Civil Society

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program, and Kyle Evanoff, research associate, international economics and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Autonomous weapons are on the agenda in Geneva this week. The Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, which has members and observers drawn from national governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, is holding its first meeting since it was established last year under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW. On the table for discussion are the technical, legal, military and ethical dimensions of machines capable of making battlefield decisions without human oversight. The stakes are high. Autonomous weapons have, in recent years, catapulted into the defense and security strategies of the world’s leading powers. Top-ranking officials in Russia, China and the United States, recognizing the military potential of advanced robotics and artificial intelligence, have invested billions into developing the technologies. That has led a growing ensemble of civil society actors to voice concerns that automated warfare will jeopardize human rights, international law and global security. A litany of groups and individuals, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jody Williams, have advocated an international prohibition on autonomous weapons, pinning their hopes on the United Nations and the CCW. Can they succeed in their quest for a ban? You can find our thoughts in our World Politics Review article.

The internet makes it easy for political ad buyers to obfuscate their donors and handlers. Despite the challenges, there are significant steps that Congress and social media platforms can take to improve transparency.

President Trump’s administration appears little troubled by the sharp democratic decline in Southeast Asia—but it should be, for economic and security reasons.

Speaker of the South African National Assembly Baleka Mbete has postponed the date for a vote of no confidence in the government of Jacob Zuma from April 18 to early May. The delay was caused by the request to the Constitutional Court from the United Democratic Movement (UDM) that the vote be by secret ballot. The court has agreed to review the case, but has not yet made a decision. The speaker, who agreed to wait on the courts decision, is a political ally of President Jacob Zuma and is the national chairperson of his African National Congress (ANC). The no confidence motion initiated by the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has the support of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and nearly all of the opposition parties. However, the ANC numbers 249 of the 400 members of the National Assembly, and a successful no confidence vote must gain over 50 percent of the parliamentary vote. To have any chance of success, the motion must be supported by about fifty ANC ‘rebels.’ If the vote is not secret, the ‘rebels’ would be subject to party discipline, virtually guaranteeing that all ANC members would vote against the motion. There would appear to be two issues for the Constitutional Court: whether the speaker could opt for a secret ballot (she says she could not) and whether the Constitutional Court could order the speaker to conduct the vote by secret ballot. The legal issues are explored by Pierre de Vos in the Daily Maverick. The Constitutional Court is known for its independence, and it has regularly ruled against the government. Nevertheless, it is likely to be reluctant to intervene in the procedures of the National Assembly, a co-equal branch of government. However, even if there is a secret ballot, ANC party discipline is so strong that it is unlikely that there would be fifty ANC 'rebels.' The delay in the vote of no-confidence means that as an issue it will not go away quickly and it allows public sentiment against Zuma to grow. For example, there was a protest demonstration in Pretoria led by the EFF on April 12 that numbered up to 120,000 participants. Even if the ANC defeats a May no-confidence motion, as is expected, this episode is likely to increase popular disenchantment with the party.

Over the Palm Sunday weekend, there were large demonstrations in South Africa’s urban centers against President Jacob Zuma and the African National Congress (ANC) in the aftermath of last week’s cabinet reshuffle. The largest demonstrations took place in Cape Town and Pretoria, where, according to the media, demonstrators numbered in the tens of thousands. Elsewhere, demonstrations were much smaller. The demonstrations received extensive media coverage internationally and in the United States, however, they will certainly have no impact on Zuma’s position or the ANC in the short term. For his part, Zuma accused the protestors of being racist. It is always difficult to judge the measurable impact of demonstrations on political change. For example, it is hard to link the demonstrations across the United States against the Vietnam War and then-President Richard Nixon to specific policy changes. Similarly, large demonstrations the day after President Trump’s inauguration in the short term appear to have effected little. That being said, large-scale public protest may have an impact over the longer term. Such nation-wide rallies contributed to the paranoia of the Nixon administration and helped establish a context for his eventual departure from office. In South Africa, if nothing else, the demonstrations over the past weekend should bring home to the ANC leadership (if not President Zuma) the apparent growing alienation of South Africa’s urban centers; at present, the party only governs one of these urban centers, Durban. The ANC risks becoming more rural as the country becomes more urban – estimates are that roughly 60 percent of South Africa is considered urban. For the time being, the ANC has firmly nailed its colors to Jacob Zuma’s mast, deeply unpopular though he is. These realities will play a role in the elections of 2019.

