Politics and Government

Heads of State and Government

  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Africa’s Presidential Phone Calls
    Africa featured not at all in the U.S. presidential campaign, and the Trump administration has been silent about the continent since the inauguration. Hence, for American friends of Africa it was encouraging that President Trump spoke with the presidents of Africa’s two largest economies on February 13. However, there has been no White House explanation as to why the president chose the chiefs of state of those two particular countries: arguably, the United States has a closer security relationship with Kenya. As of February 14, the White House has released few details about the conversations, while there have been only brief reports from Nigerian and South African sources. This is not unusual: details of communications among heads of state are rarely made public. Both conversations must have been short. According to the White House schedule, the President talked to Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari at 9:45 a.m. and to South Africa’s Jacob Zuma at 10:30 a.m. Most of the remainder of President Trump’s day was involved with the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The February 13 focus on Africa telephone calls appears to follow a White House pattern of geographical consolidation. Over the weekend and earlier in the week President Trump or Vice President Pence talked to the heads of state of Colombia and Brazil. According to South African sources, the presidents talked about strengthening the ‘already strong’ diplomatic relationship, and President Zuma referred to the six-hundred U.S. companies at present operating in South Africa. (Few outside observers would characterize the bilateral relationship as ‘already strong.’) If Nigerian reports are accurate, the conversation between presidents Trump and Buhari was much more significant. According to a Nigerian presidential spokesman, “President Trump assured the Nigerian president of U.S. willingness to cut a new deal in helping Nigeria in terms of military weapons to combat terrorism.” The Obama administration and parts of the U.S. Congress had been reluctant to sell certain types of military equipment that the Nigerians wished to buy. It remains to be seen how the necessary generalities of the two presidents’ conversation translates into a policy change.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 4 – February 10
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 4 to February 10, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1487003086513’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); February 5: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Abakaliki, Ebonyi. February 6: Gunmen kidnapped six traders in Okene, Kogi. February 6: Suspected Boko Haram terrorists killed two in Damaturu, Yobe. February 7: Nigerian troops killed one would-be suicide bomber and arrested another in Maiduguri, Borno. February 7: Pirates kidnapped eight off the coast of Brass, Bayelsa. February 8: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Uhunmwonde, Edo. February 9: Nigerian troops killed thirty Boko Haram insurgents and lost seven of their own in Dikwa, Borno. Boko Haram also kidnapped one of the soldiers. February 9: Boko Haram killed one and abducted one boy in Chibok, Borno. February 10: Gunmen attacked a police station in Okehi, Kogi, killing two policemen and two others. February 10: Boko Haram killed eight Nigerian soldiers in Mafa, Borno.
  • Nigeria
    Goodluck Jonathan on the Nigeria-U.S. Bilateral Relationship
    In his February 1, address to the U.S. Congress’s House Subcommittee on Africa, former President Goodluck Jonathan argued for Nigeria’s continued importance to U.S. strategic interests in Africa. He recalled the 1961 state visit to Washington by then-Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa, and observed that the close bilateral relationship not only continued but could be enhanced. (Tafawa Balewa was Nigeria’s first, post-independence prime minister. Assassinated in a 1966 military coup, he is today a national hero.) Jonathan’s list of factors that make Nigeria important to the United States are its mineral resources, the size of its economy, “biotic resources” (resources from organic material, including oil and gas), its population, and its “human resources.” (The Nigerian Statistics Office now estimates the population at more than two-hundred million; the UN estimates that by mid-century the population will be over 440 million, and that Nigeria will have displaced the United States as the third-largest country in the world by population.) Jonathan’s list is unexceptionable. However, he also said, “Nations such as Nigeria can impact the globe positively when things are handled properly. They may also affect the world negatively if things go wrong. It is not in the best interest of the U.S. and indeed the international community to ignore Nigeria.” Here, Jonathan hits the nail on the head. Since independence, Nigeria has played a constructive role in West African regional affairs. It has been actively involved in peace-keeping initiatives across the continent; most notably in Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and the Ivory Coast. And, that list is incomplete. Nigeria has led