Heads of State and Government

In a boost to President Muhammadu Buhari’s anti-corruption crusade, Bolaji Owosanoyu, Executive Secretary of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption has announced that the British government will release to the Nigerian government information about Nigerians who own property in the United Kingdom (UK). According to Owosanoyu, “Britain has promised that by 2018, she will provide Nigeria with the information about who owns what and where; that’s very helpful. These include all the houses that have been bought by public officials or accounts that are held by public officials on which they are right now not paying taxes or which they cannot explain the sources.” It is conventional wisdom that rich Nigerians buy expensive apartments in London’s Mayfair neighborhood, and that the acquisition of expensive property is a form of laundering ill-gotten gains. However, many other Nigerians of more modest means have acquired property in the UK, the number of which is unknown. Such a move from the British government appears to be a concrete and practical means of assisting the Buhari administration’s anti-corruption efforts. It is a step that should be seriously considered by Nigeria’s other friends and partners, including the United States. Wealthy Nigerians have a history of designating New York, Los Angeles, and Washington DC real estate as a place to invest their money.

The African National Congress’s (ANC) National Working Committee (NWC) decision to back South African President Jacob Zuma in the face of his widely unpopular cabinet reshuffle makes it unlikely that there will be sufficient ANC defections for a no-confidence measure to pass the National Assembly. It remains to be seen how the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) will respond to the NWC decision. At present, it appears that any genuine unity within the ANC over a future sense of direction is absent. It is likely that until December, the ANC government will, in effect, be paralyzed. Such stagnation with regards to leadership and the decision making process in the South African government could produce incoherent economic policy, and further political influence and intrusion from the infamous Gupta brothers. These circumstances will be to the chagrin of the international financial markets. Standard & Poor’s downgrading of parts of South Africa’s sovereign debt may be followed by similar actions by the other rating agencies. There is a high probability that short-term investment in the economy could be stifled, as will economic growth. The national currency, the Rand (ZAR) has fallen by more than 11 percent. However, shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange rose – this was driven by shares in gold-mining companies and the weakening Rand. It remains to be see whether these trajectories will persist. Following Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle last week, and his decision to fire well regarded Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, the party leader and chief of state has been under intense pressure from all quarters of the government. The ANC’s political partners, the SACP and the COSATU have called for his resignation because he did not consult with them over the cabinet reshuffle. The absence of any consultation, as well as the dubious quality of certain members of his cabinet picks, has spurred division amongst the highest level of leadership within the ANC. The backstory to the current political crisis includes issues of “state capture,” corruption, the preservation of the unity of the ANC, and the upcoming election of a new ANC leadership in December. Zuma is widely perceived to be corrupt, and his cronies, the Gupta brothers, are seen as exercising undue influence over the administration – otherwise known as “state capture.” The discord over Zuma within the ANC leadership, is a direct challenge to party cohesion, its principle of decision making by consensus, and to never “wash dirty laundry in public.” At least two, perhaps three, of the six most influential members of the ANC have aspirations for the party leadership in December. Zuma is seeking the election of his own outside candidate in December, most likely his ex-wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to forestall prosecution for corruption when he is out of office. Taking these circumstances together, the ANC is opting for party “unity” – at least until December. Hence, on April 4 the party’s NWC affirmed that it would not support Zuma’s removal from the party leadership now, and that it would strongly oppose a no-confidence vote in the National Assembly. There was mild criticism of Zuma for his failure to seek consultation over the cabinet reshuffle but also of those within the party who were publicly critical of him – a further display of party disunity. The bottom line for the ANC leadership is that Zuma, and his new cabinet picks, are locked-in until December. However, his opponents at higher levels of party leadership have maintained opposition to him. As yet, there is no sign of meaningful party unity.

