Civil Society

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 28, 2016 to June 3, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   May 28: Gunmen killed eight in Ahoada East, Rivers. May 29: Suspected cultists killed six in Emuoha, Rivers. May 29: A religious clash led to the deaths of four in Rafi, Niger. May 29: A bomb planted by Boko Haram killed one soldier and four civilians in Biu, Borno. May 29: Nigerian soldiers killed fifteen oil militants in Brass, Bayelsa. May 30: Nigerian soldiers clashed with oil militants and Biafran protestors, resulting in the deaths of eight soldiers and twenty civilians in Ontisha, Anambra. May 30: Herdsmen killed seven in Konshisha, Benue. June 1: Oil militants killed three soldiers and four civilians in Warri, Delta. June 2: Nigerian soldiers killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Chukungudu, Borno (Local government area could not be found–estimated at Gwoza). June 2: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Nganzai, Borno. June 2: One Nigerian soldier was killed along with eight Boko Haram militants during a Boko Haram ambush in Mafa, Borno.

South Africa’s sporting record is outstanding. The country regularly produces world-class performances in golf, tennis, cricket, rugby, and soccer (‘football’). As with much else, sports in South Africa are shaped by race. Under apartheid, like everything else, sports were strictly segregated by race. White South Africans, especially, were ‘sports mad,’ and felt keenly the imposition of sporting sanctions as part of the world wide anti-apartheid campaign. Of the two mass spectator sports, rugby was ‘white’ while soccer was ‘black.’ Other sports, such as tennis and golf, were almost exclusively play by white South Africans. Twenty-one years after the ‘transition to non-racial democracy,’ the pattern remains largely the same. Whites, about 9 percent of the population, dominate golf, tennis, cricket, and rugby. Soccer is almost entirely black, with the national squad having a sole white player. The Springboks, the national rugby team, has thirty-six players, of whom twelve are “of color,” with the ‘majority’ being black Africans. (The others ‘of color’ are likely to be coloured, who often regard themselves as a separate race, or ‘Asians’.) The policy of the governing African National Congress (ANC) is the ‘transformation’ of sports to ensure the end of apartheid injustices. To that end, the Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, has announced he will ban certain South African sports bodies from hosting international events “because of their failure to reach their transformation target.” The sports targeted are cricket, netball, and rugby. Despite ANC policy, a recent South African Institute of Race Relations poll indicates that over 70 percent of black South Africans believe sports teams should be chosen based purely on merit, and not the transformation goals. As with affirmative action in the United States, mathematical percentages loom large in the South African debate. For example, one South African tweeted, “White people make up 8.9 percent of South Africa’s population. One white player in #Bafana is 9.1 percent of team, which is more than enough #Transformation #Mbalula” (Bafana Bafana is the male national soccer team’s nickname.) Black South Africans have been slow to make a mark in certain sports where the costs of participation can be high. Hence, in part, the paucity of black South African tennis or cricket players. Their impact, however, is growing in prominence in rugby.

A footnote to the May 2016 forest and brush fires in Alberta, Canada is the presence of three hundred South African professional firefighters. They had previously received training in the use of Canadian firefighting equipment. Air Canada transported the firefighters from South Africa to northern Alberta, a flight that lasted more than twenty hours. According to Canadian media, the flight was the first time Air Canada operated to South Africa. The South Africans are part of Working on Fire, a South African government-funded job creation program with a focus on the marginalized. According to its website, it has five thousand men and women trained in wildfire fighting with two hundred bases around the country. Almost one third are women, the highest percentage of any firefighting force in the world, according to the website of Working on Fire. Wildfires have always been a part of the ecology of South Africa, often used as a tool for the management of grasslands and some forests. There are two fire seasons: the summer in the Western Cape, and the winter almost everywhere else. As elsewhere, now most fires in South Africa are started by accident or through carelessness. Working on Fire would appear to be an effective program that directly addresses marginalized youth, especially in the rural areas, in addition to meeting the need for wildfire fighters. It is not clear from media sources whether the Alberta government compensated the South African organization for wildfire fighting services, or instead paid the firemen individually.

The following text is the entirety of John Campbell’s speech delivered at the Nigeria Summit on National Security held by the Council on African Security and Development in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 25, 2016.  Thank you for your warm introduction. It is a pleasure to be at this important conference, to see old friends, make new ones, and to be back in Nigeria. I am honored to be billed as a “principal speaker.” But, let me begin my remarks with a disclaimer. I retired from the U.S. Foreign Service in 2007. Since 2009, I have been at the Council on Foreign Relations. So, in no way do I speak for the Obama administration or the U.S government. Nor do I speak for the Council which does not adopt formal positions on international, political, or other issues. However, I am a friend of Nigeria of longstanding. Long ago my imagination was captured by the vision of Nigeria as a multiethnic, pluralistic democracy based on the rule of law with the heft to give Africa a seat at the table – the “Nigeria Project.” So, my views may be of some interest, if only from the perspective of how things look to a highly sympathetic observer. The title of this session is “The Surge of Insurgency/Terrorism in Recent Times: Social and Economic Consequences.” To state the obvious, from Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the west to the so-called Islamic State redoubts in Libya to al-Shabab in the east, African states are increasingly facing terrorism and its consequences at the hands of radicals who claim to be Islamic. This morning, I am mostly going to refer to Nigeria, the West African country I know best. And that means my remarks will be dominated by Boko Haram, its consequences, and the response to it by Nigeria and the international community. Let there be no misunderstanding. Boko Haram is evil, to use theological language that will be understood in this deeply religious country. Nevertheless, trying to understand it is not the same thing as endorsing it or tolerating it. Failing to think hard about it can lead to a misreading of its consequences and result in poor policy choices. Boko Haram and its ilk are new. Not a single sovereign state endorses the kind of vicious and indiscriminate violence perpetrated by Boko Haram. Its crimes go way beyond rebellion against duly constituted authority. Its adherents are, among other things, murderers, kidnappers, rapists, smugglers, and extorters. They attack schools. They butcher teachers, murder young boys, kidnap young girls, of whom the Chibok girls are the best known. Boko Haram uses the term marriage to describe what is actually rape. Recovery from the social and economic consequences of Boko Haram is a challenge for Nigeria, and also for its international partners and friends. We need to step back and look at what we are up against. Pew Trust polling over the past year finds that about one Nigerian Muslim in five is favorably inclined toward the Islamic State. A separate Pew poll finds that ten percent of all Nigerians