Civil Society

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Bloomberg Markets’ Michael Cohen and Helen Nyambura-Mwaura have analyzed the current state of Africa’s economies in a very interesting article. They point out that despite the current poor performance of Africa’s larger economies (particularly Nigeria and South Africa), some of the continent’s smaller economies, especially in East Africa, are doing well and will likely continue to do so. Unlike Nigeria and South Africa, such East African countries as Kenya and Tanzania have avoided a reliance on commodities. Focusing on agriculture and manufacturing, these economies are poised to continue growing at over 5 percent this year. These countries have also continued to work together toward greater regional regulation and cooperation, as well as committing significant investment in transportation links and telecommunications. The article highlights a home truth about how the continent is treated by international business: Africa is too often painted with a broad brush. They quote economist John Ashbourne, “The narrative of 6 percent growth as far as the eye can see and Africa as a new China is dead, or at least dying, but it was always a bit overblown… At the end of the day Africa is still huge, has a growing population, and massive natural resources. There will always be opportunities.” Unfortunately, it is unlikely that many businesses will stop viewing Africa in a homogenous light anytime soon. As the authors points out, the current disinterest in Nigeria and South Africa is likely to negatively affect investor and business interest in other African economies still showing promise. Those countries can continue to grow their own economies by practicing sound business practices, limiting corruption, and continuing to build regional economic ties.

This is a guest post by Zara Riaz, a research specialist in the Politics Department at Princeton University. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia stands out among neighbors for its political and economic stability. Recent protests and escalating violence, however, expose Ethiopia’s longstanding political tensions and pose a serious threat to the government’s ability to maintain its strong hold. Last November, protests spread across Ethiopia’s Oromia region. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group constituting over 30 percent of the country’s population, demanded an end to the government-sponsored Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, which would have extended the capital city’s limits further onto Oromo territory. The government, dominated by the Tigray minority group representing only 6 percent of the country’s population, announced plans to cancel the initiative in January. Nevertheless, many Oromo have continued to protest their political, economic, and cultural marginalization. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is not unique to the Oromo. The Ethiopian constitution explicitly grants self-determination and the protection of cultural rights for all ethnic groups, however, these rights are far from realized for the majority of the country’s population. For example, speaking Oromiffa is frequently used to identify actual or suspected members of the Oromo Liberation Front, an organization to promote Oromo self-determination that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government. As a result, many Oromos do not feel free to speak their language in public. Protests over officially sanctioned land grabbing have also spread across the Amhara region, home to Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group, the Amhara. Demonstrations among both groups are highlighting that though the country is celebrated for its strong economic growth, only an elite minority benefits. For example, fertile land in Oromia generates roughly 60 percent of Ethiopia’s economic resources, yet the Oromo are repeatedly denied the benefits accruing from these resources. In fact, Oromo land is being used for flower farms in an effort to compete with Kenya for the European market, yet a local resident claims that the government “took 90 percent of the payment and gave 10 percent to the people.” In response to demonstrations, the government is brutally cracking down on dissenters. During the first weekend of August, protests resulted in over one-hundred civilian causalities, while the death toll since the initial protests in November exceeds five-hundred. In the past, government opposition has been routinely interpreted as a threat to national unity and addressed as an act of terrorism. But, current demonstrations by two groups representing over 60 percent of the country’s population will make it more difficult to employ such tactics without igniting further unrest and anger. Though the government in the past has taken advantage of the decades long rivalry once characterizing the relationship between the Oromo and Amhara, the protests are giving birth to a sense of solidarity between the groups in demanding greater representation. These protests across Amhara and Oromo regions and the deteriorating human rights situation in the country cannot be ignored by the international community. Up to now, Western reluctance to condemn the government’s actions has been tied to Ethiopia’s important role in the fight against terrorism in the region. The Western response, which has so far included urging the government to allow international observers in parts of the country and expressing “concern” over the government’s actions, is weak, given the country’s deteriorating situation. The international community should act now to curb the government’s brutality against the protesters to decrease the likelihood of long-term instability in Ethiopia.

