Religion

In the aftermath of the January 7 Islamist terrorist attack on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and a separate but apparently related January 9 attack on a Jewish supermarket, both in Paris, over 3 million demonstrated throughout France in solidarity against terrorism. In Paris, demonstrators numbered some 1.6 million. There were also companion demonstrations in London, Washington, and other cities. Europeans are comparing the trauma caused by the attacks as similar to that of 9/11 in the United States. According to the New York Times, President Francois Hollande was joined by more than forty heads of government or heads of state, including German chancellor Angela Merkel, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, and many African heads of state. (The absence of high-level Obama administration representation is curious.) On January 10, at a market in the northern Nigerian city of Maiduguri, a suicide bomber, a girl perhaps as young as ten years of age, killed herself and at least twenty others and wounded an unknown number. On January 11, two female suicide bombers, one perhaps fifteen years of age, killed themselves and four others in the city of Potiskum, according to Agence France-Presse. Potiskum is in northern Nigeria’s Yobe state. Borno and Yobe have long been venues of Boko Haram operations. However, the militant jihadist movement has as yet not claimed responsibility for either attack. Earlier in January, Boko Haram defeated the Nigerian Security Forces at Baga. The fighting, and a subsequent Boko Haram massacre, resulted in at least 2,000 deaths. Boko Haram and the French militant jihadists use a similar rhetoric. Yet the attacks in France and Nigeria are almost certainly unrelated. Instead, both reflect the unique circumstances where the attacks took place. France was the colonial power that dominated North Africa and Syria. France has Europe’s largest Muslim population, mostly of North African origin. Its integration has been difficult and incomplete. The killers in France appear to have been French citizens of Algerian origin, and some may have been trained by al-Qaeda affiliates. In Nigeria, Boko Haram flourishes in a predominately Muslim part of the country that is poor (and getting poorer), perceives itself as politically marginalized, and is open to radical Islamist influences. Ties between Boko Haram and international jihadist movements appear to be weak. Total casualties from the January 7-9 attacks in France were seventeen, and in Nigeria the suicide attacks seem to have claimed about twenty-six. Killings in northern Nigeria associated with Boko Haram since May 2011 number at least 10,501, according to the Council’s Nigeria Security Tracker. Yet the killings in France now dominate Western discourse, while the little attention devoted to those in Nigeria is focused on the sensational use of child suicide bombers. The difference in Western attention commanded by the two is not entirely media bias. The attacks in France go directly to the core Western values of freedom of expression, and they took place in one of the West’s greatest cultural capitals. (As Thomas Jefferson allegedly said, “Every man who loves liberty has two countries, his own and France.”) The attacks also play on anxiety generated by non-European immigration. By contrast, the Boko Haram attacks occur in an isolated part of Africa, far even from the Nigerian metropolis of Lagos. Further, in Nigeria, Boko Haram appears to be (among other things) engaged in a civil war against other forms of Nigerian Islam. In the context of upcoming national elections, its attacks bear little relevance to people outside northern Nigeria – even in Lagos. That said, there is no question that the use of child suicide bombers in northern Nigeria is a new threshold of horror.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard. Emily is a researcher for the Tony Blair Faith Foundation working on their Religion & Geopolitics resource (religionandgeopolitics.org) in London, England, and a former research associate for the CFR Africa program. The All Progressive Congress (APC)  announced December 11 that Muhammadu Buhari would run as their candidate for the presidency. Buhari, a devout Muslim from the North, was military head of state from 1983-85. The election will be a rerun of 2011, pitting Buhari against the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. In anticipation of the political contest between Jonathan and Buhari, Dr. Ahmad Gumi, a prominent and controversial Muslim cleric wrote an October 18 open letter to Jonathan and Buhari cautioning both, in his capacity as a religious leader, not to contest the elections. Muslims, Gumi argues, see Jonathan as Nigeria’s pro-Christian president, who “has tainted [the governing Peoples’ Democratic Party] as a Christian Association of Nigeria party” and who,  in a time of unprecedented crises, will be seen by the predominantly Christian south as preferable to his probable opponent Buhari. For his part, Gumi claims Buhari, whom he endorses as “incorruptible,” should not contest the elections because he will always be seen and mistrusted by Nigerian Christians as an Islamist, whether the label is valid or not. Gumi counsels fielding any candidates other than these two, believing they will be the political lightning rods for a brewing religious storm. On