Civil Society

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. At the end of May the Chinese government announced that following a one year ban on ivory imports, it will “strictly control ivory processing and trade until the commercial processing and sale of ivory and its products are eventually halted.” If the Chinese are able to follow through, this could be one of the most important actions taken to end the illicit trade of Ivory that is contributing to the decimation of elephant populations in Africa (China is the largest market for elephant ivory). However, as the Chinese point out, if the ivory trade is to end, other governments must commit to bans as well. As the United States is the world’s second largest market for ivory, it would be an equally important move if the U.S. government were to enact a ban on the trade of elephant ivory. It seems that this may at least be occurring at the state level. On August 2014, the New Jersey State government announced a complete ban on the sale and import of ivory (including rhinoceros horn). It was the first state to do so. Previously, New York passed legislation to limit the sale of ivory in the state (certain items viewed as ‘antiques’ are exempt). These are currently the only states with legislation restricting the trade. However, since New Jersey’s ban was announced ten more states have submitted bills to their legislature in order to restrict the trade of ivory. There have also been moves by the U.S. federal government to restrict the trade. As part of President Obama’s National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking, the Fish and Wildlife Service has pushed for a near ban on the ivory trade. After recent reports that Mozambique and Tanzania have respectively lost 48 and 60 percent of their elephant populations due to poaching over the last five years, it would seem that now is the time for the U.S. federal government to clamp down on the ivory trade.

Muhammadu Buhari will be inaugurated president of Nigeria today, May 29, in Abuja’s Eagle Square. To call an occasion “historic” is hackneyed. But, this time, it is true. For the first time in Nigeria’s history, an opposition candidate will become president because of elections that Nigerians regard as expressing the people’s will. Unlike past failures, the 2015 elections worked because of structural reforms and the leadership of the Chairman of the Independent National Elections Commission, Attahiru Jega. Nigerian civil society was thoroughly mobilized in support of credible elections. The international community, especially the United Kingdom and the United States, warned that perpetrators of violence and those who meddled in elections faced serious consequences. Because Buhari won credible elections by a large margin, his political position at home and abroad is inherently stronger than that of his predecessors. In his successful 2015 campaign, he said he would re-invigorate the struggle against the Islamist radical group Boko Haram that has killed thousands, and fight against Nigeria’s ubiquitous corruption. His campaign symbol was a broom, a sign of his commitment to clean things up. (Nigeria needs it.) Specifically, he has promised to clean up the national oil company, a notorious nest of corruption. It is important to know that Buhari is a devout Muslim, but he is no fanatic. His personal life style is austere. (His trip last week to London was without an entourage, and he stayed in a holiday flat rather than a hotel palace.) He personally has never been tarred with credible allegations of corruption. A former general, he led a military coup against a corrupt civilian government in 1984. He was then military chief of state for twenty months until he in turn was overthrown by another military coup. Buhari argues credibly that since then he has converted to democracy. He has asked the media not to refer to him as ‘general’ but simply as Muhammadu Buhari. He is a strong Nigerian nationalist in a country where national identity has been declining. Hence, he has said that Boko Haram is primarily a Nigerian responsibility. Nevertheless, he has also signaled that he would like a closer relationship with the United States and Nigeria’s other western partners. Nigeria’s challenges are great: Boko Haram and a huge population of internally displaced, a potential renewal of an insurrection in the oil patch, ubiquitous corruption, falling oil prices, labor unrest, and generally, a people by and large alienated from their government and their elites. Buhari has appealed for patience from the Nigerian people. It remains to be seen whether they will give it to him. Nigeria’s challenges will be there tomorrow and for long after. However, today, Friday, Inauguration Day, is for celebrating Nigeria.

