Corruption

Corruption allegations and revelations cover Mexico’s front pages. Public officials’ penchant for expensive watches, use of government helicopters for personal errands, and a string of expensive houses facilitated by preferred private contractors have incensed not only Mexico’s chattering classes but also the broader public. 2014 opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center show corruption ranks second only to crime in citizen concerns. The challenge of corruption goes beyond just a few bad seeds. A 2013 survey found that one third of Mexicans paid a bribe for a public service. Think tank Mexico ¿cómo vamos? estimates corruption reduces gross domestic product by 2 percent. Due to rampant corruption among judges and police (as well as weak investigation and adjudication systems), the World Justice Project’s international rule of law index ranks Mexico seventy-ninth out of ninety-nine countries, comparable to Egypt and Russia. Things may be poised to finally begin changing. After dragging its feet for nearly three years (anti-corruption promises were part of the original Pact for Mexico signed in December 2012), Congress recently passed constitutional reforms that will provide stronger tools to prevent, investigate, and sanction government corruption. The new National Anti-Corruption System targets the political system, requiring more public officials to report their assets and any potential conflicts of interest, strengthening the hand of federal auditors, expanding asset forfeiture laws, and creating a new independent anti-corruption prosecutor. Transparency International’s Mexico chapter has welcomed the reform, and others, including local think tank Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad, see it as a step in the right direction. Shifts are already underway at the local level, led by Mexico City. Current mayor Miguel Angel Mancera announced an anti-corruption plan in early 2013 with five main aims: (1) professionalize public servants through training and evaluation; (2) strengthen internal controls; (3) simplify administrative processes; (4) engage citizens; and (5) create an anti-corruption website. Since then, the capital has appointed hundreds of new auditors and nearly doubled the number of investigations. It has suspended over 900 public officials and recovered roughly $9 million in illicit funds. The 21 million person megalopolis now has a citizen advisory council to supervise anti-corruption efforts, made up of business and non-profit executives, academics, and lawyers. And it “names and shames” sanctioned officials and disqualified suppliers through publicly available lists. In New York last week, Mancera signed on with the NGO Open Contracting Partnership (OCP) to become their first city partner to create an online portal opening up the capital city’s public contracts to citizen scrutiny. In their infancy, these reforms have yet to prove themselves, and if they can change the status quo. Mexico City’s nascent trial shows some promise. If Mancera can show visible anti-graft results in the capital city, it could prove a savvy political platform for the 2018 presidential election.

Adam Nossiter has published a thought-provoking article in the April 29, 2015, New York Times. He comments on the silence of African leaders regarding the deaths of scores of African boat people who were trying to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life. While it is true that many of the Mediterranean boat people are from Syria, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, the majority are African. Nossiter quotes the chairwoman of the African Union commission, South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as expressing her “condolences.” To me, that is a trivial reaction to an African tragedy, which, one might have thought, exposes an issue that would be a central concern of the African Union. Nossiter also reports similarly weak statements from other African leaders. European civil society indignation and calls for their governments to “do something,” even if sometimes dysfunctional, lacks an echo among African political classes and elites. African governments simply seem to be disengaged from the tragedy. Part of the reason for this disengagement may be an African lack of capacity. Few African states can control the flow of people across their borders. Many, if not most, have weak bureaucratic institutions and underdeveloped civil services. Disengagement may also reflect elite detachment from their own people. The drivers for Africans to take to the boats appear to be poverty and the lack of opportunity, underpinned by poor governance. But, economic and social development as well as improvement in governance and accountability are not simple tasks and take a long time to achieve. The African boat people are a rebuke to the popular, undifferentiated narrative of “Africa Rising.” In too many parts of Africa, nominally high rates of economic growth go hand in hand with increasing poverty and desperation. So, if they can, many Africans will take to the boats, believing that life in a European camp is preferable to staying home.

