Political Movements

Everybody loves a horserace among political personalities. South Africa is no different. The December 2017 African National Congress (ANC) leadership contest is commonly seen as a race between Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, the a reformer with an urban constituency, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, President Zuma’s ex-wife and potential protector of his patronage networks. A possible dark horse is Zweli Mkhize, ANC party treasurer, who has been identified as a likely compromise candidate. There are also suggestions of compromise arrangements, such as Ramaphosa accepting Dlamini-Zuma as deputy president of the party or vice versa. In a thoughtful piece, Stephen Grootes suggests that the ANC leadership race is more than a matter of personalities, and fall out from it poses a threat to the ANC continuing in its present form. He observes that each time there has been a leadership struggle within the party – in 2009 and 2014 – some of the losers left the party. In 2009, the vanquished supporters of Thabo Mbeki organized the Congress of the People. In 2014, opponents of Jacob Zuma led by Julius Malema organized the Economic Freedom Fighters. Grootes raises the specter that the December 2017 party election might result in much larger secession of defeated leaders, because the stakes are much higher. Ramaphosa is seen as the candidate of ‘good government’ and ‘reform.’ Dlamini-Zuma is the candidate of the status quo – a patronage-driven political system. Grootes accurately notes that for many ANC operatives, politics and the resulting patronage is all they have ever known. A Ramaphosa victory could leave them out in the cold and Jacob Zuma subject to prosecution for corruption. That faction will do anything to stop Ramaphosa. On the other hand, a Dlamini-Zuma victory would accelerate voter disaffection from the party – and the party knows that. Grootes suggests that should she win, Dlamini-Zuma is by personality is simply incapable reconciling the “losers.” Ramaphosa, however, might have the political skills to do so. Given the realities, Grootes suggests that the possibility of a compromise is “actually rather small.” Though, if a compromise is reached Mkhize is often seen as a middle ground candidate. Many outsider’s view him as in the same cloth as Rampahosa, and a possible ‘good government’ candidate. However, he also appeals to much of the ANC voter base as he is a Zulu, like the Zuma’s. That ethnicity is about a quarter of South Africa’s population and has been a crucial part of the ANC voter base, though it is unclear whether that is still true. Observers have long seen the possible splintering of the ANC as leading to a restructuring and realignment of South African domestic politics. Many see electoral politics emerging from such an alignment as similar to that of European and other democracies, with one cluster of parties on the right, one in the center, and one on the left. However, other alignments are possible. One might be a cluster of parties that represent urban interests, and another that is based in the rural areas.

On January 7, The Economist published a short analysis of the poor state of education for most – not all – South Africans. On various league tables, South Africans are near the bottom in educational achievement. However, there is a huge gap between the educational opportunities for white South Africans and everybody else. The Economist notes that of two-hundred black students starting school only one will do well enough to study engineering. The equivalent figure among white students is ten. With the end of apartheid, a school system based on race has been replaced by one based on geography, and, therefore, as in the United States, by social class. Schools in poor areas receive more funding, but schools in richer areas may charge fees. Though virtually all are integrated racially, most white students attend schools of good quality, while few black children do, and they represent over 80 percent of the population, while whites are less than 9 percent. The problem is not one of funding. South Africa spends 6.4 percent of GDP on education; in the European Union, it is 4.8 percent. As I discussed in my recent book, Morning in South Africa, education is one of the largest parts of the national budget. At over 15 percent of the national budget, it is significantly larger than the allocations for defence, public order, and safety. But black educational achievement is much lower than in other African countries. For example, The Economist cites that 27 percent of South Africans who have attended school for six years cannot read, compared with 4 percent in Tanzania and 19 percent in Zimbabwe. For The Economist, the chief culprit is the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), closely tied to the governing African National Congress and riddled with ill-discipline and corruption. The Economist cites other factors as well, ranging from the challenges of overcoming the heritage of apartheid to poor teacher training. But, the focus is on SADTU and the solutions are largely concerned with getting around the union by means of private and “collaboration” schools, the latter funded by the government but run by independent operators. Indeed, The Economist’s Criticism of SADTU recalls that of teachers’ unions in the United States. The Economist does not address the language issue. South Africa has eleven official languages, and English is spoken as a first language by only an estimated 9 percent of the population—mostly white South Africans. By contrast, Zulu is the first language of perhaps a quarter of the population. Yet, English is the international language of business and commerce, not Zulu. This creates its own issue. Because South Africa’s primary education is conducted in eleven different languages, many Zimbweans, educated in English, are more competitive for jobs in South Africa. Language is central to ethnic identity, and in democratic, non-racial South Africa, English is not privileged over Zulu, or Afrikaans for that matter. Language and education policy, like so much else in South Africa is seen through a racial and ethnic prism. Politics is as much at play as educational policy. Yet, only when primary education is conducted in English, the language of commerce, will the majority of South Africans be prepared to work in the modern economy.

