Heads of State and Government

Genocide and other massacres cast a long shadow over contemporary politics. In Africa, the genocide in Rwanda and massacres in Burundi and the eastern Congo come immediately to mind. As Zimbabwe spirals down under Robert Mugabe and the unresolved questions about his successor, the 1983-84 massacre of Ndebele in Matabeleland will be part of the context of whatever regime finally emerges. The International Association of Genocide Scholars estimates that the 5th Brigade of the Zimbabwean army murdered some 20,000 Ndebele in Matabeleland. In 2015, Stuart Doran published in South Africa’s The Daily Maverick a story (republished by London’s The Guardian) that credibly argues that Mugabe almost certainly orchestrated the massacre. The massacre appears to have been caused by a desire to eliminate or neuter opposition to his regime by his chief political rival Joshua Nkomo. In play were also ethnic rivalries between Mugabe’s Shona and Nkomo’s Ndebele. Especially in Matabeleland there was also a history of suspicion and distrust between Nkomo’s and Mugabe’s fighters, both of which waged military campaigns against the white Rhodesian regime. Stuart Doran has just published a follow-up article that looks at British and American reaction to the massacre while it was occurring. If you are American or, presumably, British, it makes for thoughtful reading. Doran shows that officials of the two countries knew what was going on in broad terms. They did, indeed, protest, if not very vigorously. But realpolitik prevailed. They were invested in Mugabe and his promises of reconciliation and stability, and feared that any other leader would be worse. They were afraid that if they pressed Mugabe too hard, he would bolt for the Soviet Union and/or North Korea. But, Doran also concludes that the western protests, however feeble they were, convinced Mugabe that there was a limit. And, “as long as he did not verge on the mass extermination that had occurred in 1983, he could kill, starve and torture his people, and outsiders would do nothing.” Ever since, Mugabe has used measured violence, rather than mass murder. And he gets away with it.

South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa all but announced his candidacy to succeed Jacob Zuma as the leader of the African National Congress (ANC) at a speech on April 23. The party’s election will take place at the 54th ANC National Conference in December. Ramaphosa’s speech, at an event sponsored by the South African Communist Party (SACP) in the Eastern Cape, was his first since Zuma sacked well-regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan (which resulted in multiple international credit rating agencies downgrading South African credit to junk status). Prevalent themes of Ramaphosa’s speech included: the need to address the “rot” within the party, the need to “root-out corruption,” and concern over outsiders unduly influencing government policy. All of these points were thinly veiled attacks on incumbent President Jacob Zuma. At the same event, Ramaphosa’s political ally, former Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, dismissed Zuma’s populist rhetoric for radical economic reform as “radical economic looting.” Ramaphosa has support within the SACP and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Such support for Ramaphosa, a millionaire businessman, demonstrates that ANC internal politics should not simply be seen as left vs. right in conventional terms. Despite the drama around Zuma’s removal of Gordhan, the electoral landscape within the ANC has changed little. Ramaphosa represents the urban areas (especially Johannesburg where Zuma is deeply unpopular), advocates for reform and “good government,” and an open political process. He is also popular among the domestic and international business communities. Zuma’s chosen replacement candidate appears to be his ex-wife and mother of some of his children, former minister of health, of foreign affairs, and chair of the African Union Commission, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma. She appears to have considerable support within party structures, especially the ANC Women’s League and the ANC Youth League. She also has support within the ANC in the poorer, rural regions. Over the past year, the ANC has become increasingly factionalized and disunited. Accordingly, the rhetoric of ANC politicians of all stripes emphasizes unity. As Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma are each clearly identified with a faction, the party may well settle on a third, “unity” candidate or an arrangement that accommodates both. One possibility might be to make Ramaphosa the party leader and Dlamini-Zuma his deputy. A “unity” candidate might be ANC Treasurer-General Zweli Mkhize, who cultivates ties with all factions. The December elections are to be held internally within the ANC–they are not popular elections, which will occur in 2019. With respect to intra-party candidates for office, the ANC is uncomfortable with open campaigning, perhaps a hold-over from the “democratic centralism” of the days when the ANC was a clandestine movement influence by Marxist-Leninism. Hence, the indirection of much of the candidates’ rhetoric. The Ramaphosa faction is acutely aware that the ANC’s popularity is slipping and that the party is increasingly identified by corruption and cronyism. This is indicative of the need for reform if the party is to retain its majority status in the 2019 elections.