are favorably disposed toward Boko Haram. Polling data is always subject to question, and the Pew data is counterintuitive in many ways. Nevertheless, it does indicate that though only a small percentage the population may be favorably disposed toward Boko Haram, it would still appear to be large enough to provide Boko Haram with a significant reservoir of recruits for a long time. Boko Haram’s stated goal is the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth through justice for the poor by strict implementation of sharia. This can be a powerful message in a region that is increasingly impoverished and feels itself marginalized. Marginalization is both a cause and a result of Boko Haram. A consequence of Boko Haram is a mindset resembling the product of brainwashing. This is a reality that projects to deradicalize Boko Haram participants will have to take into account. Perhaps we should start with the observation that while Boko Haram has roots in the past, in its present form it is new. It might be useful to recall its trajectory. In 2004 as American ambassador I could travel throughout all of Nigeria—and did so. At about the same time, malam Mohammed Yusuf established his commune at the Railway Quarter mosque in Maiduguri. This group would eventually become known as Boko Haram. We at the embassy knew about the commune, but paid it little attention. At that time it was not associated with violence. Moreover, its members would have nothing to do with western diplomats. But, by 2007, on occasion Boko Haram was murdering religious and political rivals. Subsequently, Boko Haram began aggressively to attack Nigerian state personnel (especially soldiers and police). In 2009 it launched an insurrection centered in Maiduguri. While putting it down, the police and security services extrajudicially killed Mohammed Yusuf and hundreds of his followers. (A video of Yusuf’s murder went viral in northern Nigeria.) The group then went underground until 2011 when under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau it mounted successful jail breaks and its first suicide attacks. By 2014 it had captured a portion of northeastern Nigeria the size of Belgium and appeared to be threatening Maiduguri. Boko Haram’s success undermined popular confidence in the Jonathan administration’s ability to protect the people—a fundamental responsibility of any government. In response to the success of Boko Haram and looking toward the impending 2015 national elections, the Nigerian, Chadian, and Nigerien security services assisted by South African-led mercenaries pushed Boko Haram out of most of the territory it controlled. It was during this time period that Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. We now understand that Boko Haram’s remarkable success in the 2011-2015 period owed something to the shortcomings of the army and the police, at least in part because corruption deprived soldiers of what they needed to fight. The struggle continues and Boko Haram is tactically flexible. In the face of a much stronger Nigerian military response, Boko Haram has moved away from occupying territory. Instead, Boko Haram has increased its use of suicide bombers, most of them female, against “soft” targets. Moreover, the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that forty-four children were involved in suicide bombing in 2015, up from four in 2014. Seventeen were in Nigeria, the rest in Chad and Cameroon. That, too, is a new and evil consequence of Boko Haram. Suicide has always been culturally anathema in West Africa, unlike in the Middle East, where it first appeared in a political context as part of the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1983. The social and economic consequences of Boko Haram are dire. Violence between Boko Haram and the security services has resulted in an estimated more than two million internally displaced persons and hundreds of thousands of refugees outside Nigeria’s borders. There are government estimates that Boko Haram has caused at least nine billion U.S. dollars in property damage. Little planting and less harvesting raises the specter of famine. OCHA estimates that three million are food insecure. It estimates that some 486,000 children in Borno and 242,000 children in Yobe are suffering from Global Acute Malnutrition. In addition, some 73,000 children under two years of age need urgently to receive ready-to-use supplementary specialized nutritious food. Without intervention an estimated 67,000 children from six months of age to fifty-nine months who suffer from severe malnutrition are likely to die in Borno and Yobe in 2016. What should we do? By ‘we’ I mean Nigeria and its international partners. The first is the need to counter and overcome Boko Haram efforts to impose radical extremism on Nigerians and their neighbors. Here, the Buhari administration has made important progress. But, beating Boko Haram on the battlefield is only the beginning. We must strike at the root—the root causes of Boko Haram. And we cannot do that unless we understand what those roots are. So let me return to the question of why people might join or support or acquiesce to Boko Haram. Some individuals within Boko Haram are driven by ethnic and religious allegiances or by membership in patronage networks that are allied to it. Others support it in response to oppression, especially human rights violations by the security services. Some likely have a selfish and shortsighted political agenda. Still others, however, are radicalized for reasons that have little to do with religion or politics. Some people appear to embrace Boko Haram because they have trouble finding meaning in life or economic opportunity; because they are deeply frustrated, and because they hope that Boko Haram will give them a sense of identity or purpose or power that they have not received elsewhere. When people have no hope for the future and no faith in legitimate authority, when they have no outlet for expressing their concerns, their frustration festers. And no one knows that better than Boko Haram. Accordingly, Boko Haram can be a consequence of personal alienation, and at the same time a cause of personal alienation. Boko Haram does all that it can to promote individual alienation from Nigerian society. In other countries challenged by radical terrorism, not just Nigeria, young people are essentially the swing votes in the fight against violent extremism. We need them to make wise choices, and yet, that is less likely if they grow up without faith in government, without an education, without the chance for a better life. Overcoming such challenges includes improving the climate for domestic and foreign investment. It means streamlining bureaucracies and preventing cronies from crowding out private enterprise. It means giving women and girls an equal chance in the classroom. Bribery, fraud, and other forms of venality feed terrorism and organized crime. Narcotics and arms traffickers are often links among terrorist networks, perhaps including Boko Haram and the Islamic State redoubts in Libya. This reality means that President Buhari’s fight against Nigeria’s culture of corruption, already a major achievement of his presidency, is a security priority of the first order as well as a cornerstone of improved governance. Boko Haram’s trajectory with its focus on Nigeria may be changing. Shekau’s pledge of allegiance to the self-proclaimed Islamic State may be “internationalizing” it.” The pledge has provided a layer of legitimacy to Boko Haram among radical extremists, giving it a greater ability to attract likeminded individuals in the region. There are reports of small numbers joining Boko Haram from elsewhere in West Africa, particularly Senegal, and of Boko Haram operatives joining the fight in Libya. While marginal at present, this could potentially be a lasting source of concern. U.S. Brig. Gen. Donald Bolduc claims a weapons convoy from the Islamic State in Libya was stopped as it moved toward the Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram is active. This convoy could be one of the first concrete examples of a