the regional movement against military dictatorship It has animated and supported the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the continent’s most effective regional organization. Furthermore, Nigeria guided the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union. However, the mishandling of the Boko Haram and Delta insurgencies has contributed to regional instability and fostered a decline in the country’s regional and continental role. For a generation, Nigeria was a major supplier of oil and gas. In the first decade of the 21st century, Nigeria regularly supplied the U.S. market with a million barrels of oil a day. Now, it exports little or none, largely because of the increase in U.S. domestic production and that of suppliers closer at hand: Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. Nevertheless, as Jonathan pointed out, Nigeria’s global importance goes beyond oil production and supply, and is enduring. Jonathan is right when he says that ignoring Nigeria is not in the best interests of the United States. It is to be hoped that the Trump administration recognizes that reality.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Muhammadu Buhari’s Questionable Health
    On January 19, President Muhammadu Buhari departed Nigeria for London for ten days of vacation and medical tests. Since then, he has extended his stay twice, most recently on February 5. His spokesman did not say when he will return to Nigeria. Before he left, as required by law, President Buhari informed the National Assembly of his departure and that Vice President Yemi Osinbajo would exercise presidential power during his absence. There is anxiety over the state of the president’s health. The Arewa Consultative Forum, probably the most important socio-political organization in northern Nigeria, has asked its members to pray for the president. So, too, has the Christian Association of Nigeria’s chapter in Niger state. The acting president, Vice-President Osinbajo has said that only President Buhari can speak about his health: “I think that the health status of Mr. President is an issue that only Mr. President would discuss at the appropriate time. Again, he is running tests and all of that. Before you determine your health status, you must be able to run the necessary tests, and do what doctors have asked to be done, and await the outcome of that before one can talk about any kind of health status.” Osinbajo said that he talked to President Buhari by phone: “Let me first say the president is hale and hearty. I spoke to him just this afternoon and we had a fairly long conversation. He is in good shape and very chatty.” There is no tradition in Nigeria of transparency about the status of presidential health. Indeed, during President Umaru Yar’Adua’s (2007-2011) long illness, there was continued obfuscation, and toward the end of his life, his wife and others around him prevented virtually all contact with him. President Yar’Adua could not, or would not, sign over presidential authority to his vice president, Goodluck Jonathan. Government all but stopped. Memories of that episode doubtlessly heighten Nigerian anxieties now. In the aftermath of the credible 2015 elections in which for the first time the opposition, led by Muhammadu Buhari, came to power, Nigeria is a democracy. But, its democracy is fragile, and Nigeria faces the challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, a low-level insurgency in the southern oil patch, reduced oil revenue due to the decline in oil prices, and related financial challenges. Under these circumstances, the personality of the president is more important than in other democracies with stronger institutions. Hence, Nigerians are praying for their president.
  • South Africa
    Jacob Zuma and the State of the South African Nation
    On February 9, President Jacob Zuma will deliver South Africa’s annual State of the Nation speech in parliament. The substance of the speech is likely to be a mixture of policy stability with calls for “radical” transformation of ownership of the economy. Few expect that the speech will really break new ground or that it will presage “radical” change. Rather, his remarks will be shaped by concern for his legacy and the leadership succession fight within the governing African National Congress (ANC). The ANC will choose a new party leader at its 54th National Conference in December. This will basically be a vote for the next president of South Africa. Zuma is unlikely to run for re-election, or, if he does so, he will likely fail. The South African president is elected by parliament, not directly by the electorate. As the ANC retains a huge parliamentary majority, the presidency is practically guaranteed to its party leader. Under South Africa’s system of parliamentary proportional representation and historical precedence, once Zuma is no longer party leader, the expectation is that he will resign the presidency of South Africa, though his term runs until 2019. (Technically, the ANC would “recall” him from the national presidency and thereby make his successor as ANC party leader also the chief of state.) Hence, Zuma must be personally concerned about whom the party chooses as his successor. Once, out of the presidency, he is liable to prosecution on hundreds of counts of corruption. Many of his critics see