Social Issues

Privacy

  • International Organizations
    UN Committee Adopts Resolution on Right to Privacy in the Digital Age
    Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  On November 25, 2014, the third committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that calls on states to "respect and protect the right to privacy" in the digital age. The resolution is the follow-up to a very similar motion that Germany and Brazil sponsored last year in response to the Snowden revelations. Germany and Brazil led the adoption of this year’s resolution and secured over thirty-five cosponsors including Cuba and Russia, countries not necessarily known as beacons of online privacy. While this year’s text is longer than last year’s, the substance of the resolution has not dramatically changed. The most notable additions include a reference to metadata having the potential to reveal personal information and that the surveillance of digital communications "must be conducted on the basis of a legal framework." There is also a reference to the NetMundial conference held in April 2014 in São Paulo, Brazil. While NetMundial is generally seen as a success, the resolution only notes that the conference took place instead of using more approving language that Brazil probably would have wanted. It is likely that the sponsors didn’t want to needlessly antagonize Russia, which is one of the few countries that protested the NetMundial outcome and is one of Brazil’s BRICS partners. The adopted text was likely much more palatable to the Five Eyes—an intelligence grouping comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States—than the first draft of the resolution. The first draft contained references to an Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights report on surveillance practices that argued that surveillance needed to confirm with principles of proportionality, legitimacy, and necessity—principles that are not contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) but that a coalition of advocacy groups are promoting. Like last year, the first draft also implied that states’ human rights obligations extend beyond their borders and jurisdiction, a position which is hotly contested. Both of these references probably constituted redlines for the Five Eyes that were removed or amended into softer language to achieve consensus on the final text. Brazil, according to an explanation of its position, did not seem pleased with some of the concessions though it welcomed the resolution’s passage at the committee stage. The penultimate paragraph of the adopted text hints at the establishment of a "special procedure" to identify and clarify "principles, standards, and best practices regarding the promotion and protection of the right to privacy." The modalities of this procedure, which could include a new UN special rapporteur on surveillance per Brazil’s request, could continue to divide the Five Eyes from Germany, Brazil, and the resolution’s supporters given that both sides disagree on the scope of applicability of the ICCPR and the necessity of new UN rapporteur. The full UN General Assembly will likely adopt the resolution within the next few weeks.
  • Cybersecurity
    Net Politics: A New Blog About Cybersecurity, Digital Trade, Privacy, and Internet Governance
    Welcome to Net Politics, a blog about cybersecurity, digital trade, privacy, and Internet governance. This is a new age of conflict in and through cyberspace. The rapid diffusion and adoption of digital and communication technologies raises profound questions for security, prosperity, privacy, and global order. States, terrorists, and criminal hackers may be able to shut down power, communication, transportation, and financial networks, inflicting not just massive economic losses but also death and physical destruction. President Obama has warned that “our enemies are seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems.” U.S. Cyber Command is set to expand from 900 to 5,000 people, and militaries and intelligence agencies around the world are rushing to develop new weapons without any agreement on how and when they might be used, or a deep understanding of the consequences this arms race has for an open and global Internet. There is also struggle for the massive amounts of data that users generate by using their cell phones, searching online, and posting to their favorite social media sites, as well as data that is “born analog,” created by sensors in cars, homes, buildings, public spaces, and industrial control systems. All of the data is of great interest to companies, who hope to profit from it, and to governments, whose interest can range from foiling terrorist plots to crushing dissent. At stake are critical questions about privacy, trade rules and intellectual property rights. To answer to the question of who will “govern” cyberspace is up for grabs. The divide is typically cast as a “digital cold war,” a face-off between those who believe Internet governance should remain distributed among the private sector, civil society, technical experts, and governments, and those who want a stronger role for the state under the auspices of the United Nations and led by the International Telecommunications Union. The reality is more complex, as a large number of states float back and forth between approaches depending on the issue. Some developing states see the current institutions of Internet governance as illegitimate but are also uncomfortable with being closely associated with the more restrictive models of domestic Internet control promoted by China and Russia. Some U.S. allies and friends are pushing for change because they fear that the United States government can leverage the dominance of American companies over Internet architecture for security, intelligence, and economic gains. Last year, I directed a Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force that covered many of these issues. Go take a look at the report, Defending an Open, Global, Secure, and Resilient Internet, if you are interested. The risks and rewards of these struggles are high. Today, 75 percent of the world’s population has access to a mobile phone, and the Internet connects 40 percent of the planet, roughly 2.7 billion people. Net Politics will provide original insight, highlight some of the best analysis on the web and elsewhere, and hopefully introduce some of the best new voices commenting on emerging politics of cyberspace. Net Politics hopes to embody the ethos of the Internet, being a source of knowledge and a two-way discussion. Your comments are always welcome on the blog, and I hope you will read some of the previous posts I did on China and cybersecurity over at Asia Unbound. I’m also on Twitter at @adschina.  