Voices calling for President Jacob Zuma to resign or to be removed from office are getting louder in the wake of his cabinet reshuffle and removal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. Within his African National Congress (ANC) the Integrity Commission – intended as an internal corruption watchdog but often toothless – has announced that at an April 9 meeting with the president, it will ask him to resign. Powerful ANC figures including Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa and Treasurer General Zweli Mkhize have disassociated themselves from the reshuffle, though they have not publicly called for Zuma to go. The Mandela Foundation and the Kathrada Foundation, keepers of the liberation movement flame, have done so, as has former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Even the ANC’s political allies are calling for a change. The South African Communist party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) have both expressed their concern regarding the abrupt cabinet reshuffle. On April 4, COSATU called on Zuma to resign. The SACP has posted at the top of its web site its call for the ANC to remove him from the presidency. Meanwhile, the leading opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are asking for a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Civil-society is mobilized and has led demonstrations in the larger cities. The focus of anger increasingly appears to be Zuma’s failure to consult the ANC leadership and that of its communist and trade union allies before his cabinet reshuffle. The Integrity Commission summarizes this point of view: Zuma “disregarded the principle and tradition of collective leadership, both within the ANC and with our alliance partners” (SACP and COSATU). COSATU never liked Gordhan, and there is anger on the South African left at Standard & Poor’s downgrading of South Africa’s credit rating to junk status; COSATU spokesmen have characterized that act as “intervention in the internal affairs of South Africa.” But, seemingly, everybody can agree on Zuma’s lack of consultation. So, will Zuma go? It is by no means certain. The National Assembly is on Easter recess. To consider a motion of no confidence, the Speaker, Baleka Mbete, would have to call it back early. She is generally regarded as a Zuma ally. More generally, Zuma has built up a formidable patronage/clientage network within the ANC that may not be prepared to abandon him just yet. The ANC is set to choose a new national leader in December. ANC politicos, including Ramaphosa, are jockeying for position. For many in the ANC, it may be tempting to leave Zuma in place until a later date, rather than engage in a messy internal fight now.

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist movement that seeks to recreate Biafra as an independent state. From 1967-70, there was a civil war over Biafra’s attempt to secede that left up to two million Nigerians dead. Ever since, the Nigerian government has tried to crack down on Biafra secessionist movements. Hence, it’s imprisonment of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu. On the U.S. inauguration day, the IPOB staged a rally in Port Harcourt in support of American President Donald Trump. According to a movement spokesman, the IPOB supports President Trump because he favors “self-governance” and “the right of self-determination.” According to some media sources, the Nigerian police killed eleven demonstrators and arrested more than sixty-five. The police say that they only used tear gas. The Nigerian police are notoriously heavy-handed and their public statements do not have the reputation for veracity. In any event, the IPOB are clearly trying to use President Trump to advance their cause (Biafran’s also initially looked to Barack Obama to support their cause after his election). The Nigerian government of President Muhammadu Buhari is likely to be highly sensitive to any indication that the Trump administration is sympathetic to Biafra separatism. Meanwhile, President Buhari is in London on vacation.

