Civil Society

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard. Emily is a researcher for the Tony Blair Faith Foundation working on their online resource religionandgeopolitics.org in London, England, and a former research associate for the CFR Africa program. Emily recently returned from Nigeria. All opinions expressed are her own. As Nigeria’s postponed national elections approach it is worth looking at what has occurred in the space provided by the postponement and at the military’s campaign against Boko Haram. Among Nigerians there is a pervasive opinion across the country that the elections must now go ahead, and that they must proceed peacefully. They understand the process will not be easy, but that it is the only democratic option. These elections are seen as a turning point, and indeed, many conversations begin with the acknowledgement that nothing is known until after the ballots are cast, counted, and the results announced. People fear a repeat of the violence that followed the 2011 elections and are determined to work against it. As such there are numerous online and social media campaigns across the country campaigning for free, fair, and nonviolent elections. Meanwhile, the role of religion in the forthcoming elections seems to be limited. One anecdote that seems to capture the mood says, “Nigeria is a car going uphill with a flat battery. We are all passengers. We all have to get out and push. We have all become pushers.” Violence, if and when it occurs, will likely be between the APC and PDP, not between Muslims and Christians. The inviolability of a sovereign Nigeria also appears to continue to be accepted. This is especially the case in the north. Nigerians recognize that for the north to defeat and recover from the ravages of Boko Haram, resources and oil revenue from the south will be crucial. In areas less affected by insecurity, such resources are needed to develop a sustainable economy, infrastructure, and education systems. Despite the recent military success against Boko Haram, it is still recognized that the group cannot be defeated in the six weeks provided by the postponement. If the group finds itself pressured by overwhelming force, it will likely go underground and continue a guerrilla campaign against soft targets, such as markets and places of worship. (Following the 2009 murder of Muhammad Yusuf, Boko Haram’s founder, the group went underground and re-emerged in 2010 to launch their current offensive.) While most Nigerians are optimistic about the current military successes, they question the failures of the Nigerian government that made the ongoing operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force necessary. Against this difficult backdrop, international observers will be closely watching as Nigerians go to the polls this Saturday. For their part, Nigerians continue to have faith in their democracy. They are determined that their vote should matter, that they will hold their politicians to account, and that the people will determine Nigeria’s next president.

Zimbabwe, once an African garden spot, is now characterized by bad governance, ubiquitous human rights abuses, abrogation of the rule of law, and poverty. These negatives are closely associated with Robert Mugabe, 91, who rules the country with an iron hand and with no apparent succession plan in place. Mugabe’s policies have resulted in humanitarian disaster and waves of refugees, mostly to South Africa. Ambassador George Ward, ret., a distinguished career diplomat now at the Institute for Defense Analysis, has written a compelling Contingency Planning Memorandum (CPM) with a focus on the potential for violence in Zimbabwe to threaten the interests of the United States in southern Africa, which include support of good governance, increased trade, as well as greater domestic and foreign investment. He also discusses the special challenges that developments in Zimbabwe pose for South Africa and other states in the region. Ambassador Ward concludes that there is “both time and opportunity” for the United States to reduce the potential for violence in Zimbabwe and to prepare for a transition that could result in improved governance and ensuing economic prosperity. Among other policy prescriptions, he urges the United States to follow a regional approach, to strengthen a partnership with South Africa, and to broaden its consultations with other African countries, the European Union, and China. He also argues for Washington to initiate a high-level dialogue with the current Zimbabwean government using a variety of methods and fora. Among his most important suggestions is that the administration begin regular consultations with Congress on Zimbabwe, initially at the staff level. Ambassador Ward makes the important point that despite limited U.S. leverage, all is not hopeless with respect to Zimbabwe’s future. But, enhanced Washington engagement is necessary. It is to be hoped that his Contingency Planning Memorandum enjoys a wide readership among U.S. policy makers. The Council’s Center for Preventative Action (CPA) seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world. With that goal, its Contingency Planning Series seeks to raise awareness of potential crises and generate practical policy options to lessen the likelihood that such crises will occur.

