerant or intolerant approach is more ingrained in American society than it is in Europe. And it is a threat to democracy. And we are not addressing it properly, including now. We are just looking at this as a bunch of white nationalists. And I don’t think it’s the right term, because the data show that you can be nationalist or religiously nationalist in America without wanting religiously based political elite and a discriminatory politics put in place. And that’s this difference that is not made that I think is worrisome because it does have political consequences. And lots of work, including mine that you just mentioned, Irina, show that there are forms of religious nationalism that are not intolerant. But religious populism, when it combines the horizontal and the vertical dimension, is very intolerant and discriminatory. And one element, also, we do not pay enough attention to is that this vision of the right and virtuous people is also transnational. We have not looked into the foreign policy of Trump. Of course, he didn’t invent the religious freedom agenda. This was created under the Clinton administration. But the rhetoric has become more and more traditional and conservative under Trump, to the point that he created a commission for the preservation of traditional values that echo exactly what Putin is doing with the Orthodox Church, or even with lots of Muslim organizations. His defense of traditional values was an Islamic specificity. It is not anymore. And this is also something we are not paying attention and are forgetting because we are ensconced in the national agenda. And that’s legitimate, but there is also a global project. And the white supremacy is about bringing this vision of a pure, religious-based elite and politics also beyond America. But the work is to be done in America. There are steps here. There is also a kind of apocalyptic vision that I don’t have time to unfold. And I think I have already exceeded my time. So my point here was to make the awareness of these different aspects, and that the terms are not the same. Religious nationalism is not populism, as I just described it, or religious populism as I just described it. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. And you point out how the nuance of language—we need to be more nuanced in how we speak about these things, and really define them, in order to talk about them and contextualize them. Tobias, over to you. One year ago, as Jocelyne mentioned, insurrectionists were storming the Capitol Building in Washington. And many of them were carrying signs and shirts with religious iconography or language, not to mention the Confederate flag. Can you talk about the links between the religious imagery and the activities that day and what you see as—going forward? CREMER: Yeah. Yes, absolutely. And thank you, first of all, Irina, for having me. And in particular, for having me with Jocelyne. It’s always a pleasure to be together and discuss that. And thank you also for setting me up with this question because, I mean, as Jocelyne just mentioned, I mean, today is a very, very symbolic day. And it was really there where it was really in your face, this reference to religious symbolism that we see in the U.S. by the far right, but also in Europe. And in response to that question, I want to in my remarks really focus on some of the similarities but also some of the variations we see between the use of religious iconography in Europe and the U.S., and really some of the drivers behind them. And I want to in particular focus on—basically approach this question in four sub-questions, first really looking at the origins of right-wing populism—and, again, based on what Jocelyne was saying—but really trying to think where is this coming from, where is this push coming from, how is this comparable in the U.S. and in Europe? And second, really looking at how religion fits into this. What do right-wing populists and what do far-right demonstrators, for instance, actually mean when they talk about religious identity or Christian identity? And third, at looking how this works out in practice. Again, here the difference between Europe and the U.S. is actually quite striking, because in the U.S. you obviously see incredible support among Christian leaders for Donald Trump, for instance, whereas in Europe we actually see in some ways the contrary. And then, fourth and finally, I want to very briefly look at what does this mean for the role of religious institutions—for the church, and of religion and politics going forward. But first things first, what are the social origins of right-wing populism? And here there is a lot of movement at the moment in the literature. But in my own research I found as well that the surge of this right-wing populism that we see on both sides of the Atlantic, in some ways—and Jocelyne is right to distinguish in some ways between the Christian right and the very  moralistic Christian right, and then a populist right on the other hand. And the populist right is different, in that it is really a consequence and a reaction to the emergence of a new social cleavage, a new cleavage around identity and identity politics that is much more concerned with issues like immigration, culture, race relations, than with traditional social or moral issues. And it really in some ways pits two visions of identity against one another. It’s about the question of who belongs and—who belongs to the “us,” and who does not. And there are really these two visions of that. One hand, a clearly defined idea of national identity based on inherited group identity markers, such as ethnicity, culture, history, and authority. And then on the other hand, a much more globalist idea of universalism, diversity, et cetera, that embraced group identities primarily for minorities, but favors much more individualist identities for the majority population. And what right-wing populists do in many ways, is that they try to capitalize on a crisis of identity, and also sense of social isolation in parts of the majority population through their own vision of right-wing or white identity politics that, in some ways, mirrors or perverts the idea of identity politics on the left by claiming to defend the group rights of the ethnic majority with claims of also cultural hegemony. And in the context of this shift, in some ways, from a faith-driven religious culture war that is much more about morality, to a much more race-driven identity politics, we see that right-wing populists employ Christian iconography, Christian symbols primarily as a cultural identity marker. It’s an identity mark of the “us.” They use Christian symbols, they use Christian language, for instance, but it’s interesting that they often remain distanced from Christian values, beliefs, and institutions. That’s particularly true in Europe, but in some ways also in the U.S. So what we are seeing here is in some ways not necessarily a return of religiosity in populist politics, but in some ways a culturalization of the concept of religion itself. Religion primarily as a way of identifying the pure national community against the secular elite on the one hand, and the Islamic “other” on the other hand. What this is is then really, in some ways, a disassociation of belief and belonging of religion as a faith from religion as a cultural identifier. And it’s really interesting, if you then think about, for instance, January 6 in some ways, because, yes, we had all this Christian reference—the oversized crosses, the “Jesus saves” flags, the—(inaudible)—prayers and all of this thing—all of these things—but they came along with a lot of also neopagan imagery. We all remember the QAnon Shaman. We also saw a lot—just more broadly, anything that is white, the Confederate flag, Viking veneer, everything that is white, in some ways, is a symbol of this white identity politics. But that is different in some ways from traditionally the idea of the Christian right. It’s really much more about national identity than it is about faith, in some ways. And the question is now, of course, how does this work out in practice? And that’s the third point. And there I think is really the big variation that we see, because we see on the one hand, of course, the overwhelming support of white Christians for Donald Trump in the U.S. But in Europe we can actually see that—often we see the contrary. That right-wing populists identitarian references to religion are often most successful among irreligious voters or non-practicing, so to speak, cultural Christians, whereas practicing Christians remain comparatively “immune” to such a degree some scholars even speak of a religious vaccination effect against right-wing populism in Europe. So if you look, for instance, my own country, in Germany, the AfD there, the far-right party, scores on average about double the size among irreligious voters than they do among Protestants and Catholics. And we see similar developments in countries like France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other countries. And then, of course, that leads us to the fourth and final point that I want to talk about, and that is the role of religious institutions. Because we kind of want to understand which factors determine whether religion works as a fuel for right-wing populism or as a barrier to it. And there, I think I want to just briefly touch on two main actors here that I think play really outsized roles that we often miss. On the one hand, we have the behavior of mainstream political parties, and specifically the idea, the question of whether there is a Christian alternative for the Christian right, so to speak. And here’s the logic that Christian voters usually are already bound to traditional conservative or Christian democratic parties. And that if such an electoral alternative is available, then these voters often tend to be unavailable for the, in some ways, more secular populist right. However, if such an alternative is lacking, for instance, because you have only two-party system, then in some ways these two movements merge much more together. And it is then we have what Jocelyne talked about, a merging of the secular populist right and the traditional Christian right. The second factor, however, that is even more often overlooked, behind this—where there’s a religion gap in Europe—is the behavior of institutional churches themselves, and specifically their willingness and ability to create and maintain social taboos around the populist right. So for instance, in many European countries by openly and vehemently speaking out against the populist right, churches have really significantly raised the social costs of association with these parties among church members, and thereby contributed to the social—to the religious vaccination effect, by really making it somewhat socially unacceptable to vote for these parties. Whereas, conversely, if you have faith leaders that for whatever reason—and I’m very happy to talk about why that may be in the U.S.—are unable or unwilling to create such taboo, to speak out in the same ways, we see this vaccination effect disappearing or even reversing. Because in a way it’s legitimized this coalition between the religious right and then, on the other hand, the identitarian right. I’m aware that I’m also already running out of time here, so I’ll leave it at that. But I’m really looking forward to the discussion. FASKIANOS: Thank you both. Obviously, this is a big and complicated topic, so we appreciate getting into it. And hopefully the questions from the group will allow you to go even deeper than you’ve already gone. So this is—we’re going to move to all of you now for your questions and comments. You can either raise your hand by clicking on the “raise hand” icon or you can type a question in the Q&A box. If you do that, please do include your affiliation so that I can announce that as well. And I’m just looking for—we have the first raised hand is Lester Kurtz. Please identify yourself and unmute yourself. KURTZ: Hello. Good afternoon or whatever it is wherever you are. This is really an excellent discussion and I appreciate it a lot. Thank you so much to all of you. I’m wondering about—maybe this is a little tangential. Maybe this shouldn’t be the first question. But I’ve done a lot of work on nonviolent movements. And I’m thinking  Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. were populists. They were religious populists. And I’m wondering, what’s the difference between their kind of religious populism and this sort of right-wing populism you’re talking about today? CESARI: I’m happy to take this on if I can briefly respond to that. The vision of Gandhi and Luther King was an inclusive vision of the people. It was, indeed, based on some belief coming from their religious tradition, but it was not exclusive. It was the opposite. And that’s the whole difference, because the religious populists of today are operating on an exclusive conception of the people. And that’s why I think we need to make a difference between religious nationalism and religious populism. And I’m a little bothered by the fact that everybody talks about Christian nationalism. America was a Christian democracy based on inclusiveness, at least until World War II. Things have changed dramatically since then, but it was inclusive. So the more we think that religious nationalism is only this space of exclusiveness and intolerance, we are also making a political mistake in the sense that we are putting a lot of religious groups in the position of being defensive. And that’s not what we want to do on this particular topic. So, yeah. Inclusive versus exclusive, if I can summarize. (Laughs.) FASKIANOS: Tobias, do you want to add to that? CREMER: Yeah. No, I think Jocelyne put this very, very well and clearly. And I mean, Jocelyne has the two-by-two metrics with the axes. I usually think of it as a triangular relationship. But it goes—it ends up with the same—with the same result, in a way, is that if you think about—it helps to think about the right-wing populists broadly, basically, as a triangular relationship between on the one hand the good, the pure, the homogenous “us;” and then the set of two others, on the one hand the liberal sort of political elite and on the other hand the external “other”—and that external “other” being often now identified as—in Europe in particular—as Islam. And it is often by—against this external “other” that you then create this religious “us.” But exactly what Jocelyne was saying, in some ways the difference between, for instance, right-wing populism and left-wing populism is that this external “other” in left-wing populism or even in inclusive religious populism falls away, and then we only have the people-elite divide rather than the people-elite-and external “other” divide. And I think that’s quite important to recognize. In a way this is a triangular relationship, whereas if you have a more inclusive way it’s much more of a binary relationship. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take a written question from Guthrie Graves-Fitzsimmons, who’s at the Center for American Progress. Do you know of any good examples from Europe of religious leaders having an impact defending democracy? CREMER: Yeah. And I’m very happy to take that one because it’s, in Europe it’s a bit of a question—we have a bit of an Eastern Europe-Western Europe divide. But we see very, very clearly in Western Europe that most—almost all faith leaders are almost in unison in their condemnation of far-right movements/far-right parties, ranging from the pope, who has been very, very outspoken about that, to most of the Catholic bishop conferences in that—in Germany, for instance, again, just going there because I was just working on that with—I also was invited to—by a German Protestant Church group who are now running a whole training camp for that clergy about how to fight right-wing populism. They have been probably the most outspoken opponents of the far-right in Germany, by shouldering, for instance, most of the refugee help and really speaking out in favor of liberal democracy. And so much so that the far-right often calls them—calls churches, just the system churches, or they call them “government spokesmen” because they’re really perceived as these main defenders of the—of traditional liberal democracy, as we currently see that. So very, very opposed to some of the dynamics we see in the U.S. And empirically we see the result of that. Empirically we really see that because they speak out in that way it—the people in the congregations, many Christians, really feel like, OK, it’s just not socially acceptable, in some ways. And it’s  not a Christian thing to do to vote for these far-right parties. And the result is on the one hand there is a really interesting study—I forgot what the title is now—but, for instance, there’s a Pope Francis effect that you can see whenever the pope speaks out in favor of refugees and against far-right politics. You can see that among church-attending Catholics in France. The support for the Front Nationale goes down and the support for refugees goes up. And it’s quite interesting to see that. But it even has impact on the behavior of far-right parties themselves. So for instance, if you look at the AfD in Germany, initially they really went out, we are the real defenders of the Christian West. We are the real defenders of Christian Germany, et cetera, et cetera. But because the Catholic churches have been so outspoken against the far-right, they’ve been demonstrating against—at their party conferences with slogans like “our cross is no swastika.” They have been disinviting far-right politicians from all sorts of church events, even kicked them out of church councils, et cetera. And what the far-right’s reaction then was, for instance, to say: We are not a Christian party. And actually, being very, very outspoken and anti-church, and very open about that. So in some ways they’ve given up on trying to assume this label of being the defender of the Christian West. And I think that’s a very interesting dynamic that the far-right, or at least the secular populist right that we see in Europe—they do that as long as it’s easy. But if they actually meet some resistance, they’re relatively ready to object. For instance, Jocelyne’s last point, I think, Éric Zemmour recently said, “oh yeah, I’m super Catholic. I’m for Catholic France.” But then he also said, “yeah, but I’m for Catholic France, but I’m against Jesus. I’m for Christendom but I’m against Christ.” And I think making this distinction, pushing right-wing populists to that distinction, can be done by church leaders reflectively. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to James Gilchrist. GILCHRIST: Hi. Jim Gilchrist, Carnegie Mellon University. For many people, loyalty to God and country are all sort of woven together. That’s certainly true for a lot of Americans. After World War II, a great deal was written about the German church, right, during the rise of the Nazis. And the historiography is generally—is critical of the so-called German church, largely Protestant, in contrast to, say, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, sort of a hero. Catholic Church gets sort of mixed reviews. Some people say they stood up against Hitler, others didn’t. So my question is twofold: Do you think the inoculating or vaccinating effect of much of the mainstream church in Europe, particularly Germany, is in a significant degree a learning from the sort of catastrophic experience of the 1930s and ’40s, where the alliance of the church uncritically with the government led to rather catastrophic results? That’s the first question. And related to that is, in the absence of any sort of catastrophic reckoning in the United States, do you—what do you see as a way in which God and country might become decoupled in the negative way in which that’s played out in Christian nationalism in America? CREMER: Mmm hmm. Should I—I’ve been talking—I’ll address that very quickly. I think excellent question. Of course, the German case is quite particular. I mean, my own great-great grandfather was actually in the—in the Confessing Church and was sentenced to death by the Nazis because of his connections to Bonhoeffer. So the place—and it’s very, very important to the German Protestant today. It’s very, very important in there, and this historical image is always there. And actually, if you talk to German faith leaders, they will often reference the Confessing Church as an example of why they can’t have a repetition of 1933, where the Churches would be too supportive of the far-right. But that whole narrative, that the church quite likes, but actually if you look a bit more closely, if we look beyond Germany, we can still see that in many other European countries we still have similar dynamics. And in some ways, there are a couple of recent studies that actually suggested that it’s less about the historical exceptionalism of, for instance, the effect of Nazism on specific—national specificities, and that it’s much more about the institutional settlement of church-state relations that has a big impact on how churches at the moment behave towards the populist right. And that specifically we can see that, for instance, if a church is much more closely institutionally set up as a state church—for instance, the German churches or many European churches just have this tradition of being a state church—that they then tend to defend whatever current arrangement the state has. Meaning that if the state is a Nazi state, these traditional state churches often end up saying, OK, well, then in that case we defend that. But conversely, if the state is a liberal democracy, these churches then often end up saying, oh, OK, then we are defenders of liberal democracy. And they do that very sophisticatedly. It’s not—it’s not as simple as just saying they follow the political mainstream, because there are very deep theological debates about that. It’s really deeply theologically grounded if you read the justifications for that. But we still see this correlation, that traditional state churches tend to defend more whatever the current arrangement is. And if that’s liberal democracy then they’re liberal democratic. Whereas if you have a situation where you have a very strict separation or historical separation between church and state, that’s not necessarily the case. So, for instance, because in the U.S. we have a much more liberal and dissociated relationship, and a very open religious marketplace in some ways, especially Evangelical churches often present themselves as anti-system. They’re not part of the establishment, even if they might effectively actually be so. The narrative is always: We are anti-establishment, we are anti-system. And as a result, they will be much less likely to defend whatever current state the—whichever current arrangement, democratic arrangement, the state has. And that’s just an empirical observation, but I think a very interesting one, that can help us understand why so many European churches see themselves as part of the liberal establishment, and therefore defended against populist onslaught. Whereas, in countries where you have a stricter separation, they might see themselves on the same line—or easier to identify with the populist opposition to the establishment. CESARI: Can I add something to that, because— FASKIANOS: Absolutely. CESARI: Yeah. It’s interesting that the question was formulated around God and country. Actually, the irony in most of European countries you have cooperation between state and different religious organizations. So what is God and country? But the society is very secular. And again, you cannot look at secularity only at the institutional level. And that’s the difference with the U.S. I think the comment that of course America’s not really founded on Christian religion, but the people who founded America never forget that they were escaping religious prosecution in Europe. And there is a whole narrative on the new Zion. If this is not religious, I don’t know what it is, you know? (Laughs.) But the institutional level has been ferociously defended as a complete separation. And I would say that America is the only country that really separates. Even France, that is supposedly—you have lots of intermingling between state and religious organization. Just look at the way that the state controls, regulates everything about Islam. This is not secular. So we have to be clear, where is God and country operating? And that’s why we have to look at the religious dimension of American nationalism that is there. But it doesn’t mean that it has always been exclusive. And that’s something that is important politically, because I see lots of questions on where do we go from there? If we do not bring all religious voices in this debate, we are missing something. And I know that  there is a tendency of secular academics, and observers, and think tanks, but the ones that can change the balance here are the ones that do not identify as populists but still consider that the Christian references make sense in the U.S., OK? And again, I invite you to look more deeply into religion and nationalism, and not to think that because it’s God and country it’s automatically exclusive. And again, the example of Gandhi is a good example. The example of Luther King is a good example. So that’s the difference here. Not to think only of the institutional but also the social level. And I think that’s why Evangelicals have an advantage that no religious group can have in the European context, because of this different history of secularization. And I stop here. Oh, may I say something here, Irina? FASKIANOS: Absolutely. CESARI: There is question on the hijab. FASKIANOS: Yes. I was going to go that next, from Sana Tayyen. Please do respond to that. CESARI: But that’s exactly the point. In America, the religious populists want laws against abortion, against contraception, and want a conservative public space. In Europe, the secular establishment is ferociously against any kind of religious distinction. So again, religion doesn’t mean you—even ignoring or combatting religion is a position on religion. And it is unthinkable in Europe to have today even a debate—I’m talking about continental Europe, not Eastern Europe, where the parameters are different. But it would be unthinkable to have the same debate on abortion and contraception. And you have very secular women that are part of this right-wing populist movement against Islam, for the reason that they see Islam as a direct threat to the secular freedom that women have gotten or gained in the last few decades. So to say, again, that to look at religion space and believe it’s far, far too limiting, and that most of what you are discussing here is not about faith. Actually, the studies show that the more religious a person, the less inclined [they are]to follow this populist movement. So there is something in there we have to pay more attention to. And I’ll stop here. FASKIANOS: Just as a point of clarification, is that in both—in the U.S. and Europe, the more religious? CESARI: Yeah, so— FASKIANOS: Or is it—I thought Tobias said it was in— CESARI: In America, we have clear data that show that the people who have a high level of personal religiosity do not identify with this religious populism. I think because what they put before—it’s the country, not God, to go back to the tension here between God and country. They have associated God with the American nation, while that’s not the traditional, I would say, position of people with religious observance. So there is something in there that we have to pay attention. And instead of looking at the level of religiosity of the people who follow this movement, they are not the indicator of any trend. What is a trend? Is what is the status of religion in the national political culture? What is the status of the political elite? And that’s something that can tell you how much religion can be a tool for the populist movement. CREMER: Can I very briefly just add on that and say a lot of you would be familiar with Andrew Whitehead and Sam Perry’s book on white Christian nationalism. And I think this is where a lot of the—also theological confusion comes from. But even Whitehead and Perry make quite clear, and show quite clearly, that white Christian nationalism isn’t really—just as Jocelyne was saying—it’s not about religious practice. So they actually see a very strong negative correlation between white Christian nationalist attitudes and church attendance. So, again, this is why I also emphasize this difference between religion as a faith and religion as a national identity marker. And we can see, for instance—and this—a big debate among a lot of Evangelical churches in the U.S. at the moment, and a lot of  traditional Evangelical establishment, if you think about people like Russell Moore, et cetera. It’s the question of what does, actually, Evangelicalism mean? Because in some ways we are seeing in the U.S. now that we have the emergence of cultural Evangelicalism that is more about politics and culture than about personal belief. And that’s really interesting because you had that with Judaism before, we had that with Catholicism before, but traditionally you wouldn’t necessarily associate that with Evangelicalism. But we can actually see that we have a lot of people in the last Pew study, very interesting of that. People said, oh, they became Evangelicals. And then when they were asked why they were Evangelicals they said, oh, because of Donald Trump. That’s a white conservative political thing to do. But this was—and then they would say, well, I don’t go to church. I don’t go to church, and I don’t really know whether I believe in God, or anything. But I’m Evangelical because I’m white, and I’m conservative, and I support Donald Trump. And that idea of Evangelicalism being this political concept rather than a question of personal belief is a very interesting, very recent development that has caused a lot of debate within the Evangelical community at the moment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Syed Sayeed. If you can unmute yourself, Syed. I see you’re still muted. There you go. SAYEED: Good afternoon. And thank you for your organizing this Zoom conference. I just wanted to go back to the names of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. For this matter, I want to add another name from India, Abul Kalam Azad. He was a Muslim scholar who joined the political process of Indian freedom. And he was appointed as a minister for education in the first Cabinet of the Indian national whatever you want to call it. The thing is that we are talking about this idea of religion, but religion is—as an institution has been in existence for centuries. And these institutions of religion have been sort of influenced by the individual characters of people who are going back to Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, and Abul Kalam Azad. They started talking about the sacred texts in such a way that they had tremendous influence on the population. So the individual person who is talking about the religion, that person’s approach becomes extremely significant. And I think we have to sort of look at the role how individual scholars, individual politicians, individual culturalists play a significant role in terms of their personal approach to the same principles called, Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. And as I am talking about this, I have a book in front of me. This was written by a scholar, professor from Columbia University. His name is Richard W. Bulliet. And he has written a book called The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization. This is an amazing thing that, I mean, while we’re talking about narrowing religion to verysort of limited issues, there are people who are trying to go beyond that and they see the prospects of combining religious approaches in a way that the world can become a different  place to live in. I can just keep going but I don’t want to—(laughs)—take too much of the time of the audience. So I just wanted to point out how the individual’s approach—the scholar or politician—can make a tremendous difference. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Syed. Appreciate it. I will go on to Anuttama Dasa has a—“I’m a Vaishnava Hindu, but have many friends in the traditional Christian communities who see religion, especially Christianity, is under attack in the U.S. and around the world. This has driven many to accept or tolerate the extremes of the far-right/Trump. Do you see some way in which a middle ground can be found to overcome such divisiveness in our two-party system?” So you can also comment on Syed’s—the comment that he made, and if you could also address this question. We have several hands raised so I’m trying to bundle. (Laughs.) CESARI: Can you repeat the question? I’m not sure what was the point made here. FASKIANOS: It was, do you see some way in which a middle ground can be found to overcome such divisiveness in our two-party system? CESARI: Oh, but this is beyond even—religion is part of the divide, but it’s only one—(laughs)—among multiple others. And I agree that you cannot reassess the role of religion if we don’t work on the deep divide in America. And it’s an economic divide. It’s a class divide. Even more than religion the class concept is taboo in American politics. But the middle class doesn’t exist anymore. There is no more middle class. So how do you build a democracy with two segments that are going away from each other more and more instead of coming together, just economically? And the second big issue is that we are still on the—sorry to say it like that—the curse of Fukuyama. When the Cold War ended, Fukuyama said that it was the end of history. We know that it was not the end of history. But the American political narrative lost its enemy. So Americans have won. There is no more need to fight, because there is no more ontological enemy. And what we see is that 9/11 has completely shaken this confidence that there was no more conflict. And there is this very—in my opinion, it’s an unhealthy conception of democracy that is only consensus. By definition, democracy is not consensus. We have eradicated everywhere the parameters for healthy contradiction or disagreement. These are all signs that for me, putting the question of religious populism in America in a broader landscape that show lots of signs of erosion of democracy—economic, cultural, post-communist. And we are not addressing it. And not only political actors don’t address it, but even the academic elite in such a way doesn’t address it. And for me, this is all very, very worrisome. FASKIANOS: OK. I agree. (Laughs.) I’m just looking to see if there are no more raised hands. So I’m going to go into the Q&A section. David Greenhaw wanted to know from you, Tobias, “I’m intrigued by the appropriation of pagan and Christian iconography/symbolism. I’m wondering how these icons have entered the symbolic repertoire. One would think that Christian symbols have been promulgated by the churches, but where do the pagan symbols come from?” CREMER: Yeah. And that’s really interesting. This is basically where, again, I want to talk about this—what we see on both sides of the Atlantic—that the populist right really comes up with this identitarian movement. And that’s really a movement that started taking off in the 1980s in France, and that is basically around what is called ethnopluralism, that is basically saying, well, ethnic groups have the right to exist—co-exist, but they shouldn’t mingle, they shouldn’t interact. And that is a lot of where the new right thinking is coming from in Europe. And what is interesting is that this school of thinking, this nouvelle droite, this identitarian right is also becoming more influential in the United States. And this are—and that was very interesting when I did a lot of my research and I talked with a lot of—to people around Steve Bannon, Steve Miller, and of the Trump campaign. And it was very interesting that if you talked to these people they would actually not necessarily reference traditional Christian writers, but they would often reference these French nouvelle droite, identitarian writers. And a lot of these people are also neopagan, because they were saying, well, actually, in many ways Christianity isn’t really white European. Christianity is a Jewish sect from the Middle East that, in their words, doesn’t belong into Christian Europe. It’s a very