This post was co-authored by John Campbell and Allen Grane, research associate for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Many friends of South Africa’s post-1994 “non-racial democracy” have seen developments within the ruling African National Congress (ANC), especially under Jacob Zuma, as threatening the open political system based on the rule of law. So long as voting was largely determined by racial identity, the 80 percent of South Africa’s population that is black seemed to ensure that the party would remain in power indefinitely. The White, Coloured, and Asian minorities supported the Democratic Alliance (DA), but together they are not large enough to constitute an alternative to the ANC, except on the provincial level. (The DA has long dominated predominately Coloured and White Western Cape.) The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which calls for an assault on White “privilege,” were largely confined to the townships. Especially under Zuma, internally the ANC appeared to be moving away from grassroots democracy and toward greater centralization under party apparatchiks, with a focus on “Lithuli House” (the ANC party headquarters in Johannesburg), rather than constitutionally mandated government institutions, often referred to as “Union Buildings” (the seat of government in Pretoria). Patronage, often with a criminal dimension, seemed to flourish under Zuma and his close associates. The disreputable Gupta brothers with their apparent goal of “state capture” (to win contracts) and business ties to Zuma’s son became the ANC’s face. However, the August municipal elections appear to signal the end of monolithic ANC domination of South African political life, and any threat of one-party rule is receding. Post-1994 ANC rule is being replaced by the emergence of coalition politics that have the potential of opening the political process and also of imposing a greater degree of political accountability on elected officials than in the past. At least some voters appear to be moving away from voting according to racial identity and toward issues of government policy. Hence, the August elections appear good for South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy. The chart below shows the swing to the DA and the EFF and away from the ANC. (The totals are never 100 percent because of numerous minor parties.) The data for this graph is found on the website of the electoral commission of South Africa here: http://www.elections.org.za/ South Africa’s largest cities are the heart of its economy and part of the modern world. Up to now, the ANC dominated the municipal governments in Tshwane (Pretoria), Gauteng (Johannesburg), eThekwini (Durban), and Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). The DA dominated Cape Town. Now, however, in most of the major cities, coalitions will be required to produce a majority. In Gauteng, where the ANC won the most votes but not 50 percent plus one, the EFF appears to have the upper hand, and a coalition between the center-right DA and the radical EFF cannot be ruled out. Indeed, there could be many strange bedfellows: there is talk of a possible coalition between the Freedom Front, a White, Afrikaner minor party, and the EFF in hitherto solidly ANC Limpopo province. In general, EFF spokesmen are ruling out coalition arrangements with the ANC. There remain questions that can only be answered following in-depth analysis of the election results. Did in fact significant numbers of blacks abandon the ANC? Or, instead, did they stay home while White, Coloured, and Asian turnout soared? (This seems unlikely, given that turnout was at least 58 percent.) The DA did well, but can its rate of growth be sustained? The EFF did not do as well as had been widely predicted. Nevertheless, it did increase its share of votes. Finally, the National Union of Metal Workers, a large, wealthy trade union, has deep support in Nelson Mandela Bay, a center of South Africa’s automobile industry. It has mooted the establishment of a “responsible, left-wing” new political party for the 2019 national elections. Such a new party could have a significant impact on the future of all three of the major parties that contested in 2016.

“It ain’t over ‘til the fat lady sings,” and at the time of this writing, between 80 and 90 percent of the ballots in South Africa’s 2016 municipal elections have been counted. Most provinces have tallied over 80 percent of the vote, with the exception of Gauteng where Johannesburg and Pretoria are located. Nevertheless, it is likely that current trends will hold. If so, about 53 to 54 percent of the vote will go to the African National congress (ANC), vice 62.15 percent in the 2014 national elections; between 27 and 28 percent to the Democratic Alliance (DA), vice 22.23 percent in 2014; between 7 and 8 percent to the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), vice 6.35 percent in 2014; and, between 4 and 5 percent to the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), vice 2.4 percent in 2014. (The remainder is split among the myriad small parties.) As of this drafting the vote between the ANC and the DA is very close in Johannesburg and Tshwane (Pretoria). The DA looks to have taken the former ANC stronghold of Nelson Mandela Bay (Port Elizabeth). In Johannesburg and Tshwane, township votes, likely to be ANC or EFF, are often the last to be counted, which could result in an ANC “surge” near the end of the  process Commentators report that the elections were almost entirely violence free and were well-conducted. South Africa has a tradition of credible elections, and this one appears no different. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africans have tended to vote along racial lines. Blacks, 80 percent of the population, supported the ANC; Whites and Coloureds, each representing 9 percent of the population, overwhelmingly voted for the DA, joined by Asians. However, over the past several years, the DA has been attempting to expand its racial identity and appeal to black voters, especially within the emerging black middle class and among those born after the end of apartheid. The increase in DA votes in 2016 suggests some success; most of the DA’s new votes appear to have been black. The defections from the ANC similarly would mostly have been black. Voters appear to be moving beyond race and toward issues. The political system is opening up after years of ANC domination, both a cause and an effect of South Africa’s strengthening democracy. Two surprises from the 2016 elections thus far: the first is the revival of IFP, a Zulu cultural movement as well as a political party. Its electoral support has doubled, perhaps reflecting ANC splits in predominately Zulu KwaZulu-Natal province. The other is the EFF. Many had expected that it would do well, perhaps gaining more than 10 percent of the vote, given the accelerating demonstrations in the townships with reference to poor service deliveries associated with ANC politicians. It did do better, but not as well as was expected. The loser is the ANC. Its support has dropped almost 9 percent since 2014. South Africans widely saw the 2016 municipal elections as a referendum on the scandal plagued ANC Zuma government during a time of economic stagnation. Pressure within the ANC for Zuma to go will likely mount. But, Zuma is a wily tactician with a strong degree of control over the internal workings of the ANC party machinery. He may survive yet again.

