Ukraine’s 2023 Counteroffensive, With Max Boot

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is Ukraine's counteroffensive.

 

With me to discuss the current state of the war in Ukraine is Max Boot. Max is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security studies here at the Council. He is also a columnist for the Washington Post. Max has written prolifically on military affairs. His most recent book, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam, was a New York Times bestseller and a finalist for the 2019 Pulitzer Prize in biography. Max, thanks for joining me.

 

BOOT:
Great to be here, Jim.

 

LINDSAY:
Let's get right to it, Max. The war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian military launched a much anticipated counteroffensive earlier in the summer. Where do things stand today?

 

BOOT:
That's a good question, which is very hard to answer, because the Ukrainians have certainly made some progress over the past three months, but they have not achieved a massive breakthrough. They have achieved some minor breakthroughs. And in the past month or so, they have broken through the Russian front lines in Zaporizhzhia province in southern Ukraine, which is a significant development.

 

But the counteroffensive ... I guess, the way to put it is that it is proceeding. It is progressing, but it is proceeding and progressing fairly slowly, which is no fault of the Ukrainians, because they are facing very entrenched Russian defenses with very heavy minefields, artillery, and Russian attack helicopters and drones.

 

And the Ukrainians lack the kind of air cover that U.S. troops have taken for granted since World War II. I mean, the U.S. military would never advance in this kind of offensive against entrenched enemy positions without air cover. And you saw how important the U.S. Air Force was in enabling the army and marine advances during the 1991 Gulf War, and during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Ukrainians don't have that, so they're really forced to advance. I mean, they have drones, but they certainly don't have control of the air the way the U.S. has done. And so they've had to take this pretty slowly.

 

And what they found was that initially, they were trying to do what Western trainers told them to do, with a combined arms assault using tanks and armored personnel carriers and all the other instruments of military power. But they found that they were bogging down in these Russian minefields, in part because the Ukrainians have not been really trained in this kind of warfare as adequately or as deeply as Western forces, and because they also don't have the same kind of equipment as Western forces. I mean, we've certainly provided them with tanks and armored personnel carriers, but basic enablers like mine clearing vehicles, they don't have nearly enough of those.

 

After some of the problems they encountered initially, in June, they basically went back to the drawing board and reset the counteroffensive, and decided that the way they would do it is they would focus on interdicting Russian supply lines to cut the flow of ammunition and other supplies to the front, and then sending in Ukrainian troops on foot to make their way through these minefields, and then clear a path for larger vehicles to come through, instead of vice versa.

 

That approach has been having some success, but again, it's slow-going. They're through the first Russian line of defense, but there are several other lines of Russian defense that they would have to penetrate. And it's kind of a race against the clock before the rainy season sets in later in the fall and makes ground movement much more difficult.

 

LINDSAY:
Let's talk about that, Max. I do want to come back to this question of what explains the slow-going for the Ukrainian military. But on this question of how much time is left in the fighting season, as it has been described, is it a fair statement to say we're looking at somewhere between four to six weeks? And if so, does that mean that fighting comes to a halt, or is it that the fighting is going to take place at a lower level?

 

BOOT:
Well, certainly, U.S. officials have said that we're probably looking at four to six weeks. Ukrainian officials have disputed that. But based on our experience from last year, I would say it's unlikely that the Ukrainians will be able to continue major ground operations well into November. I think by early November, there will be sufficient rain that it'll be hard to move.

 

But that doesn't mean that the war is going to simply stop. I think what will happen is you'll continue to see an exchange of artillery fire, HIMARS, and other weapon systems. And what the Ukrainians are really trying to do now is, even if they can't make it all the way to the coastline of the Sea of Azov, which is their ultimate destination so they can cut the Russian land bridge in southern Ukraine in half ... Even if their ground forces cannot make it all the way there, and they're probably about fifty miles or so away from their objective right now ... If they get close enough, if they get within HIMARS range, they can put at risk Russian supply lines, railroad lines, and the highways that they use to supply their forces. And then, assuming that we continue to supply them with the ammunition they need, they can continue to greatly degrade Russian forces over the winter.

