Religion

A Boko Haram warlord Abubakar Shekau, in his latest video reiterated his war on western education, as well as calling for antigovernment operations throughout Nigeria, with specific reference to Abuja, Lagos, and oil producing areas. Over the past month, there have been successful large-scale operations against the security services in Maiduguri (Giwa Barracks, March 14), in Abuja (an attack on the State Security Services’ headquarters, March 30) and the attack on the Abuja suburb bus station on April 14. At the same time, there are reports of numerous, smaller Boko Haram operations. The kidnapping of a large number of girls on April 15 who were studying for their final exams seems to be part of the pattern of escalating and accelerating Boko Haram activity. Because of Boko Haram depredations, Borno has closed all of its secondary schools. But the educational authorities convened the girls to a boarding school to take their final exams, necessary if they were to proceed to university or other higher education. That, apparently, is why there were so many (an estimated three hundred) at one place. Boko Haram may have kidnapped more than two hundred of them in the April 15 incident. Some–how many is unknown–seem to have escaped. What has happened to the others, and how many there are, is not known at this time. There are however, conflicting statements as to the girls’ fate. Details about the kidnapping are unclear. One report says that the kidnappers arrived at the boarding school late at night dressed in military clothing. They told the girls that the school was in danger of attack and that they would take them to a safe place. Apparently the girls voluntarily boarded buses and trucks. But, subsequently some of the girls became suspicious and managed to escape. In the past, Boko Haram has kidnapped girls and used them as maids or cooks and for other purposes. In his latest video, Shekau reiterated that girls should not be educated. Perhaps more worrying, he states that “in Islam it is allowed to take infidel women as slaves and in due course we will start taking women away and sell in the market.” Boko Haram has long been especially hostile to education for women but does not kill them with alacrity. In previous attacks on boarding schools, Boko Haram has murdered the boys but spared the girls, telling them to return home and find husbands. This kidnapping operation, horrific though it is, may have little  impact on Nigerian elite perceptions because it occurred in a traditional area of Boko Haram operations. By contrast, Abuja has been relatively free of Boko Haram attacks for the past two years. But, in the aftermath of the bus station bombing, it can no longer be regarded as safe as it had been.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Elections are often seen as progress toward democracy in Africa. Elections confer legitimacy on governments, especially abroad. However, in some conflicts, conducting elections credible enough to confer legitimacy is an unrealistic goal. Instead there are “election-like-events.” These may even exacerbate internal cleavages within a society. Rushing into elections in the Central African Republic will not resolve the breakdown of order there and could make it worse. When the CAR was a French colony, Paris left the regions outside Bangui largely undeveloped and did little to promote a common identity between the capital and its hinterland. That pattern persisted long after independence from France in 1960. In December 2012 and January 2013, when a loose coalition of rebels from the northern region, and guns for hire from Chad and Darfur came together and marched on Bangui, it was to demand more resources for marginalized communities –and for themselves. President Francoise Bozize’s government fell to these rebels in March 2013. Since then the country has been in a state of deepening chaos. The victorious rebels (called Seleka) were disbanded, but that merely released its operatives from any semblance of government control. They thereupon resorted to banditry, rape, murder, and pillaging the communities surrounding the capital. In response to months of ex-Seleka violence, some southern communities armed themselves, forming community level anti-balaka (anti-machete) militias who protected their communities, attacked the former Seleka rebels, and carried out attacks against communities seen to be allied with them. In January 2014, Michel Djotodia, a Seleka leader who had installed himself as interim president, was in turn forced from office by a domestic coalition abetted by some neighboring states and France. He had failed to halt the escalating violence. In the void left by his departure, anti-balaka fighters stepped up their own attacks, forcing many of the former Seleka fighters from Bangui. A massive refugee exodus has resulted. The CAR’s neighbors, former colonial power France, the AU, and the UN are seeking a credible CAR partner to end the chaos. Catherine Samba-Panza was, on January 20, elected the new interim president by the Transitional National Assembly, itself of only limited reach and credibility. It has given her one year to restore order and to organize and hold national elections. But elections in such a short timeframe are likely to exacerbate the CAR’s internal conflicts that still show little sign of diminishing. To focus solely on electing a new president at all costs only strengthens the impression that the presidency is the sole arbiter of power and legitimacy. Accusations by parts of the UN system and some international NGOs that “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” are underway further poison the political climate among the population. The CAR military has all but disintegrated. The peacekeepers currently on the ground in the CAR (1,600 French troops and approximately 5,500 AU troops, mostly from Chad and Rwanda) lack the numbers, resources, and mandate to restore and maintain order. They remain encamped in Bangui, while the rural areas are overrun by competing militias and bandit groups. The previous voting registries have largely been lost or destroyed in the breakdown of order over the past year. Some regions lack any history of elections, in others elections have not been held in over a decade, and in still others, elected officials prefer to remain in Bangui rather than carry out their responsibilities in rural areas. Louisa Lombard recently published in African Arguments the proposition of working instead for local elections rather than rushing for national elections. It seems likely that only when local communities are engaged can the nation as a whole move toward reconciliation and elections that reflect a national consensus. But, even local elections will require relative security. That reality will require international provision of more resources, likely including boots on the ground. In an era of “rhetorical enthusiasm” but “action fatigue,” will they be forthcoming?