October 21, Gumi released a second letter, this time directly addressing retired general Buhari. This letter has a distinctly pastoral character to it, beginning with a hadith tradition from the Prophet discussing timing and character of leadership. The conclusion of the story being that these elections are not the time for Buhari, and Buhari is not the man the nation needs at this time. He maintains that Buhari’s popularity will divide Muslims, and the nation will suffer for providing Buhari the opportunity to once again seek election to be head of state. Security will be the main issue in these elections Gumi argues, “Nigeria now needs peace and stability first. Then we talk of good governance later even though it’s the source of the predicament we are facing.” Buhari, widely respected in the North for his anti-corruption campaigns, is running on an anti-corruption platform, not a security platform. Gumi also warns against Buhari running because Jonathan and his political allies have painted Buhari as a radical Islamist, and Christian leaders in the south are painting Jonathan as “their only Savior.” Religious affiliation, Gumi warns, will be used to win allegiance and gloss over deficiencies in governance. Far from presenting himself as the “security vote” candidate however, Jonathan’s campaign launch speech barely touched on security issues. Of the 112 numbered points in Jonathan’s speech, he had moved on from security by point six. Development, infrastructure, education, and freedom of speech instead are the foundations of Jonathan’s campaign. This evasion is  a worrying sign that Jonathan fails to take seriously  the defeat of his soldiers, annihilation and enslavement of his people, and annexation of his territory. Mark Amaza recently published a discussion of Buhari’s chances, concluding that they are not very promising. Combined with Zainab Usman and Oliver Owen’s recent analysis of the power of incumbency in Nigerian elections, the prospects of any candidate other than Jonathan look dire. Gumi is not the only one to advise the political candidates. Former president Olusegun Obasanjo warned against presidential and vice-presidential candidates for parties being chosen from the same religion, a likely a reaction to Buhari, who indicated he is considering choosing a fellow Muslim as running mate. Jonathan recently announced he will run alongside his current (Muslim) vice president, Namadi Sambo. Given the obvious current challenges Nigeria faces, candidates have been warned by politicians and religious leaders alike not to run and not to capitalize on easy crowd pleasing tactics such as politicizing religious differences in lieu of intelligent governance. Time will tell if Jonathan, Buhari, and their political operatives will heed this advice.

The November 28 attack on worshippers at Kano’s Central Mosque killed at least 130, according to the Nigerian media. No group has claimed responsibility, though most observers appear to think it was Boko Haram. Kano is the largest and most important city in northern Nigeria, with perhaps three million inhabitants. It has been a major trading city for more than one thousand years. It has an international airport. It is also perhaps Nigeria’s pre-eminent center of Islamic culture and scholarship. Its emir, at present former Central Bank governor Lamido Sanussi, is usually ranked among the top three Nigerian Muslim traditional rulers by protocol. Its governor Rabi’u Musa Kwankwaso, is widely viewed as successful. Some of my Nigerian interlocutors see him as a possible opposition candidate for the presidency  in 2015. Kano has also long been a center of Islamic radicalism. It was a center of operations for Ansaru, a group that broke with Abubakar Shekau’s Boko Haram centered in Borno and the city of Maiduguri. Ansaru objected that Shekau was killing too many innocent Muslims. Ansaru had been silent for many months but, has apparently issued a statement of condolence for the victims of the Kano bombing. It is plausible that the Kano attack was carried out by a local group with the same outlook as Shekau but not under his direct control. Shekau usually claims responsibility for big operations, such as Kano, but often there is a time lag. If he does claim responsibility in the next several days, that will indicate that his brand of Boko Haram is indeed now active in Kano. The attack on the Central Mosque should, I think, be seen as a direct challenge to both the secular state, symbolized by Governor Kwankwaso, and the traditional Islamic establishment, symbolized by Emir Lamido Sanussi. The Emir may himself see it that way; on Saturday he led the prayers at the Central Mosque and in remarks is reported as saying that Muslims will not be intimidated into abandoning Islam. So, the Emir posits establishment Islam as the true Islam. The Islamic radicals called Boko Haram claim that theirs is the true Islam. Among other things, the struggle in northeast Nigeria is a civil war within Islam. In addition to Kano on Friday, there were also attacks over the past few days in Maiduguri, Damaturu, and Damassak. These are areas where Shekau has carried out operations in the past. The Kano attack highlights one of the many unknowns about Boko Haram. How centralized is it? To what extent is it a decentralized, grass-roots rebellion only loosely under the leadership of Shekau?