 

LINDSAY:
Two things, Max. Tell me what HIMARS is and what it does. But more important, why is it that the Ukrainians have decided that getting to the Sea of Azov is the main strategic goal? What is the significance of achieving that objective, if they can?

 

BOOT:
Well, if they can reach the Sea of Azov, they will basically cut the Russian positions in half, because you have Russian territory now running from occupied Crimea through occupied southern Ukraine, towards the Donbas in eastern Ukraine, and then into Russian territory itself. And that's a corridor that the Russians use to supply their forces, and to keep them entrenched in occupied Ukrainian territory. So if the Ukrainians can reach the Sea of Azov, they will make it impossible for the Russians to supply their forces, in essence, and make it much more difficult for the Russians to remain in occupation. Could very well force them to vacate Ukrainian territory without the Ukrainians having to fight for every last inch of ground.

 

And HIMARS is a very important system for making that happen. This is the multiple rocket artillery system that the U.S. has provided, beginning last summer. And it has a range of about fifty miles, and it's been very, very effective in targeting Russian supply depots, command posts, and other targets.

 

Now, the Russians have also made some adjustments. They've pushed a lot of their depots and headquarters farther away from the front line. They've used electronic warfare devices to try to jam HIMARS. And the Ukrainians have come back with counters to their counters. It's kind of a constant cat-and-mouse game. But essentially, fifty or so miles is the effect of Ukrainian artillery range or multiple rocket range. And so if they can range the highway and the railroad line running along the Sea of Azov coast in southern Ukraine, the Russians are going to be hard put to keep supplying their forces.

 

LINDSAY:
One last question about the counteroffensive itself, Max, and that is ... Is the fact that the Ukrainians have yet to have a major breakthrough on the scale of what we saw in last year's counteroffensive, where they took back Kharkiv? Does that indicate that they can't get a major breakthrough in the time that's left for the major portion of the so-called fighting season?

 

BOOT:
No, it doesn't indicate that at all. It just indicates that the Russians had a lot of time to prepare for this counteroffensive. They spent months laying out minefields and trenching positions, and just making it very difficult to attack. But the Ukrainian calculation is if they can break through those Russian lines, then at that point the counteroffensive will greatly accelerate, because they've already made some breakthroughs in some wedges. And I think that what they're trying to do now is to expand that hole so they can bring in more tanks, more armored vehicles, more troops, and then really start to roll up the lines.

 

I mean, the way that these things often work ... And we've seen this historically, in World War I, World War II, many other conflicts, is that the war can seem like it's static, that it's mired in deadlock, but then all of a sudden, that gridlock can break very suddenly if one side can achieve a breakthrough of the enemy lines. And all of a sudden, you could see panicked Russian soldiers not knowing how to respond and fleeing.

 

Now, I'm not predicting that's going to happen, but that is the Ukrainian hope. And they still think that they have a chance to achieve that, but certainly, I think there has been a worsening of the outlook for the counteroffensive, just because it has gone on so long and it has met such entrenched resistance. And the Russians certainly have not fled from the initial Ukrainian assault.

 

LINDSAY:
So it's important to keep in mind that sometimes lines can hold, and sometimes lines can break, and break quickly.

 

BOOT:
Right. Just to underline that point, I mean, war is probably the most unpredictable and complex human activity. And so it's just very, very difficult for anybody to predict what's going to happen. And there's countless examples from military history of outcomes that were completely shocking and surprising.

 

LINDSAY:
Is there any risk of a Russian counteroffensive taking advantage of what it is that the Ukrainians are doing, or, as we see the Russian strategy unfold, is it simply to hold current lines and absorb the blow?

 

BOOT:
The Russians have been trying to mount an offensive of their own in northeastern Ukraine, which has not gotten very far. That's generally seen as an attempt to distract Ukrainian forces, and the Ukrainians have enabled to hold their lines. The Russians don't really seem to have much capability for offensive operations at this point. I mean, you saw what happened over the winter, their big winter offensive centered on Bakhmut, which was a costly fiasco where they lost upwards of 20,000 soldiers to take a few meters of ground, essentially. And they're still fighting around Bakhmut, and there's some debate over whether the Ukrainians are pouring too many resources into Bakhmut, or whether they need to be doing that.