This is a guest post by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, a journalist and adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma has denounced the anti-immigrant violence racking his country while also promising to step up a crackdown on illegal immigration. It’s a tricky and dangerous high stakes game to play, one that does not address the nation’s underlying problems of unemployment and poverty, and that sadly puts South Africa’s stability at stake. The country is indeed at risk of destabilization. While President Zuma may claim that more South Africans have electricity, are connected to piped water, and have standard sanitation than one year ago, his record is dim on the economy as a whole. South Africa’s economic growth was 1.5 percent last year, representing the country’s second-lowest growth rate over the past sixteen years. The nation’s unemployment rate, at 25 percent, is one of the highest in the world. Unemployment is over 50 percent for those between 15-24 years old. These poor economic circumstances, coupled with Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini’s incendiary remarks in March that foreigners “should pack their bags and go” because they are taking jobs from South Africans, have incited violence against migrants. King Zwelithini now claims that journalists misquoted him. President Zuma’s call for tolerance and calm has been largely ignored. Indeed, the country is experiencing its worst violence against immigrants since 2008, when nearly 60 people were killed and some 50,000 were forced from their homes. Just this past weekend police arrested nearly 4,000 people, half of them allegedly illegal immigrants, in an effort to promote calm. In April, a clash between locals and immigrants in the port city of Durban left seven dead. Since then, nearly 2,000 foreigners from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other African countries have fled their homes for government-created refugee camps. A University of the Witwatersrand study estimates that 4 percent of South Africa’s population is made up of immigrants, divided about equally between legal and illegal immigrants. Zimbabweans comprise the largest group, and some analysts estimate they account for 23 percent of South Africa’s workforce. Human rights groups and African nations have condemned the attacks. Countries like Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe are evacuating their citizens from South Africa. In Zambia, one radio station, QFM, has stopped playing South African music in solidarity with the victims. In Mozambique, there are reports that South African energy and chemical giant Sasol sent hundreds of South African nationals home after Mozambican employees protested their presence. So why are President Zuma’s pleas for peace going unanswered? He may only have himself to blame. He is sending conflicting messages about immigration and the value of immigrants. He’s called the violence “shocking” and said “many [immigrants] bring skills that are scarce that help us to develop the economy and are most welcome to live [in] our country.” Yet, Zuma has also said “there are socio-economic issues that have been raised which are being attended to. These include complaints about illegal and undocumented immigrants in the country, the increase in the number of shops or small businesses that have been taken over by foreign nationals and also perceptions that foreign nationals commit or perpetrate crime.” Such statements send mixed signals. So what can be done? First, President Zuma, who has known poverty and was once a migrant worker in Mozambique and Zambia, needs to denounce that he is a member of the emerging anti-immigrant wave washing from Marie Le Pen’s France, to the United Kingdom’s Independence Party, to the Greek rise of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn. Then he should fulfill the promises he made one year ago when his party won a decisive 62 percent of the nation’s elections. Back then he said in his acceptance speech, "This mandate gives us the green light to … promote inclusive economic growth and job creation."

The African National Congress’s (ANC) electoral support is slowly eroding. Its share of the national vote has declined to 62.2 percent in 2014 from its high water mark of 69.7 percent in 2004. Its leader, President Jacob Zuma, is much more unpopular than the party, and outside his Zulu core constituency, many see him as corrupt and incompetent. The ANC remains South Africa’s largest political party, in part because of its crucial role in the struggle against apartheid but also because of its education, health, and housing policies. In addition, more than 16 million of South Africa’s 53 million citizens receive government allowances that have reduced the percentage of the population living in extreme poverty, tieing those recipients to the ANC. Nevertheless, after twenty-one years in power, discontent with the ANC is growing, and the party is seen in some quarters as increasingly out of touch. The party’s leadership is also aging: President Zuma is seventy-three; National Chairman Baleke Mbete is sixty-five; Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is sixty-two. By contrast, the leadership