direct link between the two extremist groups. It was carrying small-caliber weapons and heavy machine guns, equipment Boko Haram is likely to need. An “internationalized” Boko Haram could result in its expanded operations elsewhere in Nigeria, and also outside the country. So, as Boko Haram’s trajectory shifts, so too do the social and economic consequences of it. Conventional wisdom is that by providing good governance and restoring popular confidence in the government, Nigeria can address the consequences of Boko Haram. This is a tall order, especially in a time of declining government revenue, and naturally raises the question of outside assistance. But, a very fundamental question is how much impact outsiders—such  as the United States and the EU—can have on Nigeria’s fight against terrorism and its trajectory toward democracy and good governance. I think we can help, but only at the invitation and initiative of Nigeria. With respect to Boko Haram, it would seem imperative to integrate security interventions with political and economic initiatives. For a start, this will require serious diplomatic engagement by Nigeria and its partners, especially the United States, with the other countries in the region, and also with the Saudis and the Gulf, and, I would suggest, with countries as far away as Malaysia and Indonesia. There is also the need to overcome distrust. Not only do governments and the governed distrust each other in certain areas, it is fanned by Boko Haram. The governments in the regions themselves often instinctively distrust each other. Boko Haram, too, fans that distrust. Elsewhere in this conference we will be looking at ways to move forward. In the meantime, let me throw out five ideas that might be worth thinking about as ways to respond to the social and economic consequences of Boko Haram and the struggle against it. First, I am hearing that the EU-funded, deradicalization programs appear to work. The trouble is they are too small. They should be greatly expanded if they are to have transformative impact. The programs are expensive at exactly the time that Nigeria’s oil-based revenue has fallen by up to 40 percent. Nigeria, the EU, and the U.S. could approach Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States for increased financial assistance to ensure their expansion. Second, security service abuses have been a driver of Boko Haram recruitment. They limit the field of military cooperation with, among others, the United States. They often appear to be the result of poor training, ill-discipline, and resource constraints. Security service human rights abuses must be addressed in a way that is convincing to harness the international community abroad and everyday people at home to the struggle against Boko Haram and also for the reconstruction of the northeast. One way to proceed might be for Nigeria to establish a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” or something like it, that would investigate credible allegations of both security service and Boko Haram abuse. It would include amnesty to those who confess. Like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, it could be made up of distinguished Nigerians from all walks of life—not just the security services. It should be conducted in public and transparent in its operations. A successful TRC might have the potential to restore a degree of trust among the shattered communities in the northeast where in liberated areas there is suspicion that returnees are Boko Haram converts. Such a body might meet the requirements of the Leahy amendment and the UK equivalent, opening the possibility for more U.S. cooperation with the Nigerian security services. The Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTF) has been accused of human rights abuses and lack of discipline. President Buhari has raised incorporating them into the police and the military where they would be subject to discipline. That would be a positive step toward restoring trust between the civilian population and the security services. As for training, the United States, the UK, and other friends and partners should greatly expand the opportunities for Nigerian military officers to attend their advanced war colleges—in the American case, notably the Army War College at Carlisle, the Air War college at Maxwell Field, and the Naval war college at Newport. Nigerian officers are already enrolled in all three, but in very small numbers. Third, over the longer term, the reconstruction of the northeast will require an international effort. As for now, to promote international understanding of the magnitude of the task, it is to be hoped that the security services will facilitate visits to the region by the international media, NGOs, and also by potential investors. National and international organizations, too, will need the ability to visit and assess humanitarian need. The intervention of the World Food Programme and relevant NGOs is likely to be essential if famine is to be avoided. Over the longer term numerous international agricultural agencies could have a highly productive role in the rebuilding of northeastern agriculture. The region has long been among Nigeria’s poorest, even before Boko Haram. The traditional economy in the northeast is largely destroyed. A new economy will have to be built, one that takes into account climate change and desertification. What would a post-Boko Haram reconstructed northeast look like? The process of visioning should begin now. Proposals for a Northeast Development Commission are steps in that direction. Fourth, the education system has also been destroyed. In a region were literacy was already low, estimates are that Boko Haram has destroyed 910 schools and forced an additional 1,500 to close. Rebuilding education so that graduates can function in the modern world and at the same time in the context of the region’s strong Islamic identity is a challenge. Here, too, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Malaysia, and Indonesia could be of help. Fifth, the health system, too, already weak, has largely been destroyed, raising the specter of epidemic diseases. International organizations and partners should be approached for help. Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from other countries that have experienced disaster, such as Haiti. I note that Cuba is offering an expanded health partnership and assistance to Nigeria. Such offers deserve serious consideration. These are musings that may or may not deserve further discussion. In conclusion, I would observe that Nigeria is a fellow pilgrim with the United States and other countries on the road to democracy. Nigeria moves on that road in a way that reflects Nigeria’s own history, experience, and challenges, just as America’s does. (Who would have predicted that Donald Trump would be the outcome of the Republican presidential nominating process?) My own personal view is that when we are talking about the post-Boko Haram reconstruction of the northeast in the context of democracy, government transparency and the rule of law are essential components. And transparency and the rule of law build trust between the government and the governed. Thank you.