Rule of Law

The federal high court in Abuja has ordered the release from detention of Lamido Sanusi, the former emir of Kano deposed and exiled by the governor of Kano state. The decision follows a suit filed by Sanusi in federal court. The rule of law can be weak in Nigeria, especially when it comes to high-profile political prisoners, but it appears that Sanusi has been released from government custody, following a visit from Kaduna State Governor Nasir el-Rufai. Shortly after his dethronement by the governor of Kano state, Abdullahi Ganduje, Sanusi was moved under a heavy security escort to nearby Nasarawa state. According to Nigerian media reports, he has been held in detention in an apartment in the town Awe. It was not immediately clear under what grounds he was being held by state authorities.  Sanusi is the former governor of Nigeria’s central bank and has a highly favorable international reputation. During his tenure, he publicized fraud in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation involving some $20 billion in missing government revenue during the administration of Goodluck Jonathan. In response, Jonathan removed him from his position at the central bank, a step that may have been illegal.  Sanusi is a member of the royal family of Kano that provides the emir. When his uncle, Ado Bayero I, died in 2014, he was elected emir by the “kingmakers” and approved by the then-governor. (Sanusi’s successor is Ado Bayero II, the son of Ado Bayero I.) He then fell out with the current governor, Ganduje, who is often accused of corruption. In social media and elsewhere, there is speculation that the governor deposed Sanusi because of his criticism. In his official reasoning for the dethronement, the governor accused Sanusi of “insubordination,” among other things.  Apparently the judge has not questioned the right of the governor to depose Sanusi, and there is ample precedent for governors removing traditional rulers going back to British colonial times. The judge’s ruling addresses instead the detention of Sanusi under what amounts to house arrest in a different state by a governor. In the Nigerian media, there are hints that the removal of Sanusi is causing unease within the political class as well as on the street. Thus far, it is unclear whether President Muhammadu Buhari has played any role. 

In southwest Nigeria (Yorubaland), the location of Nigeria’s commercial capital Lagos, there has been a dramatic upsurge in kidnapping, house invasions, and robbery. On January 9, the governors of the six states in the region announced the establishment of Operation Amotekun (“leopard” in the Yoruba language). The apparent goal of Operation Amotekun is to support and supplement the national police service, but not replace it. Initially met with controversy after Abubakar Malami, the attorney general, first declared the group illegal, Amotekun has now been given the green light by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo. (President Muhammadu Buhari was out of the country at the time.) Yoruba traditional rulers, led by the Ooni of Ife, had earlier voiced their support for the initiative.  The creators of the program were explicit that it was meant to support, rather than undermine, the work of federal security services. According to Governor Kayode Fayemi of Ekiti state: “We are not here to undermine the power of the Federal Government of Nigeria, but our primary interest is the security and safety of our people.” Former governor of Lagos State Bola Tinubu compared Operation Amotekun to “Neighbourhood Watch,” a program his administration instituted to pass information along to the police, which also included an early-warning system. But he criticized Amotekun for its use of uniforms and custom vehicles, which give the impression of a defense force. (According to some photos, participants received bright-red pick-up trucks with “Amotekun: Zero Tolerance to Crime” written on the side.) Apparently, funding comes from the state governments. It is not clear whether Amotekun participants will be salaried. Nigeria has a national police force—a gendarmerie that echoes that of France and francophone states in Africa—but there is no state or local police force. Since the colonial period, there has been concern that local policing could result in ethnic tensions. In theory, if not in practice, national policemen are deployed outside the communities from which they come. However, with the general breakdown of security throughout the country, there is a lively debate over the merits of establishing some sort of local police. This is part of a larger debate on the devolution of more power to state and local governments. There is also recognition that the national police are undertrained, underfunded, and too few in numbers.  According to one report, twenty-three out of Nigeria’s thirty-six states have similar local security outfits. Some are armed, some not, but all apparently operate under the authority of state or local governments, and many seem designed to work with the federal police force. In areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, for example, there are local units, some existing under the umbrella of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), and others loosely referred to as “hunters.” These groups are meant to assist the police and security services rather than replace them. CJTF is particularly involved with information gathering, but some members are also armed, often with homemade or locally made guns. Hunters, who tend to know the land well, are known for identifying Boko Haram bases. Participants in the CJTF and hunter groups initially were volunteers. Now at least some receive a small stipend from the Federal and sometimes state governments. In October 2019, the governor of Borno state enlisted the services of thousands of “hunters” to compliment the Nigerian military in the state.  The southwest governors and others are at pains to say that Amotekun is not a regional police force. Yet, in northern Nigeria, CJTF and hunters exercise police functions, at least from time to time. Critics have likened them to vigilantes, too often ill-disciplined, ill-supervised, and accused of taking justice into their own hands. On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that they have played an important role against Boko Haram. Faced with a security breakdown in their region, the southwest governors likely felt they had little choice but to establish what may prove to be a regional security force. 