Voices calling for President Jacob Zuma to resign or to be removed from office are getting louder in the wake of his cabinet reshuffle and removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Within his African National Congress (ANC) the Integrity Commission – intended as an internal corruption watchdog but often toothless – has announced that at an April 9 meeting with the president, it will ask him to resign. Powerful ANC figures including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Treasurer General Zweli Mkhize have disassociated themselves from the reshuffle, though they have not publicly called for Zuma to go. The Mandela Foundation and the Kathrada Foundation, keepers of the liberation movement flame, have done so, as has former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Even the ANC’s political allies are calling for a change. The South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have both expressed their concern regarding the abrupt cabinet reshuffle. On April 4, COSATU called on Zuma to resign. The SACP has posted at the top of its web site its call for the ANC to remove him from the presidency. Meanwhile, the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are asking for a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Civil-society is mobilized and has led demonstrations in the larger cities. The focus of anger increasingly appears to be Zuma’s failure to consult the ANC leadership and that of its communist and trade union allies before his cabinet reshuffle. The Integrity Commission summarizes this point of view: Zuma “disregarded the principle and tradition of collective leadership, both within the ANC and with our alliance partners” (SACP and COSATU). COSATU never liked Gordhan, and there is anger on the South African left at Standard & Poor’s downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status; COSATU spokesmen have characterized that act as “intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa.” But, seemingly, everybody can agree on Zuma’s lack of consultation. So, will Zuma go? It is by no means certain. The National Assembly is on Easter recess. To consider a motion of no confidence, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete, would have to call it back early. She is generally regarded as a Zuma ally. More generally, Zuma has built up a formidable patronage/clientage network within the ANC that may not be prepared to abandon him just yet. The ANC is set to choose a new national leader in December. ANC politicos, including Ramaphosa, are jockeying for position. For many in the ANC, it may be tempting to leave Zuma in place until a later date, rather than engage in a messy internal fight now.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 25 to March 31 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1491234961674’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); March 25: Herdsmen killed one at a prison farm in Kwande, Benue. March 25: Boko Haram killed three in Konduga, Borno. March 28: An IED planted by Boko Haram killed two CJTF in Dikwa, Borno. March 29: Sectarian violence led to nine people being shot, but no deaths, in Ife North, Osun. March 29: Soldiers killed one Boko Haram militant in Dikwa, Borno. March 30: Boko Haram killed one and kidnapped twenty-two girls in Gwoza, Borno.

As part of a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle, President Jacob Zuma has fired highly respected Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, along with other long-time stalwarts of the ruling African National Congress (ANC). Gordhan and Jonas had long opposed pet projects of the president, and Gordhan has become the symbol of reform and good governance even as the reputation of the governing ANC under Zuma’s leadership has declined into a miasma of charges of corruption and “state capture” by the president’s cronies. Many South Africans (including those within the ANC) will see Gordhan’s departure as a major setback for “reform” and the struggle against corruption. International investors already are not happy. The Rand fell dramatically yet again against the U.S. dollar. There is now a greater likelihood that the international credit rating agencies will downgrade South Africa’s sovereign debt to junk status. The ANC was already divided over Zuma’s successor as party leader; the party leadership vote is expected to take place in December. Zuma and his faction’s preferred candidate is his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma; a “reform” faction candidate is the well-regarded deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and there could be others. Looking toward December is part of the context of the cabinet reshuffle. Zuma apparently did not consult the traditional ANC party leadership over the reshuffle, an indication that it would have opposed him. It is still not clear whether Zuma has the support of his parliamentary partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); Gordhan has had considerable support among both. The South African opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) has now tabled a motion of no confidence in President Jacob Zuma in parliament. If it is successful, Zuma would immediately lose the presidency. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) supports the motion. The other opposition parties will almost certainly support the motion. The parliamentary arithmetic is straightforward. Parliament has four hundred seats. A successful vote of no-confidence requires 201 votes. The ANC has 249 seats (COSATU and SACP MP’s vote as ANC). All of the opposition parties have 151. To oust Zuma a no-confidence motion would require the votes of about fifty ANC MP’s. Despite the outrage in the aftermath of the Zuma cabinet reshuffle even inside the ANC, it is unlikely that a DA motion of no confidence will succeed. In the past, when the DA has proposed such a motion, even when supported by the “radical” EFF, the ANC has closed ranks, protecting the party and ensuring Zuma’s position. Since the days of Nelson Mandela, the ANC has prioritized party unity. The DA continues to be perceived as the party of whites, other minorities, and the privileged in South Africa, while the ANC (despite its multiracial principles and history) is seen as “black,” “pro-poor,” and the leader of the successful fight against apartheid. (Black South African’s constitute about 80 percent of the country’s population, and most of it is poor.) The EFF is something of a wild card. Its “pro-poor” rhetoric goes beyond the ANC, but Malema’s personal hatred for Zuma is visceral and unabated. He is prepared to cooperate on occasion with the DA. Nevertheless, given the realities of racially based identity politics, a no-confidence vote will likely fail. Only if a significant portion of the ANC leadership concludes that keeping Zuma in the presidency is electoral poison might the no-confidence measure succeed. We may know soon; the party’s highest leadership body, the National Executive Committee may meet over the weekend of April 1-2. However, if such a meeting is postponed, or if it takes no significant action, Zuma’s short-term chances of weathering his current political crisis are improved.

