Shinzo Abe

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is better positioned to push constitutional revision following his landslide electoral win, but his efforts will be challenged at home and abroad.

Japanese will once more go to the polls this Sunday to give Prime Minister Shinzo Abe a thumbs up or a thumbs down on his performance as prime minister. This snap election for the lower house of Japan’s Diet is the second since Abe returned to lead his country in 2012. Early dynamics suggested Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike and her new party, the Party of Hope, might challenge the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s hold over the conservative vote, but she declined to run in the race herself. Instead, the story of this election is of rivalry among opposition legislators—divisions that Abe’s snap election has brought into sharp relief.  So what should we expect on Sunday? First, all polling among major media outlets suggests a return of Abe's coalition and thus a significant victory for the prime minister. The question will be how big of a majority voters will give him to work with. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) initially prepared to lose over 40 seats (the total in the new Diet will be 465), but now it looks likely that Abe’s party will end up close to its pre-election 287 seats. With Komeito’s expected 35 seats, the new Abe government will have a comfortable majority, although not necessarily the super-majority the Abe cabinet once enjoyed. (A two-thirds majority would require 310.) It will also likely solidify Abe’s leadership within the LDP. Second, this election has been fascinating, even for Japan’s relatively blasé voters. The media headlines have focused on the fast-paced excitement of political realignment in which Koike and now Yukio Edano of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) have played starring roles. But Abe and Natsuo Yamaguchi, president of the Komeito party, have also captured the stage. Stump speeches by all party leaders have been animated, drawing large crowds. Polling suggests that voters have a high interest in this year’s electoral drama, and thus voter turnout should be higher than the anemic 52.7 percent of Abe’s last election in 2014. Third, while Koike’s new party seemed to be the darling of the media early in the campaign, it is the other new opposition party, the CDP, that is drawing the most attention in these final days of the campaign. Edano is viewed fondly by most Japanese, remembered for his compassionate and calm role as chief cabinet secretary during the 2011 disasters. He has drawn particularly large crowds and challenged Japanese voters to think more carefully about Japan’s values and its successes. Edano has argued that in his heart of hearts, he is not a liberal but a conservative—someone who cherishes his Japanese identity. But in this election, the CDP is the center left party among a field of center right and right parties. Only the Japanese Communist Party stands on the far left. While the Party of Hope seemed an early favorite for being the second largest party in the Diet, taking 80 or more seats, it seems now that the CDP will eat into that lead, and both parties could emerge from the election splitting more evenly the share of opposition party seats. Finally, the constellation of political parties in this election now reveals without a doubt that Japan is on its way to a serious deliberation on constitutional revision. The LDP and Komeito have already come to an understanding that amending the constitution (as opposed to revising the current language) is the right way to go, and Prime Minister Abe suggested adding text to Article 9 to ensure that no one can challenge the constitutionality of Japan’s Self-Defense Force. Of all seven political parties today, large and small, only two—the CDP and the Japanese Communist Party—continue to advocate leaving the existing constitution unchanged. When this election is over, the majority of Japanese legislators in the lower house will likely agree that the time has come to change the 1947 document, and they will prepare to debate what should be amended first. Stayed tuned on Monday for an in-depth look at the election outcome and what it means for Japan’s foreign policy.   

For the second time since returning to the prime minister’s office in 2012, Shinzo Abe has called for a snap election. His calculus seems to revolve around timing. A drop in Abe’s approval ratings this summer shook confidence in his leadership, and rumblings of new contenders for the presidency of his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began to emerge.   It is a risky move; some would even say a cynical one, based largely on the idea that Japan’s opposition parties were in such disarray that the LDP would have little competition. But this year’s snap election has set in motion a new round of political realignment. In a surprise turn of events, Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike has met the prime minister’s electoral challenge and used this snap election to build a new opposition party.   Koike announced the formation of the Party of Hope (Kibō no Tō) on September 25, changing the dynamics of the October 22 election. With defectors from the crumbling Democratic Party moving to her side, the new party as of today has around 80 of its own candidates for the lower house lined up and potentially 130 former Democratic Party members in the wings.  Koike’s new party will field more than 220 candidates, four times the number her Tokyo First party ran in July’s Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election. In that contest, she had amazing results: 49 of 50 of Koike’s candidates were elected by Tokyo voters. If that margin carries in the lower house, she could end up leading Japan’s largest opposition party—one that could give the LDP a run for its money.  This realignment comes at the expense of the Democratic Party (DP). As more and more of the DP’s policy-savvy centrists left the party last week to join the Party of Hope, DP President Seiji Maehara took the unusual step of announcing that the DP would not even run candidates in this election and urged his party’s members to bandwagon with the Party of Hope in order to defeat the LDP. This prompted even more knocks at Koike’s door, but she publicly stated she would vet incoming members for their positions on policy before accepting them en masse.  Building a new party in the midst of an election campaign is no easy feat, however. In contrast to the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which led the country from 2009-2012, the Party of Hope is not setting out to be a liberal alternative to the LDP. Koike has made it clear that she wants to give Japanese voters a better conservative choice.  