  • United States
    The Post-9/11 Civil Liberties Debate
    Post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism and surrounding civil liberties issues are unlikely to stray far from currently policy no matter who is in the White House in 2013, says CFR’s Matthew Waxman.
  • United States
    What is the Legality of the NSA Domestic Surveillance Program?
    Should the domestic spying of U.S. "persons" be permitted? If it is "critical to saving lives," then yes, argues President Bush. He further says that shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks Congress gave him and the National Security Agency (NSA) widespread powers—among them the right to intercept international phone calls or emails with suspected terrorists—to execute the war on terror by passing a joint resolution called the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). But some civil libertarians and lawmakers say the NSA’s decision to wiretap without warrants raises a number of legal predicaments, including whether such domestic surveillance programs violate the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers, its Fourth Amendment protections from illegal search and seizure, as well as a 1978 statute by Congress establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which created a secret court with authority to grant eavesdropping warrants. The president says his secret domestic surveillance program is not aimed at gathering evidence for criminal trials per se, but at preventing future 9/11-style attacks and is therefore "vital and necessary" to national security. Cfr.org asked five lawyers and legal scholars whether the president’s wiretappings are legal, from a constitutional or statutory standpoint. Lee Casey, partner at the law firm, Baker & Hostetler, LLP Yes, because FISA does not cover all the potential situations where intelligence must be gathered in the current conflict. In particular, that statute applies only in four situations: Where a U.S. person is the target of, rather than incidental to, the surveillance; where the acquisition of the intelligence will be accomplished by devices in the U.S.; where the sender and all recipients of the communication are present in the U.S.; where surveillance devices are used within the U.S. to collect communications other than wire or radio communications. FISA simply does not apply to the most important category—surveillance of a non-U.S. person overseas.   In addition, there are procedures that must be followed under FISA that, while streamlined, still take time. In a war where seconds and minutes matter, even hours may be too long. Finally, the FISA court is not a rubber stamp. There may well be instances in which the president believes surveillance justified, but where the court refuses to issue a warrant. To the extent the foreign surveillance is otherwise within his constitutional power, it is up to the president to make the final decision here. Just as the president cannot intrude upon the constitutional authority of Congress or the courts, neither Congress nor the courts can intrude upon his constitutional authority. In some sense, the outrageous thing is the outrage being ginned up by the media over this monitoring program, which frankly seems run of the mill. U.S. spies gather intelligence on a lot of countries overseas and on a lot of individuals, mostly government officials, but also individuals who may pose a threat or can provide useful intelligence. All this is perfectly legal. Simply because an American interposes himself into that situation doesn’t mean the U.S. government must shut down its intelligence-gathering and get a warrant. Carl Tobias, professor of law at the University of Richmond I think there are more persuasive arguments that the president should not have had taken these actions. The administration claims that AUMF is a very broad grant; if this is true, then authority to use domestic surveillance, which is the argument the attorney general is using, is that there’s a factual case that it can’t move quickly enough under the 1978 FISA statute. The argument on the other side is that under this statute, there is a secret court that Congress specifically established for these kinds of issues and the court has been favorably disposed to all administrations when requests are made for warrants. Only a tiny percentage has been rejected. So the argument does, then, go back to Congress and seeks an amendment on procedures in FISA.   