Radicalization and Extremism

President Barack Obama's decision to resume repatriation efforts for Yemeni detainees held in the detention center at Guantanamo Bay presents a significant opportunity to strengthen the counterterrorism relationship between the United States and Yemen. As part of the repatriation effort, the United States should fund the establishment of a permanent terrorist rehabilitation institution in Yemen, providing a critical counterterrorism partner with a needed strategic capability to counter al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and forming the cornerstone of a strengthened intelligence-sharing relationship. While the center would initially be used to reduce the significant political and security risks of returning Guantanamo detainees, it could then serve to rehabilitate other Yemeni terrorism detainees, undermining AQAP and other militant groups threatening the security of the United States and Yemen. The Yemeni Dilemma Over 600 Guantanamo detainees have been repatriated or released, but 155 remain. The Guantanamo Periodic Review Board (PRB) determined that there is no longer a basis to hold fifty-five of the detainees from Yemen as enemy combatants and cleared them for release. Of the fifty-five detainees, there are thirty in "conditional detention." Statute prevents their transfer until the president certifies the security situation in Yemen is adequately stabilized, appropriate third-country resettlement options have been arranged, or a suitable rehabilitation program has been established. These detainees are not considered high-value detainees for intelligence purposes. The youngest Yemeni detainee is thirty-two, making indefinite detention a forty- to fifty-year proposition. The PRB determination strengthens the possibility of these detainees eventually prevailing in federal courts, forcing their release or transfer under potentially less-than-ideal terms. Resettling the Yemeni detainees in third countries would complicate reintegration and raise the risk of recidivism, which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed to be more than 25 percent for released Guantanamo detainees. Resettlement would shift this security risk to those countries—a risk few are likely to accept. The continued detention of the Yemeni detainees is straining the relationship with Yemen and is allowing al-Qaeda to delegitimize the Unites States' counterterrorism efforts. However, the recidivism risk involved with their repatriation is particularly acute in Yemen, home of AQAP, al-Qaeda's most active affiliate. The failed "underwear bomber" in 2009 and two subsequent attempted attacks on U.S.-bound cargo flights highlight AQAP's desire to strike the U.S. homeland. AQAP also radicalizes extremists in English-speaking countries through its online magazine, Inspire. Different Approaches to Risk Mitigation This recidivism risk could be reduced through different mitigation strategies, including rehabilitation, parole, and post-release monitoring. Some terrorist rehabilitation programs have focused on deradicalization, a process designed to change individuals' political or religious beliefs through dialog as a means to convince them to abandon terrorism. Other programs emphasize demobilization, a system of incentives and disincentives to convince subjects to abandon violence. Deradicalization and demobilization are not mutually exclusive rehabilitative approaches and are often used simultaneously. Parole places various conditions on the subject as a condition for release with the consequence of incarceration for violating them. Post-release monitoring can include overt meetings and clandestine surveillance to determine if the subject is meeting the terms of parole, recommits terrorist acts, or associates with terrorists. Various countries employed combinations of risk-mitigation approaches in a variety of settings, including prisons, halfway houses, military detention centers, and noncustodial settings. For example, the Pakistani military ran a deradicalization program in the Swat Valley to counter the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Indonesia's police-run deradicalization approach includes sentence reduction and financial assistance. In Yemen, the Political Security Office (PSO) used religious scholars in a prison-based program to deradicalize detainees. Post-release, the National Security Bureau (NSB) monitored the detainees, typically for only about a year. Saudi Arabia uses a model similar to halfway houses in criminal justice systems. The center encourages parolees to publicly renounce al-Qaeda, placing them at odds with the terrorist groups and keeping the detainees dependent on the security services, making them easier to monitor when released. The Early Release Scheme (ERS) in Northern Ireland was a group demobilization approach in which imprisoned terrorists were paroled on the condition that all paroled members would be reincarcerated if their group carried out a terrorist attack. Colombia's reincorporation program operated in a noncustodial setting and allowed individual paramilitaries to leave the conflict with amnesty and financial incentives. Assessing the recidivism rate for rehabilitation programs is difficult. Yemen asserted a 2 percent recidivism rate for the 364 detainees who went through its deradicalization program. Despite its claimed success, the program has not been active since 2005. Similarly, Saudi Arabia claims its program has a recidivism rate of 2 to 3 percent, but concedes that the recidivism rate for Saudi former Guantanamo detainees was about 8 percent. This outcome still compares favorably to the recidivism rate experienced with other Guantanamo detainees. These claims are hard to verify, as they are self-reported by the government agencies running the programs and based on intelligence with significant gaps. However, the ERS is independently monitored. Of the 450 prisoners who participated, only 16 were rearrested for terrorism-related activity. Recommendations The only viable option for the Yemeni detainees who have been cleared for release is to repatriate them; however, this process should be done in a manner that minimizes the risk to the United States and Yemen. While reducing the recidivism risk to zero is impossible, the most promising risk-mitigation program would include rehabilitation, strict post-release parole, and a rigorous post-release monitoring plan. The State Department should allocate International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds to establish and operate a permanent rehabilitation institution in Yemen. Based on the cost of the Saudi program, the estimated cost for initial build-out and three years of operating funds is roughly $26 million. In comparison, the United States spends over $454 million annually to run the Guantanamo detention center. An