Koike is counting on attracting LDP voters who were shaken by the Abe cabinet’s scandals. She has positioned the Party of Hope as an advocate for transparency in governance, a position she took in her campaign for governor of Tokyo and again in the Tokyo Assembly elections.  While Koike has described her party as reform-minded, its platform looks largely to be in line with the LDP’s goals. One pledge is conspicuously different, however. The Party of Hope would like to postpone the final hike in Japan’s consumption tax, scheduled for 2019. Gaining popular support for the two percent increase in the consumption tax was Prime Minister Abe’s rationale for this year’s snap election. Yet Abe promised to use the new revenue for childcare and other social subsidies rather than to pay down government debt.  For now, the Japanese public seems intrigued by Koike’s new party. Polling suggests that the Koike-led challenge to the Abe cabinet is gaining momentum. Immediately following Koike’s announcement of the new party last week, its support was only in the single digits. Yet a poll taken by the Yomiuri Shimbun over the weekend put Party of Hope support at 19 percent, behind the LDP’s 34 percent. On Sunday, Japanese media focused on a Kyodo News poll that suggested the gap was narrowing with the Party of Hope at 15 percent and the LDP at 24 percent.  Much could depend on Koike’s own popularity. Whether the Tokyo governor will join in the race remains to be seen. For now, she plans to sit out the lower house campaign, saying that she will remain where she is for the time being. For Koike and her new party, establishing a foothold in the Japanese Diet may be the first step to a larger challenge of Japan’s longstanding conservative party.  As important as numbers is a consensus on policy goals. Clearly, Koike wants to avoid building a party with the kind of internal cleavages that weakened the DPJ, the first party that was strong enough to oust the LDP from power. Rising Japanese concern over missile testing by North Korea also highlights the need for a clear position on Japan’s defenses. Koike is asking new entrants to her party to support Japan’s expanded defense role, including acceptance of the 2015 security legislation and the right of collective self-defense, and she is also asking for an openness to constitutional revision. This will make it difficult for the left-leaning members of the DPJ to enter the party, but it is designed to avoid the fatal policy divisions that undermined their ability to govern.  Abe’s coalition of LDP and Komeito parties was expected to lose its supra majority even without the new Koike challenge. On September 26, the official lower house website put the number of LDP seats at 287 and the number for Komeito at 35, for a total of 322 seats in the ruling coalition out of a 475-seat house. Election redistricting has reduced the number of seats, and so in this election, only 465 seats will remain. Abe has said he understands this his ruling coalition may only get a simply majority in this round of elections. An internal LDP survey reportedly showed that the coalition would drop from 322 to 280 seats, leaving the government parties far short of seats needed to feel comfortable in their ability to control the legislative agenda. If true, this loss of seats would also put an end to early prospects for the revision of the Japanese constitution, one of the prime minister’s personal goals. If Japanese voters decide that the time has come for something new and different this October, the Party of Hope could be in a position to temper the government’s legislative agenda.  Equally important are the election’s implications for Japan’s foreign policy. Several issues can be expected on the campaign trail. The first, of course, is Japan’s defense in the face of the rising North Korea challenge. Abe has already laid out the North Korean threat as one of his two defining issues. A second issue liable to come up in debate is the Abe-Trump relationship. Given Abe’s close relationship with the unpredictable U.S. president, expect to see this highlighted as a plus for the LDP. Moreover, Abe has come to be seen outside Japan as a stabilizing influence on the global liberal order, as Japan continues to urge the United States to return to multilateral governance institutions that Trump has decried. Finally, the core issue of Japan’s approach to military force has to come up. The prime minister has advocated constitutional revision and earlier this year focused in on revising Article 9 to ensure that the Self-Defense Force (SDF) is constitutional. Even more urgent, however, may be the upcoming five-year defense plan, in which the government is seeking to improve Japan’s missile defenses and perhaps even argue for introducing a retaliatory strike capability to the SDF’s arsenal. Both of these enhancements are in response to Pyongyang’s growing missile range and its ambition to add nuclear warheads in the hopes of decoupling Washington from its allies in Tokyo and Seoul.   Koike is not likely to take issue with strengthening Japan’s defenses, nor will many of those who rallied to her side be faint of heart about preparing to contend with a belligerent Pyongyang. She was, after all, Japan’s defense minister, and allied with her now are some of the DPJ’s more realist security thinkers, including Aki Nagashima, who served as Prime Minister Noda’s national security advisor, and Goshi Hosono, who led the U.S.-Japan task force that responded to the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors during the 2011 disasters. All are well known in Washington; all are supporters of close alliance cooperation with the United States. The Party of Hope’s position on constitutional revision, however, may be a bit less clear. The prime minister has long advocated that the time is ripe for revising the document that has guided Japanese politics since 1947. Koike has also in the past supported revision. Today, however, she and her new party may not have this on their immediate agenda. Whether they agree on what needs to be revised, or on how soon, remains to be seen. This snap election began as an effort by the prime minister to shore up public support. 2018 brings some difficult decisions for the Abe cabinet: ensuring economic growth, expanding government support for childcare and the elderly, and providing for national security in the midst of an increasingly volatile region are all high on his priority list. The Abe cabinet may be counting on Japan’s voters to opt for what they know rather than seeking political change.   And yet, there is opportunity for those who seek a different path for Japan. Koike has created an alternative conservative identity and a more compassionate conservative option. Whether she and her new party can make inroads in this election remains to be seen, but once more the excitement of political realignment has taken hold in Japan.  If nothing else, Governor Koike has guaranteed that the prime minister’s snap election will be far more contested—and thus far more interesting—than he originally thought.   

