Corruption

Julius Malema has been convicted of anti-white hate speech, and advocates the nationalization of white property without compensation. He has attacked the governing African National Congress (ANC) establishment, ranging from former president Thabo Mbeki to current president Jacob Zuma to possible future president Cyril Ramaphosa. He is the founder of a radical, populist political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which won 6 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections, making it the third largest party in parliament. The EFF has disrupted parliamentary sittings, notably in its protests against President Zuma’s alleged corruption with respect to his private estate, Nkandla. A populist, Malema represents himself as the voice of the marginalized in South Africa. His lifestyle is extravagant, and how he pays for his fast cars and large farm is unclear. (He was born into poverty in Limpopo, one of the country’s poorest provinces.) It is fair to say that Malema is the South African government and establishment’s most disliked, if not hated, political figure. Since 2012, Malema and four associates have faced charges of fraud, corruption, racketeering and money laundering in conjunction with road construction projects. He has consistently stated that the charges were politically motivated by Zuma because of Malema’s strident accusations that the president is corrupt. On August 4, the judge threw out the case against Malema. The judge said that three years was too long for an accused to await trial, and laid the blame for the delay squarely on the prosecutors. While Malema was “free to go,” the judge made no decision on the merit of the case, and has stated that the move should not be misinterpreted as an acquittal. Malema could be tried on the same charges in the future. The South African media is focused on the political fall-out from the dismissal, seeing it generally as a defeat for President Zuma and the ANC. However, perhaps its primary significance for outside observers of South Africa is that it is yet another example of the independence of the South African judiciary. The government’s recent failure to uphold a high court order to arrest Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir raised concern that the Zuma administration may be undermining the judiciary. President Zuma and much of the South African establishment likely would have been delighted to see Malema behind bars. That the High Court dismissed the case (on the basis that keeping an accused waiting three years for a trial was unjust) is evidence that South Africa remains committed to judicial independence. South Africa’s independent judiciary, along with its constitution and its guarantees of human rights among the most extensive in the world, is a major pillar of South African democracy.

As President Dilma Rousseff’s polling numbers fall far into the single digits, the calls for her impeachment grow louder. In Congress, PMDB lower house head Eduardo Cunha has broken with Rousseff, intimating his support for her removal. On the streets protestors too call for a change, marching by the hundreds of thousands to express their anger and frustration. The legal case against her is currently weak. As the Petrobras corruption investigations expand to include dozens of high profile names, among them former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Eduardo Cunha himself, and construction magnate Marcelo Odebrecht, Rousseff has not—at least yet—been publicly named. Even if she is, impeachment is only possible for crimes committed as president (the Lava Jato scandals primarily occurred while she was chairwoman of Petrobras, from 2003 to 2010). Some political opponents believe they could try her instead for breaking campaign finance rules or for fudging government accounts. To move forward, two-thirds of the lower house of congress would need to vote to impeach; in the case of criminal charges the Supreme Court would then weigh in. If tried on corruption charges, the Senate would preside. Eight of the eleven sitting Supreme Court judges are Rousseff or Lula appointees. In the Senate her coalition, though weakened, still maintains a majority. Politically, impeachment doesn’t necessarily help her most avid opponents in the PSDB. If removed before January 2017, Vice President Michel Temer of the PMDB would take over, strengthening the hand of a potential rival for the 2018 election. And even with the tensions within Rousseff’s own party, the PT, none benefit from her ouster. Finally, Rousseff’s impeachment could set a worrisome historical precedent. This isn’t Brazilian democracy’s first impeachment go round. In 1992, the opposition PT and PMDB pushed congress to impeach then President Fernando Collor de Mello on corruption grounds. Though he resigned in an effort to stop the proceedings, he was found guilty and barred from public office for eight years (today he is a senator and actively being investigated for accepting bribes in exchange for lucrative government contracts). At the time some hailed it as a democratic achievement, taking on the most powerful and corrupt; others saw it as the political backlash of those opposed to Collor de Mello’s austerity and other measures to root out vested interests (none question the actual corruption). Another impeachment, particularly if done for political or popularity (rather than rule of law) reasons, could weaken Brazil’s thirty-year-old democracy. It is this fear that has brought opposition PSDB elder Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency’s defense. In the words of the former president, “You’d need to have a crime, and a political consensus in Congress as well as in the street. I don’t think that’s the situation here.”