 

But even if this Ukrainian counteroffensive doesn't achieve the kind of victory that many of us hope it will ... Even if that doesn't happen, that doesn't mean that the Russians will then be able to go on the attack either, because the Russians have been so badly hurt and they continue to be hurt and degraded, and have suffered such heavy casualties that I think the general feeling is they don't have much capability for offensive operations anytime soon.

 

LINDSAY:
I've seen suggestion, Max, that the Russians have lost as many as 100,000 troops in less than two years. Something on the order of 150 to 170,000 casualties. I mean, those are staggering numbers.

 

BOOT:
Those are staggering numbers, and nobody has a great idea of what exactly the losses are. But it is certainly the case that these are, by far, the heaviest casualties that Russia has suffered since World War II. I mean, this is orders of magnitude greater than what they lost in Afghanistan. It's orders of magnitude greater than what we, the United States, lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, or even in Vietnam. So this is the kind of industrialized, all-out warfare that Europe has not seen since 1945. And the Russians fight in this very blunderbuss type of style, where they have no regard for their own men. And in fact, they've used human wave attacks, just sending troops, often convicts, into this meat grinder where they don't care how many of them get killed. And they have taken shocking losses.

 

And there's been a hope or an assumption among many in the West that this will lead to dissatisfaction of the war back home in Russia. But so far, Putin remains in complete control, and there's no real challenge to his ability to continue fighting this war. And in fact, Putin was just bragging, just a day or so ago, that they've managed to convince 300,000 contract soldiers to sign up this year. So Russia still has a lot of manpower. So they still have the ability to continue this conflict, no matter how wasteful, ruinous, and terrible it is.

 

LINDSAY:
You note that the Russian strategy has been industrialized warfare, and particularly heavy reliance on artillery. I'm seeing reports that the Russians are going through artillery shells at an unsustainable rate, and that's what led to the recent meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, as the Russians try to find someone to supply artillery shells. Is that a real concern, that the Russians may essence end up with what I think has been referred to as shell hunger, in essence not have the materiel it needs to prosecute the war?

 

BOOT:
I think both sides find themselves running low on artillery ammunition. This is kind of a repeat of what we've learned in World War I and many other conflicts, that when a war like this really gets going in earnest, it uses up way more ammunition than any nation had prepared in peace time. And certainly, there have been reports of artillery shortages on both sides, and now, especially on the Russian side, which is why Putin is reaching out to one of his few remaining allies in North Korea to try to get North Korean artillery ammunition.

 

And it remains to be seen how much he will get and what kind of shape it's in, because the North Koreans are not renowned for taking good care of their military stockpile. So this ammunition could have been rotting there in warehouses for decades. We don't know. But clearly, they probably will have access to some more ammunition from North Korea.

 

And we don't really know how many shells the Russians have in stockpile, or how many they can produce. So I think it's safe to say that they are facing some shortages, but I would not jump from that observation to the conclusion that they're going to run out of ammunition anytime soon. Sadly, they have a lot of stuff in stockpiles. They're also making more. There was just a report that they've actually managed to maintain their missile production, despite the Western sanctions on microchips.

 

LINDSAY:
Now, Max, you mentioned one of the reasons why the Ukrainians didn't have the kind of immediate success with their counteroffensive that many people either expected or hoped for is that the Russians had had ample time to dig in, that they laid down heavy minefields, dug trenches, pursued a number of other activities that any defender would pursue, to make it difficult to dislodge them. But I've also seen a lot of criticism, particularly from Western military experts, that the Ukrainians erred in opening up too many lines of attack. They essentially have three axes of attack. While the efforts in the south may be the most important, receive the biggest share of forces, there's an effort in the east and an effort in the northeast. Do you buy into that criticism?

 

BOOT:
I mean, I think there are some legitimate concerns that they might have committed too many troops to Bakhmut in the east, which is not the main effort of their counteroffensive. But I would tend to defer to the Ukrainian commanders, because they're on the ground and we're not. And as the Ukrainians have often pointed out, the United States really does not have a lot of experience with this kind of warfare. I mean, we've gotten used to counterinsurgency warfare. And as General Zaluzhny, the Ukrainian commander, said, "This is not counterinsurgency. This is Kursk," referring to one of the biggest tank battles of World War II. So this is not a type of warfare that we've conducted, and certainly not one we've conducted without air cover. So I think the Ukrainians are pretty cognizant of the challenges that they face, and I think they're trying to adjust to the situation as best they can.