On April 12, Nigeria’s principal anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), announced that it had found $43.4 million stashed in a vacant apartment in Lagos. The cash was in U.S. dollars, British pounds, and Nigerian naira. The EFCC did not reveal the owner of the cash—if it even knows. The EFCC said its seizure was the result of a tip-off under a program whereby the whistle-blower received 2.5 percent of recovered funds. The Federal High Court in Lagos has ordered the temporary forfeiture of the cash. The developer of the building where the cash was stashed is Adamu Muazu, former chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which governed Nigeria from 1999 to 2015 during the presidencies of Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Yar’Adua, and Goodluck Jonathan. Muazu was also the governor of Bauchi from 1999 to 2007. In response to media speculation that he owns the stash, Muazu stated that he is a property developer who built the building and sold all of the apartments through a real estate agency, and that he has no knowledge of the money. However, the media says that sale of the apartments is still underway, and that Muazu has reserved the penthouse for his own use. According to the media, an unnamed, senior EFCC official has suggested the money belonged to Esther Nnamdi-Ogbue, the now-fired former retail director for the national oil company, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). (According to the media, she was fired in connection with a NNPC scandal involving its illegal sale of 130 million liters of gasoline.) She denies owning the stash, but, according to the media, said that the owner was “well-known.” The media also reports that according to one source, the apartment where the cash was found is owned by a daughter of Anthony (‘Tony’) Anenih. A former minister, Anenih was also a former chairman of the board of trustees of the PDP. In 2009, a Nigerian senate committee investigated the use of N300 billion (Roughly $2 billion.) in the transport sector. It recommended prosecution of thirteen former ministers, including Anenih. Later that year, the senate deferred indefinitely consideration of the report; it is now a dead letter. Meanwhile, the PDP governor of Rivers state, Nyeson Wike, is telling the media that the money belongs to his state. He says that his immediate predecessor as governor, Rotimi Amaechi stole the money to finance the All Progressives Congress (APC) 2015 election campaign. Wike and Amaechi are political enemies. Amaechi is serving as minister of transport in President Buhari’s APC cabinet. Amaechi is accusing Wike of resorting to “fake news.” In yet another wrinkle, the director general of the Nigeria Intelligence Agency claims that the money belongs to his agency, and that it was intended for “covert” operations. The media is skeptical of his claims because of the apparently disorganized way the money was scattered about the apartment. On the other hand, April 19 Nigeria media reported that President Muhammadu Buhari had suspended the director general of the National Intelligence Agency, Ambassador Ayo Oke, pending a full-scale investigation into his activities with respect to the $43.4 million stash. In what may, or may not, be a related development, he also suspended the secretary to the government of the federation, David Babchir Lawal in conjunction with contracts related to the Presidential Initiative for the Northeast. The investigation of both, with a two-week deadline, is headed by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo. The bottom line is that $43.4 million has been recovered, with claims or insinuations that it was stolen by highly connected officials in one or the other of Nigeria’s two principal political parties and possibly involving somehow the Nigeria Intelligence Agency. The secretary to the government of the federation and the director general of the National Intelligence Agencies are at the pinnacle of the Nigerian government, and Buhari has made the fight against corruption a central theme of his presidency, hence the suspension and the investigation. It would seem that there is a real swamp to be drained. Allen Grane and I have recently written a Council Special Report urging the Trump administration to make support of anti-corruption efforts by the Nigerian and South African governments a priority. Among the recommendations Grane and I made in our report was that the U.S. Department of State revoke the U.S. visas of political figures suspected (not necessarily proven) of kleptocracy. The individuals involved in this episode might be a place to start.

Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja (the second busiest airport in the country after Lagos) reopened on April 18, after having been closed for six weeks since March 8 for runway repairs. Following the repairs, the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority has officially certified the airport for operations. The airport reopened one day ahead of schedule, with the first international flight by Ethiopian Airlines. While the airport had been closed, air travelers were diverted to Kaduna International Airport. This resulted in a decline in the number of passengers, according to officials, given the “inconvenience” of diversions to Kaduna. The distance from Abuja to Kaduna International Airport is 101 miles, more than three hours by road. Security concerns over banditry and terrorism on the Abuja-Kaduna road probably also played a role in the decline in air travel. Apolitical banditry has long been a problem, and Boko Haram continues to be active in northern Nigeria. There were no media reports of Boko Haram attacks on the Abuja-Kaduna road while the Abuja airport was closed. However, the same day the airport reopened, Nigerian media reported that a bomb believed to have been planted by Boko Haram killed one and injured seven near Damaturu in Yobe, 356 miles from Abuja, perhaps ten hours by road. Moreover, at the end of March the Nigerian security services announced that it had foiled an attempted Boko Haram attack on the U.S. embassy and the British high commission (embassy) in Abuja. The U.S. Department of State issued an updated travel warning on April 5, noting that Boko Haram has attacked government and other installations in Abuja and elsewhere. The last serious Boko Haram attacks in Abuja occurred in 2015. In a country where major infrastructure projects are often delayed, the re-opening of Abuja’s airport is good news.

Rachel Brown is a research associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Xi Jinping certainly isn’t the only recent Chinese visitor to the United States whose travel is affecting U.S.-China relations. Rates of Chinese tourism to the United States have been marching steadily upward. Even though overall tourism numbers have declined since President Donald J. Trump’s election – incurring $185 million in lost revenue – interest from China remains high. A recent survey of prospective visitors from eleven nations found that only those from China were now more likely to visit the United States as a result of the current political climate. So what explains this uptick in interest among Chinese citizens in travelling to an ideologically divided nation whose leader hasn’t had much positive to say about their country? One possibility is that Chinese interest in travel to the United States would have increased anyway and doesn’t depend much on who sits in the Oval Office. In 2015, tourism from China grew 18 percent year-on-year with 2.6 million visitors. American companies are also stepping up efforts to woo Chinese travelers. Certain hotels have begun adding amenities like in-room teakettles, Chinese television networks, and room service congee. The U.S. government has gotten into the game too. During the “U.S.-China tourism year” in 2016, agencies introduced Mandarin materials at popular national parks, reductions in visa processing times, and other changes. One article in the People’s Daily suggested that Chinese tourists’ increased interest in the United States might be the product of this promotional year and of a greater willingness to explore more unconventional routes. Finally, Chinese travelers are simply less affected by the Trump-era restrictions that have deterred other visitors, such as the visa ban, enhanced scrutiny of Muslim travelers, and regulation of electronics aboard flights from certain Middle Eastern airports. But could there be something else at play? After all, the survey respondents linked their increased interest explicitly to the political climate. So what political factors could be at work? First, it is possible that despite Trump’s anti-China comments throughout the campaign, Chinese visitors believe he will prove an effective leader or make the country safer for visitors by addressing crime and terrorism threats. Second, political tensions could be fueling a sense of urgency about the need to travel. Some prospective visitors may want to squeeze in a trip before new visa polices or worsening U.S.-China relations could make it more difficult. (Indeed concerns about tighter visa policies and greater security scrutiny feature heavily in online Chinese discussions of U.S. tourism.) Others have a more humorous take on why changing U.S.-China dynamics are making a visit more urgent. One online commenter advised Chinese travelers to go to the United States before it becomes like a province of China after being bought up by foreign money. Finally, Chinese visitors may just want to get a sense of a political drama playing out in the open, the likes of which they would not see at home. One article published just after the election suggested that many Chinese wanted to travel to the United States to experience the election culture for themselves; in November the average frequency of bookings for tourist routes involving the United States increased for the following two months. An article on the People’s Daily website added that perhaps tourists are eager to “explore the new face of the United States under the Trump administration.” But the promising tourism numbers aren’t guaranteed to hold. Not all the statistics have been as positive as those in the Brand USA survey. Flight research site Hopper found that weekly average flight searches to the United States from China fell by 33 percent between the period just prior to Trump’s inauguration and his announcement of the travel ban. Additionally, while the Trump-Xi summit appears to have cooled trade frictions for now, a reemergence of tensions could affect tourism. Twisting the spigot on the flow of Chinese nationals travelling abroad has long been a tool in the government’s arsenal. Following 2012 disputes over Scarborough Shoal, Chinese officials discouraged tourists from going to the Philippines, and more recently bilateral disputes have triggered restrictions on tourism to South Korea  and Taiwan. Similar threats have been floated regarding the United States, although it is highly unlikely anyone would act on them. In November, a Global Times op-ed on the prospect of a U.S.