Political Movements

The National Assembly will vote on April 18, on a motion of no confidence in the African National Congress' (ANC) Zuma administration. The motion has been put forward by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and is supported by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The occasion of the vote is Zuma’s earlier cabinet reshuffle which is perceived by many as having opened the flood gates to cronyism and corruption. The ANC has 249 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly. The two largest opposition parties are the DA, with eighty-nine seats, and the EFF, with twenty-five. The seats of all the other opposition parties together number thirty-seven. The ANC party leadership seems to have rallied around Zuma, and it must be expected that the motion will fail. While such a failure is probable, there are new developments that indicate the direction in which South Africa is moving. Today, April 12, there have been mass demonstrations against the Zuma government (on, of all days, his seventy-fifth birthday). Of the thirteen opposition parties, all save two are supporting the demonstrations. This is an exceptional showing of opposition unity. The two that did not support the demonstrations are the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). The PAC favors wholesale expropriation of white-owned land. Its spokesman said that there is little to choose between Zuma and his supposed successors within the ANC as both are in the hands of capitalists and are corrupt. (The PAC’s one member of the National Assembly will abstain on the April 18 vote.) The FF+ is a fringe Afrikaner political party. Its spokesman said that it would vote for the motion on April 18, but not participate in the April 12 demonstrations because they are likely to be counterproductive. (The party has four seats.) All the rest of the opposition parties will participate in the demonstrations and will vote for the no-confidence motion. So, there are likely to be 150 opposition votes for the motion. To be successful the motion will require fifty or so ANC defections. The prospect of substantial ANC defections is unlikely. Zuma is notorious for his vindictiveness, and the political career of an ANC defector would almost certainly be at an end. However, a small opposition party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), led by anti-apartheid veteran Bantu Holomisa, has applied to the South African Constitutional Court for an order that the ballot be secret. A secret ballot may well encourage some ANC MPs to support the no-confidence measure. (The UDM also has four seats.) Meanwhile, respected elder statesman Thabo Mbeki, in an op-ed, is urging members of the National Assembly to vote “for the people of South Africa,” rather than for a political party – an invitation to disaffected ANC representatives to vote for the motion. It is hard to see how the Constitutional Court might mandate a secret ballot in the National Assembly. That would constitute intervention in the internal procedures of another branch of government. Further, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party have not supported demonstrations against the Zuma government up to now, and there is no sign of participation in today's protests. Both want Zuma out, but they want his exit to be the result of internal deliberations within the ANC rather than through a political process in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, South Africa’s notoriously fragmented opposition has come together in a new way. Politics in South Africa are churning as ANC predominance fades.

Over the Palm Sunday weekend, there were large demonstrations in South Africa’s urban centers against President Jacob Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) in the aftermath of last week’s cabinet reshuffle. The largest demonstrations took place in Cape Town and Pretoria, where, according to the media, demonstrators numbered in the tens of thousands. Elsewhere, demonstrations were much smaller. The demonstrations received extensive media coverage internationally and in the United States, however, they will certainly have no impact on Zuma’s position or the ANC in the short term. For his part, Zuma accused the protestors of being racist. It is always difficult to judge the measurable impact of demonstrations on political change. For example, it is hard to link the demonstrations across the United States against the Vietnam War and then-President Richard Nixon to specific policy changes. Similarly, large demonstrations the day after President Trump’s inauguration in the short term appear to have effected little. That being said, large-scale public protest may have an impact over the longer term. Such nation-wide rallies contributed to the paranoia of the Nixon administration and helped establish a context for his eventual departure from office. In South Africa, if nothing else, the demonstrations over the past weekend should bring home to the ANC leadership (if not President Zuma) the apparent growing alienation of South Africa’s urban centers; at present, the party only governs one of these urban centers, Durban. The ANC risks becoming more rural as the country becomes more urban – estimates are that roughly 60 percent of South Africa is considered urban. For the time being, the ANC has firmly nailed its colors to Jacob Zuma’s mast, deeply unpopular though he is. These realities will play a role in the elections of 2019.

