Civil Society

Over the weekend—near the end of the Christian observance of Holy Week—a fire broke out in Kano’s Sabon Gari market. It eventually destroyed 3,800 shops, according to the Nigeria Emergency Management Administration (NEMA), obliterated at least two trillion naira (approximately ten billion dollars) worth of goods, and affected at least 18,000 traders. The NEMA director general said, “This is the biggest market fire outbreak Nigeria has ever witnessed. This is a serious calamity.” (Despite the magnitude of the disaster it has not been reported in the mainstream Western media.) There was a previous fire in the market only five months ago. The Emir of Kano, Malam Muhammadu Sanusi II, called on the federal and state governments to investigate the causes of recent fires at Kano markets and schools. The emir is the former governor of the Central Bank who blew the whistle on the national petroleum company’s failure to remit revenue to the national Treasury during the administration of the previous president, Goodluck Jonathan. Kano’s Sabon Gari, the “foreigners’ quarter,” is often called the largest settlement of ‘non-indigenous’ people in northern Nigeria. Its population is made up of ethnic groups from all around the country, with the Igbo especially prominent. Most of the indigenous population of Kano is Hausa-Fulani, who are typically Muslim. Sabon Gari residents, on the other hand, are often Christian. The Sabon Gari is also known for its freewheeling atmosphere in otherwise observant Muslim Kano, with the ready availability of beer and prostitutes. Kano has been the site of ethnic and religious clashes in the past. Though not of late, Boko Haram has been active in Kano. Officials are saying that the fire is electrical in origin, and it spread rapidly because there was nobody in the market shortly after midnight. This is plausible. Market fires are common. Even this weekend, there was another large market fire in Birnin Kebbi, capital of Kebbi state. Senate President Bukola Saraki commented on March 27 that fires in markets around the country were negatively affecting gross domestic product. Nevertheless, there is speculation that the fire in Kano’s Sabon Gari market was the result of arson, and that it involved Boko Haram. Boko Haram has carried out big operations before around the principal Christian holidays, and the Sabon Gari market would be a tempting target. Arson could also have been perpetrated because of ethnic and religious hostilities. Thus far, no group has claimed responsibility for the fire. It is to be hoped that the federal and state authorities will respond positively to the emir’s call for a thorough investigation.

Nielsen’s “Africa’s Prospects: Macro Environment, Business, Consumer and Retail Outlook Indicators” of February 2016 rank orders sub-Saharan Africa’s nine leading markets. The list represents 71% of the region’s GDP, and half of its population. Ivory Coast is ranked first, Kenya second, Tanzania third, and Nigeria is fourth. It ranks Zambia as fifth, Cameroon as sixth, South Africa as seventh, Uganda as eighth, and Ghana brings up the rear. Nielsen cites Ivory Coast’s growing economy and political stability. Nigeria, ranked first in 2015, declined because of “deteriorating macroeconomic indicators” and declining consumer confidence. A recent report from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics notes that the inflow of capital into the economy stood at $9.6 billion, a 53 percent drop from the previous year. Nigeria has been hard hit by declining oil and gas prices, while Ivory Coast’s primary export commodity, cocoa, has not declined. Nigeria faces the challenge of the Boko Haram insurrection that has resulted in some three million internally displaced persons. It remains to be seen whether the March 13 al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack at an Ivorian resort signals that Abidjan will face a sustained terrorist threat that could have an impact on investor confidence. Nielsen is a S&P 500 company. It provides a wide range of measurement services that are highly respected. Nielsen’s “Africa Prospects,” some twenty-six pages in length, includes a wide range of economic and consumer data. For example, it compares the price of a basket of commonly consumed items in various countries. Such a basket costs $34 in Angola, $27 in Ghana, but only $15.33 in South Africa. Nigerians—alongside Angolans and Ghanians—are facing rising prices due to inflationary pressures.