effective risk-mitigation initiative would include the following features: A permanent institution. The objective of rehabilitation should be to transition the detainees from long-term detention at Guantanamo into Yemeni society, making the halfway house model the most apt. The PSO should establish and administer a terrorist rehabilitation center that utilizes both deradicalization and individual demobilization approaches. Although security will be the PSO's responsibility, the center should be staffed with religious, psychological, and social-services experts from outside of government. As in the Saudi center, religious scholars should be used to deradicalize detainees. As part of the demobilization effort, the center would provide financial payments, family counseling, mental health services, basic education, and job assistance. Detainees would stay at the center for a minimum of three months prior to being paroled. After the Guantanamo detainees complete the program, Yemen would then use the center to rehabilitate and reintegrate its other Yemeni terrorism detainees, hundreds of whom are in custody. Measureable outcomes. Prior to being paroled from the rehabilitation center, PSO officials would have to certify the detainee successfully met standards measuring the likelihood of violence and of successful reintegration into society. Detainees' public renouncement of terrorism would be one such factor and should be used as part of Yemen's strategic-messaging campaign against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. ODNI would produce an annual report using qualitative and quantitative measures assessing the recidivism of the former detainees including those in rehabilitation or on parole. The classified report should include an unclassified annex for public dissemination. Rigorous post-release monitoring and parole procedures. Yemen should closely monitor the detainees via physical surveillance, home visits, and meetings with security services. The duration of the monitoring would be based on a risk assessment conducted jointly by the NSB and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a form of group demobilization, the detainees' tribal elders would be required to sign parole agreements acknowledging the parolees' obligation not to commit terrorist acts or join militant groups. The PSO would provide funds to tribal leaders to encourage compliance and provide intelligence. A detainee's failure to meet the terms of the parole would result in the cessation of financial assistance to the accountable elders and would subject the former detainee to incarceration or military action by Yemen or the United States. An ongoing intelligence-sharing relationship. The CIA should bolster Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities by providing the PSO and NSB with technical and paramilitary assistance (if required). In return, the PSO and NSB should regularly share intelligence on former detainees, including their status in the program, the level of monitoring, and any indications of terrorist activity. In addition, human intelligence gathered from former detainees, tribal elders, and family members would aid Yemen and the United States in undermining AQAP and other militant groups. A Significant Opportunity AQAP poses a significant security threat to the United States. While it is in the United States' interest to repatriate the Yemeni detainees who have already been cleared for release, it must do so in a manner that does not strengthen AQAP, and ideally weakens it. Critics may argue that the security risks of repatriation outweigh the gains, but there are no viable alternatives. The most promising strategy to reduce the risk of recidivism is for Yemen to combine multiple risk-reduction approaches utilized by other countries. By repatriating Yemeni nationals while aiding in the efforts to minimize the risk they pose, the Unites States has the opportunity to strengthen the counterterrorism relationship between the two countries by providing funding and security assistance in return for human intelligence.

The rise of Islamist radicalism continues to threaten U.S. interests in the greater Middle East. Last year's attacks on U.S. embassies, instability in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, and an increase in political activism among Salafist movements are all cause for concern. In Pakistan, extremist networks use U.S. drone strikes and the killing of Osama bin Laden to rally people to their cause. Although Muslim organizations in the Middle East, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Europe have had some success countering violent extremism (CVE), these groups desperately need financial assistance to continue their work. The United States should address this funding gap. By using the existing Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), founded by the U.S. State Department in conjunction with Muslim-majority governments (including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey), the United States is now ideally situated to create a long-term funding mechanism, or "global venture," that consolidates existing programs and seeds new initiatives. Done properly, within eight to ten years al-Qaeda's theology and ideology can become as unattractive among young Muslims as communism became to East Germans. The Problem Al-Qaeda and its ideological affiliates do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they feed off of ideas that have proliferated in Muslim communities over decades. A combination of religious literalism and conspiracist politics is at the core of their anti-Western ideology. These ideas include the beliefs that democracy is man-made and only extremist understandings of God's law should be enforced; that violent jihad is a Muslim obligation until "God's law" is manifest; that those who die pursuing it, including suicide bombers, are martyrs; and that the greatest obstacle to Islam's dominance is the modern West, led by the United States. Killing Americans, therefore, weakens an enemy that oppresses Muslims. Unless such ideas are challenged and discredited, extremist groups will continue to regenerate no matter how many terrorists are killed. Developing Alternative Narratives Organizations in the Middle East, Pakistan, and elsewhere are leading the way in advocating counternarratives to extremist messaging. Organizations like Khudi, a Pakistan-based campus network, use Muslim history to argue against radicals who twist the meaning of the word umma into a "nation united against infidels" (its correct, historical meaning is "community"). The Radical Middle Way, a Muslim organization based in London, holds public "question time" events with clerics from Egypt's prestigious al-Azhar seminary who use scripture to undermine the belief that suicide bombers are martyrs and to support democracy