Rule of Law

Tyler McBrien is an associate editor for education at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. On August 21, South Africa’s Equality Court ruled that gratuitous displays of the Apartheid-era flag counted as hate speech and discrimination. Confronting history head on, Judge Phineas Mojapelo wrote in his ruling that the flag represents “a vivid symbol of white supremacy and black disenfranchisement and suppression,” and flying it, “besides being racist and discriminatory, demonstrates a clear intention to be hurtful.”  The court ruled in favor of the Nelson Mandela Foundation, who argued that the Old Flag, as some call it, has long become a global symbol of “white supremacy, exclusion, and hatred.” Ultimately, the ruling is not an outright ban, but rather expressly prohibits “gratuitous” displays. This interpretation leaves room for the use of the flag for artistic, academic, or journalistic purposes, similar to the German law banning Nazi and other hate symbols outside the context of "art or science, research or teaching.”    Many in the country welcomed the Equality Court ruling, and members of opposition political party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) encouraged the government not to stop at the flag. EFF leader Julius Malema has urged the government to go even further in its banishment of apartheid-era symbols and to remove the Afrikaans portion, known as Die Stem, from South Africa’s national anthem. But not everyone was happy. On the opposing side, self-described Afrikaner rights group AfriForum maintained that the flag restrictions curtail free speech, even though the group applauded a similar ruling in 2011, when the court deemed the anti-apartheid struggle song “Shoot the Boer” as hate speech (the group claimed that “boer” in this case referred to white farmers, and defenders of the song asserted that “boer” represented the system of apartheid as a whole). Nonetheless, AfriForum plans to contest the judgment. In fact, just hours after the ruling, AfriForum’s deputy chief Ernst Roets tweeted an image of the now-banned apartheid flag with the question, “Did I just commit hate speech?” In response, the Nelson Mandela Foundation promised to file an urgent request to hold Roets in contempt of court.  The recent lawsuit and subsequent fallout represent just one episode in the country’s ongoing reckoning with its apartheid past, a process that has picked up steam over the past few years. Amidst the greater context of decolonization, a social movement called Rhodes Must Fall erupted at the University of Cape Town in 2015 over a statue commemorating Cecil Rhodes, whom many see as a symbol of white supremacy. More recently, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has made land reform a priority, to address inequality in land ownership, which many see as the economic legacy of apartheid.  These developments offer a stark reminder that even South Africa, a model of reconciliation to many, remains divided and deeply unequal. Twenty-five years of political freedom has not translated into economic freedom for most in the country, which the World Bank considers the most unequal in the world. Though the flag ruling represented a powerful symbolic victory over the apartheid past, material and economic victories are proving much more elusive in a country where the white minority owns almost three quarters of all farmland. For South Africa, William Faulkner’s words ring true. The apartheid past is never dead, it’s not even past.

There has been a string of arrests of media personalities and suspensions of media outlets in Nigeria. Recently, some of the arrests have been related to support for a protest tagged “Days of Rage” and #RevolutionNow, against what supporters consider a failure of governance, but the harassment of media in Nigeria is nothing new.  In January 2019, Nigerian Security Services raided multiple offices across the country of the Daily Trust, one of Nigeria’s largest circulation newspapers, apparently angry at its published reports about upcoming army operations against Boko Haram. President Buhari quickly ordered the military to leave the newspaper’s offices, raising questions at who exactly had ordered the raids. In April, an activist known as IG Wala was sentenced to seven years in jail for organizing a peaceful demonstration and for making “unsubstantiated allegations” against a public official, the chairman of the National Hajj Commission. He is in the process of appealing the ruling. He had been denied bail, which he requested on health grounds until his appeal could be heard. He was then transferred to a remote prison. In June, DAAR Communications, owner of African Independent Television and RayPower FM radio, had its license suspended indefinitely, allegedly for failure to pay licensing fees and for the presence of hate speech and suspect information from social media in its programming. The following day a Federal High Court judge ordered the reopening of the networks. The owner of DAAR communications had accused the director general of the National Broadcasting Commission of editorial interference and political bias.  On August 2, Abubakar Dadiyata Idris, was apparently kidnapped. Family and friends are saying that he has been arrested by the SSS. Known as Dadiyata, he was a fierce critic of Governor Umar Ganduje of Kano state. The next day, the SSS arrested Omoyele Sowore, editor of Sahara Reporters, ostensibly for supporting the #RevolutionNow Lagos demonstration. He was also the presidential candidate for African Action Congress in the 2019 elections. His support for the demonstration was, according to the police, grounds for arresting him for advocating violence. There is a national and international campaign by some human rights advocates for his release. Allegations against those arrested appear to be a mixture of the mundane, such as the failure to pay licensing fees, and various forms of incitement or criticism of government officials. It is worth noting that in at least some cases, courts have reversed arrests and suspensions. The specifics of each case are obscure, at least for someone based outside of Nigeria. But people in authority are clearly nervous. The country is facing serious challenges ranging from Boko Haram to Middle Belt conflict over water and land use that falls along ethnic and religious lines. Amid these crises, social media in Nigeria, as elsewhere, can be irresponsible. Governor El-Rufai of Kaduna state has made explicit reference to the role of “fake news” to the Rwandan genocide. Nevertheless, what appears to be an acceleration of media arrests and intimidation must be cause for concern. 