For now, Jacob Zuma has succeeded in defeating his rivals for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and an upcoming parliamentary vote of no-confidence will likely fail. The intra-party show-down has followed on the heels of his dramatic cabinet reshuffle. Zuma carried out this reshuffle without consultation within the ANC or with its partners in government, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have called for a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. It has been scheduled for April 18. To be successful, the vote would require the defection of fifty to sixty of the ANC’s 249 members. (The National Assembly has four hundred seats; almost all of the opposition members will vote for the motion.) However, the ANC collective party leadership has now rallied behind Zuma, making such defections highly unlikely. South Africa operates according to a “closed list” system of proportional representation. The electorate votes for the party, not an individual. Before each election, a party leadership prepares a list of candidates: it determines the place on the list of each candidate. Those at the top of the list are usually assured a seat; those at the bottom are not. Hence, any party has a whip-hand over its members in the National Assembly. For an ANC member to vote against the party is political suicide – unless the party leadership splits. Even though three of the “top six” leaders of the ANC were publicly critical of the reshuffle, and the SACP and COSATU called for Zuma’s removal from office, it has not. Rather, the party has publicly rallied behind Zuma. The removal of Gordhan, a steady hand on the economy and dyke against public corruption, has given investors pause.  S & P Global has downgraded South Africa’s credit rating to junk status and the currency has fallen about 11 percent in value. Economic growth, already anemic, will likely stall as domestic and foreign investment dries-up. So long as Zuma stays in office, this trend is likely to continue. Between now and the December ANC vote for a new party leader, Zuma is likely to seek to consolidate support for his hand-picked successor. Though he is flying high now, it is by no means certain that he will be successful in December, especially as the economy deteriorates. The faction fighting should not be seen in left vs. right or radical vs. conservative terms. Zuma’s critics included Cyril Ramaphosa, a black oligarch as well as deputy president and aspirant for the presidency, and the ostensibly left-wing SACP and COSATU. Nor should it be put in a pro-west vs. anti-west context. Zuma is no friend of the west and appears attracted to a closer relationship with Russia. But, Gwede Mantashe, at one stage a Zuma critic, has leveled the ridiculous charge that the American embassy in Pretoria is plotting “regime change” in South Africa. However, there is an urban vs. rural and reform vs. tradition dimension to the faction-fighting. Broadly speaking Zuma’s critics within the ANC are urban and seek better to position South Africa in the modern world; Zuma’s core support is rural, and he has cultivated relationships with traditional rulers. Increasingly, that is where the ANC’s electoral support is to be found. The party now governs only one of South Africa’s large cities, Durban. Over time, the party’s rural base is a wasting asset as the country is urbanizing rapidly. But, for now, the party’s leadership structure favors rural areas where its votes are, and Zuma has cultivated effective patronage/clientage networks among them that this week was crucial to his defeating the challenges to his authority. This episode leaves the ANC a shambles. Its factional divisions are there for all to see. The upcoming no-confidence vote is lose/lose for the party. It will likely win the vote, demonstrating that the party has no way of responding to Zuma’s bad governance and dubious friends. On the other hand, should the vote succeed through circumstances difficult now to foresee, then the party will be exposed as a paper tiger. However, as I argue in Morning in South Africa, this entire episode is an illustration of the strength and maturity of South African democracy, nothing that has occurred has been illegal or extra-constitutional.