It raises a question of checks and balances. When Congress passes a Statute that specifically deals with an issue and then the president ignores that statute, then that’s a problem in terms of separation of powers. It’s not as if he’s operating in a vacuum. Congress was very clear about procedures to use for domestic surveillance, so it seems the president ought to follow it, or at least have that procedure modified if it’s inadequate. Apparently, six weeks later, Congress included in the Patriot Act provisions that provide exceptions to FISA; that cuts against the argument that Congress meant to authorize it. The other big issue is that lawyers for those being prosecuted will argue that if any information used in the prosecution was secured in this manner, [does] that play back to Fourth Amendment issues? If this is illegally obtained evidence, what does that mean for prosecuting, or indicting them? Some lawyers are saying if the information used to convict was secured illegally, they intend to raise that issue and argue it has to be thrown out. John R. Schmidt, partner at the Chicago-based law firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw Based on what we now know, I think the president acted lawfully. The weight of judicial authority supports the president’s inherent constitutional authority to carry out surveillance without judicial approval in order to obtain intelligence on foreign threats to the United States. The Supreme Court expressly declined to reach that issue back in 1972, but we have had four Court of Appeals decisions that have explicitly upheld that inherent presidential power. Most recently, the FISA Court of Review, consisting of three court of appeals judges, reviewed those cases in support of the president’s authority and said it agreed. If the president has that inherent constitutional authority, it is hard to think of a more compelling case for its exercise than the aftermath of 9/11, when we had not just a threat but had seen an actual attack on the U.S. by an identifiable group, al-Qaeda. We knew they were planning future attacks; and surveillance offered a way, perhaps the only one, to find out where and when those future attacks might take place.   The Court of Review also said explicitly, and I think correctly, that FISA could not encroach on the president’s inherent constitutional authority. But we avoid any conflict between that statute and the Constitution if we conclude, as I think is correct, that the post-9/11 congressional authorization to the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force" against al-Qaeda carried with it the authority to carry out necessary intelligence activities for that purpose. The authorization to use military force naturally carries with it the authority to carry out the necessary related intelligence activity. The only reason that conclusion seems surprising now is because in this case the enemy forces were here in the U.S. and therefore some intelligence activity might take place here and involve U.S. citizens. But that is the fact of the al-Qaeda threat, and I think Congress gave the president the authority to respond to that threat. Michael J. Williams, attorney with the Georgia-based law firm Fincher & Hecht, LLC There is disagreement over whether the president, as commander in chief, has plenary power under the Constitution to authorize these kinds of wire taps separate and apart from any authority Congress may have provided him under FISA. Some say the argument that the president has plenary power to conduct the surveillance [has been] faulty since after 9/11, [when] the administration sought changes to FISA under the Patriot Act to make certain anti-terrorist surveillance activities easier. In other words, if FISA did not apply, why seek the amendments?   In any event, one might view FISA as a sort of compromise between the president and Congress on this question. Under FISA, in response to concerns about the monitoring of U.S. citizens, Congress authorized wiretaps to be conducted without a court order if the attorney general certifies, among other things, that the surveillance is directed at "foreign powers" and that it is unlikely parties to the communication will not include a "U.S. person." In theory, the administration is concerned about having the ability to monitor communications of U.S. persons if they are part of terrorist organizations. Part of the problem is that FISA authority regarding these wiretaps extends to communications among "foreign powers" but as currently drafted, does not cover communications within terrorist organizations. For instance, the government might be able to monitor communications involving foreign governments under the FISA conditions without a court order, but does not allow monitoring of communications of terrorist organizations. The administration has said that not only does it have plenary authority under the Constitution but also because of the [post-9/11] joint resolution authorizing the president to go after al-Qaeda. Arguably, this has the legal effect of a congressional declaration of war. If we’re at war, under FISA, Section 1811, the president may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order, but only for fifteen days. This is in addition to the 72-hour emergency surveillance provisions that presumably are applicable to peace-time conditions. I think there is enough legal wiggle room on a number of fronts for the president to argue there’s no clear-cut case he broke the law or engaged in an impeachable offense. Dakota S. Rudesill, defense consultant, former professional staff member on national security for the U.S. Senate, and J.D. candidate at Yale Law School As a legal question, we are going to