 

And I think, instead of trying to second-guess them from afar, I think our main job should be to provide them with as much equipment as we can. And we have provided a lot. I mean, the United States has provided tens of billions of dollars in military aid. But I think, sadly, a lot of it has been somewhat tardy and slow, and it took until the beginning of this year for the U.S. and our allies to provide tanks to the Ukrainians. And then we somehow expected that they would miraculously learn to use tanks, Western tanks, in their formations in a few months, and then use them successfully. And we still haven't provided F-16s, which we keep promising, which probably will be delivered next year. But these are all weapon systems that we could and should have delivered a year ago. And if we had done that, I think the Ukrainians would be in a much stronger position in this counteroffensive.

 

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk a little bit more about that, Max, because again, one explanation for the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to yield the strategic objectives the Ukrainians held for it is that the West hasn't been as forward-leaning in providing weapons to Ukraine, and particularly the United States hasn't been. You mentioned F-16s. There's a lot of talk about ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System. Explain to me why these weapons might be game changers. How would they affect the course of fighting on the battlefield, that would significantly advantage Ukrainians?

 

BOOT:
Well, again, the Ukrainians really want to interdict the Russian supply lines, because they don't want to have to pay this heavy price in blood to take every inch of their country back. What they want to do is to make it impossible for the Russians to keep defending their positions, because they run out of fuel, ammunition, food.

 

LINDSAY:
So you attack behind the lines.

 

BOOT:
Exactly. You interdict there, what military technicians call the ground lines of communication. And if you can do that, then you force the Russians to pull back without having to sacrifice more of your troops in a frontal assault. So to do that, they have to be able to hit far behind the Russian lines. I mean, one of the key enablers of the entire Russian war is the Russian control of occupied Crimea. And so the Ukrainians want to be able to hit Russian bases in Crimea. And they have been doing some of that, for example, with the Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles provided by Britain and France. But they could do a lot more of it if we would send them the ATACMS, these army missiles that have a range of 150 miles. They could really increase the tempo of fire and make it much harder for the Russians.

 

And honestly, at this point, I don't understand why we're not doing more of this, why it's so slow to deliver these weapon systems. Initially, you could sort of understand President Biden was fearful. Hey, we don't want to cross any Russian red lines. We don't want to trigger World War III. But at this point, there are not a lot of Russian red lines left because ... Keep in mind that in the last few months, the Ukrainians have been attacking Russia itself pretty heavily. I mean, they have been mounting pretty regular drone strikes on Moscow. They destroyed Russian bombers at an air base south of St. Petersburg. They've certainly mounted many attacks on Crimea. And Russia is not starting World War III.

 

So I think that should ease some of these concerns that Putin is some irrational madman who's going to resort to nuclear weapons. I think it should put our minds at ease a little bit and understand that ... No. In fact, the safest course we can pursue is to provide more weapons to the Ukrainians so they can end this war, because the longer this war goes on, the greater the risks all around, and of course, the greater the price that Ukrainians pay in blood.

 

LINDSAY:
There's been a lot of speculation that the Biden administration may in fact give the green light on sharing ATACMS when President Zelensky comes to Washington later this week. We'll see if that happens.

 

BOOT:
I think this calls to mind Churchill's observation about how the United States always does the right thing, but only after exhausting all the other options.

 

LINDSAY:
Well, let's talk about the U.S. position on the war, because there are many people, as you know, in the United States who question U.S. support for Ukraine, argue that it's not in our national interest to do so. I know you believe it, in fact, is. So make the argument for why it is in the U.S. interest to make sure that Ukraine wins, or at least doesn't lose in its war against Russia.

 

BOOT:
I really think this is a defining conflict of the 21st century that will determine whether the international system will be governed by the rule of law or by the law of the jungle, because if the Russians can get away with this kind of unprovoked aggression, this attack on their neighbor, it will set the world back to 1939. This is going to be back to the world that we thought we had left behind in the post-World War II era.