South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has often been accused of corruption. But, until recently his hold on the governing African National Congress (ANC), with its huge parliamentary majority, has ensured that he could weather political storms. However, his recent missteps have eroded his support within the party. There is speculation that the party could remove him as party leader which would likely result in his resigning the presidency. While such speculation is premature, he is certainly politically damaged. The greatest threat to Zuma’s political future is now from within his own political party, rather than from the opposition. Zuma’s current round of troubles began in December 2015 when he abruptly fired his well-regarded finance minister, Nhlanhla Nene, and appointed a non-entity in his place. South African financial markets swooned, and Zuma was forced to back down, fire his newly appointed choice, and appoint Pravin Gordhan, who had previously served in that position. In February 2016, after months of insisting that public expenditure on his private estate, Nkandla, were justified on the grounds of national security, he reversed himself during legal proceedings before the Constitutional Court, South Africa’s highest. But, his reversal came after the ANC had defended him for months in parliament. Earlier this month, the High Court ruled that the Zuma government acted improperly in failing to enforce warrants against Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir when he was in South Africa, raising the possibility that the president is in contempt of court. Finally, Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas, has gone public saying that three brothers of Indian origin—the Guptas—offered him the finance minister position before Zuma fired Nene. There are additional accusations that the Gupta brothers have been involved in high-level and para-statal appointments, that, in effect, Zuma has allowed them to “capture the state.” Jonas’ revelation would appear to be the “smoking gun.” Presumably, the Guptas will claim that they were acting on Zuma’s behalf. With respect to ministerial appointments, the South African president may appoint to his cabinet anybody he pleases, with no requirement that he consult. So the Guptas’ involvement with the finance minister position is not illegal. However, it does violate ANC policy and regulation, and as a party member Zuma is subject to party discipline. High level appointments are within the purview of the ANC deployment committee. So, Zuma is in trouble because the Gupta brothers usurped party functions. The three Gupta brothers and their families migrated to South Africa from India just before and after the 1994 transition to non-racial democracy. Their seemingly enormous wealth is based on Sahara Computers and Oakbay Investments, the latter of which includes significant interests in mining, real estate, and media. A prominent business partner is Duduzane Zuma, President Zuma’s son. The Gupta brothers are very close to the president, even on one occasion using a military airport for their private purposes. The media reports that they asked for South African diplomatic passports because they travel so frequently with the president. Thus far, President Zuma has refused to explain his relationship with the Gupta family, though he has acknowledged they have helped his son. Jonas’ revelation ties the Gupta brothers to the firing of Nene, an act that at the time seemed inexplicable. The South African media speculates that the Gupta brothers embarked on “state capture” to ensure favorable access of a variety of government contracts. Whether true of not, the story is widely believed, and many South Africans see the Gupta brothers as the face of Zuma government corruption. The ANC’s National Executive Committee meets March 19-20. It is no longer in Zuma’s pocket. Its agenda will include the president’s relationship with the Gupta family, according to the South African media. The credible Daily Maverick, citing unnamed sources, reports that within the ANC there is sentiment for a wide ranging discussion of the president’s conduct and his breach of constitutional duties. This discussion would include possible ANC disciplinary action and whether parliament should impeach him. Others believe that such consideration should be delayed until there is a final ruling by the Constitutional Court on Nkandla. Of the two scenarios, the latter is the more likely.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a federation of labor unions, played a crucial role in the struggle against apartheid. It provided much of the personnel that mobilized voters for the African National Congress (ANC) from the country‘s first “all-race” elections in 1994 up to now. COSATU, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the ANC form the coalition that governs the country. COSATU and SACP contest elections as part of the ANC. Conventional wisdom holds that the leadership of COSATU is increasingly distant from the laboring and unemployed masses, just as is President Jacob Zuma and the top ANC political leadership. (Unemployment in South Africa is variously estimated in the range of 25 to 50 percent, depending on the demographic.) The unions that make up COSATU are increasingly white-collar and based in the public sector, rather than blue-collar employees of private enterprises. By and large, the unions do not advocate low-wage, low skill policies that might reduce the very high levels of unemployment that drive poverty. COSATU is internally divided because of personal rivalries, but also over principle. The most salient division of the latter is between those in the federation that want closer ties to the ANC and SACP political leadership, and those who want to maintain greater distance. In general, those who favor distance want a more radical and aggressive labor movement. Here, as is often true elsewhere in South Africa, the SACP and the ANC political leadership are essentially conservative in outlook. Zwelinzima Vavi, a former General Secretary of COSATU who lost an internal power struggle and was fired in 2014, has announced that he will lead a “workers summit” in March, to be followed by the organization of a new federation in May that will rival COSATU. According to the media, current COSATU affiliates that are likely to join the new federation include the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA)--usually identified as the largest and richest trade union, the Food and Allied Workers Union, the South African Football Players Union, and the Public and Allied Workers Union of South Africa. Vavi is saying that the new labor federation will not be affiliated with any political party. However, there has been speculation that a new, “responsible” left-wing party based on trade unions such as NUMSA, will emerge before the national elections of 2019. It would challenge the ANC and also the Economic Freedom Fighters—a radical party that on occasion uses non-democratic methods, such as the disruption of the sitting of parliament. A new labor federation might generate such a “left-wing but responsible” political party. The emergence of two, rival labor federations at best will contribute to the general opening up of South African political life, so long dominated by the ANC and the politics of racial identity. However, it could also result in more labor militancy with consequences difficult to foretell.