Geoff Hill writes in a credible Daily Maverick (South Africa) op-ed that people across Africa want the rule of law, and they are demanding it more and more, often from their local judiciaries. But Africans at the same time remain critical, for good reason, of the behavior of judges. Hill reviews a series of court cases in South Africa that have led to reverses for the government of President Jacob Zuma. Notably, the Pretoria High Court’s determination that Zuma’s effort to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is unconstitutional. Hill cites other examples from around the continent, even including Zimbabwe, notorious for the tyrannical rule of Robert Mugabe. But, Hill also cites polling data that shows Africans are critical of the behavior of many judges. He reports that an Afrobarometer poll showed that 30 percent of respondents paid a bribe to court judges or officials. Sierra Leone was the worst, with 67 percent paying a bribe. Botswana was the best, with a bribe-paying score of zero. In South Africa, only 5 percent reported paying bribes. There were also complaints about the expense of going to court, and court delays. In Kenya, three quarters of respondents characterized court delays as “intolerable.” In Africa, democracy, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and economic development seem to advance hand-in-hand. Botswana probably has the highest per capita income in Africa, and the wealth (largely based on diamonds) is not totally monopolized by a corrupt elite. South Africa, with the largest diversified economy in Africa, has both an independent judiciary and a lively, fully-functioning democracy.

On March 27, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas were on an investor road show to the United Kingdom and the United States when they were abruptly ordered to return to South Africa by President Jacob Zuma. There was media speculation that Zuma was about to reshuffle his cabinet, removing from office the well-regarded finance minister and his deputy. (There is much speculation that former ESKOM CEO Brian Molefe will replace Gordhan.)The Rand (ZAR), South Africa’s currency, swooned, losing 3 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. Foreign investor confidence in South Africa, which had been on the upswing, fell. Zuma’s power within the ruling African National Congress has been eroding ever since he tried and failed to replace the well-regarded Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene with one of his inner circle in December 2015. Since then, he has suffered severe political reverses because of court rulings, and his party is looking toward its leadership election in December 2017. Intra-party factionalism has been increasing even as Zuma’s star has been waning. It is likely that Zuma’s recall of the finance minister is part of intra-party maneuvering rather than presaging Gordhan’s removal. Indeed, parts of the ANC have already expressed their displeasure with the idea. Enoch Godongwana, the ANC’s head of economic policy was quoted by Bloomberg as saying that if Gordhan was fired “it would be tragic and damaging for the local economy, which has struggled with poor growth levels.” The president might, indeed, carry out a cabinet reshuffle, not least to include in his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, the just-returned former Africa Union Commission chair. Zuma has signaled that she is his candidate to succeed him as party leader in December. But, Gordhan has substantial support within the ANC, as well as among the business community, civil society, and the media. A cabinet reshuffle does not mean that he would go.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 11 to March 17 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1490640051462’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); March 18: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and four others in Jere, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. March 18: Seven Boko Haram insurgents and two Cameroonian soldiers died in a clash in Soueram, Cameroon. March 20: Unknown gunmen killed fifty-two in Ukum, Benue. March 20: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Baruten, Kwara. March 22: Five suicide bombers killed themselves and four others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. March 23: Nigerian troops killed a "number" (estimated at ten) of Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. March 23: A policeman killed one and shot three others in Isiala Mbano, Imo.