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Later this year, Somalia looks to continue its recent progress by holding a successful parliamentary election. The election provides an opportunity to improve governance in the country and could illustrate the improvement Somalia has made to the donor community, international businesses, and the world. But, enormous pitfalls remain, and Somalia’s partners, including the United States, have expressed concerns about the process. This election could prove to be disastrous and set Somalia back if not handled correctly. To cope with these pitfalls, Somalia is forced to rely on an already strained African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to secure this election, but international support appears to be waning for the African Union (AU) force. The AU should reaffirm its commitment to Somalia and implore member and donor nations to not give up on AMISOM, and Somalia, yet. As Somalia approaches the election, slated for September 2016, the most obvious sources of disruption will probably come from the terrorist group al-Shabab and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Both will likely try to play spoiler in this process as both have used politically or religiously important events to magnify the relevance of their attacks. Beyond typical security concerns, there are also humanitarian concerns that could mar the election. Somalia’s neighbor, Ethiopia is already in the grips of the worst drought in decades and reports have started to come in from Somalia of similar conditions. Further, El Nino may actually bring increased rainfall to Somalia this year, potentially causing flooding and washing away crops. As the Economist points out, the aid community is already stretched thin by situations in Yemen and Syria, and ongoing issues with refugees in Europe. Foreseeing potential problems, the Somali government has already shied away from a true popular vote and opted for a more modest election. This all but ensures that an election will take place, but the positive effects that Somalia hopes to gain from a successful election may be overshadowed if it cannot mitigate the potential pitfalls. Despite a number of issues with AMISOM, including a lack of cohesion and not enough troops to completely extinguish al-Shabaab, the institution is currently the best suited to cope with this confluence of issues. As the only force that can counter al-Shabab and hold territory it is, by far, the most effective institution in Somalia and is the biggest driver of stability. The government can and should depend on AMISOM to secure the election. However, the AU must support and bolster AMISOM if it is to succeed. More troops and better communication are needed. Unfortunately, when the AU should be increasing support for AMISOM, it seems like it will be providing less. Earlier this month the BBC reported that Uganda is beginning a review of its troop force in Somalia and considering pulling them out. This is the largest contingent of soldiers in AMISOM and their departure would severely hamper the ability of AMISOM to support the federal government. This comes on the heels of recent reports that the European Union is going to cut AMISOM funding to try to force Burundi into peace talks. Although the internal strife gripping Burundi is troubling, soldiers from Burundi make up nearly a quarter of AMISOM forces, and this misguided effort would cripple an already hobbled AMISOM at a crucial moment. European and African lawmakers should think carefully about the knock on effects of these decisions. Not only would the success of the election be in danger, it would also provide the space for al-Shabab to reemerge, or the Islamic State to secure a base in Somalia. Although AMISOM cannot stay in Somalia forever, this is not the time to reduce its funding or decrease its troop size.

This is a guest post by Sherrie Russell-Brown. She is an international human rights lawyer, who writes about issues of gender, security, international justice and humanitarian law, with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The Nigeria Foundation for the Support of Victims of Terrorism, also known as the Victims Support Fund (VSF), is an organization with a mandate to administer support to and raise awareness of the victims of Boko Haram’s insurgency. While a key initiative of the Federal Government of Nigeria, implementation is private sector driven. To date, the VSF has raised approximately twenty-eight of fifty-four billion naira pledged in 2014. According to Professor Sunday Ochoche, executive director of the VSF, a conservative estimate of two trillion naira would be required for the immediate short term intervention to address the physical damages associated with the insurgency. No single agency, not even the Federal Government, has the capacity to sufficiently address the damages caused by Boko Haram. The VSF has identified three key priority areas: women’s economic empowerment, children’s education, and the mainstreaming of psychosocial support. By the end of this year, ten thousand women in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states are expected to benefit from the VSF’s economic empowerment program focused on fostering entrepreneurship. Approximately twenty thousand children are reported to be in the VSF educational support program, with hopes of meeting the needs of over fifty thousand children by year’s end. The program supplies the children with everything they need to return to school, from books to shoes. The VSF also supports the Safe Schools Initiative with two billion naira, the largest interim measure to which the VSF has contributed. Psychosocial support is mainstreamed throughout the VSF’s initiatives and it has also given grants to hospitals in Abuja, Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Kano, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe states in order to fill gaps in care to victims of the insurgency. As part of its mandate the VSF is responsible for caring for all of the Chibok girls that have been, and will hopefully be, rescued. As such, it is the VSF that will be funding the care of the recently freed Amina Ali Darsha Nkeki. But, it is important to remember that she is not the only victim in need. As a result of Boko Haram’s insurgency, nearly one million children in northeast Nigeria have been deprived of an education. Women and girls have become an integral part of Boko Haram’s strategy, with a dramatic increase in the number of child suicide bombers, usually girls. The humanitarian community is reportedly failing women and girls who have suffered gender-based violence at the hands of Boko Haram. In the wake of the second Regional Security Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, and last Friday’s UN Security Council Presidential Statement there was an acknowledgement that an inclusive approach focused on addressing the drivers of extremism--poverty, deprivation, lack of opportunity and education--is needed in order to degrade and defeat Boko Haram. According to Mr. Alkasim Abdulkadir, spokesperson for the VSF, Amina will be provided with full psychosocial support, a scholarship to a secondary school and university of her choice, as well as enrollment in the VSF’s economic empowerment program. The reintegration, education, and health-care needs of her child will also be met. However, with the challenges it faces, including funding and the remaining pledges, it remains to be seen the extent to which the VSF can meaningfully execute its mandate for the remaining victims.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a body of vigilantes, recruited by local and state governments, that has assisted the Nigerian security services in the struggle against Boko Haram. They are widely said to have invaluable local knowledge. Critics, however, have been concerned about their lack of discipline and their alleged personal score-settling. They are also accused of serious human rights abuses. Now that they are armed, there has been concern about what they will do if and when the struggle against Boko Haram concludes. President Muhammadu Buhari, in a May 14 press conference reported in the Nigerian media, gave insights into his thinking. He sees the potential for formally integrating the CJTF into the military and the police. He said, “For those who have received military training, it will be advised either to recruit them if they are within the age bracket of recruitment in the military or the police.” The president praised the CJTF: “They have been of tremendous help to the military because they are from there, they have local intelligence and some of them are retired military or retired policemen. Since they were drawn by the authorities of their respective states, they were taken into confidence and trusted.” Buhari also said that because CJTF members are locally known, they can easily be disarmed once the fighting is over. However, Boko Haram operations continue. The timeframe for disbanding the CJTF is yet to be determined.