The African National Congress (ANC), which has governed South Africa since the 1994 transition to “non-racial democracy,” traditionally eschewed identity politics. Though its electoral support was overwhelmingly Black, the party recruited its leadership from all races, which included many Whites and Asians. Nelson Mandela’s emphasis on racial reconciliation was very much in the spirit of the ANC. He particularly emphasized that there was place for Whites in post-apartheid South Africa. Famously, he attended a rugby championship match, the subject of the film Invictus. (Rugby is a White, mostly Afrikaner sport). As problems of black poverty remain seemingly intractable, black identity politics is on the upswing. Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters argues for the wholesale expropriation of white land. Within the ANC, especially under the leadership of Jacob Zuma, the party has become more ‘African,’ even more Zulu, in character. (Zulu speakers are the largest linguistic group in South Africa.) The new generation of ANC leaders appears to include a smaller percentage of non-blacks. In some areas, ANC local governments have replaced Afrikaner or Dutch place names with those from African origin. At historically white universities, black students have demonstrated successfully for the removal of statues and other symbols from the past, and for the replacement of Afrikaans by English as the language of instruction. Some also call for the replacement of “colonial” curricula with a “liberation” one. Perhaps inevitably, there is a white, especially Afrikaner, backlash. Eve Fairbanks profiles the explosive growth of AfriForum, a movement dedicated to white, especially Afrikaner, advocacy. AfriForum’s primary concerns are on alleged attacks of white farmers, the preservation of the Afrikaans language (especially in historically white educational institutions), and the preservation of Afrikaner names for locations and institutions. In a country with perhaps the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, with the second highest GINI coefficient in the world, the emergence of identity politics was probably inevitable. The process was probably accelerated by the decline of the ANC and the identification of its leadership with corruption. However, in a highly fractured society such as South Africa, identity politics can hurt the poorest and most vulnerable. Whites control the economy and most of the nation’s wealth, and wealthy Whites can retreat into gated communities and private schools. The police function in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg already has, in effect, been privatized. These security companies provide a level of community safety lacking in black townships. It is to be hoped that identity politics does not lead to the wholesale withdrawal of Whites from hitherto public institutions, such as traditionally Afrikaans speaking high schools and universities.

This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow, an Africa watcher, following politics and economic currents across the continent. He works at RTI International in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. The Gambia is in a political crisis. The country’s longtime strongman, President Yahya Jammeh lost his bid for re-election to a fifth term earlier this month. After initially conceding defeat, he is refusing to step down. Citing irregularities on the part of the Electoral Commission, Jammeh has rejected the results, and is calling for fresh elections. Reminiscent of the post-electoral crisis in the Ivory Coast a few years ago, the Gambia is risking a jealously guarded reputation for peace and tranquility in a region fraught with political turmoil. Unless cooler heads prevail, and Jammeh respects the will of the Gambian people, the country is in for a wild ride. The Key Players The Incumbent: President Yahya Jammeh has ruled this small country for twenty-two years. He came to power through a bloodless military coup in 1994, ousting the country’s post-independence president, Sir Dawda Jawara. Styling himself and his group as “soldiers with a difference,” Jammeh quickly returned the country to nominal civilian rule with himself at the helm. Known for the eccentric, President Jammeh claims to have a cure for HIV/AIDS and once vowed to kill homosexuals. To the Gambian population, the stifling of opposition and dissent, arbitrary detentions and disappearances, and the all-around limited space for political activism has driven many people into exile. The Opposition Coalition: The opposition, long in the wilderness due to the harsh tactics of the Jammeh regime finally joined forces under a coalition that gave Jammeh a run for his money. With the core of its leadership jailed after protests earlier in the year, the consensus candidate was Adama Barrow; a little-known businessman that no one had heard of. As it turned out, that was a genius move. He went on to win the elections, though by a slim margin, surprising everyone, including Jammeh himself. The Army: The Gambian Army has so far remained loyal to Yahya Jammeh, and has shown no signs of abandoning him. As the strongest institution in the country, the loyalty of the army has been a key factor in Jammeh’s twenty-two year rule. The way this political crisis ends will determine the future of the Gambian Army, especially its leadership, and it will be a litmus test as to where their loyalties lie—to their country, or to an individual. ECOWAS: When the political crisis started in the Gambia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) quickly sprang into action to avert an all-out crisis. A delegation headed by its current chair, Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, along with Presidents Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, John Mahatma of Ghana, and Earnest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone flew to the Gambia to encourage Jammeh to accept the results of the elections. Their efforts have so far failed, and ECOWAS is now considering additional steps to force Jammeh out of power. Senegal: Senegal is Gambia’s only neighbor, wielding significant influence on the politics and economy of the country. Jammeh and Senegal have never gotten along, and a number of blockades and boycotts since he came to power have stifled economic activities between the two countries. With Senegal and most of the world now backing the coalition, Jammeh’s options are getting very limited. Whatever decision ECOWAS takes, Senegal is sure to play a significant role. The Key Date January 18, 2017 will be the key date in the Gambia. That is the date Jammeh’s mandate officially ends. The opposition is planning to inaugurate President-elect Adama Barrow as the new president of the Gambia, and West African leaders have vowed to attend his inauguration. Will Jammeh allow Barrow to be sworn in as the new president of the Gambia? Will he allow other West African leaders landing rights to attend Barrow’s inauguration? Will Senegal and West Africa intervene to forcefully remove Jammeh? These are critical questions that will determine the future of the Gambia come January 18, 2017. The Way Forward Since independence in 1965, The Gambia has been a quiet and peaceful oasis in a tumultuous region—a fact that many of the nation’s two million people have guarded jealously. With this political impasse, the country risks sliding into an all-out conflict. The defeated president must hand over power to the elected president as he initially promised to do come inauguration day in January. Anything short of that will be devastating for the Gambia.