Like it or not, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is extremely popular among Chinese people. According to an online survey, “combating corruption” trails “income distribution” as the top two concerns of the Chinese public. There are already reports suggesting that the campaign has helped reduce the transaction cost for ordinary people to get things done in China. But from the perspective of the more than eleven million government officials in China, this also means reduced opportunities to access “grey income” (i.e., bribes), which accounts for 12 percent of China’s GDP. Consequently, civil servant jobs are increasingly losing their attractiveness in China. According to a recruitment website, more than ten thousand civil servants had quit their jobs in the three weeks following the Spring Festival in Feburary. The exodus of civil servants poses particular challenges for the operation of the judicial system. Already burdened by heavy caseloads, high risks, and government interference, judges are leaving in droves. As aura of appeal for civil service fades, China faces growing pains in policy making and implementation. But this is only part of the story. The campaign has also changed the rules of the game in China’s officialdom. Corruption in China is so rampant that it involves almost every government official. According to a conservative estimate made by a law professor of Renmin University, China has at least two million corrupt officials not being investigated, but just investigating and convicting them would take forty to fifty years. Instead of setting limited objectives, the new leadership under President Xi has indicated that it will not set any endpoint for the campaign or give pardon or amnesty to corrupt officials. It also vows to pursue each corruption case to the very bottom (yi cha dao di). Those who are found guilty would lose big, including their political life. This in effect creates a zero-sum, one-shot game where winner takes all, and losers (i.e., Bo Xilai) have little chance of replaying the power game and becoming tomorrow’s winners. This has significantly raised the stakes in the game, making players on each side feel insecure. This is evidenced by the rapid increase of officials who have committed suicide since November 2012, when President Xi came to power. In March 2015, President Xi reshuffled the Central Security Bureau that is in charge of his personal safety. The changing rules of game, coupled with the sustained political hierarchy in China and rapid centralization of the power of President Xi, make it more likely to reproduce the bandwagoning politics found in the Mao era, when policy actors rushed to jump on the bandwagon of the perceived winner (i.e., Mao) in order to demonstrate their early and enthusiastic support of his favorite policy. While the successful amassing of power should increase the credibility of President Xi’s promises and punishments in the policy process, there is no guarantee that he is the ultimate winner in the anti-corruption campaign. China’s anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan allegedly said recently that the fight against corruption was a stalemate, with each side pitted against each other. Equally important, as a result of more than three decades of post-Mao reform and social change, the political hierarchy has been sufficiently decentralized so that central authority is limited by subnational authorities. This is especially the case if the central leadership fails to spell out its priorities clearly and consistently. These developments have profound implications for the public policy process in China. As fighting corruption becomes a top priority in China, other important agenda items such as tackling the environmental crisis and deepening healthcare reform might end up on the back burner. Lower-level government officials, being wary about their personal security in the campaign, would officially bandwagon with Xi, or at least pay lip service to his preferred policy agenda. But in reality, they would balk at making any moves that would be interpreted by their colleagues as ambitious attempts to seek personal advantages or threaten the latter’s vested interests. As a result, “not taking phone calls and not writing instructions on documents” becomes the new normal in the policy process. In May 2014, Premier Li Keqiang at a State Council executive meeting assailed this phenomenon of “holding an office and enjoying all the privileges without doing a stroke of work.” The problem of government inaction and policy gridlock is particularly serious at the grassroots level. According to the party secretary of Shanxi Province, in 2014 there was a 60 percent increase in the amount of petitions and offense reports targeting officials at the township level, but the filed charges actually dropped over the same period; during 2013-2014, 20 percent of the townships failed to investigate any corruption cases. In order to address this policy paralysis, the central leadership should seriously consider limiting the objectives of the anti-corruption campaign and incorporating it into the track of rule of law.

