Political Movements

Those universities commonly regarded as the best in South Africa have been roiled by student unrest over the past two years. First, it was protests against the symbols of imperialism and racism such as the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Then in October 2015, protests over university fees and tuition hikes began. After reaching a settlement last year the university fees and tuition have been raised once again, inciting major student protests. The students are now calling to make university education free. South Africa is the only sub-Saharan African country that contributes to the journalists’ lists of the world’s top five-hundred universities. For example, The Times Higher Education ranking of top universities in the world includes the University of Cape Town (148), the University of Witwatersrand also known as ‘Wits’ (182), and Stellenbosch University (401-500). All other African universities are ranked in the general category of eight-hundred and above. (Such lists are notoriously contentious and controversial but they do reflect commonly-held perceptions in the developed world.) Apartheid had a particularly baleful influence on South African education at all levels, and the black majority was mostly excluded from higher education, though there were a few black-only universities with limited curricula. At base, the current unrest is a consequence of trying to address those consequences. For background on the challenges to South African education, see chapter 5 of my new book, Morning in South Africa. At present, the center of the unrest is at the University of Cape Town and Wits, though it is often to be found at other formerly white-only universities, as well. As is so often the case in South Africa, an underlying issue is the integration of Black Africans fully into national life, in this case Black students into historically ‘White’ universities. (South Africa is about 80 percent Black, 9 percent is Coloured, and 9 percent White.) With a focus on free tuition, demonstrations have also spread to black-majority institutions. Under apartheid, UCT and Wits were ‘White’ universities. (A few non-Whites were enrolled during the last years of apartheid.) Now, both have non-White majorities, though the percentage of Whites is much higher than 9 percent. But, in terms of administration, faculty, and general atmosphere, they remain ‘White.’ Black students frequently complain that they are marginalized and ‘disrespected.’ Further, university tuition and fees are especially burdensome for students from a poor demographic. Yet, as elsewhere in the world, university education is becoming more expensive and the value of the national currency is falling, with a resulting pressure on administrations to raise tuition and fees. Black students often come from primary and secondary schools little improved over the “Bantu” schools of the apartheid era. The high academic standards which they must meet at UCT and Wits can be a challenge. The universities have financial aid available to help alleviate the economic burden, and there are remedial programs that attempt to make up for weak secondary schools. Nevertheless, for black students, who are often the first of their family to attend a high-quality university, the road is not easy. These issues will be familiar to Americans, where federal and state governments over the past generation has sought to make quality higher education available to those formerly excluded by pervasive racism and, in the southern states, legally-based segregation.

Reading selections for the weekend of September 16, 2016.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On August 31, The Great Elephant Census announced  disturbing news: the African savannah elephant population is  approximately 350,000, down from about 470,000, The study showed a 30 percent decline in the population between 2007 and 2014. This represents an 8 percent annual decrease in savannah elephant numbers, largely due to poaching. At the same time the Census released these numbers, an article in the Journal of Applied Ecology announced that African forest elephant reproduction rates are much slower than once thought. Forest elephants, a distinct sub-species of African elephants found most often in Central African rainforests, suffered a 62 percent decline between 2002 and 2011. These forest elephant populations were not accounted for in the Great Elephant Census, but are also subject to poaching. The researchers conclude that based on forest elephant reproduction rates, it would take ninety years to return the population to pre-2002 levels. That is, if poaching stopped completely. Unfortunately, both the savannah and forest sub-species of African elephant face considerable, current threats. It is believed that before the Europeans arrived in  Africa there may have been some twenty million African elephants (including both sub-species). By the turn of the 20th century, this number had declined to between three and five million. By 1979, the numbers were, down to 1.3 million. While elephant hunting is far more regulated than it was in the 1970’s, poaching for ivory is still a major threat. Elephants also face the increasing risk of human/elephant conflict due to an ever growing human population which promotes greater resource competition. (Elephants have been known to destroy small farms when migrating.) With all of this in mind, the upcoming conference of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) is more important than ever. In a non-binding decision at the recent International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) congress, nations and environmental groups agreed to close the domestic trade in ivory, despite protests from Japan and South Africa. However, it is important for nations to keep up the momentum and seek ever stricter enforcement. Members of CITES must come together to develop a comprehensive, global solution to prevent the loss of what African elephants still remain in the wild.