South Africa is a notoriously divided nation. There are eleven legal languages and four races with degrees of legal recognition (Indian/Asian, Black, Coloured, and White). Though Black Africans are about 80 percent of the population, they are divided into numerous ethnic groups, of which the Zulus are the largest, about a quarter of the population. South Africans sometimes say that there is no “majority” or “minority” in the country, with an overall, encompassing national identity as Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s Rainbow Nation. Coloured’s are mostly Afrikaans speaking and Dutch Reformed in religion, but the ‘Cape Coloured’s” are a Muslim minority. Among Whites, the division is between Afrikaans speakers and English speakers, with the former the majority. White Afrikaners sometimes identify themselves as the “white tribe." The South African constitution recognizes the freedom of legal and cultural self-determination, including the possibility of establishing an ‘ethnic homeland.” In terms of wealth, Whites have done better in post-apartheid South African than any other group, especially those that are English-speaking. White numbers have stabilized at just over 4.5 million (out of a total population of over fifty-four million), about the same as at the end of apartheid. White unemployment is dramatically lower than that of other racial groups; they are the racial group least likely to be the victims of crime. Social and economic statistics of Whites, both Afrikaner and “English,” are the best of any group. But the apartheid-era safety next for whites is gone. Because of this, there are now poor Afrikaner inhabitants of shanty towns. As in Europe and perhaps in the United States, ethnic identification is strengthening among South Africans. For example, President Jacob Zuma strongly emphasizes his Zulu identity and seeks political support from African traditional rulers, while his predecessors Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela chose not to emphasize their Xhosa heritage. Among some Afrikaans-speaking Whites there is concern that their unique culture is fading under the pressure of the overwhelming Black majority and globalization. CNN carries a fascinating story about Orania, an Afrikaner response. CNN’s report is based on the work of Swedish journalist, Kajsa Norman, who is writing a book on the Afrikaners. Orania is an Afrikaner homeland restricted to Whites who are Afrikaans speaking and Afrikaner in culture. In effect, it is whites-only. Coloureds, who are usually Afrikaans speakers and Afrikaner in culture, are excluded. Orania is located on the edge of a desert in territory nobody else wanted. Its residents are embarked on building a new state-within-a-state based on self-imposed racial and cultural segregation. (As Norman notes, the Afrikaners in Orania have essentially created their own Bantustan.) CNN reports that its population is about 1,300 and is growing at the rate of 10 percent per year. The economy is based on agriculture, with unemployment at only 2 percent. As CNN reports, Orania is becoming something of a haven for Afrikaner down-and-outs, including recovering alcoholics and drug addicts, now that the apartheid state no longer exists. Some settle permanently, others come to dry out and then move on. Since the seventeenth century, the Dutch settlers in South Africa who evolved into Afrikaners have often seen themselves as God’s chosen people, set aside from the rest of the population. This was a premise of the racial segregation that evolved into apartheid. Orania is, apparently, a return to that ideal. Orania is predicated on a vision of society that is far from the racially and ethnically integrated ideal of Nelson Mandela and the “Rainbow People of God.” It is easy to imagine that many of its residents are white supremacists. But, its emphasis on ethnic identify also recalls that of Jacob Zuma’s Zulu identity. Whites-only Orania is entirely legal under South African law, as was affirmed by a 2000 high court decision. Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma have both visited; CNN reports that some Orania residents feel that Zuma, with his strong Zulu identity, understands what motivates their separation.

