Radicalization and Extremism

Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is by Natalya Wallin, University of Chicago MPP, DACOR Fellow in Foreign Affairs, and rising policy strategist based in DC. The untapped potential of political campaign research and voter modeling for exploring women’s persuadability and vulnerability to recruitment for suicide terrorism. Since the rise of violent extremism, policymakers and media have struggled to come to grips with the involvement of women in terrorism. As Jayne Huckerby noted in the New York Times article, “When Women Become Terrorists”, “simplistic” gender-based assumptions often contribute to baffled responses about why women join terrorist organizations and engage in suicide attacks. Although these acts by women represent a small percentage of the total suicide attacks to date, the fact that they occur at all runs in direct contrast to the focus on women as peacemakers and victims of conflict. The current emphasis on women as peacemakers is heartening, but in this surge of optimism, have the United States and its allies been blindsided and overlooked the darker side of women’s involvement in terror? Those seeking to counter extremism are overdue for a closer look at women and terrorism and female suicide terrorism specifically. Suicide attacks by women is a persistent reality that can no longer be ignored—the number of these attacks has been steadily increasing. During the 1980s the greatest number of female suicide attacks in any single year was five. By contrast, in 2008 alone there were 35 female suicide attacks and in 2014 there were 15 such attacks according to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) Suicide Attack Database. Although suicide attacks by men are still the overwhelming majority, suicide attacks by women occur and is a phenomenon that should be understood. As Lindsey O’Rourke noted in a 2009 study, “What’s Special about Female Suicide Terrorism,” female suicide attacks are more effective and result in more deaths on average than attacks carried out by men, making women strategically valuable to terrorist organizations seeking to further their objectives. That same study notes that while secular terrorist organizations have been first-movers in recruiting women for suicide terrorism, religious organizations are increasingly following suit because of the tactical advantages in doing so. In light of these findings, we should anticipate that terrorist organizations of all types will continue to recruit women for suicide terrorism. It is for this very reason that understanding what makes women persuadable and vulnerable to recruitment for suicide terrorism is significant for counterterrorism efforts. There is also a need for evidence-based policy recommendations related to women, peace, and security. Given concerns about the Islamic State and efforts to counter violent extremism, think tanks and International Organizations like the OSCE are increasingly focusing on the role of women in counterterrorism. While a recent article by UN senior officials argues in favor of women’s role in combatting terrorism, there is incomplete evidence for building sound policy. To effectively incorporate women into counterterrorism efforts, we must also understand what draws some women to terrorist activity. In previous attempts to understand why women would engage in suicide terrorism, researchers and journalists have explored a long list of potential motivations (including everything from revenge, resenting gender norms, mental illness, group solidarity, desire for equal participation as men, rape, re-embracing gender norms, and commitment to community) pointing out possible different factors for male and female suicide attackers. However, this research is still inconclusive. There remains a lack of consensus on why women participate, and as a result, a lack of consensus on counterterrorism policy implications. While various theories about women’s motivations for engaging in terrorism exist, there is a need for a new way to evaluate them. One possible new approach is the focus of my full-length working paper on female suicide terrorism at the University of Chicago. Drawing from the Obama campaign’s groundbreaking data analytics techniques as well as existing literature on female suicide terrorism, I propose building an adapted model to identify a combination of possible risk factors—like experiencing death of a family member in conflict and marital status based on profiles of previous female suicide attackers—that may contribute to recruitment susceptibility for suicide terrorism. Specifically, this approach would focus on women’s persuadability (and thus vulnerability to effective terrorist organization recruitment) towards suicide terrorism. Although such a model would not predict recruitment, it would help identify critical trends and potential policy interventions. Limited data access and small datasets are current obstacles, and the key to employing campaign data analytics techniques will be identifying future partners for collecting and compiling necessary data. Challenges notwithstanding, this interdisciplinary thinking opens the door to innovative possibilities for a range of terrorism research and offers a new way to grapple with the uncomfortable reality of female suicide terrorism.

