Heads of State and Government

Speaker of the South African National Assembly Baleka Mbete has postponed the date for a vote of no confidence in the government of Jacob Zuma from April 18 to early May. The delay was caused by the request to the Constitutional Court from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) that the vote be by secret ballot. The court has agreed to review the case, but has not yet made a decision. The speaker, who agreed to wait on the courts decision, is a political ally of President Jacob Zuma and is the national chairperson of his African National Congress (ANC). The no confidence motion initiated by the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has the support of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and nearly all of the opposition parties. However, the ANC numbers 249 of the 400 members of the National Assembly, and a successful no confidence vote must gain over 50 percent of the parliamentary vote. To have any chance of success, the motion must be supported by about fifty ANC ‘rebels.’ If the vote is not secret, the ‘rebels’ would be subject to party discipline, virtually guaranteeing that all ANC members would vote against the motion. There would appear to be two issues for the Constitutional Court: whether the speaker could opt for a secret ballot (she says she could not) and whether the Constitutional Court could order the speaker to conduct the vote by secret ballot. The legal issues are explored by Pierre de Vos in the Daily Maverick. The Constitutional Court is known for its independence, and it has regularly ruled against the government. Nevertheless, it is likely to be reluctant to intervene in the procedures of the National Assembly, a co-equal branch of government. However, even if there is a secret ballot, ANC party discipline is so strong that it is unlikely that there would be fifty ANC 'rebels.' The delay in the vote of no-confidence means that as an issue it will not go away quickly and it allows public sentiment against Zuma to grow. For example, there was a protest demonstration in Pretoria led by the EFF on April 12 that numbered up to 120,000 participants. Even if the ANC defeats a May no-confidence motion, as is expected, this episode is likely to increase popular disenchantment with the party.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 8 to April 14, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1492437803056'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); (last week April 7: Boko Haram kidnapped thirteen women in Gwoza, Borno) April 8: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. April 8: One suicide bomber killed himself but no others in Kolofata, Cameroon. April 8: Two Boko Haram killed eight in Maiduguri, Borno. April 9: Unknown militants killed two soldiers and five policemen in Ikorodu, Lagos. April 9: Nigerien troops killed fifty-seven Boko Haram militants in Gueskerou, Niger. April 9: Kidnappers kidnapped two Turkish citizens and one other in Eket, Akwa Ibom. April 10: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. April 12: Pirates killed two soldiers in Nembe, Bayelsa. April 13: Gunmen killed five and abducted four in Ibeju-Lekki, Lagos. April 13: Gunmen killed five in Katsina-Ala, Benue.

The National Assembly will vote on April 18, on a motion of no confidence in the African National Congress' (ANC) Zuma administration. The motion has been put forward by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and is supported by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The occasion of the vote is Zuma’s earlier cabinet reshuffle which is perceived by many as having opened the flood gates to cronyism and corruption. The ANC has 249 seats out of 400 in the National Assembly. The two largest opposition parties are the DA, with eighty-nine seats, and the EFF, with twenty-five. The seats of all the other opposition parties together number thirty-seven. The ANC party leadership seems to have rallied around Zuma, and it must be expected that the motion will fail. While such a failure is probable, there are new developments that indicate the direction in which South Africa is moving. Today, April 12, there have been mass demonstrations against the Zuma government (on, of all days, his seventy-fifth birthday). Of the thirteen opposition parties, all save two are supporting the demonstrations. This is an exceptional showing of opposition unity. The two that did not support the demonstrations are the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). The PAC favors wholesale expropriation of white-owned land. Its spokesman said that there is little to choose between Zuma and his supposed successors within the ANC as both are in the hands of capitalists and are corrupt. (The PAC’s one member of the National Assembly will abstain on the April 18 vote.) The FF+ is a fringe Afrikaner political party. Its spokesman said that it would vote for the motion on April 18, but not participate in the April 12 demonstrations because they are likely to be counterproductive. (The party has four seats.) All the rest of the opposition parties will participate in the demonstrations and will vote for the no-confidence motion. So, there are likely to be 150 opposition votes for the motion. To be successful the motion will require fifty or so ANC defections. The prospect of substantial ANC defections is unlikely. Zuma is notorious for his vindictiveness, and the political career of an ANC defector would almost certainly be at an end. However, a small opposition party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), led by anti-apartheid veteran Bantu Holomisa, has applied to the South African Constitutional Court for an order that the ballot be secret. A secret ballot may well encourage some ANC MPs to support the no-confidence measure. (The UDM also has four seats.) Meanwhile, respected elder statesman Thabo Mbeki, in an op-ed, is urging members of the National Assembly to vote “for the people of South Africa,” rather than for a political party – an invitation to disaffected ANC representatives to vote for the motion. It is hard to see how the Constitutional Court might mandate a secret ballot in the National Assembly. That would constitute intervention in the internal procedures of another branch of government. Further, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party have not supported demonstrations against the Zuma government up to now, and there is no sign of participation in today's protests. Both want Zuma out, but they want his exit to be the result of internal deliberations within the ANC rather than through a political process in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, South Africa’s notoriously fragmented opposition has come together in a new way. Politics in South Africa are churning as ANC predominance fades.