 

It's going to be a green light, not only for Putin to continue his aggression against possibly NATO members, it's also going to be a green light for Xi Jinping in China to attack Taiwan or do whatever they want, because it will show that the West cannot stand up to the tyrants. Whereas, on the other hand, if the Ukrainians can prevail and defeat the Russian attack and take their country back, I think it will send a very strong signal that aggression does not pay, that the West is united, that democracies can defend themselves.

 

And I think that is the message that we want to send if we want to be safe in the twenty-first century. We don't have this option of being a fortress America. We can't just say, "Put America first," and hide behind our oceans, because at this point, even North Korea can attack the United States. Even North Korea has ICBMs that can reach the United States. So we need to be proactive in working with our allies around the world to maintain international norms, and to send a signal that this kind of unprovoked aggression will not stand, to cite what George H. W. Bush said during the Gulf War in 1991.

 

LINDSAY:
How do you respond, Max, to arguments made by people like Republican presidential candidate, Vivek Ramaswamy, that U.S. support for Ukraine is driving Russia into the arms of China, and that the United States should actually do a wholesale rethink of its policy, and that what we should be doing is trying to find a way to separate Russia from China.

 

BOOT:
Well, Ramaswamy does not know what the heck he is talking about. He is just making this stuff up because he thinks it sounds good to the base. But anybody who knows anything about international relations understands how ridiculous what he's saying is, because in fact, China is not being wholehearted in its support for Russia at the moment, because they are taken aback. They are very ambivalent about Putin's war. They are not supplying weapons to Putin, because they're also very cognizant that China is part of this international trading system, and that they need to trade with the U.S. and with Europe. They can't be totally cut off the way that Russia is being cut off.

 

But if Russia gets away with its aggression, that will drive Russia and China closer together, because it's going to send a signal that Russia is stronger than the West. And so as China looks around the world and says, "Should we placate Europe and the United States, or should we placate Russia?" If Russia gets away with its aggression, they'll be more likely to placate Russia, whereas if Russia is defeated, then Russia's going to be weak. It's not going to be a country that China wants to align itself with. It can still do trade with Russia, but it's certainly not going to entrust its security to Russia. So if we want to break the China-Russia axis, the best way to do that is to defeat Russia. And in fact, Russia is being constantly weakened all the time, and their value as an ally for China continues to decline.

 

LINDSAY:
It's clear, Max, that there is a significant segment of the American public which is deeply skeptical about U.S. support for Ukraine, regardless of the arguments you and others have made for supporting Ukraine. And that gets to the question of whether or not the United States is going to support Ukraine in the months to come.

 

There's some debate going on Capitol Hill now about additional funding for Ukraine, but I think the bigger issue is speculation about who will be in the White House come January 2025, and whether that person, whether it's Donald Trump or someone like Donald Trump, will fundamentally reorient U.S. foreign policy, and that this is sort of playing into the way other countries, American partners and adversaries, are assessing the war in Ukraine. It's been particularly suggested that that expectation that the Biden administration may be succeeded by a different administration with a different foreign policy is a reason for the Russians to hold out. How do you assess that argument?

 

BOOT:
Well, there's no question that Putin has no incentive to end this war before November 2024, because he knows that if Trump wins, he will get bailed out, because Trump continues to show a disturbing affinity for Putin. And of course, Putin knows how to manipulate him and how to stroke his ego. I mean, just this week, I almost had to laugh, where Putin actually said that Donald Trump is the victim of a politically motivated prosecution that has no basis in law. Of course, Putin is an expert in politically motivated prosecutions. What Trump is facing, of course, are completely legitimate criminal charges that will be decided in a legitimate court of law, which doesn't exist in Russia. But that's just an example of how Putin continues to gain Trump. And of course, Trump reacted very positively to Putin's words, because he is very easily manipulated. 