Earlier this week I blogged on the arrest of 320 Muslim traders of northern origin in Rivers state on allegations that they were “Boko Haram.” According to the media, the traders had lived in Rivers state for many years, traveled to the north to buy vegetables to sell and returned home in a bus convoy because of poor security on the roads. Now, in adjacent Imo state, there is a media report that the authorities have sent home to Katsina state in northern Nigeria eighty-four Muslim students taking a skills acquisition course at the Imo College of Advanced Professional Studies. The local branch of the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) had “raised an alarm that they might be Boko Haram insurgents.” According to the media, the authorities sent the students home for their own protection. Like Rivers, Imo state is mostly Christian and Boko Haram has never operated there. However, over the past week in the northern states of Borno and Adamawa, Boko Haram has killed more than 138 people in attacks on churches, according to the media. This set off a new wave of refugees crossing over to southern Niger and Cameroon. So, sensitivity in the south to Boko Haram killing of Christians is particularly high. But, all may not be what it seems. The governor of Imo state, Rochas Okorocha, is in opposition to President Goodluck Jonathan’s PDP. Now that the Independent National Electoral Commission has announced that national presidential elections will take place in February, 2015, the country is rapidly moving into a partisan political mode. It could be that the PDP denunciation of Muslim students from the north is part of a local political struggle. Nevertheless, the apparent resumption of Boko Haram attacks on Christians in the north, and the singling out of Muslims in the south in Rivers and Imo may be the start of a worrisome trend.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The growing violence and chaos in the Central African Republic (CAR) has returned to the front pages of the media in recent weeks. The Seleka (“Alliance”), a group of numerous different militia groups, mostly from the north of the country, which is predominantly Muslim, launched a campaign in December 2012 to overthrow the government of Francoise Bozize. They seized Bangui in March 2013. Subsequently national elections were held on April 13, 2013, and Michel Djotodia was elected as interim president with Seleka support. He subsequently dissolved Seleka. Once disbanded, Seleka fighters proved to be uncontrollable. There have been credible claims of human rights abuses (including rape, murder, and possibly the use of child soldiers among others) documented by Human Rights Watch. In response, communities formed militias, broadly labelled anti-balaka (or anti-machete), to protect themselves from ex-Seleka fighters. These anti-balaka militias are largely Christian and have targeted civilians, normally Muslim, as well as ex-Seleka forces. The rhetoric used by the anti-balaka fighters is often religious and anti-Muslim. Commentators are increasingly casting the conflict in religious terms. The country is at least 50 percent Christian, evenly divided between Protestant and Catholic, approximately 35 percent traditional religions, and 15 percent Muslim. The Muslims live mainly in the north of the country, perceive themselves to be marginalized, and have never held the presidency. There are accounts of former president Bozize’s presidential guard, and other members of the security sector, committing human rights abuses among Muslim communities. The roots of the current conflict are, however, less religious than economic and political. Militias are engaging in sectarian violence, attacking other communities rather than protecting their own. Religious leaders stressed to Human Rights Watch that the violence was not religious but political. An imam in a village attacked by anti-balaka fighters claimed that they were loyalists to Bozize and had military weapons. The BBC supported the assertion that Bozize loyalists were among the anti-balaka fighters. They attacked Bangui on December 5. So far however, Djotodia remains in nominal control. This violence appears to be  predominantly political and sectarian and makes use of existing religious differences and rhetoric. What is going on in the CAR is neither a jihad nor a crusade. It is rather a struggle for political power with Bangui as the prize.