Addis Ababa is the location of the headquarters of the African Union, which has been deeply involved in the search for an end to the civil war in South Sudan. So, too, has the Ethiopian government of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. The Obama administration was a prime sponsor of the process by which South Sudan became independent four years ago, and has contributed over one billion U.S. dollars to the country since the conflict erupted in 2013. As such, President Obama’s visit to Addis provided a good opportunity for talks at the highest level on the conflict in South Sudan. The Obama administration is blunt: the humanitarian disaster now underway is the result of unscrupulous political leaders who have exploited an ethnic conflict that they cannot control. Currently, there is little optimism that South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir and his former vice president and current rebel opposition leader, Riek Machar, will accept a peace keeping and power sharing deal sponsored by neighboring countries by an August 17 deadline. The hope is that this deal would put an end to the brutal ethnic warfare between Kiir’s Dinka people and Machar’s Nuer people, and the consequent humanitarian disaster. On July 27, President Obama and the presidents of Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia, the Chairperson of the Africa Union Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, and the foreign minister of Sudan met to consider next steps. According to the media, the conversation focused on what next steps might be if the two South Sudanese warlords do not accept the peace keeping and power sharing deal by the deadline. According to the media, the leaders discussed possible additional sanctions. In the past, U.S. officials have raised the possibility of economic sanctions and an arms embargo to pressure Kiir and Machar to come to an agreement. One non-U.S. participant, not identified, also raised the possibility of the deployment of regional forces if there is no agreement by August 17 or, if there is, to enforce the terms of the agreement. However, an anonymous U.S. official is reported by the media as saying that the group did not reach a consensus on next steps. Neither an arms embargo nor an intervention force are easy options. Despite conflicting views within the administration, the U.S. joined Russia and China to veto a UN Security Council resolution that would have imposed an arms embargo. An African intervention force, however constituted, would likely require substantial international support in terms of money and materiel. On the other hand, an African intervention force could be the first step toward the creation of an institution that could exercise a trusteeship of a state that has failed. South Sudan’s current chaos is a reversal for the Obama administration’s approach to Africa. It has devoted much diplomatic and political capital to South Sudan up to now, to little avail. But, so too did earlier, successive administrations over more than a decade. Indeed, the plight of South Sudan under Khartoum’s occupation before 2005 became a rare, African issue of widespread concern to American public opinion. The “lost boys of Sudan” was its face as a public issue.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs candidate at the University of Toronto. Over the weekend, 170 opposition fighters were captured and thirty-one killed by Burundian armed forces in the Chibitoke region (near the borders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). This is the latest in a series of violent incidents following President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid to run for a third term in office in violation of Burundi’s constitution. Last week Nkurunziza’s party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), announced victory in the parliamentary elections, despite an opposition boycott and the UN proclamation that the vote was not free, fair, or credible. Once a post-conflict success story, Burundi now threatens to relapse into violence, raising questions about what went wrong in the peacebuilding process. Burundi emerged from a twelve-year civil war in 2006 and was placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a UN advisory body that supports strategies for countries emerging from conflict. Burundi has a similar Hutu-Tutsi ethnic makeup as its neighbor, Rwanda, (85 percent and 14 percent) and experienced episodic ethnic cleansing during the civil war. The Arusha Accords ending the conflict detailed a power sharing constitutional arrangement designed to avoid the kind of “zero-sum” politics that lead to violence in highly divided societies. One crucial aspect of Burundi’s peace efforts seems to have worked: political and security entities are no longer split along clear ethnic lines. Observers argue the most salient divide is now between those who support the incumbent party, and everyone else. Whether this modest success is enough to prevent the re-emergence of conflict remains to be seen—the situation is extremely tense as the election draws closer. Peacebuilding gains began to unravel after the 2010 election boycott, and the PBC subsequently failed to reopen dialogue among opposing groups. However, as the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC recently emphasized, the failure to meaningfully engage youth (aged 15-25), particularly ex-combatants, in peacebuilding efforts also had a detrimental impact on peace. Others have emphasized that the failure to create opportunities for youth outside of conflict may have been a driving factor in the country’s recent violence. The Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, has attacked protestors and engaged in campaigns of violence and intimidation in the north. Leaked UN documents revealed that the group has received arms and training from the ruling party. The ease and speed with which youth have taken up arms is testament to the incomplete nature of the demobilization and reintegration process after the war. Among the ranks of the Imbonerakure are former combatants  whose grievances are easily manipulated by political elites that offer them security, a cause, and material rewards. Little progress has been made in Burundi in terms of socioeconomic development; over 80 percent of Burundians still live below the poverty line. The situation is particularly dire for youth, who experience unemployment at a rate three times higher than their older counterparts in parts of the country. Frustrated with the lack of progress, many of these young people are now armed and ready to participate in violence if the political situation deteriorates. The role of youth as agents of positive change or drivers of conflict in fragile societies has been widely documented. It is clear that creating opportunities for youth to participate in the reconstruction of their countries, combined with a development strategy to improve their wellbeing, is vital to maintaining peacebuilding gains.