his ex-wife and mother of several of his children, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, as his best insurance policy and hence his preferred candidate. After Zuma speaks in parliament on February 9, he will proceed to Cape Town’s Grand Parade where he will address an ANC rally that may number up to 10,000. That speech will likely be more radical in tone than his parliamentary address and have a clearer partisan political dimension. The opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has threatened to disrupt the state of the nation speech, as it has done in the past when Zuma has spoken in parliament. The EFF argues that Zuma is “unfit” to deliver the address in light of the Constitutional Court’s 2016 decision that he improperly used public funds on his private estate, Nkandla. In response, Zuma has ordered the deployment of 440 members of the South African Defense Force (SADF) to supplement the police. As constitutional expert Pierre de Vos and numerous opposition spokesmen are arguing, such a deployment is almost certainly illegal. It is the police, not the military, who are charged with maintaining domestic order. Further, the activities of the police, let alone the military, within parliamentary precincts are strictly constrained by law. In defiance to the deployment of the SADF, the formal opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the EFF are once again on the same side of an issue, even though they are at the polar ends of the South African political spectrum. The EFF’s radical rhetoric includes advocating the expropriation of white-owned property without compensation, while the DA firmly supports private property and popularly is still associated with the wealthy white minority. Nevertheless, the two parties are already coalition partners in some local government areas. Immediate opposition to the ANC and especially Jacob Zuma outweigh ideological differences. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And both want Zuma to go.
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Violence and Impunity
    Observers have long tied Nigeria’s very high levels of ethnic and religious violence to impunity, that there is a history of the security services and the judiciary failing to find and punish the perpetrators of violence. That reality, among other things, leads to a cycle of revenge. Nigeria’s former President Goodluck Jonathan openly acknowledged this reality when he addressed the U.S. Congress’ House Subcommittee on Africa on February 1. Jonathan said there had been more than ten “major incidences of ethnic and religious conflagration” in the state of Kaduna alone since 1979. But, only once did the authorities move to identify, try, and punish the perpetrators. This, Jonathan said, occurred after the 1992 Zangon Kataf riots, which resulted in an official death toll of three-hundred. The military government of Ibrahim Babangida established a special tribunal, which sentenced to death fourteen perpetrators. Babangida’s government later commuted the sentences to five years in prison. Jonathan observed that in 2011 the radical Islamist movement Boko Haram bombed a church in Madalla, killing forty-four. The 2013 trial and sentencing of that perpetrator was “the first and only” instance of the prosecution of a terrorist crime against a place of worship since the 1999 restoration of civilian government after a generation of military rule. That prosecution took place, Jonathan said, because his own administration had the political will to proceed. In his remarks to the subcommittee, Jonathan recommended that Nigeria establish a “religious equity commission” to oversee enforcement of laws in the aftermath of religious and ethnic conflicts. Jonathan also said, “The point I want to emphasize is that my administration had the political will to halt impunity in Nigeria, and that is “why killings due to religious extremism was localized in the northeast with occasional killings in other zones in the north.” Jonathan is surely right to focus on the relationship between high levels of violence and impunity. One can only wish that there had been more specific instances of his administration having demonstrated the requisite political will he claims to arrest, try, and punish the perpetrators of religious and ethnic violence when he was chief of state.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: January 28 – February 3
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 28 to February 3, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1486397410773’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); January 28: Boko Haram killed twenty in Damboa, Borno. January 28: Sectarian violence led to eight deaths in Lau, Taraba. January 31: A suicide bomber killed herself and one other at a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. January 31: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Lau, Taraba. January 31: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Girei, Adamawa. January 31: Suspected bandits killed five members of a UN team in Kontcha, Cameroon. January 31: Boko Haram killed one policeman in Damboa, Borno. February 1: Nigerian soldiers killed six Boko Haram militants and lost three of their own in Damboa, Borno. February 1: Illegal miners clashed in Jos South, Plateau, resulting in six deaths.