The African National Congress’s (ANC) National Working Committee (NWC) decision to back South African President Jacob Zuma in the face of his widely unpopular cabinet reshuffle makes it unlikely that there will be sufficient ANC defections for a no-confidence measure to pass the National Assembly. It remains to be seen how the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will respond to the NWC decision. At present, it appears that any genuine unity within the ANC over a future sense of direction is absent. It is likely that until December, the ANC government will, in effect, be paralyzed. Such stagnation with regards to leadership and the decision making process in the South African government could produce incoherent economic policy, and further political influence and intrusion from the infamous Gupta brothers. These circumstances will be to the chagrin of the international financial markets. Standard & Poor’s downgrading of parts of South Africa’s sovereign debt may be followed by similar actions by the other rating agencies. There is a high probability that short-term investment in the economy could be stifled, as will economic growth. The national currency, the Rand (ZAR) has fallen by more than 11 percent. However, shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange rose – this was driven by shares in gold-mining companies and the weakening Rand. It remains to be see whether these trajectories will persist. Following Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle last week, and his decision to fire well regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, the party leader and chief of state has been under intense pressure from all quarters of the government. The ANC’s political partners, the SACP and the COSATU have called for his resignation because he did not consult with them over the cabinet reshuffle. The absence of any consultation, as well as the dubious quality of certain members of his cabinet picks, has spurred division amongst the highest level of leadership within the ANC. The backstory to the current political crisis includes issues of “state capture,” corruption, the preservation of the unity of the ANC, and the upcoming election of a new ANC leadership in December. Zuma is widely perceived to be corrupt, and his cronies, the Gupta brothers, are seen as exercising undue influence over the administration – otherwise known as “state capture.” The discord over Zuma within the ANC leadership, is a direct challenge to party cohesion, its principle of decision making by consensus, and to never “wash dirty laundry in public.” At least two, perhaps three, of the six most influential members of the ANC have aspirations for the party leadership in December. Zuma is seeking the election of his own outside candidate in December, most likely his ex-wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to forestall prosecution for corruption when he is out of office. Taking these circumstances together, the ANC is opting for party “unity” – at least until December. Hence, on April 4 the party’s NWC affirmed that it would not support Zuma’s removal from the party leadership now, and that it would strongly oppose a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly. There was mild criticism of Zuma for his failure to seek consultation over the cabinet reshuffle but also of those within the party who were publicly critical of him – a further display of party disunity. The bottom line for the ANC leadership is that Zuma, and his new cabinet picks, are locked-in until December. However, his opponents at higher levels of party leadership have maintained opposition to him. As yet, there is no sign of meaningful party unity.

Voices calling for President Jacob Zuma to resign or to be removed from office are getting louder in the wake of his cabinet reshuffle and removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Within his African National Congress (ANC) the Integrity Commission – intended as an internal corruption watchdog but often toothless – has announced that at an April 9 meeting with the president, it will ask him to resign. Powerful ANC figures including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Treasurer General Zweli Mkhize have disassociated themselves from the reshuffle, though they have not publicly called for Zuma to go. The Mandela Foundation and the Kathrada Foundation, keepers of the liberation movement flame, have done so, as has former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Even the ANC’s political allies are calling for a change. The South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have both expressed their concern regarding the abrupt cabinet reshuffle. On April 4, COSATU called on Zuma to resign. The SACP has posted at the top of its web site its call for the ANC to remove him from the presidency. Meanwhile, the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are asking for a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Civil-society is mobilized and has led demonstrations in the larger cities. The focus of anger increasingly appears to be Zuma’s failure to consult the ANC leadership and that of its communist and trade union allies before his cabinet reshuffle. The Integrity Commission summarizes this point of view: Zuma “disregarded the principle and tradition of collective leadership, both within the ANC and with our alliance partners” (SACP and COSATU). COSATU never liked Gordhan, and there is anger on the South African left at Standard & Poor’s downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status; COSATU spokesmen have characterized that act as “intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa.” But, seemingly, everybody can agree on Zuma’s lack of consultation. So, will Zuma go? It is by no means certain. The National Assembly is on Easter recess. To consider a motion of no confidence, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete, would have to call it back early. She is generally regarded as a Zuma ally. More generally, Zuma has built up a formidable patronage/clientage network within the ANC that may not be prepared to abandon him just yet. The ANC is set to choose a new national leader in December. ANC politicos, including Ramaphosa, are jockeying for position. For many in the ANC, it may be tempting to leave Zuma in place until a later date, rather than engage in a messy internal fight now.