African National Congress (ANC) Secretary General Gwede Mantashe is accusing the United States and its embassy in Pretoria of plotting “regime change” in South Africa. In public remarks on February 19, Mantashe referred to “clandestine meetings” at the American embassy that “are about nothing else other than mobilization for regime change. We’re aware of a program that takes young people to the United States for six weeks, brings them back and plants them everywhere.” Following up, the ANC spokesman Keith Khoza said that the U.S. government must clarify the “irregular activities” of its diplomats, asserting “We believe the matter will be pursued using the proper channels going forward. At this stage there is nothing more we can say on the matter.” U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Patrick Gaspard denied the allegations and affirmed his support for his embassy personnel: “I’m incredibly proud of the work my U.S. Embassy colleagues do every day to partner with South Africans on health, education, and job growth, and I will fiercely defend their honor and non-partisan integrity. And I might even employ sarcasm as a tool to do so.” And so he has, with good effect, to judge from the South African social media response. Ambassador Gaspard tweeted that if he ever tried to organize a coup, “it would look like Mardi Gras,” with singing and dancing. He also observed that Mantashe knew about the Nelson Mandela Scholars program to which the secretary general was apparently referring, because he had approached Mantashe some months ago for nominations of ANC members. South Africans joined the fun on Twitter, for example asking the ambassador to appoint them “Minister of Sport” or “Minister of Breweries” once the “coup” was over. Do Mantashe and Khoza actually believe there is a U.S. plot to bring about “regime change” in South Africa? It is unlikely. But the governing ANC is under pressure. The Zuma presidency is in disarray, the national currency has declined, economic growth rates are near zero, and the party is likely to be challenged in provincial and local elections later this year. Under these circumstances, ludicrous accusations deflect attention from unattractive realities. However, South African social media indicates that the accusations have backfired. (The United States is far more popular among South Africans generally than it is among ANC operatives.)

The following is a guest post by my colleague Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. As one of the single biggest funders in global health, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has not only helped renew the dynamism and attractiveness of global health, but also played an important part in improving health conditions in developing countries. What role do policy and advocacy play in shaping the global health and development agenda, particularly as it relates to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? What are the implications for development and governance following the adoption of the health-related SDGs? Finally, what role is the foundation playing in pandemic preparedness following the Ebola crisis? In this podcast, I discuss these and other questions with Mark Suzman, president of Global Policy, Advocacy, and Country Programs at the Gates Foundation.

On January 24, in London, UK Prime Minister David Cameron honored Nelson Mandela’s three surviving co-defendants at the 1964 Rivonia trial. They were Denis Goldberg, Ahmad Kathrada, and Andrew Mlangeni. Cameron also honored their suriviving defense attorneys, Lord Joel Joffe and George Bizos, who succeeded in avoiding the death penalty for their clients, though not twenty-six years of imprisonment. Goldberg was a member of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC). At Rivonia, he was convicted of armed resistance to apartheid. Among the ten men convicted at the Rivonia trial, the most famous being Mandela, Goldberg was the only white man. In a January 24 BBC interview, Goldberg publicly called for the current leaders of the governing ANC to be replaced due to widespread corruption. However, he also cited the huge gains South Africa has made since the coming of “non-racial” democracy in 1994, when Nelson Mandela was sworn-in as president, especially with respect to education, health care, economic growth, and the transformation of the civil service. Other liberation icons have made the same point. Progress in democratic, non-racial South Africa is real, but in their view the ruling ANC has lost its way, and its leadership must be replaced. Though Goldberg named no names, for many South Africans President Jacob Zuma and his close associates will immediately come to mind.