South Africa’s minister of police reports that the country’s murder rate increased by 4.9 percent from March 2015 to March 2016. That is more than fifty people killed every day. Official statistics show 142.2 sexual offences per day in the same time period, a slight reduction that likely is due to under reporting. South Africa’s population is estimated at approximately fifty-three million. These statistics are appalling, but some context is needed. South Africa’s murder rate is by no means the highest in the world: according to NationMaster, which has compiled data from the UN and various census reports, South Africa ranks fifteen per capita, behind (among others) Honduras (one), Jamaica (four), Uganda (eleven) and Malawi (twelve). Tanzania, with about the same population as South Africa, ranks twenty-three; Nigeria, almost four times as large in population, ranks fifty-nine. Other types of crime in South Africa are also up: carjacking’s increased by 14.3 percent and house robberies by 2.7 percent. South Africa has the best official statistics in Africa. Nonetheless, as elsewhere, murder and rape are probably under reported. As always, when comparing crime statistics from one country to another, there are definitional and other issues. Nevertheless, the NationMaster ranking is a rough indication of how countries stack up against each other. The police minister, Nathi Nhleko, attributed the rise in the murder rate largely to domestic violence and alcohol abuse. He said, “What it says about us South Africans is that we are violent, we have a prevalent culture of violence. It’s not about what the government can do, it’s about what we can do. It’s a huge societal issue that we have to deal with.” South Africans are deeply concerned about the prevalence of a culture of violence. That concern played a role in the commentary on the Oscar Pistorius killing of his girlfriend Riva Steenkamp. It is also a concern in the United States. On the NationMaster list cited above, the United States ranks ninety-nine, much lower than South Africa’s rank, and about mid-way on the list. But, especially in cities like St. Louis, Baltimore, Detroit, New Orleans, and Chicago the murder rate is likely much higher.

A month after the governing African National Congress (ANC) lost heavily in South Africa’s municipal elections, the party is at war with itself. From my perspective, the struggle is between democratic reformers who want to restore public confidence in the ANC and win back lost voters, and those around President Jacob Zuma who are seeking to preserve their patronage networks based on publicly owned enterprises and sleazy contracts. An effort, apparently orchestrated by the president’s allies, if not the president himself, is underway to remove Pravin Gordhan, the well-regarded treasury minister. (Gordhan has sought to introduce a wide range of reforms in the publicly owned enterprises.) But, the heart of the matter is not the treasury minister or government contracts but rather control of the ANC in a period of leadership change. President Zuma must leave office in 2019, if not forced out earlier. Sometimes a comedian captures well where a society or an institution is in a period of political turmoil. ‘Evita Bezuidenhout’ has done so in An Open Letter to the ANC published in the Daily Maverick. Evita is a character created by Pieter-Dirk Uys, an actor probably most famous for his performances in drag. In the days of National Party domination, her performances were a send-up of the absurdities of apartheid. Now, she has turned to the ANC. Her letter is full of sly jokes and is thoroughly entertaining. But, she also makes serious points: “‘What do people think of when they see a fat politician in parliament?’ They immediately think of a thin voter. And many ANC voters are poorer and thinner than before.” With respect to the municipal elections, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) performed well, and the mass of voters “proved they have learnt a lot in the last 21 years.” She won’t leave the ANC because many in the party “are still working hard to keep the country more or less balanced.” She will not abandon the ANC to “ambitious and charismatic comrades focused on getting the most for themselves… They are ruthless and successful because they know that as loyalty to the president is paramount, no one will dare challenge their thievery in the public arena.” She closes by recalling that during the transition to non-racial democracy, the National Party under F.W. de Klerk “did something no one would expect.” She calls on the ANC to do the same now. Perhaps she is hinting at ANC “recall” of Zuma from the presidency – but she is not explicit. Drag performers are popular satirists in South Africa, with a long tradition of outrageous criticism that is tolerated by the powers that be. Like Evita, the Australian Barry Humphries character ‘Dame Edna” is also popular. Pieter-Dirk Uys, who is openly gay, is also widely celebrated in South Africa for his role in popular HIV/AIDS education.