Scott Snyder ([email protected]), senior fellow for Korea studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Brad Glosserman ([email protected]), executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, are coauthors of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States (Columbia University Press, 2015). South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in, has a long list of priorities. Topping the list is restoring faith and credibility in his country’s political system and getting the struggling economy on its feet. In foreign policy, chief concerns include ensuring that the alliance with the United States remains strong, getting China to ease up on its campaign of economic intimidation and ending the freeze in North-South relations and imparting momentum into diplomacy to reduce tensions and remove the North Korean nuclear threat. Another critical issue Moon must manage is relations with Japan. That task will be complicated by his campaign platform pledges to unwind the December 2015 comfort woman agreement negotiated by his discredited predecessor, Park Geun-hye. In his first conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Moon noted that his fellow South Koreans could not emotionally accept all the items in the agreement. At the same time, and to his credit, he also appears to have made space for Japan-South Korea relations, noting that they should not be contingent on the resolution of the comfort woman issue. This “two-track” formula could help him avoid the box that Park created for herself over the issue when she took office in 2013. President Moon is likely to find that a strong relationship with Tokyo will pay important dividends and help him deal with other grave geopolitical challenges. Relations between South Korea and Japan have long been fraught: a tangled history, imperial conquest, territorial disputes, and the residues of Japanese occupation have poisoned the bilateral relationship for more than seventy years after the end of World War II. After several years of ambivalence, President Park tried to set a floor on the relationship by striking a deal on comfort women and approving a long-delayed agreement on information sharing between the militaries of Japan and South Korea. At U.S. prodding, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington have moved forward on greater trilateral cooperation to address the North Korean threat. Yet cooperation remains controversial and contingent. Worse, Park’s impeachment has tainted the measures she adopted to improve relations. While Moon has said that the December 2015 comfort women agreement will not be the starting point for relations with Japan, he said during the campaign that “both the agreement and the negotiation process were wrong,” and that the agreement “must be renegotiated [in accordance with] the will of the majority of the public.” This approach risks stalemate with Japanese counterparts who negotiated with the Park administration in good faith. Moon’s top national security challenge is North Korea. To do that effectively, he needs the support of both China and the United States. Beijing offers Seoul important leverage in dealing with Pyongyang. But China’s relations with the South have been troubled in recent months. The primary problem is Seoul’s decision to ignore Beijing’s objections and proceed with deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system that is intended to counter the North Korean missile threat. China is convinced that the system threatens its own nuclear deterrent and has responded to Seoul’s indifference to Chinese concerns with fury, boycotting Korean cultural exports, shutting down Chinese tourism to Korea, and closing 90 percent of the Lotte stores in China (punished because it swapped the land the South Korean government is using for the THAAD deployment). China’s 8.1 million visitors accounted for about half of South Korea’s tourists last year, and 70 percent of duty-free operators’ annual revenue of 8.6 trillion won ($7.59 billion) according to the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO); that number is estimated to plunge 50 percent in 2017. Korea Development Bank forecasts $20 billion in potential losses in trade with China, should the diplomatic spat continue, more than half of which are in the tourism and duty-free sectors. For its part, the United States provides security guarantees to South Korea against the North Korean threat, and gives Seoul credibility in the eyes of Beijing. Astute South Korean policy-makers concede that China would not take them seriously if they did not have the United States behind them. In addition, Pyongyang ultimately wants a deal with Washington, and Moon needs a good relationship with the United States to prevent the North from negotiating behind his back. In this context, a deal with Tokyo gives Moon breathing room. A strong relationship with Japan also gives South Korea more credibility with China; without a partner, South Korea is susceptible to the type of pressure that China has brought to bear in the wake of the THAAD controversy. While the United States should continue to provide that protection, there is greater uncertainty and less assurance in South Korea about U.S. positions in the Donald Trump administration. Regardless of whether the United States is encouraging good Japan-South Korea relations or appears more untrustworthy from the vantage point of Tokyo and Seoul, a stable Japan-South Korea relationship provides both governments with a measure of assurance in an increasingly volatile security environment. Moreover, a strong Japan-South Korea relationship would prevent Beijing and Tokyo from coming to agreement on interests in East Asia in ways that prejudice South Korean interests. In other words, a durable Japan-South Korea relationship is an insurance policy for Seoul. Building that relationship will take time. It will be incremental. It could begin with Moon’s personal affirmation of a future-oriented relationship, followed by outreach to Abe to construct a larger and more enduring bilateral relationship. Abe should respond with an offer of assistance (in the appropriate form) to mitigate the damage being done to South Korean economic interests by China. A resumption of the expired currency swap agreement would also be a nice gesture. While the Japanese government is likely to resist formal renegotiation of the 2015 comfort woman agreement, it is undeniable that Japan-South Korea relations will be constrained without broader Korean public acceptance of Japan’s efforts to address the past. Both leaders will have to do more to change the situation. The challenge for Moon is to show that South Korea’s public grievances toward Japan can be satisfied, while Abe will need to make greater efforts to win over South Korean public support. Over time, Japan-South Korea cooperation should evolve into a genuine framework of reconciliation. In many ways, Moon is the most appropriate leader for such a deal. The real tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship are generated by the right in Japan and the left in South Korea, both of which are struggling with the political status quo in their own countries. Moon, a progressive, and Abe, a conservative, are the leaders best able to deliver the constituencies that would make reconciliation between the two countries meaningful. Both short- and long-term considerations should impel them to get started now.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe could not have wished for a better outcome from his summit meeting with President Donald Trump. To be sure, there were some awkward moments—like the Lost in Translation-like nineteen-second handshake. But Japan’s prime minister came to Washington to ensure that the U.S.-Japan alliance was on steady ground with the new administration and to explore the economic pathway for Japan as the president develops his America First agenda. The formal meeting on Friday produced a joint statement and a presser that allowed both leaders to discuss their priorities. Trump read from the script when it came to the security guarantee the United States offers to Japan. In many ways, it read like the to-do list for the U.S.-Japan alliance: Deterring aggression. Check. Senkaku Islands protection. Check. China. Check. But with Trump’s addition of alliance reciprocity. Check. For his part, Abe had his own check list, one that focused largely on the benefits of the liberal economic order. Shared democratic norms. Check. The rule of law. Check. Free and fair trade. Check. There was no reference to the Transpacific Partnership. Nor did Abe use the word protectionism. Nonetheless, Abe too echoed the alliance refrain that previous prime ministers might have used with U.S. presidents. But Japan’s prime minister brought also some new ideas for working with the Trump administration. New avenues for economic cooperation will be explored including President Trump’s ambition for a nation-wide infrastructure improvement plan. Japan’s much vaunted high speed rail and its newer maglev technologies, Abe noted, could help. Maglev, for example, would allow President Trump to get from Washington to New York in an hour, he promised. Equally important, a new high level conversation was established between the vice president, Michael Pence, and the deputy prime minister and finance minister, Aso Taro. They will delve into the various ways the United States and Japan can find common economic cause, one that will help both leaders fulfill their promises at home for economic growth and job creation. Business done, the two leaders headed to Florida for extensive socializing. The Abes were scheduled for dinner with the Trumps along with Robert Kraft, the owner of New England Patriots, two or three rounds of golf, and lots of fun at Mar-A-Lago, Donald Trump’s private resort. On television, CNN and other media shared small glimpses of Abe and his wife, Akie, with Donald and his wife, Melania, seemingly having a wonderful time as a room of on-lookers set back at a discrete distance looked over their shoulders at the new U.S. president’s diplomatic gathering. On Saturday, however, this carefully planned program of down time for Abe and Trump was interrupted by North Korea. The launch of a Pukguksong-2 missile from a mobile launch vehicle in North Pyongan province, which came down in the Sea of Japan, could not have been better timed. At a hastily arranged press conference, Prime Minister Abe invoked the United Nations Security Council and decried the launch as “absolutely intolerable.” President Trump stood back until Abe turned over the podium, and then stated, “The United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.” From a Japanese perspective, no more needed to be said. As summits go, it was an unusual one. The diplomatic ups and down of the first few weeks of the Trump administration had dominated the headlines, from the cancellation of the Mexican president’s visit to the curt twenty-minute phone call with Australia’s prime minister. But this was a hole in one for the U.S.-Japan relationship, reflecting the care with which both governments gave to ensuring success. Back home in Tokyo, newspapers headlined the visit as an Abe-Trump “honey moon” or a “homerun,” but remained cautious as to what could be ahead. After Candidate Trump rattled many, initial worries in Japan seemed to have been assuaged. Now it will be up to Vice President Pence and Deputy Prime Minister Aso to translate this initial diplomatic win into a meaningful economic agenda, and for Secretaries James Mattis and Rex Tillerson to assume leadership over the alliance agenda. As Pyongyang just demonstrated, Asia will not stand still. This article originally appeared on Forbes.