This is a guest-post by Andrea Crosta, co-Founder and Executive Director of Elephant Action League (EAL). The Elephant Action League (EAL) is appreciative of this opportunity to justify our findings on al-Shabaab’s involvement in the ivory trade and our decision to not share certain details gleaned from confidential sources due to security and confidentiality reasons. The professional investigative team that conducted the investigation – including myself – considers the safety of our sources nonnegotiable. As such EAL will not release sensitive details until our sources are safe. However, we hope that more information supporting our work will be published in the coming months. The figures presented in our 2013 report, Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory, are based on an investigation into the potential role of al-Shabaab in the trafficking of ivory conducted between 2011 and 2012. At the time, African governments, international governmental organizations, and law enforcement agencies were apathetic and often unaware of the magnitude of elephant poaching and the large quantities of ivory trafficked through East Africa. Especially prominent was the port of Mombasa, through which an estimated 188,170 kg of ivory was smuggled between 2009 and 2015, as outlined by our newly released report (based on an estimated 10% seizure rate). In Tanzania, between 2009 and 2014, over 85,000 elephants have been poached, which is equal to roughly 200 tons of ivory smuggled every year from Tanzania alone, often through Kenya. In that period, we began picking up information about large quantities of ivory being trafficked by Somalis, either through Somalia or directly from Kenya. The fact that Somalis were involved in ivory trafficking was not new, as they have been historically linked to elephant poaching. What was unique was the alleged involvement of al-Shabaab, as also reported by Jeffrey Gettleman in an article for the New York Times in September 2012. Over the subsequent eighteen months, thanks to personal introductions by trusted individuals coming from the same clans and sub-clans (crucial in the Somali culture), the investigators met several Somali traffickers and businessmen who were doing businesses with al-Shabaab who confirmed and explained how the terrorist organization had positioned itself as an important middleman in the trafficking of ivory, making hundreds of thousands of dollars every month through their direct involvement in this illicit activity. At that time al-Shabaab still controlled vital points on the border with Kenya, as well as key ports in Somalia such as Kismayo and Merca. EAL has never denied the importance of other far more substantial sources of profit for al-Shabaab - such as charcoal - but through this investigation, we simply exposed an important regional player that contributed significantly to ivory trafficking. Terrorism and terrorist organizations do not drive elephant poaching and ivory trafficking,  but they certainly do play a role. The magnitude of al-Shabaab involvement in the illegal ivory trade at the moment is unknown although occasionally through our on-going field activities, we receive information about ivory continuing to be smuggled through Somalia by various entities.

The past week has almost surely been the most challenging of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib tun Razak’s career. Late last week both the Wall Street Journal and the Sarawak Report, an investigative reporting website about Malaysia, reported that a group of companies linked to debt-ridden state fund 1Malaysian Development Bhd. (1MDB) had made deposits into Najib’s bank accounts. The WSJ further alleged that the biggest deposit into Najib’s account was worth $620 million, and that one of the other deposits was worth over $60 million. The prime minister’s office denies the charges, and some Malaysian media have reported that Najib plans to sue the WSJ for criminal defamation. 1MDB’s leaders also denied the reports, saying they had never transferred any money to the prime minister. 1MDB was already being investigated by the central bank, a parliamentary committee, and the police after running up debts of over $11 billion and needing multiple cash infusions to stay afloat. Still, over the weekend other top members of the government did not exactly rally around Najib. Some senior members of the governing coalition defended the prime minister, calling the allegations baseless. But not all came to Najib’s side, and the new charges against Najib come at a time when he and his allies appear to be struggling to gain control of the governing coalition following a public challenge to Najib by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Mahathir’s allies. “These allegations are serious because they can affect the credibility and integrity of Najib as PM and the leader of the government," Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin said in a statement. The deputy prime minister also called on the government to investigate the allegations made in the WSJ report. Opposition politicians, meanwhile, called for Najib to immediately stand down as prime minister while a completely independent investigation is conducted into the charges made in the WSJ and Sarawak Report’s stories. Lost amidst the WSJ and Sarawak Report stories, Najib’s response, and the political in-fighting in the governing coalition is the fact that these revelations suggest Malaysian politics are more open than many previously believed. After all, the WSJ’s report emerged after investigations into the 1MDB fund by government investigators, apparently including investigators from the anticorruption commission, the police, and the central bank. These investigators acted even though the anticorruption agency comes under the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and Najib is the minister of finance, as well as the prime minister; and the investigation occurred even though the governing coalition wields vast political power, having ruled Malaysia since independence. Then, on Sunday Malaysia’s attorney general revealed that authorities had raided three firms allegedly linked to the payments discussed in the WSJ article. To be sure, someone leaked documents from the investigation to the media, and without these media reports it is possible that these charges would have never come to light. Still, in a country where, according to Human Rights Watch, the government acts with impunity, persecutes opposition voices, and controls most levers of power, the fact that these stories even emerged suggests that Malaysian political discourse is becoming far more open than it was even a decade ago.