Peter Akinola, retired primate of the Church of Nigeria (Anglican Communion) and his driver were kidnapped the day before Christmas as he drove away from his office in Abeokeuta, Ogun state (in Yorubaland). Some reports–but not others–say his daughter was also kidnapped. There are other contradictions and inconsistencies in the details of the episode in the press reports. They were freed unharmed shortly thereafter when the archbishop convinced his captors that as a retired clergyman, he had no money to pay ransom. Though the archbishop was unharmed, the circumstances remind us that kidnapping can be brutal. The archbishop–who is almost seventy years old–was according to one report forced to lay on the ground. When he and his party were released, they were dumped on the side of the road and had to make their way through dense bush until the police found them. Even though the archbishop has been one of the most powerful religious leaders in the country, and is one of the Nigerians best known outside of Nigeria, the kidnapping appears to have had no political or "terrorist" dimension. It looks like it was solely a criminal act with the goal of collecting a ransom. Another Anglican archbishop was kidnapped in September 2013, and an Anglican bishop was kidnapped in January 2010 and another in September 2010. Up to now, the Church of Nigeria has avoided publicizing the kidnapping of senior clerics in hopes of avoiding copy-cat episodes. It is unknown whether ransoms have ever been paid. But, many other prominent people and their relatives are kidnapped almost on a regular basis. The criteria for victim selection appears to be the perceived ability to pay ransom. One notable victim was the elderly mother of Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. Others have included elderly relatives of governors, traditional rulers, and business people, especially if they do not have bodyguards. The motives appear almost always to be ransom, not political. Before he retired, Archbishop Akinola was the primate of the Anglican Church of Nigeria, with perhaps twenty million communicants, probably the largest Christian denomination in Nigeria, and the second largest part of the world-wide Anglican Communion (after the Church of England). The archbishop was also the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, a powerful interdenominational advocacy group. He is a leader of Christianity in the Global South; in 2006 Time Magazine included him in its list of the hundred most important people in the world, in the category of "Leaders and Revolutionaries." A low-church evangelical, he is a social conservative and strongly opposed to gay rights. He organized the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (CANA) for dissident Episcopalians after the Episcopal Church (the branch of Anglicanism in the United States) ordained an openly gay bishop. Kidnapping is not usually political, but it has a political consequence. The Nigerian government’s inability to suppress it contributes to the lack of confidence many Nigerians have in their institutions of government.

According to the media, Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan on November 8 said he is under pressure to run for a second term. Speaking through his special adviser on political matters, Ali Ahmed Gulak, Jonathan said that over 1,665 campaign groups have volunteered to work for his re-election. His spokesman went on to say that Nigerians in the diaspora are "burning in unquenchable desire to return to the country and cast their votes for the ruling PDP come 2015." Jonathan is the head of the party and would be the PDP presidential candidate if he runs. Jonathan also reiterated that he will announce whether or not he is going to run only in 2014. Elected vice president in 2007, Jonathan, a Christian from the south, served as "interim" president when President Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, was dying. After his death in 2010, Jonathan became president. He was elected president in his own right in 2011. Though Nigeria’s president is limited to two terms, most Nigeria legal experts maintain that Jonathan can run again in 2015 as he has been elected president only once. However, under an informal system within the PDP whereby the presidential candidate alternated between the North and the South every eight years, in 2011, it was still the North’s turn. Many in the North expected Jonathan to finish Yar’Adua’s term and then stand aside for a northern candidate. Jonathan could then run in 2015. However, many northern politicians say that Jonathan gave an undertaking not to run again in 2015, in return for their supporting him in 2011. The possibility–even likelihood–that Jonathan will run again in 2015 is a major reason for the recent split within the PDP. Jonathan is certainly under pressure from his supporters and his region to run again. The November 8 announcement that there are over 1,665 campaign groups prepared to work for his re-election is evidence of that pressure. The November 9 announcement may also be part of the preparation for the eventual announcement that Jonathan will run.