The Nigerian presidential polling, initially scheduled for Saturday, March 28, was extended in some areas to Sunday, March 29, because of technical glitches. Attahiru Jega, the Chairman of the Independent National Elections Commission (INEC), is saying that the complete results will be announced on Tuesday, March 31. INEC did release partial results on March 30, and they have been broadcast by Nigerian media outlets. Predictably, Buhari appears to be doing well in the west and the north, Jonathan in the south and in Nigeria’s oil patch. Based on incomplete returns, the two candidates are dividing the middle belt, where Nigeria’s Christian and Muslim populations meet and where religious and ethnic tensions are high. With respect to the votes counted thus far, Bloomberg reports INEC as saying that Jonathan is leading with 47.3 percent of the vote to 46.9 percent for Buhari. By and large, elections in Nigeria are no longer rigged at the ballot box but rather at the collation centers where local ballot counts are brought together. In an extraordinary March 30, joint statement, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.K. Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, said “…there are disturbing indications that the collation process—where the votes are finally counted—may be subject to deliberate political interference.” Their statement also said that their two governments would be “very concerned” if there were efforts to “undermine the independence” of INEC and chairman Jega. The Situation Room, a coalition of Nigerian civil society groups, is saying that it is receiving reports that the security services, under the control of Jonathan, are interfering with the vote-counting. Already there are signs that the results of the election, as announced, will not be accepted by at least some and perhaps many Nigerians. Femi Fani-Kayode, close to Jonathan, is claiming that the president is winning by a margin of more than two million votes, and that Buhari’s supporters and the media are spreading false reports of holding the lead. Fani-Kayode is quoted in the Nigerian media as saying that Jonathan’s ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) will reject “any attempt to manipulate figures or to rig us out from any quarter.” On the other hand, in the north, traditionally a stronghold of Buhari’s All Progressive Congress (APC), thousands demonstrated against a 24-hour curfew in the city of Bauchi that they said was imposed to facilitate rigging the vote on Jonathan’s behalf. However, the authorities justify the curfew as prudent because of ongoing Boko Haram attacks. In Port Harcourt, Rivers State, a center of Jonathan support, police used tear gas against women supporting Buhari to stop their march on the local electoral office. INEC has announced that Jonathan won that state by a margin of 1.48 million to 62,238 for Buhari. APC campaign spokesmen are rejecting the result. The next few days will be tense in Nigeria. Already there have been election-related deaths, though exactly how many is not clear. A Buhari victory has been widely anticipated, not just in the predominately Muslim north. Many will likely see an INEC announcement of a Jonathan victory as less than credible. In the past, Buhari has said that he will not return to the courts to adjudicate election disputes because he believes he was unjustly treated in the past. Some of his supporters have said that a less than credible Jonathan victory will result in the APC establishing a “parallel government,” which they have not defined. On the other hand, some of Jonathan’s supporters in the oil patch have said that if the incumbent is denied re-election they will renew attacks on the oil infrastructure. The high stakes of these elections in Nigeria are illustrated by the extraordinary joint statement issued by Secretary Kerry and Foreign Secretary Hammond during the ballot-counting. However, the leverage of the United States and the United Kingdom over electoral matters in Nigeria is limited. It is Nigerians themselves, driven by specifically Nigerian factors that will determine how the country gets through the post-election period.

This is a guest post by Russell Hanks, now retired from the State Department, who is a long-time observer of the Nigerian political scene. The views expressed are entirely his own. Nigeria’s election, originally scheduled for last month, is set to take place this weekend. This is the first open election in the nation since 1980, one in which the outcome is not a foregone conclusion. The Independent Nigerian Election Commission (INEC) has undertaken reforms that could enhance both security at the polls and confidence in the election’s results. Since the end of military rule in 1999, Nigeria’s elections have been less than effective. In 1999, a fait accompli was imposed, giving General Olusegun Obasanjo the presidency as a reaction to the northern military domination. In 2003, Obasanjo was re-elected in an election fraught with massive manipulation of the results. In 2007, after Obasanjo’s third-term hopes were frustrated, it is unclear whether INEC’s production could even be termed an election. Given these low barriers, the 2011 election was termed “the best election since military rule” although announced results point to continued massive rigging. If INEC’s reforms prove sufficient, the worst outcome would be an inconclusive result rather than a pre-ordained victor. The complicated formula for electing a president, including a minimum percentage of votes from a number of states, increases the possibility of uncertain results. Politically, though, other dangers are more critical. The incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, and the challenger, Muhammadu Buhari, are locked in a battle that, on the surface, pits Jonathan’s “business-as-usual” approach against Buhari’s perennial “anti-corruption crusade.” The voters, fed up with corruption and ineffective government, seem to be more supportive of Buhari’s current campaign than in previous contests. But a number of Buhari’s current alliances complicate his ability to pursue his “security” and “anti-corruption” agendas. As the political landscape has shifted since the post-military, Obasanjo presidency, many of those who profited during Obasanjo’s tenure moved into the Buhari camp. Their influence could limit his efforts to end corruption and hold past offenders accountable. And while, as a leader, Buhari seems positioned to deal with the threat of Boko Haram, it is unclear whether the Nigerian military is up to the task. Decades of corruption and political manipulation of the command structure bring into question its capabilities, and habitual Nigerian xenophobia limits cooperation and support from the United States and Europe. Still, this election could improve the overall electoral performance and might present some hope to Nigeria’s polity. If the manipulation of the south-south minorities and the marginalization of the Igbos is limited, Nigeria’s democratic path to the future could be cleared. The biggest danger to Nigeria, though, would come from a Buhari victory followed by a continuation of historical practices, such as blatant corruption. In that case, the voters’ hopes would be dashed and the reputation of democracy in Nigeria would be irreparably tarnished, threatening the nation’s commitment to democracy and reform.