This is a guest post by Tyler Lycan. Tyler is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program, he recently obtained his Masters in International Security Studies from the University of St. Andrews, and is a former U.S. Marine. In This Present Darkness Stephen Ellis inspects the roots of the current culture of corruption in Nigeria. At an abstract level, he presents two, connected theories. First, he argues that the post-colonial political history of Nigeria combined with the economic power of the state’s oil riches created an environment in which fraud and corruption is accepted. Second, he suggests that the spirituality characteristic of many Nigerians allowed for a unique understanding of the interplay between two different worlds: the physical in which they exist, and the intangible world of economics and government institutions. The current political economy is a ‘new’ representation of the spirit world to which they have a long cultural and religious connection. His argument invoking traditional religion is subtle and well-developed; and a short review such as this one cannot do it justice. Hence, the focus here is on his discussion of the historical roots of corruption rather than its metaphysical dimension. While there is no activity during British Colonial rule that parallels exactly the current patterns of corruption, Ellis argues that much of the groundwork was laid then. The divide between North and South was exploited by the British in their effort to extract as much wealth as possible and their use of indirect rule distorted the existing political frameworks in each region. In the North, that included extra-governmental Sharia (Islamic) courts, while in the South it included secret societies and gift giving. In the South, there was a “distinction between public and private” realities that did not exist in Britain. ’Indirect rule,’ colonial governance through indigenous institutions, encouraged a “high degree of deceit and manipulation as to amount to training in subterfuge for anyone who had close experience of it.” According to Ellis, the origin of state corruption in its current form is illustrated by the career of Festus Okotie-Eboh. He needed to borrow large sums of money to achieve political and electoral success. Once in office, he used his position to acquire illegally the funds he needed to pay those debts and amass his own fortune. He pressured those dependant on him, and they in turn preyed on those subordinate to them. Corruption thereby came to infest the whole of Nigerian society. Colonialism in Nigeria created an environment in which fraud allowed individuals to flourish, and the subsequent oil boom of the 1970’s further enhanced a culture of fraud. From 1967-1977, oil revenues increased by 2,200 percent, but was managed with little transparency of sense of the public good by a military government that came to power through successive coups d’état. Yet, strong economic growth inspired many Nigerians to envision their country as on the cusp of superpowerhood, creating an ideology of “Nigerianism” that encouraged acquiescence to a culture of fraud. In summary, Ellis argues that indirect rule by the British created new, and exacerbated old, frameworks of power that were susceptible to fraud. Following independence, Nigerian politics took on a life of trickle-down bribery and fraud that infected all levels of society. Finally, Nigerian oil reserves, national pride, and a culture of consumption led many Nigerians to seek out any means to reach their goals. The implication is that the Buhari administration’s current crusade against corruption should keep this historical roots in mind as it seeks to root out the culture of corruption.