The African National Congress (ANC) celebrated the 105th anniversary of its founding on January 8 in Johannesburg. (The ANC is one of the older of the democratic world’s governing parties.) Last year was a bad year for the party. National president and ANC leader Jacob Zuma was tarred by credible accusations of personal corruption and that of close associates. He met judicial and political reversals. The economy grew very slowly. In a party that values unity, factionalism increased, centered mostly on Zuma himself. In the August local government elections, the ANC faced its most severe reversal since it came to power in 1994. Accordingly, at the anniversary celebrations the emphasis was on party unity and the acknowledgement (even by Zuma himself) that the party had made mistakes that threatened to isolate it from its core constituencies. The coming year will also be challenging for the party. By December 2017, the party must choose a new president and National Executive Committee. Though not formally prohibited, there is little sign of party support for a third Zuma term as  leader and there is widespread expectation that he will be out by the end of the year. However, his term as president of South Africa lasts until 2019. There is no precedent for a president to remain in office once he is no longer party leader (Zuma’s predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, stepped down as president of South Africa after his removal from party leadership). However, Zuma may try to stick it out. But, absent his party leadership position, he would be politically weak. If he resigns, the interregnum would be filled by the current deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa. Traditionally, the ANC distrusts internal, factional political competition. But, it will face factionalism in 2017. Already, the Congress of South African Trade Unions  has endorsed Ramaphosa for party leader. During the anniversary celebrations, the ANC Women’s League endorsed Zuma’s ex-wife and current head of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The ANC secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, refers to such endorsements as manifestations of ill-discipline. Factional competition for power is perfectly normal in most democratic parties. The ANC’s bias against it – as manifested by Mantashe – appears to be a vestigial remnant from its earlier iteration as a clandestine movement rather the democratic party it has become.

South Africa is a notoriously divided nation. There are eleven legal languages and four races with degrees of legal recognition (Indian/Asian, Black, Coloured, and White). Though Black Africans are about 80 percent of the population, they are divided into numerous ethnic groups, of which the Zulus are the largest, about a quarter of the population. South Africans sometimes say that there is no “majority” or “minority” in the country, with an overall, encompassing national identity as Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Rainbow Nation. Coloured’s are mostly Afrikaans speaking and Dutch Reformed in religion, but the ‘Cape Coloured’s” are a Muslim minority. Among Whites, the division is between Afrikaans speakers and English speakers, with the former the majority. White Afrikaners sometimes identify themselves as the “white tribe." The South African constitution recognizes the freedom of legal and cultural self-determination, including the possibility of establishing an ‘ethnic homeland.” In terms of wealth, Whites have done better in post-apartheid South African than any other group, especially those that are English-speaking. White numbers have stabilized at just over 4.5 million (out of a total population of over fifty-four million), about the same as at the end of apartheid. White unemployment is dramatically lower than that of other racial groups; they are the racial group least likely to be the victims of crime. Social and economic statistics of Whites, both Afrikaner and “English,” are the best of any group. But the apartheid-era safety next for whites is gone. Because of this, there are now poor Afrikaner inhabitants of shanty towns. As in Europe and perhaps in the United States, ethnic identification is strengthening among South Africans. For example, President Jacob Zuma strongly emphasizes his Zulu identity and seeks political support from African traditional rulers, while his predecessors Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela chose not to emphasize their Xhosa heritage. Among some Afrikaans-speaking Whites there is concern that their unique culture is fading under the pressure of the overwhelming Black majority and globalization. CNN carries a fascinating story about Orania, an Afrikaner response. CNN’s report is based on the work of Swedish journalist, Kajsa Norman, who is writing a book on the Afrikaners. Orania is an Afrikaner homeland restricted to Whites who are Afrikaans speaking and Afrikaner in culture. In effect, it is whites-only. Coloureds, who are usually Afrikaans speakers and Afrikaner in culture, are excluded. Orania is located on the edge of a desert in territory nobody else wanted. Its residents are embarked on building a new state-within-a-state based on self-imposed racial and cultural segregation. (As Norman notes, the Afrikaners in Orania have essentially created their own Bantustan.) CNN reports that its population is about 1,300 and is growing at the rate of 10 percent per year. The economy is based on agriculture, with unemployment at only 2 percent. As CNN reports, Orania is becoming something of a haven for Afrikaner down-and-outs, including recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, now that the apartheid state no longer exists. Some settle permanently, others come to dry out and then move on. Since the seventeenth century, the Dutch settlers in South Africa who evolved into Afrikaners have often seen themselves as God’s chosen people, set aside from the rest of the population. This was a premise of the racial segregation that evolved into apartheid. Orania is, apparently, a return to that ideal. Orania is predicated on a vision of society that is far from the racially and ethnically integrated ideal of Nelson Mandela and the “Rainbow People of God.” It is easy to imagine that many of its residents are white supremacists. But, its emphasis on ethnic identify also recalls that of Jacob Zuma’s Zulu identity. Whites-only Orania is entirely legal under South African law, as was affirmed by a 2000 high court decision. Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma have both visited; CNN reports that some Orania residents feel that Zuma, with his strong Zulu identity, understands what motivates their separation.

Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the public does not vote directly for the president. Rather it is parliament that votes for the president. Because of the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) huge parliamentary majority, since the end of apartheid, parliament has always selected its party leader as head of state. The ANC will choose its next party leader no later than December 2017. (Incumbent party leader Jacob Zuma has said that he will not run for a third term, as is party tradition.) South Africa’s next national elections will take place in 2019. In theory, Zuma could remain as president of South Africa after he leaves office as party leader. However, precedent is that the president resigns his office when he is no longer party leader. Within the ANC there is a tradition against early politicking for high office. Candidates are often coy about their political ambitions. Hence, up to now, while there has been much speculation, no ANC figure has publicly announced his candidacy for the presidency. However, on December 16, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa threw his hat in the ring: “It would be very humbling to get into a key position like that, to lead. I am available to stand.” Ramaphosa has significant support from a number of trade unions and the South African Communist Party. He is likely to win the support of the business community (he is a millionaire many times). He was a lead ANC negotiator of South Africa’s 1994 transition to non-racial democracy and the creation of the country’s constitution; hence, he is likely to be supported by those who fear that the Zuma government has sought to undermine the constitution. It is by no means certain that a deputy president becomes the president through a natural order of succession. His negatives include a sophisticated lifestyle far removed from the party’s township and rural base, and his association with the company involved in the 2012 massacre of workers at the Marikana platinum mine. (A commission of inquiry exonerated him.) Conventional wisdom is that he is far more popular in business circles in London and New York than he is among ANC voters. At present, his chief competitor is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, at present the chairperson of the African Union Commission. She is Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife, and they had four children together. Her support includes Jacob Zuma and his political allies, including the ANC Women’s League, the ANC Youth League, the MK Veterans Association (participants in the armed struggle against apartheid), and the premiers of three provinces. She is a Zulu, South Africa’s largest ethnic group, and a major source of electoral support for the ANC. (Ramaphosa comes from the much smaller Venda ethnic group.) She has held numerous ministerial portfolios, including health and foreign affairs. However, her tenure at the African Union has been lackluster. Her supporters play the feminist card. There will be other candidates. Frequently mentioned as a possible compromise between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma is the ANC’s party treasurer, Zweli Mkhize. A Zulu and a former premier of KwaZulu-Natal, he is seen as a reconciler who would promote party unity. Another possible candidate is the speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete. She is also a former deputy president and has been active in the ANC Women’s League. Whoever emerges as party leader will be the result of an internal ANC party political process that does not rule out a dark horse. Stay tuned.