The Tony Blair Faith Foundation has just published Emily Mellgard’s “Must Reads on Religious Conflict in Nigeria.” As Mellgard observes, Nigeria has a rich literary tradition, and the Lagos International Book Fair is the largest in Africa. She suggests that an entry point into the complexities of the country is through its literature and what others have written about the country. Her list of "must reads" starts with two classics by Chinua Achebe,  Ngozi Adichie’s first novel, and  Saro-Wiwa’s  travel memoir. Her non-fiction selections are focused on the interplay between religion and politics in Nigeria. The full selection includes: Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart Chinua Achebe, Arrow of God Noo Sara-Wiwa, Looking for Transwonderland Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Purple Hibiscus Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom:  the Rise of Global Christianity Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities:  The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria John Campbell, Nigeria:  Dancing on the Brink John Paden, Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution:  the Challenge of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria Julius Adekunle, ed., Religion in Politics:  Secularism and National Integration in Modern Nigeria Toyin Falola, Violence in Nigeria:  The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies Readers of Africa in Transition will recognize Emily Mellgard as its editor and also a contributor, especially on environmental issues. She has now moved to the Tony Blair Faith Foundation in London where she will continue to follow Africa and religion.

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. In his July 24 blog post, John Campbell referred to the “civil war within Islam in northern Nigeria.” There may be a slightly different way to view the events of which he writes. It’s credible to say that there is a civil war within Islam in northern Nigeria, but such claims also play into the hands of those who have long denied the seriousness of Boko Haram and its dire implications for Nigeria as a whole. From Boko Haram’s beginning as a movement until the Chibok kidnapping, the Nigerian government and many others viewed the phenomenon as: a problem in the remote northeast; a violent group that is marginal to the country’s main players and constituencies; or a blip on the radar screen of more well-known and threatening terrorist groups globally. In other words, nothing that really affected Nigeria’s national integrity. Those Nigerians and outside observers who have thought of Boko Haram as marginal can draw on comments like “civil war within Islam in northern Nigeria” as a justification for their own avoidance of the problem. The unspoken assumption is, therefore, that Boko Haram is isolated, contained, and thus minor. All manner of mental gymnastics will be performed to sustain this kind of denial. But the reality is a lot different. First, Abuja’s role in Boko Haram’s origins is enormous, so it has been a national (if unrecognized) issue from the outset. It is also important to note that despite Muhammadu Buhari’s criticism of the group, the attempt on his life could easily have been carried out by his traditional political opponents, who, given Boko Haram’s high profile, anticipated that the blame would fall on the group. What better time to try to eliminate an opponent than when a group with a track record of murder is at large in the area and will likely be blamed? Nigeria’s “democratic” national election seasons typically begin with an unofficial “primary” in which political rivals narrow the playing field by trying to kill each other. We are now well into that political murder season. Boko Haram, in contrast, does not care about elections. Polls are irrelevant in their world view. If they did attack Buhari, it is more likely to have been on the basis of his reputation as a traditional Muslim leader than a political candidate. But there are more layers to the Nigerian crises that can’t be understood very well by conventional ways of seeing. The academic concept of “post-modernism,” not normally discussed by those interested in security, does seem to accurately describe aspects of some present-day phenomena, Boko Haram included. The term is used to describe a situation in