It is not so surprising that Radio France Internationale journalist and sound engineer Claude Verion and colleague Ghislaine Dupont were kidnapped on November 2 in the northern Mali town of Kidal. The kidnapping of foreigners in the Sahel is, if not frequent, then also not uncommon. The question is, however, why were they murdered and not held for ransom? According to Radio France Internationale (RFI), Deutsche Welle (DW), and the Voice of America (VOA), the two journalists were kidnapped shortly after they concluded an interview with a leader of the MNLA, a Tuareg separatist group. Quoting the French foreign ministry, RFI reports the two were taken by a group of armed men. An MNLA spokesman is quoted by VOA as saying the captors killed the journalists and French troops found their bodies a short distance from Kidal. Apparently, they were murdered shortly after they were seized. No group or organization has claimed responsibility. Criminal groups and jihadists operating in the Sahel (including northern Mali) have grown fat from the ransoms paid for the release of European kidnap victims. Hence the kidnapping of the two French journalists fits a pattern. What does not fit is their murder. Kidnap victims are sometimes held for a long time. Last week, four French men were released in Niger after having been held for more than three years. While never openly reported, the common supposition is that most kidnap victims are released upon the payment of ransom. Ransoms constitute an important revenue stream for jihadists in the Sahel as well as a variety of smuggling and other criminal syndicates active in the region. Official American and British government policy is to never pay ransom. Not so among some European states, and private corporations have long been suspected of paying ransom for their captive citizens and/or employees. American and British policy and practice may reduce the attractiveness of their citizens to kidnappers. On the other hand, kidnappers will kill their victims when it is clear that no ransom is forthcoming. That can constitute formidable pressure on governments to pay. So, if ransom was not the motive, why were Verion and Dupont killed? The French and Malian governments have launched an inquiry and a search for the perpetrators. The UN Security Council has called on Mali to “swiftly investigate the case” and to hold the perpetrators to account. But, in northern Mali where jihadist and other violence continues, infrastructure is poor, and the government weak or non-existent. The likelihood of learning the truth behind this tragic episode is remote.

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the minister of finance in Goodluck Jonathan’s government, is widely respected by the international economic community. A veteran of the World Bank, she served as finance minister in Olusegun Obasnajo’s second administration (2003-2007) and successfully negotiated Paris Club debt relief. Her presence in Jonathan’s cabinet has been an important source of confidence in Nigeria by the international investor community even as the country faces a diffuse jihadist revolt in the North labeled Boko Haram, continued ethnic and religious violence in the Middle Belt, and the threat of resumed violence in the oil patch with high levels of oil theft. She is closely tied to the Jonathan administration. Hence, it is no surprise that Jonathan’s political enemies are calling for her resignation on the implausible grounds that she is personally mismanaging the economy. She, in turn, is staunchly denying that she has any intention of resigning. Ngozi Okonji-Iweala is an Igbo. That ethnic group played the primary role in the attempted secession of Biafra from the Nigerian Federation and the subsequent 1967-1970 civil war. The event deeply scarred Nigeria; estimates are that up to two million people died during the conflict, mostly from starvation and disease. A large percentage of the victims were children. A poster of a starving Igbo child helped energize support for Biafra’s cause in the United States, as did returning Peace Corps volunteers and humanitarian non-governmental organizations. Biafra, the civil rights revolution, and the anti-war movement associated with Vietnam were frequently joined together on American university campuses. However, there was little formal cooperation among the activists that led each cause. The United States, Britain, and the (then) Soviet Union supported Nigerian national unity, while doing all that they could to stay out of the civil war. Britain and the Soviet Union did sell military equipment to the Nigerian government. Some American human rights activists accused the Lyndon Johnson administration of discouraging the provision of humanitarian assistance to Biafra. Following the federal victory, the national government pursued a policy of “no winners, no losers,” and Biafra and the Igbo were rapidly re-integrated into the federation. However, there was an understanding that there was a glass ceiling in place that would prevent Igbos from ever assuming the presidency. Igbos–probably the best educated, most Christian, and most “westernized” of the principal ethnic groups–have flourished, and as such are often the focus of jealousy and resentment. Many Igbos, in turn, resent their perceived residual, second-class status. Many of Jonathan’s political enemies see him as somehow pursuing an “Igbo agenda,” of which Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala allegedly is a part. Jonathan’s political support comes from the south, is heavily Christian, and includes many Igbos. This places Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in a difficult position. Is’haq Modibbo Kawu, writing in Vanguard, reports that Ngozi’s alleged “biafranization” project has gone viral on the web. She confronted the accusations in a lecture she gave in Lagos. She acknowledged the allegations of an alleged Igbo agenda, especially with respect to public appointments. Kawu quotes her as saying, “my point is, I don’t give a damn. If the people got there on merit, they deserve it and we will stick with it as long as we know they didn’t get it through the back door.” Fair enough. But Kawu also quotes her as saying, “by the way, when you think of merit and competition Igbos don’t do badly and that is the problem, we do rather well. Somebody said everybody in the financial sector is Igbo; they begin to list people like the deputy governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, the director general of the Stock Exchange, director general of Securities and Exchange Commission, director general of Debt Management Office, myself, and the Sovereign Wealth Fund.” Kawu characterizes these remarks as Igbo “triumphalist.” That will resonate with Nigerians who resent Igbo success and despise the Jonathan government. An h/t to Georgetown University’s Herb Howe for his insights and contributions to this blog post that was first published on September 19, 2013.

The Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) has been updated with the data from August 2013. While my analysis of the data is, at the moment, preliminary, there appears to be a renewed upsurge in violence since the declaration of the state of emergency on May 14, 2013; contrary to official spokespersons. The violence also seems to be of a different rhythm: there have been fewer incidents total over the past three months (June-August) than in the three months before that (February-May), but more incidents over the summer resulted in higher casualty rates. In the late spring and early summer, there were more incidences of ethnic and sectarian violence. In August, however, that pattern reversed. Boko Haram was involved in 261 deaths, while sectarian actors were involved in twenty-seven. Boko Haram victims appear to have been disproportionately from vigilante groups, especially in Borno state where the “Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF)” is being targeted. The “Civilian JTF” is an unarmed civilian auxiliary of the government’s Joint Task Force. It reports alleged members of Boko Haram to the authorities. Revenge against those in the community who are hostile to Boko Haram therefore appears to be an important element in this most recent increase in the violence. Following the police murder of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, Boko Haram tactics have taken on aspects of a civil war among Northern Nigerian Muslim communities. There has been a focus on killing those Muslims seen as collaborating with the state. The insurgency is highly diffuse and probably lacks much internal cohesion or coordination. Alongside the conflicts among Muslim communities, there is also an ebb and flow of attacks on Christians. But a constant theme has been violence against the state and those Muslims who collaborate with it. And the “Civilian JTF” is collaborating with the government JTF. Because the NST is based on public sources, mostly the Nigerian media, it almost certainly undercounts the number of victims, especially those killed by the security services. That said, the NST does provide a point of comparison among different time periods; and August was bloodier than July.

Citing church representatives, BosNewsLife is carrying the story that Islamists killed five people outside Jos in central Nigeria after they declared their Christian faith. Two other Christians were hurt in the attack. The victims were congregants of the Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN), a fundamentalist denomination that claims two million adherents and is based in Jos. An alleged eye-witness identified the attackers as “a combined band of ethnic Fulani herdsmen and Islamic extremist mercenaries.” This specific  story is plausible because of its specifics, including the testimony of the alleged eye witness. The story has been picked up by The Washington Times, which stops just short of tying it to “Boko Haram.” BosNewsLife describes itself as a "Christian news agency" while The Washington Times has long been associated with Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church and with conservative causes. The murder of a Christian solely because of his or her faith is commonly counted as martyrdom. Stories of Muslims killing Christians who declare their faith or refuse to convert are common. They circulate on Nigerian and diaspora websites. So too, are reports of Islamic family members killing one of their own who converts to Christianity. Such stories appear to be plentiful in parts of the North or the Middle Belt where there is a history of ethnic and religious violence, often masking other conflicts, such as those over land use or water. They are rare in other parts of the country, such as Yorubaland, where Christians and Muslims are commonly found in the same households. While some “martyrdom” stories can be verified, it is very difficult to determine how widespread such crimes actually are. The motives of the killers are also unclear. Especially where ethnic and religious boundaries coincide in a region of unrest, such as Jos; are the victims murdered because of their religion, their ethnicity, or perhaps some personal grudge? Nevertheless, “martyrdom” stories are widely told in Nigeria and help shape the view of many Christians about Muslims. As such, they fuel the apparently increasing religious polarization in some parts of the country.