Nietzschean idea of Christianity as the slave religion of the weak that came from the Middle East. And a lot of that thinking is now taking root in the United States. And you actually have the right within the Republican Party, it’s not as powerful as the Christian right, but you do have a post-religious right that really takes up a lot of this symbolism. And they will then take also the neopagan symbolism. They will take up a lot of this Viking veneer. Some of them might even take up the secular—what Jocelyne talked about—actually saying the idea of  we are the real defenders of gay rights, we are the real defenders of LGBT rights against this culturally “other,” Islam. And because Islam is conservative in terms of not being very progressive, or seen as very progressive, in many of these social matters, therefore we are the real defenders of these things. But that is really—it’s an ex negativo. So in a way, it’s everything that is against the external “other.” But I think we often tend to think that what we’re seeing at the moment is—with the references in religion in European right-wing populist movements, if you listen to European news or if you listen to the academy in Europe, you often think, oh, this is an Americanization of European politics, these, culture wars—religious culture wars are coming to Europe. And I’ve actually in some ways argued it’s the contrary. We’re actually seeing in many ways a Europeanization of the American right. We are seeing this—instead of religion-based, faith-driven, religious culture wars, we are seeing a much more race-driven identitarian identity politics, or identity politics that has been around in Europe for a long time, and that is now also more influential in the United States. Again, it’s not as powerful as the religious right yet, but it’s a current that’s becoming more important. And this current is much more the QAnon, Proud Boys force rather than the traditional base of the Republican Party. And there this neopagan symbolism is very, very popular. FASKIANOS: Thank you. OK. So we have many questions. I’d just invite everybody to look at the chat, because there are resources. People are dropping resources into the chat and adding their commentary. So please go there. I guess I would end—we have about four minutes left. And as you’ve studied this, what would you leave this group with, what they should be doing in their community, with their congregants, at their—either through universities, et cetera, to slow this down and help—(laughs)—with these meddlesome problems that we are seeing, both here and in Europe? CESARI: Well—(laughs)—I would say that there are lots of things that religious communities are facing now. They’ve been at the forefront of the social psychological consequences of the—of the COVID crisis. But what—and I think we are not acknowledging that. What I’m observing through my research now is the thinking—the momentum of these religious communities—Muslim, Christian, Jewish—about looking not only at what you would call welfare, but also thinking of re-founding the social contract. And it’s much more ambitious. And it’s not meant as campaigning for election or trying to be part of the institutional politics. It’s about changing the parameters in which we define the community. And all we have said here is that religion populism thrives on very restricted approach to the national community overlapping certain religious communities. So I think lots of religious leaders and figures have a role here. And to—and I know how difficult it can be to get away from defensive. No religion is not that. But there are lots of other things that are going on that can be put into the public discussion beyond, again, looking at religion as a negative aspect of intolerance and erosion of democracy. And that’s what I would say for people who are in charge. And young people are very much behind this new approach. And it is beyond the institutional and it is long term, and it is across religious tradition. The other thing is looking beyond the parochial to a more—I’m not talking—that’s not interfaith. (Laughs.) It is about looking together at the responsibility of the citizen that is not only an individual vis-à-vis the state, but the responsibility of the civil community. And religions have lots of things to say about that. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Tobias. CREMER: Yeah. And I can only build on that. And I think, especially for interfaith leaders, I think they can really play a role on two levels. On the one hand, by, so to speak, fighting the symptoms of right-wing populism. And that—I think that can really do. And I think it’s really important not to underestimate the role of faith leaders here in the idea of this social taboo, and in the idea of—in a way, where we are heading at the moment is a discussion of what actually is Christianity, and what actually is religion. Is religion about national identity, God and country, and all these things? Is it about that? Is it a national identity marker, or is religion about personal faith and religious practice? And right-wing populists have their view of that and the churches have their view of that. And I think what faith leaders can do is actually—and we see that it’s very effective—they can be very self-confident and engage in that discussion. And say, well, our idea of Christianity is maybe slightly different from that of an Éric Zemmour, or even perhaps a Steve Bannon, where it’s much more about the contents of a faith rather than its history and cultural dimension. And I think being very self-confident in that debate—maybe you’re doing some public theology—can be very effective. And having this conversation of what we actually mean by Christianity here. But that’s more about the symptoms in a way, challenging right-wing populists’ claim over Christian symbols and reclaiming them in some way. But the other, and I think more important, thing is really what Jocelyne was saying, is  also fighting the roots. Because in many ways this—what I mentioned—what I mentioned at the early beginning, this right-wing populism as a result—as a response to this new identity cleavage, this new identity cleavage is largely a result of the disintegration of traditional identities, of the erosion of traditional group identities. And then ethnicity and nationalism is a different form of identity. But I think if you actually say religion can be a source of an inclusive and transcendent identity that cuts across races, for instance, that could be incredibly powerful and, in many ways, a real ally against this right-wing populist movement. But it can also give people a source of identity that might then make them less socially isolated and less prone to focusing on the race, or ethnicity, or nationality as the only other source of identity. Usually when we see—the more identities there are, the less likely people are to be really polarized in one way or the other, because these identities are overlapping and bring them in contact with people from other backgrounds. FASKIANOS: Wonderful. I apologize to all the questions in the chat and in the Q&A box that we did not get to. We needed more time for this conversation, and we will have to revisit it. So thank you very much to both of you for this illuminating discussion. We really appreciate your taking the time to be with us. We encourage you to follow Jocelyne Cesari’s work on Twitter at @jocelyne_cesari and Tobias’s work at @cremer_tobias. As I said, we will send out a link to this webinar. We’ll do a roundup of some of the materials that were dropped in the chat to share with all of you so that you can revisit it and share with your colleagues. And I hope you will follow the Religion and Foreign Policy Program on Twitter at @CFR_Religion for announcements and upcoming events. As always, reach out to us at [email protected] with ideas, feedback, topics, et cetera. We’re here. We want to continue to put forward topics of interest and we welcome your suggestions. So, Jocelyne and Tobias, thank you again. We really appreciate it. CESARI: Thank you for having us. Thank you. It was nice. Thank you. CREMER: Thank you. Yeah, thank you. FASKIANOS: Take care.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Understanding Sharia: The Intersection of Islam and the Law
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    Addressing Food Insecurity Around the World
    Play
    Eugene Cho, president and CEO at Bread for the World, and Ertharin Cousin, visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center on Food Security and the Environment, discuss the work of faith communities and multi-lateral organizations to address food insecurity around the world. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach at CFR. As a reminder, this webinar is on the record. And the audio, video, and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Reverend Eugene Cho and Ambassador Ertharin Cousin with us to talk about food insecurity around the world. We’ve shared their bios with you, so I will just give you a few highlights. Reverend Cho is the president and CEO of Bread for the World and Bread Institute, a prominent nonpartisan Christian advocacy organization urging both national and global decision-makers to help end hunger both here in the U.S. and around the world. He’s also the founder and visionary of One Day’s Wages. And he is the founder and former senior pastor of Quest Church, an urban, multicultural, and multigenerational church in Seattle, Washington. Reverend Cho is the author of two acclaimed books, Thou Shalt Not Be a Jerk: A Christian’s Guide to Engaging Politics and Overrated: Are We More in Love with the Idea of Changing the World Than Actually Changing the World? Ambassador Cousin is visiting scholar at the Center on Food Security and the Environment and a distinguished fellow of global agriculture at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She previously served as executive director of the World Food Programme, where she led fourteen thousand staff serving eighty million vulnerable people across seventy-five countries. In 2009, she was nominated by the president as the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Agencies for Food and Agriculture in Rome, where she helped identify and catalyze U.S. government investment in food security and nutrition activities supported by the USAID Feed the Future program. And prior to her global hunger work, she helped lead the U.S. domestic fight to end hunger while serving as executive vice president and chief operating officer of what is now Feeding America. And she also was appointed by the U.S. president to the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development, where she helped oversee U.S. government agriculture research investments worldwide. So thank you both. It is an honor to have you both with us today to talk about this really, very intense problem. Reverend Cho, I thought we could begin with you to talk about the progress that the world has made in addressing hunger in recent years. CHO: Thank you for having me here, Irina, and it’s an honor to address the Council on Foreign Relations and Ambassador Cousin. It’s a true pleasure, as well, to be able to partner with you in this conversation. I know that you have a history with Bread for the World and my predecessor, David Beckmann, and I hope that we can continue the fruitful relationship that began many years ago. One really off-topic note is that, as you mentioned the two books that I’ve written, I’ve since learned that those are horrible titles for books because it’s—the main ways in which people search me on Google is “overrated jerk” is what they search—(laughter)—when they look after my name. Again, a little off topic. But you asked a very important question, and I think it’s one that we need to be asking constantly during a time when we have so many urgent needs and conversations all around our nation and around the world. It’s really tempting and easy for certain things to get lost in the shuffle. And as we’re mindful of hunger, our neighbors both in our nation and around the world who are experiencing the oppression of hunger, the challenges of hunger, we have to keep highlighting this important injustice and lead. So maybe to highlight your question once more, what progress has the world made in addressing hunger in recent years? The answer is mixed. If we’re talking about recent years, then the answer is truthfully and unfortunately not much overall. But if we’re to look back further, over the last decades, the answer is a resounding yes. We’ve made tremendous progress against hunger, poverty, and disease around the world, especially in the last thirty years. And just to give some perspective on these numbers and metrics, compared to 1990, when about one billion people were hungry—the emphasis on the word “billion” with a B—we counted only 795 million people in 2015. Now, it sounds odd to say “only,” but I think it does highlight the tremendous progress that we’ve made despite population growth in those years. In 2015, seventy-two nations had made the Millennium Development Goals of halving the percentage of people in their populations who were struggling with hunger. This is amazing and something that we should highlight and celebrate. But, as I shared earlier, there’s kind of a mixed story, a mixed bag. In recent years, that progress has stalled or even regressed. And we’ll get to COVID, but this actually began in the couple years prior to COVID as well. Hunger had been rising since 2014 due to issues like conflict and economic shocks, the effects of climate change, and now of course the reality of COVID-19. COVID-19 is compounding existing challenges and threatening to reverse years of hard-won progress that the world had made toward a more food-secure world. For example, the World Bank is predicting that the number of people facing acute food insecurity will double as a result of these challenges, including COVID-19. Only one-quarter of countries are on track to end malnutrition by 2030, and around half of all children live in countries that are not on track. So just for a moment to reflect upon these statistics and numbers, it’s quite sobering. And I think it’s important for a purpose like this to be reminded of the sobering nature of the work that’s before us. Now, that’s the overall picture, but as I’m sharing some mixed messages, there are pockets of progress even amid the challenging larger picture. Progress against hunger and poverty has always been somewhat uneven as countries have different experiences that impact hunger locally. The most recent data shows that between 2019 and 2020 hunger decreased in countries that were not affected by conflict, climate change, or economic downturn. There has been clear progress against hunger and malnutrition in places where Feed the Future—the U.S. government’s global food security initiative—works, and that’s good news. Feed the Future invests in addressing the root causes of hunger, poverty, and malnutrition in twelve countries. Over the last ten years of Feed the Future, for example, in areas where the program works, Bangladesh has seen a 68 percent drop in hunger. In Tajikistan, there’s been a 28 percent drop in child stunting, a long-term impact of childhood malnutrition. In Uganda, Feed the Future has seen a nearly 25 percent reduction in child wasting, a life-threatening form of child malnutrition. Across all Feed the Future countries, 5.2 million families are no longer suffering from hunger. Now, we don’t have numbers for 2021 and COVID’s impact on that progress. That data is forthcoming. But we do know that the Feed the Future model has helped communities to stabilize and set a foundation that should help them cope with some of COVID’s challenges. I’ll just share maybe a couple more things and pass the mic back to you. The situation now for people experiencing hunger is truly—it’s dire. It’s sobering and seems poised, sadly, to worsen. But there is hope for us, particularly I think people that are approaching this from a perspective of faith that informs our worldview and our work. One is that we have seen progress, as I shared earlier, in those Feed the Future countries despite the scale of challenges before us. Two, we have hope because of what people in communities and communities of faith around the world are doing to address food insecurity. People are helping to sow peace, which leads to greater stability; are raising awareness; are taking action; and the list goes on. Three is that I think the work of people of faith, we are creating and contributing to and growing the human will to end hunger, which then generates political will. And then, lastly, if I may—I’m sure we’ll speak more to this—is that a reason for hope, at least for me—I know that we have a diverse group of audience joining us, which is great. But I know for myself is that I’m—as a pastor, as a minister, as a person of Christian faith, I’m reminded that especially during the season of Advent, that we have a hope that we’re clinging onto in addition to the work that we do here on Earth, of that hope—that theological hope—contributing and bringing depth through the work that we do. So I’ll stop here at this moment. Mic back to you, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. Ambassador Cousin, can you talk about how you think the United States can address food security abroad while ensuring it is doing enough to end food insecurity here at home? COUSIN: Well, first of all, let me begin by thanking you, Irina, and the Council on Foreign Relations for giving me this opportunity to participate in today’s discussion alongside Reverend Cho. Let me, Reverend Cho, take this opportunity to congratulate you for your leadership of Bread for the World and look forward to working with you in the future. And I also want to note, Irina, that the Council provided me with a list of the distinguished and widely representative audience of faith leaders participating in today’s conversation, and to note that the faith community has always served as the operational backbone for food assistance and relief programs, both globally and domestically. So I’m honored to speak to this audience. This community has long accepted that addressing hunger is just—not just an economic and a