Standard & Poor (S&P), the international credit rating agency, left its assessment of South Africa’s foreign-currency debt unchanged. It remains at the same level as Italy’s and India’s. However, it did lower South Africa’s local-currency rating, which remains above “junk.” On the S&P news, the South African currency, the Rand, rose 1.6 percent against the U.S. dollar, and yields of rand-denominated government bonds fell nine basis points to 9.02 percent. S&P warned that Zuma government interference in economic reform could damage investor confidence, affect exchange rates, and lead to a future downgrade: “Political events have distracted from, growth-enhancing reforms, while low GDP growth continues to affect South Africa’s economic and fiscal performance and overall debt stock.” Within the governing African National Congress (ANC), there is a struggle over the successor to Jacob Zuma, who must step down as party leader by December 2017, and the future direction the party will take. The party has been roiled by credible charges of corruption involving the Gupta brothers, confidants of the president. An S&P downgrade of South African debt to “junk” status had been widely anticipated, and such a move could have provided the occasion and excuse for President Jacob Zuma to reshuffle his cabinet and remove the highly regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Gordhan is usually numbered with those ministers that are seeking Zuma’s ouster by the party, the most recent failed effort being within the ANC National Executive Committee on December 3 and 4. The S&P move is probably contrary to Zuma’s goal of restoring his power within the party and strengthens the hand of the “reformers” within the cabinet. Nevertheless, Zuma as president retains the power to remove Gordhan, though should he do so the markets would react badly.

Thursday, December 1, is World AIDS Day, a fitting occasion to call attention to an HIV vaccine clinical trial that has started in South Africa. The vaccine being tested is based on one used in a Thailand trial in 2009 which had a protection rate of about 30 percent, reports the BBC. Results from the South Africa trial will be known in about four years. The study is code-named HVTN 702. It is led by Glenda Gray, a South African university research professor and the head of the country’s Medical Research Council. The study is sponsored by the U.S. National Institutes of Health. South Africa has been the world’s ground zero for HIV/AIDS. One estimate is that by 2015 seven million South Africans were HIV positive, including approximately 19 percent of the country’s adult population. The HIV/AIDS disease burden is carried disproportionately by blacks. A 2012 study found that 15 percent of black South Africans tested HIV positive, while only .3 percent of whites tested positive. There have, however, been successes. Under the current minister of health, Aaron Motsoaledi, the Zuma administration’s approach to the disease has been vigorous, with public education programs, widespread condom distribution, and male circumcision campaigns. On World AIDS Day 2014, the government broke the record for the number of people tested for HIV/AIDS. Minister Motsoaledi in 2016 said that mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS was down below 2 percent. Overall mortality rates, driven by HIV/AIDS and associated diseases such as tuberculosis, is also down. Nevertheless, other statistics from the credible South African Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) indicate that the fight is far from over, with a resurgence of new cases and much of the population still unaware how the disease is transmitted.

Minister of Tourism Derek Hanekom appears to have been the initiator of the African National Congress’s (ANC) November 27-29 in-house debate over whether to recall Jacob Zuma as party leader. (Zuma survived, but is further weakened politically within the ANC by the episode.) Hanekom, who is white, is a useful reminder that the ANC remains a multi-racial party, though its electoral base is overwhelmingly black. In the aftermath of the ANC’s Zuma debate, some black political officials that backed the president accused Hanekom of “racism,” but others defended him as a full member of the movement, even though he is white. Hanekom and his wife were imprisoned for three years under apartheid. In the post-apartheid Mandela government, he was minister of agriculture (he was a farmer). Subsequently, he has held numerous positions in the ANC government, including minister of science and technology. He has been minister of tourism since 2014. He is at the very center of the ANC party power structure, and he has served on the National Executive Committee, its highest governing body, since 1994. He was the chair of the party’s National Disciplinary Committee that in 2012 was instrumental in the expulsion of bad-boy Julius Malema, who went on to found the Economic Freedom Fighters, a party that now challenges the ANC from the left. He also reflects the liberal social and democratic views of the Mandela generation. For example, in April 2016, he was the keynote speaker at the global convention of the International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association in Cape Town. There he said, “There is a huge economic value in LGBT tourism and it can help our country to get more visitors to come and stay here and spend money in our restaurants and accommodation. We have to change attitudes and break down stereotypes.” Diversity within the ANC extends to policy as well as ethnicity. South Africa is the only African country that permits gay marriage, the result of a court case based on the country’s constitution. Though it and a gay lifestyle is deeply unpopular with the party’s base, the ANC has made no move to amend the constitution to prohibit it.