When Jacob Zuma succeeded Thabo Mbeki as African National Congress (ANC) party leader and eventually became the South African chief of state, his flaws were already well known: personal financial issues, a rape trial (he was acquitted), and corruption scandals. The ANC was willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. However, during his second term, patience may be wearing thin in the face of Zuma’s continued refusal to accept accountability (not least with respect to public expenditure on his private estate, Nkandla), his attacks on independent institutions such as the public protector, and visible economic stagnation highlighted by high unemployment rates. Most South Africans believe that corruption is getting worse. Nevertheless, earlier in March the ANC majority soundly defeated a motion of no confidence in the president. In the aftermath of that defeat, Bantu Holomisa, the leader of a small opposition party, the United Democratic Movement, publicly said that South Africa is in “a leadership crisis of epic proportions.” He urged the ANC “to take back its president and keep him (Zuma) away.” This is what the ANC did in 2007, when it deposed Mbeki as party leader, ultimately leading to his resignation from the presidency. However, Ranjeni Munusamy, in a compelling piece in the Daily Maverick, argues that ANC support is based on history, its delivery of social services since 1994, as well as popular “love” for the party. Hitherto, Zuma’s leadership failures do not threaten ANC electoral support. That could change in the future. Munusamy suggests that the first signs of change might be seen in the local government elections next year. But, for now, she argues, the ANC leadership continues to back Zuma. In a nice twist, Munusamy argues that the opposition, especially the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters, also need Zuma. She maintains that anger against the president promotes the consolidation of the support base of the opposition parties. Some thoughtful South Africans argue that the fundamental problem is with the electoral system, whereby ballots are cast for a political party, not for specific candidates. Holomisa, for one, is calling for the direct election of the president. Others are urging that South Africa’s system of proportional representation be altered to make individual members of parliament somehow accountable to the voters. However, at present, such fundamental changes are unlikely.

For many South Africans, the expenditure of roughly 246 million Rand (about $24.6 million) on President Jacob Zuma’s private residential compound, Nkandla, has become symbolic of the corruption at the upper reaches of the African National Congress (ANC). Parliamentary members of the ANC’s opposition have increasingly complained about the misuse of public money to fund Zuma’s ostentatious home. The public protector, a position established by South Africa’s constitution, can investigate any complaint at any level of government. The incumbent, Thuli Madonsela, is well-known for her independence. Indeed, she determined that significant amounts of public money were misused on Zuma’s Nklanda compound in KwaZulu-Natal, and recommended that he make a refund to the treasury. In parliament on March 12, Zuma denied any personal wrongdoing with respect to Nkandla and brushed off any obligation to make a repayment at present. He said that it was up to the Police Minister, Nathi Nhleko, to make a determination as to whether he is liable for any portion of the expenditure, and that there would be a report by the end of the month. Nhleko is a former chief whip of the ANC and chairperson of the ANC caucus. Sparing Zuma of any repercussion for his actions would come as no surprise. Many ANC parliamentarians dismiss complaints about Nkandla as playing politics by the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters. These parties represent the ANC’s main opposition. With a large ANC majority, it is unlikely that parliament will move against Zuma. Stephen Grootes, in Daily Maverick, notes that Zuma views the public protector’s findings as recommendations rather than a legal ruling. A legal case is underway to determine whether the public protector’s findings are legally binding. Grootes points out that the public protector is not a judge and does not have the authority of one. Nevertheless, the Nkandla episode has damaged the reputation of Zuma and it has energized the opposition parties. It remains to be seen whether there will be significant political consequences for the ANC.