According to the Nigerian media, the Department of State Security Services (DSS) arrested seven judges over the weekend for corruption and is planning to move against an additional eight. Among the seven are three supreme court justices. The arrested judges are to be arraigned in court yesterday and then released on bail. The media reports that the DSS carried out the arrests in its characteristically rough manner: according to Leadership (Abuja) “Gun-wielding DSS and police operatives had on Friday night and in the early hours of Saturday swooped on the residences of senior judges, breaking doors and threatening to harm their family members and aides.” The move against corrupt judges is already a political football. The opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Nigerian Bar Association are accusing the Buhari administration of attacking the independence of the judiciary. The PDP accuses the Buhari administration of “selective prosecution” in its campaign against corruption. Abubakar Mahmoud, president of the Nigerian Bar Association has declared “a state of emergency.” He characterized the arrests as “unconstitutional" and a “Gestapo-style operation” that violated the constitutional separation of powers. The governing All Progressives Congress (APC) has countered by denouncing the PDP’s effort to associate President Buhari with the arrests. President Buhari said that the arrests were an attack on corruption, not the judiciary. He also said that that he would not undermine judicial independence. “The recent surgical operation against some judicial officers is specifically targeted at corruption and not at the judiciary as an institution.” Parts of the judiciary are notorious for corruption. According to the media, the DSS stated on October 8 that it had recovered more than N93 million (approximately $306,000) and $530,000 in cash from three of the arrested judges. However, it remains to be seen whether the DSS has the power to arrest judges. Claims that DSS methods at the time of arrest were rough and “disrespectful” are credible, given the frequent pattern of behavior of the security services.

The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) endorsed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa for the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC) on September 26. The election of party president will take place in 2017; the next presidential elections will take place in 2019. Under South Africa’s system of proportional representation the ANC party president is likely to be the next president of South Africa. Cyril Ramaphosa was a founder of the NUM as a black trade union in the late apartheid era. A lawyer, he was a leading ANC negotiator of the peaceful transition from apartheid to South Africa’s “non-racial” democracy that culminated in Nelson Mandela’s election as president in 1994. It is widely said that Mandela favored Ramaphosa as his successor, but he bowed to the will of the party and endorsed Thabo Mbeki. Thereafter, Ramaphosa left politics and accumulated a substantial fortune. He re-entered politics in 2012. In the aftermath of scandals and court judgments against it and it’s very poor electoral performance in the August 2016 elections, the scandal-prone administration of President Jacob Zuma is in a shambles. Zuma retains significant support within the party machinery, state owned enterprises, and among the heads of the security agencies. He also commands the loyalty of a big patronage network. Those ANC party leaders who want Zuma to go before the end of his term in 2017 so that the party can rid itself of scandal and rebuild following its relative defeat in August, have rallied around the finance minister Pravin Gordhan. They include Ramaphosa. At present the pro-Zuma and anti-Zuma factions appear to be evenly balanced and governance largely at a standstill. At the same time the NUM endorsed Ramaphosa, its secretary general said that “Zuma must serve his term.” NUM may be seeking a compromise between the pro and anti-Zuma factions: Zuma gets to remain in office until the end of his term as president of the ANC. But, he is blocked from choosing his successor. That would, in effect, further reduce Zuma’s political power for his remaining time in office. ANC faction fighting is likely to continue. That Ramaphosa will prevail is far from certain. He is much more popular in London and New York and within parts of the South African business community than he is among the ANC rank and file.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has frozen U.S. dollar bank accounts that former Nigerian First Lady Patience Jonathan claims are hers. The total value of the accounts is worth $31.5 million. She has applied to the Federal High Court in Lagos to unfreeze the accounts. Many Nigerians, including the Nigeria Labour Congress, are asking how she accumulated $31.5 million in the first place. It is hard to see how Patience Jonathan could have piled-up such a large amount of money. Now fifty-eight years of age, she is Nigerian-university educated, and has taught off and on and held various civil service jobs in her oil-rich native state, Bayelsa. She went into banking in 1997. When her husband, Goodluck Jonathan, became deputy governor of Bayelsa, the governor made her the state’s permanent secretary, the pinnacle of the state civil service. The appointment was widely criticized as she had no obvious qualifications for the post, and had been out of the civil service for years. After her husband became chief of state, she was known for her arrogance and imperiousness, and she is widely disliked. As first lady, she insisted on the use of the title of “Dame.” (There is no provision for a first lady in the Nigerian constitution; the wife of the current president calls herself ‘Mrs. Buhari.’) She also made political blunders. Shortly after the Boko Haram kidnapping of the Chibok school girls, in a meeting with community leaders, she accused them of fabricating the abduction to give her husband’s administration a bad name. Stories circulate that she collected fees for access to her husband. At present, she is in London, ostensibly for medical treatment. As is often the case with grand corruption at the top in Nigeria, the details are murky. According to the media, some of the accounts were opened in the names of Patience Jonathan’s domestic servants, who had no access to them. Her lawyer claims that $15 million of the frozen money was paid by the Nigerian state for her medical treatment in the UK. Because she is so widely disliked, there is always the danger of leaping to conclusions. Nevertheless, judging by the media and social media, most Nigerians regard her as guilty. With his wife under investigation and facing likely arrest should she return to Nigeria, the corruption issue is getting close to former President Goodluck Jonathan. But moving against the former president, who remains popular in the predominantly Christian south and east, could pose special challenges for the Buhari government. The average Nigerian is very poor, poorer still with the current state of Nigeria’s economy. They have little access to quality health care while elites almost always go abroad for medical treatment. Patience Jonathan’s expensive ‘treatment’ is typical of the corruption Nigerian elites are often known for. Popular indignation over corruption under Patience’s husband played a major role in Muhammadu Buhari’s victory in the 2015 presidential elections.