The 2014 Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership has been awarded to the Namibian president, Hifikepunye Pohamba. He is set to leave office later this month. Mo Ibrahim, British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, established the prize in 2006. It may be awarded annually to an elected African head of state who promoted good governance and left office in accordance with the constitution. The prize comprises of $5 million, spread over ten years, followed by $200,000 a year for life. Among other things, it is intended to free African leaders from the financial concerns that have led some of them to cling to power. Pohamba is the first person to have received the prize since 2011. It has been awarded only three times previously: to Mozambique’s Joaquim Chissano (2007), Botswana’s Festus Mogae (2008), and Cape Verde’s Pedro Verona Pires (2011). Other years, the selection committee found no qualified candidate. The lack of laureates is commonly taken to be an indictment of the quality of African leadership. The committee has made two exceptional awards, to Nelson Mandela in 2007, who left office as president of South Africa before Ibrahim established his prize, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, then archbishop of Cape Town and a founder of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a part of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to “non-racial” democracy. Pohamba is hardly a household name in the United States, nor is Namibia, which has as grim a history as any other African state. Both deserve to be better known. Namibia was a German colony, also known as German Southwest Africa, established in 1884. The second colonial governor was Ernst Heinrich Göring, father of one of the leading Nazi politicians, Hermann Göring. The German repression of the native Herero and Namaqua (Nama) peoples was so dire that it has been cited by some as a dress rehearsal for the Holocaust. Even though Namibia only became a trusteeship of South Africa after World War I, it felt the full rigors of apartheid when the system was established in 1948. Namibia achieved full independence in 1990. Today, it has a population of about 2.2 million. The largest ethnic group is the Ovambo, who comprise half the population. The Kavangos make up 9 percent of the population, the Herero and Nama account for 7 and 5 percent of the population respectively, and whites are about 6 percent of the population. Under Pohamba, Namibia has become something of a poster child for what can be accomplished through constitutionalism, the rule of law, and good governance. The Mo Ibrahim Index of Good Governance ranks Namibia sixth on the continent, trailing after Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, and the Seychelles. The Ibrahim leadership prize committee noted Pohamba’s respect for the constitution, the rule of law, media freedom, and human rights. It also noted his active efforts on behalf of racial reconciliation. On Pohamba’s watch, Namibia also enjoyed significant economic growth, and a small but successful land reform program, in which mostly unused white-owned land was purchased by the government and distributed to poor blacks, was implemented.

South African and Israeli media report that the student council at Durban University of Technology is demanding that “Jewish students, especially those who do not support the Palestinian struggle, should de-register.” The student council call has been unambiguously rejected by the university authorities. The vice chancellor of the university, Ahmed Bawa, even went as far as to say that the students’ request violated the South African constitution. The student action appears to conflate Judaism with the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Nevertheless, the student vote is deeply disturbing, given South Africa’s history of anti-Semitism. The Durban University of Technology in KwaZulu-Natal is a post –apartheid merger of a white technology school with one for “Indians,” as South Asians were referred to during the apartheid era. It has 22,000 students on four campuses divided between Durban and Pietermaritzburg. The Jewish community in South Africa numbers perhaps 90,000, with most living in Johannesburg and Cape Town. They are, of course, part of the white population that numbers almost five million. There is also a small African tribe, the Lemba, that identifies as Jewish. Some South African Jews, such as Joe Slovo, were prominent in the anti-apartheid movement, and anti-Semitism could be found among the Afrikaner population, especially those that supported apartheid. In the 1930’s some Afrikaans language newspapers were anti-Semitic, and Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party had some admirers in South Africa, who opposed their country’s entry into World War II on the side of the allies. With the Israel-Palestinian conflict, such anti-Semitism as there is in South Africa is no longer identified with Afrikaners. Rather it is to be found primarily on college campuses and is a reflection of a bitter international relations issue rather than domestic South African politics.