within an Islamic framework. Activists in Saudi Arabia and Egypt are using social media to challenge conspiracy theories and a pervasive sense of victimhood vis-à-vis the West. They work in hubs of extremist recruitment—mosques, community centers, universities, prisons, and websites—and target vulnerable youth with innovative programming. Building on these and like-minded organizations and activists, CVE efforts must focus on: Educating Muslim thought leaders in mosques and on university campuses through workshops and testimonies from former radicals about why Islamist hard-liners threaten Muslim communities. In 2009, al-Qaeda and its affiliates killed more Muslims than non-Muslims. Muslims need to reclaim their faith because Islamist extremism endangers the very fabric of mainstream, moderate Islam. Providing financial support to moderates for establishing alternative satellite television channels across the Middle East. A region with bulging youth populations, high unemployment, low rates of reading books, and mass popularity of satellite television means radical clerics often provide unchallenged guidance on questions of religion and politics. Supporting the publication and dissemination of reading materials on normative Islam. Those looking for religious literature in the Middle East are often exposed to glossy publications from Gulf countries that promote a literalist, radical reading of Islam. Alternative and mainstream material exists in Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, but requires translation and targeted distribution on campuses, in bookshops, and in mosques. Initiating the around-the-clock presence of a professional, well-informed network of web-savvy Muslims who are active in Arab and Muslim chat rooms and on social media, refuting al-Qaeda propaganda with factual and scriptural arguments. The purpose is not to dissuade jihadis (that would be a bonus), but to ensure virtual audiences do not assume that extreme narratives are unchallenged and hence preponderant. Puncturing the popular perception that the United States is at war with Islam and Muslims by inviting religious leaders annually as guests of the U.S. Congress during the president's state of the union address. This respectful, high-visibility presence would generate Arab and Muslim media coverage that further dents anti-Americanism. Pioneering a Global Venture A cornerstone of the Obama administration's counterterrorism and CVE strategy is the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Launched in 2011, this effort has rightly identified the need for governments and experts to coordinate and share effective CVE strategies. The forum has inspired the creation of the Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Abu Dhabi, an institution focusing on training, research, and dialogue between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and governments that counter extremism. Building on these efforts by establishing a CVE global fund is a natural next step for the GCTF. A global venture that identifies and funds counterradicalization projects in strategically important countries would be a first step in reversing the grip of the al-Qaeda narrative. Worthy efforts have been undertaken in the past, such as the State Department's public diplomacy initiatives and the appointment of a U.S. special representative to Muslim communities, but they have come up short by failing to address the ongoing funding crisis among anti-extremism organizations. A global venture, however, would build on existing efforts and financially strengthen Muslim civil society against extremism. The money to seed this project should come from a wide variety of individuals, organizations, and governments that share an interest in countering extremism. Public and private funding is readily available in Turkey and Gulf countries, from Muslim American communities, and from Western development and philanthropic organizations. Rooting this venture in a diverse network of partners would bolster the program's appeal while heading off the al-Qaeda allegation that it is an American plot. Garnering support to combat radicalism under the umbrella of a global venture will require a centralized effort from a body that can lend the venture prestige, direction, and continuity. Based on existing American and Turkish cooperation at the GCTF, the United States should encourage Turkey to take the lead in establishing the global venture (the two currently lead the coordinating committee). A Global Venture in Practice Initially, the GCTF should convene an international conference of high-profile Muslim and non-Muslim philanthropists, imams, thinkers, community leaders, and government officials to define objectives and elect an oversight board from within their ranks. They may wish to name the fund after a prominent Muslim historical figure to make it appeal to religious activists. Washington should encourage American philanthropies to advise the GCTF board on how to raise money and staff the venture. The venture should be headquartered in Istanbul or a Gulf capital, locating it centrally in terms of both physical and religious geography. Based on interest levels from potential donors, funding levels for analogous ventures in the past, and absorptive capacity of future grantees, the global fund would require at least $300 million and a ten-year commitment by major donors at the outset to ensure the venture is sustainable and deeply rooted. Private and/or government-funded organizations could apply for grants of various sizes depending on the scope and activities of their proposed projects. With support, these organizations could organize youth camps, create social network–based websites to educate youth, provide speaking platforms for moderate imams, disseminate publications on Muslim campuses, offer scholarship opportunities, and create exchange programs for students to learn firsthand about Western government and society. To ensure funds reach the right people, applicant organizations would need to demonstrate a commitment to religious pluralism, human rights, democracy, and nonviolence. Project proposals would require letters of support from groups credibly doing similar work on the ground or GCTF founding-member governments. Monitoring and evaluation would be central to the venture's mission, and therefore a robust staff will be needed to work with experts assigned to measure the success of funded programs and determine their eligibility for future funding. Existing philanthropies could be enlisted to advise on best practices. Through sustained funding of existing efforts and supporting new initiatives in mosques, on campuses and satellite television, and through publications and online media, a global venture can target audiences through multiple avenues, maximizing efforts to discredit radical narratives.