This is a guest post by Claire Wilmot, a former intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. She is a master of global affairs graduate from the University of Toronto, where she currently researches justice reform. You can follow her on twitter at @claireLwilmot. On July 18, Kenya’s high court charged four police officers in connection with the murders of lawyer Willie Kimani, his client Josephat Mwenda, and their driver Joseph Muiruri. The three men were reported missing after a court hearing on June 23, and their bodies were recovered from the Ol-Donyo Subuk River in Machakos County a week later. Kimani, a lawyer with the International Justice Mission, was acting as Mwenda’s legal defense in a battle over charges laid against him by a police officer during a traffic stop. Mwenda alleged that the officer shot him in the arm during the encounter, and chose to file a complaint with the Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA). Mwenda was subsequently harassed and threatened by the officers involved in the incident until his death on July 1, 2016. The IPOA is a new oversight authority that investigates deaths and injuries caused by members of the Kenyan National Police Services, and can recommend prosecution. It also monitors, reviews, and audits police performance. IPOA was convened in response to Article 244 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, which requires police to behave in a transparent, accountable manner consistent with Kenya’s human rights standards and fundamental freedoms. The Kenyan police have a poor record in this regard, which has contributed to high levels of mistrust between police and civilians. A recent report on Kenyan police accountability found that residents of Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighbourhood are more trusting of non-state security groups than they are of the police. Kenyans of Somali ethnic heritage in Eastleigh have been disproportionately victimized by police, who routinely "disappear" young men suspected of being affiliated with al-Shabab. Similarly, a World Bank survey found that 70.6 percent of residents from Nairobi’s Korogocho neighborhood trusted vigilante groups to reduce crime and violence, while only 4.4 percent trusted the Kenyan police. This degree of mistrust should come as no surprise. The Kenyan police force was designed as a tool of British colonial rule. After independence, Kenya’s presidents retained a centralized, opaque police force to suppress opposition. During Kenya’s 2008 post-election violence, police were believed to have been responsible for 36 percent of civilian deaths and over half of all incidences of torture that occurred. Proponents of IPOA, and police oversight more generally, believe that effective accountability mechanisms help deter police excesses and build trust between civilians and police. Trust is necessary for police to investigate and prevent crimes, which is thought to contribute to community safety. IPOA’s ability to build trust through accountability is hindered by police reluctance to cooperate with investigations, constraints on resources, and a lack of public awareness regarding IPOA’s function. Recognizing the magnitude of its challenges, IPOA recently chose to limit its investigations to only the most serious categories of deaths and injuries caused by police. Despite facing considerable challenges, IPOA has made notable strides. Numbers of complaints reported to IPOA are increasing each year, which may indicate greater public awareness of the institution. Last year, an IPOA investigation led to charges against a Nairobi police officer for the murder of two brothers, and, in 2014, it released a report on Operation Sanitization Eastleigh publicizing civilian accounts of police abuse during anti-terror operations. Kenya has a dire need for empowered and accessible oversight mechanisms that ensure police uphold, rather than undermine, the rule of law. IPOA is a new institution tasked with holding to account a police force used to operating with impunity. Demonstrating its ability to fulfill this function through successful investigations and charge recommendations may encourage more victims to file complaints and cooperate with criminal proceedings. While the Kimani murders are indicative of the severity of Kenya’s problem with police brutality, the outcome of the case could constitute a watershed moment for IPOA, and a meaningful step towards police accountability in Kenya.

The Mugabe regime appears to be continuing to unravel. After the regime arrested Evan Mawarire, a Christian pastor who has emerged as a leader of the protest movement #ThisFlag, judges in an unusual show of independence, ordered his release. Mawarire has now gone to South Africa, but denies he is seeking asylum, according to media. The media also reports that President Robert Mugabe has now referred to Mawarire by name, accusing him of organizing “violent” protests: “So beware these men of cloth, not all of them are true preachers of the Bible. I don’t know whether they are serving God. They spell God in reverse.” The Mugabe regime is also accusing “Western embassies” of supporting the #ThisFlag movement, especially the American and French ambassadors. Protests organized by #ThisFlag have been non-violent. However, there has been violence associated with the official security services. For its part #ThisFlag makes no reference to “regime change” in its social media postings, thereby depriving Mugabe of an excuse for a crackdown. Instead, it says it is mobilizing citizens to hold the government accountable for the “poverty, corruption, and injustice.” Reuters is reporting that the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association has issued a public statement that Mugabe’s “leadership has presided over unbridled corruption and downright mismanagement of the economy.” The war veterans also said they would no longer Support Mugabe’s political campaigns. In the past, Mugabe used the war veterans as thugs against his enemies. Meanwhile, the media is reporting that civil servants are concerned that they will again be paid late, as Zimbabwe has delayed paying its soldiers for the second month in a row. According to the media, soldiers were paid two weeks late last month. The media is reporting that the military will be paid the last week in July, while school teachers will be paid in August. When a regime is unraveling, it is dangerous not to pay soldiers which it relies on for protection.