As part of a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle, President Jacob Zuma has fired highly respected Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, along with other long-time stalwarts of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Gordhan and Jonas had long opposed pet projects of the president, and Gordhan has become the symbol of reform and good governance even as the reputation of the governing ANC under Zuma’s leadership has declined into a miasma of charges of corruption and “state capture” by the president’s cronies. Many South Africans (including those within the ANC) will see Gordhan’s departure as a major setback for “reform” and the struggle against corruption. International investors already are not happy. The Rand fell dramatically yet again against the U.S. dollar. There is now a greater likelihood that the international credit rating agencies will downgrade South Africa’s sovereign debt to junk status. The ANC was already divided over Zuma’s successor as party leader; the party leadership vote is expected to take place in December. Zuma and his faction’s preferred candidate is his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma; a “reform” faction candidate is the well-regarded deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and there could be others. Looking toward December is part of the context of the cabinet reshuffle. Zuma apparently did not consult the traditional ANC party leadership over the reshuffle, an indication that it would have opposed him. It is still not clear whether Zuma has the support of his parliamentary partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); Gordhan has had considerable support among both. The South African opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has now tabled a motion of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma in parliament. If it is successful, Zuma would immediately lose the presidency. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) supports the motion. The other opposition parties will almost certainly support the motion. The parliamentary arithmetic is straightforward. Parliament has four hundred seats. A successful vote of no-confidence requires 201 votes. The ANC has 249 seats (COSATU and SACP MP’s vote as ANC). All of the opposition parties have 151. To oust Zuma a no-confidence motion would require the votes of about fifty ANC MP’s. Despite the outrage in the aftermath of the Zuma cabinet reshuffle even inside the ANC, it is unlikely that a DA motion of no confidence will succeed. In the past, when the DA has proposed such a motion, even when supported by the “radical” EFF, the ANC has closed ranks, protecting the party and ensuring Zuma’s position. Since the days of Nelson Mandela, the ANC has prioritized party unity. The DA continues to be perceived as the party of whites, other minorities, and the privileged in South Africa, while the ANC (despite its multiracial principles and history) is seen as “black,” “pro-poor,” and the leader of the successful fight against apartheid. (Black South African’s constitute about 80 percent of the country’s population, and most of it is poor.) The EFF is something of a wild card. Its “pro-poor” rhetoric goes beyond the ANC, but Malema’s personal hatred for Zuma is visceral and unabated. He is prepared to cooperate on occasion with the DA. Nevertheless, given the realities of racially based identity politics, a no-confidence vote will likely fail. Only if a significant portion of the ANC leadership concludes that keeping Zuma in the presidency is electoral poison might the no-confidence measure succeed. We may know soon; the party’s highest leadership body, the National Executive Committee may meet over the weekend of April 1-2. However, if such a meeting is postponed, or if it takes no significant action, Zuma’s short-term chances of weathering his current political crisis are improved.

On March 27, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas were on an investor road show to the United Kingdom and the United States when they were abruptly ordered to return to South Africa by President Jacob Zuma. There was media speculation that Zuma was about to reshuffle his cabinet, removing from office the well-regarded finance minister and his deputy. (There is much speculation that former ESKOM CEO Brian Molefe will replace Gordhan.)The Rand (ZAR), South Africa’s currency, swooned, losing 3 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. Foreign investor confidence in South Africa, which had been on the upswing, fell. Zuma’s power within the ruling African National Congress has been eroding ever since he tried and failed to replace the well-regarded Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene with one of his inner circle in December 2015. Since then, he has suffered severe political reverses because of court rulings, and his party is looking toward its leadership election in December 2017. Intra-party factionalism has been increasing even as Zuma’s star has been waning. It is likely that Zuma’s recall of the finance minister is part of intra-party maneuvering rather than presaging Gordhan’s removal. Indeed, parts of the ANC have already expressed their displeasure with the idea. Enoch Godongwana, the ANC’s head of economic policy was quoted by Bloomberg as saying that if Gordhan was fired “it would be tragic and damaging for the local economy, which has struggled with poor growth levels.” The president might, indeed, carry out a cabinet reshuffle, not least to include in his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, the just-returned former Africa Union Commission chair. Zuma has signaled that she is his candidate to succeed him as party leader in December. But, Gordhan has substantial support within the ANC, as well as among the business community, civil society, and the media. A cabinet reshuffle does not mean that he would go.