  • South Africa
    South Africa’s ANC Horserace
    Everybody loves a horserace among political personalities. South Africa is no different. The December 2017 African National Congress (ANC) leadership contest is commonly seen as a race between Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, the a reformer with an urban constituency, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, President Zuma’s ex-wife and potential protector of his patronage networks. A possible dark horse is Zweli Mkhize, ANC party treasurer, who has been identified as a likely compromise candidate. There are also suggestions of compromise arrangements, such as Ramaphosa accepting Dlamini-Zuma as deputy president of the party or vice versa. In a thoughtful piece, Stephen Grootes suggests that the ANC leadership race is more than a matter of personalities, and fall out from it poses a threat to the ANC continuing in its present form. He observes that each time there has been a leadership struggle within the party – in 2009 and 2014 – some of the losers left the party. In 2009, the vanquished supporters of Thabo Mbeki organized the Congress of the People. In 2014, opponents of Jacob Zuma led by Julius Malema organized the Economic Freedom Fighters. Grootes raises the specter that the December 2017 party election might result in much larger secession of defeated leaders, because the stakes are much higher. Ramaphosa is seen as the candidate of ‘good government’ and ‘reform.’ Dlamini-Zuma is the candidate of the status quo – a patronage-driven political system. Grootes accurately notes that for many ANC operatives, politics and the resulting patronage is all they have ever known. A Ramaphosa victory could leave them out in the cold and Jacob Zuma subject to prosecution for corruption. That faction will do anything to stop Ramaphosa. On the other hand, a Dlamini-Zuma victory would accelerate voter disaffection from the party – and the party knows that. Grootes suggests that should she win, Dlamini-Zuma is by personality is simply incapable reconciling the “losers.” Ramaphosa, however, might have the political skills to do so. Given the realities, Grootes suggests that the possibility of a compromise is “actually rather small.” Though, if a compromise is reached Mkhize is often seen as a middle ground candidate. Many outsider’s view him as in the same cloth as Rampahosa, and a possible ‘good government’ candidate. However, he also appeals to much of the ANC voter base as he is a Zulu, like the Zuma’s. That ethnicity is about a quarter of South Africa’s population and has been a crucial part of the ANC voter base, though it is unclear whether that is still true. Observers have long seen the possible splintering of the ANC as leading to a restructuring and realignment of South African domestic politics. Many see electoral politics emerging from such an alignment as similar to that of European and other democracies, with one cluster of parties on the right, one in the center, and one on the left. However, other alignments are possible. One might be a cluster of parties that represent urban interests, and another that is based in the rural areas.
  • France
    How Powerful Is France’s President?
    The winner of the presidential election this spring will heavily influence how France approaches foreign and domestic issues, including its future with the European Union.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: January 21 – January 27
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 21 to January 27, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1485808029179’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); January 21:  Sectarian violence continued in Kaduna, leading to the death of five college students and a thirteen year old. January 23: Boko Haram attacked a village in Askira LGA of Borno, killing three and abducting a woman. January 25: The military foiled three suicide attacks, one of a military check point and another two on a mosque in Borno. January 25: The military fought off an effort by Boko Haram to take a military base in Yobe.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Salafism in Northern Nigeria Beyond Boko Haram
    This is a guest post by Alex Thurston. Alex is the author of  Salafism in Nigeria: Islam, Preaching, and Politics, and is an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Alex was an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2013-2014. Internationally, the jihadist sect Boko Haram has become the most famous manifestation of Salafism in Nigeria. Yet Boko Haram is merely a fringe offshoot of a much larger Salafi movement in the northern part of the country. Mainstream Nigerian Salafis often use strident and confrontational rhetoric toward other Muslims and toward Nigerian Christians, but they are not jihadists: mainstream Salafis do not generally engage in violence, they do not advocate the overthrow of the secular state, and they do not reject Western-style educational institutions. In my recent book, I argue that the mainstream Salafi movement has had a much larger impact on shaping how northern Nigerian Muslims think about Islam than Boko Haram has, or will have. Salafis are Sunni Muslims who describe Salafism as an “approach” – in their eyes, the only correct approach – to being Muslim. This approach involves a literalist creed and a conviction that every issue in contemporary