This is a post of a new series on the Development Channel,“This Week in Markets and Democracy.” Each Friday, CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program will highlight the week’s noteworthy events and articles. Cost of Tax Breaks and Evasion on African Economies As organizations gear up for July’s Third International Conference on Financing for Development, new reports highlight the toll of tax evasion and outsized corporate tax breaks on African economic development. The World Bank calculates that between 2002 and 2009, Tunisia lost at least $1.2 billion in import taxes as firms undervalued and underreported imports. A recent report by Health Poverty Action (HPA) reveals that Sierra Leone has lost nearly $200 million a year in tax breaks, or three times its 2015 health budget. HPA estimates that by reducing benefits for the nation’s five largest mining firms, Sierra Leone could generate an extra $94 million in government revenue. Curbing Corruption in Central and Southeast Asia Asian countries are fighting corruption through digital platforms, legal reforms, and innovative civil society programs. With public procurement accounting for 20 percent of all government expenditures, the Kyrgyz Republic is taking on graft by requiring government bodies to publish all public contract details on a central web portal. Since the roll-out, 700 state and local governments have switched to e-procurement and over 2,000 businesses have registered. In Cambodia, Transparency International has rolled out an Anti-Corruption Card, which citizens receive in exchange for signing a declaration against corruption. The cards, now numbering over 8,000, provide discounts at cafés and shops in Phnom Penh. ILO and UNODC Launch Global Call to Action for Labor Rights Against the background of horrific labor abuses in preparations for the 2022 Qatar World Cup, the ILO and UNODC announced a partnership to promote fair and ethical labor recruitment during this week’s UN Human Rights Council session in Geneva. The two organizations are urging governments, labor organizations, and the private sector to end fraudulent labor recruiting through broad legal, regulatory, and enforcement reforms. Such legal protections would be welcome in Hong Kong, where existing laws don’t recognize labor exploitation or domestic servitude as human trafficking. In the private sector, Apple recently ended all recruitment fees for its factory workers, serving as a model for other corporations to end rights violations in their supply chains.    

For this outsider, the parliamentary and judicial response to the Zuma administration’s failure to detain Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and turn him over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides a window in to the state of South African democracy. To me, it is clear that the Zuma government broke both South African and international law by not only failing to hold al-Bashir, though specifically ordered to do so by the South African judiciary, but also facilitated his clandestine departure. South African law is relevant because the South African government at the time incorporated the ICC treaty into its own legal system. Neither the judiciary nor the parliament is taking the Zuma administration’s violation of the law quietly. The Pretoria high Court has “invited” the National Director of Public Prosecutions to look into how South Africa violated a court order to hold al-Bashir. Judge President Dunstan Mlambo said, “A democratic state based on the rule of law cannot exist or function if the government ignores its constitutional obligations.” The parliamentary debate was raucous. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), stated that the Zuma government was in contempt of both the South African court and the ICC. A DA parliamentarian, Steven Mokgalapa said, “The African National Congress (ANC) government, led by Zuma has committed a crime of assisting a wanted man to run from the law.” Congress of the People (COP) leader Mousiuoa Lekota is quoted by the media as saying, “You lied to us. You said you will uphold the constitution, uphold the law and be an example. You have misled the people of our country and now we are ashamed before the nations of the world.” (“Terror” Lekota – his nickname comes from soccer – is a Robben Island veteran and was once an ANC stalwart; a former Minister of Defense, he broke with the ANC when it removed Thabo Mbeki from the party leadership.) The ANC defense boils down to the propositions that heads of state are immune from the ICC. (The Rome Statute specifically says that heads of state are subject to ICC jurisdiction.) Further, that al-Bashir was attending an Africa Union summit, rather than making an official visit to South Africa. However, some ANC leaders are roundly attacking the ICC and calling for South Africa to withdraw. In what is likely to be a swipe at the United States, ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe said on local radio that the ICC “is a tool in the hands of the powerful to destroy the weak and it is a court that is focusing on Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.” He said South Africa should consider leaving the ICC: “If I was in government, I would give notice, get out of that, it was not what was envisioned.” Justice and Constitutional Development Deputy Minister John Jeffrey is quoted as saying that the ICC “has diverted from its mandate and allowed itself to be influenced by powerful non-member states. We signed up for a court that was going to hold human beings accountable for their war crimes – regardless of where they were from. We perceive it as tending to act as a proxy instrument for those states who see no need to subject themselves to its discipline, to persecute African leaders, and effect regime change on the continent.” The al-Bashir episode provides a muddled picture of South African democracy. The government appears to have acted illegally. The judiciary and the legislature have reacted vociferously. But, nobody seems to expect that anything will happen.

