Religion

Earlier this week, Pope Francis visited Myanmar. During his visit there, he did not mention the word “Rohingya” publicly, despite the fact that since August 25, world attention has been focused on the Myanmar military’s ethnic cleansing of more than 600,000 Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State. That’s why, when the pope mentioned the Rohingya by name today in Bangladesh, it captured attention. Pope Francis—arriving at a cathedral in an open cycle rickshaw, totally unlike the bulletproof “popemobiles” of his predecessors—participated in an interfaith gathering in Dhaka, and then interacted with sixteen Rohingya refugees who had been brought to Dhaka from refugee camps near the border with Myanmar. As the BBC reported, Pope Francis said in a remark departing from his planned speech that “the presence of God today is also called Rohingya.” He asked for their forgiveness “in the name of all those who have persecuted you.” Recognition from the pope does help raise global awareness of the continued humanitarian catastrophe the Rohingya have experienced, but it unfortunately does very little to address the big questions about their future. With much fanfare, Bangladesh and Myanmar reached an agreement on the repatriation of the Rohingya on November 23. As my colleague Josh Kurlantzick wrote on Monday, there are some big questions to ask about how this agreement would work in practice. Specifically, Josh asks: how would repatriation occur with ongoing violence still in Rakhine State? Where would the Rohingya live in Rakhine State—would they be forced into camps? What rights would they have, if not citizenship rights? And how can their safety be guaranteed? The questions Josh poses are some big ones, and they illustrate how difficult it will be to effect an actual repatriation of any scale. Is this agreement actually implementable? Despite a relatively successful repatriation effort in the 1990s, I am personally doubtful, and would like to be proved wrong. It is entirely possible to imagine this agreement running aground if, for example, Rohingya refugees are refused entry to Rakhine based on a lack of identity documents, or they are told they will have to live in camps once again, or there is no way to guarantee their safety in the end. Meanwhile, what of the present situation and the immediate future for the Rohingya refugees? To date, the total number of Rohingya arrivals to Bangladesh since August 25 has increased to 625,000. The UN mounted a humanitarian funding appeal to support the extensive needs of such a large refugee population in Bangladesh, and the total appeal amount through February 2018 is $434 million. According to the most recently available figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, only 34.8 percent of that total has been funded so far. The financial shortfall will obviously affect the ability of aid organizations to deliver relief. And the Bangladesh government, which should be commended for its open door to the refugees in this terrible moment, has begun taking steps to move refugees from the Teknaf Peninsula to an island in the middle of the Bay of Bengal. Reuters reported that the Bangladesh government this week approved a plan to develop this island, known as Thengar Char or Bhasan Char, so refugees could be shifted there. The island, as Reuters notes, is “two hours by boat from the nearest settlement…has no roads or buildings and it regularly floods during the rough seas of the June-September rainy season.” So, despite the good news of an agreement to repatriate the Rohingya, it strikes me that bigger questions still remain about what will happen to them in the next several months. I am afraid all the mercy Pope Francis can muster will not help with the answers. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

In an earlier post today, I noted that there remain many questions about the memorandum of understanding that Dhaka and Naypyidaw have supposedly negotiated, allowing at least some Rohingya to return to Myanmar, after years of a scorched earth campaign in Rakhine State. As I noted in my earlier post, the memorandum of understanding remains vague. It does not answer important questions like how the Rohingya would be protected if they returned to Myanmar, what types of legal and civil rights they would enjoy back in Myanmar, and whether they would be moved into camps in Myanmar once they crossed back across the border. On Pope Francis’s visit to Myanmar and Bangladesh this week, perhaps the most politically charged trip on the pontiff’s career, the pope is walking a fine line in his meeting with senior Myanmar and Bangladesh officials. He has already apparently met with Myanmar commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, though he may meet with the general again. He also plans to meet with de facto civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, top political leaders in Bangladesh, and prominent religious leaders as well. The Pope is reportedly trying to be careful to highlight the suffering of Rohingya refugees—the result of a massive, military-managed campaign in Rakhine State—while not taking any actions that might turn the rage of Myanmar’s Burman, or Bamar, majority, against Christians as well. Several questions should be raised about the trip. Here are some questions to ask to assess how Pope Francis has handled his trip: Is Pope Francis actually going to call the Rohingya “Rohingya,” or will he use some kind of compromise terms—like “they refer to themselves as Rohingya.” Calling the group “Rohingya,” without qualifications, would send a powerful message of how Pope Francis views the Rohingya, and how they should be treated in Myanmar. Will Pope Francis push both Dhaka and Naypyidaw to present a clearer, more obviously feasible plan for how Rohingya could actually ever return to Myanmar without facing the threat of renewed violence against them, or being confined to camps within Myanmar itself? Right now, the repatriation plan is only sketchily detailed, and likely would not protect returning Rohingya from a wide range of abuses if they returned to Myanmar. Will the Pope actively rebut obvious falsehoods by top Myanmar leaders? Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing today apparently told the Pope that there was “no religious discrimination” in Myanmar, which is clearly false. How forcefully will the Pope highlight continuing discrimination against Christians in Myanmar, which has been overshadowed by the ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State? Christian minorities, especially outside of central Myanmar, often face discrimination and even violence, according to extensive reporting including a report released last year by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom.  