A lead story in today’s New York Times reports, “The systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the Islamic State in the year since the group announced it was reviving slavery as an institution.” In fact, sexual violence has become a crucial part of the political economy of some of today’s terrorist organizations. Last month, I attended an event at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), on Women and Countering Violent Extremism where experts from government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia, discussed women and countering violent extremism (CVE).  One issue, among many, we discussed was the use of sexual violence by violent extremist groups. From Boko Haram to the self-proclaimed Islamic State, sexual violence against women is a common, yet brutal strategy used by extremists to consolidate power, spread fear, and foster their ideology. This type of violence against women is “…integrally linked with the strategic objectives, ideology, and funding of extremist groups,” noted a United Nations (UN) report released earlier this year. As UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Bangura noted at the USIP event last month, “We’re also seeing a new phenomenon, sexual violence being used as tactic of terror, to displace communities, and destroy existing family and community structures. To strike fear into the heart of civilian population, to extract intelligence, and to generate revenue for trafficking, trading, gifting, auctioning, and ransoming women and girls as part of the currency by which [the Islamic State] consolidates its power.” One video that emerged last year showed Islamic State fighters gleefully bartering for kidnapped Yazidi women at a slave market. Kidnapped women and girls are sold for ransom as a method for generating revenue, and sexual slaves are used to entice new recruits to the group. As I discussed in a recent blog post, women are sold, bought, and traded like goods at a market. Today’s New York Times story notes, “the Islamic State has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts notarized by the ISIS-run Islamic courts[,] [a]nd the practice has become an established recruiting tool to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.” Extremists also use sexual violence against women as way to weaken communities into submission and punish those who resist their ideology. Not only do extremists groups use sexual violence to control communities, but also to create new generations of terrorists. Reports abound of Boko Haram fighters enslaving and kidnapping women, and girls, with the primary goal of getting them pregnant. For the Islamic State as well, one of their objectives is to create new generations of extremists indoctrinated with their beliefs from birth. They have focused heavily on recruiting children –those training with the Islamic State are known as the “Cubs of the Caliphate” – and preparing them to commit acts of terror. Reportedly, Boko Haram raped hundreds of women as a part of a strategy to both debilitate local communities and create the next generation of militants. Similarly, as Ms. Bangura noted at last month’s USIP event, “[The Islamic State] understands full well that you cannot build a state with only male fighters. ….[E]xtremist groups are not only controlling territories and land, they are controlling women’s physical, sexual, and reproductive rights in order to give rise to a new generation raised in their own image.” Hundreds of women have been subjected to sexual violence by terrorist organizations, yet humanitarian assistance for survivors is limited. “We need a humanitarian surge. It can’t be just Canada, it can’t be just Europe — everyone has a role to play in attending to the sheer scope to the damage,” said Ms. Bangura in an interview.  In the interview, Bangura recounted what she said to the Yazidi girls who had escaped, “‘[W]e can provide counseling, we can help you go to school and make something of yourselves, become whole again.’”  Bangura further noted, “This is precisely what ISIS does not want. [We can] help these women recover and giving them a path to thrive. But they need qualified medical and psychosocial support and neither the UN nor the regional authorities are in a position to provide it.” In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted, UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, which is geared toward increasing the participation of women in the resolution and prevention of conflict. After all, women are not just victims of war, but have been leaders in peace and security issues, and – as I’ve noted elsewhere – the women’s participation has led to more sustainable peace, reduced conflict, and lessened extremism. A major theme of the USIP event was the need to find ways to link this year’s fifteen year anniversary of Resolution 1325 (which was adopted before the September 11 terrorist attacks) with efforts to address the new face of war.  In implementing National Action Plans on Women, Peace, and Security (to implement Resolution 1325), the United States and other countries should develop and resource strategies to more effectively draw connections between women and CVE, including supporting local women’s groups in conflict zones, which – as discussed at the USIP event – are empowering mothers and other female leaders to combat violent extremism in their own communities.