From the perspective of the expectations of Nelson Mandela, South Africa has been treading water, if not worse, especially since the national elections of 2014. Economic growth remains an anemic 2 percent or less, thereby challenging Mandela’s assumption that poverty could be eliminated rapidly. Public concerns about corruption remain unaddressed. Parliament appears increasingly dysfunctional. Its procedures are under assault by Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters and stonewalling tactics by the Zuma government over corruption. All the while, the Zuma government appears to be consolidating executive power at the expense of the other, theoretically co-equal branches of government. It has twice kept out the Dalai Lama, apparently to keep Beijing happy, while it welcomed Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir with a red carpet to keep the African Union happy. Though wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for genocide, the Zuma government forestalled Bashir’s arrest, which was required by South African law and mandated by the judiciary, by assisting in his clandestine departure. Once one of the strongest supporters of the ICC, the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), now denounces it in neo-colonial terms similar to the denunciations by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe and Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta. Democracies often go through bad patches of governance. However, democratic institutions including an independent judiciary, civil society, and the rule of law provide a corrective mechanism. Up to now, all three have fulfilled this role in post-apartheid South Africa and have been a basis of optimism about the future of the country. The al-Bashir incident will be a test of the extent to which that optimistic conclusion is still valid. The bottom line appears to be that the Zuma government broke South African law by failing to arrest Bashir and undermined the judiciary by failing to implement its ruling. The courts are now demanding that the Zuma government provide an explanation in seven days for how Bashir entered the country, was not arrested, and then left, though there was a court order requiring the government to ensure that he not leave. Civil organizations are saying that they will likely sue the government for contempt of court, but will delay filing until the government responds to the courts with its explanation. The opposition Democratic Alliance has roundly denounced the government’s behavior. It can be anticipated that it will raise the issue in the National Assembly. Meanwhile, the media, including social media, is expressing outrage over the Zuma government’s behavior. Nothing that happens in South Africa now will result in Bashir’s arrest and handover to the ICC. But the courts and civil society may be able to hold the Zuma government accountable. However, if they fail to do so, or are successfully thwarted by Zuma and the ANC, South Africa will have moved away from democracy conducted according to the rule of law. The next week or so could be significant for South Africa’s future.

The media’s take on the failure of South Africa’s Zuma government to hold Sudanese President al-Bashir is that it is a slap in the face of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The press drama is focused on al-Bashir and the credible charges of genocide that he faces before the ICC, and the many African objections to the way the court operates. If less dramatic but of greater significance to the governance of South Africa, the Zuma administration’s connivance with al-Bashir to facilitate his departure flouts a South African high court decision that he could not leave the country pending further judicial review. The Zuma administration’s actions would appear to be in contempt of court and thereby a threat to the legal and constitutional basis of South African governance. The independence and integrity of the judiciary has been a bedrock of South African democracy based on the rule of law. Arguably, the administration’s actions challenge neither. What it did do, however, was challenge the authority of the high court. South African law is clear. The Pretoria High Court is a superior court. A decision made by such a court may only be appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal or even the Constitutional Court, both of which are primarily appellant courts. Absent such an appeal, the high court’s ruling stands. The Zuma government filed no appeal in the al-Bashir case. The High Court was clear: South Africa is a signatory to the treaty establishing the ICC, and as there is an ICC order for al-Bashir’s arrest, the High Court directed that al-Bashir could not leave the country pending its ruling. Moreover, South Africa’s 2002 International Criminal Court Act created a domestic legal imperative for the country to comply with ICC arrest warrants. The ICC clarified and reiterated South Africa’s legal obligation to hold al-Bashir in an official decision issued on June 13. The Zuma government apparently conspired to move al-Bashir’s private airplane from the Johannesburg civil airport to a military base near Pretoria, and then facilitated its departure from South Africa. Officials within the Zuma government would appear to be in contempt of court. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has issued a strong statement condemning the Zuma government. It says that “The DA is in consultation with our lawyers as to what means we have at our disposal to ensure that the government not be allowed to sidestep accountability.” It also said, “We will pursue all avenues available to us to ensure that the  government is not allowed to blatantly disregard the laws of this country or its obligations under international law.” Civic organization have also raised the possibility of legal action against specific persons within the government for contempt of court. The Zuma administration’s apparent contempt of court is only the most recent and most blatant of a string of actions that weaken the judiciary and other constitutional limits on the executive. How the DA and civil society respond in this instance will be an indication of the strength of popular support for the rule of law and whether the country’s legal and constitutional institutions are, indeed, under threat.

