Religion

Sahara Reporters has acquired a video of a confrontation on Saturday, October 27, between the Nigerian military and a parade of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia political movement. The video clearly shows young men, presumably Shia, throwing stones at the Nigerian military, who then responded with live fire. Traffic was stopped as apparent civilians fled for cover and some continued to throw stones at troops. Much about the incident remains unclear; a recent report put those killed at more than ten, though previous reports have suggested three or five. According to Sahara Reporters, on October 27 the Shia were marching from Suleja to Abuja in preparation for a religious event called Arbaeen Symbolic Trek. The marchers apparently took a route that had not been approved by the security services. When the soldiers and police intervened, marchers responded by throwing rocks. The army and police responded with live ammunition.  In a press release, the military claimed, among other things, that troops “escorting ammunitions and missiles from Abuja to Army Central Ammunition Depot in Kaduna State were attacked by some members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria.” The military spokesman, Major General James Myam, also alleged that members of the IMN procession “attempted to overrun the escorts to cart away the ammunition and missiles the troops were escorting,” and that the marchers “established an illegal roadblock denying motorists free passage.” A spokesman for the IMN rejected the military’s description of events, claiming instead that the IMN protesters were peaceful and were attacked. The IMN’s three-day march began on October 28 in Abuja and included a call for the freeing of Shia leader Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, who has been under house arrest since 2015. Members of the IMN, marching in connection with the religious event, support of el-Zakzaky's release, or both, were reportedly fired on by the army on Monday, and clashes continued on Tuesday. Reports place the number of marchers and protesters in the hundreds, despite IMN claims that one million would attend. Overall, the IMN claims some three million followers in Nigeria, though the country's predominately Sunni Islamic establishment says that the real figure is much less. In 2015, there was a bloody confrontation between an IMN march and the convoy of Tukur Buratai, the army chief of staff. In that confrontation, the army killed several hundred Shia IMN marchers. The military states that the IMN had tried to assassinate Buratai in the alleged attack on the convoy. El-Zakzaky has been under house arrest ever since. Objective observers have not found the official explanation credible. The 2015 event is reminiscent of the 2009 confrontation between the security services and the followers of Boko Haram, then led by Mohammed Yusuf. A difference is that thus far, the IMN has eschewed violence.  The video of the October 27 confrontation, as well as the subsequent reports of action by the security services, is chilling because it clearly shows how poorly trained the security service personnel were, and how willing they were to resort to the use of live ammunition in the midst of marchers and otherwise innocent bystanders. The military explanation, should it be firmly disproven, would become yet another intentionally false claim made by the military to cover up their treatment of civilians.

International and Nigerian media are reporting that intercommunal violence led to fifty-five deaths in Kasuwan Magani, about thirty kilometers east of Kaduna in Kaduna state. Nigerian media reports that the state authorities have arrested and jailed roughly twenty-two suspects. The violence is likely related to similar violence in February, which left over ten dead and led to the widespread destruction of property. Authorities had arrested around sixty-five suspects in connection to February's violence, though their cases are still pending. Nigerian media provides few details as to the cause of the violence, which started in the market near the end of the day. The governor of Kaduna state, Nasir el-Rufai, toured the town with local traditional and religious leaders. He also spoke with leaders of local Christian and Muslim organizations, which in turn have called on their co-religionists to respect and tolerate the beliefs and practices of others, implying that there is a religious dimension to the episode. President Muhammadu Buhari has denounced the violence. In Kaduna state as elsewhere in the north and Middle Belt, the fault lines are usually, between Muslim, Fulani herders and Christian farmers from smaller ethnic groups, some of which the Fulani historically preyed upon to fuel the slave trade. Violence can fall along religious, occupational, and ethnic lines. There is also a criminal dimension with cattle rustling, though that does not appear to have played a role in this particular episode. Hence it is often unclear whether a victim was killed over land use, ethnicity, religion, as retaliation, or in a robbery. Perhaps taking a cue from Nigerian media—often southern and Christian in its sympathies—Western media frequently presents a narrative of Fulani aggression against Christians. The reality is often obscure, complicated, and intensely local. Historically, rioters and killers have operated with considerable impunity. With the reported arrest of sixty-five perpetrators in February and twenty-two this week, it is to be hoped that this may be changing. Too often, however, mass arrests have been followed by quiet releases. It is election season in Nigeria. Voting for the presidency and national assembly will occur in February 2019, followed shortly thereafter in March by gubernatorial and state assembly elections. Buhari is running for reelection against former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, who is heading the ticket of the People's Democratic Party, which is the chief opposition party, as well as numerous other candidates. When he was elected president in 2015, Buhari vowed to restore security. He is now regularly criticized for his government’s inability to end ethnic clashes, as well as its failure to destroy the radical Islamist group Boko Haram, which continues to be active in the northeast. Thus far there is no evidence of Boko Haram complicity in the Kasuwan Magani violence. 