Those universities commonly regarded as the best in South Africa have been roiled by student unrest over the past two years. First, it was protests against the symbols of imperialism and racism such as the statue of Cecil Rhodes at the University of Cape Town (UCT). Then in October 2015, protests over university fees and tuition hikes began. After reaching a settlement last year the university fees and tuition have been raised once again, inciting major student protests. The students are now calling to make university education free. South Africa is the only sub-Saharan African country that contributes to the journalists’ lists of the world’s top five-hundred universities. For example, The Times Higher Education ranking of top universities in the world includes the University of Cape Town (148), the University of Witwatersrand also known as ‘Wits’ (182), and Stellenbosch University (401-500). All other African universities are ranked in the general category of eight-hundred and above. (Such lists are notoriously contentious and controversial but they do reflect commonly-held perceptions in the developed world.) Apartheid had a particularly baleful influence on South African education at all levels, and the black majority was mostly excluded from higher education, though there were a few black-only universities with limited curricula. At base, the current unrest is a consequence of trying to address those consequences. For background on the challenges to South African education, see chapter 5 of my new book, Morning in South Africa. At present, the center of the unrest is at the University of Cape Town and Wits, though it is often to be found at other formerly white-only universities, as well. As is so often the case in South Africa, an underlying issue is the integration of Black Africans fully into national life, in this case Black students into historically ‘White’ universities. (South Africa is about 80 percent Black, 9 percent is Coloured, and 9 percent White.) With a focus on free tuition, demonstrations have also spread to black-majority institutions. Under apartheid, UCT and Wits were ‘White’ universities. (A few non-Whites were enrolled during the last years of apartheid.) Now, both have non-White majorities, though the percentage of Whites is much higher than 9 percent. But, in terms of administration, faculty, and general atmosphere, they remain ‘White.’ Black students frequently complain that they are marginalized and ‘disrespected.’ Further, university tuition and fees are especially burdensome for students from a poor demographic. Yet, as elsewhere in the world, university education is becoming more expensive and the value of the national currency is falling, with a resulting pressure on administrations to raise tuition and fees. Black students often come from primary and secondary schools little improved over the “Bantu” schools of the apartheid era. The high academic standards which they must meet at UCT and Wits can be a challenge. The universities have financial aid available to help alleviate the economic burden, and there are remedial programs that attempt to make up for weak secondary schools. Nevertheless, for black students, who are often the first of their family to attend a high-quality university, the road is not easy. These issues will be familiar to Americans, where federal and state governments over the past generation has sought to make quality higher education available to those formerly excluded by pervasive racism and, in the southern states, legally-based segregation.