Africa in Transition usually runs an update of the Nigeria Security Tracker on Mondays. However, July 18 is Nelson Mandela Day, so the Tracker update will appear on Tuesday, July 19. Nelson Mandela was born July 18, 1918. He died in 2013; were he living, he would be 98 years of age. In 2009, the UN General Assembly officially declared July 18 Nelson Mandela International Day, starting 2010. It is the celebration of Mandela’s theme that each individual has the ability and responsibility to change the world for the better. In South Africa, Mandela Day is not a public holiday. Instead, it is intended to honor Mandela’s values of inclusive democracy conducted according to the rule of law and to celebrate his public service. Mandela Day is also an occasion for taking stock of where South Africa is and where it is going. Many of Mandela’s colleagues in the struggle against apartheid and for nonracial democracy believe that under the administration of Jacob Zuma, the country has gone astray. Zuma is mired in scandal and surrounded by cronies of dubious reputation. It is widely said, even within his governing African National Congress (ANC), that he uses intimidation, even blackmail, against his political opponents within the party. His governance decisions are increasingly quixotic, notably his effort to replace a respected finance minister with a crony. Markets swooned and he failed. More broadly, the consequences of three centuries of white supremacy, culminating in apartheid, still rest heavy on South Africa. There has been social and economic progress since the 1994 coming of nonracial democracy, but it has been slow. For many, perhaps most black South Africans, some 80 percent of the population, there has been too little change. However, I argue in Morning in South Africa, released last month, that South Africa’s institutions of governance (based on perhaps the world’s most respected constitution) are continuing to strengthen; this is because these institutions of governance are conducted according to the rule of law with an independent judiciary and defended by civil society and a free press. Notably, the judiciary regularly rules against the Zuma administration, and its decisions are upheld. Even though the ANC has an overwhelming majority of seats in parliament, a vigorous opposition ensures that it is no Zuma rubber-stamp. The so-called “Chapter 9” (of the Constitution) institutions continue to impose limits on what the Zuma administration can do. Democracy conducted according to the rule of law enjoys strong support from South Africans across the racial rainbow. Democracies sometimes go through patches of bad, even criminal governance. We Americans remember the last days of Richard Nixon’s administration. And former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover was no stranger to intimidation and blackmail. Democratic institutions, the rule of law, and active civil society have carried the United States through dark days in the past and will do so now in South Africa.

The tragedy-as-soap-opera starring Paralympian Oscar Pistorius is over. Or, maybe not. Pistorius, a Paralympian gold medalist who also competed in non-disabled events, was a major media celebrity and hero in sports mad South Africa. In 2013, he killed his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp, by shooting her through a closed bathroom door. He maintains that he thought she was an intruder. In 2014, in a trial before Thokozile Masipa, a female, black judge, he was found guilty of “culpable homicide” (roughly the equivalent of manslaughter) and sentenced to five years imprisonment. South Africa does not have the jury system. In South Africa, both the defense and the prosecution have the right to appeal to a higher court. The prosecution did so. In 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeals overturned the verdict of culpable homicide and found him guilty of murder. It then sent him back to Judge Masipa for resentencing. On July 6, 2016, she sentenced him to six years imprisonment, one year more than her sentence for culpable homicide. In her public statement, the judge carefully balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors. Her bottom line: there was no purpose to imposing the usual fifteen-year sentence for murder. (South African judges have discretion in sentencing.) Many South Africans, especially those active on women’s issues, found the judge’s arguments unconvincing. In its aftermath, there has been popular outcry that the sentence reflects the enduring privileges of race and celebrity. (Pistorius is  famous, white, and was once wealthy.) The Pistorius case has for many become emblematic of South Africa’s persistent problems: violence against women, the ubiquitous presence of firearms, the frequency of home invasions, and persistent white privilege. As Greg Nicolson, writes in the Daily Maverick, “Much of the response to Wednesday’s sentencing reflected on the socio-economics of race and class: Pistorius is white and can afford a top legal team, so he was viewed favorably and given a lenient sentence, when black, and particularly poor, people would be judged harshly.” The same observation could too often be made about the operation of the criminal justice system in the United States. The new, six-year sentence may be appealed by the defense and the prosecution. Pistorius’ lawyers have said they will not appeal. It is not yet clear what the prosecution might do, especially given the outcry against the leniency of the sentence. However, if the sentence stands, in eighteen months Pistorius could be given credit for the time he has already served under “correctional supervision” and would be eligible for parole in three years.