Helen Zille is the premier of the Western Cape and a former leader of South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). A former journalist and anti-apartheid activist of German descent, she is famous for being one of those who exposed the murder of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko at the hands of the apartheid security services. Zille has actively sought the transformation of the DA into an opposition party that could win significant support from South Africa’s majority black population. In addition, she was one of those who engineered the selection of Mmusi Maimane, a black politician from Johannesburg, as party leader. She is well known for her outspoken criticism of the dominant African National Congress (ANC). Earlier in March, Zille released a series of tweets asserting that South Africa’s colonial heritage was not all negative; after all, it included, “our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water, etc. Would we have had a transition into specialized health care and medication without colonial influence? Just be honest.” The tweets caused an uproar, with the DA launching an investigation into whether Zille had violated party policy with regards to social media. Maimane tweeted, “Let’s make this clear. Colonialism, like apartheid, was a system of oppression and subjugation. It can never be justified.” In response, Zille has apologized: “I apologize unreservedly for a tweet that may have come across as a defense of colonialism. It was not.” What is going on here?  If there is any truth to Zille’s comments, it is that South Africa’s independent judiciary and largely first-world infrastructure are indeed part of the colonial legacy. This controversy has shed light on enduring racial tensions in divide in the post-apartheid era. For Maimane and many other South Africans, the “logic of colonialism” culminates in apartheid, a crime against humanity. Hence, Zille’s seeming “defense” of colonialism is deeply offensive and, undermines the DA’s effort to broaden the party’s appeal to the black majority who make up about 80 percent of the population. South African whites generally have a different reading of the country’s history (even when, like Zille, they have impeccable anti-apartheid credentials). As in other areas, there are parallels here with the United States. The historical perceptions of British colonization and westward expansion amongst members of the Daughters of the American Revolution or the Sons of the American Revolution are in stark contrast to those of Native or African Americans. However, unlike in South Africa, the national narrative of the latter has been the dominant one, though this may be changing slowly.

Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari returned to Nigeria from medical leave in the United Kingdom on March 10. In his absence, Vice President Yemi Osinbajo served as the acting president for the fifty days that Buhari was out of the country. Upon Buhari’s return, it was unclear as to whether he would resume his duties, especially given his statement that he would need to return to the United Kingdom soon for further medical tests and treatment. However, on March 15, Buhari sent a letter to the national assembly stating that he would be resuming his presidential duties. Nigerian commentators have noted that Buhari’s return was greeted with joy in the northern, predominantly Muslim part of the country, much less so in Lagos and other largely Christian, southern urban centers (Osinbajo is a Pentecostal Christian from Lagos). Popular opinion indicates that Osinbajo has received high marks for his stewardship during Buhari’s absence. Throughout this episode, Buhari has followed the constitution scrupulously. He formally notified the national assembly on both the occasion of his medical departure, as well as his return and resumption of presidential office fifty days later. In addition, Buhari turned over his office to the deputy president as mandated by the constitution. In spite of this, ambiguity continues to surround the circumstances of the president’s medical leave, and the condition of his health. On one hand, the president said that he was in good health and that he was on leave for rest and medical tests (the implication being that they were routine). During this period of medical leave, he remained in direct contact with world leaders, scheduling an over the phone meeting with President Donald Trump, and meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury (who has long been involved in conflict prevention in Nigeria). He also was in touch with Nigerian political figures, including acting President Osinbajo, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, and members of the Nigerian senate. On the other hand, members of his family and religious leaders, including the Sultan of Sokoto, called for “serious prayers.” Increasingly insistent rumors suggested that Buhari was suffering from an aggressive form of cancer. Given Nigerian lack of transparency on matters of individual health and the history of African heads of state dying abroad, the persistence of such rumors is no surprise. At present, Nigeria faces greater challenges than during Yar’Adua’s presidency. These include: the Boko Haram insurgency, unrest in the Niger Delta, ethnic conflict in the middle belt, and the fiscal consequences of the fall in oil prices. Nevertheless, there has not been the general sense of crisis that was characteristic during President Umaru Yar’Adua’s fatal illness of 2010. Unlike Buhari, Ya’r’Adua did not formally hand over presidential authority to the deputy president when he left the country for medical treatment in Saudi Arabia. Further, Yar’Adua’s staff blocked virtually all contact with outsiders, while Buhari has maintained contact with a range of interlocutors over the course of his medical leave