Richard Javad Heydarian is an assistant professor in political science at De La Salle University in Manila, and, most recently, the author of Asia’s New Battlefield: The U.S., China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific. As electoral shocks overhaul the Asian geopolitical landscape, Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe is on an all-out charm offensive. When Donald Trump Jr. pulled off a surprising electoral victory on the back of a populist, anti-globalization rhetoric, the Japanese leader immediately scrambled to secure a meeting with the president-elect. In fact, Abe became the first head of government to visit Trump Tower after the November elections in the United States. However, there is little indication that the Japanese leader managed to change the president-elect’s views on some of Tokyo’s key strategic concerns, particularly the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. Well before meeting Trump, however, Abe was already on a mission to win the favor of the Philippines’ tough-talking leader, Rodrigo Duterte, who has been dubbed as the “Trump of the East”. In his first six months in office, Duterte has shaken up the regional geopolitical landscape to the consternation of traditional allies such as Japan. A self-described socialist with a long history of tense relations with the United States, Duterte has managed to recast his country’s foreign policy more radically than any of his recent predecessors in Manila. Vowing to pursue a more independent foreign policy, Duterte has gradually downgraded military relations with Washington in favor of closer economic and military ties with China and Russia. In recent months, Manila has moved towards terminating major joint military exercises with Washington, namely the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Exercise (Carat) and the joint U.S.-Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHIBLEX). Manila’s deteriorating ties with Washington have gone hand in hand with improved ties with Beijing. In fact, the Dutetre administration is now considering military agreements with both China and Russia. In a dramatic departure from its predecessor’s hawkish foreign policy on China, the Duterte administration has effectively sidelined the Philippines’ landmark arbitration case against China in the South China Sea, advocated for joint development schemes in disputed South China Sea waters, and often described Beijing as a friend and partner. With the Philippines assuming the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) this year, Duterte has signaled minimum interest in mobilizing regional pressure against China’s maritime assertiveness, even though other Asean members, like Vietnam and Singapore, would be happy if the organization stepped up the pressure on Beijing. Thus, Abe’s recent two-day visit to the Philippines came at a critical juncture in Asian geopolitics. Tokyo is deeply troubled by deepening tensions between Manila and Washington, particularly over Duterte’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs. In many ways, the Japanese leader’s goal was to maintain strong strategic relations with Manila, mediate between feuding allies, and ensure the Duterte administration is not moving too far into the Chinese strategic orbit. The Abe administration seems interested in assertively countering China’s charm offensive in Manila and matching whatever economic incentives Beijing offers the Duterte administration. Abe became the first head of government to visit the Philippines during Duterte’s term, even though the Philippine president chose to make his own first state visit to Beijing rather than Tokyo. Given the importance in Asia of Japan, the world’s third largest economy and an increasingly major bilateral security partner for many Southeast Asian nations, the Abe visit also served as a major source of legitimization for Duterte, who has faced increasing international pressure over his human rights record. As the Philippines’ biggest export destination, leading foreign investor, and largest source of overseas development assistance, Japan already has significant leverage over the Philippines. Still, Abe offered a whopping additional $8.7 billion five-year aid package, focusing on infrastructure development across the Philippines, including in Duterte’s home island of Mindanao. In a classic display of personal diplomacy, Abe also visited Duterte in Davao, where they had breakfast amid much fanfare. Abe also became the first global leader from a rich democracy to offer support for Duterte’s controversial campaign against illegal drugs, offering assistance in terms of drug rehabilitation. But aside from charming, there was also some prodding by Abe. Though Abe formally welcomed improved relations between Manila and Beijing, he pushed the Philippines to be cautious on repairing ties with China, to maintain a strong stance on the South China Sea issue, and to uphold the rule of law (a code word for the arbitration award) on the high seas. Abe also offered more maritime security assistance to bulk up the Philippines’ surveillance and coast guard capabilities in the South China Sea. Abe also encouraged the Duterte administration to find a common understanding with Washington, especially with the Trump administration, which has shown little interest in human rights concerns overseas, set to take over the White House. It is far from clear whether Abe has convinced Duterte to reconsider his strategic posturing, but Duterte now appears to be the beneficiary of a bidding war among regional powers.