For most Americans, their first exposure to South African comedy has been Trevor Noah, the host of Comedy Central’s “The Daily Show.” Noah’s January 20, riff on Sarah Palin’s endorsement of Donald Trump is an example of South African standup comedy at its best, with the added dimension of an African “seeing us as others see us.” One example is his comment that America is such a great place because “…presidents might have term limits but Sarah Palin is forever.” In fact, comedy has been an instrument of popular protest and social transformation since the anti-apartheid movement, and it is becoming even more influential in contemporary South Africa. It flourishes in an environment of near-absolute freedom of speech. Lyn Snodgrass, the Head of the Department of Political and Conflict Studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, argues that a new generation of South African comedians is increasingly popular, and, in their search for laughs, provide a biting social and political critique during a particularly unsettled political period. She argues that South African comedians – often outrageous – are “hallmarks of a robust democracy.” Snodgrass cites Pew Research Center research that talk show hosts and comedians are a significant source of political information in the United States—particularly among Millennials—and that the same is true in South Africa. Snodgrass focuses on young, black comedians. However, there are comedians from nearly all racial groups and permutations. Trevor Noah is of mixed race. Nic Rabinowitz is described as “the world’s leading Xhosa-speaking Jewish comedian,” and his impersonation of national icon Archbishop Desmond Tutu is far from “politically correct.” The political establishment within the governing African National Congress (ANC) should pay attention to comedians, as their constituents certainly are. And, often the target of comedic barbs, President Jacob Zuma should be worried.

President Muhammadu Buhari successfully ran for the presidency on an anti-corruption ticket and a promise to restore security by destroying Boko Haram. His geographical support was based in the north and the west of the country, and he also benefitted from a general sense among the political class that incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan was incompetent and had to go. But, in the predominately south and east of the country, a majority apparently voted for Jonathan and his Peoples Democratic Party’s (PDP) candidates in the National Assembly. Just how large a majority is not clear, as there was election rigging in the region on Jonathan’s and the PDP’s behalf. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that notwithstanding Buhari’s electoral victory, the PDP has not gone away. With its votes in the National Assembly, it remains a powerful political factor that can thwart Buhari’s reform agenda. Since election day, there have been complaints that Buhari’s government is “northern” in character, and that it is not moving to address the genuine grievances in the southern and eastern parts of the country, including the oil patch, that had voted for the PDP. There has been a revival of public sentiment in favor of Biafra, a predominately Christian, Igbo-dominated state that tried to secede from Nigeria and failed in the 1967-70 civil war. In a government misstep that risks inflaming Delta opinion, the Buhari administration has arrested the head of Radio Biafra and denies him bail. Since election day, President Buhari has vigorously pursued an anti-corruption campaign that includes senior associates of the Jonathan administration in its dragnet. Many of those arrested or under investigation are Christians from the areas that voted for Jonathan and the PDP. It should be no surprise that there are complaints that the Buhari government is selective in its investigations and prosecutions to the detriment of southern Christians, though, in fact, northern Muslims (including the former national security advisor and a close associate of Buhari himself) have also been caught in the anti-corruption dragnet. Last week, the Abuja High Court ordered the arrest of the warlord Government Ekpemupolo (or Tompolo), one of Jonathan’s more disreputable political allies from the oil patch, for corruption. Apparently as a result of the arrest, Niger Delta militants over the weekend attacked oil and gas pipelines that shut down two of Nigeria’s four refineries. Long out of operation, the four refineries had recently been revived as part of the Buhari administration’s effort to reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported refined petroleum products. During the last round of unrest in the oil patch under the 1999-2007 Obasanjo administration, militant attacks on the oil infrastructure significantly cut production and reduced government revenue. The Yar’Adua and Jonathan administrations in effect bought off militant leaders, like Tompolo, through government contracts and office. Ex-war lord and man of violence, Tompolo faces credible charges. But, he is also seen by some in the Delta as a Robin Hood by a region that is feeling marginalized. As the anti-corruption campaign unfolds, it should be anticipated that Delta restiveness and associated attacks on the oil infrastructure will continue.