On the occasion of President Muhammadu Buhari’s second inauguration, Amnesty International has issued a report, Nigeria: Human Rights Agenda [PDF] a twenty-page indictment of human rights violations by "state and non-state actors," but with the emphasis on the state security services. It calls on the Buhari administration to address perennial human rights abuses and makes specific recommendations as to what needs to be done.  The report begins with a review of the extensive constitutional and legal protections of human rights in Nigeria and also of the international human rights instruments that Nigeria has ratified, but concludes that Nigeria is facing a worsening human rights crisis across the country.  It is grim reading. There are eight sections identifying different types of human rights abuses, accompanied by recommendations about how they can best be addressed. Among them, it details different forms violence against women and girls, such as female genital mutilation, child marriages, and the abuse of women and girls by security services, especially in internally displaced persons camps in the northeast. The report also highlights the environmental degradation caused by the oil industry in the oil patch, the country’s education crisis, attacks on journalists and peaceful protesters, the practice of torture, and extrajudicial executions. It specifically calls out the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) for torture and maltreatment of prisoners and captives. The Nigerian political class, by and large, tends to denounce such reports by Amnesty and other human rights organizations. Many of them see what Amnesty characterizes as human rights violations as justifiable in the face of terrorism. Some do not accept the premise that governments must be held to a higher standard than terrorist or criminal organizations. Others think the violations are simply not true. Speaking before the report was launched, Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai said that he believed that Amnesty had “a hidden agenda” and that, after he investigated their claims, he “found out the allegations they made were fabricated.” If the report tells us anything, it is that a significant portion of the suffering faced by Nigerians—even in the face of Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and clashes among, farmers, herders, and bandits—is at the hands of their own government.