The Tax Justice Network-Africa has issued a press release praising the South African government’s commitment to register and make public the “beneficial owners” of all companies incorporated in the country. “Beneficial owners” are those who ultimately benefit from a company. In many countries, governments do not require such information, resulting in anonymously owned companies that may be used by corrupt politicians or others who want to hide their identity. The “Panama Papers” highlight the role such companies play in activities ranging from money laundering to tax evasion. The South African government’s announcement was made on the margins of the Africa regional meeting of the Open Government Partnership. It includes reference to the register being available to the public, not just the authorities. Denise Dube Mubaiwa, of Economic Justice Network of the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa, commented, “Public registers give investigators, journalists, civil society, and the general public the tools necessary to peel back the layers of secrecy that anonymous companies create.” She called on the Zuma administration to send to parliament quickly the necessary draft legislation. Former South African President Thabo Mbeki chaired in 2015 the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa. The panel urged governments to create public registers of beneficial ownership. The panel estimated that Africa loses some $50 billion every year through illicit financial flows. The Open Government Partnership presses governments to promote transparency and good governance. Some sixty-nine governments now participate. However, sub-Saharan Africa is underrepresented. In addition to South Africa, only Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone participate. Notably absent is Nigeria, which U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron has artlessly characterized as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Nigeria is ostensibly the largest economy in Africa and in the midst of a major anti-corruption drive sponsored by President Muhammadu Buhari.

According to Bloomberg, militant attacks on the oil infrastructure in the Niger delta have resulted in the lowest level of production in Nigeria in twenty years, falling below 1.7 million barrels a day. As such, Nigeria is no longer Africa’s largest oil producer; Angola is. Bloomberg, citing the International Energy Agency, estimates that the Nigerian government could lose $1 billion in revenue by the end of May. It appears that some of the oil companies are withdrawing “non-essential” workers out of concern for their safety. The Buhari administration is concerned. There are reports that at the direction of President Muhammadu Buhari, Vice President Yemi Osinbajo on May 8 met with Army and Navy “security chiefs,” the Minister of State for Petroleum, and “other officials.” Separately, he met with the governor of Bayelsa state (a major oil producer), and at least one traditional leader. The southeast caucus of President Buhari’s All Progressives Congress urged the militants to give the president time to address their grievances. It also said that militant anger should be directed against former President Goodluck Jonathan, who failed to address the long-standing problems of the region. The hitherto largely unknown Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) claim responsibility for the attacks. There is speculation that militants involved in the last round of attacks, from 2006 to 2009, are also somehow involved. However, former militant leader Government Ekpemupolo, alias ‘Tompolo,’ specifically denies his involvement. The NDA may represent a new generation of militants. The 2006-2009 attacks on oil infrastructure ended with an “amnesty” established by President Umaru Yar’Adua and continued by his successor, Goodluck Jonathan. The amnesty ostensibly involved the militant surrender of weapons, and training programs for former militants—with allowances. In addition, it is all but an open secret that the government paid off former militant leaders, in some cases with government contracts to “protect” the oil infrastructure. Bloomberg says, “The militants have been frustrated by current President Muhammadu Buhari’s decision to scale back the allowances.” This is credible. Delta grievances are widespread and very long standing. In essence, the region resents that it does not receive a larger share of the revenue from the oil and natural gas that it produces. In addition, the oil and gas industry is held to be responsible for the massive pollution of the environment, depriving farmers and fishermen of their livelihood. Though it produces so much wealth, the region is remarkably under-developed in terms of infrastructure. However, the world-wide fall in petroleum prices combined with attacks on the oil-producing infrastructure means that the Buhari government has less revenue with which to address such grievances.

According to Nigerian media, the northern branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) warned President Muhammadu Buhari that “Nigeria would boil” if former President Goodluck Jonathan, the “hero of democracy,” were arrested as part of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. CAN is an umbrella lobbying group; the warning was issued by its northern branch, not CAN as a whole. The leadership of CAN had been close to the Jonathan presidency. In the aftermath of the March 2015 elections, it was widely speculated that there was an agreement between the newly elected president and Jonathan that he and his wife would not be prosecuted in return for the defeated candidate’s acceptance of the election outcome. Were Jonathan to be arrested, at least some African heads of state might be encouraged to hang on to power for fear of possible prosecution. There has been no announcement by any part of the Buhari government of plans to move against Jonathan. Yet the public relations officer of CAN’s northern branch, the Rev. John Joseph Hayab, said “Every honest Nigerian knows that the feelers on the ground are that this administration’s popularity is dwindling rapidly among the Nigerian people. It is therefore not advisable to think or plan to arrest former President Goodluck Jonathan. Let me warn that such a misadventure will set a wrong precedent and only open the door for mischievous people to set this nation into confusion.” What is going on here? There are at least three credible hypotheses. The first is that there may be conversations within the anti-corruption agencies about the possibility of proceeding against Jonathan, notwithstanding the alleged post-election agreement not to proceed against the former president. If such conversations are taking place, however, there is no evidence that they reflect the views of President Buhari or other senior personalities in his administration. A second hypothesis is that Jonathan’s supporters are increasingly anxious that the former president could be besmirched by the ongoing investigations of some of the most senior members of his administration, such as the former oil minister, and national security advisor. The CAN statement could be a warning not to proceed against the former president. Finally, and perhaps the most credible hypothesis of all, the warning may be the result of internal CAN politicking, perhaps intersecting with broader political maneuvering.