Following the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) decline in the August 3 municipal elections, in effect a referendum on the scandal plagued administration of President Jacob Zuma, South African politics looks dramatically different. The big winners were the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a radical party based in the townships. But, minority parties are also more important now. In the elections, in four metropolitan areas and twenty-three smaller local councils, no single party secured the necessary 50 percent plus one majority. A largely monolithic ANC (it had controlled all of the major metropolitan areas except Cape Town and still has a huge majority in the National Assembly), now faces multiparty coalitions in Johannesburg, Tshwane (Pretoria), Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth), and Rustenburg. These metros are at the heart of South Africa’s modern economy; Johannesburg is the richest city in sub-Saharan Africa and the country’s economic engine. Of the largest metros, the ANC retains unchallenged control only of Durban. Since the elections, in the large metros, the EFF has been in the catbird seat. Were it to support the ANC, the latter could form a municipal government; the same would be true if it threw its support to the DA. In the twenty-three smaller councils, some of the minority parties were able to play a similar role, enhancing their importance. In some areas, the parties joined the DA in formal coalitions, thereby excluding the EFF. On August 17, the EFF announced that it would enter no formal coalitions with either the ANC or the DA in the large metros. Instead, in Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Rustenburg, it supported the DA. That allowed the DA to organize the municipal governments in three of the four metros meeting the August 24 deadline, in Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay. The new opportunities and the risks for the DA are large. It has the reputation of being the party of good governance. However, it will be a minority government in the disputed metros. Should it fall short on service delivery in the townships, the EFF will not have to carry any of the responsibility. On the other hand, if it enjoys measurable success before the national elections in 2019, it will have gone a long way toward establishing itself as an alternative to the ANC as the party of government. As for the ANC, the National Executive Council has taken “collective” responsibility for the party’s electoral failures rather than saddling Jacob Zuma with the blame. This makes it unlikely that the party will “recall” Zuma from the presidency anytime soon. The South African media is speculating that Zuma will reshuffle his cabinet, targeting his communist, labor movement critics, and Praven Gordhan, the finance minister who has opposed Zuma’s policies. Zuma staying on will largely preclude any improvement in the short-term in the official U.S.-South African bilateral relationship. In Africa, opposition victories in credible elections promote the development of good governance and a democratic culture. The same is true of coalition building, which promotes accountability. Hence, what happened on August 3 and thereafter is good for a democratic South Africa. It should also be noted that the ANC generally accepted the elections and has not challenged the results. Despite the prominence of cronyism and corruption within the Zuma administration, at least some of the party remains democratic at heart. August 3 and the subsequent results has also been good for “non-racial” South Africa, with signs, here and there, that racial identity politics is breaking down. Hence in one disputed council in Limpopo province, the White Freedom Front Plus political party is likely to join a Black coalition, and the new mayor of Port Elizabeth is a Xhosa-speaking White. Taken altogether there is a basis for optimism.

Tyler Falish is a student in Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development and a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Tanzanian President John Magufuli is known as “the Bulldozer,” a moniker reflecting his knack for pushing through big infrastructure projects during his time as minister of works. As president, he has received praise for his anti-corruption platform, as well as his very public displays of support for government thrift. However, Magufuli has also tightened the vise on opposition to his party. Magufuli’s party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has won every election since Tanzania adopted a multiparty system in 1992 and is the longest reigning ruling party in Africa. In the past few years, CCM’s popular support has waned, and this became particularly evident during the October 2015 elections. The elections also revealed cracks in CCM’s intraparty unity, as erstwhile CCM Prime Minister Edward Lowassa defected to the mainland’s main opposition party, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), after he was passed over for the CCM nomination that eventually went to Magufuli. Although Magufuli ultimately won the election, Lowassa earned nearly 40 percent of the vote—an unprecedented level for an opposition party. Meanwhile, in the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar, the opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) likely won the October election which was canceled by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission based on allegations of fraud, drawing criticism from international observers. The rerun in March 2016 returned the incumbent Ali Mohamed Shein to power, but the vote was largely uncontested due to a CUF boycott, and electoral observers from the EU chose not to attend. As a result, the current government lacks legitimacy, and it appears increasingly likely that the CUF will push for further autonomy for the islands, perhaps under the long-stalled constitutional review process. After taking office in November 2015, Magufuli reduced his cabinet from thirty to nineteen ministers. While presented as a cost-cutting measure, it could also be viewed as a bid to consolidate executive control over policy making. After CHADEMA increased the volume of protests—one of which was broken up with tear gas—against the president’s decision to discontinue live broadcasts of parliamentary sessions, Tanzanian police announced a ban on any further planned opposition protests. Recently, Magufuli doubled down, reacting to the announcement of opposition protests scheduled for September 1 by promising to deal with troublemakers “without mercy.” CHADEMA has indicated they will hold the rallies as planned. Vocal opposition parties—and even protests—can be useful for a dominant ruling party, as they provide discontented citizens with a manageable and predictable avenue for expressing dissent, which serves as a safety valve and can avert more destabilizing forms of defiance. However, when the opposition becomes popular and independent enough to prove a real threat to the hegemony of a long-ruling party, the illusion of tolerance for plurality can quickly diminish. Tanzania appears to have turned that corner, and the extent to which Magufuli’s government extends its clampdown on opposition will affect the future of Zanzibar’s position in the Union, and the stability of an East African country that tends to fly under the radar.