human life can be resolved by consulting and applying the Qur’an, the Sunna (model or tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad, and the example of the first three generations of Muslims (the salaf). Salafis are hostile to the Shia, to Sufism (a mystical approach to Islam), and to various theological sects. For Salafis, Salafism represents the pristine Islam of the early community, but historians increasingly argue that what we call Salafism took its present shape in the twentieth century when Saudi Arabian Wahhabism intersected with various Islamic currents from Egypt, India, and elsewhere. Salafism is a global movement, but it is loosely organized. Saudi Arabia is a stronghold of Salafism, but Saudi Arabian leaders and scholars do not control everything that other Salafis do. Most Salafis around the world subscribe to what is sometimes called “purist,” “scholarly,” or – misleadingly – “quietist” Salafism. A minority, albeit a deadly and highly visible minority, of Salafis are “Salafi-jihadis,” who embrace jihadism and try to impose Salafism by force. Boko Haram, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and al-Qaeda are Salafi-jihadis. Salafism in northern Nigeria emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992), who served as the north’s top Islamic judge from 1962-1966 and afterwards became a prominent radio preacher. Influenced by his time in British colonial schools, where he came to view most local northern Nigerian scholars as backward, Gumi became an outspoken opponent of Sufism. In 1978, followers of Gumi formed the Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna, better known as Izala (Arabic for “removing”). Izala became a powerful force for disseminating anti-Sufism. Yet there were tensions within Izala, particularly after Gumi died. In the 1990s, Izala split into two main factions, based respectively in Kaduna and Jos. Meanwhile, young Izala preachers who had studied at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia were returning home. Some graduates of Medina were dissatisfied with Izala: they considered it parochial and insufficiently attuned to global Salafi scholarship. In the 1990s, some Medina graduates began to present themselves as independent – as ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a, “the people of the Sunna and the community,” a synonym for Sunni Muslims. These Medina graduates wanted people to think of them not as mere Izala members but as the representatives of a pure kind of Sunni Islam. The most prominent such Medina graduate was Ja‘far Adam (1961/2-2007), who rose from poor origins to become the most famous Salafi preacher in northern Nigeria after Gumi. After returning from Medina in 1993, Adam promoted a style of Salafism that was both scholarly and political. Adam’s involvement in politics grew after northern Nigerian states began implementing “full sharia” in 1999. Adam served in government in Kano State, although he resigned in disgust in 2005, claiming that sharia was not being properly implemented. Adam was assassinated in 2007, and the crime remains unsolved. When Adam’s name is heard in the United States, it is often mentioned in connection to his mentorship of – and then estrangement from – Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), the founder of Boko Haram. Adam’s conflicts with Yusuf were a watershed moment for Salafism in northern Nigeria. Yusuf took advantage of the networks and preaching style that Adam had developed. Yusuf sought to bend those resources to his project of denouncing Western-style education and secular government. Adam fought back by attacking Yusuf’s scholarly credentials and personal integrity. Adam also made the case for why preaching was better than armed jihad, and why Western-style education could benefit the Muslim community. But the story of mainstream Salafism in northern Nigeria does not end with, or revolve around, the conflicts between Adam and Yusuf, or between mainstream Salafism and Boko Haram. Looking beyond Boko Haram, one finds that mainstream Salafis wield tremendous influence today. Unlike in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, Nigeria’s Salafis have not formed a political party of their own. But many of them are deeply involved in politics. They sometimes publicly support candidates for office (one can even find Salafis on opposite sides of elections in the same state). Some of them hold government positions. The most prominent such figure is Aminu Daurawa, who has been Commander General of the Hisbah, a kind of morality police, in Kano State since 2011. Under Daurawa, one signature Hisbah initiative has been mass weddings for widows and divorcees – a project that blends social conservatism (marrying off the unmarried) with a form of progressivism (caring for the vulnerable). As that example shows, Salafi politics are hard to put on a “left-to-right” spectrum. Other preachers remain outside of government and do not endorse candidates. Nevertheless, some preachers intervene in politics by offering “advice” to politicians. Such advice is not always heeded. For example, in 2015, Ahmad Gumi (Abubakar Gumi’s son) sought unsuccessfully to discourage current President Muhammadu Buhari from seeking the presidency. But Salafis can make headlines with their advice, whether or not is it followed. For its part, Izala remains a strong force. The organization’s