Herman J. Cohen, former assistant secretary of state for Africa, former ambassador, and former special assistant for African affairs to President Reagan, has written a fascinating and clear-eyed book on his “conversations with dictators, statesmen, and father figures.” His interlocutors, including more than sixteen African heads of state, range from Leopold Senghor to Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. Cohen seeks to address the question of why fifty years after independence, African countries continue to do relatively poorly. His hypotheses are subtle and do not lend themselves to summary in a blog post. But, they involve leadership failures and the degree to which Africa “…to a great extent continues to be a prisoner of its cultural history.” The book is a great read – I did so in a single sitting because I could not put it down. Africa watchers will delight in Cohen’s subtle pen portraits of Africa’s big men. Through him, the reader feels he or she actually participates in conversations with personalities as variable as Congo’s Mobuto or Nigeria’s Babangida. Many American readers will be particularly intrigued by his francophone “big men,” with whom we are less familiar than the anglophones. The conversations all provide a feast of insights. My favorite: his conversation with Albertina Sisulu, the wife of the great anti-apartheid crusader Walter Sisulu, and herself a formidable personality, prior to South Africa’s transition to "non-racial democracy." Cohen raised concerns about white South African anxiety regarding the coming changes. Her response: “Why should they worry? We are all Christians.” Indeed, they were. Cohen concludes that South Africa is different from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa because of its longer exposure to Christianity. He suggests that a shared Christian culture may be why black and white South Africans could work together to establish the new, post-apartheid dispensation based on democracy and the rule of law. Cohen freely acknowledges that his hypothesis is based on conversation rather than academic research. It is likely to be unfashionable. Still, I think he is on to something.

This post marks the launch of a new feature on the Development Channel, "This Week in Markets and Democracy." Each Friday, CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Program, will highlight the week’s noteworthy events and articles. 1. Rampant Corruption at FIFA On Wednesday, Swiss police raided a Zurich hotel and arrested several top officials of the global soccer governing body FIFA with plans to extradite them to the United States. The U.S. Department of Justice is charging them, along with former FIFA officials and top sports marketing executives, with corruption, money laundering, conspiracy, and racketeering. “These individuals and organizations engaged in bribery to decide who would televise games, where the games would be held, and who would run the organization overseeing organized soccer worldwide,” said U.S. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch. The Department of Justice estimates that officials received$150 million in bribes and kickbacks since the early 1990s. FIFA has long been mired in inconclusive corruption scandals. Now the United States and the Swiss government—which is investigating bribery allegations in Russia and Qatar’s bids for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups—are unveiling the rampant, systematic corruption plaguing the international organization. The arrests have received overwhelming support from the global soccer fandom. Even senior soccer officials have expressed support. In a statement, the European soccer federation (UEFA) said, “These events show, once again, that corruption is deeply rooted in FIFA’s culture. There is a need for the whole of FIFA to be ‘rebooted’ and for a real reform to be carried out.” These investigations not only offer an opportunity to clean up soccer’s international governing body, but they are also a boon for anti-corruption organizations and activists—illustrating how domestic laws and courts can help change even the most opaque and powerful international organizations. 2. FAO 2015 Report shows chronic hunger reaches record lows This week, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) released its annual hunger report, which monitors global food deprivation and security. According to FAO estimates, chronic hunger worldwide fell below 800 million for the first time since FAO began tracking it. The FAO also reports that the majority of the 129 monitored countries achieved the 2015 Millennium Development Goal of halving domestic undernourishment. Developing regions, however, missed the MDG target, though narrowly (by less than one percentage point). FAO Director General José Graziano da Silva optimistically stated, “The near-achievement of the MDG hunger targets shows us that we can indeed eliminate the scourge of hunger in our lifetime. We must be the Zero Hunger generation. That goal should be mainstreamed into all policy interventions and at the heart of the new sustainable development agenda to be established this year." These gains are particularly impressive given they occurred in the face of economic recessions, volatile commodity and food prices, extreme weather and natural disasters, and political instability—all of which aggravate food insecurity. Yet, progress has been uneven across world regions. Over the past few decades, East and Southeast Asia as well as Latin America and the Caribbean significantly reduced hunger within their borders. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, on the other hand, lag behind, and the two regions are now home to over half of the chronically hungry. Breaking with the global trend, the undernourished population in Sub-Saharan Africa actually increased by 25 percent since 1990-92. For these laggards, the FAO calls for inclusive economic growth, agricultural investments, and expanded social protection as the ways to reduce hunger. 3. It’s possible to lift people out of poverty Poverty eradication is the first goal of the sustainable development framework, the proposed successor of the Millennium Development Goals. World leaders have committed to ending extreme poverty by 2030. The problem donors, multilaterals, nonprofits, and private sector partners confront is that poverty is a complex, multidimensional issue—which encompasses lack of access to health, education, financial services, capital, and markets. Programs often suffer from shoddy implementation, prove difficult to replicate across countries, achieve results in one aspect of individuals’ lives but not the others, or fail to deliver benefits that last. Against this backdrop, a new study published in the May 2015 issue of Science offers if not a panacea, certainly hope. Authored by several development economists, including MIT’s Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo and Yale’s Dean Karlan, the paper presents findings from six randomized control trials (RCTs) implemented in Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan, and Peru. In five of the six countries, it finds that multipronged poverty reduction programs—which they call graduation programs—can deliver sustainable benefits. By providing a productive asset, training, access to savings, health care, regular home visits, and food or cash for a few months to a year, they find that household income and consumption not only increased during the intervention, but continued after. This suggests that a concentrated approach can raise people out of poverty in the long term, good news indeed.