Nigerian media, quoting sources in the security services, reports that up to thirty people were killed and possibly one hundred kidnapped on the night of January 14 in a single incident on the Kaduna-Zaria highway in Kaduna state. The perpetrators were dressed in military uniforms. Among the wounded was the Emir of Potiskum.  As is frequently the case with major criminal episodes, reporting on the details is contradictory. For example, it is variously reported that the attack took place at 11:00 p.m. on Tuesday and 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday, and the Kaduna police officially reported only six deaths. What is clear is that the attack took place at night, and that victims included members of the emir’s entourage. There also seems to be a consensus that a very large number of people were kidnapped.  It is not clear whether the episode was related to Boko Haram or whether it was purely criminal. The Kaduna-Zaria road is known to be the venue of frequent kidnapping. Both Boko Haram operatives and other criminals are known to dress in military uniforms, but Kaduna is relatively far removed from the jihadi group’s area of operations in the northeast. It is also not clear whether the emir was an intended target (though some media indicates he was) or whether he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Still, the emir is from Yobe state, long a center of Boko Haram activity. The emir is a senior traditional ruler, and he was visiting “traditional institutions” in preparation for the upcoming commissioning of the Potiskum Central Mosque, according to Nigerian media. Traditional rulers, including the Sultan of Sokoto, the Shehu of Borno, and the Emir of Kano, have all been targeted by Boko Haram, which regards them as sell-outs to the secular state.  Kidnapping for ransom, once largely confined to the southern part of Nigeria, has now spread throughout the country. Militant and criminal groups, including Boko Haram, resort to kidnapping for ransom to raise funds. The wave of kidnapping in recent years a major contributor to the widespread national malaise.   

Neil Edwards is the volunteer intern for CFR's Africa Program in Washington, DC. He is a master's candidate at the School of International Service at American University and a returned Peace Corps Rwanda volunteer. In an open letter published on December 4, the former coach of Team Rwanda cycling accused the Rwanda Cycling Federation president, Aimable Bayingana, of corruption and ignoring sexual misconduct against female riders. On December 7, Bayingana, along with some executive members of the federation, resigned. Their resignations occurred alongside an investigation by the Rwanda Investigation Bureau and a promise by the Rwandan Sports Ministry to impose a new policy against sexual abuse that will apply to sports nationwide. Cycling is one of the most popular sports in Rwanda. The nation has hosted the Tour du Rwanda every year since 1998, drawing huge crowds in the process. Team Rwanda Cycling was founded as part of an effort to rebuild the country and restore relations among its people after the genocide. One of its founders, Adrien Niyonshuti, qualified for the 2012 and 2016 Olympic Games in London and Rio, bearing the flag at the opening ceremony for Rwanda at both events. The former coach who wrote the open letter is cyclist Jonathan Boyer. The first American to participate in the Tour de France, he played a pivotal role in developing the cycling program in Rwanda.  Rwanda prides itself on its measures toward gender equality, including having the world’s leading female representation in the legislature at 62 percent—three times the world average. Additionally, women make up half of the cabinet and supreme court. However, according to a survey by Transparency International, around half of respondents believe that gender-based corruption, which includes but is not limited to gender bias and sexual harassment, exists in the workplace. Five percent of respondents reported personally experiencing gender-based corruption, and 85 percent of those who reported personally experiencing gender-based corruption were women. Still the resignations of senior members of the Rwandan Cycling Federation and the possibility of a new policy rollout by the Sports Ministry are positive steps toward correcting gender-based corruption in Rwanda. Continued pressure for reform coupled with policy initiatives from the Rwandan government set a standard of inclusion in the workplace and an expansion of the country’s already impressive anti-corruption measures. 