-China trade war noted that, “China can also limit the number of Chinese students studying in the U.S.” Similar actions could also be taken to limit the number of tourists. Tourism could also fall for other reasons. Despite American companies’ best efforts to endear themselves to Chinese clients, frustration could mount with certain U.S. travel providers. The video of United Airlines passenger David Dao, who was of Chinese-Vietnamese heritage, was viewed over 330 million times in China. Many Chinese and other viewers attributed the action partially to racism. Such perceptions could hit tourism hard.  Recently the CEO of Ctrip, one of China’s largest travel sites, commented that further incidents like the United kerfuffle could damage Chinese tourists’ image of the United States. She explained, “Chinese consumers always pick the place that is friendly to them. The [U.S.] government needs to send a very strong message that it promotes friendliness between countries.” A decrease in tourism from China – whether caused by stricter visa policies, other government actions, or simply changing preferences– would be costly for the United States. In 2015, Chinese tourists spent $30.1 billion in the United States and tourism helps fuel the U.S. trade in services surplus with China.  Given President Trump’s hyperawareness of the U.S. trade deficit with China – not to mention his own background in the hospitality industry – one would hope he might proceed with caution on anything that could disrupt tourist ties. Then again, if the survey results are to be believed, perhaps more bombastic rhetoric from Trump would be good for tourism after all.

Speaker of the South African National Assembly Baleka Mbete has postponed the date for a vote of no confidence in the government of Jacob Zuma from April 18 to early May. The delay was caused by the request to the Constitutional Court from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) that the vote be by secret ballot. The court has agreed to review the case, but has not yet made a decision. The speaker, who agreed to wait on the courts decision, is a political ally of President Jacob Zuma and is the national chairperson of his African National Congress (ANC). The no confidence motion initiated by the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has the support of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and nearly all of the opposition parties. However, the ANC numbers 249 of the 400 members of the National Assembly, and a successful no confidence vote must gain over 50 percent of the parliamentary vote. To have any chance of success, the motion must be supported by about fifty ANC ‘rebels.’ If the vote is not secret, the ‘rebels’ would be subject to party discipline, virtually guaranteeing that all ANC members would vote against the motion. There would appear to be two issues for the Constitutional Court: whether the speaker could opt for a secret ballot (she says she could not) and whether the Constitutional Court could order the speaker to conduct the vote by secret ballot. The legal issues are explored by Pierre de Vos in the Daily Maverick. The Constitutional Court is known for its independence, and it has regularly ruled against the government. Nevertheless, it is likely to be reluctant to intervene in the procedures of the National Assembly, a co-equal branch of government. However, even if there is a secret ballot, ANC party discipline is so strong that it is unlikely that there would be fifty ANC 'rebels.' The delay in the vote of no-confidence means that as an issue it will not go away quickly and it allows public sentiment against Zuma to grow. For example, there was a protest demonstration in Pretoria led by the EFF on April 12 that numbered up to 120,000 participants. Even if the ANC defeats a May no-confidence motion, as is expected, this episode is likely to increase popular disenchantment with the party.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 8 to April 14, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1492437803056'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); (last week April 7: Boko Haram kidnapped thirteen women in Gwoza, Borno) April 8: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. April 8: One suicide bomber killed himself but no others in Kolofata, Cameroon. April 8: Two Boko Haram killed eight in Maiduguri, Borno. April 9: Unknown militants killed two soldiers and five policemen in Ikorodu, Lagos. April 9: Nigerien troops killed fifty-seven Boko Haram militants in Gueskerou, Niger. April 9: Kidnappers kidnapped two Turkish citizens and one other in Eket, Akwa Ibom. April 10: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. April 12: Pirates killed two soldiers in Nembe, Bayelsa. April 13: Gunmen killed five and abducted four in Ibeju-Lekki, Lagos. April 13: Gunmen killed five in Katsina-Ala, Benue.