which organizations construct their own reality and act accordingly, often to the utter disbelief of those watching them. Oddly enough, the Boko Haram discussion reminds me of Amazon.com’s conference call on July 24, in which CEO Jeff Bezos announced second-quarter losses of $126 million, or seventeen cents a share. Many on Wall Street expressed horror at the announcement, asking why the company showed no interest whatsoever in reducing spending in order to achieve profitability. As a result of the call, Amazon’s share price dipped 10 percent. But Amazon simply does not care that much about its share price; it does care deeply about its long-term objective of dominating global retail, and is determined to do what it takes to get there. One need only look at the company’s 1997 Letter to Shareholders to understand its guiding philosophy. It will take losses, operate in the red, and “press on regardless.” Similarly, Boko Haram does not operate according to anyone else’s playbook. This is one reason why some observers think they are stupid. There is no one to negotiate with, they complain. That’s because Boko Haram doesn’t want to negotiate. They intend to move forward, regardless. They are not deterred by losing men in battle; they just keep pressing on. Nor, like ISIS, do they care about national borders. They have created their own reality, an amalgam, as John Campbell says, of twenty-first century technology and esoteric (medieval) Islamic texts, which they hold up as guiding documents. Journalist Alex Perry’s account of Lamido Sanusi’s explanation of reality in Nigeria—“to understand Nigeria…you must throw away notions like certainty and consensus”—dovetails with the view of Boko Haram as a group that creates its own reality. All of this means our current policy approach is stuck in the old, modern world where democracy was viewed as an absolute and elections were seen as the pathway to the end of human history. (Apologies, Mr. Fukuyama.)

This is a guest post by Jim Sanders, a career, now retired, West Africa watcher for various federal agencies. The views expressed below are his personal views and do not reflect those of his former employers. Tom and Dorothy Linthicum spoke at Christ Church in Old Town, Alexandria, Virginia last Sunday about their experiences in South Africa. They recently returned from a year of teaching, preaching, and listening in Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, at the College of the Transfiguration, the only residential Anglican seminary in southern Africa. South Africa, they explained at the outset, is simultaneously “first world” and “third world.” However, unlike much of the United States, for example, impoverished areas are not always tucked away, out of view. Grahamstown is situated in a bowl-like depression, enabling residents to look up and see the poverty of those living all around. The material wealth enjoyed by most Americans and Europeans dwarfs that of most South Africans. Despite South Africa’s transition from the apartheid system to one of majority rule in 1994, the Linthicums observed that racism remains deeply ingrained. Tension between groups is great, and anger is never far from the surface. During their stay, an African American clergyman visited and attempted to broach the issue in a racially mixed seminar. His effort to start a conversation was met with silence. Eventually, a student stood up and asked, “Why can’t we talk about racism in this faith setting?” Again, dead silence met the request, and the session ended. Like most missionaries, the Linthicums found that relationships require time and trust to build. Ms. Linthicum shared an experience in which one young Zulu man eventually, and unexpectedly, opened up after she introduced the concept of post-modernism. Those with power like those in his church, he intimated, live in the modern world, where authority exists in hierarchies and words are stronger than action. Most of the women and young people, like himself, live in a post-modern world, he explained, where people don’t tell others, but rather walk with them, and let the example of their lives teach, and possibly convert. The chapel emerged as the ultimate levelling ground, Ms. Linthicum noted. All baggage was dropped at the door before entering and the Anglican exchange of the peace represented true reconciliation.