Having watched Japan in trade negotiations with the United States for more than a quarter century now, I would never have described the Japanese approach as direct. When confronted with a difficult trade negotiating problem, they always tended to obfuscate, delay and otherwise try to muddy the waters. So it is rather astonishing, and refreshing, to see Japan emerging as the most courageous and articulate opponent of the new Donald Trump and Theresa May style of economic nationalism. Rather than trying to hide from the spotlight, Japan has been surprisingly forthright in challenging the facts and perceptions of the new nationalists, and forcing them to confront some of the logical and factual inconsistencies in their positions. With Trump poised to take office, both U.S. allies and multinational companies that do business in the United States and abroad should be paying close attention, and emulating Japanese leadership. Three actions especially stand out. The first was the government of Japan’s surprisingly blunt intervention last fall on the issues at stake in Britain’s pending exit from the European Union. While the UK government of Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May seems to be inching ever closer to a “hard Brexit” that severs the UK’s link to the European common market, the operative policy is still the “having our cake and eating it too” approach, in the famous words of Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson. But the 15-page memo from Japan last September – titled “Japan’s Message to the United Kingdom and the European Union” – was clearly intended to snatch away the dessert. In diplomatic language, Japan warned that a poorly-managed Brexit would have real costs for the UK. It noted that Japanese businesses had created some 440,000 jobs in Europe, with nearly half of Japan’s direct investment going to Britain. It laid out a clear Japanese wish list for Brexit: no new customs duties or restrictions, unfettered investment, free movement of financial transactions across borders, access to workforces with the necessary skills, and harmonized regulations between the UK and EU. It called on the UK and EU to “heed such requests to the fullest extent…. so as to remain an attractive destination for doing business.” In other words, maintain something very close to the current economic framework in Europe or watch Japanese investment dry up. That tough and pointed message was badly needed at a time when May and other UK leaders are trying to persuade the British people to believe that leaving the EU will restore the full measure of British economic sovereignty with no costs to the economy. The global economy, the Japanese were politely noting, does not actually work that way. The second example was the decision by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to move ahead with ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal despite Donald Trump’s promise to pull the United States out of the agreement. Abe was not trying to pick a fight with Trump – indeed he was the first foreign leader to meet directly with the president-elect after Trump’s election. But instead of falling in line with Trump’s opposition to the TPP, Abe shepherded the deal through the Japanese parliament just days after his meeting with Trump. “Japan’s population is declining. If Japan is to maintain growth, it has to tap into Asia, which has a growing population and an expanding market,” Mr. Abe said when the deal was ratified. The message to the United States was clear – Japan is going to continue moving forward on trade, including participating in the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, whether or not the United States remains at the table. The United States is welcome and encouraged to return, but others will not stand still. It is a message the Trump administration needs to hear. The final example was the reaction by Toyota Motor Corporation – Japan’s most important company – to finding itself on the receiving end of one of Trump’s Twitter bombs. To be clear, Toyota is not the Japanese government – it is a sophisticated, global multinational company that carefully tends its relationships with dozens of governments around the world. But having watched Toyota maneuver during trade disputes going back to the early 1990s, I again would never have described its approach as direct. That is until Donald Trump unleashed one of his trademark Twitter blasts on the company January 5, writing “Toyota Motor said will build a new plant in Baja, Mexico, to build Corolla cars for U.S. NO WAY! Build plant in U.S. or pay big border tax.” Toyota’s shares immediately fell, as did those of other Japanese carmakers. Faced with similar bullying, other companies – including Ford, General Motors and Carrier – quickly backed down, promising to alter investment plans to respond, or at least be seen as responding, to the president-elect’s bluster. Not Toyota. Instead, it immediately issued a statement that began with a factual correction, noting that the planned new factory was “actually in Mexico's Bajio region, not Baja.” The company pointed out that all models of the current Toyota Corolla are built in either Mississippi or Ontario, Canada; the new $1 billion factory in Mexico will displace Canadian, not American, production. And the company noted that it “has $22 billion invested in the U.S., which includes 10 manufacturing plants and 1,500 dealerships that employ a total of 136,000 workers.” It went on to say: "Toyota looks forward to collaborating with the Trump administration to serve in the best interests of consumers and the automotive industry," There was no promise to change investment plans, no pleas for Trump’s forgiveness. It was a clear, firm and factual response. And Trump’s Twitter feed went silent. The lesson from these incidents is that facts are the best weapons, and that America’s allies, and its leading companies, should not hesitate to speak up. For months now, before and following his election, Trump has dominated the political and economic debate in the United States, and will only be emboldened further when he occupies the Oval Office. America’s friends need to stand up to him, and Japan is showing the way.

Late last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Japan, stopping first in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s home in Yamaguchi Prefecture and then moving up to Tokyo. It was a visit that had been long in the planning, but delayed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But Putin did not bring much with him, arguing instead that it was the United States that had derailed the Abe-Putin diplomatic momentum. Much has been made of the personal chemistry between Vladimir and Shinzo, but this meeting suggested that their fifteen previous meetings had been less about personality and more about a shrewd calculus of keeping others in Asia off kilter. Would they transform a relationship long stunted by a territorial dispute? Would they distance themselves from others who might want to limit their strategic options—Washington for Abe, Beijing for Putin? Would they be able to put an end to their extended “postwar” diplomatic purgatory for lack of a peace treaty? Moscow and Tokyo muddled through the Cold War without a peace treaty. There may be little real incentive for change. Energy and other economic cooperation has proceeded without one. Russians travel to Japan and Japanese to Russia freely and without rancor. The islands—known as the Kuriles in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan—appear to have few proponents in either capitol, and more than half a century later, seem far less pressing. This is not the same Asia, however, and the geopolitical currents are running faster. China is on the rise and willing to assert itself, and the United States, with an unpredictable new president-elect, could be wiling to upend some of the region’s longstanding foundations, including perhaps its alliances. As Putin said in the joint press conference with Abe, “Japan lived without close cooperation with Russia for seventy years, and we lived without