of the two opposition parties, Mmusi Maimane of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Julius Malema of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), are both thirty-four, a generation younger. With the slow waning of the ANC, the official opposition, the DA, is moving to broaden its electoral base beyond whites, coloureds, and Asians. It has enjoyed some success; in the 2015 elections it increased its vote share to 22 percent, and perhaps 20 percent of its voters were black. Now, it has selected Mmusi Maimane, a black man born in Soweto, as its new party leader, succeeding Helen Zille, who is white. Maimane ran for mayor of Johannesburg in 2011. Defeated by the ANC candidate, he has served as the leader of the DA on the Johannesburg city council. He has been leader of the DA in the National Assembly since May 2014. In the 2016 municipal elections, Maimane is targeting Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth, in addition to Cape Town, which the DA already controls. Maimane has a BA in psychology from the University of South Africa, a MA degree in public administration from the University of the Witwatersrand, and a MA in theology from the University of Wales (Bangor). A business consultant, he preaches at a protestant church in suburban Johannesburg, though he was raised a Roman Catholic. His church, Liberty Church – Roodeport, appears to be multiracial, and, based on its website, is evangelical, even Pentecostal in its style of worship. (Pentecostal worship styles are growing very rapidly among black South Africans.) Some critics of the DA charge that the party seeks to bring back racial segregation, an ironical accusation as it is the direct descendant of white liberals who fought against apartheid. Critics will accuse the DA of cynically trolling for black votes by acquiring a veneer of black leadership while the real power rests with whites. University-educated Lindiwe Mazibuko, the former DA leader in the National Assembly, was regularly accused of being a “coconut,” white on the inside and black on the outside. With his multiple academic degrees, a background in business, a preacher to an apparently multi-racial congregation, and with a white wife, Maimane is also accused of not being black “enough.” (Interracial marriage between whites and blacks in South Africa is relatively rare, of about the same magnitude as in the United States.) Breaking the racial box of South African politics will be difficult. There is anecdotal evidence that middle-class blacks disillusioned by the ANC still cannot bring themselves to vote for the “white” DA. So, they support the EFF, which advocates policies directly contrary to their presumed economic interests. However, South African politics are opening up in that they are no longer the exclusive purview of the ANC. Before the national elections in 2019, it is widely anticipated that the National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa’s largest and wealthiest trade union, will establish a “responsible” left wing party that might deprive the EFF of its oxygen. The day may not be too far distant in which South African politics become multivalent, with the DA on the right, the ANC in the middle, and a social democratic party on the left. When that day comes, political identification is likely to owe much less to racial identity than it does now.

This is a guest post by Mora McLean, President Emerita of The Africa-America Institute. Some twenty years ago, Amartya Sen, spurred a major shift in development theory by making the case that per capita gross domestic product should not be the sole measure for assessing and comparing well-being across the globe. Sen called attention to global mortality data showing that men in Bangladesh were more likely to live to age forty than black American men in Harlem, despite having much lower incomes. He argued that “[t]he need to widen the scope of conventional economics to include the economics of life and death is no less acute in the United States than it is in famine stricken sub-Saharan Africa.” Sen’s assertion draws some of its power from the juxtaposed references to “black America” and “sub-Saharan Africa.” He shows how people of African descent, on the African continent and in the Americas, are proxies for evoking images of impoverishment and depravation. The resonance of this imagery is understandable given that, for instance, the majority of Nigeria’s population lives in absolute poverty, despite its oil wealth and enviably high growth statistics; and that one in three black males born in the United States in the 21st century is expected to go to prison. But, development discourse rarely examines the enduring role of racism in shaping institutions, processes, and perspectives that contribute to intractable poverty in Africa and elsewhere. The obvious racialism of apartheid is acknowledged, but as income inequality increases under black majority rule, concerns that South Africa is “going the way of black Africa” gain currency. Moreover, although Sen successfully steered analysis toward multidimensional poverty by factoring in U.S. demographics, the well-being of poor black Americans is not scrutinized according to the UN Human