Zimbabwe is rapidly deteriorating, if not imploding. In the midst of a drought, estimates are that up to half of the rural population will face hunger or famine in the coming year. The economy is contracting, and the government is running out of hard currency, British sterling, the U.S. dollar, and the South African Rand, which it uses since it abandoned its own currency. The government is failing to pay its civil servants and some of its security forces and has imposed a ban on imports from South Africa. Unemployment figures are so high – up to 85 percent –as to be meaningless. The government’s diamond revenue is running out or diverted. President Robert Mugabe – at times referred to as “Uncle Bob” – is 92 years of age, and it shows. His political behavior is increasingly quixotic. He has abandoned a traditional pillar of his regime, the “war veterans,” who played a crucial role as Mugabe’s thugs and drove the white farmers out. He has even threatened the “veterans” with mayhem if they dabble in succession politics. Mugabe’s party, ZANU-PF, is factionalized over the succession issue, with the security services supporting Emerson Mnangagwa while “Generation 40” supports Mugabe’s wife, Grace, as does Uncle Bob, at least for now. Meanwhile, Zimbabwe functions as an inefficiently repressive police state, and regime critics “disappear.” Government spokesmen blame “opposition parties” and “Western embassies” for fomenting unrest. The traditional opposition parties continue to be in disarray and do not provide a credible alternative to the current regime. Up to now, however, Zimbabweans have been remarkably passive, or they have left the country, especially for South Africa, and they are now found all over the world. Though Zimbabwe is divided ethno-linguistically, the Shona are the largest; Mugabe’s mother was a Shona. And, undeniably, Mugabe retains substantial support, especially in rural areas. After all, he drove the white people off the land, and they may come back once he is gone. However, driven by and fear of hunger, passivity may be giving way to anger and manifesting itself outside conventional politics. There are now daily demonstrations and strikes that attract some of the unpaid government employees. The strikes are widespread, though of limited duration. A strike on July 6 is described by the media as the largest in the country’s history; more are planned for the week of July 11. Thus far, they have apparently been non-violent, though there has been some destruction of property. Reminiscent of the early days of the Arab Spring, demonstrations are organized through social media and by hitherto unknown figures. One is Evan Mawarire. He is a pastor but earns his living, such as it is, as a professional master of ceremonies. According to South African journalist Simon Alllison who has interviewed him, Mawaire was driven into political activism by his inability to raise the money for his children’s school fees. His mode of public protest, now widely adopted, is to wear the Zimbabwean flag around his neck. His hashtag, #ThisFlag, has hits in the tens of thousands. But, again reminiscent of the Arab Spring, Mawarire appears to have no political program beyond overcoming Zimbabwean passivity about a rotten regime, and he claims no affiliation with any political party. The government jailed him on trumped-up charges on July 12. How these strikes and protests evolve will in large part depend on how much violence occurs. There are scattered reports of police violence in “high density suburbs” (slums) outside the country’s largest cities, Harare and Bulawayo. If the security services, those that are still being paid and are loyal to Mugabe, resort to widespread violence, that could ignite deep public rage with unpredictable consequences. An all-too-frequent African pattern is that it is the security services that set off a cycle of violence which then spins out of control. There is also the question of the impact of ongoing public protests on the ZANI-PF internal political jockeying. In so far as the regime is functioning, Mnangagwa appears to be the most responsible, if also the most sinister. A breakdown of order might drive party support his way.  

As directed by the South African courts, the Treasury has determined that President Jacob Zuma owes the state ZAR 7.8 million (US$ 531,024) for work done on his private home, Nkandla. The South African government has spent over ZAR 246 million (US$ 16,747,680) ostensibly on “security upgrades.” Those include underground bunkers, a heliport, and elaborate communications facilities. But, they also include amenities not related to security such as a swimming pool, a chicken run, and a visitors’ center. It is these types of facilities for which the Treasury is seeking repayment. Public expenditure on Nkandla has become a political football, with the opposition parties accusing the president of gross corruption. There has been a series of parliamentary moves and court cases regarding the issue. The upshot has been to strengthen South Africa’s “Chapter 9” institutions, those established by the constitution as outside the control of the government and designed to protect the human rights of South African citizens and to promote good government. In effect, the Nkandla episode has reaffirmed the constitutional limits on the power of parliament, dominated by Zuma’s African National Congress (ANC), and also on the presidency. The episode has reinforced the rule of law. More immediately, Nkandla has reinforced Zuma’s popular reputation for corruption in the run up to important local government elections scheduled for August. Zuma has alienated some of the founders of the ANC, who have called for him to resign. If the August elections do not go well for the ANC, it is a distinct possibility that the ANC will remove Zuma from the party leadership, and, in effect, the presidency. However, Zuma retains support. Zuma’s political allies, the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (where Nkandla is located) and the ANC Women’s League, have called upon ANC members voluntarily to contribute to the Zuma repayment. The former general secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COASTU), a parliamentary ally of the ANC but an enemy of Zuma, has denounced the proposal. Nkandla occupies tribal trust land controlled by Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. In principle, tribal land cannot be mortgaged, bought, or sold. This greatly reduces any market value Nkandla might have. King Zwelithini is a close ally of fellow Zulu Jacob Zuma. On June 28, King Zwelithini announced that he has started the process by which residential occupants of trust land will become fee simple owners of the land they occupy. That means the property could be bought, sold, and mortgaged. This would l be a personal bonanza for Zuma, and it is hard to believe that Zuma’s travails and King Zwelithini’s move are unrelated. *All currency conversions are based on rates from June 30, 2016.