This is a guest blog post by Anthony Carroll. Anthony is founding director of Acorus Capital, a private equity fund investing in Africa, and a vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, an international business advisory firm. He has over forty years of experience working with Africa and is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last week, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced on national television the selection of South Africa’s new cabinet. This announcement quickly followed his inauguration to become president after Ramaphosa’s African National Congress (ANC) secured 57.5 percent of the vote in the national elections of May 8, the fifth since the end of Apartheid in 1994. Since the elections there had been much speculation as to the size and content of President Ramaphosa’s cabinet. During his predecessor Jacob Zuma’s presidency, cabinet members were often chosen on the basis of their closeness to Zuma and were his praise singers within the ANC. Also, with thirty-six departments, each with a minister and deputy ministers, there was jurisdictional overlap which detracted attention from substantive tasks and the departments often served as their own magnets for corruption. In order to create more coherence, President Ramaphosa reduced the number of cabinet ministers to twenty-eight. The selection process was a delicate one involving ANC party leadership and Ramaphosa’s executive team, with certain concessions having to be made to the ANC’s old guard, including some Zuma acolytes. However, Ramaphosa’s choices were largely merit-based, broadly representative (50 percent are women) and in harmony with his “New Dawn” initiative of expanding economic opportunity for all South Africans through economic growth rather than redistribution. This is a cabinet in his own likeness and being! It should be noted that the cabinet of President Mbeki also was filled with competent executives who were able to achieve the highest economic growth rates and job creation in the past twenty-five years. The Zuma presidency was a costly detour. Although there was no surprise to see the names of such competent officials as Pravin Gordhan, Ephraim Patel, Naledi Pandor, Lindiwe Sisulu, and Tito Mboweni, Ramaphosa’s selection of Patricia de Lille as minister of public works and enterprises really “put the cat among the pigeons.” De Lille won high marks as an anti-apartheid activist in the Western Cape as a leader of the strident Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). She later departed the PAC and formed the Independent Democrats and eventually merged that into the Democratic Alliance. She was elected mayor of Cape Town in 2011 where she gained high marks for her courage and executive leadership. She was a tireless critic of President Mbeki’s HIV/AIDS denialism and the massive corruption of the Zuma presidency. Despite being the most popular politician in the Western Cape, she was pummeled by DA leadership over allegations of favoritism and inflexibility. After a long but successful battle to clear her name, last year she resigned as mayor, quit the DA party and formed GOOD, a new political party that received 3 percent of the Western Cape provincial vote in the May elections.  De Lille’s selection has many promising aspects. First, she is fearless and has little tolerance for incompetence or corruption. Second, she has executive experience that she will bring to bear in addressing the acute needs for infrastructure development in South Africa. These needs include modernizing ports, airports, roads, and rails to improve South Africa’s ability to grow its economy and in so doing deftly navigate the pitfalls inherent in the country’s federal system. She can also address the woeful status of local and provincial governments to provide the most basic of infrastructure for its citizenry. For example, she could tackle the problem of housing shortages in South Africa’s burgeoning cities and in so doing ameliorate some of the polemics around land redistribution, the “Third Rail” of South African politics.  Last, her appointment provides an opportunity for the U.S. to pivot and develop a more coherent and fulsome political and economic relationship with South Africa. The passage of the BUILD Act will see the creation of a new development finance agency by the US government with $60 billion to finance projects that benefit both the U.S. and South African private sectors. Indeed, South Africa’s sophisticated banking and financial services institutions could provide a solid basis to explore opportunities for financial leveraging that could create mutual benefits. Let’s get the ball rolling.

Globa1 Witness, a non-profit corruption watchdog, is reporting that the daughter of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, president of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), purchased an apartment for $7 million in a Donald Trump-developed building in New York. Global Witness and a Lisbon newspaper have traced ownership of the apartment to a shell company owned by Claudia Sassou-Nguesso and involving a money trail including Republic of the Congo contracts awarded to a Brazilian company to a shell company in Cyprus to the purchase of the apartment. An author of the Global Witness report is calling on the Department of Justice to seize the apartment because it was purchased with embezzled money. Separately, the French government is actively investigating Sassou-Nguesso for corruption and has identified 60 million euros of various types of property that the family has acquired in France. Because of the association of the New York apartment building with President Donald Trump’s company and the involvement of the daughter of the president of the Republic of the Congo, the Global Witness story is attracting mainstream media coverage; it has been featured on the first page of the business section of the New York Times. However, the Trump Organization, apparently, had nothing to do with the sale of the apartment to Claudia Sassou-Nguesso. The shell-company purchaser acquired the unit from a third party.  The use of expensive real estate in the developed world for money laundering by the elite in the developing world is an old song. In New York and London, the practice is extensive enough to distort the real estate market in certain neighborhoods. Money-laundering elites create a market for houses and apartments costing tens of millions of dollars; absent such a market, developers might build housing in a different price range. In New York and London, in areas where such mega-million dollar residential properties are concentrated, owners typically will be in residence only a few days or weeks a year, if at all. Otherwise, the units sit empty. Empty units mean, among other things, lack of customers for the numerous small enterprises that a residential neighborhood would otherwise support.  Of course it is odious when these elites, usually from countries that are among the world’s poorest, spend huge amounts of laundered money stolen from the public on residential units in two or three of the world’s most expensive cities. Municipal authorities in New York and London are considering measures to control, even reduce, the construction of these pied-à-terres. The U.S. Treasury Department is now requiring title companies to report on all-cash purchases of high-end real estate in certain New York and Miami neighborhoods. Once corruption goes international, certain laws in sought-after destinations can allow foreign governments to play a positive role. In July 2017, the FBI announced that it would seek the forfeiture and recovery of some $144 million, the proceeds of Nigerian corruption allegedly laundered in and through the United States. In June 2018, Nigeria reached an agreement with a number of countries, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, for the repatriation of $500 million in looted public funds. Prior to that, over $300 million was agreed to be returned from Switzerland. Much of this wealth was connected to the late Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s former military chief of state. Elite money laundering is an aspect of the pervasive problem of failed leadership and lack of accountability to be found in various parts of the developing world. It is an aspect of the alienation of many elites from the people that they ostensibly lead. 