There have been a series of credible reports on the Nigerian army’s abuse of civilians in the struggle against the jihadist movement Boko Haram. A story on the front page of the February 28, New York Times cites a particular village where residents said that there were no Boko Haram present. Apparently, the soldiers did not believe the villagers and concluded that it was nest of Boko Haram. In response, the army proceeded to torch the village and slaughter the majority of its male population. Civilian survivors of the attack maintain that there was no Boko Haram presence in their village, but their testimony is difficult to verify. Such absence of such verification is representative of the notoriously poor army intelligence on Boko Haram. Like most such reports, the New York Times story is anecdotal, but credible. Such stories contribute to the reluctance of some in the U.S. Congress to sell sophisticated military hardware to the Abuja government that might result in civilian casualties. Driven out of territory it once occupied, Boko Haram appears to be embedding itself in the general population. This makes it all the more difficult to distinguish between innocent civilians and Boko Haram fighters. Dimensions of Boko Haram that fuel the army’s frustration include its religious overtones which supplement its populist revolt against the Nigerian political economy. As part of his campaign against Boko Haram, President Muhammadu Buhari has re-equipped the army and advocated for an emphasis on training and discipline. However, it will take time before such measures effect army behavior. Meanwhile, such deficiencies in training and attitude leave Nigerian soldiers ill-prepared to confront a shadowy and murderous enemy, whose recruitment activities are emboldened by the army’s human rights abuses within civilian populations.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 4 to March 10, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1489419516071’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); March 5: Herdsmen killed two in Ika South, Delta. March 6: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Obubra, Cross River. March 7: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Ife, Ogun. March 7: Nigerian and Cameroonian troops killed "many" (estimated at twenty) Boko Haram militants on the Nigerian/Cameroonian border (believed to be in the Kala/Balge local government area) in Borno. March 7: Five were killed during a bank robbery in Akoko North-West, Ondo. March 8: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Ganye, Borno. March 9: Robbers kidnapped two in Bwari, Federal Capital Territory. March 10: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Buruku, Borno.

South Korea’s Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment of Park Geun-hye today, paving the way for new elections to be held within 60 days of the ruling. May 9 has been reported as the most likely date for the election of a new president, who will replace President Park and serve a five-year term. Park announced that she would immediately move out of the Blue House to her private residence in Gangnam. And with her removal from office, Park will almost certainly face a criminal trial now that she no longer enjoys immunity from prosecution. South Korea’s Presidential Scandal: What Happened?   The decision paves the way for an early resolution of a leadership vacuum that has engulfed South Korea for months. Acting President Hwang Kyo-Ahn has made decisions in a caretaker role, but with no political mandate to take new initiatives. A compressed presidential campaign and early election would be the quickest way to return to political normalcy within South Korea, but only following intensified polarization of differences between conservative and progressive factions resulting from the impeachment ruling. Polarized factions on both sides Most notably, the Park’s impeachment has taken its toll on South Korean conservatives, who are weakened and divided following a party split over whether to impeach Park. Conservative legislators who supported the National Assembly motion for Park’s impeachment left the ruling Saenuri Party to start the Barun (Righteous Party), while pro-Park stalwarts changed the Saenuri Party name to the Korea Freedom Party and appointed an interim party leadership. There were hopes that former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon would mobilize a unity candidacy, but they quickly evaporated in early February. As public support for conservatives has waned, Democratic Party support rates among the Korean public have surged to the high 40% range, with former Roh Moo-hyun chief of staff and 2012 Democratic Party presidential candidate Moon Jae-in emerging as the current frontrunner with a 30-35% support rate. A four-person Democratic Party primary also features South Chungcheong Province Governor An Hee-jung and Seongnam City Mayor Lee Jae-myung, both of whom have broken into double digits in recent Korean presidential polls. Current levels of support for these three presidential candidates suggest that the winner of the Democratic Party primary will be heavily favored to win the presidency. But as the public focus shifts from Park’s impeachment to the presidential campaign, Moon Jae-in’s candidacy will face greater scrutiny, especially from older Korean conservatives who are distrustful of his progressive politics. Thus, the major question likely to shape the campaign is whether any presidential hopeful can unify and mobilize the Korean public in an effort to stop Moon’s candidacy. People’s Party leader Ahn Chulsoo, who unsuccessfully challenged Moon for the Democratic Party leadership in 2012, remains hopeful that he can emerge as that candidate (despite languishing 8-10% public support ratings) if he can garner conservative support. With no viable conservative option, Ahn might have a chance to emerge as a viable challenger to Moon. Questions for a progressive South Korean presidency A progressive South Korean presidency would raise a number of questions about the future direction of the country’s foreign policy. While all the major presidential candidates will run on platforms that emphasize a strong alliance relationship with the United States, progressives want to reopen dialogue and possible economic relations with North Korea and hope to take the edge of China’s rise by promoting regional cooperation as a counter to rising regional rivalries. On the domestic end of things, they will want to address income inequality and are more likely to confront chaebol privilege. A major challenge for South Korea’s next president will be the task of managing an effective political transition. A tough transition The extraordinary circumstances surrounding this election will mean that the president will be sworn in the day after being elected, but it will likely take weeks to nominate a cabinet and hold hearings before a National Assembly in which no party controls a parliamentary majority. Thus, a new president will initially lead a government in composed of either a cabinet he did not choose or acting ministers that hold interim leadership while a new cabinet is selected. While most administrations struggle to organize themselves following a two-month transition period, South Korea’s next leader must be prepared to go from zero to sixty in only a day. Then, the hard work of rebuilding trust in the country’s leadership begins. A version of this post originally appeared on Forbes.