In 1964, Nelson Mandela was convicted of sabotage in conjunction with the armed struggle against apartheid in the Rivonia Trial. He was sentenced to life in prison. His statement at his sentencing was an anthem for a democratic South Africa free of racism. Because Americans may be less familiar with it than South Africans, it is worth quoting part of it here: I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if needs be, it is also an ideal for which I am prepared to die. On February 11, 1990 the government of South Africa led by State President F.W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison. The rest is history. The new, democratic South Africa constructed over the past quarter of a century has been a remarkable legal and constitutional achievement. But, social change has been slow and economic growth disappointing. Economic growth is currently at about 2 percent, and is likely to remain at that anemic level, too low to lift millions of South Africans out of poverty. HIV/AIDS and other diseases remain a scourge, and despite massive public expenditure, educational services for the black majority remain poor. Official corruption is a matter of public preoccupation. The current disillusionment of many South Africans is focused on the current president, Jacob Zuma, and scandals surrounding the expenditure of public money on his private estate, Nkandla. Critics of Zuma’s ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), claim that it has lost its way in a fog of cronyism and that gradually institutionalized corruption and cronyism have created a small clique of oligarchs detached from the millions of impoverished in the townships and rural areas of South Africa. Judith February, a senior researcher at the institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria, has written a brief analysis of the country’s current sour mood that is well worth reading. Her primary focus is on a breakdown in parliamentary behavior by the president, who refuses to come clean over Nkandla, and a dissident party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The EFF is a new far-left party that threatens radical change, including the appropriation of white owned land. However, there are positive signs for South Africa. Jacob Zuma will not be president forever; there is much talk of his resigning before his term is up and speculation about his health. His deputy, Cyril Ramaphosa, is a likely successor and has a strong reputation within the international business community. It is widely believed that he was Mandela’s choice for the presidency when Mandela declined to run for a second term as president in 1999. Not to mention after multiple escapades and internal clashes, the EFF already seems to be losing support. The likely emergence of a new left-wing political party with close ties to the trade unions could both revivify the ANC and suck out the oxygen of public support from the EFF. The current sour mood is not predestined to last forever.

On Saturday, Nigeria’s Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) announced that Nigeria’s presidential election would be delayed until March 28. According to Attahiru Jega, chairman of the INEC, National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki directed the postponement of the February 14 elections for at least six weeks. Dasuki said that starting February 14, the military and security services will launch a campaign against Boko Haram, the militant Islamist movement in northeast Nigeria. Therefore, they can not provide the necessary security for the electoral process. Predictably, the opposition presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari, leaders of civil society, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry have expressed frustration and disappointment. Incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan and his Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) support the postponement. Buhari has called for calm, and thus far there has been no violence. Yet, there are reports of soldiers patrolling the streets of Lagos, one of the world’s largest cities and a center of opposition to the Jonathan government. Jega’s statement makes it clear that the postponement was not caused by the logistical challenges of organizing the polling, specifically the distribution of permanent voter cards. Rather, postponement is the direct result of the national security advisor and the security services call for postponement. Skepticism abounds about the postponement. Buhari’s momentum had been building. A delay may allow Jonathan and the PDP to recapture the momentum. Cynics – or realists – suggest that a delay will also enable the PDP to put in place the necessary arrangements to rig the elections. Others suggest that the military and the security services will do all that is necessary to block a Buhari presidency. When Buhari was chief of state for twenty months, 1983-1985, he cracked down on the ubiquitous corruption within the military and elsewhere. Accordingly, he was ousted from office in a military coup led by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida. Given the government’s failure over the past five years to address the resilient militant movement’s violent insurgency, Dasuki’s claim that the security services can defeat Boko Haram in the next six weeks rings hollow. Despite the short period to fulfill such an enormous task, Dasuki is claiming that the general election will not be postponed any further. Nevertheless, if his new military initiative against Boko Haram falls short and the elections are again postponed in March, the possibility of popular unrest will increase. The de facto contract among the cooperating and competing elites that have run Nigeria is fractured. Signs include the recommendation of the Council of State, comprised of former heads of state and former chief justices, that the elections go forward on February 14. Nigeria is in unchartered territory, with political developments no longer following familiar precedents.