The National Assembly will vote on April 18, on a motion of no confidence in the African National Congress' (ANC) Zuma administration. The motion has been put forward by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and is supported by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The occasion of the vote is Zuma’s earlier cabinet reshuffle which is perceived by many as having opened the flood gates to cronyism and corruption. The ANC has 249 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly. The two largest opposition parties are the DA, with eighty-nine seats, and the EFF, with twenty-five. The seats of all the other opposition parties together number thirty-seven. The ANC party leadership seems to have rallied around Zuma, and it must be expected that the motion will fail. While such a failure is probable, there are new developments that indicate the direction in which South Africa is moving. Today, April 12, there have been mass demonstrations against the Zuma government (on, of all days, his seventy-fifth birthday). Of the thirteen opposition parties, all save two are supporting the demonstrations. This is an exceptional showing of opposition unity. The two that did not support the demonstrations are the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). The PAC favors wholesale expropriation of white-owned land. Its spokesman said that there is little to choose between Zuma and his supposed successors within the ANC as both are in the hands of capitalists and are corrupt. (The PAC’s one member of the National Assembly will abstain on the April 18 vote.) The FF+ is a fringe Afrikaner political party. Its spokesman said that it would vote for the motion on April 18, but not participate in the April 12 demonstrations because they are likely to be counterproductive. (The party has four seats.) All the rest of the opposition parties will participate in the demonstrations and will vote for the no-confidence motion. So, there are likely to be 150 opposition votes for the motion. To be successful the motion will require fifty or so ANC defections. The prospect of substantial ANC defections is unlikely. Zuma is notorious for his vindictiveness, and the political career of an ANC defector would almost certainly be at an end. However, a small opposition party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), led by anti-apartheid veteran Bantu Holomisa, has applied to the South African Constitutional Court for an order that the ballot be secret. A secret ballot may well encourage some ANC MPs to support the no-confidence measure. (The UDM also has four seats.) Meanwhile, respected elder statesman Thabo Mbeki, in an op-ed, is urging members of the National Assembly to vote “for the people of South Africa,” rather than for a political party – an invitation to disaffected ANC representatives to vote for the motion. It is hard to see how the Constitutional Court might mandate a secret ballot in the National Assembly. That would constitute intervention in the internal procedures of another branch of government. Further, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party have not supported demonstrations against the Zuma government up to now, and there is no sign of participation in today's protests. Both want Zuma out, but they want his exit to be the result of internal deliberations within the ANC rather than through a political process in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, South Africa’s notoriously fragmented opposition has come together in a new way. Politics in South Africa are churning as ANC predominance fades.

Over the Palm Sunday weekend, there were large demonstrations in South Africa’s urban centers against President Jacob Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) in the aftermath of last week’s cabinet reshuffle. The largest demonstrations took place in Cape Town and Pretoria, where, according to the media, demonstrators numbered in the tens of thousands. Elsewhere, demonstrations were much smaller. The demonstrations received extensive media coverage internationally and in the United States, however, they will certainly have no impact on Zuma’s position or the ANC in the short term. For his part, Zuma accused the protestors of being racist. It is always difficult to judge the measurable impact of demonstrations on political change. For example, it is hard to link the demonstrations across the United States against the Vietnam War and then-President Richard Nixon to specific policy changes. Similarly, large demonstrations the day after President Trump’s inauguration in the short term appear to have effected little. That being said, large-scale public protest may have an impact over the longer term. Such nation-wide rallies contributed to the paranoia of the Nixon administration and helped establish a context for his eventual departure from office. In South Africa, if nothing else, the demonstrations over the past weekend should bring home to the ANC leadership (if not President Zuma) the apparent growing alienation of South Africa’s urban centers; at present, the party only governs one of these urban centers, Durban. The ANC risks becoming more rural as the country becomes more urban – estimates are that roughly 60 percent of South Africa is considered urban. For the time being, the ANC has firmly nailed its colors to Jacob Zuma’s mast, deeply unpopular though he is. These realities will play a role in the elections of 2019.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 1 to April 7, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1491849488916'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); (Last week – March 31: Boko Haram killed three and abducted "scores" (estimated at forty) in Damboa, Borno) April 1: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ife North, Osun. April 2: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. April 2: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Jere, Borno. April 2: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Odukpani, Cross River. April 2: Sectarian violence led to fifteen deaths in Kwande, Benue. April 5: Boko Haram killed seven in Maiduguri, Borno. April 6: Boko Haram killed four soldiers in Dikwa, Borno.

