Race and Ethnicity

The African National Congress (ANC) has governed South Africa since the inauguration of Nelson Mandela in 1994, which formally brought about an end to apartheid. It supported and actively participated in the drafting of the 1996 constitution, which included some of the most sweeping human rights provisions in the world. Based on that constitution, the independent South African judiciary has, among other things, eliminated capital punishment and sanctioned gay marriage. The constitution also has sweeping provisions against discrimination based on race, gender, or religion. The ANC has a long history of strongly supporting gender equality, and many ANC ministers have been women. In the 2017 race for the party leadership, a leading candidate was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Though defeated by Cyril Ramaphosa, her gender was a source of political strength for many party delegates who believed it was time for a female party leader and, ultimately, chief of state. The constitution is largely sacrosanct in urban, modern South Africa, but this is less true in rural areas, which are often still dominated by traditional rulers and ethnic customs. Discrimination against women is widespread, allegedly sanctioned by traditional custom and contrary to the letter and the spirit of the constitution. The clash between the modern and the traditional is illustrated by the “reed dance.” Performed by “maidens” in the semi-nude, it is a widespread custom among the Ndebele people, including Xhosas and Zulus, in southern Africa. It is perhaps best known in Swaziland, where the king chooses a new wife every year—he now has fourteen—following the annual reed dance (pictured). Reed dance performances often attract tourists and are seen as folkloric. In South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, the New York Times reported on a reed dance performance organized by a choirmaster in celebration of “Xhosa tradition” that went viral on social media. According to the choirmaster, it was to celebrate “Xhosa heritage.” (The Xhosas are the second largest ethnic group in South Africa, after the Zulus, and are the majority in the Eastern Cape.)  The minister of basic education, Angie Motshekga, has publicly denounced the performance. She characterized the performance as “completely inappropriate” and that teachers “should know better than to expose teenage girls to this form of exploitation.” She went on: “There is absolutely nothing wrong with being proud of your culture and heritage. But there was absolutely no need for these children to perform completely naked. That indignity goes against the values of our culture.” (According to the New York Times, the performers wore small aprons.)  Motshekga has been minister of basic education since 2009. She has agitated for more resources for rural schools and for basic female education. She seeks the introduction of the compulsory study of history as part of the curriculum. But she is also the public face of the poor quality of South African primary education, especially in the rural areas and for the black majority more generally. She holds multiple university degrees, including from the highly prestigious University of the Witswatersrand (“Wits”) where she was also a lecturer. She is from Soweto, outside of Johannesburg, and is a veteran of the struggle against apartheid. Like many urban South Africans, she mentions no ethnic affiliation in her standard biographic notes. It is no surprise that she would oppose a “traditional” ceremony that demeans women. She is a former president of the powerful ANC Womens League (ANCWL), and former President Jacob Zuma appointed her to her current post. The controversial Zuma was chief of state from 2009 to 2018. Especially toward the end of his tenure, when criticism of his crony style of government became widespread in the country’s major cities, Zuma turned to rural areas for political support. He often participated in Zulu traditional ceremonies, including reed dances. As early as 2015, Motshekga’s husband, an ANC member of parliament, called on Zuma to step down. In the 2017 ANC party convention, Motshekga broke with the ANCWL and supported Ramaphosa, rather than Dlamini-Zuma, who was Jacob Zuma’s preferred candidate (and former wife). Ramaphosa was an architect of South Africa’s constitution and in style, he is a modern, attractive figure. He is unlikely to be as sympathetic to South African traditional rulers and their customs as Zuma. 