This is a guest post by Russell Hanks. Mr. Hanks is a national security professional and a retired diplomat with the U.S. Department of State. Guinea-Bissau has a new government, or not, only a few months after the previous attempt to paper over its seriously polarized politics. Elections in 2014 were indecisive and installed officials with the same differences that led to the 2012 coup. The current dispensation is no more likely to bring political stability to the nation than the last. Guinea-Bissau has been plagued by instability since its independence in 1974. Following independence, two decades of one-party government stalled progress. An accommodation among the then-political factions was within grasp in the 1990s, as the one-party system gave way to efforts to liberalize the nation. These efforts were aborted by civil war and the subsequent intervention by its neighbors. Post-civil war, the three primary factions came to an uneasy accommodation. The old guard remained in control. A second group of politicians strived to break this faction’s hold on the economy. The third power element, the military, focused on promoting nationalism and served as the arbiter between the two political factions. Assassinations, coup plots, and corruption upset the balance among the three. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior (Cadogo) stepped into the vacuum left by the assassinations of both the president and the chief of defense staff. Cadogo proceeded to starve the military, forcing it to self-finance. Not limited to the military, the theft of natural resources (fisheries and timber) and transshipping cocaine expanded to provide needed funding. The opposition found itself fighting a defensive battle as suspicious murders and police intimidation of its supporters continued. Cadogo’s heavy-handed approach to the 2012 elections, necessary after the unexpected death of the president, precipitated a 2012 military coup that ousted him from power. In the two years of interim government preceding the 2014 elections, Cadogo was exiled and his political power diminished. The elections of 2014, however, exacerbated the divisions in the polity. After much acrimony, Domingos Simōes Pereira, a reformer, took the leadership of the majority party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde. However, a former Cadogo supporter, Jose Mario Vaz, gained the party’s nomination and eventually won the presidency. Vaz was elected president and Pereira became prime minister. Vaz, intent on continuing a policy of crony capitalism, almost immediately challenged Pereira’s efforts at institutional reform and reconciliation with the international community. In 2016, Vaz dismissed Pereira. While current trends remain unclear, it appears that Vaz and his supporters remain intent on continuing the climate of corruption and impunity. Pereira and his allies are still working, although from a disadvantaged position, toward reforms. The military remains in the barracks for the moment, but it is unclear if it remains united behind its new leadership. While the president has sworn in another new prime minister, constitutional questions remain about his legitimacy. Until those questions are resolved, development and reform are stalled. Without a new election, not likely before 2018, the unstable political and economic situation will continue. Narcotics trafficking remains lower than in 2011, but corruption continues. Within each of the competing groups there are reform-minded people; but unless they can unify, any present or future government will remain hampered by challenges to its authority and questions of its legitimacy.    