This post was co-authored by John Campbell and Allen Grane, research associate for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Many friends of South Africa’s post-1994 “non-racial democracy” have seen developments within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), especially under Jacob Zuma, as threatening the open political system based on the rule of law. So long as voting was largely determined by racial identity, the 80 percent of South Africa’s population that is black seemed to ensure that the party would remain in power indefinitely. The White, Coloured, and Asian minorities supported the Democratic Alliance (DA), but together they are not large enough to constitute an alternative to the ANC, except on the provincial level. (The DA has long dominated predominately Coloured and White Western Cape.) The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which calls for an assault on White “privilege,” were largely confined to the townships. Especially under Zuma, internally the ANC appeared to be moving away from grassroots democracy and toward greater centralization under party apparatchiks, with a focus on “Lithuli House” (the ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg), rather than constitutionally mandated government institutions, often referred to as “Union Buildings” (the seat of government in Pretoria). Patronage, often with a criminal dimension, seemed to flourish under Zuma and his close associates. The disreputable Gupta brothers with their apparent goal of “state capture” (to win contracts) and business ties to Zuma’s son became the ANC’s face. However, the August municipal elections appear to signal the end of monolithic ANC domination of South African political life, and any threat of one-party rule is receding. Post-1994 ANC rule is being replaced by the emergence of coalition politics that have the potential of opening the political process and also of imposing a greater degree of political accountability on elected officials than in the past. At least some voters appear to be moving away from voting according to racial identity and toward issues of government policy. Hence, the August elections appear good for South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy. The chart below shows the swing to the DA and the EFF and away from the ANC. (The totals are never 100 percent because of numerous minor parties.) The data for this graph is found on the website of the electoral commission of South Africa here: http://www.elections.org.za/ South Africa’s largest cities are the heart of its economy and part of the modern world. Up to now, the ANC dominated the municipal governments in Tshwane (Pretoria), Gauteng (Johannesburg), eThekwini (Durban), and Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). The DA dominated Cape Town. Now, however, in most of the major cities, coalitions will be required to produce a majority. In Gauteng, where the ANC won the most votes but not 50 percent plus one, the EFF appears to have the upper hand, and a coalition between the center-right DA and the radical EFF cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there could be many strange bedfellows: there is talk of a possible coalition between the Freedom Front, a White, Afrikaner minor party, and the EFF in hitherto solidly ANC Limpopo province. In general, EFF spokesmen are ruling out coalition arrangements with the ANC. There remain questions that can only be answered following in-depth analysis of the election results. Did in fact significant numbers of blacks abandon the ANC? Or, instead, did they stay home while White, Coloured, and Asian turnout soared? (This seems unlikely, given that turnout was at least 58 percent.) The DA did well, but can its rate of growth be sustained? The EFF did not do as well as had been widely predicted. Nevertheless, it did increase its share of votes. Finally, the National Union of Metal Workers, a large, wealthy trade union, has deep support in Nelson Mandela Bay, a center of South Africa’s automobile industry. It has mooted the establishment of a “responsible, left-wing” new political party for the 2019 national elections. Such a new party could have a significant impact on the future of all three of the major parties that contested in 2016.