hear three interrelated debates. The first is about the Fourth Amendment. How do the Fourth Amendment’s basic guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and its warrant requirement constrain congressional legislation and executive activity in the war on terrorism? The other debates are about inherent constitutional executive and congressional war powers, and how, in light of those constitutional powers, we should read together two statutes. Those statutes are the FISA law that governs electronic surveillance specifically, and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that authorizes military operations post-9/11 generally. The Bush administration has advanced a sweeping reading of presidential war power, saying that AUMF has put the president’s constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces at its maximum, and that includes broad authority for warrantless surveillance of communications with some foreign terrorist link. On the other hand, we can expect to hear from many on Capitol Hill a different line of argument, that the Congress can restrict executive power under the legislative branch’s constitutional authority "for the government and regulation" of the armed forces, that Congress intended to regulate NSA and all wiretaps under the FISA statute, and that Congress did not intend to create a way around FISA in the post-9/11 AUMF. Therefore, the argument will run, the administration should have either gotten FISA warrants or worked with Congress to amend FISA. This is a profoundly important debate, and everyone interested in national security and foreign policy should pay close attention.
  • United States
    Question and Answers with Morton H. Halperin
    MORTON H. HALPERIN has been on both sides of the fence. Now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Halperin worked for the Defense Department during the Vietnam War. And for 21 months during the war-18 of them after he’d returned to the private sector-the federal government illegally tapped Halperin’s phone because of fears he was leaking classified information to reporters. Halperin, who was cleared of any wrongdoing, says the experience was “chilling” and a lesson in the importance of keeping checks and balances within the government. The director of the Council’s Center for Democracy and Free Markets returned to Capitol Hill recently to testify before Congress about new anti-terrorism measures. NEWSWEEK’s Jennifer Barrett spoke with Halperin about the difficulties of balancing security concerns and civil liberties and whether new anti-terrorism measures have gone too far. NEWSWEEK: You’ve been quoted as saying you’d always feared “a serious terrorist attack in the United States would pose the gravest threat to our Constitutional liberties.” Have those fears been realized now? Morton H. Halperin: Yes. We’re seeing actions taken every day that violate fundamental civil liberties and violate judicial procedures and people’s due process rights. One of those actions that has received a lot of criticism is the Presidential Order that President Bush signed earlier this week allowing trials by special military commissions of non U.S. citizens who are suspected of involvement in international terrorism. Do you feel the current circumstances allow for the reinstatement of trials before a U.S. military tribunal? Morton H. Halperin: The Constitution states that any person in the U.S. is entitled to certain protections. There may be narrow exceptions, including when we’re at war. But that requires that a judge make the decisions about whether these are appropriate circumstances for the use of this type of commission. Under this order, it says that if the president decides you’re within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the secretary of defense can have you arrested, and you can be tried and convicted by the court with no recourse except by the president. The trial can be held in secret, the panel can decide by a two-thirds vote and is not asked to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The government can use evidence obtained through torture. The suspect is not allowed witnesses. There have to be limits on the degree to which the government can deviate from normal Constitutional practices in arresting, detaining and trying people. Newsweek: Earlier this month, the Department of Justice declared that prosecutors could eavesdrop on phone calls between detainees and their lawyers without seeking judicial approval if they have a reasonable suspicion that the inmate might be trying to pass terrorism-related messages through his attorney. Critics claim this breaches lawyer-client confidentiality rights and may prompt suspects to keep valuable information to themselves. What do you think? Morton H. Halperin: I think this is a perfect example of an authority the government may well need and should be granted in special situations, but the government has bypassed the judicial process here. You need to go to a judge and say you believe the lawyer is part of this conspiracy and ask the judge to remove the lawyer, or