Tyler McBrien is a research associate for education at the Council on Foreign Relations. The land reform debate in South Africa has recently reached a fever pitch following parliament’s passage of a motion that opens the door for land expropriation without compensation through a constitutional amendment. Much of the country’s right wing, notably Afrikaans-speaking white descendants of early Dutch settlers known as Afrikaners, have mobilized against the February motion.  Parliament's actions come on the heels of growing discontent over the extreme disparity in wealth between white and black South Africans, which remains virtually unchanged two decades after apartheid. Land ownership, though only part of the poverty story, has emerged as a potent symbol of this racial inequality. Called South Africa’s “original sin” by President Cyril Ramaphosa, the dispossession of black-owned land and continued disproportionate white ownership features prominently in policy agendas and newspapers alike. AfriForum, a self-described Afrikaner rights group, has positioned itself as an especially vocal critic of land expropriation, which the group views as an existential threat to white South Africans. In their campaign against expropriation without compensation, AfriForum has launched appeals abroad, raising the specter of the murder of white farmers and stoking fears of “white genocide” among American, European, and Australian leaders and media outlets.  AfriForum can be convincing. On their trip to Washington, DC, in May, AfriForum heads Kallie Kriel and Ernst Roets visited, among other people and places, the Cato Institute, a conservative think tank. Following their visit, one senior policy analyst concluded that the “explicitly racist” policies of the current South African government echoed those under apartheid. Thousands have petitioned President Donald Trump to accept white South Africans as refugees to the United States. Australia’s home affairs minister urged his government to issue emergency visas to white farmers who needed protection from a “civilized country.” AfriForum’s activism has led to headlines like Newsweek’s “A White Farmer is Killed Every Five Days in South Africa and Authorities Do Nothing About It, Activists Say” and a Fox News segment that was accompanied by “White farmers are being brutally murdered in South Africa for their land. And no one is brave enough to talk about it.”  Due to unreliable or unavailable data, calculating the farm murder rate is a tricky business, and ascribing a racial motivation even trickier. Nevertheless, AfriForum regularly presents a misleading narrative and ignores data that undermines their claims. Numerous fact-checkers have explained in detail why their numbers do not tell the whole story. Caveats to the data notwithstanding, and though horrific farm murders do happen, a recent report based on police statistics, original research, and media reports from AgriSA, a South African agricultural industry association, found that farm murders are at a twenty-year low. Even beyond their spread of questionable statistics, AfriForum members routinely engage in apparent apartheid revisionism. Its leaders have argued apartheid was not a crime against humanity and have defended apartheid symbols. Despite AfriForum’s almost three-hundred-thousand-strong membership and self-portrayal as a civil rights organization, U.S. policymakers and foreign governments in general would do well to be cautious of AfriForum’s characterization of the “plight” of white South Africans.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 2 to June 8, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528727891498'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 2: Nigerian soldiers killed ten Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. June 2: Five were killed in a communal clash in Kogi, Kogi. June 3: Herdsmen killed ten in Kwande, Benue.  June 3: A cult clash resulted in eight deaths in Oturkpo, Benue. June 3: Two were killed during a prison break in Chanchaga, Niger. June 3: Herdsmen killed three policemen and eight others in Nasarawa, Nasarawa. June 4: Herdsmen killed eight in Gassol, Taraba. June 4: Three Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and seven others in Diffa, Niger. June 3–June 4: A cult clash resulted in nine deaths in Calabar, Cross River. June 5: Herdsmen killed eight in Guma, Benue. June 6: Herdsmen killed five in Logo, Benue. June 7: Nigerian soldiers killed five bandits in Maru, Zamfara. June 7: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. June 7: The Nigerian military killed four civilians in Nemba, Bauchi. June 7: Nigerian troops killed twelve bandits in Giwa, Kaduna. June 8: Bandits kidnapped twenty-three in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.  