 

So yeah, I think there's no question it's a terrifying prospect for American democracy, for the entire world, but also for Ukraine if Trump manages to retake the presidency in 2024, which based on the current polls, he has a reasonable chance of doing. But short of that, I think that you will see robust, continued American support for Ukraine, and European support. It's actually been stronger than I think a lot of people expected. It's stronger than Putin expected when he invaded Ukraine in February of 2022. And the Europeans, in particular, are stepping up. And this is actually a counter to one of the big Trumpist talking points. "All of our allies are freeloaders," they claim, "and why aren't the Europeans doing more?" Well, actually, the Europeans are doing more. And right now, the Europeans are actually sending more aid to Ukraine than we are. And they're going to be providing the F-16s, as opposed to the U.S. providing them. And they provided the Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles, something we have not been willing to do.

 

So the Europeans are actually doing a lot. They weathered the last winter with a cutoff of Russian oil and gas, which Putin thought would bring them to their knees. It didn't happen. Actually, support for Ukraine has been much stronger than expected. There's something like fifty countries around the world that are aiding Ukraine, and Russia is really scraping the bottom of the barrel, trying to get aid from Iran and North Korea, it's fellow pariah nations. So I think, in terms of the international outlook, I think it's pretty positive for Ukraine, barring, of course, the disaster that would befall the world if Trump were to get back into the White House.

 

LINDSAY:
I suspect that a big part of the motivation for President Zelensky's visit to Washington is to build support for continued United States aid to Ukraine, which leads me to ask you a question, Max, which is do you see the potential that the current counteroffensive might not achieve all of Ukraine's strategic objectives, but set up the Ukrainian military for a more successful counteroffensive next year?

 

BOOT:
Absolutely. And that's a case that's been made to me for months by Mark Arnold, who is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general, somebody I actually met in Ukraine in May. And even in May, before the start of the current counteroffensive, he was actually telling me that he thinks that the Ukrainians don't have what is necessary to achieve victory this year, but they could be setting themselves up for a much more successful outcome to a counteroffensive next year. And General Arnold has spent a lot of time on the front lines of Ukraine, so this is not just armchair analysis. He's actually been up close, and been able to render judgment on what's going on.

 

And I think that is actually a reasonable case. I think there is a tendency in the U.S. government to think that this is all-or-nothing, that the Ukrainians have to win now or otherwise fold their tents and try to reach a negotiated solution of the Russians. But in fact, it is possible that the Ukrainians could be in a stronger position next year when they'll have, hopefully, F-16s. The U.S. and Europe, we are ramping up our production of artillery ammunition, so the Ukrainians could have more artillery ammunition. They could have ATACMS and other systems they don't currently have. They could have more tanks.

 

And, perhaps most important of all, they might have more experience with offensive operations because of what's been happening in the last few months. The troops who have gone through that and survived will come out much more battle hardened and much more experienced and much more capable of future operations. So yeah, I think there are grounds to think that perhaps Ukraine could do better next year than they're doing this year. But again, it remains to be seen what the outcome of the operation this year is going to be. It's not over yet.

 

LINDSAY:
So my main takeaway from our conversation, Max, is that you see it as important to continue the military pressure on the Russians, because Vladimir Putin has no incentive to negotiate before early 2025.

 

BOOT:
That's exactly right. And there's been no indication that the Russians are willing to negotiate. If they were to do some kind of deal right now, it would basically be to entrench their forces in 20 percent of Ukraine, and then they would restock, rebuild, resupply, and then get ready for another major offensive in the future designed to achieve their maximalist objectives, which would include taking Kyiv and, in fact, extinguishing Ukraine as an independent state. So that's what negotiating with the Russians right now ... It would enable the Russians to achieve their objectives. I just don't see any indication that Putin is willing to seriously compromise in any way right now. I think it would take more defeats on the battlefield. And it would also, I think, have to take a defeat for Putin in the U.S. presidential election for him to possibly get serious about making a deal.

 

LINDSAY:
On that note, I'll close up The President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Max Boot, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security studies here at the Council on Foreign Relations. Max, thank you as always for joining me.

 

BOOT:
Always a pleasure to be on with you, Jim.

 

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen in. And leave us a review. We love the feedback. The publications mentioned in this episode and a transcript of our conversation are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on CFR.org. As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the host or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

 

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla for her research assistance. This is Jim Lindsay. Thank you for listening.