Nigeria inaugurates its new president, Muhammadu Buhari, on May 29. It is the first time a Nigerian head of state has defeated an incumbent at the ballot box. Buhari’s successful campaign was largely based on the need to restore security and to counter corruption. Now, as he takes office, the radical Islamist insurrection labeled Boko Haram is the country’s most immediate security threat. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), during the week of May 16 Boko Haram was likely responsible for killings in Damaturu in Yobe state, Madagali and Gombi in Adamawa state, and Chibok in Borno (the town where the “Chibok School Girls” were kidnapped). The death toll due to Boko Haram attacks that week was sixty, though almost certainly understated. Boko Haram also kidnapped six women. Meanwhile, the Nigerian army claims it destroyed ten Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest, killing an estimated twenty insurgents. Despite the military offensive of February and March, involving the Nigerian army, Chadian and Nigerien militaries, and South African mercenaries that drove Boko Haram out of cities and towns, the insurgency appears undefeated. But, the NST indicates that things have changed. For the first time since the NST was launched four years ago, there have been four months of consecutive declines in monthly cumulative deaths this spring. (These include deaths attributed to Boko Haram, to fighting between the security services and Boko Haram, to the security services alone, and to sectarian violence.) Even so, since March of last year, cumulative deaths have only dipped below one thousand for three months. In contrast, from May 2011 to February 2014, there were only two months that deaths exceeded one thousand. Though bloodshed has declined, it still remains high. The NST data comes from open sources, mostly the Nigerian media. So, the decline might reflect changes in the focus of media reporting. Or, security service tactics against Boko Haram may be more covert. Nevertheless, it is hard not to conclude that the violence is declining. Meanwhile, the “face” of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, has been silent since March 14. Boko Haram has released no high profile statements. Some observers had thought that the practical consequence of Boko Haram swearing “allegiance” to the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria might be access to more sophisticated media. However, there is no sign of it. It remains to be seen whether Boko Haram will attempt a high-profile attack on inauguration day.