On December 12, the Sultan of Sokoto publicly said that disobedience to court orders is “a recipe for lawlessness and chaos.” He said, “We must regularly obey and respect the laws of our land. We should never disregard the laws to avoid the consequences. If a court makes a judicial pronouncement on a particular matter, it should be obeyed to the letter.” Though he never mentioned Sowore by name, the Sultan’s audience understood that the context was the State Security Service (SSS) invasion of a court room and the re-arrest of Omoyele Sowore contrary to court order. He was speaking at a quarterly meeting of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council in Abuja. Apparently under the sultan’s leadership, the Islamic establishment appears to be moving to oppose the SSS assault on the judiciary. The Sultan of Sokoto is regarded as the premier Islamic traditional ruler in Nigeria. In terms of formal protocol, he is usually listed first. He is the president-general of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, the paramount Islamic umbrella organization in Nigeria. Muslims in the north often accord him greater respect than secular leaders, including the president. Indeed, he and President Buhari are both supported by the northern man-in-the-street. Were the Sultan and the president seriously to diverge—and they are far from doing so, at present—it is difficult to know who would have the greater support. However, during military rule, military chiefs of state removed one Sultan of Sokoto and replaced him with another, though from within the same family. Before his enthronement, this Sultan, Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar III, was a career military officer. He served as Nigeria’s defense attache in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unlike many in public life, he shows a strong sense of Nigerian national identity and promotes national unity. He is known for his good relations with Christian leaders and for promoting Muslim-Christian dialogue.  The Sowore re-arrest is consolidating opposition to the president by civil society, the press, international opinion and now religious leaders. It is to be hoped that the Buhari administration is looking actively for a way to defuse the Sowore issue, perhaps by allowing him to return to the United States.

In the immediate aftermath of the State Security Service’s invasion of an Abuja court room and its re-arrest of Nigerian journalist Omoyele Sowore, the Lagos daily newspaper the Punch announced that it will prefix President Muhammadu Buhari’s name with his military rank, Major General, and will refer to his administration as a “regime,” until “they purge themselves of their insufferable contempt for the rule of law.” In its announcement, Punch draws parallels between Buhari’s government and his “ham-fisted military junta in 1984/85,” when he was military chief of state. For Punch the “regime’s actions and assaults on the courts, disobedience of court orders and arbitrary detention of citizens reflect the true character of the martial culture.” The Punch announcement also attacks the military and the police because they “fail to understand that peaceful agitation and the right to associate are fundamental rights.” In addition to Sowore, Punch refers specifically to the detention of the leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, and his wife, and of former National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki, all in violation of various court orders. It also refers to various governors that have sought to curtail media freedom and the right to demonstrate. Punch claims to be the largest circulation daily in Nigeria. In addition to the daily, it publishes Saturday Punch, Sunday Punch, Punch Sports Extra, and digital platforms, of which the best known is Punchng.com. During the period of military rule, Punch was known for its democratic and human rights activism. The military closed it three times and imprisoned its editor and deputy editor. It remains to be seen how the Buhari government will respond. The newspaper is based in Lagos, and it and its readership has long been critical of northern Nigerian governance. Its criticism of Buhari is not surprising, but it is worth noting that Zakzaky and Dasuki are both northern Muslims. What is different this time is the parallelism between military rule and Buhari’s civilian administration. Buhari’s supporters are likely to find the Punch stance infuriating. Nigeria’s foreign friends will be hoping that the government takes no move to limit Punch’s freedom of expression. The SSS assault on a court room and the re-arrest of Sowore has already damaged the country’s international reputation. 