Sectarian conflict is becoming entrenched in some Muslim countries and is threatening to fracture Iraq and Syria. This interactive InfoGuide—which includes videos, infographics, maps, and timelines—explains how tensions between Sunnis and Shias could reshape the future Middle East.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 21 to June 27, 2014. These incidents are also available here, and are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. Learn About Tableau June 21: The Civilian Joint Task Force and the military both claimed credit for killing seventy Boko Haram members in a raid in Borno state. June 21: Boko Haram raided villages in Chibok, Borno, killing forty people. The attacks only ended after military fighter jets dropped bombs on the insurgents. June 22: Three Nigerian youth were shot dead at a birthday party in Plateau state by members of the Special Task Force on Jos Crisis after a noise complaint brought the STF to the beer joint where the party was taking place. June 22: Boko Haram abducted sixty people in Borno state, and killed thirty-one others who tried to escape. June 23-24: Sectarian violence in Kaduna state hit multiple local government areas. In Kauru and Zangon Kataf, four were killed. But in Sanga, thirty-eight were killed on June 23 and one hundred more people killed on June 24. June 24: Boko Haram attacked a military post in Borno state, killing sixteen soldiers and lost twenty-five of their own. June 25: An explosion at the EMAB Plaza Mall in Abuja killed twenty-two people. Boko Haram was blamed. June 25: Unknown gunmen dressed in military uniforms opened fire on a police bus, killing two policemen and two civilians. June 25: Cameroon killed ten members of Boko Haram just across the border from Bama, Borno state.

For a movement that is destabilizing Nigeria, “the giant of Africa,” we have remarkably few hard facts about Boko Haram. Some of the questions that we don’t have answers to—or at least, that there is no consensus about—include:   How many operatives does it have? Where does its funding come from? How much popular support does it have? What is its leadership structure? What kind of assistance does it receive from outside Nigeria? Why do people join? On this last question, Freedom C. Onuoha has performed a major service for those of us trying to understand Boko Haram. In a United States Institute of Peace (USIP) special report titled “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” he draws on survey data and interviews conducted in 2013 by a Lagos-based non-governmental organization, CLEEN Foundation, to analyze why young Nigerians join insurgencies, especially Boko Haram. CLEEN’s research was commissioned by USIP. Onuoha shows that the familiar factors of poverty, ignorance, weak family structures, illiteracy, and unemployment all play a role in radicalization of youth. Of particular interest to me, however, is his discussion of the role of itinerant preachers who are outside the mainstream of Islam. They are particularly influential with those who are illiterate and/or poorly instructed about Islam, of which there are a huge number in northern Nigeria. His discussion of the role of children–most often “throw-away kids”—is chilling. But Boko Haram also includes high school dropouts and college graduates. To me, Onuoha’s study lends support to the view that Boko Haram has a strong “grass-roots” quality. This is a must read.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. In September 2014 twelve thousand United Nations peacekeepers are slated to phase out and replace two thousand French troops and to assimilate six thousand African Union troops in the Central African Republic (CAR). The French forces currently in the CAR intervened to halt a political and humanitarian catastrophe and prevent what many feared would amount to genocide. The situation the UN peacekeepers inherit in September will in many ways be worse. There is no peace to keep in the CAR. Instead there is radicalization within chaos. The violence of the past eighteen months has destroyed all semblance of national unity. There is no police or military. The current president’s influence does not cover the entire capital city, let alone the nation. Her political mandate stretches no further than to bring the country to elections in the first quarter of 2015. The Seleka rebels who overthrew the former president in the spring of 2013, and were themselves overthrown in January 2014, are regrouping. They elected a new military commander in May, ostensibly to provide an interlocutor for the government. The Muslims remaining in the country are trapped in a few villages guarded by peacekeepers who often cannot guarantee their safety. The majority of Muslims–once 15 percent of the population–have fled to neighboring countries. The conflict in the CAR is often framed in religious language, and there are religious dimensions to the conflict. But this is not a war for God, against “evil,” or in the name of proselytization. Radicalization however is often along religious lines. According to CAR expert