This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a landmark resolution recognizing the importance of women as leaders in the peace and security sector, not merely as victims of conflict. I recently hosted Nahla Valji—the head of women, peace, and security work at UN Women—to discuss international progress on the resolution and the U.S. role in its implementation. In both 2004 and 2005, the president of the Security Council urged member states to adopt national action plans (NAPs) to guide implementation of resolution 1325. So far, fifty countries have done so, including the United States and—most recently—Afghanistan. The evidence from the last fifteen years demonstrates that increased participation of women in peace and security matters and is associated with reduced conflict, violence, and extremism. Afghan civil society groups initiated the call for a national action plan in 2007, and official meetings on the potential document started in 2009. To garner support, activists and policymakers were careful to frame women’s social equality as critical to Afghan development and security priorities. Mahbouba Seraj, a member of the Afghan Women’s Network who worked on the NAP, asked “resistant men to imagine Afghanistan as a half-crippled body. Without the inclusion of 50 percent of its citizens, how could Afghanistan really achieve national peace and reconstruction?” Furthermore, the drafters worked with religious leaders to link the argument with Islam and de-emphasize the NAP’s Western roots. Yet the implementation of the Afghan NAP will likely be dependent on foreign—predominantly Western—governments, as those donor countries will provide the funding for these gender initiatives. As Miki Jacevic, vice chair of the Institute for Inclusive Security, notes in ForeignPolicy.com, “If you don’t have the money for it, we should not kid ourselves that Afghans will implement this.” Enter the U.S. National Action Plan—a document that calls for empowering “half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity.” The U.S. NAP is international in focus, and though it does include mention of the “recruitment, retention, treatment, and integration of women into U.S. Armed Forces,” much of the strategy faces outward, on women outside the United States. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) criticizes this tendency in the NAPs of developed countries in its 2014 study on UNSCR 1325. “National implementation strategies are relevant for all countries, not only for those involved in conflict,” the report reads. “Several studies have already pointed out that including more women in military and peacekeeping structures and operations has the potential to greatly enhance management and military operational effectiveness. “The Women, Peace and Security agenda not only focuses on situations where peace is immediately threatened, but also aims at ensuring higher female participation in the political sphere overall. It is not possible to comply with this agenda by suddenly including more women only in conflict or post-conflict situations—women must be included in everyday political and military life and operations to make their participation meaningful.”

I am pleased to launch the publication of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program’s second Cyber Brief, authored by Net Politics’ very own David Fidler. This brief, entitled Countering Islamic State Exploitation of the Internet, examines the challenges of countering the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s use of the Internet for propaganda and recruitment purposes. In order to stem Islamic State propaganda online while protecting the right to free speech, David argues the White House should issue a presidential policy directive indicating the circumstances in which it will ask social media companies to remove Islamic State content. And to avoid potential infringements on the First Amendment, David argues the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—a body created by Congress—should have the power to review takedown requests. You can find the full brief here.

Boko Haram has kidnapped hundreds, perhaps thousands of young women, of whom the Chibok school girls are only the most well-known. Now, many of these girls are being rescued by the Nigerian army after having been abandoned by retreating Boko Haram operatives. So, why did Boko Haram kidnap so many girls in the first place? Invoking 7th century Islamic practice as its justification, Boko Haram claims that the wives and daughters of “infidels” or “pagans” are legitimate “booty,” and thus they can be sold into slavery. But, keeping so many girls alive must have been a logistical burden. Up to now, conventional wisdom has been that the kidnapped victims either became “wives” of Boko Haram fighters, domestic servants, or other support personnel. Some of the women have been indoctrinated and have become fighters or suicide bombers. Recently, Borno’s governor Kashim Shettima provided another reason. He suggested that Boko Haram operatives deliberately impregnated women for ideological reasons: “These people have a certain spiritual conviction that any child they father will grow to inherit their ideology whether they live with the children or not.” So, kidnapped “wives” have ostensibly become a Boko Haram recruitment strategy. It has been argued, that Boko Haram’s core ideology and mannerisms adhere closely to 7th century Islam. If Governor Shettima is correct, however, and Boko Haram operatives believe that their children will inherit their “ideology” from an absent father, then the movement has adopted at least one practice very far from 7th century Islamic teaching, as usually understood.