In Nigeria, intruders stabbed the managing director of Maersk Nigeria, Gildas Tohouo, and his wife, Bernadette, following a December 8 holiday party at their home. She was killed on the spot while he remains in the equivalent of intensive care. They have three small children, all of whom have been accounted for and are being cared for, according to Maersk. The Lagos media is reporting that the intruders also forced one of the two to drink a liquid suspected to be acid. The Lagos state police have arrested two suspects. They are stating that one of the perpetrators was an electrician known to Tohouo and his wife, who admitted the other suspect to the residence during the course of a power failure.  Tohouo is Cameroonian. Nigerian media variously reports his wife as Hungarian or Bulgarian. Maersk is a major shipping line, based in Denmark. The motive appears to have been theft. There is often an uptick in violent crime in Nigeria during the holiday season when expenses are high. The brutal murders are a nightmare for expatriates and have unsettled the Lagos “establishment.” It occurred during a period of strikes by electric power workers that reportedly shut down the national grid. (The strikes have since ended.) Economically, the times are bad, and the closing of the country’s borders may have made things worse. There is also concern about apparent assaults by government agencies, especially the State Security Service, on the rule of law and freedom of the media. More generally, there is the perception that President Buhari is either returning to what are seen as his authoritarian roots or alternatively that he is largely missing in action, earning his nickname "Baba go-slow." There are also whispers (as there always are) that Vice President Osinbajo, who enjoys the confidence of the business community, has been marginalized by the “cabal” around the president.

Adam Valavanis is a former intern with the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received a master’s degree in conflict studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. The small West African country of Guinea has become the latest in sub-Saharan Africa threatened by third termism. President Alpha Conde’s second term ends in 2020, and the current constitution prevents him from seeking a third. So, last month, the eighty-one-year-old set to work drafting a new constitution, one that could allow him to remain in office indefinitely.  Tensions have been running high in the country since Conde refused to rule out running for a third term earlier this year. However, in recent weeks, as Conde has made a more aggressive play to rewrite the constitution, protests in the capital Conakry and in the country's north have reached a breaking point. Thousands of civilians have taken to the street calling for Conde to respect the constitution and leave office come December 2020.  In preparation for this unrest, his government in July passed a law that effectively provides immunity for gendarmes in cases of potential unlawful killing. Human rights activists argue this law has laid the groundwork for Conde’s aggressive response to the protests. Scores of civilians have been killed by security forces since mid-October. Condé responded to these killings by sacking the head of the security services earlier last week. But Guinea's human rights record remains rife with excessive use of force and unlawful killings by state security forces and intimidation of journalists. Amnesty International released a report this month documenting the deteriorating human rights situation in the country since January 2015, the start of Condé's second term. Though thousands of Guineans rallied in support of Conde in Conakry at the end of October, it is unclear how much popular support he enjoys. Responding to a 2017 Afrobarometer survey, more than 80 percent of Guineans, including 70 percent of respondents who support Conde's Rassemblement du Peuple Guineen party, favored a two-term limit for the presidency. Such numbers provide hope that even if Conde does present a new constitution to the public, they will reject it in referendum. But there is a fear that any vote could suffer from irregularities, similar to the 2015 presidential vote. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has weighed in on the unraveling political situation, though it only provided a tepid response to the killings that took place during protests on October 14 and 15, calling for all parties to engage in constructive dialogue. In recent years, ECOWAS has proven itself capable of responding to political crises and threats to democratic rule in the region. This year, ECOWAS played an instrumental role in ensuring presidential and legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau. In 2017, it pressured Yahya Jammeh into stepping down from the presidency after losing the election in the Gambia. Should the situation continue to deteriorate in the country, ECOWAS must respond forcefully to protect democracy in Guinea. 