Development Index. This “determined colorblindness” obscures history and geopolitics, and facilitates false assumptions and simplistic conclusions. For instance, with few exceptions, mainstream journalists and development economists routinely reduce Africa’s problems to ethnicity and corruption. They gloss over the institutional legacy of European colonialism in Africa, and overlook the ongoing, large-scale looting of Africa’s natural resources by transcontinental economic elites, facilitated by modern global financial mechanisms. Failing to examine the role of race also leaves unchallenged the pervasive, albeit unspoken, view that intractable poverty amongst Africans and African descendants is attributable to their culture and innate qualities. As Kwame Anthony Appiah observes in his Foreign Affairs essay “[i]n the twenty-first century, as in the twentieth…a belief in essential differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ persists widely…”. It’s been decades since Amartya Sen proved that poor countries can outperform rich countries in improving healthcare and life expectancy; and one of the lessons of the current global economic crisis is that aid recipient and donor countries face common challenges. Building on the analytical contributions of Sen and others, careful analysis of the interplay between concepts of race and development is needed. Doing so could usefully eliminate the “us” versus “them” development paradigm, and would provide a more holistic view of how to tackle poverty and achieve widespread well-being in Africa, in the United States, and beyond.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. This year rhino poaching has increased significantly in South Africa and Namibia, part of a worsening trend. Since 2007 there has been a 10,000 percent increase in poaching in South Africa alone. An average of twelve rhinos were poached in South Africa between 2000 and 2007 per year; that number ballooned to 1,255 in 2014. Africa is home to two of the five rhino species: the white rhino and the black rhino. The white rhino, which conservation organizations deem as threatened, has an estimated population of 20,000, while the critically endangered black rhino numbers around 5,000. Including the three other species of rhino there are approximately 29,000 rhinos worldwide. With an estimated 20,000 black and white rhinos, South Africa is home to almost 70 percent of all rhinos. The remainder of Africa’s rhinos are scattered throughout southern and east Africa. Just since January, 393 rhinos have been poached in South Africa—an 18 percent increase from the same time period in 2014. In neighboring Namibia, alarmingly, sixty rhinos have been poached since January (only twenty-four were poached in 2014). The rhino population in Zimbabwe is believed to have decreased by nearly 30 percent in the last three years, having lost two hundred rhinos since 2012. Meanwhile, Mozambique, the country blamed for much of South Africa’s poaching problem, saw its reintroduced rhino population disappear in 2013. If this trend continues, African countries will lose one of their most iconic animals and a keystone species. Indeed, if poaching continues at an 18 percent increase in South Africa, the number of poached rhinos in 2015 will reach 1,480, and will far exceed the number of rhinos being born. Fortunately, governments and local NGOs are taking steps to address the increase in rhino poaching. The group Rhinos Without Borders plans to move one hundred rhinos from South Africa to Botswana, they have already relocated ten. As Botswana has seen a sixfold increase in its rhino population over the last ten years, going from 26 to 153 animals, it seems to be one of the few safehavens left for rhinos in Africa. Botswana has been successful at protecting its animal populations because the government has prioritized its conservation programs, going so far as to deploy its military to protect its rhino population. In search of other ways of keeping the rhino population safe, others have suggested more radical solutions. In fact, a conservation group recently proposed to move a thousand rhinos from South Africa to Texas. Though criticized by many conservationists as impractical, and seen by some as a move spurred by big game hunters, the Texas proposal does highlight the need for a drastic response. However, the best way for African governments to save the rhino is through prioritizing conservation efforts that include education and community outreach. While not all African governments have the resources to commit their military to the protection of these animals, they can emphasize the biological, ecological, and financial costs that losing the rhino population would have on local communities. African governments can only stop the poaching crisis once their communities are committed to the fight against poaching.