order a wiretap and instruct the lawyer and client that their conversation will be taped. What they can’t do is to do it on their own. Under our system now, you have to go through a neutral magistrate or higher authority because prosecutors, in their zeal to prosecute, cannot be trusted to protect these people’s rights. Newsweek: An estimated 1,200 terrorism suspects have been detained since Sept. 11, many of them secretly. The Justice Department has not been very forthright about who is being detained or why. Isn’t this exactly the type of behavior that our government has protested against in other countries? Morton H. Halperin: Here we say we don’t have to follow the norms that everyone else does. The detentions violate our own Constitutional procedures and the norms we apply to other countries. And the fact that some people have relatives missing but are unable to find out if they are being held by the government, that is unacceptable. The notion that the government is holding material witnesses indefinitely is again a fundamental violation of the basic rights that people have in the United States, whether they are citizens or not. It makes a mockery of what we are fighting for. We are doing many of the things that we tell other people they should not do because there are universal laws. We insist that all nations behave consistently with those laws, but we’re behaving as if those rules apply to others but not to us. Newsweek: Do you feel that any of the authorities granted under the new anti-terrorism measures are justified in the fight against international terrorism? Morton H. Halperin: I actually believe that most new authorities granted to the intelligence officials and FBI in the counter-terrorism bill were appropriate in investigating international terrorist activities aimed at killing Americans at home and abroad. For this new threat, I think the government needs new authorities and a fundamentally new approach to dealing with the problem. The objection I had was that the government insisted on getting the authority not just on terrorist groups seeking to kill Americans but all terrorist groups--that could mean protesters who damage property, and people who are involved in nothing more than legal protests against American policies. Newsweek: During the Vietnam War, your telephone was tapped for 21 months, both while you were working for the National Security Council and when you’d gone back to the private sector. How has that affected your views on balancing security concerns with civil liberties? Morton H. Halperin: They recorded my conversations, my wife’s conversations, my children talking to their friends on the phone. If you read over them [transcripts of the conversations] as I did later, it is a chilling intrusion into your privacy and also a lesson that if you allow the executive branch officials to do whatever they want, they’ll do things that cross the lines and invade people’s privacy. Newsweek: Do you think the Bush administration has adequately and appropriately responded to concerns about violating international law or civil liberties? Morton H. Halperin: No. There was an attempt by members of Congress to narrow the authorities in the bill to apply only to those specific [international terrorism] investigations. And the administration bitterly opposed this, just as they had in committee and when the issue was raised in private conversations. They were clearly determined to get these authorities beyond investigating terrorist activities. The idea is to put everything they want in the bill now because Americans are scared and Congress will not want to be accused of delaying the passage of measures to protect against terrorism. The danger is that these authorities will be directed at both Americans and legal aliens in the U.S. who are not engaged in criminal activities. We know from experience that these powers migrate outside of the areas Congress initially had in mind. Some of the things that occurred that I knew about, none of them rise to the pervasiveness, the intensity of outrageousness in the scope of what the government wants and claims to be able to do now. I think Congress has a responsibility to put a stop to it. Newsweek: How do you keep the government from crossing the line from protecting citizens to violating their civil rights? Morton H. Halperin: You can start with the Constitution. Congress also needs to keep a check on the executive branch by the kinds of reporting and overseeing it does and through remedial legislation. And, of course, the courts have a critical role to play. The government is systematically trying to restrict the courts in these processes but I don’t think the court will allow it. The public also has a role to play-the press, in making sure people get the news, and the public, in speaking out and through protests and creating a climate where the administration cannot continue to get away with these things. I think we need to try and reverse some of these measures. The public needs to become educated and convey that this has gone too far, and Congress needs to step in.