Over the Palm Sunday weekend, there were large demonstrations in South Africa’s urban centers against President Jacob Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) in the aftermath of last week’s cabinet reshuffle. The largest demonstrations took place in Cape Town and Pretoria, where, according to the media, demonstrators numbered in the tens of thousands. Elsewhere, demonstrations were much smaller. The demonstrations received extensive media coverage internationally and in the United States, however, they will certainly have no impact on Zuma’s position or the ANC in the short term. For his part, Zuma accused the protestors of being racist. It is always difficult to judge the measurable impact of demonstrations on political change. For example, it is hard to link the demonstrations across the United States against the Vietnam War and then-President Richard Nixon to specific policy changes. Similarly, large demonstrations the day after President Trump’s inauguration in the short term appear to have effected little. That being said, large-scale public protest may have an impact over the longer term. Such nation-wide rallies contributed to the paranoia of the Nixon administration and helped establish a context for his eventual departure from office. In South Africa, if nothing else, the demonstrations over the past weekend should bring home to the ANC leadership (if not President Zuma) the apparent growing alienation of South Africa’s urban centers; at present, the party only governs one of these urban centers, Durban. The ANC risks becoming more rural as the country becomes more urban – estimates are that roughly 60 percent of South Africa is considered urban. For the time being, the ANC has firmly nailed its colors to Jacob Zuma’s mast, deeply unpopular though he is. These realities will play a role in the elections of 2019.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 1 to April 7, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1491849488916'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); (Last week – March 31: Boko Haram killed three and abducted "scores" (estimated at forty) in Damboa, Borno) April 1: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ife North, Osun. April 2: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Maiduguri, Borno. April 2: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves but no others in Jere, Borno. April 2: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Odukpani, Cross River. April 2: Sectarian violence led to fifteen deaths in Kwande, Benue. April 5: Boko Haram killed seven in Maiduguri, Borno. April 6: Boko Haram killed four soldiers in Dikwa, Borno.