it. Can we live without it in the future? Yes, we can. Will it be the right decision? No." Yet Putin did not bring to the table what Abe needed. There was no new thinking on the islands, and no readiness it seemed to be creative about how to find compromise. Sovereignty still matters, and island disputes in today’s Asia carry just as much nationalist emotions as they did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The formula on the table remains one that former Soviet and Japanese leaders initially agreed in 1956. Two islands closest to Japan, Habomai and Shikotan, could be returned to Japan, under the conditions they would not be used for military purposes. The larger two islands to the northern, Etorofu and Kunashiri, populated by Russians and others, and the site of Russian infantry units, would not. Japan at one point may have been ready to settle for the two islands formula. Russia, like the Soviet Union, offers no more. Today, this same formula for solving Japan’s island dispute with Russia is not Washington’s primary concern, as it was in the 1950s. Rather it is Russian behavior elsewhere that concerns the United States. The annexation of Crimea and military involvement in Ukraine, as well as the growing pressures on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s newest members, continue to focus Washington’s attention on Russian behavior in Europe. More recently, the Russian intervention in the U.S. presidential election has put everyone—including the U.S. Senate—on edge. It seems Putin’s appetite for impinging directly upon Washington’s interests seems no less than that of his Soviet predecessors. The Russian and Japanese governments will continue to work on how to bridge their differences over the islands. The effort to find a pathway to some special initiative that could allow free movement and joint investment across the four islands continues. Abe delivered a letter during his early meeting with Putin, written in Russian, from the Chishima Habomai Shotō Kyojū Renmei, elderly Japanese who had been residents of these islands. Putin noted their sentiments, but did not meet with them nor promise any ready solution to their desire to visit. Visits between the islands might be made easier, a boon to tourism perhaps. And fishermen—the constituency with the most direct economic interests in the resolution of this half century of distance—may be able to fish without impunity in the waters of the Northern Territories/Kuriles regardless of nationality. The economic potential for Russia may not be insignificant—an eight point plan for Japanese economic initiatives with Russia is in the making. The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry and other ministries signed agreements to explore economic cooperation. Before Putin’s arrival, up to 95 billion yen in loans to Gazprom, Russia’s state energy company, were being considered by private Japanese lenders. The full contours of such an agreement were not publicly disclosed, however, and Japanese companies may still hesitate until more credible signs of Russia compromise are evident. Yet despite Abe’s economic largesse, Putin demonstrated little of his normal warmth on this visit. He arrived three hours late, keeping Japan’s prime minister waiting in the midst of his home constituents. He refused the offer of a mate for his beloved Akita, a gift from Abe earlier in their diplomatic journey. Despite his second visit to the renowned Judo Dojo, Kōdōkan, in Tokyo where the elders of his favorite sport teach, he did not demonstrate his skills as he had in 2000—a move that could have won him greater popularity among an expectant Japanese public. Instead of the charming persona he presented to the Japanese then, this Putin seemed far cooler. He gave a pre-visit interview with the Yomiuri Shimbun and Nippon Television in Moscow that cast a chill over the visit. Claiming it was Japan that had abandoned the 1956 framework for resolving the island disputes, Putin laid bare his own calculus: Tokyo must abandon its support for sanctions that had been in place since Crimea. At the joint press conference after their meeting, Putin took aim at the United States, reminding his Japanese audience that after all it was the United States that had stood between Tokyo and Moscow in the 1950s. Today it is the sanctions against Russia imposed in the wake of Crimea that rankle. Putin suggested that yet again its ally in Washington was holding Japan back. For now, no tremendous breakthrough appears likely for this relationship which seems frozen in time. A grand bargain may be more appealing at a time when Russian prosperity looks more promising, when bridges across the frigid seas of the northern Pacific are more welcome, and when Japanese security is more assured. Instead, more modest goals may be prudent for the time-being. The two neighbors would be well served by beginning strategic dialogue they agreed to in the early days of Abe-Putin diplomacy to ensure stable and predictable interactions between their militaries, and by continuing to build the citizen-to-citizen ties that will support their diplomacy at home.

Like many around the globe, Japanese are stunned by the election outcome and worried about what this means for the United States’ role in the world. Of particular concern, of course, are the comments Candidate Donald J. Trump made on the campaign trail about Japan, about trade, and about U.S. alliances. But what matters now is what President-elect Trump will do to reassure Tokyo that he values the U.S.-Japan strategic partnership. Last night, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with Trump in New York, and by all accounts it was a good beginning to what will undoubtedly be a long conversation on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the strategic challenges of Asia. Abe wasted no time in reaching out to the president-elect after the election to congratulate him, and to stop by New York on his way to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Peru. For Trump, this was his first meeting with a world leader, and media from around the globe watched to see how he would handle the scrutiny. For Abe, however, this was the first opportunity to test just how committed the president-elect was to his campaign rhetoric. Abe hoped that his personal touch, including the gift of a golf club, would dispel fears in Tokyo that Trump wanted to abandon the alliance. During the campaign, Trump suggested that Japan and South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons and deal with North Korea on their own. He also claimed there was no reciprocity in the alliance, noting that while the United States defends Japan, Japan does little for the United States. He asked why Japan’s 50 percent contribution to the costs of stationing of U.S. forces there could not be raised to 100 percent. Since elected, however, Trump’s advisors have sought to reassure Tokyo on its support for the alliance. Even President Barack Obama joined in, noting that in his White House meeting with the president-elect it was clear that Trump valued America’s alliances. Trump himself tweeted that he never said Japan should have nuclear weapons. When questioned in the Diet on Thursday on his change of heart about the U.S.