South Africans are voting today, August 3, 2016, in nationwide municipal elections that are widely regarded as a referendum on President Jacob Zuma and the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Economic growth has slowed to near zero, unemployment is sky-high, and the Zuma administration is mired in credible accusations of corruption. There are indications that voter turnout will be heavy; up to 77 percent of eligible voters (or 26 million people) are expected to cast their vote, up 11 percent from the last municipal elections. Nevertheless, an ANC electoral rout is not certain. (High voter turn out is encouraged by the fact that election day is a public holiday in South Africa.) At least up to now, South Africans have largely voted according to their racial identity. Blacks, about 80 percent of the population, have overwhelmingly supported the ANC, thereby ensuring that it has been the party of government since 1994. In the 2014 national elections, it won about 62 percent of the vote. Whites, Coloureds, and Asians have favored the Democratic Alliance (DA), a party which is seeking to attract middle class black voters especially the “born frees,” those born after the end of apartheid. Also in the contest is the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a new party that calls for the expropriation of white property and has resorted to non-parliamentary methods. In the 2015 national elections, the DA won 22 percent of the vote while the EFF won 6 percent of the vote. Polling data indicate that the ANC is in electoral trouble in Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. In those three cities it may lose its majority, ushering in an era of coalition building that could include various combinations and permutations involving the DA, the EFF, and even the ANC. The EFF has been especially active in social media, but it is unclear to what extent South Africa’s youngest voters will bother to go to the polls. There is also the possibility that the ANC’s share of the vote may drop below 60 percent for the first time since the 1994 end of apartheid. In either event, pressure within the ANC is likely to mount for Zuma to resign from the presidency. That would mean a new political era for South Africa. The Council on Foreign Relations has published an Expert’s Brief on the South African elections; it can be found here. By August 5, winners and losers in this latest electoral round should be clear.

Africa in Transition usually runs an update of the Nigeria Security Tracker on Mondays. However, July 18 is Nelson Mandela Day, so the Tracker update will appear on Tuesday, July 19. Nelson Mandela was born July 18, 1918. He died in 2013; were he living, he would be 98 years of age. In 2009, the UN General Assembly officially declared July 18 Nelson Mandela International Day, starting 2010. It is the celebration of Mandela’s theme that each individual has the ability and responsibility to change the world for the better. In South Africa, Mandela Day is not a public holiday. Instead, it is intended to honor Mandela’s values of inclusive democracy conducted according to the rule of law and to celebrate his public service. Mandela Day is also an occasion for taking stock of where South Africa is and where it is going. Many of Mandela’s colleagues in the struggle against apartheid and for nonracial democracy believe that under the administration of Jacob Zuma, the country has gone astray. Zuma is mired in scandal and surrounded by cronies of dubious reputation. It is widely said, even within his governing African National Congress (ANC), that he uses intimidation, even blackmail, against his political opponents within the party. His governance decisions are increasingly quixotic, notably his effort to replace a respected finance minister with a crony. Markets swooned and he failed. More broadly, the consequences of three centuries of white supremacy, culminating in apartheid, still rest heavy on South Africa. There has been social and economic progress since the 1994 coming of nonracial democracy, but it has been slow. For many, perhaps most black South Africans, some 80 percent of the population, there has been too little change. However, I argue in Morning in South Africa, released last month, that South Africa’s institutions of governance (based on perhaps the world’s most respected constitution) are continuing to strengthen; this is because these institutions of governance are conducted according to the rule of law with an independent judiciary and defended by civil society and a free press. Notably, the judiciary regularly rules against the Zuma administration, and its decisions are upheld. Even though the ANC has an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament, a vigorous opposition ensures that it is no Zuma rubber-stamp. The so-called “Chapter 9” (of the Constitution) institutions continue to impose limits on what the Zuma administration can do. Democracy conducted according to the rule of law enjoys strong support from South Africans across the racial rainbow. Democracies sometimes go through patches of bad, even criminal governance. We Americans remember the last days of Richard Nixon’s administration. And former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover was no stranger to intimidation and blackmail. Democratic institutions, the rule of law, and active civil society have carried the United States through dark days in the past and will do so now in South Africa.