political challenge; as Reverend Cho just stated, it is a religious challenge as well. When I was serving as the executive director of the World Food Programme, Pope John Paul came and delivered keynote remarks at one of my final sessions as executive director in 2016. And during his presentation, he specifically said we are bombarded by so many images that we see pain, but we don’t touch it; we hear weeping, but we don’t comfort it; we see thirst, but we don’t satisfy it; and all those human lives turn into just one more news story. The pontiff acknowledged that the global interconnections created by modern communication technologies has led to an information overload and the numbers that were just stated by Reverend Cho become—we become immune to other people’s tragedy. And right now the tragedy is unfolding in front of our eyes. As reported by WFP, 811 million people—more than 10 percent of the world’s population—go to bed hungry tonight. After nearly a decade of progress, as Reverend Cho just said, the number of hungry people has slowly increased, driven by the twin scourges of conflict and climate change, and now compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. And that COVID-19 pandemic did not just compound hunger abroad, but here at home. And we know that while Asia is home to the greatest number of undernourished people at 418 million, Africa is the region with the highest prevalence of undernourishment in percentage of population terms at about 21 percent. The WFP is now also raising the alarm about the forty-five million people in forty-three countries at the emergency phase of food insecurity in 2021, just one step away from starvation or famine. Afghanistan becoming the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, with the country’s needs surpassing those of the other worst-hit countries of Ethiopia, South Sudan, Syria, and even Yemen, where over half the population is food insecure and requiring international food assistance. Amongst the most vulnerable groups are internally displaced people and refugees caught between the frontlines and many of whom are totally dependent on food assistance. And despite the record amounts of resources raised by WFP and the humanitarian system, WFP is now some $5 billion short of the financial resources required to meet the acute emergency food needs of the population that is on the verge of hunger. But it’s not just about the emergency system; it’s also about the challenges of moving from just saving lives. It’s also about how we invest in adaptation and supporting our food system, because today’s global food system is fundamentally unviable, contributing to poor nutritional outcomes, climate change, destruction of biodiversity, unstable food prices insecurity, and providing low-quality, low-wage jobs in too many places. The World Bank says that our food system costs us about $12 trillion a year. So in answer to your question of what is the U.S. doing to help address these challenges both from an emergency side, as well as from an investment in the adaptation and mitigation that is necessary to address our—and create a food system that supports our environment, human health, and economic community, I’m proud to say that the U.S. is—has historically and continuously serves as the largest government donor to the multilateral food system around the world. The U.S. in 2020 contributed $3.7 billion to the World Food Programme when the World Food Programme raised about 8.4 billion (dollars). And the U.S. is the largest contributor to the FAO’s budget, with a total of about 527 million (dollars) between 2018 and 2019 assessed period, as well as the IFED, which is consistent with our leadership role there. The U.S. contributes about 7 percent of the total budget, or $129 million pledge annually, to that budget. While these numbers seem significant, they pale in comparison to the rising need, and the threat conflict and climate pose to food security and nutrition of the world’s most vulnerable people. And in response to that, how do we transition the food system, at the recent U.N. Food Systems Summit, the—from Secretary Vilsack and Administrator Power we heard a new U.S. commitment of $10 billion—$5 billion for—to support and strengthen our domestic food system; and $5 billion to support Feed the Future, which Reverend Cho talked about, and to expand the number of countries that Feed the Future works in. And again, at last week’s Japan-convened Nutrition for Growth conference, the world recognized that despite malnutrition being the underlying cause of nearly half of all child deaths under five, less than 1 percent of all the global foreign aid is currently spent on malnutrition-related issues, and they noted a gap of some $700 billion in addressing malnutrition. And at that conference, the U.S., through Administrator Power, committed to an additional $11 billion over the next three years. These numbers are important and they represent a significant contribution. But as you can tell, the difference between what is required and what the—what our country as one of the largest donors is providing leaves significant gaps, both in our emergency funding system as well as what is necessary to support the mitigation and adaptation of our food system to ensure that we avoid the crisis in the future. So it’s no longer enough, if it was ever enough, for just governments alone to support the financial contributions that are necessary to—for the emergency as well as the development system. We must seek and receive more support from business, from organizations, and high-net-worth individuals if we hope to begin to fill this gap in the funding requirements. When I was U.S. ambassador, I was always proud to say that the U.S. taxpayer, through our government, are the most generous donors in the world. The challenges, as well as the opportunities, to change our—to change lives and to expand the—to embrace the ability to avoid conflicts and to avoid the crisis of hunger in the future will require us expanding the field of actors here at home and abroad, and the investment in the food system and addressing malnutrition. So we must provide the resources to protect and save lives from today’s crises while supporting and adapting to the changing climate—to changing climate challenges to avoid tomorrow’s crisis. FASKIANOS: Thank you both. We’re going to go now to all of you for your questions. You can either raise your hand by clicking on the icon and I will call on you—when I do, please unmute yourself and state your name and affiliation before asking your question—or else you can write your question in the Q&A box. And I see that the first question comes from Bruce Knotts, who is the director of the Unitarian Universalist Office at the United Nations. He actually has two parts: Please discuss how to address famine such as it persists in Yemen and is beginning in Afghanistan. And where are the worst areas of hunger in the U.S.? I think I’ll start and let you answer that before going to the second part because that is a big question right there. So I don’t know who wants to go first. Reverend Cho, do you want to start about Yemen and Afghanistan, what you’re seeing? CHO: Well, I think simply by the fact that that question is raised that we know that Afghanistan and Yemen are two of the—sadly, these hotspots of extreme hunger, conflict, and challenges. There are numerous other places as well. I think we’re still processing data that’s coming in. For example, as we’re highlighting the circumstances in Afghanistan, things remain very fluid. We know that it’s bad. We know that it’s challenging. And part of the reason why it’s challenging is we’re unable to be—to freely send resources to be able to confidently do that work there. Earlier in the century, as I’m looking at some of my notes, Afghanistan is an example of a country that had made strong progress on reducing hunger and malnutrition. Over the course of a decade, hunger fell by half. Child mortality, I believe, was—had fallen by nearly a third during that time. But again, an example of conflict has contributed to some of the challenges there. We could also speak about the circumstances in Tigray in Ethiopia. And some of the most common elements is either because of famine, because of natural disasters related to climate change, and again, the challenges of what happens when conflict enters into a situation. I’ll ask Ambassador Cousin to speak more, but in terms of domestic issues, I think one of the things that we have to relay to the American people is that hunger is not a partisan issue. What I mean by that is it’s impacting all people. It’s impacting all of our neighbors in our nation. Now, as we say that, we can also speak an element of truth that there are people that are more particularly vulnerable as a result of the challenges that confront us. During the height of the pandemic, 40 percent of Black and brown families were having difficult times putting food on the table to feed their families. That’s at the height of it, 40 percent. And by that we’re speaking about African American, Latino, and indigenous families. And so I think we have to acknowledge that, yes, it’s impacting all communities, and yet, as we hold up that truth, also speak that there are certain communities that are particularly experiencing more challenges as a result of the different circumstance. COUSIN; Well, if I may— FASKIANOS: Yes, absolutely. COUSIN: —speak to, first, the domestic challenge. COVID exposed the fragility of wage-earner households in the United States, particularly frontline workers and those we refer to as “essential,” as well as the vulnerability of workers across our food system. In the U.S., the food distribution channels were simply upended. Companies that produce, process, and distribute food now evaluated that—they’re now evaluating and reexamining the risks that were illuminated during COVID in our food system. And as a result, we saw an increase in the number of those who were food insecure as—including about 13 million children as projecting by Feeding America. But the reality is that the COVID relief programs that provided the safety-net support from housing support to the additional child assistance that was provided has made a significant difference in avoiding the projections that Feeding America  offered during the height of COVID. I have not—the challenge of over thirty million Americans being food insecure is nonetheless a crisis, but the numbers that Feeding America was projecting of forty-two million did not—we did not achieve—reach those numbers, thankfully, because our government did respond. But the question is, those programs that we responded with are temporary. How do we ensure that those households that live on the cusp of hunger right here in our own country continue to have the access to the financial resources and the support that is required to allow them to access the food through the market system, and that we are supporting our food banks and our philanthropic food system in a manner that will ensure that where families do not have the financial means that they have access to the food support that is required in their communities? That is what is necessary, is that we cannot simply say the crisis is over and we no longer need these programs at home. And in Yemen, I will simply add on in supporting everything that Reverend Cho has said but also recognize that we have the challenge of donor fatigue in countries like Yemen and South Sudan, where we have had a population of over 50 percent of the nation requiring access to emergency food assistance for over five years now. And as Afghanistan comes online as a greater challenge, we see donor—reduction in donor contributions to places like northeast Nigeria, South Sudan, and Yemen, resulting in a requirement that those agencies that are providing that assistance, including WFP, are then forced to reduce the number of people that they serve, and to those people the amount of food assistance that they provide. We cannot have—we cannot prioritize one hungry child over another. We must continue to provide the necessary financial support to meet the full emergency needs of those countries, whether it’s a country like Afghanistan where we’re seeing increases over the last six months, or a country like Yemen where those—the number of those who are acutely food insecure has continued to plague that nation and those families for over the past five years. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We’ll take the next question from Azza Karam. KARAM: Thank you very much indeed. The presentations from Reverend Cho and Ambassador Cousin are just brilliant and very enriching. I have a quick comment and a question. And the quick comment is I’m not sure how many people realize on this call that Ambassador Cousin in her stint as the World Food Programme executive director did something that no other United Nations system leader dared to do and that many of us are still complaining about when it comes to governments, which is she took the extra step of inviting the pontiff, Pope Francis, to a board meeting where she introduced him not only to the members of the board, the various governments, but to her staff, who received him, I think, in a way that even Bono or any major star would not have been received, quite frankly. And it goes against all that talk about how secular the global system is because there was genuine joy to see him, but also made sure to introduce him to something else which she had thoroughly innovated, which is to create a board of multi-religious advisors to the World Food Programme precisely because of the point she mentioned in the very beginning, is she saw how incredibly critical and tipping point nature it can be to engage religious organizations in the distribution and advocacy. So I just—I can’t let this call go. Sorry, Irina, but I can’t let this call go without giving her a special tribute for the courage and the visionary wisdom that she has. Now I want to ask a question to both of you, if you don’t mind. Isn’t there a bit of a dissonance—and I’m being—trying to be polite here—a bit of a dissonance between the incredible giving, the incredible leadership the United States International Aid and Development puts forward, on the one hand, and the sometimes interesting relationships, militaristic weapons, industry based, interest alliances, that are made with certain governments around the world which are actually contributing to food insecurity among their own populations, and populations of their neighboring nations? I think, in this regard, I wouldn’t necessarily need to name names of countries, but you can well imagine who I’m referring to that are strong allies of many, many successive administrations, not just one. But also a small point to share here that if you look at the sanctions that are currently imposed on the Afghan regime for perfectly fine reasons, are these not somewhat a dissonance with the concern about those who are now generally facing starvation? Is there not supposed to be a connectivity within any administration between the military, defense, and the international aid industry? Thank you. COUSIN: Well, I’ll jump in here. (Laughter.) FASKIANOS: Good. Take the ball. COUSIN: Let me thank you, Ms. Karam, for recognizing the convening of global religious leaders that has been maintained by my successor at the World Food Programme. But it was the first—we began that convening of all faiths because despite the challenges that the international community experiences in raising capital for the support of hunger relief and malnutrition, we identified and recognized that every faith believes that you should feed the hungry and saw them as an ally and a partner, not just in our operations but also in our policy—in our policy advocacy work. It is imperative that we have faith leaders using their political capital in a nonpartisan way to ensure that we advocate for the financial resources that are necessary to provide the support that is required to feed hungry people and to support agricultural development activities. And in that same regard, we need this community to support the policies that will ensure access. In places like Yemen, Afghanistan, northeast Nigeria, many times the challenge to providing assistance to the most vulnerable populations is because of lack of access to humanitarian workers. Despite the global commitment to the humanitarian principles, those principles are often disregarded when it comes to operations on the ground and ensuring that those who provide that assistance, whether they are local actors or international actors, have the access that is required in areas of conflict. So to your specific question, I’m a pragmatist in everything that I do and the reality is where there is conflict there are hungry people, whether you’re talking historically or in modern times. The challenge of ensuring that we distinguish between those who are noncombatant actors and those who are part of the conflict, to provide the assistance that is necessary is one that has—that challenge is one that has plagued committed humanitarians throughout the ages. And one of the reasons why I was successful, my predecessor was successful, is because we separate the politics from the humanitarian work, and if you are going to serve as a humanitarian and meet the needs of vulnerable populations, it requires that those questions that you are asking about the combatants and the investments in arms that humanitarians are not part of that dialogue. But the—recognizing—I’m not naïve. I recognize that those issues challenge the ability of those on the ground to access food as well as the ability of humanitarians to access those in need. But you must separate the politics from humanitarian operations. FASKIANOS: Reverend Cho, do you want to— CHO: I’ll offer a couple thoughts from a neophyte, someone who’s not necessarily an expert on geopolitical aspects, but just maybe a couple broad contributions to the conversation. Without naming names, I think about twenty-plus years ago I was having a conversation with a significant philanthropic humanitarian organization, and in this conversation one of the things that I had heard that was really alarming as a minister, was that this foundation was intentionally choosing not