In February, the Ibrahim foundation announced that, yet again, it would not be awarding it’s famed Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. Mo Ibrahim, a British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, established the award in 2006. It is probably the richest international prize in the world. It awards laureates $5 million over ten years, then $200,000 per year for life. In addition, laureates may apply for an additional $200,000 per year for their own philanthropy. The prize appears to have been designed to recognize and encourage African leadership of the highest quality and also to free them from post-presidential financial burdens. The selection committee, numbering seven, is of outstanding quality: it includes former president of Ireland Mary Robinson, former first lady of both Mozambique and South Africa Graca Machel, and former president of Bostwana (and laureate) Festus Mogae. Though it can be awarded annually, the selection committee has only come across a suitable candidate on four occasions. Recipients of the award include Joaquim Alberto Chissano of Mozambique (2007), Festus Gontebanye Mogae of Botswana (2008), Pedro De Verona Rodrigues Pires of Cabo Verde (2011) and Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014). In 2007 the foundation awarded the honorary prize to South Africa’s Nelson Mandela who had left office seven years before the prize was established (because of this he did not meet all of the eligibility criteria). Hence, selected laureates are extraordinary examples of outstanding African leadership. In honor of his leadership and contributions, Archbishop Tutu was also awarded a one off prize from the Mo Ibrahim foundation, though he is not considered a laureate. For some observers, the inability of the committee to find each year suitable laureates is a condemnation of the overall quality of African presidential leadership. When announcing that the prize would not be awarded this year, Prize Chair Salim Ahmed Salim (former secretary general of the organization of African Unity and former prime minister of Tanzania), tried to soften the implied criticism: “We recognize and applaud the important contributions that many African leaders have made to change their countries for the better. But the prize is intended to highlight and celebrate truly exceptional leadership, which is uncommon by its very definition.” Nevertheless, the committee has awarded the prize only four times over the past eleven years, and it is hard to make the case that it overlooked eligible candidates. Some Nigerian observers had hoped that former President Goodluck Jonathan would be awarded the prize given that he was democratically elected and did not contest his defeat in 2015 by opposition leader Muhammadu Buhari. Had he contested the 2015 election results there might have been civil war. But, in the face of rampant and accelerating corruption on his watch, the raging Boko Haram insurrection, widespread security-service human rights abuses, it is hard to see him as having “demonstrated exceptional leadership.”