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Robina Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis.  The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has ordered a sit-at-home for May 30 in the five southeastern states of Nigeria to commemorate the fifty-first anniversary of the Nigerian Civil War, in which “Biafra” attempted to secede. The IPOB primarily comprises members of the Igbo ethnic group, and reflects a desire to separate from Nigeria that dates back to before independence from British rule.  Nigeria, however, is not the only country that faces pressure from separatism. After their independence, over ten African countries have experienced armed separatist movements, many of which resent the retention of colonial borders. The African Union (AU) maintains that African countries should “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” Many in Africa, particularly separatist movements, see this as unfair, arguing that European colonists arbitrarily drew these borders when they partitioned the continent in the “Scramble for Africa.” They forced people from distinct religious and ethnic groups with diverse beliefs and little historical relationship into single political units. Sir Arthur Richards, the governor-general of Nigeria in 1948, aptly describes this problem: “It is only the accident of British suzerainty which has made Nigeria one country… they do not speak the same language and they have highly divergent customs and ways of life and they represent different stages of culture.” Two decades later, each of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria, each more or less dominating one of the country’s three administrative regions, had at some point threatened to secede. However, only the Igbo ethnic group carried out this threat in 1967, leading to the death of perhaps one million civilians. Many Igbos believe that they are and have been politically and economically marginalized. The Nigerian civil war emanated from a 1966 pogrom against ethnic Igbos living in the north. The pogrom itself was partly the result of a junior officer coup, popularly known as the “Igbo Coup,” which was led by four Igbo majors and one Yoruba major. The coup quickly took an ethnic coloration as its principal victims were northern and western leaders, leading some to believe the coup was a conspiracy by the Igbos to run northern elites out of government. To begin to address separatism in Nigeria, the government needs to address the concerns and grievances of the Igbo ethnic group through dialogue as opposed to the use of military force. More so, it is important that the Nigerian government revisit the 3R policy of “Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, and Reintegration” promised after the Nigerian Civil War. Many scholars have argued that the failure of the Nigerian government to achieve this is one of the major reasons for the recurrence of other uprisings. This process would involve implementing the recommendations of past national conferences. Unless the Nigerian government takes some form of action to understand the concerns of the Igbo ethnic group, it risks the perpetual agitation for an independent Biafra.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 19 to May 25, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1527607191291'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 19: Nigerian troops killed thirty-five bandits and lost one soldier in Gwer West, Logo, and Guma LGAs in Benue.  May 20: Herdsmen killed two soldiers and took one soldier captive in Logo, Benue. May 20: Gunmen abducted nine and killed one in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. May 20: Gunmen killed "scores" (estimated at forty) in Toto, Nasarawa. May 20: Herdsmen killed five in Logo, Benue.  May 22: Kidnappers abducted a Zamfara Commissioner's wife and six children in Zurmi, Zamfara. May 22: Police killed five protesters at Niger Delta University in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa. May 22: Bandits kidnapped ten in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.  May 23: Bandits kidnapped thirty-eight in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna. May 23: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Yorro, Taraba.

There is now more violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt than in the northeast, where Boko Haram continues its operations. Ostensibly, violence in the Middle Belt is driven by conflict between “herders” and “farmers” over land use, ethnic and religious rivalries, and (likely but hard to prove) the agendas of rival politicians. As was long the case with respect to Boko Haram, Lagos and the prosperous south have ignored or minimized this violence, but that may be changing. A catalyst is the killing of seventeen parishioners and two Roman Catholic priests during mass in April in Gwer East Local Government Area in Benue state by “herdsmen.” The Catholic Bishop's Conference has directed that every diocese in the country should organize demonstrations on May 22, the date of the funeral mass for the Gwer East victims. The Lagos archdiocese is also organizing a requiem mass for the victims the same day. (Gwer is outside the archdiocese.) The Catholic Bishops characterize the demonstrations as peaceful and say they will be focused on “the barbaric but (sic) intolerable killing of two priests and seventeen others by herdsmen.” The paramount ruler of the Tiv nation, the Tor Tiv, is James Ayatse. At his own initiative, he has announced plans to meet with the local Muslim traditional ruler, the Emir of Lafia, as well as the governor of Nasarawa State and the chief of army staff, General Tukur Buratai. His stated goal is to end the killing of Tiv people in Benue and Nasarawa state by “herdsmen.” He has acknowledged the political dimension of some of the conflict. The current Tor Tiv is a Christian, the chairman of the Benue State Council of Chiefs, and a distinguished former professor of biochemistry. The strong responses by the Catholic Bishop's Conference and the Tor Tiv to Middle-Belt killings are significant and may focus national attention.  