On February 7,  the Federal High Court in Lagos issued a warrant for the arrest of Ayodele Oke, former director general of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and his wife Folasade following an application by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Just before they were due to appear in court, they apparently left the country for "medical treatment," and the Nigeria media is not reporting where they are now. The EFCC has declared the couple wanted after their failure to respond to a court summons.  They are charged with the theft and laundering of staggering amounts of public money. One of the EFCC charges relates to roughly $43 million, £28 thousand, and ₦23 million—all in cash—that the EFCC found in their apartment in Lagos in 2017 following a raid. Another charge relates to $160 million that the couple allegedly diverted from the Nigerian federal government for their own use.  In 2017, Oke was suspended as director general of the NIA. Vice president Yemi Osinbaijo headed a committee that investigated the incident and recommended to President Buhari that the director general be removed.  Oke is a member of Nigeria’s political class. He studied at Emory University in Atlanta, became a career diplomat, and served as Nigeria’s ambassador to the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations in London. He was appointed director general of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) by then-President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013. The Nigerian NIA is roughly analogous to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States.  President Buhari has made the fight against corruption his signature policy, though critics have accused him of using it as a tool to go after his political enemies. Some media have said that Oke was “close to” Buhari and viewed how the case was handled as important to the president’s anti-corruption bona fides. However, at least in the media, there is little or no evidence of any such close relationship. At the very least, this episode is illustrative of the magnitude of corruption in parts of the upper reaches of Nigerian government.

In Nigeria’s presidential elections in February, incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari was declared the winner, but his primary opponent, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, is challenging those results in court. According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Buhari received [PDF] 15.2 million votes, or about 56 percent of the total, to Atiku’s 11.3 million, or 41 percent.  On March 18, Atiku Abubakar issued a legal challenge to the election results on the basis of “irregularities.” According to his party’s parallel tabulation, he won by more than two million votes. The Buhari camp, predictably, rejects the allegations and maintains that the elections were free and fair. Meanwhile, inauguration day is May 29. Almost certainly the court ruling will occur after President Buhari has been inaugurated for his second term.  In Nigeria, elections are not over when the voting is finished, the ballots are counted, the winner is announced, and the foreign observers have gone home. Candidates unhappy with the results can lodge a legal challenge with a presidential election tribunal appointed by the Supreme Court, which issues a ruling within 180 days of the appeal. After elections in 2003, 2007, and 2011, Buhari as an opposition candidate filed such appeals and lost. In 2015, however, Buhari was declared the winner over incumbent Goodluck Jonathan in the presidential election. To considerable surprise, Jonathan conceded and did not appeal to the courts. Buhari thereupon became the first opposition candidate in Nigeria’s modern history to assume the presidency through the ballot box. Since the restoration of civilian government in 1999, no presidential election has been overturned. However, gubernatorial and senate elections on a number of occasions have been annulled and new elections held. The fact that Nigeria has in place a procedure by which defeated candidates can appeal probably reduces the political temperature in the aftermath of a close election. As for the Supreme Court, President Buhari removed the sitting chief justice shortly before the elections on the basis of allegations of corruption. While the judicial system is widely regarded as corrupt in Nigeria, the Supreme Court is seen as more independent of the government than lower courts. Supreme Court rulings against the government have occurred, so the possibility of a decision favorable to Atiku, if at present unlikely, cannot be ruled out once the evidence is presented. New elections, should they occur, would likely lead to instability, at least initially.   