Jeffrey Smith is the founding director of Vanguard Africa, a nonprofit organization that partners with African leaders to advocate for free and fair elections and ethical leadership. On November 7, a Magistrates Court in Tanzania postponed for the seventh time the case of journalist Erick Kabendera, who has voiced criticism of the country’s president, John Pombe Magufuli. After initially being violently abducted from his home and later investigated over his citizenship status, Mr. Kabendera is now facing a host of economic charges, including “assisting an organized crime racket” and money laundering.  The multiple court postponements are the ostensible result of still “incomplete investigations” on the part of the government, as no evidence has yet been produced by prosecuting authorities. Independent lawyers, human rights groups, and press freedom organizations have rightly labeled this for what it truly is: a politically motivated show trial meant only to instill fear in would-be critics and dissidents in Tanzania. During the four-year tenure of President Magufuli, the country has moved toward full-on authoritarianism.  Since taking power following a deeply flawed election in 2015, President Magufuli and his regime have ruthlessly clamped down on the country’s media fraternity, with harassment, intimidation, arrests, and even disappearances becoming commonplace. Perhaps the most troubling example is that of investigative journalist Azory Gwanda, who this month will have been missing for two years. Draconian cybercrime laws and the effective silencing of critical newspapers and independent bloggers have led to a further deterioration of the country’s media landscape ahead of next year’s scheduled elections, according to reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, respectively.  But President Magufuli’s disregard for the basic tenets of democracy reaches well beyond the media sphere. By means of legislation, and often through extra-legal means, the regime has sought to muzzle independent voices, particularly those of the political opposition, but also members of civil society, the business community, and organized religion.  Almost invariably, critics of the Magufuli regime have been charged with non-bailable economic offenses, such as money laundering, tax evasion, or corruption. In many of these cases, assets and bank accounts have been seized or emptied without a court order. In an alarming number of instances, the government has failed to present evidence in court, resorting instead to perpetual adjournment on grounds of “incomplete investigations,” such as in the case of Mr. Kabendera. This strategy of “persecution by prosecution” is indeed a hallmark of modern dictatorships; Zimbabwe is a prime example. It often fails to garner the global attention and condemnation that baton-wielding security forces otherwise would.   The cumulative effect of Magufuli’s war on democratic freedoms has hurt Tanzania’s economy. Hundreds of vital businesses have closed down or scaled back their operations. By all independent accounts, economic growth has declined, unemployment is higher and economic hardships have worsened.  The reality of Magafuli’s authoritarian turn should be acknowledged and properly addressed. Tanzania’s main development partners, including the United States, should stand up and speak out, putting the government on notice that further repression is unacceptable. This is an especially crucial juncture for Tanzania, as the country is once again barreling toward an election. In addition, Magufuli seems to be exploring the option of staying in power beyond his constitutional mandate. Less than a year from today, Tanzanians will queue to vote in a general election. If needed reforms remain ignored, and if patriotic, independent voices like Erick Kabendera remain captive, the hopes of anything resembling a free and fair election will remain an illusion. This outcome would have wide-ranging ramifications, not only for the future of Tanzania, but also for the region—one that is desperately in need of a democratic champion. 