Introducing Steven A. Cook's new book, False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East.

Helen Zille is the premier of the Western Cape and a former leader of South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). A former journalist and anti-apartheid activist of German descent, she is famous for being one of those who exposed the murder of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko at the hands of the apartheid security services. Zille has actively sought the transformation of the DA into an opposition party that could win significant support from South Africa’s majority black population. In addition, she was one of those who engineered the selection of Mmusi Maimane, a black politician from Johannesburg, as party leader. She is well known for her outspoken criticism of the dominant African National Congress (ANC). Earlier in March, Zille released a series of tweets asserting that South Africa’s colonial heritage was not all negative; after all, it included, “our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water, etc. Would we have had a transition into specialized health care and medication without colonial influence? Just be honest.” The tweets caused an uproar, with the DA launching an investigation into whether Zille had violated party policy with regards to social media. Maimane tweeted, “Let’s make this clear. Colonialism, like apartheid, was a system of oppression and subjugation. It can never be justified.” In response, Zille has apologized: “I apologize unreservedly for a tweet that may have come across as a defense of colonialism. It was not.” What is going on here?  If there is any truth to Zille’s comments, it is that South Africa’s independent judiciary and largely first-world infrastructure are indeed part of the colonial legacy. This controversy has shed light on enduring racial tensions in divide in the post-apartheid era. For Maimane and many other South Africans, the “logic of colonialism” culminates in apartheid, a crime against humanity. Hence, Zille’s seeming “defense” of colonialism is deeply offensive and, undermines the DA’s effort to broaden the party’s appeal to the black majority who make up about 80 percent of the population. South African whites generally have a different reading of the country’s history (even when, like Zille, they have impeccable anti-apartheid credentials). As in other areas, there are parallels here with the United States. The historical perceptions of British colonization and westward expansion amongst members of the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Sons of the American Revolution are in stark contrast to those of Native or African Americans. However, unlike in South Africa, the national narrative of the latter has been the dominant one, though this may be changing slowly.

Nelson Mandela’s South Africa was one of the founders of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As an early signer of the Treaty of Rome the widespread view within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) was that the ICC was a means of holding accountable dictators and other heads of state for criminal behavior. The ANC government even incorporated the Treaty of Rome into South African law. Hence, violation of the Treaty of Rome is also a violation of South African law. Since its establishment, the ICC shoe has pinched the toes of a number of dubious heads of state, notably Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta. At the request of the then-Kenyan government, the ICC investigated crimes committed at the time of the 2007 Kenyan elections and subsequently indicted Uhuru Kenyatta, by then president of Kenya, and his vice president William Ruto. However, Kenyatta’s Kenyan government refused to cooperate with the ICC and prosecutors accused it of intimidating witnesses, who withdrew their testimony. The cases collapsed, and Kenyatta launched a campaign for African states to withdraw from the ICC. He and others accuse the ICC of bias against African states, and many claim that the ICC’s jurisdiction should not extend to heads of state or governments. There is also resentment that certain Western countries, notably the United States, support the ICC but have declined to sign the Treaty of Rome and therefore are not under its jurisdiction. There is anger in some quarters that the ICC could not indict members of the George W. Bush administration for perceived crimes during the war in Iraq. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma, too, has fallen afoul of the ICC. Under the Treaty of Rome, if a person indicted by the ICC falls into the hands of a signatory state that state is obliged to hand him over to the court. Sudan’s chief of state Omar al-Bashir has been so indicted by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur. Al-Bashir visited Pretoria in 2015 for an African Union heads of state summit. Zuma not only failed to detain Bashir, he facilitated the latter’s hasty departure from the country when South African courts were moving toward ordering Bashir’s arrest, following suits filed by South African civil organizations. Subsequently, the Zuma government has joined the quit ICC bandwagon by notifying the United Nations of South Africa’s intention to withdraw. At its January summit, the African Union heads of state voted in favor of a non-binding resolution calling for its members to withdraw from the ICC. However, on February 22, the South African High Court ruled in favor of the opposition Democratic Alliance suit that the government’s announced departure was “unconstitutional and invalid.” Because the Treaty of Rome is incorporated into South African law, only parliament could change it so that South Africa could leave ICC jurisdiction. In response to the ruling, the Zuma administration has reiterated its intention to leave the ICC and is considering its options. Zuma’s ANC has a majority of over sixty percent in parliament. The BBC concludes that at the end of the day, parliament is likely to approve withdrawal; but such a projection is premature-still. The ANC is badly fractured with pro and anti-Zuma factions. The party is scheduled to elect a new leader in December 2017. Many South Africans, including some in the ANC, see the ICC as part of the Mandela legacy of “non-racial” democracy and the rule of law. Shedding ICC jurisdiction, by contrast, is associated with Zuma, who is discredited among some for alleged corruption. Hence, it is by no means certain that parliament would do Zuma’s bidding on this issue anytime soon.