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Last week, authorities at Juba International Airport seized nearly a ton and a half of ivory in South Sudan. This seizure highlights some of the critical factors in the fight against wildlife trafficking. The flight coming from Uganda was scheduled to fly to Malaysia via Cairo, one of the key entrepôt’s for wildlife trafficking in Africa. In 2014, C4ADS conducted a study called Out of Africa that highlighted the five airports from which most African ivory is trafficked to Asia. These are: Quatro de Fevereiro (Angola), Addis Ababa Bole International (Ethiopia), O.R. Tambo International (South Africa), Jomo Kenyatta International (Kenya), and Cairo International (Egypt). But, the Juba seizure highlights the importance of monitoring transit points for ivory smuggled within Africa. As the Juba seizure illustrates, ivory and other wildlife products may travel through many countries and transport hubs prior to ever leaving the continent. From the enforcement perspective, this means that there are more opportunities to prevent these products from reaching consumer markets. In the case of Juba, it is worth noting that such a large shipment was transported by air. Based on the experience of previous seizures, this is relatively uncommon. For various reasons, including transport costs, airfreight has been less appealing for smugglers transporting large quantities of ivory. Up to now, the volume of trafficked wildlife has been much greater by sea than by air. In most cases of airborne trafficking the amount seized is under ten kilograms. The Juba shipment was more than 280 times that. The Juba seizure highlights the importance of monitoring all potential routes for trafficked wildlife. As pressure from the international community and law enforcement agencies increases, wildlife traffickers will begin to try and find new locations to transport their cargo from and new strategies for distribution. Hence, a two and a half ton airfreight of ivory through Juba international airport.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 4, 2016 to June 10, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   June 4: Fulani herdsmen killed fifteen in Ukum, Benue. June 5: Cultists killed eleven in Emuoha, Rivers. June 7: Cultists killed five in Makurdi, Benue. June 8: The Delta Avengers blew up a pipeline in Warri, Delta. June 9: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram insurgents in Bama, Borno. June 9: Nigerien and Chadian troops killed 130 Boko Haram insurgents in Bosso, Niger.

There is less than meets the eye to the South African parliament’s passage at the end of May of a land reform bill, called the “Expropriation Bill.” Ostensibly, the new legislation has some similarity to law of eminent domain in the United States. The new legislation would permit the government to take land for a “public purpose,” but (as in the United States) South African landowners would be compensated with an amount determined by a new ‘valuer general.’ The new legislation replaces the “willing buyer, willing seller” principle of land reform. The parliamentary vote was almost entirely by the governing African National Congress (ANC); the principal opposition parties, including the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters, were not present or walked out. It is commonly estimated that since the end of apartheid only about 8 to 10 percent of white-owned land has been transferred to blacks. Background to land reform is to be found in Chapter 6 of my recently released book, “Morning in South Africa.” The ANC, facing local and provincial elections in August, is increasingly dependent on a rural, black constituency. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is politically allied with the ANC, along with the South African Communist Party (SACP). Accordingly, the COSATU spokesman hailed the new legislation as addressing “the legacies of apartheid and colonialism.” He denounced opposition as “hysterical attacks” by those who “clearly miss and are nostalgic for an era, where this country belonged to [a] minority and the majority was treated as second class citizens.” Clearly the ANC sees the new legislation as a populist electoral plus. However, deputy public works minister and longtime SACP activist Jeremy Cronin correctly cautions: “It’s very important to not see this framework bill as some kind of silver bullet that’s going to solve all problems in regard to land reform.” Constitutional law expert Pierre de Vos is quoted in the media as observing that expropriation of property is subject to the South African constitution and fair market prices. He notes that the government is short of funds to buy large amounts of land at market prices. Nor is there much money for the support of small farmers. His bottom line: the bill is unlikely to make much difference. AgriSA, a commercial farmers union, tells the media that it will monitor the legislation’s implementation and “take to court any attempts to expropriate agricultural land without full compensation.” The judiciary has repeatedly and successfully affirmed its independence from the ANC administration. Other commentators see agricultural land reform as yesterday’s issue. John Kane-Berman at the South African Institute of Race Relations is quoted in the media as saying that the black demand for farm land is much less than land for housing in cities: “The view in the ANC that land is the answer to poverty, inequality, and unemployment has no basis in reality. Ordinary people have long since voted against this idea with their feet by moving to town.” He makes an important point: the country is rapidly urbanizing, with more than 60 percent of South Africans living in urban areas.