The Petrobras corruption investigation, known locally as Operation Lava Jato (Carwash), entered a new phase last week, when Rodrigo Janot, Brazil’s general prosecutor, implicated 53 politicians from six different political parties. All but two come from President Dilma Rousseff’s Workers’ Party (PT) congressional coalition. The accused include two of the legislature’s most prominent politicians: Eduardo Cunha (PMDB), the president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Renan Calheiros (PMDB), the president of the Senate. Cunha is accused of taking a personal bribe; Calheiros is accused of trading political support for funds for the PMDB; both deny any wrongdoing. Dilma’s former Chief of Staff Gleisi Hoffman (PT) and former Energy Minister Edison Lobão (PMDB) were also accused of receiving illicit money for political campaigns – Hoffman for her own 2010 Senate run; Lobão to support Roseana Sarney’s gubernatorial campaign in the northeastern state of Maranhão. Sarney – the daughter of former President Jose Sarney – was previously implicated in a scandal involving Amazon development funds. Former president, now senator Fernando Collor de Mello (PTB) made the list for allegedly receiving bribes. This isn’t his first scandal; he resigned from the presidency in 1992 rather than be impeached for corruption (he was later found guilty and barred from public service until 2000). The opposition PSDB didn’t emerge unscathed either. Antonio Anastasia, an influential senator and close ally of defeated presidential candidate Aecio Neves, allegedly received R$1 million to run his own gubernatorial campaign in the state of Minas Gerais. These political revelations expand upon the already extensive investigations into Petrobras employees and numerous private sector firms, including construction firms OAS, with over one hundred thousand employees, and Andrade Gutierrez, with projects in more than 40 countries around the world, as well as the Brazilian conglomerate Camargo Correa, with operations in construction, energy, transport, and engineering. With estimates topping $4 billion in illegal kickbacks over the past decade, two high-level Petrobras executives and 24 private sector executives have been indicted so far. Twelve of the 26 have been taken into custody indefinitely, while fourteen remain under house arrest. All this is happening at a difficult time for Brazil as a nation. When the 2005 Mensalão scandal hit, Brazil was growing rapidly and the country’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was near his all-time highs in terms of popularity. By contrast, Dilma faces a stagnant economy, weak currency, and water shortages and electricity blackouts due to a record drought. In a recent poll, just 23 percent of people interviewed rated Dilma’s performance as “excellent or good,” down from 42 percent in December, and she is bracing for a wave of protests this Sunday. The revelations may paralyze Brazil’s government. But combined with general dissatisfaction, it also could create the incentive for real reform. Dilma’s challenge is to not waste this crisis.