Nigeria’s presidential elections are scheduled for February 14, 2015, though there has long been speculation that they might be postponed. The Nigerian National Security Advisor, Sambo Dasuki, called for the elections to be postponed on January 22 to allow time for the distribution of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs), which are necessary for a ballot to be cast. Dasuki’s call was rejected by the opposition and civil society. On February 4, a commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the body in charge of conducting elections, re-opened the possibility that the vote could be postponed. Amina Zachary, another electoral commissioner, confirmed that only 44 million out of 68.8 million PVCs had been distributed to voters. According to reports, 60 percent of voter cards have been distributed in eleven of Nigeria’s thirty-six states. In four states, less than 50 percent have been dispursed. In Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous state, about 40 percent of cards have reached voters. INEC plans to review election preperations on February 8, the initial deadline for completing PVC distribution, in order to decide whether to continue delivering PVCs up to the election or honor the deadline. The slow distribution rate of PVCs could effectively disenfranchise a substantial percentage of the electorate. If INEC proceeds with elections and more PVCs are not delivered, a significant portion of the voting population would not have their say on election day, a reality that would call into question the credibility of the elections. In addition, INEC is having trouble delivering PVCs to Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa, the three northern states under a state of emergency. Swaths of this territory is controlled by the radical Islamist movement, Boko Haram. It is expected that the group will try to significantly disrupt voting. It is also likely that a high percentage of Nigeria’s one million-plus internally displaced persons and refugees will be unable to vote, despite reports that INEC is making some provisions for them. Attahiru Jega, then as now the INEC chairman, delayed the 2011 presidential elections by one week. As is currently the case, voting materials for the 2011 election had not been distributed throughout the country on time. In 2011, by and large, non-governmental organizations were supportive of Jega’s decision. Today, it is unclear whether postponement would be welcomed. The opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) is deeply suspicious that the governing Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan would somehow use postponement to rig the elections. Most recently, the council of state, an organ of the Nigerian government that advises the executive branch, determined that the elections should not be postponed. Western media is claiming that the council convinced government proponents of the postponement to back down. It remains to be seen whether the council will maintain this stance as we get closer to elections. The logistics of conducting a national election in Nigeria are daunting in the best of times. Failure to distribute many PVCs along with a very close race between the two presidential candidates, much higher levels of pre-election violence than in 2011, and the Boko Haram insurrection compound the challenges of holding credible elections. To say the least, these are not the best of times.

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Amid a public debate over the presidential succession, President Robert Mugabe named Emmerson Mnangagwa vice-president of Zimbabwe on December 10, 2014. It would seem that Mnangagwa, nicknamed ‘Ngwena’ or ‘Crocodile,’ is now the heir apparent to Zimbabwe’s president. Mnangagwa has been a member of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party since the 1960’s, and fought alongside Mugabe in the Zimbabwe war of liberation from white rule, which lasted from 1964 to 1979. Among other duties, Mnangagwa has served as Zimbabwe’s minister of state security, and, most recently, he was the minister of justice. Mnangagwa’s appointment to vice-president may spell bad news for Zimbabwe’s conservancies and animal populations. Under Mugabe, national parks have been state-owned, while conservancies have remained privately owned game reserves. His government instituted a program known as the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community based resource management program that gave local communities control of revenue from hunting licenses. Since its introduction, CAMPFIRE has been used as an example for other conservation programs in southern Africa. More recently however, powerful elites have begun to seize wildlife conservancies for their own personal use and invasions of park areas by Zimbabwe’s ‘war veterans’ have led to higher levels of animal poaching. Even the CAMPFIRE program has been hit: financial disbursements for local communities have declined by over 75 percent since 2000. In this climate, where conservation is already faltering, enters a man known for profiting from endangered species. In 2009, Mnangagwa was implicated in the arrest of a Chinese national attempting to smuggle six rhino horns out of Zimbabwe. A police investigation into the incident discovered that an illegal rhino poaching network, known as the ‘Crocodile Gang,’ was filling orders of rhino horns for Chinese buyers. Mnangagwa was identified as the supposed ‘Godfather’ of this illegal network. However, prior to any judicial hearings or convictions, the police docket, in the hands of then Attorney General Johannes Tomana, disappeared. As it currently stands, Zimbabwe has a poor reputation for conservation. It has recently been criticized for selling a significant number of animals, including at least thirty-six young elephants and ten lions, to foreign governments. Due to political and economic pressure from senior ZANU-PF leaders and foreign investors Mugabe’s government has allowed the exploitation of Zimbabwe’s wildlife. However, Mugabe has criticized government officials for their seizures of conservancies, even calling that these captured lands be turned into national parks. Under a potential Mnangagwa led government, with apparently little concern for conservation, these conservancies and the animals in them may prove to be ‘open game.’