Koert Lindijer, the “biggest problem now is that in the perspective of the country’s Christians, Muslims and Seleka mean the same thing.” For Muslims, “Christians are equal to the anti-Balaka.” When Seleka was pushed out of the capital, Bangui, “Christian youths with machetes cleansed the land of Muslims.” This shifts the dynamics of the conflict from political power and access to resources toward bifurcation of the Central Africans along lines of religious identification. This cannot be reconciled with a new constitution, peacekeepers, or food aid. But, this is not purely a religious conflict. With no Muslims left to blame for the violence and trauma of the past eighteen months, some anti-Balaka vigilantes have begun turning on those they “liberated,” extorting compensation from internally displaced Christians and animists for throwing off the hold of Seleka rebels. UNHCR spokeswoman Fatoumata Lejeune-Kaba has said “…it seems like [anti-Balaka] have arms and they use that power over internally displaced persons (IDPs) to get whatever they want…It is becoming more criminal.” There is rising fear about the escalating tit-for-tat religious violence and radicalization of religious identities. Previously in the conflict religious establishments were respected as refuges for all; that is now changing. Thousands of mosques and Islamic schools have been destroyed. A church sheltering nine thousand IDPs was recently attacked by unknown gunmen, though Muslim rebels are suspected. A mosque was destroyed and looted in retaliation. There is escalating rhetoric on both sides of “wait, we will soon have revenge.” From some Muslims: “…we will destroy as many churches as the mosques Christians are destroying…let al Qaeda come to protect us.” Many blame the foreign troops for failing to overcome the insecurity, forcing civilians to take personal action toward their own security. Twelve thousand peacekeeping troops are unlikely to be able to drastically alter the horrors in the CAR. There are strong indications that the current crises could further escalate and spread to CAR’s neighbors–many are already fragile and now flooded with traumatized refugees they are ill-equipped to absorb. Further degeneration of security and entrenchment of zero-sum identity groups will escalate religious radicalization. Even if the UN peacekeepers can restore a semblance of security to the urban areas, it is unlikely the CAR will have a functioning state structure or national identity within the foreseeable future.

The kidnapping of more than two hundred schools girls, and the security services’ inability to find and free them, appears to have engaged Nigerian opinion nationwide, far more so than any other atrocity associated with the “Boko Haram” insurgency. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping, though the Nigerian media, reflecting the Nigerian public, appears all but universally convinced that “Boko Haram” is responsible. There is growing criticism, even rage, against what is seen as the fecklessness of the security services, especially the army. Some of this anger is being directed toward federal institutions. On April 29 there was a demonstration at the National Assembly in Abuja by parents of the kidnapped girls, according to the Nigerian media. There is a huge march planned in Abuja by women on April 30 and May 1 in support of the girls. Leading figures in the government, and those close to it, are now taking a much harder line on “Boko Haram.” The president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Ayo Oritsejafor, has regularly denounced “Boko Haram” in the past. In response to criticisms directed at the military, he is defending them: “I believe that the military are doing their best; they are trying. I will not join those who condemn them; if they were not here, what would we have done?” As for “Boko Haram,” he said, “my pronouncement on them is that when they die their bodies should be given to pigs because they do not deserve more than that.” Ayo Oritsejafor is a Pentecostal pastor who, as the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria is the face of the largest Christian umbrella group in the country. David Mark, president of the Senate, a retired general, and a Christian from the middle of the country, has in the past called for “dialogue” with “Boko Haram.” According to Nigerian media, on April 29 he said, “I have been in the forefront of saying we must dialogue with them but I think we must take the battle to a level where they must beg for dialogue. We cannot do this unless the locals on the ground there cooperate with members of the armed forces.” He also state that "Boko Haram" operatives are not "terrorists," but “insurgents.” “The people we are dealing with are well trained.” He called for all-out war on them, extending beyond the current state of emergency in three northeastern states. Meanwhile, President Goodluck Jonathan still has not announced whether he will run for the presidency in 2015, though there are fresh rumors that he will announce his candidacy this weekend in Port Harcourt.