Tens of millions of Chinese now identify as Christians, and the number has grown rapidly, posing challenges for a government that is officially atheist and wary of threats to its power.

Michelle Gavin is a senior fellow for Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. From 2011 to 2014, she served as the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and to the Southern African Development Community. She started at CFR in February 2018. In March, international donors pledged $1.7 billion to Gambia, a small West African state perhaps best known for its eccentric and sometimes brutal recently departed leader, Yahya Jammeh. For over two decades, Jammeh was the only leader the people of Gambia knew, and he tolerated little dissent. After failing to rig the 2016 elections sufficiently to be declared the victor, he tried to remain in office despite electoral defeat. He left only after regional states represented by the Economic Community of West African States, backed by the rest of the international community, exerted substantial pressure on him to go in early 2017. While today Jammeh lives comfortably in Equatorial Guinea, protected by an even longer-serving dictator (Teodoro Obiang has been President since 1979), his country is left to grapple with his legacy: crippling public debt and utterly corroded governing institutions. In the face of these problems, the new government has the added burden of unrealistically high expectations that naturally accompany a long-awaited change at the top.  The winner of the momentous 2016 elections, President Adama Barrow, cohosted the recent donor conference with the European Union. He was seeking support for his government’s comprehensive National Development Program, which is intended to rebuild the economy so that young Gambians have fewer reasons to flee to Europe. It also aims to strengthen the rule of law and reform the security sector to address the repressive legacy of the Jammeh years. The need for multiple sweeping, soup-to-nuts political and economic reforms is a daunting challenge—and one well worth helping Gambians meet.  Gambia is a small state of just over two million people. But it is worth international attention and support because of the potential power of its example. Democratic transitions are notoriously difficult. Such a transition in a multi-ethnic, majority Muslim society is a rare and encouraging development. A successful recovery from a highly personalized and often erratic regime and transformation into one of Africa’s stable democracies can yield valuable lessons and insights for others far beyond Gambia’s borders. Right now, Gambia has political will at the top and a commitment to inclusive processes aimed at giving all Gambians a stake in building a different kind of state. Those raw ingredients are not easy to come by, and with continued international support, they could deliver results that strengthen the hand of democratic forces striving to change repressive regimes elsewhere, proving that there is indeed another way.   

There is now more violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt than in the northeast, where Boko Haram continues its operations. Ostensibly, violence in the Middle Belt is driven by conflict between “herders” and “farmers” over land use, ethnic and religious rivalries, and (likely but hard to prove) the agendas of rival politicians. As was long the case with respect to Boko Haram, Lagos and the prosperous south have ignored or minimized this violence, but that may be changing. A catalyst is the killing of seventeen parishioners and two Roman Catholic priests during mass in April in Gwer East Local Government Area in Benue state by “herdsmen.” The Catholic Bishop's Conference has directed that every diocese in the country should organize demonstrations on May 22, the date of the funeral mass for the Gwer East victims. The Lagos archdiocese is also organizing a requiem mass for the victims the same day. (Gwer is outside the archdiocese.) The Catholic Bishops characterize the demonstrations as peaceful and say they will be focused on “the barbaric but (sic) intolerable killing of two priests and seventeen others by herdsmen.” The paramount ruler of the Tiv nation, the Tor Tiv, is James Ayatse. At his own initiative, he has announced plans to meet with the local Muslim traditional ruler, the Emir of Lafia, as well as the governor of Nasarawa State and the chief of army staff, General Tukur Buratai. His stated goal is to end the killing of Tiv people in Benue and Nasarawa state by “herdsmen.” He has acknowledged the political dimension of some of the conflict. The current Tor Tiv is a Christian, the chairman of the Benue State Council of Chiefs, and a distinguished former professor of biochemistry. The strong responses by the Catholic Bishop's Conference and the Tor Tiv to Middle-Belt killings are significant and may focus national attention.  Nigerians like to say that theirs is the world’s most religious country—and the happiest. They are likely right, at least about the first. Traditional rulers, ranging from the Sultan of Sokoto to the Oba of Benin to the Tor Tiv, enjoy significant influence in their communities, though they are not recognized by the constitution. Their authority often has a religious dimension and they are trusted by the man and woman in the street more than politicians or government officials. Hence, clergy and traditional rulers are powerful.  While both initiatives have a Christian coloration, the Tor Tiv is also reaching out to Muslim traditional leaders, and the Catholic Bishops are appealing for support from “all men and women of good will,” a reference to Muslims and non-Roman Christians. It will be important for both parties to avoid stereotypes and over-simplification, not least by their followers. Land and water issues in the Middle Belt would test the Wisdom of Solomon. Moreover, the murderous “herdsmen” may in fact be cattle rustlers and other criminals, and they may or may not be Muslim. Then, too, there is the possible political dimension to the killing, especially in the run-up to the national and local elections now scheduled for early 2019. Nevertheless, both initiatives have the salutary consequence of bringing Middle Belt insecurity to the attention of all Nigerians.   