Nigerian anxiety is high about the approaching February 14 national elections. The country’s political class is fragmented, oil prices are falling, Nigeria’s currency has been devalued, and the Lagos stock exchange is in the doldrums. The insurgency called Boko Haram appears to be gaining strength. Under these circumstances, some are expressing nostalgia for the 2011 elections, in which sitting president Goodluck Jonathan was elected, defeating Muhammadu Buhari. (Elected vice-president in 2007, Jonathan initially became president in 2010 upon the death of President Umaru Yar’Adua.) At the time, international observers proclaimed the elections as a dramatic improvement over those of 2007 (a low bar). Yet, in many ways, the 2011 elections set the stage for the current national crisis. Nigerian governance under civilian rule has been characterized by power alternation between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south. Though enshrined in the governing Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), power alternation was a matter of practice, not of law. In 2011, it was the north’s turn. Jonathan’s decision to run, and his subsequent victory, broke from the power sharing principle, contributing to the alienation of many in the north. As in 2015, the two presidential candidates in 2011 were the Christian Jonathan and the Muslim Buhari. The campaigns were disfigured by appeals to ethnic and religious identities. Buhari won all of the predominately Muslim states, Jonathan won the rest (with one exception). So, the election results seemingly bifurcated the country between a Muslim north and a Christian south. Nigeria’s constitution requires a successful presidential candidate to win 50 percent plus one vote of the total cast. It also requires the successful candidate to win 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the states. Otherwise, there is a runoff between the top two candidates. Since the establishment of civilian rule, no presidential incumbent has been defeated, and there has never been a run-off. Rigging has long been a characteristic of Nigerian elections. In 2011, it was less obvious. Polling was better than it had been with more polling stations open on time and supplied with ballots than ever before. However, ballot box stuffing remained. Nigerian civil organizations saw electoral fraud at the collating stations, where individual polling station results are collated. In 2011, the goal of the rigging appears to have been ensuring that Jonathan met the two constitutional requirements for electoral victory. When Jonathan’s victory was announced in 2011, there was rioting in the north, accompanied by the greatest bloodshed since the 1967-70 civil war. The rioting initially appeared directed against those in the Islamic establishment who had supported the Jonathan candidacy, and later degenerated into ethnic and religious killings. In 2015, once again the contest pits Jonathan against Buhari. This time, however, the political class is fractured, making election rigging more difficult as a practical matter. There is anecdotal evidence that, once again, there are appeals to ethnic and religious identities. Hence, the results of 2015 are not fore-ordained, as they have been in previous elections. In that sense, the 2015 elections are “real” in a way elections have not been in the past. Wild cards include how elections will occur in the three states under a state of emergency and how the estimated one million internally displaced persons can vote. And then there are the refugees in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. In the past, these populations would likely have supported Buhari, but if they are unable to vote, Jonathan may have an advantage. On the other hand, many observers are surprised by what seems to be widespread support for Buhari in areas outside the North. No matter which candidate is declared the winner, there would seem to be plenty of grounds for the loser to reject the results. Hence, anxiety about the upcoming elections is not misplaced.

The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has dominated every single Nigerian presidential election since 1999. Using sophisticated forms of electoral rigging and relying on a relatively unified political class built on patronage, a PDP incumbent or his anointed successor has secured electoral victory at every turn. Such a scenario would all but ensure the re-election of Goodluck Jonathan in the February 14, 2015 elections. But, that mold is broken. Under pressure from falling oil prices, a decline in the value of the national currency, the fall in values on the Nigerian stock exchange, the increasing success of the Boko Haram insurgency, and repeated episodes demonstrating that the Nigerian state can no longer provide security for its citizens have fractured agreements between the political elites that have run Nigeria for decades. Many elites also appear increasingly detached from the Nigerian people because of their association with corruption and poor governance. Reflecting these new realities, there is anecdotal evidence that the All Progressives Congress (APC) and its presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, are generating exceptional excitement around the country, not merely with Buhari’s core constituency in the Muslim north. For example, a faction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), based in an area that voted overwhelmingly for Jonathan in 2011, has endorsed Buhari. In a sign of the splintering of the elite consensus, former president Olusegun Obasanjo who anointed Jonathan in the first place, has stated that the president has “failed Nigeria.” Most of the leaders of the APC have been part of the PDP at one time or another. Yet at this time, some political elites are transferring their support to the APC in order to repudiate the behavior of the PDP. Under these circumstances, it is critical that the February 14 elections be free, fair, and credible – and that Nigerians see them as so. The alternative is grim. Following failed judicial challenges to election results in the past, Buhari has said that he will not return to the courts to adjudicate election disputes. The secretary of the APC has said that in the event of a rigged Jonathan victory, his party will establish a “parallel government,” though it is unclear what shape that might take. The run up to the elections have included appeals to ethnic and religious identities, which carry the risk of unleashing forces difficult for anybody to control. According to the Nigerian constitution and various electoral laws, the successful presidential candidate must win 50 percent of the votes plus one. In addition, he must win 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the states. Otherwise, there is a run-off between the top two vote winners one week later. This has never happened. Nigerian law requires voters to be registered with permanent voter cards, and that they may vote only in their local government. Meeting these requirements will be a challenge. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has acknowledged a shortfall in the delivery of permanent voter cards. In Borno, for example, they have been delivered in only three of twenty-seven local government areas because of security issues. In other places, the reason for non-delivery is less clear. In addition, Nigerian refugees in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are effectively disenfranchised. They number at least in the tens of thousands. More serious is the question of internally displaced persons, the estimated number of which reaches three million. Based on previous electoral behavior, the internally displaced, the majority of whom are from the north, are likely to have voted for Buhari. However, the INEC’s move to restore the registration of millions of voters removed last year from the electoral rolls is an encouraging sign. Nevertheless, no matter what scenario unfolds, there are likely to be multiple grounds for challenging the credibility of the February 14 vote.

