Heads of State and Government

There is heavy media attention to the Nigerian air force’s tragic, accidental bombing of a camp for internally displaced persons near Rann, in northeast Nigeria. Though details are hardly definitive, it appears that the attack resulted from the mistaken identification of the camp as a center of Boko Haram. (Recently, Boko Haram has been active in the area.) As is usually the case when such accidents happen in northeast Nigeria, the numbers killed are not definitively known, but appear to be in the fifty to one hundred range. The media reports that the number of dead is likely to increase because of the difficulty of evacuating the wounded from an isolated area and because of the inadequacy of medical facilities in the camp. The dead include humanitarian workers for the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders. Both organizations have issued scathing public statements. No cover-up appears to be underway. The security services have promised an investigation, and President Muhammadu Buhari has issued an apology with condolences to the victims and their families. There are anecdotes of other such episodes whereby innocent civilians have been killed by the Nigerian security services, either by mistake or because they are caught in the middle of a fire fight with Boko Haram. In the past, unlike in this case, there has been little official transparency. There have long been complaints about the inadequacy of security service tactical intelligence about Boko Haram activity. Concern about accidents such as Rann has played a role in the reluctance by the United States to authorize Nigerian purchase of certain types of aircraft, especially those which require extensive pilot training which the Nigerian air force has not received. U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has been that accidents like Rann have the potential for alienating the local population. Indeed, Nigerian security service abuses in the past have been identified as a significant driver of Boko Haram recruitment.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 7 to January 13, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1484685860784’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); January 7: Boko Haram attacked a military base and killed six soldiers, but Nigerian troops repelled the attack and killed fifteen militants in Gujba, Yobe. January 8: Herdsmen killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of civilians and five police offers, and abducted one in Demsa, Adamawa. January 8: Five suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. January 10: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Bosso, Niger. January 12: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bosso, Niger. January 12: An improvised explosive device planted by Boko Haram killed two soldiers in Damboa, Borno. January 13: Three Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and eight others in Madagali, Adamawa. January 13: Boko Haram attacked soldiers in Kukawa, Borno, killing three soldiers and losing 10 of their own. January 13: Kidnappers kidnapped two Turkish teachers and three Turkish pupils from a school in Ifo, Ogun.

On January 7, The Economist published a short analysis of the poor state of education for most – not all – South Africans. On various league tables, South Africans are near the bottom in educational achievement. However, there is a huge gap between the educational opportunities for white South Africans and everybody else. The Economist notes that of two-hundred black students starting school only one will do well enough to study engineering. The equivalent figure among white students is ten. With the end of apartheid, a school system based on race has been replaced by one based on geography, and, therefore, as in the United States, by social class. Schools in poor areas receive more funding, but schools in richer areas may charge fees. Though virtually all are integrated racially, most white students attend schools of good quality, while few black children do, and they represent over 80 percent of the population, while whites are less than 9 percent. The problem is not one of funding. South Africa spends 6.4 percent of GDP on education; in the European Union, it is 4.8 percent. As I discussed in my recent book, Morning in South Africa, education is one of the largest parts of the national budget. At over 15 percent of the national budget, it is significantly larger than the allocations for defence, public order, and safety. But black educational achievement is much lower than in other African countries. For example, The Economist cites that 27 percent of South Africans who have attended school for six years cannot read, compared with 4 percent in Tanzania and 19 percent in Zimbabwe. For The Economist, the chief culprit is the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), closely tied to the governing African National Congress and riddled with ill-discipline and corruption. The Economist cites other factors as well, ranging from the challenges of overcoming the heritage of apartheid to poor teacher training. But, the focus is on SADTU and the solutions are largely concerned with getting around the union by means of private and “collaboration” schools, the latter funded by the government but run by independent operators. Indeed, The Economist’s Criticism of SADTU recalls that of teachers’ unions in the United States. The Economist does not address the language issue. South Africa has eleven official languages, and English is spoken as a first language by only an estimated 9 percent of the population—mostly white South Africans. By contrast, Zulu is the first language of perhaps a quarter of the population. Yet, English is the international language of business and commerce, not Zulu. This creates its own issue. Because South Africa’s primary education is conducted in eleven different languages, many Zimbweans, educated in English, are more competitive for jobs in South Africa. Language is central to ethnic identity, and in democratic, non-racial South Africa, English is not privileged over Zulu, or Afrikaans for that matter. Language and education policy, like so much else in South Africa is seen through a racial and ethnic prism. Politics is as much at play as educational policy. Yet, only when primary education is conducted in English, the language of commerce, will the majority of South Africans be prepared to work in the modern economy.