Nigerians like to say that theirs is the world’s most religious country—and the happiest. They are likely right, at least about the first. Traditional rulers, ranging from the Sultan of Sokoto to the Oba of Benin to the Tor Tiv, enjoy significant influence in their communities, though they are not recognized by the constitution. Their authority often has a religious dimension and they are trusted by the man and woman in the street more than politicians or government officials. Hence, clergy and traditional rulers are powerful.  While both initiatives have a Christian coloration, the Tor Tiv is also reaching out to Muslim traditional leaders, and the Catholic Bishops are appealing for support from “all men and women of good will,” a reference to Muslims and non-Roman Christians. It will be important for both parties to avoid stereotypes and over-simplification, not least by their followers. Land and water issues in the Middle Belt would test the Wisdom of Solomon. Moreover, the murderous “herdsmen” may in fact be cattle rustlers and other criminals, and they may or may not be Muslim. Then, too, there is the possible political dimension to the killing, especially in the run-up to the national and local elections now scheduled for early 2019. Nevertheless, both initiatives have the salutary consequence of bringing Middle Belt insecurity to the attention of all Nigerians.   

Much of the current conversation in South Africa around black poverty links it to the disproportionate white ownership of the commercial agricultural sector. Simply put, the narrative within the governing African National Congress (ANC), the radical Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), and many others, is that enduring black poverty is a result of the white domination of land ownership, itself the result of colonialism and apartheid. The EFF’s Julius Malema and the ANC’s Jacob Zuma highlighted that the disproportionate ownership of the land by white South Africans was an historic injustice and its perpetuation a moral outrage. Indeed, much of the public conversation about land ownership is conducted in moral, rather than economic terms. However, if the goal is the reduction of poverty, there should be more focus on education and labor policy and less on land reform, which is increasingly irrelevant to most South Africans. About half of South Africa’s population is poor by most standard measurements, and the poverty rate is not decreasing. Most, but not all, of the poor are part of the 90 percent of the population that is black or "coloured," while the white minority of 9 percent by and large enjoys a standard of living comparable to that of the developed economies of eastern Europe. South Africa’s Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, is among the highest in the world.  Certainly white ownership of most of the productive land shaped the modern history of South Africa, just as the potato famine shaped modern Ireland, the highland clearances modern Scotland, and the forced expulsion of Native Americans the westward expansion of the United States. In the twenty-first century, however, white land ownership would seem to be increasingly marginal as a cause of black poverty. South Africa is predominately an industrial, information, and market-driven economy. The country is already about 60 percent urban and urbanizing rapidly. Few who migrate from rural to urban areas appear to wish to return to the land. In fact, most of those indemnified by the post-apartheid state for the seizure of their land under apartheid opted for a cash payment rather than the land itself. Experiences elsewhere show that the establishment of small holders through land reform requires the state to provide significant technical and financial support if they are to succeed, which successive post-apartheid South African governments have been unable or unwilling to do. Furthermore, while both Zuma, Malema (ironically fierce personal enemies), and like-minded politicians have sought to build political support by advocating “expropriation of land without compensation,” it is not clear that there is still substantial demand for such a change in the rural areas. There is, however, demand for security of tenure from black farmers, especially those working in tribal trust areas where fee-simple ownership of land is absent. Moreover, there is real land hunger in urban and suburban areas, where new arrivals from rural areas too often find land unavailable, resulting in squatter settlements in which residents have little security of tenure. Much of the political discourse surrounding the subject is largely irrelevant to  the kind of land reform demanded by much of the public. There appears to be a correlation between poverty and unemployment. The country’s unemployment rate is usually estimated to be around 25 percent, rising to 50 percent among males in the townships. Female unemployment in rural areas is similarly very high. Meanwhile, potential employers complain about a shortage of workers. Unemployment is exacerbated by the failure of the educational system to prepare students to participate in the modern economy. The issue is not government funding—in some years, South Africa spends up to 25 percent of the government’s budget on education. Rather, education innovation and reform is held hostage by the political power within the ANC of the teachers unions, poor teacher training and discipline, and the multiplicity (eleven) of legal languages, among others. English—the international language of business—is the first language of only 9 percent of the population, and they are mostly white. Elementary education of black children is too often is in African languages or Afrikaans rather than in English. South African labor policy has long favored a high-skilled, high-wage work force. That approach is strongly supported by organized labor, an important part of the ANC’s electoral base. Unsurprisingly, a large percentage of the unemployed and the poor are unskilled because the economy has too few low-skilled and low-wage opportunities, and there is little space for organized labor in that respect. The bottom line is that, in order to address the drivers of poverty in a meaningful way, there should be more focus on education and labor policy and less on the distraction of land reform. 