In the best of times, Northeastern Nigeria and the adjoining regions in neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon are among the poorest regions in the world. Food security, especially, is highly fragile in the face of desertification and overpopulation. These are not the best of times. In areas where the radical, Islamist movement called Boko Haram operates, there has been little or no planting or harvesting of food, in some cases for up to three years. Fighting between Boko Haram and the Nigerian security services has displaced many residents of these farflung regions in the north. The number of iternally displaced people (IDPs) is not known, but some credible estimates put the figure at more than one million. Most IDPs are taken in by family, and some receive assistance from the Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Legally, IDPs are the responsibility of the Abuja government. Once displaced individuals leave Nigeria, however, they become refugees and the responsibility of the international community, particularly the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as per various UN agreements and protocols. This month, the UNHCR reported that some 7,300 Nigerians have fled to Chad as a result of Boko Haram’s recent campaigns in and around the border town of Baga.On January 8, Chad’s prime minister appealed for more international assistance to enable his government to respond to the refugee flows. The UNHCR has agreed to assist with the relocation of refugees who became stranded on islands in Lake Chad while attempting to flee Boko Haram. The UNHCR estimates that more than 10,000 Nigerian refugees have ended up in Chad due to the fighting in Baga and previous Boko Haram attacks in the neighborhood. Niger may have more Nigerian refugees than Chad. A census carried out by the Niger government with UNHCR technical support found that at least 90,000 refugees have arrived in one Niger region since May 2013. (That figure includes many Niger nationals who had been living in Nigeria.) The UNHCR and the National Eligibility Commission of Niger have established a refugee camp, in which  some refugees have been documented and basic relief, including drinking water and latrines, supplied. There are likely to be many more refugee camps in the future if Boko Haram’s terror campaigns in the north continue unabated. Africans have a long and honorable history of taking in refugees, often with little cognizance by central government authorities. That seems to be especially true of the response to Nigeria’s IDPs. Yet, refugees fleeing Nigeria are an international responsibility and it is only a matter of time before the international community will need to ramp up its support for the UNHCR and for other relief agencies such as the World Food Program to respond to the humanitarian disaster growing quietly in northeast Nigeria.

A large proportion of the government of Nigeria’s revenue goes to pay the salaries of civil servants at the national, state, and local levels. With the exception of Lagos state, the heart of Nigeria’s modern economy, the states and the local government authorities have few sources of revenue of their own. They are largely dependent on revenue from the Federation Account, the share of oil revenue distributed by the federal government according to a set formula. In normal times, oil accounts for about 70 percent of the Nigerian federal government’s revenue. But, these are not normal times. The price of a barrel of oil has fallen about 50 percent. The national budget has been recalculated at least twice to take into account falling oil prices and the resulting fall in government revenue. Less money for the federal government means there is less to be distributed to the states and local governments through the federal account. That, in turn, may translate in to public employees not being paid. In Plateau state, in the center of the country where there is a long history of violence between herdsmen and farmers and Muslims and Christians, there are claims that public employees have not been paid for up to seven months. A special assistant to the governor denies this. He says that state salary’s have been paid up to October. Presuming the special assistant is correct, that means there are still arrearages outstanding for three or four months. There are also anecdotal reports of Nigerian soldiers not being paid on time, and that this is contributing to the evident erosion of morale.