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Last month, Sudan held national elections, and Omar al-Bashir secured another presidential term. Though expected, many commentators are focused on the illegitimacy of al-Bashir’s victory. The election’s results are indeed disappointing, but the real challenge facing Sudan is its uncertain future. The country is struggling with an economic crisis, ethnic conflict, and political gridlock. These must be the focus of politicians and analysts alike if Sudan is ever to regain stability. Nothing about the April election was surprising. As promised, major opposition parties boycotted, making the election largely uncompetitive. With few options on the ballot, voter turnout was low, forcing Sudan’s National Elections Commission to keep the polls open an extra day to attract more citizens. Still, less than half of the 13 million registered voters cast ballots. The African Union estimates 30 to 35 percent turnout, while Sudan’s National Elections Commission estimates 46 percent. As anticipated, al-Bashir garnered 94.5 percent of votes. While the African Union and Arab League electoral observer missions have certified the election as legitimate—free of vote-buying and fraud—questions remain over the National Congress Party’s (NCP) mandate to govern, given that half of the voting public abstained. Indeed, the United States, United Kingdom, and Norway released a joint statement saying that Sudan’s election does not represent a credible expression of citizens’ will, as did Canada. While legitimate support for al-Bashir may well be anemic, the election results are only the beginning. For the NCP and the country, there are several demanding challenges to confront. The economy remains in dire straits since South Sudan seceded in 2011, taking with it three-quarters of oil production and half of fiscal revenues. Conflict rages in the east and south as fighting between government and rebel groups continues in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, resulting in massive casualties and displacement. Just since the beginning of 2014, over 450,000 people have fled Darfur. And the political landscape is exceptionally fractured. NCP efforts to bring together Sudan’s political opposition—which has been kept out of government since the NCP took power in 1989—have been half-hearted at best, further alienating opposition parties and leading them to boycott the recent elections. Without merging these disparate political factions, stabilizing the country and uniting its populace will remain impossible. For years now, Sudan’s political leaders have ruthlessly pursued their own interest, ignoring not only the needs of their 37.9 million constituents but also the looming political, economic, and ethnic crises. Rather than remaining short-sighted and plundering a sinking ship—whether through illicit business contracts or unfettered access to state coffers—the NCP should work to keep Sudan afloat. With another five years securely under their belt, the ruling NCP has the time and opportunity to change course: offer opposition parties a seat at the table; make peace with rebels in the east and south; rein in state corruption; reduce profligate military spending; and, invest in profitable sectors like agriculture. It would be foolish to pretend that the NCP will adopt this agenda—which is so contrary to its near-quarter century of regressive policies—out of altruism. Yet perhaps the political, economic, and societal stability ushered in by these reforms and the potential resulting growth will be enough to convince them otherwise.

Adam Nossiter has published a thought-provoking article in the April 29, 2015, New York Times. He comments on the silence of African leaders regarding the deaths of scores of African boat people who were trying to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life. While it is true that many of the Mediterranean boat people are from Syria, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, the majority are African. Nossiter quotes the chairwoman of the African Union commission, South African Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as expressing her “condolences.” To me, that is a trivial reaction to an African tragedy, which, one might have thought, exposes an issue that would be a central concern of the African Union. Nossiter also reports similarly weak statements from other African leaders. European civil society indignation and calls for their governments to “do something,” even if sometimes dysfunctional, lacks an echo among African political classes and elites. African governments simply seem to be disengaged from the tragedy. Part of the reason for this disengagement may be an African lack of capacity. Few African states can control the flow of people across their borders. Many, if not most, have weak bureaucratic institutions and underdeveloped civil services. Disengagement may also reflect elite detachment from their own people. The drivers for Africans to take to the boats appear to be poverty and the lack of opportunity, underpinned by poor governance. But, economic and social development as well as improvement in governance and accountability are not simple tasks and take a long time to achieve. The African boat people are a rebuke to the popular, undifferentiated narrative of “Africa Rising.” In too many parts of Africa, nominally high rates of economic growth go hand in hand with increasing poverty and desperation. So, if they can, many Africans will take to the boats, believing that life in a European camp is preferable to staying home.