to work with faith-based or religious organizations even though they were working in places around the world where there were significantly high populations of faith-based communities, whether Christian or Muslim, and the list goes on. And I thought that was so naive that they, in their Western perspective as a secular organization, was choosing not to do that. And, thankfully, in subsequent years, they had a change of heart, and they had a change of heart because we have to acknowledge that for good or at times not good, religious people comprise a significant population of the world. To deny its reality and to deny its identity is simply not genuine. And so I’m grateful for the fact that as these conversations about hunger and poverty, climate, and conflict, and the list goes on, we’re not reducing it simply for that conversation to exist within religious spaces but that we’re including religious voices in that dialogue. That’s the major, I think, contribution that I want to make about this, that in many ways we can see how religious people have contributed to harm but may it be more about positive contributions as we work for the sake of the common good of our global world. To the second point,  I—again, I’m not an expert on these things. But I think the point that I want to emphasize here again is that while we work around these hunger and humanitarian spaces—and I want to affirm what Ambassador Cousin mentioned—but I think it’s also highlighting the reality that as much as we work in these spaces that we understand that in the bigger picture of things these things are all connected in some way or the other and, thankfully, there are others who are contributing to these conversations. The word that comes to mind for me is distance, and maybe to take a step back, let’s just talk about climate change, for example. I find it troubling when United States, that we’re trying to lead the conversation around climate change when or if we don’t acknowledge our complicity, when we don’t acknowledge that we’re one of the biggest contributors to some of the hazardous statistics around climate change. So to simply say that while we have to not necessarily in our space engage in the politics of it is that we need to have the prophetic courage to contribute to acknowledging where in, again, our policies might we be contributing to that dissonance. So far, I think in my talk and in Ambassador Cousin’s remarks, we’ve mentioned conflict numerous times. Well, as we’re addressing conflict, if we’re wanting peace in our world then we have to contribute to policies that contribute and promote peace. And so to the—to Ms. Karam, who made her comments, I don’t have all the answers but I can simply affirm that I acknowledge at times the dissonance and want to contribute not just to reductions in poverty and reductions in malnutrition but also wanting to see policies that promote and contribute to peace and prosperity in our world. FASKIANOS: OK. Thank you. The next written question comes from David Wildman, who is the executive secretary for human rights and racial justice with the United Methodist Church’s General Board of Global Ministries, and he writes, many of the places facing hunger are in conflict areas like Afghanistan and Yemen. Many of these same places are also subjected to sanctions. While the U.N. and governments all claim they make exemptions for food and medical supplies, the reality is that sanctions, especially banking sanctions, are contributing to hunger in many places. How can we address the impact of sanctions on global hunger in so many places? Ambassador, do you want to start? COUSIN: Yeah, I’ll start where I left off. OK. The sanctions are a tool that the political community uses internationally to support the behavior change or to reinforce the—as a negative reinforcement for actions that a country may take. The literature is filled with analysis of the impact of sanctions on vulnerable populations. This is—there’s nothing that I could say or add that has not already been written about with the recognition of the impact of sanctions on populations. The opportunity, then, is for those who are the provider of support to those vulnerable populations is to ensure that those sanctions do not affect the ability of the organizations to deliver the food assistance that is necessary to populations who are detrimentally impacted by those sanctions. If we look in the political toolkit of what actors—what governments have to address the behavior of countries, sanctions is one tool that, I would argue, is—while it has a potential detrimental impact is less impactful than armed conflict as a response. And so if you think about what are the tools that governments may use in—to drive actions of state actors, sanctions are a legitimate tool. But those sanctions have consequences that any government that determines that they’re going to use that tool must be prepared to address to ensure that vulnerable civilian, and vulnerable populations are not detrimentally affected by those sanctions, and that includes ensuring that there’s access to the financial resources as well as access to the populations to provide the assistance that is necessary. FASKIANOS: Great. I’m going to go next to Lynne Speed, who has a raised hand in the queue. SPEED: Thank you. Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes, ma’am, we can. SPEED: OK. Great. Thanks. First— FASKIANOS: Please give us your affiliation. SPEED: Oh. Lynne Speed with the Schiller Institute. And, first of all, thanks so much for having this program on this most important topic, which is all too much being ignored, I think, both in the U.S. and internationally by governments, people, et cetera. So I have two quick questions. First of all, as Ambassador Cousin already emphasized and the Schiller Institute has been very concerned with this, our co-initiator of the Committee for the Coincidence of Opposites, Dr. Joycelyn Elders, former surgeon general of the United States, has—who I think Dr.—I see Ambassador Cousin is nodding—knows her well from the Clinton administration of her other work. But she has really stressed that the immediate short-term emergency solutions are not adequate, that you need long-term durable solutions including a full-scale health care system in every nation and this includes infrastructure. It includes clean water. It includes, in fact, food. I mean, how can you vaccinate starving people? That’s not going to do very much. It includes energy and it includes the infrastructure to support this. So my first part is on that. My second question is, Schiller Institute president Helga LaRouche has called for what she calls Operation Ibn Sina to work with the Afghanistan government, first of all, in releasing the $9 billion in Afghan government funds, which had been held back by financial institutions in the U.S. and internationally, and to further support the stabilization and future through this kind of infrastructure development. The alternative is unthinkable, as Ambassador Cousin already pointed out. Humanitarian concerns have to supersede geopolitical policies and politics. So I would like your comments both in terms of this question of the infrastructure development and more investment and development in these areas that could be done by governments around the world so we’re not always playing catch up on these emergency situations. And secondly, very specifically with respect to Afghanistan, this is not a sanction question. This is money that belongs to the Afghan people being released immediately to deal with the impending starvation of some eighteen to twenty million people. FASKIANOS: Ambassador Cousin, do you want to start with that, and Reverend Cho, we— COUSIN: Yeah, I’ll start with that. I’ll begin where I ended and that is that there’s a tension—there’s often a tension between the political community of actors and the humanitarian community of actors, and the decisions that are made in addressing geopolitical challenges have, too often, detrimental human consequences, and the opportunity for the dialogue that is necessary to create the environment where those political decisions do not or minimally, if at all, impact civilian populations of a country are critical. You can point to these challenges from Syria to Afghanistan and beyond. These are always questions that are raised if there are economic—particularly where there are economic issues at play, and the response of the political actors is to then provide the financial resources and the political support for humanitarian actors to respond to the consequences, and they’re not—they’re unintended consequences but they’re definitely not unforeseeable consequences of political decision-making. And if I—to suggest that I have the perfect answer to that juxtaposition between the political actors and the humanitarian consequences is above my experience as well as my intellectual capacity. But I would also add to what she said about infrastructure and wholeheartedly agree from a food system standpoint that it is an imperative that we need to invest in the adaptation measures that are necessary to support developing countries’ ability to build a food system that protects the environment, produces affordable and healthy food, and provides for economic return for all of the actors across the food system. This is the only way that we are going to build a food system infrastructure that supports our ability and supports the ability of global communities to address the impact that climate will have on the ability of populations to feed themselves and, particularly, their vulnerable people. And so these investments are an imperative. We don’t have the ability of addressing the emergency challenges that we’re describing in isolation of performing the work that is necessary to create the systems and the infrastructure support from food, health, education, that will support the ability of populations to prosper and not just survive. FASKIANOS: Reverend Cho? CHO: Yeah, just a couple thoughts. I want to, first, begin by just saying a wholehearted affirmation with what the ambassador just shared about the infrastructure. I think the question almost answers the question. We believe that it can’t just be a Band-Aid response to these issues. We know there’s always going to be emergencies. But I think Feed the Future is an example of trying to give a more holistic approach in creating more vitality and health. Right now at Bread for the World one of our focuses in recent years, in this year, and in the coming years, is the issue of malnutrition, and I know it’s a very specific topic, but we’re trying to emphasize the significance of investing in nutrition for a child in their first one thousand days, and how when we do this collectively it has a significant impact for that child’s life, for that mother’s life, for that family’s life, for that community’s life, and, ultimately, it contributes to the well-being, the flourishing, of that entire community and nation. And in some ways, I think that’s a microcosm of looking at it from a more holistic perspective, whereas twenty, thirty years ago, I think, oftentimes we saw or we were obsessed with simply getting calories into human beings that were struggling with hunger. And so we see it now in a much more holistic infrastructure perspective. The second thing that I wanted to contribute to this question was just I think our job, I feel like, in the complexity of the questions that were being asked—and certainly for myself as a minister, a pastor of a local church for many, many years, these are very complex, nuanced conversations. I think the ambassador is giving great answers but she’s also acknowledging how complex these things are. And yet, having said that, I feel like, as I’m speaking for myself, my job is to keep amplifying the message that right now, if we’re talking about Afghanistan, two million children right now as we’re speaking need immediate life-saving treatment for malnutrition. And I think when things get very complex—and, certainly, geopolitics, is very complex—what gets lost is the stories of real people that are suffering not because of their actions but because of what’s confronting them. So I would suggest that, yes, as we acknowledge and try to engage these complexities let’s not grow weary in highlighting these real stories of women and children especially who are being affected by what’s going on. FASKIANOS: I am—we’re almost at the end of our time. I’m going to try to squeeze in one last question, and my apologies for not getting to all of them. The next and final question comes from Imam Saffet Catovic, who is with the ISNA Office for Interfaith and Community Alliances. Do you believe, as late Senator McGovern did, that global hunger could come to an end by 2030, as stated in his book, The Third Freedom, in which he calls for the U.S. government to step up its game and adopt his five-point program, which includes universal lunches for all students worldwide? This could only be done if funds America currently spends on the military is spent on these five priorities. After all, is not global hunger in and of itself a destabilizing force and military threat? So I’ll turn it to each of you to share your thoughts and make any final remarks. COUSIN: Well, as the military and the Department of Defense has acknowledged is that food insecurity is a conflict multiplier, and that there’s—without—and it may—we may not have the ability to draw a direct causal relationship between hunger and conflict but there’s definitely a correlation between conflict—between hunger and instability, and the need to ensure that we address the challenges of hunger and malnutrition are definitely security questions, which is why not only does the Department of Defense say this, but the Munich Security Council now regularly convenes conversations around addressing food insecurity as a conflict-prevention strategy. And so this is—I would say in the words of my son, this is a no-brainer, that we must provide the assistance that is required to ensure that we support access to the food that is necessary to ensure stability, particularly in places that are vulnerable to conflict. CHO: These are fantastic questions and we could probably go on for hours at a time, and I know we’re almost up in time. The question referenced Senator McGovern and his leadership, and one of the things that I wanted to highlight is, his name has popped up often in the past week at the Bread for the World offices and his name has popped up because of his friendship and partnership with Senator Bob Dole, who, as we all know, passed away this past year. Senator Bob Dole was a member of the board of directors at Bread for the World since 2001, and I find it really interesting that for some folks they don’t quite realize the significant role that Senator Dole and Senator McGovern had in their respective areas of leadership, and it reminds me—just as one example, they created the bipartisan McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, which provided school meals in forty-two countries and equipped leaders to graduate and then begin administering the program themselves. This was a significant victory for the global community, for humanitarian issues, and for me, it’s a reminder how important leadership is during our current time. We need leadership in all levels, whether it’s in a private sphere, whether it’s in corporations and universities, certainly, in religious spaces and among our leaders in our respective nations. As a U.S. citizen, I need—I’m urging more substantive, moral, prophetic, courageous leadership from our members of Congress and from the administration to continue to lead in these spaces. I’m encouraged that during what feels like a very partisan time issues around hunger still experiences a level of bipartisan support. We’re working on something called the Global Malnutrition Prevention and Treatment Act right now, which, if it gets passed, would have impacts on tens of millions of people, an example of—and we need more of this during our current time. The last thing that I’ll just share is I think for those who are listening right now and watching, is that we need to make sure that as we grow in our intellectual acumen and our policy wonky chops, that we don’t forget that when it’s all said and done it still needs to be a personal issue, and I’m reminding myself of this on a regular basis. My father was born in what is now called North Korea. When he was a child, there was only one country before it was separated by war. And to this day, he still shares, occasionally, stories of what he experienced as a child of hunger, a child of war, a child of conflict. He lived in a refugee camp for some time separated from some members of his family, having to pull out grass from the ground to consume it because it was the only thing that he could do to satisfy hunger pangs. This is the story of my father from decades ago but just the reminder that this is also a reality for our neighbors around the world, and for that reason I pray and I hope that as we learn, again, statistics and ways in which we engage this is that, from my theological perspective, to embrace this truth that every single human being deserves inherent worth and dignity, that every single human being is created in the image of God, and this is why we need to have the moral urgency to do what we can and to keep going. So I’ll stop there. FASKIANOS: That was a beautiful way to end. Thank you very much to both of you for sharing your insights, your expertise, the work that you’re doing. Thank you for your service to this country and all that you’re doing for people around the world. We really appreciate it. You can follow Reverend Cho on Twitter at @EugeneCho and Ambassador Cousin at @Ertharin1. Just going to let that sit there for a minute. (Laughter.) We also encourage you to follow CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy program on Twitter at @CFR_Religion, and please feel free to email us at [email protected] with any suggestions of topics we should cover, going forward—suggestions, feedback, et cetera. You know where to find us. Thank you both again for today’s terrific discussion and to all of you for your great questions, comments, and participation. Wishing you all happy holidays.