Claire Wilmot is a freelance journalist and research officer at the Global Justice Lab at the University of Toronto. Two days before Nigeria’s election postponement was announced, thousands of police officers travelled from their duty stations to field postings across the country to ensure the security of voters and sensitive election materials. A week later, officers remain in the field without stipends for food and accommodation.  “The money is finished,” said one officer deployed to the south of the country. “The public hall they are using [to house officers] has disconnected the water and light,” he added. According to the Police Services Commission (PSC), a civilian oversight agency for the Nigerian police, similar reports are coming in from police in states all across the country. No additional money has been made available for stipends.  “If officers are mobilized and their allowances are not paid it could be a recipe for election violence,” said Dr. Benson Olugbuo, executive director of CLEEN Foundation, a leading Nigerian civil society organization focused on police reform. Security agencies are considered to be “actors likely to cause election violence” in almost half of Nigeria’s thirty-six states, according to CLEEN Foundation’s Election Security Threat Assessment [PDF]. “How can we expect them to go there and do whatever it takes to protect the elections when they haven’t been paid? It will definitely affect morale and concentration,” said Rommie Mom, human rights commissioner for the PSC.  Additional funds to support officers would have to be approved through the National Assembly—a lengthy process unlikely to conclude by the time voting is scheduled to begin on Saturday, February 23. The PSC has filed a report with the national security advisor requesting additional funds be made available for officers, but they have not yet received a response. While most senior officers have returned to their home stations until next Saturday, almost all junior officers, who make up the majority of the force, will remain in the field for at least another week. These officers will do the majority of the heavy lifting come election day, responding to possible incidents of violence and crime, as well as policing against vote buying and political interference in the electoral process.  After Nigeria emerged from military rule in 1999, security services continued to play a critical role in elections. The worst examples of security sector misconduct came from the 2007 general elections, where the EU observation mission reported that police and military officers turned a blind eye to vote rigging [PDF], while also intimidating and harassing voters. The 2015 elections were the first in the country’s history considered by Nigerian and international observers to be broadly credible, despite some reports of misconduct by security services [PDF]. “There were isolated incidents [in 2015], but mainly they did well,” said Rommie Mom. “Unfortunately, this is a sad story because in 2018 we had gubernatorial elections in Osun and Ekiti states, and unfortunately they were back to the 2007 template.” Election tribunals are currently hearing cases of security sector interference in the Osun and Ekiti cases. Media reports confirm police were unable to prevent vote buying, intimidation, and violence at the polls. Resisting political influence is no easy feat during Nigerian elections. Political parties have significant resources at their disposal to buy influence, and it is not hard to imagine that tired, hungry officers might be less resilient in the face of corruption, intimidation, or violence.  In many parts of the country, civil conflict and crime violence continues to threaten voter turnout. Security agencies are absolutely necessary to ensure that Nigerians feel safe enough to head to the polls, and Nigeria’s Electoral Act names the police as the lead agency in providing election security. Civil society groups estimate that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) will provide anywhere between 60 and 85 percent of election security personnel, though the NPF has not confirmed these numbers. “As a matter of strategy, we try not to give out numbers,” said Frank Mba, assistant police commissioner and public relations officer for the NPF. “But what I can say is that almost every police officer in Nigeria [approximately 350,000] will one way or another be involved in policing this election.”  The central role police play in Nigeria’s elections make their welfare a source of great concern. On February 23, they may face significant challenges to the freedom, fairness, and credibility of the election. “Our argument has always been that if you deploy security agencies during an election, their welfare is paramount. If money is moving around and government is not paying, it’s a problem,” Dr. Benson Olugbuo said. 

Early in the morning on Saturday, February 16, just hours before polls were scheduled to open, the Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) postponed Nigeria’s elections by a week. The national elections have been pushed back from February 16 to February 23, and elections at the state level from March 2 to March 9. The delay is not without precedent; national elections were postponed in 2011 and 2015. According to INEC Chairman Mahmood Yakubu, “a careful review of the implementation of its logistics and operations plan” made it clear that “proceeding with the elections as scheduled is no longer feasible.” With more than 80 million registered voters and almost 120,000 polling places in a country with poor infrastructure, logistical issues would appear to be a credible reason for postponing the elections by one week. However, many Nigerians are not buying it. Instead, they are seeing the postponement as part of a strategy to throw the elections, most often to incumbent president Muhammadu Buhari. They note that INEC had given assurances twenty-four hours before the polls were to open that all systems were go. The current INEC chairman lacks the personal prestige and reputation for integrity enjoyed by his predecessor Attahiru Jega, further fueling skepticism about INEC’s “excuses.”  Postponement, so their argument runs, will reduce the electorate because many Nigerians who traveled to their home villages to vote will need to return to their place of work; they cannot afford to be away from work for a week. Nigerians are also concerned that postponement provides more opportunity for the incumbent powers to buy votes and deploy security services to intimidate voters. The leading opposition candidate, Atiku Abubakar, has issued a statement claiming that the Buhari administration postponed the vote to ensure a low voter turnout. In addition, “their plan is to provoke the public, hoping for a negative reaction, and then use that as an excuse for further anti-democratic acts.” Atiku called on his supporters to be patient and not to react with anger and violence that could be exploited “by those who do not want this election to hold.”  Most observers think the election will be very close. There were signs over the past two weeks that sentiment among Nigerian movers and shakers is shifting toward Atiku, but Buhari, with the advantages of incumbency and control of the election machinery, could yet prevail. Indeed, Buhari removed for alleged corruption the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who would preside over election disputes brought to court. INEC had also appointed Amina Zakari, Buhari’s niece, as head of the presidential elections collation committee. Past elections have been rigged at the collation stage, and two 2018 gubernatorial elections were distorted by vote buying and security service intimidation that kept voters away from the polls. Civic organizations as well as Atiku supporters are concerned that history may repeat itself.