Today is Earth Day, an appropriate moment to remember Africa’s HeroRats. On April 19, the New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof called attention to these creatures and their ability to sniff-out land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as their ability to screen sputum samples for tuberculosis. To date these animals have detected over 48,000 land mines and UXO’s, and screened over 290,000 samples for tuberculosis. APOPO, a Belgian non-governmental organization (NGO) with an international staff, trains these HeroRats in Tanzania. Originally starting with mine and UXO detection APOPO has more recently begun using these HeroRats to detect tuberculosis. According to APOPO’s web site, it deploys mine detecting rats in Mozambique, Thailand, Cambodia, and Angola. They have also worked to clear UXO’s in Laos and Vietnam. For tuberculosis screening, APOPO deploys the rats in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Maputo, Mozambique. The rats are able to clear mine fields and screen sputum for tuberculosis faster and more efficiently than other methods. For example, while a human can screen twenty-five samples of sputum for tuberculosis in a day, HeroRats are able to screen one hundred samples in twenty minutes. In clinics using HeroRats the number of patients identified with tuberculosis has risen by 48 percent. Along with being efficient, HeroRats are an inexpensive answer to the problems they seek to solve. APOPO estimates that in order to fully train one rat the cost is approximately $6,400, far cheaper than the alternatives. A theme of Kristoff’s column is that HeroRats are an example of innovative non-profit approaches. HeroRats are Gambian pouched rats. They can be up to three feet long and weigh perhaps forty ounces, too light to set off a mine. Their sense of smell is very strong, compensating for weak eyes. Their life span is about eight years, and they are retired after six. They eat fruits and nuts. Kristof reports that they become close to their handlers. Despite their name, they are rats, not marsupials. HeroRats are an unabashed good-news story. A NGO has identified how a creature can be used to tackle two different horrors, unexploded munitions and tuberculosis. Kristoff writes that his children “gave” him a HeroRat as a Father’s Day present a few years ago. The cost to adopt a rat is $84 per year, most of which goes toward the year-long training that APOPO provides the rats. If you are interested in adopting your own HeroRat, you can visit apopo.org.

The current wave of violence and intimidation against African immigrants in South Africa started in Durban and has spread to Johannesburg and other parts of the country. Intimidation and fear mongering appears to be widespread, generating panic among African foreigners. There have been previous waves of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa that also were violent. What is going on in South Africa is unclear. However, South African xenophobia is in part a response to rampant poverty. Many black South Africans have seen little improvement in their lives in the twenty-plus years since Nelson’s Mandela’s inauguration as president of the “non-racial” South Africa. In terms of income and opportunity, South Africa remains one of the least equal countries in the world. While whites, many Asians, and a small black elite generally enjoy a first-world standard of living, much of the vast black majority remains mired in poverty and underdevelopment. South Africans perceive their society as one of the world’s most violent. Protests, sometimes violent, against poor service delivery in the townships is now almost a daily occurrence. Poor blacks have little political voice, and the governing African National congress (ANC) is increasingly remote from many township dwellers. (Only Julius Malema’s quixotic Economic Freedom Fighters seeks to speak for the poor majority.) As a result, many blacks South Africans are deeply angry. But the rage and violence associated with the waves of xenophobia is not directed toward whites or the small black elite. Instead, its victims are African immigrants who likely possess little more than their tormentors. Immigrants can readily be identified as “the other.” This is especially true of immigrants from francophone or lusophone Africa. Though, Anglophones, especially Zimbabweans and Nigerians, are also victims. Immigrants are also near at hand – they very often live in townships. Reflecting apartheid’s physical separation of the races, elites, white or black, often live at a considerable distance from poor blacks, with whom they may have little contact. One of the main drivers of anger seems to be that immigrants are competitors for scarce township jobs. Some immigrants, for example from Zimbabwe, have benefited from better primary schooling than most black South Africans. This has given them an advantage in obtaining jobs in township environments where unemployment can