Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, With Jonathan Berkshire Miller

LINDSAY:
Welcome to The President's Inbox, a CFR podcast about the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. I'm Jim Lindsay, director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week's topic is Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy.

With me to discuss Canada's first Indo-Pacific strategy is Jonathan Berkshire Miller. Jonathan is a senior fellow and director of foreign affairs in the national defense and national security program at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute just based in Ottawa, Canada. Jonathan also serves as a senior fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs, a senior fellow on East Asia for the Asian Forum Japan, and the Director and co-founder of the Council on International Policy. He previously spent more than a decade working on Asian economic and security issues in the Canadian federal government. Jonathan, thanks for joining me.

MILLER:
Thanks a lot, Jim. It's a real pleasure to be on and thanks for highlighting this topic.

LINDSAY:
Well, I'm glad to jump into it. Canada, back in November, released its Indo-Pacific Strategy. So let's begin with an obvious question. What's in it?

MILLER:
Well, so Jim, this is a culmination of a long period of work for the Canadian government. I think if you were to go back in time three years ago, for example, and for the details of what came out in this strategy to be there, I think would be a big surprise to a lot of folks. What was in the news here in Canada, and might have been in the news internationally, was the detention of our two citizens that we called the "two Michaels," Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. There were other issues structurally in the relationship with China, including 5G and next generation networks, and our position on Huawei.

And all of this led, in this three year period where the bureaucrats in Ottawa were thinking about this Indo-Pacific Strategy, is number one, how do we grapple with China? And I think that the strategy looks to deal with that challenge, but number two, how do we come to grips with the fact that we are a Pacific nation? One of the things I think that the Canadian government, success of Canadian governments from different political stripes have often tended to think maybe we can look for example at the Europeans and other friends for their approach to Asia, but the reality is that the difference is twofold. Number one, we share a large Pacific coastline. We have big equities in the Indo-Pacific that are a bit different from some of our European friends.

And the second fact is that we are also a North American nation. That doesn't mean necessarily that we agree a hundred percent with how the US approaches the Indo-Pacific, but I think we have definite shared interests and I think on 85 to 90 percent of the issues there are areas that we can collaborate on. So within this strategy, I think there's an attempt to address these issues. Number one, a realistic view of China. This strategy calls China a "disruptive actor," and number two, making up for lost time on those relationships that are key to our interests, Japan and South Korea, for example, in Northeast Asia, but looking a bit more broadly at the relationships in ASEAN and also India. So I think that's the intent. The follow through is I think what everyone's going to be focused on.

LINDSAY:
Well, let's actually focus for a moment, Jonathan, if we can, on the diagnosis. You mentioned the shock to the Canadian-Chinese relationship created by the arrest of the two Michaels in the wake of Canada living up to its treaty obligations to the United States and extraditing the daughter and the chief financial officer of Huawei to the United States. But the number of other issues happening in the relationship, my recollection, is that when Prime Minister Trudeau met with President Xi on the margins of the G20 summit last November in Bali. Prime Minister Trudeau was subjected to what I would describe as a tongue lashing by the president of China. I know that Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed some concerns about Chinese interference in Canada's domestic affairs. Could you sort of just spell out that diagnosis, sort of the reaction in Canada to what they perceive as a more threatening, more disruptive China?

MILLER:
Yeah, that's great, Jim, because I think, I mean the issue with the two Michaels I think was just a small anecdote of a bigger problem that we've been facing, and we're not alone in that problem. I think obviously the United States is grappling with issues of interference and influence. Our European friends are, our Japanese friends are, South Korea, et cetera. From the Canadian context, there's a few issues. Number one, we've been suffering from economic coercion. So for example, when our citizens were detained, China mysteriously lost some of the safety inspections for our canola and pork and other products, and all of a sudden our exporters couldn't export large amounts of these commodities to China. So that's one example of economic coercion.