Although it may have slipped from headlines, the conflict in Sudan’s western region of Darfur has not disappeared. Indeed, the region has seen almost unabated violence for over a decade, notably spiking in January 2013. In February of this year, a Human Rights Watch report shed light on the violence, documenting mass rape and other atrocities committed by forces loyal to the Sudanese government from October 30 to November 1, 2014. Though these stories of government-allied Janjaweed militias ravaging Darfur harken back to the early 2000s—when pro-government militias carried out systematic killings across the region—a new factor has emerged in the conflict since the separation of Sudan and South Sudan: the Sudanese government’s struggle to finance and maintain the support of their proxy militias. Before South Sudan’s independence, much of Sudanese government revenues came from oil located in what is now South Sudan. Though Sudan now earns some fees for allowing the transport of oil out of landlocked South Sudan, civil conflict within South Sudan and standoffs between the two nations have made this an uncertain source of revenue. Without this income, the Sudanese government has turned its attention to another natural resource: Darfur’s gold mines. The Sudanese government not only operates the country’s sole gold refinery, it is also the only entity allowed to sell gold abroad. To encourage miners to sell their gold to the government, rather than to smugglers, the Central Bank offers competitive prices, leaving the government with an effective monopoly on the trade. Though the IMF reports that gold accounted for only 13 percent of Sudan’s exports in 2011, that figured had skyrocketed to 42 percent by 2012. Yet Darfur’s gold is not just financing these militias and the human rights violations they commit; the search for gold and efforts to consolidate control of gold mines are also a cause of conflict. A report by the Enough Project outlines the government of Sudan’s “strategy of economic plunder of the periphery through violence and forcible demographic change.” The discovery of new gold mines in the area has even led to harassment of Arab groups traditionally exempt from attacks by government-sponsored militias. Given the role of gold in funding and spurring conflict in Darfur, especially the egregious instances of sexual violence and ethnic cleansing reported by Human Rights Watch, international consumers and traders should take steps to ensure the gold they purchase is not sourced from conflict-ridden areas. As a February New York Times op-ed suggests, “International banks, gold refiners, and associations like the Dubai Multi Commodities Center and the London Bullion Market Association should raise alerts for Sudanese gold and initiate audits to trace it all to its mine of origin to ensure that purchases are not fueling war crimes in Darfur.” A similar campaign has been started for gold originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Enough Project’s #CongoGold “Look Who’s Getting Engaged” campaign highlights major jewelry retailers that have taken steps such as establishing supply chain controls and supporting communities affected by mining and violence. While the DRC gold campaign is not as extensive as the Kimberley Process for certifying diamonds, an agreement between governments and the diamond industry that requires participating states to pass legislation and export and import controls, it is an improvement over the lack of any such system or movement targeting Sudanese conflict gold. Human rights organizations have proposed steps in Sudan including United Nations’ investigations into major Sudanese gold traders, U.S. legislative action to curtail trade in conflict-affected gold, and greater gold industry due diligence. Though sometimes criticized, the Kimberley Process serves as a good model. It is credited with reducing the percentage of conflict diamonds reaching international markets from 4 to 1 percent. The Kimberley Process also walks a fine line: it works with governments—which are necessary to efforts to control gold supply chains in their respective nations—while ensuring that the organization does not become too bureaucratic or politicized. Any approach to supply chain management of conflict-affected resources should similarly incorporate both governmental and nongovernmental action, as the Enough Project’s proposal for Sudan does. To generate economic pressure on Sudan, governments and international organizations should work with private sector and other nongovernmental actors.

Corruption allegations and revelations cover Mexico’s front pages. Public officials’ penchant for expensive watches, use of government helicopters for personal errands, and a string of expensive houses facilitated by preferred private contractors have incensed not only Mexico’s chattering classes but also the broader public. 2014 opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center show corruption ranks second only to crime in citizen concerns. The challenge of corruption goes beyond just a few bad seeds. A 2013 survey found that one third of Mexicans paid a bribe for a public service. Think tank Mexico ¿cómo vamos? estimates corruption reduces gross domestic product by 2 percent. Due to rampant corruption among judges and police (as well as weak investigation and adjudication systems), the World Justice Project’s international rule of law index ranks Mexico seventy-ninth out of ninety-nine countries, comparable to Egypt and Russia. Things may be poised to finally begin changing. After dragging its feet for nearly three years (anti-corruption promises were part of the original Pact for Mexico signed in December 2012), Congress recently passed constitutional reforms that will provide stronger tools to prevent, investigate, and sanction government corruption. The new National Anti-Corruption System targets the political system, requiring more public officials to report their assets and any potential conflicts of interest, strengthening the hand of federal auditors, expanding asset forfeiture laws, and creating a new independent anti-corruption prosecutor. Transparency International’s Mexico chapter has welcomed the reform, and others, including local think tank Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad, see it as a step in the right direction. Shifts are already underway at the local level, led by Mexico City. Current mayor Miguel Angel Mancera announced an anti-corruption plan in early 2013 with five main aims: (1) professionalize public servants through training and evaluation; (2) strengthen internal controls; (3) simplify administrative processes; (4) engage citizens; and (5) create an anti-corruption website. Since then, the capital has appointed hundreds of new auditors and nearly doubled the number of investigations. It has suspended over 900 public officials and recovered roughly $9 million in illicit funds. The 21 million person megalopolis now has a citizen advisory council to supervise anti-corruption efforts, made up of business and non-profit executives, academics, and lawyers. And it “names and shames” sanctioned officials and disqualified suppliers through publicly available lists. In New York last week, Mancera signed on with the NGO Open Contracting Partnership (OCP) to become their first city partner to create an online portal opening up the capital city’s public contracts to citizen scrutiny. In their infancy, these reforms have yet to prove themselves, and if they can change the status quo. Mexico City’s nascent trial shows some promise. If Mancera can show visible anti-graft results in the capital city, it could prove a savvy political platform for the 2018 presidential election. This blog has been reposted from CFR’s Latin America’s Moment blog.