South Africa became a “non-racial” democracy in 1994, twenty-three years ago. Nelson Mandela, who has always firmly been identified with the African National Congress (ANC) and the end of apartheid, died five years ago in 2013. Winnie Mandela, his wife during his imprisonment and the transition to non-racial democracy (he was married three times), died this year. She was a radical activist in her own right and was for many in the liberation movement the “Mother of the Nation.” Shortly before her death, Cyril Ramaphosa became the ANC leader and then chief of state. His ascension to power came in the wake of the quasi-criminal ANC administration of President Jacob Zuma, which lasted from 2009 to 2018. Together, the juxtaposition of Ramaphosa’s pro-business presidency with the death of the Winnie Mandela and the prospect of national elections in 2019 are encouraging some opinion leaders and others on the left to question the Mandela legacy with a new vigor. Zuma’s corrupt administration has also contributed to the declining prestige of the ANC and, by extension, Mandela. Since 1994, formal apartheid structures have been dismantled. The ANC government sponsored the construction of more than three million houses and put in place a safety net for the very poor. For the first decade or so, rates of economic growth were respectable, but over the past decade, the country has still not completely recovered from the worldwide recession of 2008-2009. For almost twenty years, economic growth fostered by government policy based on the “Washington consensus” of a free-market economy promised to be the tide that would lift all boats. Confidence in that system is waning, however, and can no longer be taken for granted. The persistence of black poverty highlights that there has been little fundamental social transformation, even if the material conditions of the black majority has improved. Access to education and health services among black South Africans remains poor, and, according to the 2013 South Africa Survey, blacks on average live sixteen years less than whites did in 2010. Most of the white minority live as pleasantly as they would in the developed world, while black South Africans, 80 percent of the country, live as they would elsewhere in Africa, with only a few exceptions. South Africa’s Gini coefficient—a measure of inequality—is by some accounts the worst in the world. Almost from the beginning, critics accused Mandela of “selling out” to the whites in 1994, whereby the latter could retain their wealth and control of the economy in exchange for ceding political power to the black majority. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe bitterly resented his replacement by Mandela as the African liberation icon and increasingly berated him over continued white privilege. Mugabe also supported financially Julius Malema and his Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who broke off from the ANC and called for a radical restructuring of South Africa’s economy and society, including expropriation without compensation of white property. Winnie Mandela’s death led to an outpouring of affection and nostalgia for a figure associated with black power and justice for the poor (and credibly accused of being a murderess), similar to Julius Malema and his EFF party. Nelson Mandela, on the other hand, is associated with democracy and racial reconciliation. In the wake of Winnie’s death, commentators on the left and advocates for black power are now openly challenging the compromise made by Nelson Mandela because of the persistence of gross inequality and poverty largely defined by race. As I argued last week, these critics tend to overestimate the strength of Nelson's leverage at the time and overlook the role cronyism and corruption has since played in exacerbating racial disparities.  