In countering the violent extremism of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), understanding and responding to ISIS’ online activities have become important challenges. Two recent reports add to this debate. In Cyber Jihad, Dr. Christina Schori Liang of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy examines the unprecedented ways in which ISIS uses Internet applications to spread propaganda, create support networks, and contribute to the radicalization of individuals. In The ISIS Twitter Census, J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan of Brookings provide data on Twitter use by ISIS supporters, who utilized approximately 46,000 Twitter accounts but whose "social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts[.]" In terms of what should be done, Liang argues that "hard security tools cannot reduce the wellspring of violent extremism" and that strategies must address "underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism" by supporting "local, community-level initiatives aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas." Such "root cause" strategies often have trouble gaining traction because people disagree about what the root causes of terrorist activities are and, even where agreement exists, how to prioritize them in policy responses. Root causes of ISIS extremism could involve many things, including a so-called identity crisis among Muslim youth, the failure of governments in the Middle East and elsewhere to respect human rights, and ISIS’ seizure of territory through military force in Syria and Iraq. While Berger and Morgan believe their data reveal that suspending Twitter accounts "limited the ISIS network’s ability to grow and spread," they do not support more suspensions. They favor a multistakeholder process to address "the complex issues raised by the problem of extremist use of social media" and emphasize the need for generating and analyzing more data. But, whether better policy-ready data can be produced in a timely manner is not clear, raising questions what the multistakeholder process does in the meantime. Supporting a root causes approach, wanting better data, and seeking inclusive decision-making are not, in themselves, objectionable. These ideas appear in various proposals to counter violent extremism. What is missing across different efforts in this policy space is an overarching strategic framework for countering ISIS in cyberspace. Here, thinking about counterinsurgency (COIN) operations can prove valuable because COIN is an intelligence-driven activity requiring "whole-of-society" cooperation that meets the needs of local populations affected by insurgent violence. The integrated parts of the COIN strategy were captured in the phrase "clear, hold, and build." In many ways, the fight against ISIS represents a COIN campaign against an extremist insurgency. Countries are attempting to clear territory in Iraq of ISIS forces, hold those gains, and rebuild governance. Given the dangers associated with ISIS’ online activities, perhaps it is time to apply "clear, hold, and build" specifically to countering ISIS extremism in cyberspace. The "clear" objective requires reducing ISIS’ profile in cyberspace. As it has done physically in Syria and Iraq, ISIS has planted its black flag in the virtual world, claiming cyberspace for its violent views. Providers of social media have already started to act against ISIS’ use of their services, and more aggressive efforts by a "clear coalition" of government and private-sector actors are needed to make cyberspace more difficult for the ISIS to exploit. Risks to civil liberties should be mitigated through familiar principles, including transparency in "clear" actions and oversight by government and civil society entities. The "hold" objective involves steps to bring online voices from communities adversely affected by ISIS’ violence and ideology. This objective connects with widespread support for facilitating counter-extremist narratives promulgated through online means. Where possible, efforts of the "hold alliance" should be widely disseminated in order to mainstream the breadth and intensity of the rejection of ISIS. As COIN experience teaches, holding the line against the return of insurgent influence works best when communities with the most at stake populate the front lines of the struggle. The "build" objective seeks to stabilize cyberspace as a means for productive deliberations on challenges facing societies damaged by ISIS. The online activities of ISIS have made cyberspace more important to terrorism and extremism than has previously been the case, which creates dangers for the Internet that go beyond "cyber jihad." The "build community" faces the challenge of minimizing the possibility that cyberspace can, again, become so prominent in the cancer of extremist radicalization and violence. In COIN strategy, the "build" component often proves the most difficult because it requires sustained commitment to tackle hard problems, including root causes of conflict. In this sense, the "build" objective connects to the role the Internet should play in fostering political, economic, and social development. Cyber Jihad and The ISIS Twitter Census form part of an emerging body of information, analysis, and advocacy supporting a more robust campaign—a "cyber surge"—against ISIS’ online activities. Such a campaign will not be the decisive factor in defeating ISIS, but ISIS’ abuse of social media makes imperative the need to harness the current proliferation of data, findings, and ideas into a more organized strategic undertaking aimed at actively defending cyberspace against ISIS extremism.