It is unduly gloomy in sunny South Africa. The national currency, the rand, is falling; the economy is hardly growing at all; the Zuma administration appears mired in corruption and mismanagement. There has been an upsurge in racist rhetoric. Hence the South African surprise and delight at the announcement that two of the richest South Africans, Allan and Gill Gray, are essentially giving away their wealth to their family foundation. The Daily Maverick says, “The total value of this endowment is currently unknown, but it will run into billions of rands, and is certainly to be the largest philanthropic foundation established by any South African in history." The gift is seen as a ringing endorsement for the future of a democratic South Africa—and the future of South African business Another Gray foundation already funds hundreds of high school and university scholarships. Gray and his wife have also endowed a Center and a Chair in Values-Based Leadership at the University of Cape Town’s Graduate School of Business. Allan Gray is #1226 on the Forbes 2015 list of world billionaires and #7 in South Africa, with an estimated net worth of 1.4 billion dollars. His investment management firm, Allan Gray Ltd., is the largest privately owned asset manager in South Africa, overseeing 40 billion dollars, according to Forbes. Patrice Motsepe, the richest black person in South Africa with a Forbes net worth of 2.2 billion dollars, in 2013 took the Warren Buffett and Bill Gates pledge to give to charity one half of his wealth. Gray and Motsepe are also reminders of the enormous wealth in South Africa, and its concentration.

Penny Sparrow, age sixty-nine, a white real estate agent in Durban and a member of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), in a Facebook post characterized black beach goers over New Year’s as “monkeys." (For many years, young black South Africans living inland have gathered on Durban’s beaches to celebrate New Year’s.) At about the same time, a bank economist tweeted about “majority (black) entitlement” as a barrier to economic growth. Others, evidently also white, on-line have expressed admiration for certain apartheid and pre-apartheid era political figures, including P.W. Botha and Cecil Rhodes. Black social media response has been fierce, including calls to take action “against all white people to end racism.” These racist comments have been condemned by the political parties and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. DA party leader Mmusi Maimane has expelled Sparrow and reaffirmed that there is no place for racism in South Africa. His rhetoric was strong: “As a human being, and the leader of the Democratic Alliance, I’m angry. Recently you called me a monkey. In your argument you said that there were some blacks you could tolerate, but those at the beach that day who littered, were monkeys. This angers me.” The Human Rights Commission says that it will investigate all complaints about racism from whatever source. The episode brings home to many South Africans that racism remains entrenched. Azad Essa, in a thoughtful post on The Daily Vox (Johannesburg) refers to “a toxic mix of race and class that pervades the way South Africa is structured.” He goes on to say, “The message of post-1990 South Africa is loud and clear... It’s okay to be racist but only in private. It’s okay to be condescending, so long as it’s subtle. It’s okay to be patronizing so long as you provide employment.” Social media provides a forum whereby outrageous statements are widely publicized and amplified. So, too, may be the similarly outrageous response to them. That is a challenge to the management of South Africa’s complex brew of race and class and the enduring poverty of too many South Africans who are black. This episode may also have a political context. The DA, long associated with whites, has been seeking black electoral support. It hopes to capture Gauteng province (Johannesburg) in elections later this year. However, its chances of success are nil if it is identified with white racism. Polling data has indicated that a significant number of young blacks believe that the DA’s “secret agenda” is restoration of apartheid. This, of course, is spurious, but the comments of Sparrow and other whites feed it. In his response to Sparrow, Maimane also said: “Our project, in case you thought otherwise, is to build a non-racial organization. A party for all South Africans. Our party is to create a movement of people from different races who are committed to Nelson Mandela’s dream, and are bound by the values of freedom, fairness, and opportunity.”

The alarums and excursions over South Africa’s economy and economic policy do not stop. December saw the discreditable episode of President Jacob Zuma’s hiring and firing multiple ministers of finance in only a few days and a drop in the country’s estimated economic growth rate to perhaps 1.2 percent. The new year kicked off with an apparent standoff with the United States over trade that if unresolved would end South Africa’s participation in the benefits of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). But, a BBC news item that appeared New Year’s Eve highlights how South Africa’s commitment to the rule of law makes it well-prepared to weather the multiple crises of the moment. A South African traditional ruler, King Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, reported to prison after his conviction and his appeals failed. The king was found guilty of kidnapping a woman and her six children, burning down their house, and beating four young men because their family members did not present himself before the king’s traditional court. (One of the young men died following his beating.) The king claimed he was innocent, that he was merely “disciplining” his subjects under customary law. The king is one of ten recognized monarchs in South Africa. They play a largely ceremonial role, but many control substantial amounts of tribal lands, and in rural areas often exercise arbitrary power over their often illiterate “subjects.” President Jacob Zuma has cultivated close relations with traditional rulers as part of his African populism. King Dalindyebo also is connected to national icon Nelson Mandela. He and the former president are both from the Thembu clan. Following the king’s trial, conviction, and failed appeals, the justice minister refused his request for a retrial on the basis that there was no legal justification. The king reported for jail after a judge refused to extend his bail. According to the BBC, at the sentencing, the Supreme Court of Appeal said of the king, “His behavior was all the more deplorable because the victims of his reign of terror were the vulnerable rural poor, who were dependent upon him. Our constitution does not countenance such behavior. We are a constitutional democracy in which everyone is accountable and where the most vulnerable are entitled to protection.” The BBC reports that during his protracted legal proceedings, the king left the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and joined the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA expelled him from the party following the Supreme Court of Appeal’s ruling. It also reports conflicting reports as to whether the tribal elders will replace Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo as king. In light of the earlier trial, conviction, and appeal of paralympian Oscar Pistorius BBC commentator Milton Nkosi rightly sums up the significance of the king episode: “South Africa has once again demonstrated that, despite its leadership problems, it upholds the rule of law, even if it means locking up a king and alienating some of his subjects ahead of crucial local elections next year.”