The African National Congress (ANC) celebrated the 105th anniversary of its founding on January 8 in Johannesburg. (The ANC is one of the older of the democratic world’s governing parties.) Last year was a bad year for the party. National president and ANC leader Jacob Zuma was tarred by credible accusations of personal corruption and that of close associates. He met judicial and political reversals. The economy grew very slowly. In a party that values unity, factionalism increased, centered mostly on Zuma himself. In the August local government elections, the ANC faced its most severe reversal since it came to power in 1994. Accordingly, at the anniversary celebrations the emphasis was on party unity and the acknowledgement (even by Zuma himself) that the party had made mistakes that threatened to isolate it from its core constituencies. The coming year will also be challenging for the party. By December 2017, the party must choose a new president and National Executive Committee. Though not formally prohibited, there is little sign of party support for a third Zuma term as  leader and there is widespread expectation that he will be out by the end of the year. However, his term as president of South Africa lasts until 2019. There is no precedent for a president to remain in office once he is no longer party leader (Zuma’s predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, stepped down as president of South Africa after his removal from party leadership). However, Zuma may try to stick it out. But, absent his party leadership position, he would be politically weak. If he resigns, the interregnum would be filled by the current deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa. Traditionally, the ANC distrusts internal, factional political competition. But, it will face factionalism in 2017. Already, the Congress of South African Trade Unions  has endorsed Ramaphosa for party leader. During the anniversary celebrations, the ANC Women’s League endorsed Zuma’s ex-wife and current head of the African Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The ANC secretary general, Gwede Mantashe, refers to such endorsements as manifestations of ill-discipline. Factional competition for power is perfectly normal in most democratic parties. The ANC’s bias against it – as manifested by Mantashe – appears to be a vestigial remnant from its earlier iteration as a clandestine movement rather the democratic party it has become.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 31, 2016 to January 6, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1483973892639’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); December 31: One suicide bomber killed herself with no other casualties in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected. December 31: Gunmen abducted a Kogi traditional ruler in Lokoja, Kogi. January 3: Nigerian soldiers repelled a Boko Haram attack in Madagali, Adamawa. There were no casualties. January 3: Cultists killed two before losing five of their own to Nigerian soldiers in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. January 3: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Okpokwu, Benue. January 4: Vigilantes killed three would-be suicide bombers in Madagali, Adamawa. Boko Haram is suspected.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) announced New Year’s Day that it had passed a vote of no confidence in President Buhari. Prior to the 2015 election, MEND had endorsed President Muhammadu Buhari, rather than Goodluck Jonathan. MEND is a shadowy organization that spearheaded the attacks on Nigeria’s oil production from 2005 to 2009. Its principal demand has always been that a greater proportion of Nigeria’s oil wealth should go to the area that produces it, the Niger Delta. MEND violence declined after President Umaru Yar’Adua put into effect an amnesty, the essence of which was payoffs to the insurgent leaders, training programs for insurgent fighters, and militant arms surrender. In effect, the amnesty did amount to a resource transfer to the delta. President Buhari’s administration has said that the program will end in 2017. That MEND should turn against Buhari is no surprise. His goals are antithetical to those of the militant group. Buhari is devoted to the principle of Nigerian unity; MEND wants greater regional autonomy, if not independence. (MEND statements are inconsistent with respect to autonomy or independence.) Buhari seeks the reform of the petrochemical industry; MEND seeks to control it. The amnesty has been a gravy train for MEND; Buhari wants to end it. If a break was more or less inevitable, the timing of the MEND announcement appears to reflect the group’s irritation with the pattern of Buhari’s consultation with delta militants. MEND has demanded that the government release the Okah brothers, MEND leaders accused of terrorism. MEND is also dissatisfied with the Buhari administration’s participation in a November 1 consultation organized by the Pan Niger Delta Forum. All in all, in its January 1 statement, the media reports, MEND accused Buhari of “grand deception.” In recent times, the war against oil production in the delta has been led by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and has resulted in cuts in production and in government revenue dependent on oil. It remains to be seen if MEND will also revert to violence. It is also unclear what, if any, relationship there is between MEND and NDA. In general, however, delta militants have been highly fragmented and characterized by shifting tactical alliances. In any event, further delta unrest is bad news for the Buhari government which already faces myriad other challenges.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 24, 2016 to December 30, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1483459627032’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); December 24: Suspected cultists killed eight in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. December 25: A suicide bomber killed himself and two others in Mora, Cameroon. Boko Haram is suspected. December 25: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed eleven in Jema’a, Kaduna. December 25: Unknown gunmen killed five in Aniocha North, Delta. December 26: One suicide bomber detonated and killed herself but no others; and a second suicide bomber was subsequently lynched by a mob in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 28: Gunmen attacked an All Progressives Congress chieftain, killing one in Ibi, Taraba. December 30: Nigerian troops killed fifteen Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno.