The All Progressives Congress (APC) is the chief opposition party contesting the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for the political control of Nigeria in national elections on February 14, 2015. The PDP’s presidential candidate is incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian. The APC’s candidate is Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler, a northern Muslim. Buhari under various parties contested unsuccessfully for the presidency in 2003, 2007, and 2011. The PDP candidates (Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003, Umaru Yar’Adua in 2007 and Goodluck Jonathan in 2011) won each time in elections that Buhari’s supporters believe, with good reason, to have been flawed. At international urging, in the aftermath of the three elections, Buhari challenged the outcomes unsuccessfully in the courts. Buhari’s supporters, and many other observers, believed the judicial proceedings were slanted in favor of the PDP. In the aftermath of the 2011 court decision in favor of the PDP, Buhari said he would never again seek redress from the courts with respect to election disputes. This background is germane to a recent statement made by the APC National Chairman, John Odigie-Oyegun. Oyegun, a Christian and former governor of the southern Edo state, said that should the February 14 elections be rigged in favor of PDP presidential candidate Goodluck Jonathan, the APC will form a “parallel” government. The chairman  went on to say that if Jonathan won re-election in a “transparent and credible process,” the APC would not hesitate to “congratulate” him. However, as Nigerian media has noted, the APC chairman did not spell-out who would be the “judge and jury” over the question of whether the elections were rigged. Even in the unlikely event that the polling and ballot-counting goes smoothly, there will be potential questions about the February 14 elections. At present, there is no provision for internally displaced persons (IDP’s) who probably number in excess of one million, to vote. Most of them are from areas that traditionally have supported the opposition. Further, the three northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, where the Islamist jihadist movement Boko Haram has the most control, have traditionally supported the opposition. At present, it is unlikely that most people in these three states will be able to vote. In the event of violence due to contested election results, the international community may urge both parties to turn to the courts. Yet, at present, the APC would appear unlikely to do so. Instead, its National Chairman posits the creation of a “parallel” government. What that would look like or what it would mean is unclear. However, a “parallel” government would almost certainly undermine Nigeria’s fragile national unity. Hence, the APC chairman’s statement is an alarm bell in the night.  

With over a billion people and the second largest continental landmass in the world, Africa is complicated and defies generalization. Yet, we do it all the time. Here are five trends to keep an eye on for 2015:   A Resurgence of Afro-pessimism. For the past several years, the narrative about Africa has been upbeat, ranging from McKinsey and Company’s “Lions on the move” to the Economist’s “A Hopeful Continent.” That could change in 2015, with a militant jihadism in the Sahel, an implosion in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, and Ebola. Falling oil prices will also mean declining currency values and falling stock markets in oil-dependent states. But, Afro-pessimism can distort as much as ‘Africa rising.’ State Stability: The political climate in Africa is unstable. While Burkina Faso has seen a relatively peaceful transition, there are several African countries in a current state of conflict or perpetual insecurity. Will the civil war in the South Sudan continue? How will the elections play out in Nigeria? What will happen as political elites prepare for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe? Only time will tell. Disease: The headlines are dominated by Ebola, a disease that like HIV/AIDS and Marburg, jumped from animals to humans in Africa and yielded devastating results. With the continued destruction of forests and the concentration of people in fetid urban slums, it is possible that a new disease will emerge in 2015. Despite Ebola and continued high levels of HIV/AIDS, the African disease story is increasingly positive. Africa is nearly polio-free and there has been dramatic progress in reducing mortality caused by malaria, in part because of the more extensive use of bednets. But, primary preventative healthcare and health systems need to be strengthened to meet the challenges of future outbreaks as well as consolidate the health gains African countries have made. Energy: Innovative solutions should be watched. They have the potential to address Africa’s energy needs. In particular, there is the promise of Power Africa, the private public partnership the United States is leading, bringing together six African governments, private sector companies and investors, and major development banks in order to double access to clean, reliable energy. African governments are also making independent investments in renewable energy solutions. Kenya, for example, has commissioned a geothermal power project and the South African government is also pursuing a new nuclear energy strategy to boost the national power grid. Elections: Elections can build democracy or exacerbate conflict. For good or ill, there will be thirteen presidential elections in Africa in 2015. Some elections may lead to positive geopolitical change. In Tanzania, incumbent president Jakaya Kikwete cannot seek a third term. In Ethiopia, freed from the dominant grip of Meles Zenawi by his death in 2012, the political playing field is more even than ever before. Yet, the power of incumbency remains strong. In Cote d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara, who came to power in the first post-civil war elections in 2010, will run again in 2015 and likely win. Sudan’s president Omer al-Bashir is essentially guaranteed an electoral victory, extending his twenty-five year reign. Similarly, Togo’s Faure Gnassingbe will likely remain in power. In some countries, elections could escalate tensions and may trigger political violence. South Sudan’s elections will likely be fraught, particularly as the specter of civil war hangs over the new country and ethnic rifts plague the populace and political elites. Nigeria will also be especially important to watch. The new opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, may present an unprecedented threat to the president’s People’s Democratic Party. With the specter of Boko Haram hanging over the country, the government will need to take extra precautions to guard against political violence and terrorism. 2015 African General Elections o   Zambia 1/20/2015 o   Nigeria 2/14/2015 o   Togo 3/2015 o   Sudan 4/2/2015 o   Ethiopia 5/24/2015 o   Burundi 6/26/205 o   South Sudan 7/2015 o   Cote d’Ivoire 10/2015 o   Tanzania 10/2015 o   Burkina Faso 11/2015 o   Guinea 2015 o   Libya 2015 o   Niger 2015 Constitutional Referendum o   Tanzania 4/30/2015 Municipal o   Mali o   Burundi o   Mauritius o   Chad  