Jacob Zuma’s political power is based on his support by the African National Congress’s political apparatus – often called Luthuli House, after the party’s headquarters building in Johannesburg. With support of the party machinery, he has weathered numerous political and personal setbacks ranging from a rape trial to accusations of corruption. However, if the party turns against him, he will not long survive as party leader or chief of state. In 2008, Thabo Mbeki was removed from both positions by a party revolt. The same is possible for Zuma. In one four-day period in December, Zuma fired two finance ministers and hired a third. International and domestic markets signaled their disapproval: the Rand (ZAR) the South African currency plunged, as did the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The international credit agencies raised the possibility of rating South African bonds as “junk,” as they have (or are about to do) with Russia’s and Brazil’s. Zuma reversed course and appointed the well-respected Pravin Gordhan as finance minister. The Rand and the stock markets thereupon recovered some—not all—of their losses. End of episode? Perhaps not. The question is whether Zuma has been seriously wounded politically in the eyes of the ANC. There are signs that he may have been. Former finance minister Trevor Manuel in an open letter to Lindiwe Zulu, small business development minister and confidant of Zuma, said that the president’s actions “shook the trust of the Cabinet collective at its roots.” He went on to say that “the trust is not broken only with the Cabinet of course’ it is also broken with the ANC, with the broader South African electorate, with the markets and the entity you (Lindiwe Zulu) call business.” “The breach of trust was not the first but perhaps the last, straw that broke the camel’s back in the careless handling of a pivotal portfolio.” Zulu has declined to respond to Manuel. Manuel does not appear to be alone. Former cabinet minister Tokyo Sexwale in a BBC television appearance was asked whether Zuma’s grip on power is slipping. Sexwale did not respond directly but said that Zuma had learned a hard lesson: “it’s important that politicians should understand before they take decisions the consequences of the decisions because particularly in the markets, you take a decision of course it knocks off the country, you fall off your stool, the debt rises, inflation, and so on.” Public anger at Zuma is also widespread, one journalist quoted Nelson Mandela: “If the ANC does to you what the apartheid government did to you, then you must do to the ANC what you did to the apartheid government.” Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the party will move quickly against Zuma. Manuel, who is widely respected in South Africa as well as by the international financial community, is retired. Sexwale lost a party leadership contest with Zuma, who subsequently fired him from the cabinet. Up to now, Zuma has been able to ignore his critics in the party as well as the quality South African media, which dislikes him. However, if the party faces severe reversals in the local elections of 2016, Zuma might find himself very vulnerable.