Wendy Leutert is a visiting researcher at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center and a PhD candidate in government at Cornell University. She worked for International Crisis Group in Beijing and holds an MA in government from Cornell and an MA in international relations from Tsinghua University. Earlier this month, China’s anti-corruption watchdog—the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection—announced the next targets in President Xi Jinping’s intensifying graft campaign. Unlike 2014, when military and Communist Party organs were front and center in Xi’s line of fire, this year Beijing is taking aim at the top fifty-three state-owned companies and their Party-appointed executives. Among those first in the crosshairs are China’s largest petroleum, automobile, electricity, shipping, and telecommunication companies. But high-profile corruption investigations at these crown-jewel firms won’t solve their problems. More important is announcing the long-delayed policies necessary to enact the reform agenda announced at the 2013 Third Plenum Party conclave. There, China’s leaders vowed to boost market competition and transparency, and strengthen corporate governance. Yet the biggest obstacle to reform lies not with China’s central government but rather with the state-owned companies themselves. At first glance this may seem paradoxical given the Party’s assumed influence on state-owned companies and its tight control over their executives. Indeed, the companies’ top leaders—chair of the board of directors, Party secretary, and general manager—are all appointed directly by the Party. What’s more, a single executive often simultaneously holds more than one of these positions, especially in strategic industries like defense and petroleum where Party control is fundamental. But central state-owned enterprise leaders are far from passive Party agents. They possess vice-ministerial or ministerial ranking, and in some cases have authority on par with the very government agencies that monitor them. Executives also wield deep personal networks they can leverage to resist change. A lucky few possess family or political connections with top leaders, further insulating them from government pressure. More importantly, many executives lack incentives to prioritize Party orders over their personal interests. During the Hu Jintao era (2002-2012), more than half of the leaders of central state-owned companies were late-career appointees and retired directly after their posts ended. With no prospect of political promotion, many executives are deeply reluctant to implement reforms and change a status quo from which they personally profit—legally or otherwise. Nor have weak governance institutions done much to reign in state-owned companies and their executives. Corporate culture in China is characterized by the so-called “number-one leader phenomenon,” in which a single powerful boss exerts dominant influence. Building a bureaucracy to regulate state-owned firms was supposed to change this, but success has been limited. And while boards of directors are now common in most of the top fifty-three state-owned companies, the chairperson is almost always also the Party secretary. Byzantine corporate structures further complicate oversight of these companies and stymie reform efforts. Company leaders operate in sprawling business groups, some with more than two hundred subsidiaries. The firms’ massive size and spread create ample space for misreporting and illicit activity. These tangled structures can be a headache for executives, but also a boon if they want to give their regulators the slip. China’s top graft buster Wang Qishan has warned that he will dangle the fabled Sword of Damocles over state-owned companies, prompting speculation of an intensifying political purge. No matter the motive, prosecuting corrupt executives is a critical step. But it’s no substitute for providing an overdue prescription for reform—one that gives real teeth to regulators, boosts outside members in corporate boards, and makes clear which sectors will be opened to market competition. Without such a policy roadmap, it may not matter how many swords fall in Beijing.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On February 10, the South African government announced the formation of a committee to determine the viability of legalizing the trade of rhino horn. As any international trade in rhino horn is illegal, if the committee were to determine that the trade is viable, the South African government would have to seek approval from the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) at their upcoming conference in 2016. There is precedent for granting such permission in the form of a one off sale. In 2008, CITES allowed Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa to sell over 100 tons of ivory to Japan and China. However, CITES is highly unlikely to approve a more regular trade. The government claims that the move may help alleviate the rhino poaching crisis in South Africa. They argue that legalizing the trade would dampen illegal demand and thus decrease the targeting of rhino populations. However, many conservationists, citing the increase in elephant poaching since 2008, disagree and contend that legalizing the trade would only boost demand and endanger South Africa’s rhino population. Regardless, it seems that the South African government’s decision to consider legalizing the rhino horn trade is motivated by a variety of motives. The South African government possesses a twenty ton stockpile of rhino horn that is worth approximately R11.6 billion (roughly $1 billion) on the black market. In an economic environment where the rand has steadily fallen against the U.S. dollar. Hence, the sale of rhino horn would be financially beneficial for the government. It is feared that the government has already made its decision to pursue legalization. On February 16, the Citizen, a South African newspaper, released a report claiming that it had obtained a copy of the agenda for an upcoming meeting of the Environmental Affairs Portfolio Committee. At this meeting scheduled for March 3, one of the planned discussion topics was “Progress in mobilising Rhino Range States to support South Africa’s proposal for a limited regulated trade in Rhino horns at the CITES COP16 meeting in South Africa.” While the discussion has now been removed from the agenda, the Citizen cites the topic’s inclusion on the agenda as proof that the South African government is leaning toward approving the trade. Another major sign that the government is dead set on legalization is the composition of the committee. While it includes a number of respected conservationists, there are also several members of questionable reputation who the opposition party have asked to be removed. For example, committee member Lourence Mogakane, was fired as the financial director of the Bohlabela district municipality in Limpopo for gross misconduct and financial mismanagement. More importantly, committee chairperson Nana Mangomola was suspended from her directorship at the National Gambling Board, and subsequently resigned, due to a forensic report that alleged misconduct. On February 12, South African President Jacob Zuma lauded the cabinet, announcing in his annual state of the the nation address that the “Cabinet has adopted vigorous and integrated interventions to combat the vicious rhino poaching in the country.” It is unclear what interventions he is referring to. One can only guess, but based on the formation of this committee, these measures may not be good news for South Africa’s rhino population.