This is a guest post by Allen Grane, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. On December 8, the Duke of Cambridge, Prince William, announced the creation of the United for Wildlife Task Force at the World Bank in Washington, DC (you can see the full speech below). The task force aims to work with the private sector to reduce illegal wildlife trafficking globally, it hopes to “identify ways that the sector can break the chain between suppliers and consumers.” video platformvideo managementvideo solutionsvideo player The vast majority of consumers of African wildlife products, like ivory and rhino horn, are based outside of the continent. As such, it is likely that the task force’s goal of tightening restrictions on the supply chain could put an end to the illicit trade. A recent report, Out of Africa: Mapping the Global Trade in Illicit Ivory, released by Washington-based nonprofits Born Free USA and C4ADS, may help assess how achievable the task force’s objective is. The report sheds light on the two main flows of the illicit international ivory trade: seaborne and airborne. By disrupting trafficking at major hubs specified in the report, it may be possible to achieve the task force’s goal and break the chain between suppliers and consumers of African wildlife products. According to the report the airborne flow of ivory accounts for the majority of ivory seizures and in turn trafficking incidents. However, most of the airborne flow is conducted on a relatively small scale. Typically, seizures involve small, finished pieces and weigh less than 10kg (22 lbs). Most airborne ivory flows through four airports in Africa: Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, Ethiopia’s Bole International Airport, South Africa’s OR Tambo International airport, and Angola’s Quatro de Feveiro Airport. All of these airports have direct flights to Asia, the largest consumer of ivory. Ivory not transported through these African hubs often flies through two other international airports on their way to China: France’s Charles de Gaulle Airport and the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai International Airport. The task force could help improve the screening of material transported through these airports. With better screening, airports could prevent these products from crossing national borders and interdict much of the international trade in wildlife. The report also documents the size and scale of the seaborne flow. Between January 2009 and December 2013, 72 percent of seized ivory by weight was seaborne. There are three major seaborne points for the international transport of ivory: the port of Mombasa in Kenya, the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and the port of Zanzibar off the coast of Tanzania. (The Biera and Pemba ports in Mozambique are the largest hubs for rhino horn and could serve as hubs for ivory transport as elephant poaching increases in southern Africa.) It is estimated that all seaborne ivory is transported in less than 200 cargo containers a year, each container carrying an estimated one to two tons of ivory. Until 2013 most ivory seizures were made in east Asia. Historically, traffickers have counted on African ports being porous. Enforcing stricter screening procedures at African ports could stem the tide of the illicit ivory and rhino horn trade at the source. The Out of Africa report shows that the illicit trade nests itself within licit patterns of trade. Traffickers have not developed separate trade routes. Instead, the report suggests that traffickers have primarily made use of Africa’s busiest trade networks. Based on this information, it would appear that by working with the transport industry, airlines to shipping lines, and improving the inspection process in African trade hubs Prince William’s task force has the opportunity to strike a significant blow to the illegal wildlife trade.