In January 2018, Ramaphosa appointed a Judicial Commission of Inquiry into “state capture,” the label commonly used in South Africa for government corruption. The head is Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo. He is assisted by five other commissioners. The “Zondo Commission” holds hearings that are open to the public and broadcast live.  Of late, South Africans have been transfixed by the testimony to the Zondo Commission of Angelo Agrizzi detailing the extravagant bribes paid by companies to the highest level of the governing African National Congress (ANC), mostly in return for highly lucrative contracts. Agrizzi was the chief operating officer of Bosasa, a logistics company purchased by a white South African, Gavin Watson, who was celebrated for playing rugby with black Africans during apartheid in the 1970s. He used his “liberation” credentials to develop contacts with the ANC leadership. The granularity of Agrizzi’s testimony about the size and scope of the bribes Bosasa allegedly paid is titillating. He said bribes ranged from cases of expensive scotch to luxury automobiles to large sums of cash. While Zuma was named in Agrizzi's testimony, President Ramaphosa is also being investigated in connection with the corruption associated with Bosaso. Agrizzi claims that he received multiple offers of large sums of money if he would keep quiet. He did not. Subsequent to his cooperation with investigators, an audio recording surfaced in which he used insulting and racists languages when referring to South Africa's black majority. For some, this might invalidate Agrizzi's testimony. However, Raymond Zondo, while deploring the racist remarks, said, “What I heard there is extremely offensive but that does not mean I will not examine your evidence to figure out where you’re speaking the truth and where not.”   Ramaphosa and Zuma are still locked in a struggle for dominance in the ANC, with Ramaphosa slowly consolidating his position. Nevertheless, Zuma retains substantial ANC support, especially in the rural areas. Testimony from the Zondo Commission is unlikely to significantly erode this base of support. As of now, South Africa's elections are scheduled for May. The chief opposition to the ANC comes from the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The DA is the official opposition and the second largest party in parliament. A DA victory will probably require a coalition with minor parties and even part of the ANC, should it split. The EFF is radical in its economic policy and pushes, among other things, for the expropriation of white-owned land without compensation. It is noisy, but it is unclear whether its support will reach double-digits. The DA is trying to exploit politically the testimony emerging from the Zondo commission, but it is still widely perceived as the “white” party despite its black leader, Mmusi Maimaine. It has its own internal conflicts and a history of ineptness in appealing to an overwhelmingly black electorate. At the January 2019 World Economic Forum in Davos, South Africa President Cyril Ramaphosa was blunt about corruption in South Africa: “We’ve gone through a challenging number of years, nine years to be exact, where we seemed to lose our way, where we deviated from the path that you traditionally would have expected us to traverse.” He was clearly referring to the Jacob Zuma presidency. However, the Agrizzi's testimony alleges that corruption preceded Zuma and implies that it continues under Ramaphosa.  It seems unlikely that the results of the Zondo Commission will influence significantly the May elections, but even so, the public aspect of the hearings is highly positive in terms of establishing a political culture of accountability and transparency, however disconcerting it might be for the ANC leadership at the moment.