Over the weekend of November 27, Jacob Zuma faced his greatest political challenge to date, a vote of ‘no-confidence’ from within his own party, the African National Congress (ANC). He had previously survived three no-confidence votes in parliament, where the party rallied around him. This time, however, the challenge, orchestrated by four ministers, was within the National Executive Committee (NEC), the highest governance body within the ANC. The motion of no confidence was introduced by Minister of Tourism Derek Hanekom. According to the media, it was supported by Health Minister Aaron Motsoledi, Science and Technology Minister Naledi Pandor, and Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi. All four are commonly known to have deep political roots and run their ministries well. The issues were, essentially, credible accusations that Zuma is corrupt with unusually close ties to an influential business family, the Gupta’s. The Gupta family itself is accused of “state capture” in search of lucrative government contracts. The backdrop was the ANC’s significant losses in the August local government elections. Despite media anticipation of a vote, none was taken. Instead there was a three-day discussion of whether the party should “recall” Zuma as the leader of the party. If it had done so, under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, he would likely have resigned as president; current Vice President Cyril Ramaphosa would then become chief of state. According to the media, the debate was fierce and emotional. Zuma has survived, and in public statements the ANC is calling for party unity. But, the episode has likely further weakened Zuma politically within the party. The opposition Economic Freedom Fighters has applied to the speaker of parliament for yet another urgent vote of no confidence. Its spokesmen suggest that there is enough support within the ANC for Zuma’s ouster that, in combination with all of the opposition parties, the vote might succeed. While this is unlikely, even a small number of ANC votes for a no-confidence motion would be yet another indication of Zuma’s declining political power. The danger that Zuma might successfully suborn South Africa’s constitution and tradition of the rule of law for the financial benefit of himself, his family, and close associates such as the Gupta’s seems to be receding.

The publication on November 2 of the South Africa Public Protector’s report on “state capture” by the president and his cronies, the Gupta family, would seem to indicate Jacob Zuma’s direct involvement in corruption. The publication has created a media stir, with the quality Western media devoting more extensive coverage to it than is usual. Yet, the report does not contain a “smoking gun,” but rather calls for an extensive (and well-financed) formal investigation. There is speculation that the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is moving toward the removal of Zuma from office. Such speculation underestimates Zuma’s sources of strength within the security establishment, among certain provincial governors, and the persistence of his patronage network. Indeed, arguably the public protector’s report has generated more excitement abroad than at home, where its broad outlines were already known. Nevertheless, the report is yet another in a string of mostly legal reversals since December 2015 that have progressively weakened Zuma’s political strength. Zuma has lost the support of erstwhile allies ranging from at least some of the party apparatus, known as ‘Luthuli House,’ after the party’s headquarters in Johannesburg, the South African Communist Party, and some of the large trade unions. One ANC elder statesman after another has called on Zuma to resign or for his removal otherwise from the presidency. Even if subsequent investigations of Zuma do produce a “smoking gun,” which is entirely possible, his removal from office by impeachment in parliament is unlikely. The ANC, despite dramatic losses in the August 2016 local government elections, retains a huge parliamentary majority, and many of the MP’s are close to the president. He survived yet another close call today, November 10, 2016, when ANC parliamentarians refused to vote him out of office. The story appears to be different within the ANC. Many party chieftains view the August 2016 elections as a wake-up call, and see the party’s reverses as a lack of confidence in the Zuma administration. Others deeply resent the influence of the Gupta’s over the president, his appointments, and his policies. Others resent Zuma’s apparent corruption, still others are genuine democrats and resent his seeming assault on South Africa’s constitutional institutions. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the president is not directly elected. Instead, he (or she) is chosen by the victorious party, and is usually the head of said party. The party could, therefore, remove Zuma as the president of the ANC. Were it to do so, following the precedent of Thabo Mbeki who Zuma defeated as party president in 2007, he would be expected to resign the presidency. In effect, the party would recall Zuma from the presidency. A party effort to topple Zuma would most likely occur at the party’s national convention. The next is scheduled for December 2017. However, it could be moved forward. If that happens, the likelihood that Zuma will not finish his term increases.