On Christmas Eve, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari announced that the Nigerian army had driven the remnants of Boko Haram out of its last stronghold, the Sambisa Forest. A Nigerian army spokesman said that it had recovered Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau’s personal copy of the Koran and his flag from “Camp Zero,” apparently the Boko Haram headquarters. An army spokesman said that the chief of Army Staff would present the holy book to President Buhari. The army also said that it had arrested 1,240 suspected Boko Haram terrorists. However, on Christmas Day, Shekau made a new video–his first since September–in which he claimed that Boko Haram is “safe.” The video, twenty-five minutes long and in Hausa and Arabic, is typically defiant: “We are safe. We have not been flushed out of anywhere. And tactics and strategies cannot reveal our location except if Allah wills by his decree.” He also said, “The war is not over yet. There is still more… Our aim is to establish an Islamic caliphate and we have our own caliphate, we are not part of Nigeria.” He accused President Buhari of lying. What is the truth? The captured Koran and flag, if they truly belonged to Shekau, would indicate that the army had indeed occupied “Camp Zero.” On the other hand, the Nigeria Security Tracker shows continuing Boko Haram activity throughout December. The Shekau video appears to be authentic. Shekau’s rival within Boko Haram, Abu Musab al-Barnawi is silent, and Shekau made no reference to him. Neither the video nor the army have made reference to the whereabouts of the remaining Chibok school girls. Of the 1,240 “terrorists” the army claims to have arrested, a spokesman said 413 were adults (apparently male), 323 “female adults,” 251 were “male children,” and 253 were “female children.” The army spokesman said, “We are interrogating them to know whether they are Boko haram members, because there is no way somebody that is not their member would live inside Sambisa forest.” Perhaps. But the description of those arrested raises the possibility that at least some were civilians caught up in the war. A hypothesis is that both President Buhari and Abubakar Shekau are telling the truth: Boko Haram has indeed been pushed out of the Sambisa forest, but it has re-established its headquarters elsewhere in the Lake Chad Basin. Shekau is likely correct when he says the war is not yet over.

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Presidential spokesman Garba Shehu has confirmed that negotiations are ongoing to secure the release of the remaining Chibok schoolgirls held captive by Boko Haram. On the government side, the Department of State Service (DSS) leads the negotiations. Garba Shehu did not identify the Boko Haram interlocutors. He expressed optimism about the negotiations, but cautioned that they were still underway: “To my friends spreading the news of a further release of the Chibok girls, we not there yet.” Recently, army spokesman have said that the Nigerian military has rescued nearly 1900 other Boko Haram kidnap victims over the past week, but Reuters has been unable to verify the claim. The DSS, often called the State Security Service (SSS), is the leading domestic intelligence agency in Nigeria. It is part of the executive. At present Lawal Musa Darwa, a security professional with extensive DSS experience, heads it. At one time, he was responsible for the security of the Villa, the Abuja residence of the chief of state. A northern Muslim, President Buhari made him director of DSS in 2015. It is not clear the extent to which he is personally involved in the negotiations. The commendable caution of Garba Shehu makes his optimism about the ultimate success of the negotiations credible. The time may be approaching when most of the Chibok girls will be free. There have been a number of high-profile attempts to help re-integrate the girls into Nigerian society, but there are still many challenges.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 17, 2016 to December 23, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1482848723421’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); December 18: Suspected Boko Haram militants killed one fisherman and attempted to kidnap sixteen others in Ngadiya, Borno (LGA unknown), but a counter-attack by Nigerian forces allowed them to only ultimately kidnap only one. December 18: A cult clash led to five deaths in Osogbo, Osun. December 18: Two suicide bombers killed themselves but no civilians in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 18: Sectarian violence led to twenty deaths in Gassol, Taraba. December 19: Continued sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Gassol, Taraba. December 22: Nigerian troops killed two would-be suicide bombers in Gwoza, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 22: Nigerian troops killed two would-be suicide bombers in Mafa, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 22: Armed robbers abducted a council chairman and killed a commissioner in Langtang South, Plateau. December 23: President Muhammadu Buhari claims to have taken the last Boko Haram stronghold in Sambisa, Borno. There were no casualty figures.