The U.S. military’s all-volunteer force has drawn on a shrinking pool of Americans, raising questions about the model’s viability.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition to the governing African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa’s parliament. It is the second largest party in the country in terms of electoral support, and it is the only party to have increased its share of the vote in every election since 1999. It holds 89 of 400 seats in parliament. It controls outright the provincial government of the Western Cape and governs in coalition Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. Of South Africa’s largest cities, only Durban is still governed by the once-dominant ANC. With strong links to civil society, the DA played a crucial role in driving from power former president Jacob Zuma and for keeping alive the criminal proceedings against him. The DA regularly presents itself as the party of good governance, the rule of law, and support for the constitution. Its new party leader, Mmusi Maimane, is young, articulate, charismatic, and black. He made an excellent impression during a recent visit to Washington DC. Yet the party faces a troubled future. Electoral politics in South African continue to be very largely a racial census. About 9 percent of the population is white, 9 percent “coloured,” and perhaps 2 percent of South Asian origin. The overwhelming majority of the population—some 80 percent—is black African. The DA’s electoral support mostly comes from racial minorities that tend to be much wealthier than the black majority. The DA is seeking to broaden its appeal to the black majority, especially among the “born frees,” those that came of age after the end of apartheid, and among the black urban middle class. However, among the former, voter participation is low, as it is among that age group in most electoral democracies. The black middle class is smaller than the amount of media attention it receives would indicate, and so far, the DA has had limited success in attracting its votes. The DA is certainly trying to attract black support, but control of the party largely remains in white hands, despite Mmusi Maimane’s leadership. On the burning issues of the day, such as service delivery in the townships, land redistribution to poor blacks, or meaningful reform of education in rural areas, the DA’s policies appear to be underdeveloped and largely unappealing. Among many black South Africans, the DA remains a “white” party; some in the townships even think, incredibly, that it aims to restore apartheid. While he was president, Jacob Zuma was “the gift that kept on giving” for the DA. With his ties to corruption, his reputation for sexual predation, his multiple wives, and his efforts to undermine institutions of government, he provided a focus for DA opposition and a rallying cry for electoral support. Now he is gone, replaced as president and ANC party leader by the urbane and skillful Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the post-apartheid constitutional settlement. His moves against corruption risk stealing the clothes of the DA and have engendered confidence among financial institutions. Further, the DA’s reputation for good governance has been marred by the water crisis in Cape Town, fights with coalition partners in Port Elizabeth, and a generally disappointing performance in Johannesburg. The DA is also burdened by the ineptness of some of its leaders. Former mayor of Cape Town, current premier of the Western Cape, and former DA party leader Helen Zille is notorious for her insensitive tweets. For example, she ignited a firestorm in 2017 when she said that the legacy of colonialism was not all bad. Faced with the possible discipline by the party, she apologized. Even if what she said objectively is true—she cited South Africa’s superior infrastructure—such comments only set back DA efforts to attract black voters in racially wounded South Africa. Other racially insensitive comments by whites associated with the DA also attract wide attention. If it is to break out of its white and “coloured” electoral ghetto, the DA will need leaders, political style, and policies that speak to the concerns of the poor, black majority. Thus far, its progress has been disappointing, despite Mmusi Maimane.

In this episode of Africa in Transition, I speak with Vincent Makori, host of Africa 54, Voice of America's daily African news show. We discuss the current state of Kenya's politics, focusing on Uhuru Kenyatta, Raila Odinga, and their families' political relationship dating back to Kenyan independence. We discuss the role that ethnicity plays in Kenyan politics, the role Cambridge Analytica played in most recent election cycle, and the apparent deterioration of democratic norms and the rule of law. According to Vincent, ethnic tensions in Kenya only manifest during election season because they are drummed up (with the help of certain foreign data firms) by politicians seeking short-term electoral advantage. To that end, political parties are primarily constructed around transient alliances defined by ethnicity rather than significant policy differences, and they change from election cycle to election cycle. Vincent argues that the personal and political rivalry between the two leading candidates, Kenyatta and Odinga, who are Kikuyu and Luo, respectively, has more to do with election-related violence than actual, historical grievances between different ethnic groups. You can listen to my conversation with Vincent here.