Nigerian media is reporting that on November 12, the Nigerian police fired live bullets to disperse those protesting the continued imprisonment of Nigerian journalist Omeyele Sowore. The media describes the protestors as conducting a “sit-in” at the offices of the Department of State Services (DSS), though it is not clear whether the protestors were inside or outside the compound. There are no reports that the demonstrators were violent or that protestors were killed. But this is yet another troubling incident involving the security services, peaceful protestors, and the rule of law. This summer, clashes in Abuja between security services and Shias, an Islamic religious minority, led to an estimated four deaths. They were protesting the imprisonment, since 2015, of their ostensible leader, Sheikh Ibrahim el-Zakzaky. Representatives of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), which is a Shia group, alleged that they were attacked by the police after protesting peacefully. Previously, in October 2018, dozens of IMN members protesting Zakzaky’s imprisonment were killed following clashes with security services in Abuja. Zakazaky’s imprisonment is based on a 2015 clash of his supporters and a military convoy, which led to the deaths of an estimated three hundred Shias. Like Sowore, Zakzaky’s imprisonment rests on dubious legal grounds (he, too, has been ordered released by the courts) and is enmeshed in the extra-judicial activities of the security services. The apparent readiness of the security services to use violence against peaceful protestors reflects poor police training and the use of the military in lieu of the police. Numbering only about 360,000 in a country with more than 200 million people, the police are underpaid, stretched thin, and often forced to fend for themselves. Morale is likely to be poor. Sowore was the presidential candidate for the Africa Action Congress in the 2019 elections. He was ostensibly arrested over his leadership of the #RevolutionNow political protest, though he is also the founder and publisher of Sahara Reporters, a well-regarded, New York-based news outlet that has reported on Nigerian government corruption. The DSS claims his protests are treasonous, but such charges appear wildly overblown. (For perspective, the government has declared the IMN terrorists.) Twice the courts have ordered his release on bail, and twice DSS has retained custody of him. This episode appears to violate freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and the law. Together, they are antithetical to President Muhammadu Buhari’s assertion that his administration believes in freedom, tolerance, and the rule of law.  Since the colonial period, there have been episodes in which the security services have operated without reference to the law or to civilian control. Notably, there was the extra-judicial murder of Muhammed Yusuf, leader of Boko Haram, while he was in police custody in 2009. That murder played a central role in Boko Haram’s ongoing war with the Nigerian state. Security service abuses are often cited as assisting Boko Haram recruitment. Similarly, there have been repeated episodes of security service violence against Shia protestors. The government has already taken some important first steps toward reform of the judicial system, but reigning in, training, and funding the security services should be a top priority. 

Ademola Bello is a Nigerian journalist and playwright. He received his master’s from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. On September 24, President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria delivered a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. In it, he assured the world that his government believes in freedom, tolerance and the rule of law. He said, “The rule of law remains the permanent, the unchanging foundation of the world order.”  But on the same day that President Buhari spoke, his government ignored a court ruling ordering the release on bail of Mr. Omoyele Sowore, the founder of Sahara Reporters, a New York-based online news website that has reportedly extensively on government corruption in Nigeria. In fact, several Nigerian journalists and activists are unlawfully held in detention by the Nigerian government for reporting on widespread corruption and human rights violations.  Justice Taiwo Taiwo, who initially ruled that Nigeria’s Department of State Services (DSS) could detain Mr. Sowore for forty-five days, granted him bail on the condition that he surrender his passport. Mr. Sowore did so on September 25, but DSS did not release him, arguing that, among other things, he was not entitled to bail.  On October 4, a second judge, Ijeoma Ojukwu, presented new bail conditions that were much more stringent, including a demand to find two private landowners in Abuja who controlled land worth roughly $500,000 and who would stand for him as guarantors to meet his bail conditions. The judge also banned him from speaking with the press, not to participate in any rally, and not to leave Nigeria’s capital, Abuja. He has not yet met these new conditions.  Sowore was detained on August 3 by the DSS. He had called for a peaceful protest, tagged “Revolution Now,” to demand, among other things, that the Nigerian government end wholesale corruption, fight poverty, and provide universal education. He was charged with treasonable felony and insulting and harassing the Nigerian president based on comments made in a press interview. Usually based in New York, his trip to Nigeria was his first since revealing Nigeria’s Central Bank lost 500 billion naira (about $1.4 billion) in a failed private investment scheme. Sahara Reporters obtained and published audio recordings made by a whistleblower at the Central Bank of Nigeria. The recordings included Godwin Emefiele, the bank's governor, and other officials discussing how to cover up the loss.   The detention of Sowore comes as press freedoms and free speech continue to be curtailed by President Buhari. The nonprofit Committee to Protect Journalists has documented widespread harassment of journalists in the country, including unlawful detention and assaults.  Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees "freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” It is time for the UN and UNESCO to speak up about the Nigerian government’s unlawful imprisonment of journalists and activists like Omoyele Sowore. 