South Africa is a notoriously divided nation. There are eleven legal languages and four races with degrees of legal recognition (Indian/Asian, Black, Coloured, and White). Though Black Africans are about 80 percent of the population, they are divided into numerous ethnic groups, of which the Zulus are the largest, about a quarter of the population. South Africans sometimes say that there is no “majority” or “minority” in the country, with an overall, encompassing national identity as Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Rainbow Nation. Coloured’s are mostly Afrikaans speaking and Dutch Reformed in religion, but the ‘Cape Coloured’s” are a Muslim minority. Among Whites, the division is between Afrikaans speakers and English speakers, with the former the majority. White Afrikaners sometimes identify themselves as the “white tribe." The South African constitution recognizes the freedom of legal and cultural self-determination, including the possibility of establishing an ‘ethnic homeland.” In terms of wealth, Whites have done better in post-apartheid South African than any other group, especially those that are English-speaking. White numbers have stabilized at just over 4.5 million (out of a total population of over fifty-four million), about the same as at the end of apartheid. White unemployment is dramatically lower than that of other racial groups; they are the racial group least likely to be the victims of crime. Social and economic statistics of Whites, both Afrikaner and “English,” are the best of any group. But the apartheid-era safety next for whites is gone. Because of this, there are now poor Afrikaner inhabitants of shanty towns. As in Europe and perhaps in the United States, ethnic identification is strengthening among South Africans. For example, President Jacob Zuma strongly emphasizes his Zulu identity and seeks political support from African traditional rulers, while his predecessors Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela chose not to emphasize their Xhosa heritage. Among some Afrikaans-speaking Whites there is concern that their unique culture is fading under the pressure of the overwhelming Black majority and globalization. CNN carries a fascinating story about Orania, an Afrikaner response. CNN’s report is based on the work of Swedish journalist, Kajsa Norman, who is writing a book on the Afrikaners. Orania is an Afrikaner homeland restricted to Whites who are Afrikaans speaking and Afrikaner in culture. In effect, it is whites-only. Coloureds, who are usually Afrikaans speakers and Afrikaner in culture, are excluded. Orania is located on the edge of a desert in territory nobody else wanted. Its residents are embarked on building a new state-within-a-state based on self-imposed racial and cultural segregation. (As Norman notes, the Afrikaners in Orania have essentially created their own Bantustan.) CNN reports that its population is about 1,300 and is growing at the rate of 10 percent per year. The economy is based on agriculture, with unemployment at only 2 percent. As CNN reports, Orania is becoming something of a haven for Afrikaner down-and-outs, including recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, now that the apartheid state no longer exists. Some settle permanently, others come to dry out and then move on. Since the seventeenth century, the Dutch settlers in South Africa who evolved into Afrikaners have often seen themselves as God’s chosen people, set aside from the rest of the population. This was a premise of the racial segregation that evolved into apartheid. Orania is, apparently, a return to that ideal. Orania is predicated on a vision of society that is far from the racially and ethnically integrated ideal of Nelson Mandela and the “Rainbow People of God.” It is easy to imagine that many of its residents are white supremacists. But, its emphasis on ethnic identify also recalls that of Jacob Zuma’s Zulu identity. Whites-only Orania is entirely legal under South African law, as was affirmed by a 2000 high court decision. Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma have both visited; CNN reports that some Orania residents feel that Zuma, with his strong Zulu identity, understands what motivates their separation.

Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation, the public does not vote directly for the president. Rather it is parliament that votes for the president. Because of the governing African National Congress’s (ANC) huge parliamentary majority, since the end of apartheid, parliament has always selected its party leader as head of state. The ANC will choose its next party leader no later than December 2017. (Incumbent party leader Jacob Zuma has said that he will not run for a third term, as is party tradition.) South Africa’s next national elections will take place in 2019. In theory, Zuma could remain as president of South Africa after he leaves office as party leader. However, precedent is that the president resigns his office when he is no longer party leader. Within the ANC there is a tradition against early politicking for high office. Candidates are often coy about their political ambitions. Hence, up to now, while there has been much speculation, no ANC figure has publicly announced his candidacy for the presidency. However, on December 16, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa threw his hat in the ring: “It would be very humbling to get into a key position like that, to lead. I am available to stand.” Ramaphosa has significant support from a number of trade unions and the South African Communist Party. He is likely to win the support of the business community (he is a millionaire many times). He was a lead ANC negotiator of South Africa’s 1994 transition to non-racial democracy and the creation of the country’s constitution; hence, he is likely to be supported by those who fear that the Zuma government has sought to undermine the constitution. It is by no means certain that a deputy president becomes the president through a natural order of succession. His negatives include a sophisticated lifestyle far removed from the party’s township and rural base, and his association with the company involved in the 2012 massacre of workers at the Marikana platinum mine. (A commission of inquiry exonerated him.) Conventional wisdom is that he is far more popular in business circles in London and New York than he is among ANC voters. At present, his chief competitor is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, at present the chairperson of the African Union Commission. She is Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife, and they had four children together. Her support includes Jacob Zuma and his political allies, including the ANC Women’s League, the ANC Youth League, the MK Veterans Association (participants in the armed struggle against apartheid), and the premiers of three provinces. She is a Zulu, South Africa’s largest ethnic group, and a major source of electoral support for the ANC. (Ramaphosa comes from the much smaller Venda ethnic group.) She has held numerous ministerial portfolios, including health and foreign affairs. However, her tenure at the African Union has been lackluster. Her supporters play the feminist card. There will be other candidates. Frequently mentioned as a possible compromise between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma is the ANC’s party treasurer, Zweli Mkhize. A Zulu and a former premier of KwaZulu-Natal, he is seen as a reconciler who would promote party unity. Another possible candidate is the speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete. She is also a former deputy president and has been active in the ANC Women’s League. Whoever emerges as party leader will be the result of an internal ANC party political process that does not rule out a dark horse. Stay tuned.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 10, 2016 to December 16, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1482162831037’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); December 10: During the Rivers rerun election, electoral violence lead to two deaths in Gokana, Rivers. December 10: During the Rivers rerun election, an All Progressives Congress youth was killed in Emohua, Rivers. December 10: During the Rivers rerun election, electoral violence lead to two deaths in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. December 10: A shootout between police and kidnappers led to the deaths of two kidnappers and one vigilante in Ganjuwa, Bauchi. December 11: Two suicide bombers killed themselves and seven others in Maiduguri, Borno. Boko Haram is suspected. December 12: Boko Haram killed a lieutenant colonel and one other in Guzamala, Borno. December 14: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed fifteen in Chikun, Kaduna.

Security service abuses in Nigeria, primarily by the army and the police, date from colonial times. Observers commonly accept that such abuses are an important driver of recruitment by Boko Haram and other insurgencies. There has been a drumbeat of criticism of the Jonathan and Buhari administrations’ seeming lack of action to curb the abuses. Of late, a focus of that criticism has been credible allegations of security service abuse of civilians, especially rape of women, in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the northeast. Perhaps in response to the criticism, the director of defense information, Brigadier General Rabe Abubakar gave an interview to THISDAY. He insisted that the military is responding to episodes of rape: “on soldiers arrested for raping IDPs, we have said that if there is any case of sexual harassment and abuse, it will definitely attract the attention of the Nigerian Defense Headquarters (DHQ). Our position is that such cases must be investigated and those officers involved must be thoroughly dealt with.” He went on to say, “the DHQ has an internal administrative mechanism to deal with such cases. After investigations are concluded and the soldiers are found culpable, appropriate punishments including dismissal will be meted out.” Abubakar cited the specific case of a non-commissioned officer assaulting a ten year old girl, “he was given three years imprisonment in addition to his dismissal from the force. These are therefore offences that we do not tolerate.” Brigadier General Abubakar’s comments indicate that it is the security services that are addressing abuses by their own personnel, not a civilian agency or civilian courts. This is the practice of many other militaries, including the U.S. military. The challenge is that the Nigerian security services have little credibility among the general population with respect to addressing abuses.