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Robina Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis. She is a native of Nigeria. Since the beginning of 2018, at least eighty people from Benue State (in the middle belt of Nigeria) were killed, and thousands displaced as a result of attacks by Fulani herdsmen on their farmlands and homes. These attacks have caused an outcry among Nigerians, especially people living in the Southern region, many of whom consider the killings to be as dire as the Boko Haram insurgency. At the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency during the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, now-President Buhari was a vocal critic, and rightly so, of Jonathan’s failure to handle quickly the insurgency until he faced international pressure. However, the inaction of President Buhari in a comparable situation, where the peace and security of a region is threatened, is similar to the behavior that he earlier criticized. The president’s apathetic response to the conflict in the middle belt encourages the perception of many southern Nigerians and even a few northerners that Muhammadu Buhari is the “President of the North,” rather than of Nigeria as a whole. Early into his presidency, he stated that the constituencies that accounted for 97 percent of his votes (all located in the north) cannot be treated the same as those who contributed only 5 percent (southeast and south-south). A news report from October 2017 revealed that 81 percent of Buhari’s political appointees are northerners. The Igbos in particular are angry that the administration arrested the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which is a non-violent separatist movement, and deployed military troops to the region. The IPOB has not been linked to any deaths. The attacks by herdsmen, however, have killed over a thousand Nigerians but have not received anywhere near the same level of attention.  While it may be argued that the powers of the president are limited, in times past, President Buhari has proven capable of taking swift action and bringing down the full might of the government in the case of Boko Haram. It is therefore crucial that the government prioritizes the conflict in the middle belt as a threat to national security. Recently, the minister of Agriculture proposed the creation of cattle colonies in southern states. Nigerians in the south, however, have vehemently refused to consider seriously this proposal mainly because they do not trust northerners. The first step the presidency could take is to deploy law enforcement to affected areas to deter the herdsmen and to keep the peace. With the former minister for defense and military chief of staff, General Theophilus Danjuma, calling for Nigerians to defend themselves, this step is crucial to preventing anarchy. Also, the federal government could take concrete steps to encourage the herdsmen to remain in their region to avoid encroaching on farmlands in the South. A possibility would be the expansion of cattle grazing reserves to facilitate migratory cattle raising. Unless President Buhari takes some major form of action, he risks making the same mistake his predecessors made, being accused of tribalism, and bequeathing these problems to future generations as thousands continue to suffer.   

On March 29, the New York Times reported that for the first time, a white woman was convicted, sentenced, and jailed for the use of racial slurs. The woman’s rant, which occurred in February 2016, lasted some minutes and was directed at black and white police officers who responded after her car had been burglarized. The episode was captured on video and went viral on social media, producing outrage in the majority black country. The court sentenced the woman, Vicki Momberg, to three years in jail with one suspended for her words. The judge refused to grant her bail while she appeals, observing that she had shown no remorse. The rant included the woman’s use of “kaffir” some forty times. The word is all but unknown in the United States, but its origin, apparently, is Arabic and refers to “unbelievers.” In South Africa, the word is a slur against black people and is regarded as even more demeaning than the “n-word” in the United States. In the media, the word is rarely written or said out-loud, but instead referred to as the “k-word.” Like the “n-word,” kaffir is redolent of white supremacy and apartheid. With its use, the woman was being as personally insulting as possible in South Africa. So much so that a white policeman who joined the episode, while trying to calm her, is reported to have said, “I am not going to allow you to insult my colleagues like that.” There has been backlash among white South Africans. Some have argued that she was upset after having just been robbed (this was part of her defense in court as well), while others have complained that black insults and threats to whites—especially by political figures—have gone unpunished. The episode shines a light on an enduring South African reality: the persistence of racism, especially among some whites. I have written previously about an episode in 2016 in which a white woman in seaside Durban characterized black beach goers as “monkeys,” though she later apologized. The recent court decision illustrates once again the complexities of managing racial issues in a democratic country with a predominately black population and black government but in which most of the wealth and privilege is in white hands.