Udo Jude Ilo is the Nigeria country representative for the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Yemi Adamolekun is the executive director for Enough is Enough Nigeria (EiE). Last week, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari suspended the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Walter Onnoghen, and swore-in Justice Tanko Muhammad as the acting CJN. President Buhari was purportedly acting on an order from the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT). The CJN was brought before the CCT for not disclosing his assets. Onnoghen later admitted this nondisclosure. However, President Buhari did not follow the provisions in the constitution for the removal of a chief justice. The move casts doubts about the commitment to the rule of law in Nigeria and the integrity of the upcoming elections on February 16. There are two ways that the CJN can be removed from office. First, the president can remove the CJN only after making a case for his removal to the senate and receiving the votes of two-thirds of its members. Second, the National Judicial Council (NJC) can recommend the removal of the CJN to the president, at which point the president can remove him. President Buhari neither addressed the senate nor received a two-thirds majority in favor of the CJN’s removal, nor did he receive a recommendation from the NJC that the CJN be removed. Let’s be clear, the Nigerian judiciary has been grossly compromised. The CJN admitted to omissions on his asset declaration form, then refused to step down, and he had been trying to prevent an investigation. The president of the Nigerian Bar Association is also being investigated for fraud, as is the head of the CCT who signed the order President Buhari implemented. But, that does not justify the president’s breach of constitutional procedure.  The courts in Nigeria, with all their imperfections, have nevertheless played a stabilizing role in matters of electoral conflict. Beyond the broader roles of the judiciary, under Nigeria’s law, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction and the final say in matters related to election petitions in a presidential election. That is why the timing of CJN’s replacement is so troubling. Many analysts, including the authors of this piece, see the move by the president as a calculated attempt to gain some electoral advantage should an election petition between the president and the main opposition party end up in the Supreme Court. Domestic and international condemnation of the move has been swift.

President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa selected Shamila Batohi to the new national director of public prosecutions (NDPP) for a single ten-year term. As NDPP, Batohi will head the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which, as its name implies, determines who to prosecute and who not to prosecute on behalf of the state.  The NPA is accountable to parliament with the Minister of Justice (who sits in parliament) having final authority over prosecutions. Contrary to the spirit of the constitution, the office has been a political football, and no national director has ever remained in office for a full term. Especially during the presidency of Jacob Zuma (2009–2017), state-linked corruption escalated, with accusations that the president’s cronies were complicit in “state capture.” Zuma ensured that the NDPP was sympathetic to him and his supporters, but the Constitutional Court determined that Zuma’s final appointment to chief prosecutor, Shaun Abrahams, was illegal, and he was forced to step down. Hence, President Cyril Ramphosa had the opportunity to fill the position. The president of South Africa may appoint a NDPP under his or her own authority. Ramaphosa, however, as a first step to de-politicize the NPA appointed a selection panel to vet applicants in a public process. The panel then submitted a short list to Ramaphosa, from which he selected Batohi. Batohi has a distinguished resume. She has been a senior advisor to the prosecutor at the International Criminal Court in The Hague since 2009, where she remained untouched by Zuma-era scandals. Earlier, she served as the director of public prosecutions for fifteen years in KwaZulu-Natal. According to the Indian media, she is of Indian origin. Zuma and his allies have never hesitated to play the race card, and they are doing so now with respect to the Batohi appointment, though apparently to no effect. More seriously, the NPA will likely address in the near future numerous cases involving members of the former Zuma administration and his supporters still in office. Ramaphosa ran as a reformer against Zuma’s preferred candidate for leader of the African National Congress (ANC), the ruling party since the end of apartheid, but Ramaphosa was himself Zuma’s deputy president and thus a central part of the Zuma administration. Hence the position’s sensitivity. Nevertheless, this episode illustrates certain characteristics of South Africa and the Ramaphosa administration, at least thus far. The first is that South Africa has a depth of internationally-recognized legal talent that other African states can only envy. The second is the strength and independence of the court system: it was the constitutional court that found illegal Zuma’s NDPP appointment of a close political ally. The third is that the process of removing one NDPP and the appointment of another was done entirely according to the law.  Of course, it remains to be seen if the new chief prosecutor will aggressively pursue corruption cases, especially within the ruling ANC, of which Ramaphosa is the head. However, Batohi’s background and previous performance is encouraging.  