This is a guest post by Fily Camara, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. He is a masters candidate at New York University. Intra-African trade has been only eleven percent of the continent’s total trade over the last decade. By comparison, more than sixty percent of Europe’s trade is intra-continental. The equivalent figure for North America is about 45 percent and for Asia it is about twenty-five percent. The small scale of Africa’s intra-continental trade reflects the continent’s dependence on foreign markets for the vast majority of their trade relations. African policymakers, as well as their Western counterparts, have long acknowledged the need for more intra-continental trade. It is a paradox that, for much of Africa’s postcolonial history, it has been a pioneer in regional integration. In addition to the African Union (AU), there are eight, smaller regional economic communities—many of which have successfully implemented common currencies and external tariffs in addition to cooperating on matters of security and justice. Nevertheless, commerce among countries in Africa remains low, with significant negative development ramifications. The emphasis in current African development discourse has been to encourage partnerships in which foreign governments and corporations can help African economies through mutually beneficial cooperation and joint business ventures. This concept is summarized by the phrase, “trade not aid.” Given the political and economic instability many African countries face, their desire to secure agreements and partnerships with the relatively stable and wealthy markets of the European Union, the United States, Japan, or China is understandable. However, when an African country’s economic success is subject to foreign markets, it is at the mercy of factors beyond its control. Such has been the case for much of the past year and a half. In June 2014 the price of oil began its decent from $140 per barrel to below $40 in recent days. For Africa’s crude-dependent countries this has severely troubled governments and economic outlooks. In 2015, China’s slowing growth rate was a factor in the worldwide plummet in demand for commodities highlighting the vulnerability of African states to international shocks. Where the United States and Europe can rely on established domestic consumer markets to spur economic activity, African exporters often have little insulation from the macroeconomic trends and political events afflicting the world. Observers cite a number of causes for the low levels of trade amongst African countries. The legacy of colonialism is, among other things, one of poor, extraction-oriented infrastructure and illogical borders that have left some countries with significant geographic disadvantages. Today, inadequate transportation networks, security concerns, persistent protectionism, poor data collection, and a lack of information sharing exacerbate the consequences of colonialism. Recent initiatives to address intra-continental trade appear promising. In 2012, the AU decided to establish a Pan-Africa Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. It also endorsed an Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade. Tangible steps toward achieving the objectives in these plans were taken in June 2015 when the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area. In late November, the AU reaffirmed its intention to use intra-continental trade to create a “prosperous and peaceful Africa by 2063.” Increasing intra-state trade in Africa would be an important step toward improving the continent’s development outlook. It would encourage competition among states to create an attractive climate for business and industry. Moreover, infrastructure could be improved, and the flow of people and ideas across borders could spur innovation. Eventually, the costs of goods could decline as shipping between African countries becomes easier, and getting certain goods from other continents less necessary. Additionally, a Pan-Africa CFTA would be the world’s largest by population and could provide Africa with the clout necessary to negotiate more favorable conditions in regional and sectoral trade agreements and World Trade Organization negotiation rounds. If properly managed and implemented, linked and diversified economies may be one answer to Africa’s development quandary.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a highly respected non-governmental organization devoted to conflict resolution and prevention, has published a quick guide to the conflict between the Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and the Nigerian security forces that started December 12-13 and that may be continuing. The author is Nnamidi Obasi, ICG’s senior Nigeria analyst. Given Nigeria’s size and importance Obasi’s article is a must-read, especially considering the government’s struggles with corruption and Boko Haram, and the obscurity to American readers of Nigerian Shia dramatis personae. Written in a clear question/answer format, it is packed with information in a small space, including what is known and not known about the December 12-13 “massacre.” He defines “Shia” in a Nigerian context, estimates its size, and introduces its leader Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has been personally distant from the episode, though he has sent his interior minister, the highly respected retired general Abdulrahman Dambazau on a fact finding mission. Tehran, seeing itself as the protector of Shia world-wide, has already weighed-in. The bottom line of Obasi’s argument is that the conflict between the security forces and Zakzaky’s Shia carries the risk, if not the likelihood, of evolving into yet another serious challenge to Nigeria’s stability. Obasi maintains that several factors could potentially mitigate the chances of more violence, such as Zakzaky’s advanced age, which makes him an unlikely candidate to lead an insurrection, IMN’s lack of support among Nigeria’s Sunni majority and even of all the Shia. He also notes that President Buhari, the Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai, and National Security Adviser Babagana Monguno are all northern Muslims. However, he also acknowledges that the Islamic Movement of Nigeria may be at a “tipping point.” Obasi quotes a post December 12 IMN statement: “No government can flourish successfully with a disoriented military, full of trigger-itchy personnel and security operatives trained by CIA and Mossad.” While hitherto non-violent, the IMN has long been hostile to secular authority and has been characterized as a “state within a state.” What should the Nigerian government do? Obasi’s advice is sensible, he urges President Buhari to respond “urgently and personally to the violence,” to underscore that his government is committed to the rule of law and that no group, including the security services, is above the law. He also urges that the rights of the wounded and imprisoned Zakzaky be rigorously respected, and that the security services show the utmost restraint.