For now, Jacob Zuma has succeeded in defeating his rivals for the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and an upcoming parliamentary vote of no-confidence will likely fail. The intra-party show-down has followed on the heels of his dramatic cabinet reshuffle. Zuma carried out this reshuffle without consultation within the ANC or with its partners in government, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The two leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) have called for a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly. It has been scheduled for April 18. To be successful, the vote would require the defection of fifty to sixty of the ANC’s 249 members. (The National Assembly has four hundred seats; almost all of the opposition members will vote for the motion.) However, the ANC collective party leadership has now rallied behind Zuma, making such defections highly unlikely. South Africa operates according to a “closed list” system of proportional representation. The electorate votes for the party, not an individual. Before each election, a party leadership prepares a list of candidates: it determines the place on the list of each candidate. Those at the top of the list are usually assured a seat; those at the bottom are not. Hence, any party has a whip-hand over its members in the National Assembly. For an ANC member to vote against the party is political suicide – unless the party leadership splits. Even though three of the “top six” leaders of the ANC were publicly critical of the reshuffle, and the SACP and COSATU called for Zuma’s removal from office, it has not. Rather, the party has publicly rallied behind Zuma. The removal of Gordhan, a steady hand on the economy and dyke against public corruption, has given investors pause.  S & P Global has downgraded South Africa’s credit rating to junk status and the currency has fallen about 11 percent in value. Economic growth, already anemic, will likely stall as domestic and foreign investment dries-up. So long as Zuma stays in office, this trend is likely to continue. Between now and the December ANC vote for a new party leader, Zuma is likely to seek to consolidate support for his hand-picked successor. Though he is flying high now, it is by no means certain that he will be successful in December, especially as the economy deteriorates. The faction fighting should not be seen in left vs. right or radical vs. conservative terms. Zuma’s critics included Cyril Ramaphosa, a black oligarch as well as deputy president and aspirant for the presidency, and the ostensibly left-wing SACP and COSATU. Nor should it be put in a pro-west vs. anti-west context. Zuma is no friend of the west and appears attracted to a closer relationship with Russia. But, Gwede Mantashe, at one stage a Zuma critic, has leveled the ridiculous charge that the American embassy in Pretoria is plotting “regime change” in South Africa. However, there is an urban vs. rural and reform vs. tradition dimension to the faction-fighting. Broadly speaking Zuma’s critics within the ANC are urban and seek better to position South Africa in the modern world; Zuma’s core support is rural, and he has cultivated relationships with traditional rulers. Increasingly, that is where the ANC’s electoral support is to be found. The party now governs only one of South Africa’s large cities, Durban. Over time, the party’s rural base is a wasting asset as the country is urbanizing rapidly. But, for now, the party’s leadership structure favors rural areas where its votes are, and Zuma has cultivated effective patronage/clientage networks among them that this week was crucial to his defeating the challenges to his authority. This episode leaves the ANC a shambles. Its factional divisions are there for all to see. The upcoming no-confidence vote is lose/lose for the party. It will likely win the vote, demonstrating that the party has no way of responding to Zuma’s bad governance and dubious friends. On the other hand, should the vote succeed through circumstances difficult now to foresee, then the party will be exposed as a paper tiger. However, as I argue in Morning in South Africa, this entire episode is an illustration of the strength and maturity of South African democracy, nothing that has occurred has been illegal or extra-constitutional.

In a boost to President Muhammadu Buhari’s anti-corruption crusade, Bolaji Owosanoyu, Executive Secretary of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption has announced that the British government will release to the Nigerian government information about Nigerians who own property in the United Kingdom (UK). According to Owosanoyu, “Britain has promised that by 2018, she will provide Nigeria with the information about who owns what and where; that’s very helpful. These include all the houses that have been bought by public officials or accounts that are held by public officials on which they are right now not paying taxes or which they cannot explain the sources.” It is conventional wisdom that rich Nigerians buy expensive apartments in London’s Mayfair neighborhood, and that the acquisition of expensive property is a form of laundering ill-gotten gains. However, many other Nigerians of more modest means have acquired property in the UK, the number of which is unknown. Such a move from the British government appears to be a concrete and practical means of assisting the Buhari administration’s anti-corruption efforts. It is a step that should be seriously considered by Nigeria’s other friends and partners, including the United States. Wealthy Nigerians have a history of designating New York, Los Angeles, and Washington DC real estate as a place to invest their money.