approach 50 percent. In some countries, xenophobia is tacitly condoned by the government as a way of deflecting opposition. This is not the case in South Africa. The government, the opposition, the media, and the South African establishment across racial lines has uniformly condemned the xenophobia. In many of the townships the local populations are divided, with many local residents seeking to protect immigrants, and there have been public protests against xenophobia. The government regards the violence against foreigners as criminal, and the police have made arrests. The authorities will likely bring the current wave of xenophobic violence under control. But, in so far as xenophobic violence is a manifestation of South Africa’s social and economic ills, it is likely to flare up again.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 4, 2015 to April 10, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. <a href=’#’><img alt=’Weekly Incident Map Dashboard ’ src=’https://public.tableau.com/static/images/NS/NSTWeeklyApril4-10/WeeklyIncidentMapDashboard/1_rss.png’ style=’border: none’ /></a>   April 4: Boko Haram killed five in Konduga, Borno. April 5: Boko Haram dressed as preachers and lured civilians in Hawul, Borno into a mosque where they opened fire, killing thirty. April 6: Boko Haram attacked New Marte in Borno. They killed an estimated forty civilians  and ten soldiers but lost an estimated ten of their own. April 7: Protests in Efon, Ekiti over Fayose’s impeachment bid led to one death. April 8: A clash between the Peoples Democratic Party and the Labour Party in Ikwo, Ebonyi, led to the deaths of two. April 9: Boko Haram killed twenty in Dile in Askira/Uba, Borno. April 9: Boko Haram killed two in Biu, Borno. April 9: The Nigerian Army retook villages in Akira Uba and Damboa in Borno, losing one soldier and killing an estimated twenty members of Boko Haram.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On March 30, Comedy Central’s the Daily Show announced that 31-year old Trevor Noah will replace John Stewart as the host. As the Daily Show’s twitter handle put it: Noah is just “another guy in late night from Soweto.” The announcement of his new position has drawn a great deal of attention, both positive and negative. The intial response was overwhelmingly positive in South Africa and the United States. To an American audience it was refreshing to see an international voice on a news platform, not to mention the first mixed-race host of a major late night show. To South Africans, his success in the United States has been inspirational, a fellow South African comedian, Marc Lottering, has said: “This is not only fantastic for Trevor, but also for young Africans who have big dreams.” However, this initial wave of excitement subsided as some of Noah’s older Twitter posts generated a negative backlash. The comments, which made fun of many different groups, were quickly picked up by the media and led to a flurry of commentary calling him offensive, misogynistic, homophobic, and racist. In particular, he has been categorized as anti-Semitic due to tweets such as: “Almost bumped a Jewish kid crossing the road. He didn’t look b4 crossing but I still would hav felt so bad in my german car!” and “South Africans know how to recycle like Israelis know how to be peaceful.” The anti-Semitic allegations have been overwhelmingly American. Some have said that they will no longer watch the show due to his comments, and called for his removal. The American Jewish Congress, an association of Jewish Americans organized to support Jewish interests, petitioned its supporters to call on the Daily Show to rescind Noah’s contract. Meanwhile, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) released a statement supporting Noah: “Negative stereotypes of all people are potentially offensive. However, the SAJBD believes that tweets made by Noah do not constitute anti-Jewish prejudice on his part. Trevor Noah’s style of humor is playful, and is intended to provoke a response. The SAJBD wishes him all the success and wisdom that he will require in his new position, and is confident that he will do our country proud.” So, why does an American audience find it so offensive that Noah makes misogynistic, homophobic, and racist jokes when American comedians make similar jokes? Typically, it seems that comedians in the U.S. focus seemingly offensive jokes towards audiences they identify with, such as Chris Rock commenting on African Americans and Sarah Silverman making Jewish jokes. Noah, growing up in a mixed race family (his father is Swiss-German and his mother is of Xhosa and Jewish heritage) in Apartheid South Africa and maturing in the ‘rainbow nation,’ may not culturally identify in the same way that Americans and American comedians do. In today’s increasingly international media, this may be something to get used to for an American audience. For their part, Comedy Central and John Stewart defend their choice of Noah.