Coauthored with Erin Sielaff, intern in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. The United Nations is attempting to restart yet another set of peace talks in Syria and Yemen, two deeply conflicted states. After years of struggling to foster a negotiated peace, hopes are high that these latest rounds will be successful. The more likely scenario is that they end like their numerous predecessors—in failure. The track record of UN-mediated peace negotiations is not good. Many talks collapse without producing a substantive agreement. And even when adversaries reach a deal, more than 50 percent of these settlements break down within five years, plunging states back into violence and societies into suffering. To be sure, making and sustaining peace is difficult, and negotiations can fail for diverse reasons. But the negative effects of aborted peace processes are felt most acutely by those who have typically been ignored in the negotiations themselves: women. Consider the impact of the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts. Though the vast majority of casualties have been men, women have borne the brunt of the conflict in many instances: they face alarming rates of sexual violence, are targeted for kidnappings and arbitrary detentions, and are disproportionately affected by shelling, chemical weapons, and air bombardments. At the same time, the social fabric in Syria has been torn asunder, upending gender roles. Women are suddenly participating in new sectors of society. They have acted as peacebuilders, pushing for peace through local ceasefires, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to besieged regions. Women have also taken on new family responsibilities: in more than 145,000 Syrian families, they are now the sole breadwinners. To house and feed their children, they have developed new income-generating skills, such as embroidery or agricultural production, and engaged in markets from which they were previously excluded. And in some instances, Syrian women have even taken up arms on behalf of the Assad government or rebel groups. Similarly, in Yemen women have been especially vulnerable, facing rampant sexual- and gender-based violence, having minimal access to healthcare, and suffering food insecurity. As in Syria, some Yemeni women have pushed for peace, while still others have joined local militias to defend tribal territory. Despite their active roles in both war-fighting and peace-building, women are regularly excluded from formal, high-level peace negotiations. Not a single woman was represented in either delegation during the January 2014 peace talks in Syria, for example. This is not simply a problem of gender equity. It is a problem of effectiveness. With rates of conflict recidivism so alarmingly high, it’s obvious that the current approach to UN-led peace negotiations is inadequate. Yet, international actors continue to rely on a faulty formula. Here’s a radical idea: why not make peace talks actually representative of the societies that negotiations are trying to stitch back together? With few exceptions, women today are almost always excluded from formal peace negotiations. But in those rare instances where they do have a seat at the table, a host of qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that they make tangible contributions to the creation and maintenance of sustainable peace. Consider these data points: First, including women in formal peace negotiations significantly increases the probability of reaching a deal. Second, it increases the chance that the agreement will be properly implemented. Overall, including women makes it 35 percent more likely that the peace deal will last fifteen years. What explains this “gender peace dividend”? To begin with, women bring unique perspectives to peace discussions, including a focus on gender issues and other social concerns. In addition, women frequently play important societal roles in fostering consensus, an essential ingredient to ensure the successful completion and implementation of peace accords. We know from recent history that women can have a productive impact on the peace process. In 1997 in Northern Ireland, women insisted on being included in peace talks. They mobilized a Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) and used their two seats at the negotiating table to advocate for a more inclusive agreement and to reconcile divides between various parties. They also contributed substantively to the final agreement, which included a recognition of the rights of victims, the rights of women, and several social provisions. A similar dynamic unfolded in the Philippines. Women played an active role in protracted negotiations, pushing for representative and inclusive talks that began in the early 2000s and culminated in a 2014 agreement. Outside the formal negotiations, female civil society groups worked to prevent spoilers from undermining the talks. None of this is news to the UN, which already has a framework to facilitate the inclusion of women in peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which celebrated its fifteenth birthday in October 2015, formally recognized the link between gender and security, and called on member states to enable the participation of women in post-conflict peace negotiations, governance, and peacekeeping initiatives. The resolution also outlined reforms within the UN system to foster the inclusion of women in the peace and security realm. Unfortunately, implementation of 1325 has been slow going, hindered by inadequate financing and political will. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon should use this month’s high-profile peace negotiations in Syria and Yemen to revitalize Resolution 1325, by insisting that women are active participants in both rounds of peace talks. Beyond that symbolic step, the UN should adopt a standardized process for automatically including women in peace negotiations that it (or a regional organization) is brokering. Women should be included in every phase—from prenegotiations through implementation. Simultaneously, the UN needs to get its own house in order, by including more women in senior UN positions. There is clearly room for improvement. In 2015, 92 percent of Ban’s senior staff appointments were male. Though some activists have called for at least 25–30 percent of peace negotiators to be women, the quality of participation is just as important as the quantity of women included. Too often, when women are included, they are assigned to limited portfolios, such as committees on “gender issues,” while the substance of the peace talks is left to the men. This is a real possibility in the ongoing Syrian talks, given the creation of the Syrian Women’s Advisory Council. On one level, the council is a positive step—a group of twelve female civil society representatives will advise UN Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura throughout the peace talks. The problem is that the council is divorced from the actual talks, suggesting it will be devoid of real influence over the negotiations. Women must be included as formal delegates, and (as in Northern Ireland), they must enjoy the same status as their male counterparts. Finally, the UN must ensure that all negotiated settlements are gender-sensitive, by incorporating provisions related to women’s rights and inclusion. The 2014 agreement between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is one example: sustained female participation throughout the negotiations helped to create a peace deal with specific provisions to include women in post-conflict governance, address the needs of female ex-combatants, and launch gender-conscious economic and social initiatives. When peace deals fail to include such concerns, they are not only unrepresentative of their societies, they also fail to address root causes of conflict, which can contribute to recidivism. The UN and its member states must do more to implement the mandates of Resolution 1325. The challenges are immense, but so are the opportunities—the UN should capitalize on the momentum from these renewed talks to overhaul its entire approach to peace negotiations, in a way that has been proven to work for all.  