The African National Congress’s (ANC) National Working Committee (NWC) decision to back South African President Jacob Zuma in the face of his widely unpopular cabinet reshuffle makes it unlikely that there will be sufficient ANC defections for a no-confidence measure to pass the National Assembly. It remains to be seen how the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will respond to the NWC decision. At present, it appears that any genuine unity within the ANC over a future sense of direction is absent. It is likely that until December, the ANC government will, in effect, be paralyzed. Such stagnation with regards to leadership and the decision making process in the South African government could produce incoherent economic policy, and further political influence and intrusion from the infamous Gupta brothers. These circumstances will be to the chagrin of the international financial markets. Standard & Poor’s downgrading of parts of South Africa’s sovereign debt may be followed by similar actions by the other rating agencies. There is a high probability that short-term investment in the economy could be stifled, as will economic growth. The national currency, the Rand (ZAR) has fallen by more than 11 percent. However, shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange rose – this was driven by shares in gold-mining companies and the weakening Rand. It remains to be see whether these trajectories will persist. Following Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle last week, and his decision to fire well regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, the party leader and chief of state has been under intense pressure from all quarters of the government. The ANC’s political partners, the SACP and the COSATU have called for his resignation because he did not consult with them over the cabinet reshuffle. The absence of any consultation, as well as the dubious quality of certain members of his cabinet picks, has spurred division amongst the highest level of leadership within the ANC. The backstory to the current political crisis includes issues of “state capture,” corruption, the preservation of the unity of the ANC, and the upcoming election of a new ANC leadership in December. Zuma is widely perceived to be corrupt, and his cronies, the Gupta brothers, are seen as exercising undue influence over the administration – otherwise known as “state capture.” The discord over Zuma within the ANC leadership, is a direct challenge to party cohesion, its principle of decision making by consensus, and to never “wash dirty laundry in public.” At least two, perhaps three, of the six most influential members of the ANC have aspirations for the party leadership in December. Zuma is seeking the election of his own outside candidate in December, most likely his ex-wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to forestall prosecution for corruption when he is out of office. Taking these circumstances together, the ANC is opting for party “unity” – at least until December. Hence, on April 4 the party’s NWC affirmed that it would not support Zuma’s removal from the party leadership now, and that it would strongly oppose a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly. There was mild criticism of Zuma for his failure to seek consultation over the cabinet reshuffle but also of those within the party who were publicly critical of him – a further display of party disunity. The bottom line for the ANC leadership is that Zuma, and his new cabinet picks, are locked-in until December. However, his opponents at higher levels of party leadership have maintained opposition to him. As yet, there is no sign of meaningful party unity.

Voices calling for President Jacob Zuma to resign or to be removed from office are getting louder in the wake of his cabinet reshuffle and removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Within his African National Congress (ANC) the Integrity Commission – intended as an internal corruption watchdog but often toothless – has announced that at an April 9 meeting with the president, it will ask him to resign. Powerful ANC figures including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Treasurer General Zweli Mkhize have disassociated themselves from the reshuffle, though they have not publicly called for Zuma to go. The Mandela Foundation and the Kathrada Foundation, keepers of the liberation movement flame, have done so, as has former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Even the ANC’s political allies are calling for a change. The South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have both expressed their concern regarding the abrupt cabinet reshuffle. On April 4, COSATU called on Zuma to resign. The SACP has posted at the top of its web site its call for the ANC to remove him from the presidency. Meanwhile, the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are asking for a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Civil-society is mobilized and has led demonstrations in the larger cities. The focus of anger increasingly appears to be Zuma’s failure to consult the ANC leadership and that of its communist and trade union allies before his cabinet reshuffle. The Integrity Commission summarizes this point of view: Zuma “disregarded the principle and tradition of collective leadership, both within the ANC and with our alliance partners” (SACP and COSATU). COSATU never liked Gordhan, and there is anger on the South African left at Standard & Poor’s downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status; COSATU spokesmen have characterized that act as “intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa.” But, seemingly, everybody can agree on Zuma’s lack of consultation. So, will Zuma go? It is by no means certain. The National Assembly is on Easter recess. To consider a motion of no confidence, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete, would have to call it back early. She is generally regarded as a Zuma ally. More generally, Zuma has built up a formidable patronage/clientage network within the ANC that may not be prepared to abandon him just yet. The ANC is set to choose a new national leader in December. ANC politicos, including Ramaphosa, are jockeying for position. For many in the ANC, it may be tempting to leave Zuma in place until a later date, rather than engage in a messy internal fight now.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 25 to March 31 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1491234961674’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); March 25: Herdsmen killed one at a prison farm in Kwande, Benue. March 25: Boko Haram killed three in Konduga, Borno. March 28: An IED planted by Boko Haram killed two CJTF in Dikwa, Borno. March 29: Sectarian violence led to nine people being shot, but no deaths, in Ife North, Osun. March 29: Soldiers killed one Boko Haram militant in Dikwa, Borno. March 30: Boko Haram killed one and kidnapped twenty-two girls in Gwoza, Borno.