Rosettenville, a suburb of Johannesburg, was the site of the February 11-12 burning of buildings alleged to have been used by “prostitutes and drug dealers.” These “prostitutes and drug dealers” have been  popularly identified as “Nigerians.” In the aftermath of the fires, the mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, bitterly criticized the South African government for failing to secure South Africa’s borders. (Mashaba is a prominent leader of the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition to the African National Congress government of Jacob Zuma.) Though many of its residents are poor, Rosettenville is far from being a “township slum.” Over time, waves of immigrants have settled there before moving on. Initial migrants to Rosettenville included eastern and southern Europeans who were followed by Portuguese settlers from Europe and former colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Most recently, immigration into this suburb has been from African countries north of the Zambezi River. This includes Nigerians. As elsewhere in urban South Africa, residents complain to outsiders about crime and the inadequacies of law enforcement. In general, crime is a major preoccupation and focus of government criticism by South Africans across all racial lines. Much like other countries on the continent, the police are national rather than local, and there is significant demand for private security services (particularly in wealthy Johannesburg suburbs). South African immigration and refugee law and policy is among the most generous in the world. For example, while their cases are being reviewed, asylum seekers are permitted to work and move across   the country freely. Adjudication of asylum cases can take years, but, once approved, refugees have most of the rights of South African citizens. The extrajudicial killings of up to 116 Nigerian nationals over the past two years is indicative of the rise in xenophobia in South Africa. This has been fueled in large part, by popular rhetoric labeling illegal immigrants and refugees as criminals. The unrest is damaging to South Africa’s reputation across the continent, especially as the Nigerian government has expressed growing concern over the dangers faced by its nationals in South Africa.