Nigerian security services say that they have been requiring residents of the northeast—where Boko Haram is active—to produce identification cards on demand. The army claims that citizens are “cooperating” with the requirement, though it is hard to verify that claim. The army has now announced that it will extend the policy to the entire country in early November. The army has also announced that it is establishing a modern garment factory to produce military uniforms, thereby ensuring their standardization.  In its struggle against Boko Haram, the Nigerian security services have long faced the problem of identifying who is a participant in that terrorist organization and who is not. Intelligence available to the security services appears weak. Many human rights violations are related to the wholesale rounding up of “suspects” who are ordinary citizens in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Giwa barracks near Maiduguri are notorious for holding citizens, including children, suspected of Boko Haram involvement. Complicating their identification, Boko Haram and criminal gangs frequently operate wearing what appear to be military uniforms. Notably, many of the Chibok school girls kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014 thought their captors, dressed in military fatigues, were from the Nigerian army sent to protect them. Hence the push for identifying citizens and standardizing security service uniforms.  As if often the case, government capacity is limited. There is no national registry of Nigerian citizens and no uniform national identification cards any more than there is in the United States. Human rights activists say that more than half of all Nigerians possess no identification cards of any kind. Enforcement, therefore, is likely to be arbitrary and open to abuse. Though progress is being made in other aspects of criminal justice, if the requirement for national identity cards sticks, it may become a symbol of what many Nigerians regard as the increasing militarization of national life, reminiscent of Buhari’s tenure as military chief of state. On the other hand, the Nigerian state certainly has the capacity to establish a garment factory and thereby standardize military uniforms, though uniforms, like other military equipment, are subject to frequent theft. A garment factory might help in the struggle against terrorism , but it is hard to see how a national requirement to carry identification cards will work. 

James Ladi Williams is a research analyst for the center on international development and governance at the Urban Institute. Views expressed are those of the author. “No one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones,” said Nelson Mandela, who spent twenty-seven years in prison. If you were to look at Nigeria’s prisons, then, according to Mandela, you would necessarily judge the country poorly.  Nigeria’s criminal justice system is in urgent need of reform. Prisons are overcrowded, holding 73,314 people despite capacity for only 50,153. Of those held, an estimated 70 percent are awaiting trial and have not yet been convicted of a crime; reports find that some people have been awaiting trial for as long as thirteen years. The chronic underfunding of the justice system exacerbates overcrowding and pre-trial detention. Moreover, these data points likely understate the reality, limiting our ability to grasp the true scale of the problem. Prison conditions are appalling, with inmates deprived of basic amenities such as food, water, sanitation, and health care, including facilities to care for pregnant women. Physical abuse and torture [PDF] are the norm for those, particularly the poor, who have contact with the justice system.  But eleven years of advocacy by Nigerian civil society seem to be paying off. In August, President Muhammadu Buhari signed into law the Nigerian Correctional Service Act, which seeks to orient the criminal justice system toward the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. The bill renames the Nigerian Prison Service to the Nigerian Corrections Service and replaces prison time with measures like community service for certain minor offenses. State prison authorities also gain powers to reject additional prisoners when their prisons are at capacity.       The correctional services bill is considered by advocates and experts an important step, but two areas left unaddressed by the bill will constitute a significant barrier to success: implementation and culture. The bill would benefit from a concerted effort to provide funding and capacity building for agencies responsible for its implementation. Courts need to be adequately resourced to enforce the right to fair and public trial without delay. Strengthening case flow management systems and addressing human resource constraints in the court system would be instrumental to increase on-time case processing, with implications for duration of pretrial detention.  Equally important, government and civil society should begin the long process of addressing practices of the country’s security services that drive the undue growth of the prison population, especially arbitrary arrests and detention. Those responsible for enforcing justice policy, especially police officers and prison wardens, must also buy in to the vision of the new law, which purports to center criminal justice on respect for human dignity. Retraining and reeducation programs are crucial, as is recruiting new officers who can then be subject to a reformed curriculum, guided by principles of restorative justice. In addition to reeducation, policymakers can strengthen incentives for culture change by putting accountability and monitoring measures in place to detect and punish cases of unfair treatment of inmates by prison wardens, for example.  