Attacks on girls’ schools and female students have appeared in the headlines regularly in recent years, from the abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria, by Boko Haram to the assassination attempt on student and girls’ education activist Malala Yousafzai. A recently released UN Human Rights Council report notes that in 2012 alone, more than 3,600 attacks occurred against educational institutions, teachers, and students. In the period between 2009 and 2014, school attacks were documented in over seventy different countries, including attacks specifically targeting students, parents, and teachers who have advocated for girls’ right to education. Threats and attacks on girls’ education have implications beyond even the livelihoods and futures of those girls. For decades, research has demonstrated that girls’ education is a proven method for growing economies, reducing extremism, and creating stability. Improvement in girls’ education is correlated with increased female participation and productivity in the labor market, thus generating economic growth and reducing poverty. Moreover, educated girls are more likely to marry later, have smaller families, and experience reduced incidences of HIV/AIDS. Not only are these benefits for the girls themselves, but also for their children, who are then more likely to be healthy and productive. Educating girls has the power to mitigate those factors—including oversized youth populations, mass poverty, and limited economic opportunity—that create the environments where extremism tends to thrive. As Nobel Prize winner Malala Yousafzai has said, “There are many problems, but I think there is a solution to all these problems, it’s just one and it’s education.” Thus, increasing U.S. investment in education abroad—particularly girls’ education—has the potential to reduce threats to national security before they manifest as full-scale conflicts. Rather than paying U.S. lives and dollars to fight terrorists after they established themselves abroad, the United States should invest in creating stable, prosperous societies, where extremism will have more difficulty taking root. International education has been discussed as part of the foreign policy agenda in recent years. In fact, one of President Obama’s 2008 campaign promises was to create a global education fund. U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has also spoken out in favor of investing in education abroad, writing in Foreign Affairs, “Education has immeasurable power to promote growth and stability around the world. Educating girls and integrating them into the labor force is especially critical to breaking the cycle of poverty.” Yet the promised increases in funding for education abroad have not yet materialized. In both 2011 and 2013, the House of Representatives introduced the Education for All Act, a bill that to increase U.S. aid for education to $3 billion per year. But the bill has never passed, and from 2010 to 2013, education funding to Afghanistan declined steadily. The United States should support education—specifically girls’ education—abroad not only to empower and benefit girls around the world, but also to reduce poverty and improve stability in strategic regions and achieve U.S. national security interests.

This week, the New York Times reported that 32 officers of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the Kunduz province are under suspicion in an ongoing investigation for corruption and ties to the Taliban. The report details harrowing crimes committed by police in Kunduz, including the kidnapping of children and rape of the citizens they are meant to protect. These allegations of police corruption and alliances with Taliban bear out concerns—highlighted in my working paper—about the ability of the Afghan police forces to maintain safety with the U.S. drawdown and the implications of the security transition for Afghan women and girls specifically. The time has come for Afghanistan to develop the capacity to provide security for themselves. An extended U.S. military presence would only hamper Afghanistan’s journey toward self-sufficiency in the security sector. Yet the question remains: without active and direct U.S. involvement in Afghanistan’s security, are the ANP and other Afghan security actors up to the task of maintaining a safe and stable public sphere? Security in the public space is particularly critical for women and girls. During the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, women and girls were barred and intimidated from participating in many sectors of society. Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan women and girls have made huge gains in education, employment, and political participation. Yet in order for continued strides in gender equality, stability and security on the ground is vital. Maintaining a safe public space for all Afghan citizens—and ensuring women and girls have the space to grow—requires a competent and professional civilian police force. Weeding out corruption in the ANP is a start, but there is more that the Afghan government can do to improve its police force. By professionalizing the police force, properly testing and vetting police leadership, and providing officers adequate pay and benefits, future officers will be less susceptible to corruption. Furthermore, the government should work to broaden the inclusion of female officers in the police force—of the ANP’s over 150,000 staff, just over 1,500 are women—and police training programs should focus on respect for human rights, including women’s rights. Building a professional police force with the ability to protect the public space is important not only for women and girls, but for Afghanistan as a whole. And the positive effects of stability in Afghanistan do not stop at the border. More broadly, Afghan security, stability, and prosperity are necessary for counterterrorism and security efforts in the region and, ultimately, U.S. national security interests.