Since 1994, South Africa’s constitutional institutions have strengthened, as has the independence of the judiciary, which now regularly rules against an increasingly discredited Zuma administration. The political parties are becoming more competitive, even as the country regularly holds credible elections. Corruption, especially in the inner circle of President Jacob Zuma and among his allies in the African National Congress (ANC), has probably increased, but it is challenged by the country’s free press and vociferous civil society. However, the parliamentary escapades of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) threatens the strength of South Africa’s parliament, one of the country’s most important institutions. Led by Julius Malema, once head of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), the EFF has challenged the way that South Africa’s parliament functions. Malema and the EFF, still small but now the third largest party in parliament, view President Zuma as disqualified to serve as the country’s chief of state in the aftermath of court rulings related to presidential corruption. Indeed, EFF and Malema’s hatred of Zuma and his close associates appears almost visceral. (After a dispute, Zuma expelled Malema from the ANC.) Accordingly, the EFF has conducted demonstrations, some akin to riots, on the floor of parliament over the past two years. The Zuma administration’s response has been to tighten security in the parliamentary precincts to such an extent that the opposition parties complain about intimidation. But, it cannot control the behavior of EFF members of parliament on the floor. President Zuma delivered his annual State of the Nation Address to parliament on February 9. Once again the EFF disrupted the proceedings, the speaker, Baleka Mbete, could not control it and eventually she called in the security services to eject the protesting EFF members, who resisted. The South African parliament broke into a brawl. At that point, the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) withdrew in protest of the methods the security services were using. In the end, Zuma delivered his address—usually one of the most important on the parliamentary calendar—to those who remained, almost all of whom were members of the ANC. Some South Africans approve of EFF disruptions when the focus is on the highly unpopular President Zuma. But, that focus can change in ways that are unpredictable. We should anticipate that there will be more and more disruptive episodes on the floor of parliament, at least until the ANC party leadership contest in December, which may lead to Zuma’s departure. In the meantime, Speaker Mbete’s seemingly ineptness has seriously damaged her candidacy to succeed Zuma and become the first female leader of the ANC and likely chief of state. The progressive breakdown of parliamentary decorum may have lasting consequences. Once the downward spiral starts, it is hard to stop. Further, continued and possibly accelerating disruption of parliament carries the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the institution among people at large. Indeed, we Americans have seen a progressive decline in popular respect for the Congress as it has become more blatantly partisan and seemingly deadlocked while issues of importance go unaddressed.

On February 9, President Jacob Zuma will deliver South Africa’s annual State of the Nation speech in parliament. The substance of the speech is likely to be a mixture of policy stability with calls for “radical” transformation of ownership of the economy. Few expect that the speech will really break new ground or that it will presage “radical” change. Rather, his remarks will be shaped by concern for his legacy and the leadership succession fight within the governing African National Congress (ANC). The ANC will choose a new party leader at its 54th National Conference in December. This will basically be a vote for the next president of South Africa. Zuma is unlikely to run for re-election, or, if he does so, he will likely fail. The South African president is elected by parliament, not directly by the electorate. As the ANC retains a huge parliamentary majority, the presidency is practically guaranteed to its party leader. Under South Africa’s system of parliamentary proportional representation and historical precedence, once Zuma is no longer party leader, the expectation is that he will resign the presidency of South Africa, though his term runs until 2019. (Technically, the ANC would “recall” him from the national presidency and thereby make his successor as ANC party leader also the chief of state.) Hence, Zuma must be personally concerned about whom the party chooses as his successor. Once, out of the presidency, he is liable to prosecution on hundreds of counts of corruption. Many of his critics see his ex-wife and mother of several of his children, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, as his best insurance policy and hence his preferred candidate. After Zuma speaks in parliament on February 9, he will proceed to Cape Town’s Grand Parade where he will address an ANC rally that may number up to 10,000. That speech will likely be more radical in tone than his parliamentary address and have a clearer partisan political dimension. The opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has threatened to disrupt the state of the nation speech, as it has done in the past when Zuma has spoken in parliament. The EFF argues that Zuma is “unfit” to deliver the address in light of the Constitutional Court’s 2016 decision that he improperly used public funds on his private estate, Nkandla. In response, Zuma has ordered the deployment of 440 members of the South African Defense Force (SADF) to supplement the police. As constitutional expert Pierre de Vos and numerous opposition spokesmen are arguing, such a deployment is almost certainly illegal. It is the police, not the military, who are charged with maintaining domestic order. Further, the activities of the police, let alone the military, within parliamentary precincts are strictly constrained by law. In defiance to the deployment of the SADF, the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the EFF are once again on the same side of an issue, even though they are at the polar ends of the South African political spectrum. The EFF’s radical rhetoric includes advocating the expropriation of white-owned property without compensation, while the DA firmly supports private property and popularly is still associated with the wealthy white minority. Nevertheless, the two parties are already coalition partners in some local government areas. Immediate opposition to the ANC and especially Jacob Zuma outweigh ideological differences. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And both want Zuma to go.

Corrupting the media, spreading chaos, and subverting the rule of law—it's what authoritarian regimes do best.