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Next week the United Nations General Assembly will begin a series of informal meetings with candidates for the next secretary-general (SG). The official list of those seeking the United Nations’ top spot is beginning to take shape. Though still far from a truly open and competitive process, this year’s race to succeed current Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon is already very different from the past. Ban and his predecessors were selected in closed-door Security Council meetings dominated by the five permanent members, or P5. The General Assembly was limited to a rubber stamp role: it simply approved the Council’s preferred candidate. Ban Ki-Moon’s successor will be chosen in a more consultative and transparent manner, and the prospect has already generated attention from member states, civil society, and the media. This month the General Assembly will for the first time conduct informal interviews with each candidate for what has been called “the most impossible job in the world." While the veto-wielding P5 will retain their outsized voice in the selection process, the interviews will give other UN member states a more meaningful role in choosing who will occupy the United Nations’ top post. And if they manage to coalesce around a single candidate—an admittedly distant prospect—they could make it more difficult for the Security Council to select an alternative applicant. To make the most of this opportunity, UN member states should avoid posing lofty, open-ended questions or discredited Google-type brain teasers. Instead, the General Assembly should stick with five tried and true job interview questions. Why are you the right person for the job? Last December the presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council outlined their criteria for a successful candidate: “proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills.” This year’s crop of candidates includes several with significant UN management experience. Antonio Guterres recently stepped down from a ten-year run as head of the UN’s refugee agency. Irina Bokova of Bulgaria heads the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Danilo Turk served both within the United Nations and as his country’s UN ambassador, before being elected president of his native Slovenia. Helen Clark of New Zealand, who recently announced her candidacy after months of speculation, leads the UN Development Group. Several candidates boast impressive linguistic skills. The leader in this regard, though a long shot for the post, is Srgjan Kerim of Macedonia, who speaks nine languages. Beyond the official criteria, there is increasing pressure both within and outside the United Nations to appoint the first female secretary-general, after eight male predecessors. There is also an informal consensus that Eastern Europe, the only region that has not filled the post, deserves the slot. Three of the eight official candidates—Bokova, Natalia Gherman of Moldova, and Vesna Pusic of Croatia—meet these two additional criteria. (Three more candidates—Turk, Kerim, and Igor Luksic—are Eastern European men). For the P5, the attribute that matters most is an individual willing to be, as the saying goes, “more of a secretary, less of a general.” As Anne Marie Goetz explains “virtue and command power are not, in practice, the qualities chiefly valued.  Inoffensiveness is.” In a recent review of Eastern European candidates, Bokova received high marks for acceptability among P5 members, including Russia. However she was the leader of UNESCO when it voted to admit Palestine into the organization, drawing the ire of many in the United States which may affect whether the United States will support her candidacy. To be sure, this year’s selection process could tempt member states to seek quid pro quos—demanding top spots in the secretariat, for instance, in exchange for vocal political support. That inherent danger, however, is outweighed by the benefits of a transparent consultative process, which enhances the likelihood that support will flow to the candidate promising to do the most for the entire membership, rather than making dispensations to individual countries to secure the position. Why do you want this job? Ban Ki-Moon’s successor will assume the position at a time of mounting crises, both global and institutional. The United Nations confronts the largest humanitarian and migration crisis since World War II, even as it reels from a growing sexual abuse scandal perpetrated by UN peacekeepers. These and other failings have exposed rampant dysfunctionality within the UN system, outlined in a scathing critique by departing senior UN official Anthony Banbury: “If you locked a team of evil geniuses in a laboratory, they could not design a bureaucracy so maddeningly complex, requiring so much effort but in the end incapable of delivering the intended result. The system is a black hole into which disappear countless tax dollars and human aspirations, never to be seen again.” So who would even want this job, particularly since its occupant wields little real power?  The secretary-general can express disappointment, concern, and alarm—but getting real action typically depends on whether the secretariat’s goals align with the interests of member states—particularly the major powers. And the multi-billion dollar budget that the SG manages? Every dollar is scrutinized and apportioned by the General Assembly in all-night negotiations. The candidates who really want the job must believe that they can not only make a difference to the burning crises of the day but also improve the United Nations’ creaking bureaucracy. As Jim Della-Giacoma notes, “only optimists need apply.” What would you look to accomplish in your first one hundred days? The next SG must hit the ground running. If the fragile cease-fire in Syria unravels, she will need to adjust on the fly. And even if the cease-fire holds, as Richard Gowan notes, the next SG will find herself in the unenviable position of consolidating a peace whose terms have been heavily influenced by the Syrian regime and its allies. Still, the arrival of a new UN leader, particularly if chosen through a more transparent process, will generate a honeymoon period. The next SG should have a window of opportunity to breathe new life into the organization—though it will close quickly. The General Assembly should ask candidates how they plan to best exploit this brief window to tackle a host of institutional reforms. New thinking is urgently needed on the United Nations’ bread and butter issue: peacekeeping. A recent review of this $8 billion per year endeavor identified a host of urgently needed reforms. One free suggestion for SG aspirants from the review: propose the creation of a second UN deputy secretary-general, focused solely on peace and security issues. Where do you see yourself in five years? All previous secretaries-general have served a five-year renewable term. But there is pressure both from within and outside the United Nations to appoint the next SG for a single, but longer, term of perhaps seven years. This argument has been made most forcefully by the Elders, a group of eminent retired statesmen and women, chaired by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. They contend that a single term would help free the SG from Turtle Bay politics—allowing him or her to focus on the real issues, without feeling beholden to member states, particularly