  • Religion
    COVID-19 Vaccines and Religious Exemptions
    Play
    John Fea, professor of American history at Messiah University, and Michelle Mello, professor of law and medicine at Stanford University, discuss the history and legality of religious exemptions to vaccines in America. Learn more about CFR's Religion and Foreign Policy Program. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. As a reminder, the webinar is on the record, and the audio, video, and transcript will be made available on our website, CFR.org, and on our iTunes podcast channel, Religion and Foreign Policy. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We’re delighted to have with us Dr. John Fea and Dr. Michelle Mello. We’ve shared their bios with you, so I will just give you a few highlights. Dr. John Fea is professor of American history and chair of the history department at Messiah University. He’s the author or editor of six books, including Believe Me: The Evangelical Road to Donald Trump. He authored an article titled “Cherry-picking the Bible and using verses out of context isn't a practice confined to those opposed to vaccines—it has been done for centuries.” Dr. Fea is the executive editor of Current and he is currently working on a book on the American Revolution in New Jersey and a survey of American Christianity. Dr. Michelle Mello is a professor of law and a professor of medicine at Stanford University. A leading empirical health law scholar, Dr. Mello is the author of more than two hundred articles on medical liability, public health law, pharmaceuticals and vaccines, biomedical research ethics and governance, as well as many other topics. Dr. Mello is the recipient of a number of awards, including a 2014 election to the National Academy of Medicine, formerly known as the Institute of Medicine, and it was one of the highest honors in the fields of health and medicine. So, Dr. Fea and Dr. Mello, thank you very much for being with us today to discuss vaccines and religious exemptions. So, John, I thought we could begin with you togive us the historical context for the use of religious exemptions to vaccines in America. FEA: Yeah. Sure. You know, you gave me five to seven minutes to discuss—(laughs)—the history of this. For the sake of a talk like this, I think there are, as I see it, I think there are essentially four kind of eras in United States history in terms of religious opposition to vaccines and other attempts, like inoculation for example, to stop the spread of disease. Until you get the first vaccine—Edward Jenner’s smallpox vaccine in the late 18 century, which really comes to the United States in the early 19 century—the colonies and the early national United States treated disease, and specifically smallpox we’re talking about here, through inoculation—which, as many of you know is essentially injecting the disease into the body. There was some religious opposition to this practice. Especially, there were huge debates over it in the early 18 century in colonial New England. But much of the opposition to smallpox inoculation was based largely upon just the danger of the practice. People died as a result, and sometimes the inoculations were botched and the disease spread even further. But having said that, there were—there were religious leaders, some of the most prominent religious leaders in the 18 century, who did take the inoculation and advocated for the inoculation, most famous being Cotton Mather, the 18 century minister in New England, and then later Jonathan Edwards, who died as the third president of the College of New Jersey—Princeton—from taking the smallpox inoculation. So, there’s this early phase, I think, of inoculation. I’ll go through that very quickly simply just to register that, at least, because this is very different than, say, vaccines. When vaccines begin to kick in—literally from the Latin word vaccus, for “cow,” right, the injection now of cowpox into human beings—you have this kind of second phase or this second era. Much of the legal history of this centers around mandates that local communities/towns/states put into place. Massachusetts is at the forefront of this in the 19 century, issuing mandates for the smallpox vaccines. The high point here is in the early 2h century—and perhaps Dr. Mello will say some things about this as well—with the famous 1905 case Jacobson vs. Massachusetts in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided that a Massachusetts vaccination law did not violate the 14 Amendment and a state, essentially, could constrain individual liberties to protect public safety against smallpox outbreaks. And then, really, the only other time—and again, Dr. Mello can correct me if I’m wrong on this—that the United States Supreme Court deals with vaccines is seventeen years later in a case that, essentially, allows for mandates of children to be vaccinated to go to public and private schools. So much of the opposition to these Supreme Court cases were oppositions based upon individual liberties, right, that government is intruding on our individual liberties, or the ineffectiveness of the vaccines so why do we have to mandate them, or perhaps there were arguments made that smallpox is no longer as much as a threat as it once was, so why do we need these vaccines. But I guess the point for this discussion is there was very little religious opposition. Whatever religious opposition came to vaccine mandates in, say, after the Civil War and before World War II were largely from kind of out-of-the-mainstream religious sects like, for example, the Christian Scientists or the Swedenborgian Church, a small little sect in Pennsylvania. Even the Christian Scientists in—or at least in the late 19/early 20 century received so much public pressure—because their children were dying in Christian Scientist schools, the disease was spreading among the community, the received so much pressure that even Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the movement, told followers to take the vaccine and essentially pray once they took the vaccine that the vaccine wouldn’t kill them, right, was their approach to all of this. So, I think in this period from roughly, say, 1800 to, 1940 or World War II, there’s not a whole lot of religious opposition to vaccines. There is opposition, but very rarely is it framed in religious terms. I think that leads, then, to a third era, really that sort of takes off in the decades following the polio vaccine in the ’50s and then the measles vaccine, which was in the early 1960s, and I think most of the debate here focused on vaccination of children in schools. For example, Christians and other religious groups, I would say most of them overwhelmingly saw the vaccine as a gift from God, right? I mean, it’s amazing to read newspapers in the 1950s and 1960s, and seeing these religious leaders of all types, including evangelical Christians, talking about the polio vaccine as something that God has brought as a special gift to fight disease. Having said that, this is also the era where you begin to see religious exemptions for the first time—the actual phrase “religious exemptions” being used. I think a lot of this has to do with the idea of religious exemptions for all kinds of things, not just vaccines, are introduced into the kind of legal and political sphere with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which of course prohibits employment discrimination based on color, race, religion, sex, national origins. So you do see pushes here for religious exemption, but again they are still largely by sects like Christian Scientists; the Amish; in some extent I think I’ve seen cases of Jehovah Witnesses  pushing for religious vaccines; but again, nothing kind of mainstream, right? There are a series of smaller cases, local cases, state cases in which these things are debated. Maybe we can get into them during the Q&A. But mostly the Christian Scientists are at the heart of these discussions, looking for some type of religious exemption. And then if I could just bring it up to the present before I close, finally, I think COVID-19 has brought us into a kind of fourth phase. It’s a much more complicated and complex phase and debate over religious exemptions. A lot of things happened. At the end of the 20 century you had this Lancet article published by Andrew Wakefield which suggested that vaccines, especially the MMR vaccine—the measles, mumps, rubella vaccine—led to autism in children. I think—it was completely, completely debunked. That was proven to be a fraudulent claim, but I think it did empower a certain kind of anti-vaxxer movement led by a few celebrities. Some of us may be familiar with those names. And then with this growing anti-vaxxer community, I think, again, led by these prominent celebrities, the call for religious exemptions kind of entered much more into the mainstream than they were before, or at least as much into the mainstream as—let me put it this way. I think they entered the mainstream alongside the rise of cable news outlets, social media, and so forth in a way, perhaps, that we haven’t seen before in American history. Maybe “mainstream” is the wrong word there, but certainly you have more appeals to these kinds of religious exemptions than you’ve seen before. But I think it’s also during this period that Evangelical Christians have played the most prominent role in calling for the rights to religious exemptions in a way that they had not before. So I think this is the point where we are at now. Again, I think most of the religious exemption claims that I see are coming from—not entirely, but coming from Evangelical Christians and conservative Catholics. But overall, the discussion of religious exemptions has not really been delved into very much by American historians. There are some very, very good books on anti-vax movements that cover religion. But I think one of the reasons why historians have not really dug deeply is because religious exemptions is really only a recent phenomenon. So maybe we could flesh this out a little bit more during the Q&A, but I’ll stop there. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. Dr. Mello, can you talk about the legality of religious exemptions to both the COVID-19 vaccine in places that have imposed mandates and how religion is being used as a loophole? MELLO: Well, maybe I’ll start with the last part of your question there because I think that maybe merits a little bit of unpacking. I think the term “loophole” is pretty charged. The fact is that the law has long recognized the right of sincere religious objectors to request an accommodation when there is a vaccination mandate. It might be reasonable to raise the question about whether that exemption is being stretched to a point where it was not intended to go for COVID, and I’m happy to talk about that. But as I intimated, the law—both statutory, the laws that Congress and legislatures make, and constitutional law—has long recognized that religious liberty can be implicated by vaccination mandates and has made provision for that. And maybe it makes sense for me to just dwell separately on those two bodies of law. The statutory law, federal civil rights laws and to a lesser extent state civil rights laws, are mostly important for employer mandates. If you’re a reasonably large employer, you are covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans With Disabilities Act. If you receive federal funding, you’re covered by the Rehabilitation Act. And these laws protect certain classes of civil rights, including the right not to be discriminated against based on race, disability, and religion. And so employers have to offer what the law calls a reasonable accommodation for religious objections unless it would pose an undue hardship on the employer. What does that mean? Well, a reasonable accommodation in the context of the COVID vaccine would be something like you have to get tested once or twice a week, you have to wear a mask at the worksite, depending on your occupation you have to work from home. These are the types of things that would be within the realm of the reasonable. Now, what constitutes an undue hardship under Title 7? That’s actually a really employer friendly standard. If the employer can just argue, look, this is more than a minimal cost burden on me to do this, for example to provide test kits to everybody twice a week, it’s quite possible that a court would say, OK,  you don’t have to provide that accommodation. In other words, you don’t have to accommodate a religious exemption in that way. There is another important aspect of the civil rights law, which is that if a person poses a direct threat—meaning they—a court would deem to pose a substantial risk of substantial harm to others, that cannot be reduced by reasonable accommodation, you don’t have to accommodate their religious objection to vaccination. And that obviously has a lot of traction in the realm of infectious disease. That was the reason for the direct threat exception. Now, COVID’s not a wildly infectious disease. It’s not measles. There are other things that we know are effective in preventing transmission. But that too is available to employers who don’t want to accommodate a religious objection. What tends to be on the employee-friendly side is how employers are supposed to treat requests for religious exemptions, which is to say they’re supposed to give people the benefit of the doubt. If the employer is aware of facts that would lead the employer to believe either this is not a religious belief, it’s something else—it’s just sort of philosophical, personal in nature, or it’s political, ideological in nature, or it’s not a sincere religious belief, then the employer can request additional information and scrutinize it a little bit. So, for example, if this was the first time the employer has ever raised a religious exemption to a vaccine— she’s gotten dozens of other vaccines in her lifetime—that’s salient information. But under the civil rights generally you’re supposed to give people the benefit of the doubt. And employers tend to get into trouble when they look too hard behind those claims of religious belief. Now, in nonemployment contexts, what’s most important is not these federal civil rights laws, but rather the Constitution. And here the law is a little bit less crisp, as is always the case when we compare constitutional to statutory law. And here, it is also increasingly unsettled as to what is constitutionally required in terms of accommodating religious exemptions. So let me give the basics, and then I’ll talk about three things that I think are under contestation right now. And when I say right now, I mean literally right now. Every day in my inbox there are two to three new court rulings coming down in this specific area. It is wildly unstable territory, from a doctrinal perspective. The basics, as John intimated, the Supreme Court has never held that a religious exemption to a vaccination mandate—and here, we’re thinking about state, or city, or school district mandates—is constitutionally required. And most lower courts haven’t either. Instead, lower courts have applied something called “rational basis review” when they’ve been evaluating challenges by religious objectors. And that merely requires a judge to say: Is what the state or school district is doing here in pursuit of a legitimate state interest? And is it reasonably related to that interest? And in practice, that comes down to an inquiry that sounds an awful lot like, is it crazy? If it’s not crazy, the court is going to defer to what the government has done. And that’s been the lay of the land for vaccination mandates for a very long time. Now, when somebody’s religious objection gets denied by a school district, let’s say, courts will look at the procedures used to deny that request and make sure that they are fair procedurally, and that the hew closely to our standards about what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief. And here the analysis looks pretty similar, as it does under federal civil rights law. They’ll look at, you know, is this person articulating something that sounds like it’s about God or a belief system that stands in the place of God? It’s bigger than vaccines. It’s kind of an organizing framework for their life. And does it actually prohibit them from taking this vaccine? They don’t require that petitioners be members of a recognized or established religion. They don’t require that they attend services or make other performative gestures demonstrating their allegiance to the religion. They don’t require that a clergy member provide an attestation saying: Yes, indeed, our religion prohibits this from happening. Nevertheless, even without those indica, they may still—and often do—find that a belief is not religious in nature. For example, some cases have involved vegans arguing that veganism stands in the place of a supreme being in terms of the organizing framework for their life. And most courts have said, hmm, not quite. That does not rise to the level of a spiritual or religious belief. OK, so that’s the basic. For a long time, lots of deference to organizations that want to impose vaccination mandates, even in the face of religious objections. What’s being contested now in courts across the country, and I believe soon at the Supreme Court, is three things. First, what is it exactly that constitutes a sincerely held religious belief? Now, I’ve outlined certain things that the courts have established you don’t have to show, like your pastor agrees with you about the religion having—you don’t have to provide this attestation that the religion bars you from receiving the vaccination. What’s going on now though kind of steps beyond this. It’s not that the person is failing to produce a letter from a clergy member saying, yes, I back them up on this claim. It’s that the clergy members have actively gone out in public and said: No, we don’t bar COVID vaccination in our religion. Our religion either has nothing to say about this, or we are going on record as saying in our church we want people to get COVID vaccines. It is acceptable. It’s consistent with doctrine to get COVID vaccines. There is no bar here. And nevertheless, there is a person who identifies with that religious belief system who comes forward and says: Yes, but my interpretation of the Bible, of Catholic doctrine, is that I shouldn’t get this vaccine. And it doesn’t matter that the religious leader has said this. What do you do in that situation? Right now, the lower courts are split. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a fairly high-level federal court of appeals, just days ago joined at least one other district court, a lower-level federal court, in holding that a member of a religious denomination can assert their own interpretation of doctrine. And they cited a Supreme Court case that indeed seemed to suggest something along that line. At least two other courts have held otherwise. For example, there was a case against UMass brought by a Catholic athlete. And the court said, look, UMass doesn’t have to accommodate her request. She did not provide any reason to think that the Catholic Church is opposed to vaccines. And they’ve come out as saying that they are not. So there’s a split right now. And it’s really important. It’s really important because religious leaders have begun to line up in making public statements either in favor of—or, let’s say either not opposed to or opposed to the vaccine. So it matters whether those statements, or to what extent those statements, have legal weight. The second reason is many people have begun filing religious exemptions. And it’s not always clear, as your suggestion when we opened the session here kind of intuited—is that it’s not always clear that it is sincerely religious, as opposed to something that looks more ideological. And so when you have a very, very large group of people looking to kind of shoehorn complaints about the COVID vaccine into religious beliefs, it really matters how wide the interpretation of sincere religious belief is going to be. I think, as John suggested, the group of people who is opposed to the vaccine now is just orders of magnitude larger than it has ever been for any other vaccine, and much broader in its reach across different religions or different age groups. It’s a new phenomenon. That makes it harder to tie to religious beliefs and might raise a suspicion of something else going on. And then the third reason that this really matters is that some pastors have started issuing letters by the hundreds or thousands for parishioners attesting to their—you know, to say that their church opposed COVID vaccination. And then people are sort of wielding these to try to get religious objections granted. So this first question, what constitutes a sincerely held belief, really matters. The second question is whether a government unit can offer a medical or a pregnancy exception to a vaccination mandate, but not offer a religious exemption. Historically, as John said, the answer has been yes. And the trend in the states has been in that direction, towards eliminating everything but the medical exemptions. But again, just this week there was a ruling relating to one of our California school district’s vaccination mandates for students that suggest otherwise. That San Diego Unified School District has an exemption carve out for pregnant students. Not clear why. Not really medically based. (Laughs.) It had that, but not a religious exemption. And the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, another big federal court of appeals, issued a kind of summary opinion, not much reasoning, but sort of hints that the reason it found that unacceptable is that under a prior Supreme Court ruling called Tandon, relating to broader stay at home orders that affected religious congregations in the earlier stages of COVID, you cannot treat any comparable secular activity more favorable than you treat religious exercise. So what the court saw in that school district mandate was unequal treatment of people who had pregnancy-related objections on the one hand, people had religious objections on the other hand. The pregnant people were treated better than the religious objectors, and that’s not OK according to this appellate court’s interpretation of this decision in the Tandon case. Furthermore, just before Halloween, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that didn’t tell us much as a majority, but three of the conservatives issued a dissenting opinion that made it very clear that they think Maine’s healthcare worker mandate, which has no religious exemption, is unconstitutional for the same reason. So this would be a big sea change in public health law, if—as I think it inevitably will be—the Supreme Courts holds on its face that religious exemption is now going to be required if you offer a nonreligious exemption of any kind. And that leads into the third area that’s under contestation right now, which is a little bit more difficult to explain, but I’ll try to do it quickly and simply. And that’s the question of what standard of judicial scrutiny applies, when vaccination mandates get challenged. As I mentioned before, usually courts apply a rational basis for review, asking only is there a legitimate state interest here and is this intervention reasonably related to that interest. There is a different standard called strict scrutiny, which almost always results in the invalidation of a state’s action. And it asks instead whether the state has a compelling interest that cannot be achieved through any means more narrowly tailored than the one that it has chosen. In this case that I mentioned before, Tandon vs. Newsom, involving California’s stay at home orders, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court adopted what legal scholars have come to call this most favored nation rule, that says a law that looks general has to be treated as targeting religion, and therefore has to get strict scrutiny if it makes an exception for some secular activities but not for comparable religious activities. So even if your vaccination mandate applies to everybody, again, if it has an exception for pregnant people, or people who have a history of a contraindication medically, but not for religious exemptions, now you’re in strict scrutiny land. And now courts are going to make it very difficult to uphold that claim. Further muddying the waters, in June of this year in a case called Fulton vs. City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court held that it won’t consider a law to be neutral—in other words, not targeting religious practice—if it contains any process for considering individualized exceptions or exemptions. So, think about that. Now if you have any process through which people could apply for a medical exemption, or potentially also a religious exemption, but there is room for the state to, like, exercise some discretion in considering those requests, now that’s not a neutral law. And if it’s not a neutral law, it gets strict scrutiny. So where are we now? Nobody knows. One read of the situation is none of this really matters too much because virtually all mandates do contain religious exemptions. So it’s unlikely to attract the Supreme Court’s attention. I don’t think that’s right. (Laughs.) First of all, a lot of mandates don’t contain religious exemptions. A lot contain religious exemptions that aren’t well administered. So I think it’s very likely the Supreme Court will turn to this. Another, and I think better, read of the situation is that it kind of creates a potential catch-22 for organizations adopting mandates. If you don’t have a religious exemption, you might get strict scrutiny under Tandon because these medical contraindications are treated more favorably than the religious objections. But if you do have a religious exemption process, well, now you’ve got a problem because now you’ve got this process for considering individualized exemptions, and that could trigger strict scrutiny. So it seems like either way you turn, as a mandate designer, you might have a problem. Now, just this week the Second Circuit in the New York City case tried to toe the line saying, well, a state could carve out some objectively defined categories of people who are exempt, and therefore it wouldn’t be this individualized process of exemption and it could potentially evade strict scrutiny on that basis. But you have to be really careful about how you do this. You can’t, for example, give too much discretion to people who are evaluating these exemption requests. So to summarize here, there are three critical issues on which we have no idea where things are going to land in terms of the law. And, again, this is really astonishing to people who study this area of law. It is just introducing incredible tumult in an area that I’ve always been able to teach in about fifteen minutes to law students because it’s so well settled. And it has really, really profound implications in a setting in which a quarter to a third of the country is deeply resistant to receiving vaccines, the situation in which we’re not confronting the omicron variant, we potentially need to revaccinate and to extend vaccination beyond the 65 percent ceiling that we’ve hit here. So, again, the implications are really profound. FASKIANOS: Well, thank you for that. That really was informative and very complex. And you really gave us insight into how to think about it. I want to go to all of you now for your questions. You can either raise your hand by clicking on the “raise hand” icon, or—and when I call on you, please unmute yourself and state your name and affiliation. And if you want to write your question in the Q&A box, feel free to do so, but I ask that you include your affiliation so that I can read it, and also identify you properly. You can also, if you want to direct your question to either John or Michelle, please do so. So I’m going to take the first question from Lawrence Whitney, who has a raised hand. So please unmute yourself. There you go. WHITNEY: Hi. Lawrence Whitney, ACLS leading edge fellow at the National Museum of American History. And I’m interested in the issue of a lot of religion scholars are looking at the way in which religion has become heavily politicized, particularly during COVID. And, for example, some research indicates that the label of evangelical no longer applies, particularly as a religious category but as much more a political category, right? So that we have Hindus and Jews and Muslims identifying as evangelical, largely because they understand their religious affiliation and conservative political views to be the defining characteristic of what it means to be evangelical. So I wonder if you could comment on the extent to which these religious exemption requests are really mechanisms for getting politically motivated behaviors through what would otherwise be an unavailable avenue of access, right? You can’t get an exemption for your political views, but you can for your religious views. So we turn our political views into religious views in order to get through the mandate wall. And the ways in which you may or may not see that playing out. And how that causes us to rethink what a religious exemption is. Thanks. FEA: Thanks for that question. I think you’re exactly right about the word “evangelical,” how it’s taken on a kind of—especially since the Trump era—has taken on a kind of political dimension. Well, really before Trump as well. Here’s what I see, and sort of putting a historical kind of gloss on it as well. And Michelle talked about this, right? What is sincerely religious belief? Is there some other kind of thing going on here, or is it religious belief? Historically like I said in my little talk, there have been two ways in which people have opposed—two major ways in which people have opposed vaccines. One is, like, the vaccine doesn’t work, or the science is bad, or it’s going to hurt me. And then second, this claim of liberty, right? Some kind of threat to my liberty. What evangelicals have done in the last forty or fifty years is they’ve essentially articulated a vision of America that is fused with their conservative religious faith. And what does that look like? I’ve talked to dozens of—here in Pennsylvania—dozens of medical professionals, school nurses, and so forth, who have shared with me the kind of things that they’re seeing these religious exemption forms that they get. And what you’re seeing is you’re finding that historic position of defending one’s liberties, one’s rights as an American, which has been there from the beginning. And it’s now being fused with kind of—and this is what I talked about in that piece in the Conversation that Irina mentioned in my bio—fused with these cherry-picking of kind of Bible verses. You know, things like my body is a temple of God or, in Luke 17, Jesus touched the leper and healed him, so I don’t need a vaccine to be healed. You know, these kinds of very commonsense, literal, inerrant interpretations of scripture. And they’re fused together. And usually when they’re fused together it looks something like this, right? The vaccine is a threat on my liberty and rights as an American, but my rights and liberties as an American come from God, right? So this is not just a constitutional or a Declaration of Independence, right, endowed by our creator with certain inalienable rights kind of threat. This is also a threat to the kind of divine order, the kind of nation that the United States is supposed to be. And it’s deeply embedded in these ideas of Christian nationalism, or the idea that America is somehow a Christian nation, is a special nation, is blessed by God. And God has given us rights in an exceptional way that no other nation has. So, I’m not the legal scholar here—I mean, this is kind of how you kind of need to—how do you pull that apart, right? If you have a sincere belief that God created the United States as a Christian nation and endowed us with certain inalienable rights, including the right of government not to interfere in your decision not to get a vaccine, is that a religious exemption? Most evangelicals, including in the recent case of the two evangelical seminaries—a Southern Baptist Theological Seminary and Asbury Seminary—who are suing the state of Kentucky over this right now, that is their position. This is a clear violation of their religious liberty, despite the fact that it’s mostly rights-oriented language kind of baptized with Bible verses. At least, that’s my take on that. FASKIANOS: OK. Let’s go onto the next question. So I’m going to go next to Galen Carey. CAREY: Hi. I’m Galen Carey with the National Association of Evangelicals. So as a religious matter, we’re among those religious leaders who have been strongly encouraging acceptance of the vaccine, and as a matter of loving our neighbor as well as being good for us ourselves. But as an empirical matter, I have the distinct impression that the vaccine mandates may themselves actually be a threat to our public health by hardening opposition to them. And if we consider that the vaccine mandates, especially on companies, may in the end not actually produce that much more vaccination, and it takes employers off the hook because now they can just say, well, it’s a matter for the course, blah, blah, blah. Whereas, without the mandates they may have put in their own private mandates just as a matter of business practice. So I wonder, is there any empirical evidence as to whether vaccine mandates are actually—have been shown to increase the rate of vaccination? Or do they actually, especially in our context now, maybe they actually work in the opposite direction? MELLO: So I don’t think we have empirical evidence about that from COVID. Prior to COVID we had lots of evidence about vaccination mandates, and it’s all that they’re very effective in inducing compliance—again, because very, very few people object to most vaccines. You know, maybe it’s 1 percent, 2 percent, maybe 3 percent. But it’s a tiny fraction of the population. So even if you let those guys go with some flimsy objection, you do really, really well with mandates. Most people go along. When you’re in a 25, 35, 40 percent objector situation, as we are now, it’s a very different calculus. And I share your concern that mandates, at the point at which they were imposed—which was beginning with colleges and private organizations starting June of this year and then now gradually extending down into school districts—at that point we were already pretty well saturated from the people who were interested in getting vaccines. There was, however, a group of people that I think there was reason to think could be picked up through mandates. It has surprised me to see how many people remain in the wait and see category now over a year—or, almost a year into the availability of the vaccine. And that cuts across a lot of different groups, but it’s especially high among certain ethnic minority groups, predominantly Latinos, where we really worry about COVID burden in that population. So it was not irrational to think that by imposing employment-based requirements you could pick up a bunch of people who were not in the definitely not category. They were in the middle, or they were leaning, but hadn’t made up their mind. Or they faced access barriers still, that employers had a direct interest in rectifying once they were required to ascertain their vaccination status. The question is, at this point how much more mileage do you get out a mandate? And in particular, for me, how much are you going to get by mandating it for kids? And there, I think the case is much, much more marginal. I think we’re down to, at this point, a pretty small group who are in the middle or the lean no categories. A much larger group, especially among Republicans, 31 percent, evangelical white Christians, 25 percent who are in the definitely not category. And I don’t see a mandate as doing much other than hardening resistance. That doesn’t mean people won’t comply. They may. But my concern, as somebody who works in public health, is what about the next vaccination? What about childhood vaccinations for their kids? Have we now reinforced a sort of siege mindset among people who don’t trust the government to make health decisions for them that could spillover into vaccines? Because, frankly, I’ll be much more concerned if those folks don’t take their kids in for measles vaccination than I am about COVID vaccination. FASKIANOS: OK. The next question comes from Dr. Nehemia Gordon at Bar-Ilan University. Some of those opposed to forced vaccinations have adopted, quote, “my body, my choice” as their motto. This sounds like a compelling argument. Why doesn’t this apply to forced vaccine mandates from both an ethical and legal perspective? MELLO: Well, I think—(laughs)—it’s not clear what is meant by that. But of course, our dominion over our bodies has never been absolute. And the reason is that certain behaviors that we engage in or health decisions that we determine not to make affect other people, affects their health. And that’s why vaccination mandates have always been sustained historically, as have a limited number of other medical interventions that involve incursions into the body to prevent harm to others. Again, up until very recently even hardcore Libertarians accepted this principle. This was, like, John Stuart Mill 101 that we all have an equal share of liberty, right up to the point where our exercise of liberty affects the liberty of others. And it’s really quite a modern concept to assert that one’s right over the body is absolute. Also, of course, ironic that many of the same voices espousing that theory have such interesting views when it comes to abortion. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Next question. We’ll take a spoken question from Douglas Kindschi. I hope I pronounced your name correctly. KINDSCHI: Yes. You pronounced it correctly. My question is a follow-up, I think, on the issue of religious liberty. And maybe it’s related also to the “my body, my choice.” What about when the objection to vaccine is extended to objections for actual testing? In our university, if you do get an exemption, you’re required to have weekly testing. But the same argument is now being used against weekly testing. MELLO: Sure. And that makes sense, because if I think that I have absolute dominion over my body, that would extend to be required to stick a swab up my nose. It would extend to being required to divulge personal health information to my employer or my school. So it makes sense to me that people’s objections are not limited to needles and vaccines going into the body, because fundamentally, as we’ve talked about already, I think this has only something to do with the vaccine itself and has much more to do with the surrounding context for vaccination mandates, which is that many people already feel incredibly put upon by public health authorities as a result of living under all kinds of restrictions over the past two years, restrictions that have bankrupted businesses, torn families apart, created mental health problems. They were sort of primed to hate any mandate for any kind of COVID-related intervention that imposes further burdens, even something as minimal as the testing. I mean, you can’t get much more minimal when it comes to intrusions than that. It takes literally thirty seconds, involves no pain, very little inconvenience, and the information is treated quite carefully, I think, as is required by law. So I think what you’re seeing here is a more generalized complaint that has something to do with the sanctity of the body, but maybe has more to do with just being fed up with the intrusion of government into people’s lives. KINDSCHI: Is there a HIPAA issue here? MELLO: No, there isn’t. FEA: But I think just to add to that, Irina, at the sort of more macro, kind of cultural-intellectual level on this question, I mean, this idea of Libertarianism, as Michelle said, even Libertarians had this larger understanding some kind of social solidarity or of society. I think Jill Lepore has a good article at The Guardian, for those of you who read American history, about the crumbling of this idea of society, right? I think you can see it really emerging in sort of the Reagan era, where you have individualism becoming so celebrated, at the expense of any kind of social solidarity, any sense of society. I give book recommendations all the time to my students. There was a Princeton intellectual historian named Daniel Rodgers, who wrote a fabulous book in 2001 called The Age of Fracture, in which he made the case that in the Reagan-era any sense of kind of community, national community, solidarity within community, love of—love of neighbor, if you want to put it in Christian terms, slowly began to erode. And you have people like Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s saying things like, “there’s no such thing as society,” right? We are individuals. So I think there’s—, flying about thirty thousand feet on this, there are sort of long-term structural shifts that have taken place in American culture over the last fifty, forty years or so. That also explains this kind of emphasis on—this kind of Libertarian individualistic emphasis that I think is just blossoming right now with these vaccine—in opposition to these vaccine mandates. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to take the next question from Shannon McAlister of Fordham University, who’s written a question. She’s directed it to you, Michelle. Would you kindly share the sources, laws, courts decisions for the court’s practice of not requiring employees seeking religious exemptions to be members of established religions or to attend services or to provide a letter attestation from clergy indicating that the vaccinating is religiously prohibited? Maybe we can send that out in a follow-up email— MELLO: Yeah, maybe I’ll just recommend, a good starting point would be to look at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s website, EEOC, which has extensive guidance relating to accommodating religious exemption requests. That guidance specifically relates to federal civil rights statutes, but the analysis for constitutional claims is quite similar. FASKIANOS: Great. The next question is from Patrick Stefan, who’s U.S. Army. Interested in the ways by which courts are entering the fray of defining what religion is and what the boundaries of religion are. It seems that post RFRA the definition of religion has lost any sense of boundary that it might have had in the past based on Protestant Christianity. Thinking about the work of Winnifred Sullivan in particular. I’m wondering what your thoughts are on how the highlight of religion on such a large political and legal scale in our culture with COVID vaccines might shape the way the courts understand the boundaries between what makes something religious as opposed to philosophical or ideological. FEA: I’ll let Michelle respond to that, but we no longer live in Will Herberg’s 1950 Protestant-Catholic-Jew synthesis anymore. I think, again with this age of fracture, the very definition of, is religion, I mean, that’s something for the courts to decide, obviously. But it’s always had a kind of transcendent kind of dimension to it. Almost a kind of faith-based irrational dimension to it. I think all religions in some ways have some degree of irrationality to it. But yeah, I mean, it doesn’t really matter what I think. I guess it matters, right, you show the courts decide on that, when it comes to vaccination. MELLO: Yeah, and the issue is more general too. It transcends vaccination, as I’ve already talked about. It’s also been a major issue in challenges to stay at home orders and other public health interventions. I don’t know what’s going to happen. I do know that the so-called standards by which courts evaluate questions like what is sincere, what is religious, what is belief, are pretty squishy. Nobody’s really very happy with them. They (INAUDIBLE) a lot of different directions. I also know that the single most important legal development of the last four years has been the changeover in the Supreme Court towards the justices who are very strongly in favor of expansive protection for religious liberty. So it would surprise me greatly if the Supreme Court got into the business of deciding that certain things were not religion or religious belief. It seems much more consistent with the worldview of the new conservative majority to say that they’re going to give religious belief claims a wide berth, and really require a very, very strong justification. It also seems possible to me that they’ll be able to sidestep core issues about what’s religious and what’s not using a trick that they’ve deployed over and over again in public health law cases, which is to instead focus on the specific question of is there something else the state could have done besides this thing—whether it’s a vaccination mandate, or a mask mandate, or whatever—that would have been less burdensome and worked just as well? And then we get into a debate, not very well informed by science, about whether the thing that the state did was really necessary, or they could have done something different, is there a better policy out there? And we don’t have to confront hard questions about the scope of religious belief. So that’s where a lot of the fighting has been around. And again, because we have such good alternatives now to vaccination for COVID, if people are willing to do them—which most of the people who resist vaccines are not—but,  if you’re willing to test twice weekly and wear a really good, solid mask everywhere you go, that works pretty well. So, there are opportunities to sidestep this question for a while longer. And I suspect  the folks who are opposing vaccination mandates would probably like that to be the case, because I think this issue is not likely to be decided in a way that favors people who are trying to do intrusive things in public health. FEA: It’ll be interesting to see because, again, the conservatives on the court are obviously, as Michelle said, very interested in these questions of religious liberty. But many of the conservative kind of vox populi, the evangelicals, the conservative Catholics, right, it’ll be interesting to see how they respond to when the Supreme Court makes a religious liberty case or defends the religious rights of, say, a Muslim, or a Native American Indigenous religion, or something to that effect. I mean, just from purely kind of political and cultural perspective. So, if you’re a member of the Christian right, be careful what you wish for when you want religious liberty to be protected, right? FASKIANOS: Right. Just going to the idea of religious leaders—and, Michelle, you had mentioned that this is the first, and I don’t want to misquote you, but religious leaders coming out and speaking strongly about getting the vaccine. Saying they’re opposed to it, or not opposed to it, it’s in our religious doctrine or not. So is that the right approach? Probably not the right approach? Should religious leaders stay out of it? I mean, we’ve seen that there’s been a lot of push from the Biden administration to really have faith leaders help get the message out, because we’ve seen that people who may not trust government are more likely to respond to, be it a religious leader or, their medical professional friend. So what’s the balance? And, John, I’d love to hear your perspective too, because you also mentioned about past pastors in the three eras, four eras, that have spoken out or not spoken out. So where are we? What should religious leaders be doing? MELLO: Yeah. I mean, I don’t think these statements are necessarily going to carry the day in court, but I do think they’re important. It’s important to clear up any confusion that may exist among adherents to a religious denomination about what their obligations as far as practitioners are. And even if there isn’t such confusion, as you mentioned, trust and leadership from the community are really critical components to making a vaccination campaign successful, especially in the political environment in which we live now. Up until COVID local public health leaders in government had the trust of an overwhelming sort of majority of the public. And when they asked people to do something, people did it. And that’s not the case anymore. And so there need to be proxies in organizations that are trusted and are visible in the community. And I know that it’s not difficult for some religious leaders to say things that fly in the face of the governing prevailing political sentiment in the community, but I think it can be very important, again, for people who might have misapprehensions about what the religious beliefs require, but also for people who are just trying to find their way amidst a sea of conflicting messages—many of which contain information that’s not accurate, many of which are pushing a political agenda that is against the self-interest of a community. FEA: And, I mean, one of the reasons why there was not a lot of push for religious exemptions or even religious opposition to vaccinations in the early 20 century was because in the progressive era there was this kind of common sense that you trusted experts, you trusted scientists, you trusted medical professionals, right? Much of the resistance has emerged with this—has coincided with this kind of emerging populism, right, that we see that distrusts experts, that distrusts science, and so forth. So, as far as religious leaders—and this cuts both ways, right? I mean, again, Biden has tried to get religious leaders to speak out. But there are also very, very powerful religious leaders based on very little scientific evidence whatsoever who are promoting resistance to vaccines based upon these kinds of religious, spiritual kind of Christian things. Even going to the extreme—you all heard these crazy things like, you know, Satan or something is inside the vaccine, or the vaccine is whatever. And in a populist society, in which we’ve lost sort of trust in kind of science and experts and so forth, that’s really, really hard to overcome. So there are religious leaders, I think, that are also kind of problematizing this whole thing. Then you have other people who you didn’t expect to—I’m thinking, again, the evangelical community is the community I know best. But you have, like, Franklin Graham, the son of Billy Graham, Robert Jeffress, the big pastor at Baptist Church of Dallas, who have come out and said, get the vaccine. In fact, Jeffress just recently opposed  the requirement for mandates in the military—or, supported it, rather, in the military, which is outrageous—or wild, I should say—considering  all the things he was saying during the Trump era. So, but no one seems to be listening to these voices. It’s kind of like when Trump said he was going to get the vaccine and he got booed off—or, he said “get the vaccine.” He got booed off the stage, right? (Laughs.) If anybody is a kind of authority to many of these populist Christians it may be Donald Trump, but even that doesn’t work. So it’s a very complex situation. I’m not sure how to get around it or how to deal with it. But, I think it cuts both ways. FASKIANOS: All right. I’m going to try to squeeze in this last question from Guthrie Graves-Fitzsimmons from the Center for American Progress. Trump vs. Hawaii was one piece of evidence that the current SCOTUS justices do not apply their defense of religious liberty equally to Christians and non-Christians. What evidence is there that they would apply their thinking equally to all religious groups, and that they are not deferential to conservative Christians? MELLO: I don’t know if I can answer that. I mean, for one thing, the court that we have now, it’s not the same court that we had at Trump vs. Hawaii. And I think that that case in which the court upheld Trump’s travel ban against an Establishment Clause claim on the basis that, well, while some non-Muslim countries weren’t implicated by the ban and—or, sorry—some Muslim countries were not implicated and some non-Muslim countries were implicated, it wasn’t a law respecting the establishment of religion. You know, it’s one data point, but it doesn’t directly give us information about how it would have viewed a similar challenge by a conservative Christian religion. So I simply don’t know whether the court’s expansive protection of religious liberty will be expansive enough to embrace all religions equally or not. FASKIANOS: John, anything to— FEA: No idea. No idea. (Laughter.) FASKIANOS: All right. So I will give you each, like, thirty seconds to wrap up on and leave us with the one thing you want to leave us with. FEA: Do you want me to go first, or you want to? MELLO: Sure. FASKIANOS: Sure. FEA: I mean, I would just say from a historical perspective—and I think Michelle echoed these points too, we are in a new moment. Historians talk a lot about continuity with the past and also change over time. I think in terms of continuity,, there is still this argument about  my body, my rights, please don’t interfere with my choices for my family and my children and so forth. So I think you see continuity there, all the way back to the early 19century on these issues. But there’s also been a profound change. And this is something new, I think, that we’re going through right now with the large numbers of vaccine-resistant people, or at least resistant to the mandate. So I think from a historical perspective I think it’s both/and, as if often is. FASKIANOS: Michelle. MELLO: I guess I would just end by saying it’s somewhat disappointing to me that these really weighty questions about religion and public health are being decided in this particular context, where, as John has said, there’s a lot mixed up in there that doesn’t really look like religion but may, and has, in my view, heavily influence the way judges resolve these cases. I would much prefer to see claims about religion fleshed out in a sterile context, where it’s clearly and truly burdening a recognized religious practice, and not a blurry situation where the line between religion and political ideology has been lost, and not in the lower courts, which  especially given appointments over the last four years, have become very unpredictable places to have disputes resolved, especially for questions of first impressions. So I guess, as I said before, one thing that worries me about all of this is that we will get some law coming out of this that is in many respects sui generis to this very unusual moment that we find ourselves in, yet is going to have profound, long-lasting implications for all kinds of things in the future in public health and outside of public health. FASKIANOS: Very worrisome. Thank you both for your time today. This is a really important and informative discussion, and we really appreciate your bringing your expertise to it, and your perspectives. So thank you. Thanks to all of you for your questions. You can follow John Fea’s work on Twitter at @ johnfea1. And Michelle’s work at @michellem_mello. We also encourage you to follow CFR’s Religion and Foreign Policy Program on Twitter at @cfr_religion. And please email us at [email protected] if you have suggestions for topics that we should cover in future webinars. So, again, thank you, Dr. Fea, Dr. Mello for all the work that you’ve done and are doing. And we look forward to continuing the conversation with all of you on the webinar. So thank you. MELLO: Thank you. FEA: Thank you.
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