As part of a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle, President Jacob Zuma has fired highly respected Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, along with other long-time stalwarts of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Gordhan and Jonas had long opposed pet projects of the president, and Gordhan has become the symbol of reform and good governance even as the reputation of the governing ANC under Zuma’s leadership has declined into a miasma of charges of corruption and “state capture” by the president’s cronies. Many South Africans (including those within the ANC) will see Gordhan’s departure as a major setback for “reform” and the struggle against corruption. International investors already are not happy. The Rand fell dramatically yet again against the U.S. dollar. There is now a greater likelihood that the international credit rating agencies will downgrade South Africa’s sovereign debt to junk status. The ANC was already divided over Zuma’s successor as party leader; the party leadership vote is expected to take place in December. Zuma and his faction’s preferred candidate is his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma; a “reform” faction candidate is the well-regarded deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and there could be others. Looking toward December is part of the context of the cabinet reshuffle. Zuma apparently did not consult the traditional ANC party leadership over the reshuffle, an indication that it would have opposed him. It is still not clear whether Zuma has the support of his parliamentary partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); Gordhan has had considerable support among both. The South African opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has now tabled a motion of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma in parliament. If it is successful, Zuma would immediately lose the presidency. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) supports the motion. The other opposition parties will almost certainly support the motion. The parliamentary arithmetic is straightforward. Parliament has four hundred seats. A successful vote of no-confidence requires 201 votes. The ANC has 249 seats (COSATU and SACP MP’s vote as ANC). All of the opposition parties have 151. To oust Zuma a no-confidence motion would require the votes of about fifty ANC MP’s. Despite the outrage in the aftermath of the Zuma cabinet reshuffle even inside the ANC, it is unlikely that a DA motion of no confidence will succeed. In the past, when the DA has proposed such a motion, even when supported by the “radical” EFF, the ANC has closed ranks, protecting the party and ensuring Zuma’s position. Since the days of Nelson Mandela, the ANC has prioritized party unity. The DA continues to be perceived as the party of whites, other minorities, and the privileged in South Africa, while the ANC (despite its multiracial principles and history) is seen as “black,” “pro-poor,” and the leader of the successful fight against apartheid. (Black South African’s constitute about 80 percent of the country’s population, and most of it is poor.) The EFF is something of a wild card. Its “pro-poor” rhetoric goes beyond the ANC, but Malema’s personal hatred for Zuma is visceral and unabated. He is prepared to cooperate on occasion with the DA. Nevertheless, given the realities of racially based identity politics, a no-confidence vote will likely fail. Only if a significant portion of the ANC leadership concludes that keeping Zuma in the presidency is electoral poison might the no-confidence measure succeed. We may know soon; the party’s highest leadership body, the National Executive Committee may meet over the weekend of April 1-2. However, if such a meeting is postponed, or if it takes no significant action, Zuma’s short-term chances of weathering his current political crisis are improved.

Geoff Hill writes in a credible Daily Maverick (South Africa) op-ed that people across Africa want the rule of law, and they are demanding it more and more, often from their local judiciaries. But Africans at the same time remain critical, for good reason, of the behavior of judges. Hill reviews a series of court cases in South Africa that have led to reverses for the government of President Jacob Zuma. Notably, the Pretoria High Court’s determination that Zuma’s effort to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is unconstitutional. Hill cites other examples from around the continent, even including Zimbabwe, notorious for the tyrannical rule of Robert Mugabe. But, Hill also cites polling data that shows Africans are critical of the behavior of many judges. He reports that an Afrobarometer poll showed that 30 percent of respondents paid a bribe to court judges or officials. Sierra Leone was the worst, with 67 percent paying a bribe. Botswana was the best, with a bribe-paying score of zero. In South Africa, only 5 percent reported paying bribes. There were also complaints about the expense of going to court, and court delays. In Kenya, three quarters of respondents characterized court delays as “intolerable.” In Africa, democracy, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and economic development seem to advance hand-in-hand. Botswana probably has the highest per capita income in Africa, and the wealth (largely based on diamonds) is not totally monopolized by a corrupt elite. South Africa, with the largest diversified economy in Africa, has both an independent judiciary and a lively, fully-functioning democracy.