London’s Financial Times and the Washington’s Washington Post ran long articles on Muhammad Sanusi II, the emir of Kano. The emir is generally regarded as second only to the Sultan of Sokoto among Muslim traditional rulers in Nigeria. His office, and much of the ceremony that accompanies it, is more than a thousand years old. The emir and his court is nothing if not picturesque, featuring an ancient Rolls Royce in impeccable condition dating from the colonial or early independence period and ranks of brilliantly robed retainers than recall the British raj in their Indian empire. The British followed a strategy of indirect rule in India and northern Nigeria, in both places largely preserving traditional, feudal government with all of its picturesque ceremonial. Emir Muhammed Sanusi is more than a traditional religious leader and he enjoys much greater influence than do Indian maharajas today. He was the director of the Nigerian central bank following a distinguished business and banking career. He was fired from that position by President Goodluck Jonathan after showing that large sums of oil revenue had not been transferred from the Nigeria National Petroleum Company to the national treasury, and was therefore, in effect, missing. The governor of Kano selects emirs among a narrow pool of candidates, all of whom are members of the royal family. The then governor of Kaduna, no friend of President Jonathan, was apparently happy to make Sanusi the emir. In addition to his business success, Sanusi is also an accomplished Islamic scholar. Boko Haram, the Islamist terrorist group present in northeastern Nigeria, has tried to assassinate him on occasion. From Boko Harma’s perspective, Sanusi is a Muslim apostate because he does not subscribe to the theological system of Boko Haram. Furthermore, Sanusi is also a threat to Boko Haram because many people in Kano (Nigeria’s second largest city) accord him greater respect than they do secular institutions of government. As with other traditional rulers, many Nigerians prefer to use the emir for dispute resolution rather than the civil courts. Sanusi’s authority over his co-religionists is much greater than secular law provides for. He is truly a bridge between traditional Nigeria and the post-independence state. It well behooves diplomats and others to maintain close contact with the emir and Nigeria’s other traditional rulers.  

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Robina Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis. She is a native of Nigeria. Since the beginning of 2018, at least eighty people from Benue State (in the middle belt of Nigeria) were killed, and thousands displaced as a result of attacks by Fulani herdsmen on their farmlands and homes. These attacks have caused an outcry among Nigerians, especially people living in the Southern region, many of whom consider the killings to be as dire as the Boko Haram insurgency. At the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency during the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, now-President Buhari was a vocal critic, and rightly so, of Jonathan’s failure to handle quickly the insurgency until he faced international pressure. However, the inaction of President Buhari in a comparable situation, where the peace and security of a region is threatened, is similar to the behavior that he earlier criticized. The president’s apathetic response to the conflict in the middle belt encourages the perception of many southern Nigerians and even a few northerners that Muhammadu Buhari is the “President of the North,” rather than of Nigeria as a whole. Early into his presidency, he stated that the constituencies that accounted for 97 percent of his votes (all located in the north) cannot be treated the same as those who contributed only 5 percent (southeast and south-south). A news report from October 2017 revealed that 81 percent of Buhari’s political appointees are northerners. The Igbos in particular are angry that the administration arrested the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which is a non-violent separatist movement, and deployed military troops to the region. The IPOB has not been linked to any deaths. The attacks by herdsmen, however, have killed over a thousand Nigerians but have not received anywhere near the same level of attention.  While it may be argued that the powers of the president are limited, in times past, President Buhari has proven capable of taking swift action and bringing down the full might of the government in the case of Boko Haram. It is therefore crucial that the government prioritizes the conflict in the middle belt as a threat to national security. Recently, the minister of Agriculture proposed the creation of cattle colonies in southern states. Nigerians in the south, however, have vehemently refused to consider seriously this proposal mainly because they do not trust northerners. The first step the presidency could take is to deploy law enforcement to affected areas to deter the herdsmen and to keep the peace. With the former minister for defense and military chief of staff, General Theophilus Danjuma, calling for Nigerians to defend themselves, this step is crucial to preventing anarchy. Also, the federal government could take concrete steps to encourage the herdsmen to remain in their region to avoid encroaching on farmlands in the South. A possibility would be the expansion of cattle grazing reserves to facilitate migratory cattle raising. Unless President Buhari takes some major form of action, he risks making the same mistake his predecessors made, being accused of tribalism, and bequeathing these problems to future generations as thousands continue to suffer.