the P5, for reelection. Whether the SG is eligible for a second term or not, the General Assembly should give preference to a candidate prepared to focus on the job through the full mandate, and who has the temperament and leadership to drive the agenda, rather than constantly reacting to crises. It should also favor the candidate prepared to make tough calls to the end, even if they are eyeing top spots within their home country (Ban Ki-Moon is widely rumored to be considering a presidential run in South Korea) or elsewhere when their term expires. Tell us about a time when you disagreed with your boss. This will be a tricky question for candidates. The secretary-general has 193 bosses, and much of any SG’s time is spent navigating their competing concerns and interests. Traditionally, SGs have paid more attention to the Security Council (especially the P5), which even under amended procedures will have disproportionate weight in the SG selection process. Members of the General Assembly will want an SG that represents the full membership. History suggests that the United Nations needs an SG who can stand up to the Security Council when necessary. The dynamics of peacekeeping are instructive in this regard. Back in 2000, the Brahimi report on UN peace operations insisted that the UN Secretariat must learn to tell the Security Council “what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.” Yet SGs still struggle with delivering honest, if unwelcome news to the Council. And yet, an SG without a good relationship with the Council, especially the P5, will find often find him- or herself sidelined. The GA should thus look for a candidate able to speak honestly to his or her bosses without irreparably damaging the relationship. Two candidates have particularly relevant experience on this front: Bokova and Gutteres. During Bokova’s tenure at UNESCO, the organization voted to include Palestine as a member state, angering the United States, which pulled its financial support in response. Bokova expressed concern about this loss of funds, not only for UNESCO but also for U.S. security interests, expressing hope that the departure would be temporary. During his time as head of the UN refugee agency, Antonio Guterres warned that the increasing number of conflicts and escalating risks of climate change had driven the humanitarian system to “a breaking point,” and he criticized the international community’s fragmented approach to humanitarian assistance. In the end, both leaders proved willing to speak truth to power, without rupturing relationships. The General Assembly, previously limited to approving the Security Council’s choice, has an unprecedented opportunity to influence the selection of the next secretary-general. The candidate interviews next week will give the United Nations’ full membership its first real chance to influence the historically closed process. If the General Assembly wants to make the most of this chance, it should stick to these five questions, asked in interviews throughout the world every day.

On March 31, the eleven justices of South Africa’s highest judicial body, the Constitutional Court, ruled unanimously that President Jacob Zuma and the National Assembly had violated the Constitution. The president, the court ruled, had improperly spent public money on his private estate, Nkandla. The National Assembly had improperly defended the president by refusing to implement the ruling of the public protector, a constitutionally mandated official, when she concluded that the expenditure had been improper. In his public statement, the chief justice, a Zuma appointee, said, “The president failed to uphold, defend and respect the constitution.” He characterized the public protector as a “Biblical David” fighting against the “Goliath of corruption.” The Constitution and the rule of law, he continued, was a “sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop the ugly head of impunity from its stiffened neck.” He also said that “ours is a genuine and vibrant constitutional democracy capable of self-correction and self-preservation.” The two largest opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters, took the Nkandla case to the Constitutional Court. The ruling highlights the effectiveness of opposition parties even though Zuma’s African National Congress (ANC) has a large parliamentary majority. The ruling also illustrates the independence of the judiciary, and reaffirms constitutional entities designed to protect citizens from abusive state power, such as the public protector. The DA is saying that it will seek Zuma’s impeachment and hopes that many ANC parliamentarians will vote with the opposition. Over the past several months, disenchantment with Zuma has grown within the ANC. It is also possible that the ANC will “recall” Zuma as party leader, as it did Thabo Mbeki. If it does so, under South Africa’s proportional system of parliamentary representation, Zuma would be required to resign the presidency, as Mbeki did. Such a step might be attractive because it would forestall impeachment. However, it is also possible that the ANC might rally around Zuma, at least through this summer’s local and provincial election. For now, however, South Africans appear ebullient over the Court’s ruling. South Africa’s currency, the rand (ZAR), hit a nearly four-month high against the U.S. dollar following the ruling.

The consequences of the brutal war between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security services will be with us for a long time. In the BBC’s series, “Letter from Africa,” Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani describes how the experience of Boko Haram occupation and subsequent liberation exacerbated the division between Christians and Muslims in the town of Michika. Christians and Muslims now hold their markets on different days of the week, and children from each community taunt those from the other. Nwaubani sums it up, “These days, the Christians and Muslims cannot stand each other.” She reports that the town was liberated by the Nigerian military after seven months of Boko Haram occupation, but security is now in the hands of “professional game hunters” and “vigilantes,” two informal, nongovernmental groups that are also suspicious of each other, even though their memberships are religiously mixed. But, Mwaibani also reports a good-news story: the work of the Adamawa Peace Initiative. Its goal is peacebuilding by working to reduce violence through encouraging religious, community, and business leaders to work together. It has been active in the state of Adamawa since 2012, working with the American University of Nigeria*, based in Adamawa’s capital, Yola. It has Michika as a focus. The initiative has organized dialogue involving “the town’s leaders, women, men, youths, hunters, and vigilantes.” Mediators are teachers and respected Christian and Muslim clergy. Frank dialogue is having a salutary effect: one resident comments, “We had been carrying these grudges instead of tabling them. We had been pretending as they did not exist.” The celebrated Africanist Stephen Ellis once remarked that a failing state is like a person who is sick, not a machine that can be repaired quickly. Recovery is by fits and starts and takes a long time. The same is likely true of smaller communities. The Adamawa Peace Initiative is providing therapy for a community that has been very ill. *As a disclaimer, I serve on the board of the American University of Nigeria.