Last week, it was reported that the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for a plan to eventually repatriate large numbers of Rohingya from Bangladesh back to Myanmar. Over 600,000 Rohingya reportedly have fled into Bangladesh since August 2017 alone. In August, Rakhine violence—which has been severe in Rakhine State for five years now—spiked once again. That number of refugees in camps inside Bangladesh does not include the many Rohingya who had fled into Bangladesh before August 2017. Reporting about the details of the memorandum on return remain sketchy. CNN reported that “So far, no official details have been released on the agreement, what it would entail and under what circumstances the Rohingya would return.” The New York Times reported that “Neither side [Dhaka or Naypyidaw] gave many details, apart from a vague commitment to beginning a repatriation process within two months’ time.” Still, before any Rohingya return to Myanmar, both countries would need to adequately answer several questions. First, is it really safe for Rohingya to return? There is little evidence that the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, reportedly overseen by the security forces and encouraged by many hard-line Buddhist nationalist religious and political leaders, has even stopped. Human rights organizations are still recording details of refugees fleeing into Bangladesh saying that ethnic cleansing remains underway in Rakhine State. Much of the northern part of the state is still often inaccessible to monitors and journalists. Who will determine that it is safe for Rohingya to leave Bangladesh and go into Myanmar? According to some reports, Dhaka and Naypyidaw have agreed to allow UNHCR to oversee repatriation of Rohingya back to Myanmar. But how can UNHCR do so while violence is still going on in Rakhine State? What’s more, the Myanmar government reportedly has not agreed to allow UNHCR full access to Rakhine State. Second, where would Rohingya who returned to Rakhine State be housed? Many have not only been driven out of their homes by a campaign of violence but also witnessed their dwellings burnt to the ground or seized by local police or Buddhist residents. It seems highly unlikely that the Myanmar army, Rakhine politicians, and the national government would allow Rohingya to return to their homes; Naypyidaw seems uninterested in some kind of program to resettle Rohingya elsewhere in Rakhine State. Instead, as Amnesty International has warned, Rohingya who did return into Myanmar could wind up in camps that are already established in Rakhine State. Those camps, which have held Rohingya since the violence first broke out five years ago, have been condemned by rights organizations as little more than open-air jails or concentration camps. Third, even if international monitors were allowed to travel in Rakhine State freely, and there was a real opportunity for Rohingya to return and rebuild communities in Rakhine, what rights would they have—and who would pay for their resettlement? As it currently stands, most Rohingya are disenfranchised, and are viewed by most national, ethnic Bamar politicians as aliens to the Myanmar state—as people who are not one of the state’s recognized groups and thus do not enjoy the rights of Myanmar citizens. Meanwhile, hard-line Buddhist nationalism is on the rise in Myanmar, and no prominent politician, including Aung San Suu Kyi, will risk alienating Buddhist nationalists. If the Rohingya return, to Rakhine State or other parts of the country, but they do not have citizenship rights, they will remain complete outsiders to the Myanmar state-building project, and will live outside the rule of law. They will have few legal protections, and no protectors in government If Rohingya return to Myanmar without getting such legal rights, what guarantees will they have that there won’t be pogroms against them in the future? This is a question that Pope Francis, who is visiting Myanmar and Bangladesh this week on one of the most difficult trips of his papacy, should raise with Myanmar’s military and civilian leaders.

This past Sunday’s edition of the New York Times ran a story about the revival of the Latin Mass among Roman Catholics in southeastern Nigeria, the region that was once the breakaway state of Biafra. The story discusses the popularity of conservative forms of religious expression, especially during periods of unrest, such as is occurring in Nigeria today. The country faces a continuing insurrection in the northeast associated with the radical, Islamist Boko Haram; “range wars” in the Middle Belt involving Muslim, Hausa-Fulani cattle herders and Christian, minority tribe farmers; the mystery surrounding the state of President Buhari’s health; and a revival of agitation for an independent Biafra. Meanwhile, international oil prices remain low, squeezing government revenue. This story is timely in a number of ways; in particular, it alludes to an oft-cited myth that the end of the Biafran war was characterized by “rape and pillage” by the federal forces. In fact, such violence did not take place. Given the re-emergence of pro-Biafra sentiment today, it is important to be accurate about the civil war almost fifty years later. The predominately Igbo areas of southeast Nigeria, the core of the former Biafra, are overwhelmingly Christian and predominately Roman Catholic. Biafran propaganda at the time of the civil war greatly oversimplified the conflict, reducing it to a struggle between Christians and Muslims (though many Christian clergy supported Biafra). The reality is much more complex. Biafran secession occurred in the aftermath of two bloody coups and a pogrom against Igbos in the Muslim north, pushing Igbo refugees south into the region that would become Biafra. The secession movement reflected the Igbo desire for a separate, Igbo-dominated state. Biafra’s leaders also wanted to control Nigeria’s oil wealth, much of which came from the same region, but from parts that were not dominated by Igbo. Over the course of the war, between one and two million people died, mostly from disease and starvation. After the war was over, the Federal government in effect “punished” Christian churches that had supported Biafra by closing church schools and hospitals and incorporating them into the public system. Their quality plunged, contributing to the ongoing educational and health crisis in Nigeria. At the time, it was widely expected that the victors would massacre the Igbo. Instead, President Yakubu Gowon instituted a policy of “no victor, no vanquished” to promote national reconciliation. The discipline of federal troops proved to be far better than anticipated, physical reconstruction and national reconciliation took place remarkably quickly, and the Igbo resumed a position in national life (though many complain of a “glass ceiling” beyond which they still may not rise). The revival of pro-Biafra sentiment appears to be acquiring a Christian colorization that reflects the same ecclesiastically conservative outlook as the popularity of the Latin Mass, and, potentially, an over-simplified characterization of the civil war. Historical memory of what happened then could distort Nigerians' and others' response to developments now.