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo has broken with President Goodluck Jonathan’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in favor of the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC). This move, along with numerous other defections from the ruling party, may be a sign that the hitherto badly splintered ruling elites may be coming together again in the face of the Boko Haram insurgency, corruption, incompetency of the federal government, and the Abuja government’s declining economic performance. Opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari’s positive polling data and the anecdotal evidence of his growing appeal in all parts of the country and across religious and ethnic lines may reflect this emerging elite consensus. A largely reunited political class in favor of Buhari would make it difficult for Jonathan and the PDP to rig the presidential elections. Postponed, ostensibly to provide space for the security services to defeat Boko Haram, the presidential election is now scheduled for March 28. After five years of failing to curb the radical Islamist insurgency, it is difficult to imagine that the security situation in the northeast will change much in just six weeks. Even if the government recaptures towns from Boko Haram, the large number of internally displaced persons and refugees, likely Buhari supporters, still would not be able to vote. But, if Buhari sweeps much of the nation, then the possible disenfranchisement of Buhari’s supporters in the northeast would be of minor importance. A Buhari administration elected in a credible election with support from across the country would be well-placed to address Nigeria’s extraordinary challenges and would signal the end of the current political crisis. However, there are potential flies in the ointment of this optimistic scenario. The first is the extent to which Nigerians will vote along ethnic and religious lines. The country is about half Christian, and the recent presidential campaigning appealed heavily to religious and ethnic identities. The second issue that could mire the electoral process is the role of money. Due to his access to government oil revenue Jonathan has far more funds than Buhari does. He may be able to “buy” an electoral victory as most Nigerians remain desperately poor and the country’s elites increasingly need money as oil revenue and the value of the Naira continue to fall. (However, in the past, Nigerian political figures have accepted payoffs without fulfilling their side of the bargain.) Finally, Buhari represents a real threat to those deeply mired in corruption. With an annual security budget of five to six billion dollars and an unimpressive track record against Boko Haram, the military would appear especially vulnerable to anti-corruption measures. Under these circumstances, would the military in conjunction with parts of the current ruling party allow Buhari to become president? It was the military that ended Buhari’s twenty month tenure as military chief of state in 1985 largely because of his campaign against corruption. It may be worth remembering that in 1993, the military refused to allow Moshood Abiola to become president, despite his victory in Nigeria’s freest and most credible election (no official election results were ever released). The Nigerian security services are much weaker now than they were in Abiola’s time. Still, they retain more coercive power than any other group of Nigeria, but only if they are united. That is a big ‘if.’