As President Obama and the Congress decide how to respond to the apparent use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, Alex Thurston has published a sobering post on his Sahel Blog. In his “A Northern Nigerian Prediction about Syria, Validated” he briefly recounts a conversation from 2011 with a northern Nigerian Muslim who predicted that the U.S. would “bomb Syria.” Thurston observes that “many Muslims, and not just Arab Muslims, look at American military actions in the Middle East as habitual, predatory, and destructive.” Thurston observes he is not a pollster, and I am not one, either. But, his conclusion fits my own experience. The U.S. approach to Israel/Palestine, Iran, Libya, and perhaps soon Syria is seen by many in northern Nigeria as fundamentally anti-Islamic. Evidence is, of course, anecdotal. For example, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 some 70 percent of all baby boys born in a particular Kano hospital were named “Osama.” It’s sad. Northern Muslims are by no means predestined to be hostile to the United States.  For example, the U.S. refusal to endorse the third term aspirations of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was deeply unpopular in the North, resulted in a momentary boost in American popularity. Like everywhere else, in northern Nigeria, “all politics is local.” Manifestations of American friendship and respect for the North and Islam in a local context can overcome or mitigate anger at U.S. policies in other parts of the world.

This is a guest post by Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African Affairs for the Washington D.C.-based think tank, The Jamestown Foundation, and a contributor to the West Point CTC Sentinel. This August, Nigeria’s Sun News conducted an interview with Nasir Isiaku, who said he was a member of an “Islamic movement” called “Shiite,” which sent members to train in Iran before he joined a Boko Haram cell in Kaduna. Isiaku said he fought Christians and “drank his victims’ blood" so their ghosts would not appear in his dreams. At first glance, Isiaku’s report seems inconsistent with Boko Haram’s image as a Sunni, salafist-jihadist movement. (It’s possible Isiaku did not even know that “Shiite” refers to the other major Muslim sect). Yet, in June, Boko Haram left behind “various charms and amulets” as members escaped the government offensive in Borno. In abandoned Boko Haram camps, the security forces found bows and arrows, which are used in traditional (and non-Islamic) rite-of-passing ceremonies and to hunt animals, but not in attacks (even though Boko Haram recently killed eighteen civilians for selling non-halal bush meat and playing cards.) Captured Boko Haram members even reported that they turned to cannibalism while hiding in Borno’s forests. All this indicated that the typology of a typical Boko Haram foot soldier likely differs from expectation. Boko Haram’s leader Abubakar Shekau was indeed a radical salafist imam before the insurgency began in 2010. However, Boko Haram has always drawn upon—and even paid—impoverished religiously uneducated youths, like Nasir Isiaku, to carry out church bombings and school burnings. Many “Boko Haram” members are not actually members of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad—the real name of “Boko Haram” in Borno. Boko Haram—meaning “western education is sinful” in Hausa language—is a name that the media and locals created; Shekau always rejected it. Nasir Isiaku’s interview suggests he was a member of the Shiite and pro-Iranian and pro-Hizbollah, Kaduna-based Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), while he also maintained animistic traditions, similar to Ombatse. The IMN avows non-violence and accepts western education with Islamic education, but is ideologically not too different from Boko Haram. For example, the IMN demonizes the United States as the “Great Satan;” claims Usman dan Fodio’s legacy; condemns his heirs, such as the sultan of Sokoto; exploits sensitive issues to Muslims, such as the U.S.-made “Innocence of Muslims” film; calls the Nigerian government “America’s stooges” and “occupiers” of northern Nigeria; and targets northern Nigeria’s al-majiri youths for membership. In fact, Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf was reportedly a member of the IMN in the 1990s before splitting to join a Saudi-funded salafist group. Nasir Isiaku may perceive that he was a member of “Boko Haram” and accepted Boko Haram’s ideology, but likely operated within a cell that had separate funding streams and leadership from Shekau in Borno. Given that Isiaku was in Kaduna, his violence was likely connected to Middle Belt violent extremists. An analysis of the violence in the Middle Belt in 2011 and 2012—including the UN Headquarters bombing, Federal Police headquarters bombing, and more than twelve suicide operations at churches—shows that the suspects tended to be immigrants from Chad or Niger; Muslim Fulani herdsman in conflict with Christians over land; Muslims who experienced the 2011, election violence, which was most deadly in Kaduna; or Nigerian former al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operatives. Most likely, Nasir Isiaku was caught up in these Middle Belt movements—but not “Boko Haram” as such. There are also likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, of youths like Nasir Isiaku in the Middle Belt, who can be recruited into violent extremist groups—whether or not Boko Haram is defeated or Shekau has been killed.