Across the country, Nigerians have seen an uptick in violent, ostensibly non-political, crime. Further, there is anecdotal evidence that crime has become more gratuitously violent. Nigerians are especially concerned about the upsurge in kidnapping, which affects an increasingly wide spectrum of the Nigerian population. In the past, kidnapping mostly occurred in the south and west of the country, but now, it has become national epidemic. In some parts of the country, kidnapping has become a business, with whispers of involvement by politicians and the police as well as entrepreneurs in it simply for the money. In the northeast and in the Delta, kidnapping has been used as a political weapon by dissidents. Boko Haram, for example, made headlines in April 2014 when it kidnapped 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, over one hundred of whom remain captive. Kidnappers had usually focused their attention on the rich and famous. Hours before the final group stage game in the 2018 World Cup, Mikel John Obi, the Nigerian national team’s captain, was informed that his father had been kidnapped and there was a ransom demand. Foreigners are prime targets, and have been targeted by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, by militants in the oil patch, and by "common criminals" everywhere. But now, almost anybody who appears to have the most minimal of resources, or access to resources, can be a victim. A demoralized psyche has gripped the country, with many Nigerians living in fear of being kidnapped.  The police are constitutionally responsible for fighting domestic crime, including kidnapping, and the current crime wave with kidnapping undermines confidence in the government’s law enforcement capacity. Thus far, neither of the two leading candidates, President Muhammadu Buhari and contender and former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, has advanced substantial ideas to address what has become a ubiquitous crisis of governance. Instead, in the current presidential campaign, issue-drive debates have predominately focused on the economy. Yet, it goes without saying that without an effective security apparatus that can quash the kidnapping epidemic, economic development becomes exponentially more difficult.  

Corruption has become a burning political issue in South Africa, particularly in the final years of Jacob Zuma’s abridged term in office. The faces of South Africa's Zuma-linked corruption were the three Gupta brothers: Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh. They immigrated from Uttar Pradesh in India in 1993, and the family has since become enormously rich; Ajay was commonly thought to be among the richest people in South Africa with a fortune of some $700 million. The Guptas were close to Zuma, whose son worked for them. They are accused of “state capture,” influence peddling, contract skimming, and numerous other white collar crimes.  For the past several months, the Zondo Commission has been investigating high-level corruption, including that allegedly perpetrated by the Gupta brothers. Amidst Zuma’s fall from power a house they owned was raided by police and warrants issued for their arrest. The Gupta brothers are currently based in Dubai. They have been at the center of controversy for many years, implicating in their alleged corruption consulting giants KPMG and McKinsey, and British public relations firm Bell Pottinger in 2017. Shortly thereafter, in October 2017, the Financial Times reported that the FBI had opened an investigation into the activities of the Gupta brothers’ nephews—American citizens living in Texas—and their links to the brothers. The UK government at the time was also probing ties to HSBC and Standard Chartered. The Guptas are declining to leave Dubai and return to South Africa to testify before the commission, but it is important to note that they have thus far been formally charged with little, convicted of nothing, and deny wrongdoing. Many or most South Africans believed that Zuma oversaw massive corruption as president, especially in state-owned enterprises. His administration is also judged by many as having badly managed the economy, in part because of personnel decisions influenced by outsiders for their own benefit. Zuma tried to move the government in an authoritarian direction, but he was largely blocked by the country’s independent judiciary, a lively parliamentary opposition, and a highly vocal civil society and free media. President Cyril Ramaphosa, then his deputy, successfully drove Zuma from office before the latter’s presidential term ended in the face of widespread popular distaste for Zuma and his association with corruption. Nevertheless, Zuma retains significant political support within the ANC, among the rural poor, and especially among his fellow Zulus, who are about a quarter of South Africa’s population.  Ramaphosa reportedly was initially reluctant for the commission to go ahead, but, in the end, he had no choice because of various judicial rulings and parliamentary pressure. Once the commission began its work, Ramaphosa’s allies (and perhaps Ramaphosa himself) hoped that the commission would illustrate that the ANC could clean up its own house. Instead, according to critics in the media, the commission has shown that corruption was pervasive within the party. It is too soon to say what the impact of the investigations into the Guptas and corruption elsewhere will be on the national elections, likely to take place in the first half of 2019. Though it is changing slowly, up to now, voting has largely been along racial lines. The ANC is officially "multiracial,” but it has been the party of choice for the eighty percent of the population that is black and mostly poor, and therefore, since 1994, has dominated the country’s politics. Even if the commission's findings do not translate into opposition votes, it will promote government transparency and the rule of law. 

Champions for Change is a series highlighting male allies working to advance equality across the globe. In this post, Salman Sufi gives an account of journey behind Pakistan’s most radical women's empowerment initiatives and their future.