As experiences of other African countries have shown, the road to criminal justice reform is long. In Nigeria, reformers will have to contend with perennial capacity limitations and entrenched political interests, so the pace of progress will be slower than desired. However, persistence on the part of civil society advocates and reform champions within government will go a long way in the effort to realize the core ambition of the Nigerian Correctional Service Act: a justice system that treats people with dignity.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury has formally sanctioned on October 10 members of the Gupta family and associates, who are members of a “significant corruption network in South Africa.” Under the sanction, all Gupta property in the United States is blocked and must be reported to OFAC. All transactions by “U.S. persons” with the Guptas are blocked. In effect, the Guptas are barred from U.S. financial markets—presumably the aspect that will sting them the most. The sanctions are part of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2017. The Gupta brothers—Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh—moved from India to South Africa in 1993. They are credibly accused of massive corruption involving public funds and public office, and the family is now counted as among the richest in South Africa. Ajay is usually regarded as the leader. Their companies are centered on mining and media, and Oakbay Investments, a holding company, is their best known enterprise. They were closely associated with former South Africa President Jacob Zuma, himself now facing trial for corruption. Among other things, one of Zuma’s sons worked for the Guptas. The influence, even control, exercised by the Gupta family over Zuma’s administration was commonly described in South Africa as “state capture.” First under investigation and subsequently facing trial, the Gupta brothers have apparently fled South Africa for Dubai.  The flight of the Guptas and OFAC’s move against them probably strengthens the hand of South Africa's current president, Cyril Ramaphosa. Within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Ramaphosa is still fighting a rear guard action by Jacob Zuma and his allies as he seeks to implement anti-corruption and other economic reforms. Zuma has remained a powerful political figure, especially among the rural poor and among his fellow Zulus, who constitute approximately a quarter of South Africa’s population.  In a conference call that included reporters, Sigal Mandelker, the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the U.S. Treasury, acknowledge the role played by South African civil society in the struggle against corruption: “We commend the extraordinary work by South Africa’s civil society activists, investigative journalists, and whistleblowers who have exposed the breadth and depth of the Gupta family’s corruption.” Cooperation between the United States and South Africa against corruption may have a positive spillover to other aspects of the bilateral relationship, which has not been close.  

The February 2019 national elections saw President Muhammadu Buhari reelected. But defeated presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar sued, alleging electoral fraud. His petition alleged that the polling had been marked by irregularities and that he had received the most votes as shown on the central server of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). He also claimed that the president lacked a secondary school leaving certificate, a constitutional requirement to run for president. On September 11, the Presidential Elections Tribunal rejected Atiku Abubakar’s petition, saying that he had failed to provide sufficient proof of fraud. Atiku Abubakar’s next step is to appeal to the Supreme Court. Defeated presidential candidates in the past have appealed to the Supreme Court, as they are entitled to do, but none have ever had an election overturned. Meanwhile, the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), a Nigerian non-government organization, published a post-mortem on the national elections. Its report is based on its own observers, and it is devastating. It describes the INEC process of collating vote totals as chaotic and subject to manipulation. It singled out five states where the collation process was especially bad: Lagos, Osun, Kaduna, Rivers, and Sokoto. The CDD report also cites instances where the collation process was marred by violence, and it notes that security services were observed intimidating election workers and voters. In a previous report, it concluded that there were widespread irregularities at collation. The CDD, initially British, now Nigerian, is a NGO devoted to good governance. It is highly credible. As a Nigerian NGO it is more likely to see electoral flaws overlooked by outside observers. The collation process is now where African elections are often rigged, rather than by ballot-box stuffing. Other NGOs have cited voter intimidation and vote buying as well as collation irregularities as a significant aspect of the March national elections. In Nigeria, as elsewhere, rigging is done by both sides in a fiercely contested election. It also does not seem to be centrally directed, though where rigging takes place appears to be the result of strategic decisions: elections are not rigged everywhere. The bottom line appears to be that the conduct of the 2019 elections were a step back from that of 2015.