As in the United States, there is a hiatus between a president’s election and his inauguration in Nigeria. Muhammadu Buhari will be inaugurated as president of Nigeria on May 29. In the meantime, President Jonathan remains in charge, but with little prestige and insufficient credibility to take the initiative in the aftermath of his election defeat. There will be gubernatorial and local elections on April 18; rivalries are often intense at that level, and there could be considerable bloodshed. The crowds of Buhari’s broom-waving supporters celebrating his victory over incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan were but one sign that the Nigerian people want change. But, Buhari’s election does not represent a revolution. The cooperating and competing elites who have benefitted from the current system and have run Nigeria since the restoration of civilian government in 1999 are still there and largely still in charge. They dominate Buhari’s All Progressives Congress (APC) just as they do Jonathan’s Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Buhari, a retired general and a former military chief of state, is a member of those elites, though unlike many others, he has never enriched himself at the public’s expense. Buhari faces the challenge of popular demands for fundamental change with few bureaucratic tools. The civil service, which played a crucial role in holding the country together during the 1967-70 civil war, is a corrupt shadow of its former self. Other national institutions, including the military, are a shambles. Buhari has been out of office for decades and his style is something of a lone wolf. This is especially significant in Nigeria where political parties are not based on policy but rather on personality. Between now and May 29, it is to be hoped that Buhari will assemble a team with whom he can work to initiate change. On the positive side, his political allies in the just-concluded campaign include Bola Ahmed Tinubu, former governor of Lagos state, and Babatunde Raji Fashola, the current governor. Both are first rate political operatives. (Lagos is commonly regarded as the best governed state in the Federation.) He can also call on Mohammed Rabi’u Kwankwaso, the governor of Kano state. Lagos and Kano are the two largest states in the Federation. Buhari’s two campaign themes were that he would fight corruption, which Nigerians agree is out of control, and that he would destroy Boko Haram, the radical Islamist insurgency in the northeast. He has reiterated those themes in his post-election comments. The Nigerian people will give Buhari a short honeymoon. But, they will be increasingly impatient that he start to show results. Yet, corruption and security are issues that will take decades to address. Nevertheless, there are early steps that Buhari could take to build popular confidence in his agenda. After his May 29, inauguration, with respect to corruption, Buhari should move quickly to revivify existing anti-corruption institutions, especially the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). New and credible appointments will be necessary as well as Buhari’s visible support. Prosecution of egregious cases of corruption could start to change the current culture of impunity and signify to the public the new government’s commitment to an anti-corruption agenda. In the past, the EFCC and other anti-corruption instruments too often were subverted by the short-term political goals of the government in power. With that baggage from the past, the EFCC’s choice of whom to prosecute will be crucial to re-establishing its credibility. With respect to destroying Boko Haram, that too will take time, given the movement’s deep roots in the marginalization and impoverishment of northern Nigeria. In the short term, President Buhari should move to shore up Nigeria’s relations with Niger and Chad, including taking the lead in the coordination of joint military activities. He should reduce Nigeria’s current use of outside mercenaries. He should end the Jonathan administration’s policy of stone walling credible claims of security service human rights abuses. If he were to investigate those claims and, where warranted, prosecute offenders, he would open the door to the possibility of closer security cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom that up to now has been largely blocked by laws against assisting governments culpable of human rights abuses.

International and Nigerian media is reporting that Aviation Minister Osita Chidoka and opposition All Progressives Congress Party spokesman Lai Mohammed state that President Goodluck Jonathan has called Muhammadu Buhari to offer his congratulations on Buhari’s victory in the March 28, Nigerian presidential elections. That two senior officials, one from the ruling party and the other from the principal opposition party, are reporting the same story makes it all but authoritative. Chidoka is also saying that President Jonathan will make a speech later in the day. Already at least one Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governor has also congratulated Buhari, calling on Nigerians to accept the outcome of the elections. Jonathan’s apparent concession is a highly positive development. The fact that President Jonathan has accepted the outcome of the elections does not preclude operatives withinthe PDP from challenging the election’s credibility. But, it makes it much more difficult. It also makes it likely that those who oppose the outcome of the elections will not have command of the security services. Nigerian social media is already praising Jonathan for his “gracious acceptance of defeat” and thereby contributing to peace in the country. Already there are tweets that Jonathan’s congratulatory call is his most “notable achievement in office” as chief of state. It is now likely that Muhammadu Buhari will be the next president of Nigeria. The Nigerian elections have strengthened democracy in Nigeria and also elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa where democracies’ roots are fragile.