The news and statistics from Guatemala are anything but reassuring. More than half the nation’s sixteen million citizens live in poverty. Worse, almost one in two children under five suffer from chronic malnutrition, which affects not just their immediate well-being but also limits their physical and intellectual potential for the rest of their lives. Violence is rampant. Guatemala City ranks among the most dangerous cities in the world and the national homicide rate, of 40 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, is bested by just four countries worldwide. Women especially are vulnerable, not just on the street but inside their homes, as domestic violence and femicide rates are also among the worst in the world. Few receive justice, with prosecution rates averaging just 2 percent of all crimes. Federal actions to take on these challenges have been largely absent or ineffective. And small islands of progress, such as the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a UN-backed independent body that has prosecuted several serious criminal cases, have been undermined. Even if the political will existed, with tax collection at just 11 percent of GDP—the lowest in Latin America—the government lacks the resources to do much. Despite the dire national outlook, after a recent trip I left with some glimpses of optimism—mainly from both local and private sector efforts to break the vicious cycles of poverty and negative dynamics more generally. These organizations and business are changing the lives of at least some individuals, families, and communities. Trying to take on the debilitating effects of malnutrition is Asociación Puente. The non-profit works directly with pregnant women and young mothers to help ensure better food and nutrition at the vital early stages of life. They also help women start micro-enterprises, to generate the basic income needed to continue putting (nutritious) food on the table.  Founded by former Guatemalan first lady Wendy de Berger and Edna Lima de Morales, the organization has reached over 2,000 families so far. Another is Sheva.com. Started by Marisabel Ruiz, it works to remove at least one of the barriers to girls’ education—puberty. In so many villages Guatemala girls can’t afford sanitary pads. Once they start to menstruate, they miss one out of every four weeks of school, falling permanently behind their classmates and their potential. For each purchase at their U.S. based company, they donate products to girls in need, helping them stay in school. Also in the social entrepreneurship mode is Wakami, an organization started by Maria Pacheco. Originally visiting poor rural communities as a trained biologist, village women kept telling Pacheco what they needed most was jobs. And so Wakami began, harnessing the weaving skills so many women already had but differentiating their products through more modern designs (as opposed to the beautiful but endlessly repeated weavings sold in Guatemala’s local markets). Today, the for-profit business employs nearly five hundred artisans by selling its jewelry in twenty-four countries—including a collaboration with Ann Taylor Loft in the United States. On technology’s cutting edge is MILKnCOOKIES, an interactive communications agency founded by Karla Ruiz Cofiño. Working with clients worldwide to design and build websites, apps and social media strategies, the company leaps up the skill ladder. Competing with technology and app developers globally, it provides not only high paying jobs for those already skilled but also training, presenting at least a handful of fellow citizens a profitable alternative to migration. Each shared what their organizations have found matters to make a difference. One is focusing on women. Studies worldwide show that money given or earned by women is more likely to be spent on children’s food, health, and education. These organizations find similar patterns in their towns, with kids eating better, staying in school longer, and dreaming of a different future than that of their parents when their mothers’ income rises. Another lesson is incorporating men. By providing training and opportunities to everyone in a village, resistance to women’s financial gains lessen. In a society that often restricts a woman and wife’s physical realm to the home, Asociación Puente found that offering workshops and classes to the whole town literally opened the door for women’s involvement. And in a telling discussion with Matilde Garcia, a founder of one of Wakami’s workshops, she related how she employs her husband as her accountant to gain his buy in, though she was quick to share that she is the one that controls the business’ bank accounts. These efforts do help—mattering greatly to those involved by changing individual, family, and community lives. The question remains though can countries such as Guatemala scale these and dozens of other small businesses, non-profits, and non-governmental organizations to change the direction of the nation. Visiting and talking with these women makes you believe that it might in fact be possible.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 24, 2015 to January 30, 2015. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. February 1: Boko Haram attacked Maiduguri, Borno again, but were ultimately repelled by the military. Five-hundred insurgents, two soldiers, and ten civilians died. February 1: A suicide bomber in Potsikum, Yobe killed himself and nine others. Boko Haram is suspected. February 1: A suicide bomber and a second bomb in Gombe killed five, including the bomber, a soldier, and three civilians. Boko Haram is suspected. February 2: A car bomb in Gombe killed the bomber and seventeen others. Boko Haram is suspected. February 2: Electoral violence in Lagos State resulted in the deaths of six. February 3: Chadian soldiers retook the town of Gamboru in Benue from Boko Haram. Two-hundred militants were killed, along with nine Chadian soldiers. February 4: The Chadian and Cameroonian militaries repelled Boko Haram in Fokotol, Cameroon. Three-hundred militants, 100 civilians, 16 Chadian soldiers, and 7 Cameroonian soldiers died in the battle. February 5: Boko Haram launched a retaliatory attack in Fokotol, Cameroon, killing ninety-one civilians. February 6: Niger forces killed 109 Boko Haram militants and lost 5 of their own in Bosso, Niger. There was one additional civilian casualty.