Jos and Kaduna branches formally reunited in 2011 under the leadership of Sani Yahya Jingir, who is – with Abdullahi Bala Lau, the National Chairman – a major figure in northern Nigerian Salafism. Izala reaches mass audiences through events such as its annual “Wa’azin Kasa (National Preaching),” where Izala preachers give lectures in cities throughout Nigeria and neighboring countries. Izala now works closely with the graduates of Medina and many other independent Salafi preachers, projecting a considerable degree of unity in the face of challengers, including the challenge of Boko Haram. Salafis are also prominent in media. Some Salafi preachers have radio and television shows. The sermons and lectures of virtually every major Salafi leader circulate widely as cassettes and MP3 files, and followers can now listen to MP3 files on their phones. Salafis are increasingly savvy about using the internet to disseminate their messages – Facebook and YouTube are key media for them. Use of Twitter is growing as well. Salafi blogs have also appeared in recent years, featuring audio and video of Salafi preaching, original blog entries and fatwas, biographies of Salafi shaykhs, and .pdf files of books in Hausa, English, and Arabic. All of this Salafi activism in politics, preaching, and media adds up to a major vehicle for social and religious change. One of the biggest effects of Salafism, in northern Nigeria and around the world, is a change in how Muslims talk about authority and debate religious questions. The question “What is your evidence?” is heard more and more. Often, the only kind of evidence a questioner accepts is texts from the Qur’an and the collected statements and deeds of the Prophet Muhammed. This kind of question does not befuddle Sufis and other non-Salafis – Sufis in particular often have a deep tradition of immersion in scholarship and scripture, and can often answer the Salafis verse for verse, text for text – but it does mean that intra-Muslim debates occur more than before on Salafis’ terms. Other forms of authority, such as charisma, hereditary, scholarly pedigrees, and even university degrees, are increasingly open to challenge. Boko Haram will, one day, fade away. But the spread of Salafism is a longer-term phenomenon. Salafism is reshaping how many Muslims – Salafis and non-Salafis – think about Islam. And that represents an even deeper change for northern Nigeria than does Boko Haram’s violence.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Biafra and the U.S.-Nigeria Relationship
    The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist movement that seeks to recreate Biafra as an independent state. From 1967-70, there was a civil war over Biafra’s attempt to secede that left up to two million Nigerians dead. Ever since, the Nigerian government has tried to crack down on Biafra secessionist movements. Hence, it’s imprisonment of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu. On the U.S. inauguration day, the IPOB staged a rally in Port Harcourt in support of American President Donald Trump. According to a movement spokesman, the IPOB supports President Trump because he favors “self-governance” and “the right of self-determination.” According to some media sources, the Nigerian police killed eleven demonstrators and arrested more than sixty-five. The police say that they only used tear gas. The Nigerian police are notoriously heavy-handed and their public statements do not have the reputation for veracity. In any event, the IPOB are clearly trying to use President Trump to advance their cause (Biafran’s also initially looked to Barack Obama to support their cause after his election). The Nigerian government of President Muhammadu Buhari is likely to be highly sensitive to any indication that the Trump administration is sympathetic to Biafra separatism. Meanwhile, President Buhari is in London on vacation.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Identity Politics in South Africa
    The African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the 1994 transition to “non-racial democracy,” traditionally eschewed identity politics. Though its electoral support was overwhelmingly Black, the party recruited its leadership from all races, which included many Whites and Asians. Nelson Mandela’s emphasis on racial reconciliation was very much in the spirit of the ANC. He particularly emphasized that there was place for Whites in post-apartheid South Africa. Famously, he attended a rugby championship match, the subject of the film Invictus. (Rugby is a White, mostly Afrikaner sport). As problems of black poverty remain seemingly intractable, black identity politics is on the upswing. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters argues for the wholesale expropriation of white land. Within the ANC, especially under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, the party has become more ‘African,’ even more Zulu, in character. (Zulu speakers are the largest linguistic group in South Africa.) The new generation of ANC leaders appears to include a smaller percentage of non-blacks. In some areas, ANC local governments have replaced Afrikaner or Dutch place names with those from African origin. At historically white universities, black students have demonstrated successfully for the removal of statues and other symbols from the past, and for the replacement of Afrikaans by English as the language of instruction. Some also call for the replacement of “colonial” curricula with a “liberation” one. Perhaps inevitably, there is a white, especially Afrikaner, backlash. Eve Fairbanks profiles the explosive growth of AfriForum, a movement dedicated to white, especially Afrikaner, advocacy. AfriForum’s primary concerns are on alleged attacks of white farmers, the preservation of the Afrikaans language (especially in historically white educational institutions), and the preservation of Afrikaner names for locations and institutions. In a country with perhaps the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, with the second highest GINI coefficient in the world, the emergence of identity politics was probably inevitable. The process was probably accelerated by the decline of the ANC and the identification of its leadership with corruption. However, in a highly fractured society such as South Africa, identity politics can hurt the poorest and most vulnerable. Whites control the economy and most of the nation’s wealth, and wealthy Whites can retreat into gated communities and private schools. The police function in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg already has, in effect, been privatized. These security companies provide a level of community safety lacking in black townships. It is to be hoped that identity politics does not lead to the wholesale withdrawal of Whites from hitherto public institutions, such as traditionally Afrikaans speaking high schools and universities.
  • Terrorism and Counterterrorism
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: January 14 – January 20
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 14 to January 20, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1485173620512’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); January 15: Gunmen killed ten civilian joint task force (CJTF) members in Katsina-Ala, Benue. January 15: Fulani herdsmen killed nine in Bosso, Niger. January 15: Sectarian violence led to ten deaths in Obubra, Cross River. January 16: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others at a mosque at the University of Maiduguri in Maiduguri, Borno. January 17: The Nigerian Air Force bombed a refugee camp in Kala/Balge, Borno, killing an estimated two hundred people. January 17: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. January 17: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Itu, Akwa Ibom. January 18: Oil militants blew up a pipeline in Ughelli South, Delta. January 19: Nigerian troops killed fifteen Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. January 20: Security forces allegedly killed eleven Biafra supporters, who were staging a pro-Trump rally in Port Harcourt, Rivers.
  • Heads of State and Government
    Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data
    As Donald Trump assumes office today, he inherits a targeted killing program that has been the cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism strategy over the past eight years. On January 23, 2009, just three days into his presidency, President Obama authorized his first kinetic military action: two drone strikes, three hours apart, in Waziristan, Pakistan, that killed as many as twenty civilians. Two terms and 540 strikes later, Obama leaves the White House after having vastly expanding and normalizing the use of armed drones for counterterrorism and close air support operations in non-battlefield settings—namely Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. Throughout his presidency, I have written often about Obama’s legacy as a drone president, including reports on how the United States could reform drone strike policies, what were the benefits of transferring CIA drone strikes to the Pentagon, and (with Sarah Kreps) how to limit armed drone proliferation. President Obama deserves credit for even acknowledging the existence of the targeted killing program (something his predecessor did not do), and for increasing transparency into the internal processes that purportedly guided the authorization of drone strikes. However, many needed reforms were left undone—in large part because there was zero pressure from congressional members, who, with few exceptions, were the biggest cheerleaders of drone strikes. On the first day of the Trump administration, it is too early to tell what changes he could implement. However, most of his predecessor’s reforms have either been voluntary, like the release of two reports totaling the number of strikes and both combatants and civilians killed, or executive guidelines that could be ignored with relative ease. Should he opt for an even more expansive and intensive approach, little would stand in his way, except for Democrats in Congress, who might have newfound concerns about the president’s war-making powers. Or perhaps citizens and investigative journalists, who may resist efforts to undermine transparency, accountability, and oversight mechanisms. Less than two weeks ago, the United States conducted a drone strike over central Yemen, killing one al-Qaeda operative. The strike was the last under Obama (that we know of). The 542 drone strikes that Obama authorized killed an estimated 3,797 people, including 324 civilians. As he reportedly told senior aides in 2011: “Turns out I’m really good at killing people. Didn’t know that was gonna be a strong suit of mine.”