-Japan alliance, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso noted this flip-flop was "to put it kindly, flexible; or to put it unkindly, ignorant." But in Tokyo, it was clear that Trump’s victory had triggered some of Japan’s leading defense policymakers to advocate for greater military self-reliance. In a November eleventh press conference, Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada said this election result "provided the opportunity to think more seriously about what Japan could do on its own to defend itself." Former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera, a respected Liberal Democratic Party moderate, echoed her sentiments, arguing that this was "an opportunity for Japan to consider how to provide national security on its own." It is also worth mentioning that the Diet committee on constitutional revision resumed talks this week after a seventeen-month pause. Equally concerning to Tokyo is Trump’s intention to retreat from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The Abe cabinet invested deeply in the effort to conclude the twelve-nation trade pact, and Abe stood side-by-side with Obama in promoting the TPP abroad. Legislation needed to ratify the agreement is currently on the floor of Japan’s parliament, and in the wake of Trump’s victory, Abe has been bombarded with the anger of legislators who feel betrayed by the thought that the United States would just walk away from a hard won fight for trade liberalization. Other foreign policy aims threaten Tokyo’s broader foreign policy interests. Japanese worry about the United States triggering a trade war with China, and about the overall protectionist tone of a Trump administration. Moreover, Japan has long championed multilateral agreements on nonproliferation and climate change; Trump’s antipathy towards the nuclear deal with Iran raises fears about further conflict in the Middle East and his desire to withdraw from the Paris Agreement climate change undermines a multilateral project that Japan has long championed. Two relationships that could change dramatically under a new Trump administration are also critical to Japan’s strategic interests. Abe will undoubtedly want to understand Trump’s thoughts on Russia and how this might affect his own diplomacy with President Vladimir Putin, who is expected to visit Japan in a few weeks. Even more critical to Tokyo will be the U.S. relationship with China. Maritime tensions in the South China Sea have been on the top of the regional security agenda this year ever since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal ruling [PDF] on Chinese claims challenged Beijing’s maritime and territorial rights in the Spratly Islands. Japan’s clash with China over the Senkaku Islands continues to hover over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air forces continue to test Tokyo’s resolve in the East China Sea. Trump said little about this in the campaign, worrying Tokyo that the alliance consultations on regional security crises might be deflected by his focus on a trade war with China. Abe and Trump, in short, have much to discuss, and many more conversations between the two governments in the months and years ahead. But under the intense glare of global media coverage, this ninety-minute get-to-know-you chat at Trump Tower was neither the time nor place. Abe went to New York to build a personal relationship with America’s president-to-be; Trump undoubtedly wants to put his best foot forward in this first foray into diplomacy. In his press briefing after the meeting, Abe was circumspect, thanking the president-elect for his time. On his Facebook page, Trump said, "It was a pleasure to have Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stop by my home and begin a great friendship." Japan’s prime minister succeeded in drawing out President-elect Trump, but there is far more at stake. This is, after all, America’s most important relationship in Asia, an alliance that grounds the United States in an accelerating geostrategic reshuffle. President-elect Trump will need to consider how the United States can shape Asia’s future, and the U.S.-Japan alliance will be an invaluable asset. For Abe, the meeting was a high-risk gamble; had he confronted Candidate Trump, it could have intensified angst at home and provided greater opportunity for Japan’s increasingly well-armed neighbors. More than a media moment, this was a significant test—of Trump’s new role, of Abe’s diplomatic skill, and ultimately, of the resilience of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

For the second time, President Barack Obama brought together President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for a trilateral summit on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit. The first time in 2014 the president was facilitating a meeting the two leaders could not have on their own, but last week the improving relations between Seoul and Tokyo were obvious. While the United States has facilitated some of these improvements, ultimately it is North Korea and its provocations that brought the two U.S. allies back to the table. Whether the future of this trilateral can be bolder and more resilient remains to be seen. Asia’s diplomacy on the sidelines of President Obama’s Nuclear Security Summits matter greatly given the tremendous stakes in the choices made by our nonnuclear allies in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang has raised threat perceptions across Northeast Asia, just as its increasingly provocative behavior has put pressure on the defense preparedness of South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs make it abundantly clear that sooner or later we will face a direct challenge to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in Asia. It is important therefore that Japan, South Korea, and the United States maintain unity in their approach to the North. Last week, the three leaders spent the bulk of their time discussing how to manage this increasingly bold North Korea. With a nuclear test followed by an intermediate range ballistic missile test, multiple firings of shorter range missiles towards Japan, and some seriously concerning threats about a nuclear attack on the United States, it is no wonder that this was the focal point. The peace and stability of Northeast Asia depends on the ability of South Korea, Japan, and the United States to cooperate effectively to meet whatever challenges Pyongyang may pose. But the last several years of diplomatic estrangement between Seoul and Tokyo should also direct our attention to the need to build broader foundations of cooperation. Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Anthony Blinken put forward an ambitious but eminently attainable agenda for the Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral just days before the leaders met. Having led a trilateral dialogue at the deputy secretary level between Japan, South Korea, and the United States for over a year, Blinken pointed out what many in Japan and South Korea have lost sight of –that the two societies have more in common than a tragic history. Together, the United States, South Korea, and Japan share a desire to lend their capacities and incredible human resources to the task of improving the well-being of citizens across the globe. The three governments have identified some important focal points for future trilateral cooperation, including climate change, counterterrorism, and the empowerment of women. We should not rush to close the door on the difficulties of the past several years in the Japan-South Korea relationship, however. President Park and Prime Minister Abe concluded an agreement that would address the deep reservations in each of their countries about the outstanding grievances regarding the treatment of women who worked in Japanese military brothels during World War II. Each government committed itself to a plan of action; and without hesitation, each government is responsible for implementing to the letter the terms of that agreement. Historical reconciliation, however, is not the work of one agreement or one peace treaty; it is the work of generations. And for generations now South Koreans and Japanese have sought to find common ground. It goes without saying that they will continue to need to reach out, to share perspective, and to commit to building a community in Asia and beyond that ensures the safety and security of women. The future of Northeast Asia rests on the success of this attempt to build a more resilient and ambitious agenda for cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Each of these three countries will adapt and adjust their foreign policies as Asia changes, thus it will be important to nurture this partnership. When the world outside is less predictable, it never hurts to have friends who see their interests as you do. That vision of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea relationship must now take hold.