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sunlight is the best disinfectant, or so the saying goes. While New York and Washington, DC, have been drenched with rain over the past month, the sun is beginning to shine again in both cities. Light is also beginning to shine inside the United Nations, at least when it comes to high-level appointments.  For the first time, the next UN secretary-general (SG), director general of the World Health Organization (WHO), and nonpermanent members of the Security Council will all be selected through more transparent procedures. Though still a far cry from free and fair elections, these reforms are a historic departure from the traditional secrecy and horse-trading that reigns at the United Nations. And the resulting choices will matter. Elected members help shape the Security Council’s work. The director general of the WHO must lead the organization in responding to fast-moving health crises that do not stop at national borders. And the next UN secretary-general will confront a daunting agenda, including the largest humanitarian crisis since World War II, growing demands for UN peacekeepers, and resurgent geopolitical competition among the great powers. The Races UN Secretary-General The current UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, will leave office at the end of 2016. Traditionally, the SG selection has been a closed door affair negotiated by the Security Council’s permanent members (P5) and rubber-stamped by the UN General Assembly. Thanks to pressure from civil society groups and activist UN member states, Ban’s successor is being chosen in a markedly more open process. In April, a packed General Assembly hosted the first-ever public interviews with the (then) nine candidates, each of whom faced two hours of questioning from member states after submitting a CV and written statement. Rather than the stale affair many had anticipated, the interviews turned out to be surprisingly heavy on substance and did not shy away from difficult topics including sovereignty, civil rights, UN reform, and abuses perpetrated by UN peacekeepers. The second round of debates, which begin Tuesday, will allow two new entrants in the race to impress member states. The candidate to watch will be Susana Malcorra, Argentinian minister of foreign affairs who formerly served as Ban Ki-Moon’s chief of staff. WHO Director General In late April, the WHO initiated its own process to succeed Margaret Chan, whose term as director general ends in June 2017. Chan’s successor will have his or her hands full in restoring the credibility that WHO lost following its belated response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak. The agency has struggled to raise funds to combat the Zika virus, and it faces complex reform challenges. Unlike Chan and her predecessors, who were selected by the WHO’s thirty-four-member executive board, with frequent allegations of corruption, the next director general will be elected through a secret ballot of all WHO member states. Candidates will be required to present a written statement, as well as field questions from WHO member states in a forum this autumn. Candidates must also adhere to a code of conduct (PDF) during the campaign period. Already, hopefuls from Ethiopia, France, and Pakistan have thrown their hats in the ring, with more expected before the list closes in September. Nonpermanent Security Council members The beam of light is even illuminating the Security Council, where last week for the first time countries competing for five nonpermanent seats submitted to questions from member states and civil society. The open hearings, held in advance of the June 28 elections in the General Assembly, covered a wide range of topics, including Security Council reform, climate change, and peacekeeping. They were also a major departure from the traditional campaign. This typically starts with private negotiations within regional groupings that determine which states will run, and frequently results in clean slate tickets. And when competitive races actually take place, campaigning often occurs behind closed doors, with countries seeking commitments from other member states, sometimes years in advance. Under this business as usual scenario, quids pro quo are common; candidates may offer support to countries in other UN elections, development assistance, or commitments to highlight (or steer clear of) certain issues while holding a Security Council seat. This year, three of the five elections are genuinely competitive:  Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden are competing for two seats in the Western Europe and Other group and Kazakhstan and Thailand are competing for one Asia-Pacific seat. (Ethiopia and Bolivia are running uncontested for the Africa and Latin America seats respectively.) What these Reforms Mean for the Campaign and Tenure of Candidates Critics have dismissed these changes as mere window dressing. After all, the elections remain exclusive affairs in practice: the P5 will still exercise undue influence on the choice of the next SG, behind-the-scenes negotiations within regional groups will still influence the election of nonpermanent UNSC seats, and major donors will likely still have an outsized role in determining the next director general of the WHO. Nevertheless, the new transparency processes are having a real impact, rewarding candidates with particular skill sets. Consider the SG race. Going into the first round of hearings, the smart money was on Irina Bokova of Bulgaria, who possessed a unique combination of traits: As head of the UN Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), she has a deep understanding of the United Nations. She also hails from Eastern Europe, the only region that has not yet held the post, and is a woman at a time that support is building to choose the first female secretary-general. However, many found her interview performance disappointing, especially when compared to candidates who came across as more personable, particularly Antonio Guterres of Portugal and Helen Clark of New Zealand. Indeed, had he competed this year rather than in 2006, it’s unlikely that Ban Ki-Moon, described as among the dullest and least eloquent of past secretaries-general, would have outshone his competitors. The more open process may also have positive implications for the subsequent tenure of the successful candidate. More formal campaigns require candidates to make clear statements about their priorities and to articulate positions on more difficult issues. Even if a select group of member states continues to wield an undue influence in the ultimate selection, civil society groups and the public at large can help hold the victors accountable for their campaign pledges. The Reforms Come with Added Risk These tentative efforts at transparency also carry dangers, however. Like partial democratic openings at the national level, they risk giving the surface appearance of change while allowing business as usual to continue in the shadows.  Corruption is a particular concern. With more member states involved in elections, candidates will seek to curry favor, sometimes through quiet promises of cushy appointments or whispered pledges of support. In an effort to discourage such behavior, the WHO’s own code of conduct calls on member states and candidates to avoid “improperly influencing” the elections. However, as Laurie Garrett notes, in this election cycle candidates for WHO director general will need to garner support from 194 member states during a five-month campaign period—a situation ripe for bribes or other forms of corruption. Secret ballots in all three races also complicate identifying corruption after the fact. Finally, all three elections are not subject to any campaign finance rules, implying that states and candidates with significant election coffers will have an advantage in nudging out less financially wealthy competitors. Anticipating competition from Romania, Estonia is already setting aside funds for its campaign for a nonpermanent Security Council seat in 2020. Despite these risks, recent efforts to increase transparency in the selection of leaders of multilateral institutions are to be welcomed. They should be treated like the dawn—the promise of greater light to come.