Following the social media circulation of a video in which a white woman lashes out at black police officers using racial slurs, the Zuma administration is proposing harsher penalties against hate speech. Proposed legislation would move hate speech cases from civil courts to criminal courts in South Africa. Currently punishable only by fines, “racist utterances and many other incidents of vicious crimes perpetrated under the influence of racial hate…has necessitated further measures,” according to the minister of justice. If the proposed legislation becomes law, a first-time offender could face three years in prison and a repeat offender up to ten years. The proposed legislation is controversial. Some critics characterize it as a distraction from the real problems of South Africa. The New York Times quotes Joel Modiri, a University of Pretoria lecturer: “here you have a black-majority society that is essentially demanding protection from a white minority. It’s revealing the deeper problem that you have a majority in this country that is fundamentally powerless.” The New York Times comments that the proposed legislation resembles that in Britain, Canada, France, and Germany, but not in the United States, where the First Amendment protects freedom of virtually all expression. The backlash against the white woman’s tirade centers on her use of the word kaffir. The word, of Arab origin, was commonly used in the in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a non-pejorative reference to black people. But, especially under apartheid, it acquired powerful, negative connotations with the black community but also across the racial spectrum. Now, like the ‘n-word’ in the United States, in South Africa the word is rarely uttered or even spelled-out in print. “Sticks and stones can break my bones but words can never hurt me.” But in a South Africa still wounded by apartheid and centuries of white supremacy, words can have profound impact on both individuals and society as a whole.

Critics worldwide of South African President Jacob Zuma characterize his administration as “Mafiosi” in style. South African society is characterized by gross inequality, generally with blacks on the bottom and whites on top. Ostensibly, the president’s goal is the “transformation” of this characterization of society, even if that means an assault on constitutional institutions and the rule of law. However, in cahoots with personal allies, notably the Gupta family, instead of “transformation” he is seeking to remain in power and preserve his wealth. Thus far, he has been successfully countered by the strength of South Africa’s institutions, a mobilized civil society, and the democratic faction within the African National Congress (ANC). Calls for his early recall are mounting within the ANC. A trenchant exposition of this “Mafioso” perspective is provided by Richard Poplak, in the Daily Maverick. Zuma and his political allies certainly have been trying to undermine the independence of the treasury, which has in general followed the policies of the “Washington Consensus” with the goal of economic growth rather than redistribution from the rich to the poor. The focus of this effort has been the removal of the well-regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. The head of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), a Zuma ally, indicted Gordhan on corruption charges which were so flimsy as to be clearly politically motivated. A consequence of this assault on the treasury was a rapid fall in the value of the Rand and a rallying of support for Gordhan. However, on October 31, the head of NPA announced that he was withdrawing the charges in the face of overwhelming support for Gordhan from within the ANC and civil society and the near certainty that the courts would throw out the case. The Rand promptly strengthened. The treasury has received good marks from the international financial community. However, with the country’s slow recovery from the 2008 recession and low commodity prices, international financial agencies have raised the possibility of reducing South African bonds to “junk” status. If that happens in December, Zuma may reshuffle his cabinet and thereby remove Gordhan. On the other hand, “junk” status may increase pressure within the ANC to remove Zuma. In the meantime, this episode has probably further weakened Zuma politically, not least within the ANC.

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) endorsed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa for the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC) on September 26. The election of party president will take place in 2017; the next presidential elections will take place in 2019. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation the ANC party president is likely to be the next president of South Africa. Cyril Ramaphosa was a founder of the NUM as a black trade union in the late apartheid era. A lawyer, he was a leading ANC negotiator of the peaceful transition from apartheid to South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy that culminated in Nelson Mandela’s election as president in 1994. It is widely said that Mandela favored Ramaphosa as his successor, but he bowed to the will of the party and endorsed Thabo Mbeki. Thereafter, Ramaphosa left politics and accumulated a substantial fortune. He re-entered politics in 2012. In the aftermath of scandals and court judgments against it and it’s very poor electoral performance in the August 2016 elections, the scandal-prone administration of President Jacob Zuma is in a shambles. Zuma retains significant support within the party machinery, state owned enterprises, and among the heads of the security agencies. He also commands the loyalty of a big patronage network. Those ANC party leaders who want Zuma to go before the end of his term in 2017 so that the party can rid itself of scandal and rebuild following its relative defeat in August, have rallied around the finance minister Pravin Gordhan. They include Ramaphosa. At present the pro-Zuma and anti-Zuma factions appear to be evenly balanced and governance largely at a standstill. At the same time the NUM endorsed Ramaphosa, its secretary general said that “Zuma must serve his term.” NUM may be seeking a compromise between the pro and anti-Zuma factions: Zuma gets to remain in office until the end of his term as president of the ANC. But, he is blocked from choosing his successor. That would, in effect, further reduce Zuma’s political power for his remaining time in office. ANC faction fighting is likely to continue. That Ramaphosa will prevail is far from certain. He is much more popular in London and New York and within parts of the South African business community than he is among the ANC rank and file.