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Robert F. Kennedy’s “Ripples of Hope” speech at the University of Cape Town, a congressional delegation (codel) visited South Africa the last week of May. It was led by Representative John Lewis, Democrat of Georgia and an icon of the American civil rights movement; Senator Chris Coons, Democrat of Delaware; and Kerry Kennedy, daughter of the late Senator Kennedy and the president of Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, a U.S. based non-profit organization. After the codel returned to Washington, Senator Coons delivered a speech on the Senate floor that is deeply thoughtful, a meditation on the parallels between South Africa and the United States, especially with respect to centuries of racism and the still-incomplete efforts to address its consequences. It is a must-read for those who care about the United States and Africa. Senator Coons’s reference point is a quotation from Robert Kennedy’s 1966 speech, delivered during the zenith of Apartheid, which began by describing “a land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; …a land which was once the importer of slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out the last traces of that former bondage.” Senator Kennedy paused before delivering the punchline: “I refer, of course, to the United States of America.” Senator Coons then proceeded to highlight and analyze the shared history and challenges of the two multiracial democracies. Senator Coons’s bottom line builds on a quotation from Nelson Mandela: “I am not a saint, unless you think of a saint as a sinner who keeps on trying.” He went on to say: “The peoples of the United States must keep on trying. The people of South Africa must keep on trying.” That the codel visited South Africa at this particular time is important and significant, beyond the commemoration of the 1966 speech. South Africa faces a historic drought, near-zero economic growth related to the world-wide decline in commodity prices, and a presidential administration seemingly riddled with corruption. Many South Africans fear that the country’s liberal democracy is under assault from forces that include some close to the president. Further, at present, formal relations between Washington and Pretoria are correct but hardly cordial. In February 2016 the Secretary General of the governing African National Congress – the party of Nelson Mandela and current president Jacob Zuma – accused the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria of plotting “regime change” through the Obama administration’s Young African Leaders Initiative. In fact, the embassy had consulted in advance with the Secretary General on suitable South African candidates for the program. The codel’s visit is a reminder of the shared civil rights heritage of both countries and is a recognition and encouragement of South Africa’s rule of law based on institutions rather than personalities and a constitution with among the most sweeping protections of human rights in the world. Senator Coons has had a particularly close relationship with Africa. He has been a volunteer relief worker in Kenya, studied at the University of Nairobi, and worked for the South African Council of Churches; in his speech he recalled his deep admiration for Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Anglican archbishop of Cape Town and former president of the South African Council of Churches.  

The July/August print edition of Foreign Affairs, entitled "The Struggle for Israel," is out. It includes interviews with several leading Israeli politicians and articles by veteran analysts Aluf Benn, Amos Harel, As’ad Ghanem, and Martin Kramer. My article, the only non-Israeli contribution to the compendium section on Israel, is entitled "Israel among the Nations: How to Make the Most of Uncertain Times" and can be accessed here. The entire group of articles can all be accessed in a special online exclusive here.

There is less than meets the eye to the South African parliament’s passage at the end of May of a land reform bill, called the “Expropriation Bill.” Ostensibly, the new legislation has some similarity to law of eminent domain in the United States. The new legislation would permit the government to take land for a “public purpose,” but (as in the United States) South African landowners would be compensated with an amount determined by a new ‘valuer general.’ The new legislation replaces the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle of land reform. The parliamentary vote was almost entirely by the governing African National Congress (ANC); the principal opposition parties, including the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters, were not present or walked out. It is commonly estimated that since the end of apartheid only about 8 to 10 percent of white-owned land has been transferred to blacks. Background to land reform is to be found in Chapter 6 of my recently released book, “Morning in South Africa.” The ANC, facing local and provincial elections in August, is increasingly dependent on a rural, black constituency. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is politically allied with the ANC, along with the South African Communist Party (SACP). Accordingly, the COSATU spokesman hailed the new legislation as addressing “the legacies of apartheid and colonialism.” He denounced opposition as “hysterical attacks” by those who “clearly miss and are nostalgic for an era, where this country belonged to [a] minority and the majority was treated as second class citizens.” Clearly the ANC sees the new legislation as a populist electoral plus. However, deputy public works minister and longtime SACP activist Jeremy Cronin correctly cautions: “It’s very important to not see this framework bill as some kind of silver bullet that’s going to solve all problems in regard to land reform.” Constitutional law expert Pierre de Vos is quoted in the media as observing that expropriation of property is subject to the South African constitution and fair market prices. He notes that the government is short of funds to buy large amounts of land at market prices. Nor is there much money for the support of small farmers. His bottom line: the bill is unlikely to make much difference. AgriSA, a commercial farmers union, tells the media that it will monitor the legislation’s implementation and “take to court any attempts to expropriate agricultural land without full compensation.” The judiciary has repeatedly and successfully affirmed its independence from the ANC administration. Other commentators see agricultural land reform as yesterday’s issue. John Kane-Berman at the South African Institute of Race Relations is quoted in the media as saying that the black demand for farm land is much less than land for housing in cities: “The view in the ANC that land is the answer to poverty, inequality, and unemployment has no basis in reality. Ordinary people have long since voted against this idea with their feet by moving to town.” He makes an important point: the country is rapidly urbanizing, with more than 60 percent of South Africans living in urban areas.