Pope Francis elevated five new cardinals on June 27. One is the current archbishop of Bamako, Mali, Jean Zerbo and another, archbishop of Barcelona Jose Omella, served as a missionary in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) earlier in his clerical career. Soon-to-be Cardinal Zerbo is not young; he was born in 1943. As archbishop, he is known for having fostered dialogue among political factions and between Christianity and Islam in Mali. As with many prominent Malians, he has been accused of corruption involving Swiss bank accounts, but has never been indicted, let alone convicted. Mali’s security in the far north and in parts of the Niger River Valley is deteriorating, with an upsurge in radical, jihadi activity. The archbishop has long been among the most prominent clerics in Mali and his elevation to cardinal is unlikely to have an impact, either positive or negative, on security questions. In any event, Mali’s Roman Catholic population is estimated at only 1.5 percent of the country’s population. How, then, to account for Archbishop Zerbo’s elevation? Perhaps the Pope wished to call attention to the prelate’s peace and reconciliation work. Then, too, the Pope may have been acknowledging the rapid growth of Africa’s Roman Catholic population and its under representation in the upper reaches of the church. Africa’s Catholic population has grown 238 percent since 1980, and as of 2010, Africans made up 16.6 percent of the world population of Catholics. There are 199 cardinals, of whom 93 are 80 years of age or older and ineligible to vote in papal elections. The remaining 106 are known as ‘cardinal electors’ because they can vote for a new pope. Sub-Saharan Africa has 17 cardinals of whom 11 are cardinal electors. As strictly a matter of percentages, Africans are underrepresented in the College of Cardinals. They are about eight percent of all cardinals and just under ten percent of cardinal electors.  

Pope Francis has demanded that priests of the Roman Catholic diocese of Ahiara accept the bishop appointed by Pope Benedict XVI in 2012 and that each priest in the diocese write him a personal letter of apology and obedience. Failure to do so will result in firing. Catholic media report that the Pope’s rhetoric was unusually harsh. What is going on here? The episode must be seen in the context of ongoing clan and ethnic loyalties in Nigeria. Ahiara is in the heart of Igboland, in Imo state. Catholic websites estimate the population to be 673,000, of whom 519,000 are Roman Catholics. Most of the Catholic population is part of a specific Igbo ethnic group, the Mbaisi, which are the result of the amalgamation of three clans. In some ways the diocese of Ahiara is a Roman Catholic powerhouse, especially in terms of the numbers of priests and of the faithful. Nevertheless, the feeling is widespread in the diocese that other Nigerian Catholics insufficiently recognize its accomplishments. In 2012, Pope Benedict XVI appointed a non-Mbaise, Peter Okpeleke, as bishop of the diocese. Though consecrated, Bishop Okpeleke has not been able to take up residence in his diocese because his appointment was not accepted by most of the clergy there. The Vatican has made efforts to reconcile the differences between the Mbaise and the bishop, which center on the role of ethnic identity. In some cases in Europe and the Americas, popes have taken ethnicity into account. For example, bishops are usually French Canadian in Quebec. However, in Africa, where the church is often new and ethnic distinctions can lead to hostility, appointments are often from outside the diocese’s dominant ethnic group. That appears to have been the case in Ahiara. Regardless of the level of accommodation afforded to dioceses, the appointment of bishops is the prerogative of the Pope. It is likely that most of the Ahiara clergy will submit to Pope Francis, though some may decamp for other “African” churches not aligned with denominations of European origin.

I recently moderated a panel for the 2017 CFR Religion and Foreign Policy Workshop. The panel featured Jocelyne Cesari, Jack A. Goldstone, and Pankaj Mishra, and together we discussed the rise of ethnonationalism and the future of liberal democracy.  You can check out the video of our discussion below or on CFR's event page.