For now, Jacob Zuma has succeeded in defeating his rivals for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and an upcoming parliamentary vote of no-confidence will likely fail. The intra-party show-down has followed on the heels of his dramatic cabinet reshuffle. Zuma carried out this reshuffle without consultation within the ANC or with its partners in government, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have called for a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. It has been scheduled for April 18. To be successful, the vote would require the defection of fifty to sixty of the ANC’s 249 members. (The National Assembly has four hundred seats; almost all of the opposition members will vote for the motion.) However, the ANC collective party leadership has now rallied behind Zuma, making such defections highly unlikely. South Africa operates according to a “closed list” system of proportional representation. The electorate votes for the party, not an individual. Before each election, a party leadership prepares a list of candidates: it determines the place on the list of each candidate. Those at the top of the list are usually assured a seat; those at the bottom are not. Hence, any party has a whip-hand over its members in the National Assembly. For an ANC member to vote against the party is political suicide – unless the party leadership splits. Even though three of the “top six” leaders of the ANC were publicly critical of the reshuffle, and the SACP and COSATU called for Zuma’s removal from office, it has not. Rather, the party has publicly rallied behind Zuma. The removal of Gordhan, a steady hand on the economy and dyke against public corruption, has given investors pause.  S & P Global has downgraded South Africa’s credit rating to junk status and the currency has fallen about 11 percent in value. Economic growth, already anemic, will likely stall as domestic and foreign investment dries-up. So long as Zuma stays in office, this trend is likely to continue. Between now and the December ANC vote for a new party leader, Zuma is likely to seek to consolidate support for his hand-picked successor. Though he is flying high now, it is by no means certain that he will be successful in December, especially as the economy deteriorates. The faction fighting should not be seen in left vs. right or radical vs. conservative terms. Zuma’s critics included Cyril Ramaphosa, a black oligarch as well as deputy president and aspirant for the presidency, and the ostensibly left-wing SACP and COSATU. Nor should it be put in a pro-west vs. anti-west context. Zuma is no friend of the west and appears attracted to a closer relationship with Russia. But, Gwede Mantashe, at one stage a Zuma critic, has leveled the ridiculous charge that the American embassy in Pretoria is plotting “regime change” in South Africa. However, there is an urban vs. rural and reform vs. tradition dimension to the faction-fighting. Broadly speaking Zuma’s critics within the ANC are urban and seek better to position South Africa in the modern world; Zuma’s core support is rural, and he has cultivated relationships with traditional rulers. Increasingly, that is where the ANC’s electoral support is to be found. The party now governs only one of South Africa’s large cities, Durban. Over time, the party’s rural base is a wasting asset as the country is urbanizing rapidly. But, for now, the party’s leadership structure favors rural areas where its votes are, and Zuma has cultivated effective patronage/clientage networks among them that this week was crucial to his defeating the challenges to his authority. This episode leaves the ANC a shambles. Its factional divisions are there for all to see. The upcoming no-confidence vote is lose/lose for the party. It will likely win the vote, demonstrating that the party has no way of responding to Zuma’s bad governance and dubious friends. On the other hand, should the vote succeed through circumstances difficult now to foresee, then the party will be exposed as a paper tiger. However, as I argue in Morning in South Africa, this entire episode is an illustration of the strength and maturity of South African democracy, nothing that has occurred has been illegal or extra-constitutional.