James Gannon is executive director of the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE)/USA, and Ryo Sahashi is associate professor at Kanagawa University and research fellow at the JCIE. Barely three years ago, Japan watchers were wondering what it would take to break the country’s streak of short-term prime ministers—six premiers had cycled through office in six years and a total of fourteen in two decades. Then Shinzo Abe upended expectations by returning to power and projecting an aura of strong leadership. He has already become one of Japan’s longest-serving prime ministers and, in the process, racked up an impressive list of foreign policy accomplishments. In light of his success, one could assume that the problem of short-lived, weak prime ministers is a thing of the past. But a recent Japan Center for International Exchange study, Looking for Leadership, warns that Abe may be the exception rather than the rule. Post-Abe, Japan is likely to slip back into the pattern of frequent leadership changes. Abe has managed to succeed since returning to the premiership in December 2012, in contrast to his disappointing performance in his first term in office a decade ago. Then the prime minister was widely perceived as lacking the political skills that the job required. His government seemed adrift, floating from one scandal to another, prioritizing issues such as “patriotic education” with limited appeal to the general public, and seemingly lacking any clear message or mission. Yet this time the Abe government has shown considerable skill in juggling politics and policymaking. The Abe cabinet made economic revitalization its top priority, deftly packaging it as Abenomics and rolling it out in a way that branded Abe as a bold leader. The cabinet has carefully managed its approval ratings by sequencing major initiatives with the political calendar, ensuring that controversial measures were wrapped up well before elections to give the ruling party time to rebound from any political damage. And Abe leveraged his political momentum to silence intra-party rivals, for example ensuring that all of the cabinet members fell in line behind him. Much of the credit for this deft political management could be given to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, however it is also clear that Abe learned a great deal about political pragmatism and how to shepherd his political capital in the wilderness. Nonetheless, the Abe cabinet would never have been able to play its hand so well without its good luck and timing. The greatest gift that a politician can receive is a deeply flawed enemy, and Abe has benefited enormously from the haplessness of his opposition. He returned to power in a landslide victory, which even he admitted was more a sign of voter disgust with the failure of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) than support for his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This gave his ruling coalition the rare advantage of a veto-proof, two-thirds majority in the Lower House. Since then, the continuing missteps of the DPJ and a yearning for political stability have helped Abe to maintain public support and party unity. The electoral landscape was also favorable to Abe. He came into office via a general election, which gave him greater credibility than if he had just inherited the post after a party election, as most of Japan’s prime ministers do. There was no unified opposition in the Upper House that could easily block his plans. Plus, Abe faced the July 2013 Upper House while his popularity was still cresting, and once he successfully passed that hurdle he did not face any other mandatory party or general elections for over two years, more than enough time for Abe to consolidate his power and allow his government to pick and choose its electoral battles. This combination of skillful political management, good timing, and no small measure of luck has enabled the Abe government to overcome the Japanese system’s daunting institutional obstacles to strong prime ministerial leadership. However, once he steps down, his successors will face the same institutional constraints that have made it so hard for previous prime ministers to lead. For one, in Japan, the prime minister still has remarkably little direct control over the legislative process, which makes it surprisingly difficult for him to implement his agenda. Unlike the United Kingdom, where the cabinet decides which legislation goes forward and how to sequence it, Japanese legislative agenda and timetable remain the prerogative of the Diet’s committee chairmen and steering committees. This allows backbenchers to delay or block legislation even when it is a top priority for the cabinet, and the resulting legislative gridlock has increasingly exacted a heavy toll during elections. Abe’s successors are unlikely to come into office with a strong hand that they can dominate party rivals and steamroll the opposition from the start in the way Abe did. Second, the Upper House has increasingly become a stumbling block for Tokyo’s ruling parties. The 1993 introduction of winner-takes-all, single-member districts for the Lower House—combined with declining party loyalty—has made it more likely for power in the Lower House to alternate between two major parties or coalitions. But the Upper House is still elected through a proportional representation system, giving greater opportunity to Japan’s smaller opposition parties, diversifying its make-up. Coupled with the different timing of Upper and Lower House elections, this increases the chances that Japan’s voters give the opposition parties a bigger voice in the Upper chamber. Since Japan’s Upper House is more powerful than other parliamentary systems, both the DPJ and the LDP while in opposition have proven adept at exploiting its powers to hold government policy hostage. Four of five previous premiers—Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso of the LDP and Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda of the DPJ—were brought down as the opposition in the Upper House stymied their legislative priorities. Sheer electoral math tells that Abe will retain control of the Upper House in this summer’s elections—given the ruling coalition’s seventy-seven seats that are not up for a vote this time, so it only needs to win slightly more than three-quarters of the seats it has in play to retain the majority. But the institutional pressures for divergence between Upper and Lower Houses are likely to reassert themselves in time, especially if there is a more viable opposition to draw votes away from the LDP. Finally, the increasing unpredictability of public support means that prime ministers pay a higher price when facing these kinds of institutional obstacles. Over the past two decades, public support has grown more volatile, with cabinet approval ratings for new governments starting out higher than before, but declining more precipitously when the prime minister fails to live up to expectations. As a result, a form of “polling politics” has emerged whereby both the LDP and the DPJ have been quick to oust their leaders when their approval ratings drop below a certain threshold. Abe has managed to avoid these perils thanks in part to a discredited opposition, yet his successors are unlikely to face such a favorable political climate. What does the likelihood of a return to the pattern of short-lived leaders mean for Japan’s friends? Five trends in Japanese foreign policymaking are likely to emerge. First, and perhaps counterintuitively, a high turnover in prime ministers will produce even greater continuity and conservatism in Japan’s overarching foreign policy line. Typically, only strong leaders who managed to stay in office for extended periods have succeeded at driving major shifts in foreign policy—think Shigeru Yoshida, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Junichiro Koizumi—while weaker ones who moved too rashly, like Yukio Hatoyama, have paid a steep political price. Second, a vacuum of political leadership will give bureaucrats a greater role in foreign affairs. This can reinforce the tendency toward continuity. But it also is likely to result in a greater stinginess in development assistance, one of Japan’s traditional instruments of influence abroad, as the powerful finance ministry gains a freer hand to advance its number one priority—cutting the national debt. Third, Japan will have difficulty maintaining a strong international presence if domestic political pressures present leaders from developing ties with other world leaders. Furthermore, diplomatic crises could become more frequently if new leaders lack the experience to manage international crises. Fourth, with no clear leadership hierarchy, ambitious politicians are more tempted to resort to populist appeals to advance their careers, especially when senior leaders have less clout to tone down their rhetoric. Former Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto’s appearance has shown how a blunt and outspoken critic could rapidly gain national prominence at a time when personal popularity becomes the currency of politics. Finally, a return to the pattern of frequently rotating leaders is likely to feed the gridlock that has become all too common on sticky foreign policy issues, such as the Futenma base relocation. This arguably makes it important for the United States to push hard to resolve politically sensitive issues while a proven leader like Abe is in office, but then be prepared to dial things back and focus more on lower-profile relationship maintenance when weaker leaders take the helm. Of course, Abe’s track record gives his successors ideas for how to buck this trend of weak, short-lived leaders. But replicating the Abe cabinet’s success will not be easy under the current political system. Without further reform to rectify the imbalances at home, Japanese prime ministers seem destined to struggle to project strong leadership abroad.