On the influence and interference element, and this was right before the prime minister's trip to G20 and these now infamous meetings as you referenced with Xi Jinping, is that there's been two scandals that have been happening in Canada with regard to the China relationship. One of them is these illegal extrajudicial police stations that are not police attaches, accredited attaches and embassies, but are extrajudicial sort of police stations by provinces in China that have been set up in Canada and other countries around the world. So that I think was one scandal that the prime minister had to grapple with. And the second one was, which is more nefarious and details are still coming out about it, was the potential funding of federal members of parliament's campaigns through United Front work from the Chinese. So I think the backdrop of this came before that meeting, and I think the prime minister wanted to address this with the Chinese side. And you saw, I think the whole world saw, the Chinese reaction to this, which was basically, "Canada how dare you approach the Chinese leader with these sort of concerns?"

LINDSAY:
Yeah, the interaction did have that sort of whiff about it. Jonathan, I'm struck as I look at Canadian public opinion, that clearly the public has soured on relations with China. Looking at a Pew Research Center poll from last August, it shows that among Canadians, the favorability view of China has fallen from 58 percent just down to 23 percent, and there was a recent poll done by an outfit known as Nanos that found that only about 8 percent of Canadians think Ottawa should make closer ties with Beijing a priority. So that leaves me wondering how China as an issue filters into Canada's domestic politics. Is this something all parties agree on so it really doesn't have any bite? Are there partisan differences within Canada, regional differences that we should be aware of?

MILLER:
That's a really good point, Jim, and I think that what's shifted in the change, especially over the past five years I would say in particular, there was China skepticism before in Canada. I think some of the polling that you would see even ten years ago would show that Canadians were more skeptical for example of China than they were of other countries in Asia when it comes to free trade agreements and investment and other elements. But I think that skepticism has changed and deepened, and not just the numbers, but I think the elements of society that are skeptical. So for example, the skepticism that we saw ten years ago was a very elite skepticism. It was folks in think tanks and universities and the bureaucracy and maybe certain chambers of commerce who were having these discussions, but now this is a whole of society skepticism, I would say.

And the biggest reason for that frankly, was the saga with the Michaels. Five years ago I would pick up one of the main Canadian newspapers, The Globe and Mail is one of the biggest ones, you'd rarely see China stories. I mean, maybe you'd flipped to page twenty and you'd be able to read something. It was almost daily, frankly, Jim, that you would see issues about the Michaels, but then that transitioned into more. That transitioned into a broader Canadian general public interest in some of the nefarious activities that China is conducting both in our country but also more broadly overseas. So I think that leads me to my concluding point in this, that we're not in this period where there's the little hills and valleys of the relationship and we can pop back up now that our citizens are back and Meng Wanzhou is back in China. I really argue that we're in a trough right now. The structural realities in the relationship don't permit a quick rebound or rebalance that the Chinese might hope for.

LINDSAY:
I should just note, to give context to our conversation, Canada's economic relations with China are significant. China clocks in as Canada's third-largest trading partner, United States being number one, the European Union being number two. Now China is in many respects a distant third. The amount of trade Canada has with the United States is about nineteen times the amount of trade it has with China. And again, anyone who spent any time in Detroit or Buffalo understands how much commerce goes back and forth across the border there. So I just wanted to flag that for contextual reasons. But still, the Chinese relationship is important to the Canadian economy. So that takes us to the question of, given the diagnosis that Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy lays out that China is a disruptive nation, what's the prescription? What is the Canadian federal government proposing to do?

MILLER:
Well, I think there's a couple avenues there, Jim. I think first of all, I think the sequencing has to be right. So the one criticism I would have of this strategy was it's great that there's a realistic assessment of the challenges that China poses, number one to Canada's national security and prosperity, but also to that of our allies, but that's not enough. I think we need to realize that this region is deeper and more diverse than just China. So for me, the biggest takeaway and the reason to produce an Indo-Pacific Strategy is not purely because China is creating challenges and is becoming a disruptive actor for the bad and also for the good, but is that the Indo-Pacific is a big region and we have a lot of other partners that we need to work with.

So that was the one critique I have on the sequencing, is that it takes away the agency of those other important states in the region that the reason that we want to engage, for example, with Japan, with India, with South Korea is because China's creating a lot of problems in the region. I don't think that it's that simple equation. I think it's that we should be engaging with India, Japan, South Korea because we should be engaging with them, because it's in our interest because we share a lot of economic and security dividends to work together on. So I think that's the challenge that we have going forward is number one, taking steps domestically and part of that will be, for example, looking at foreign influence and interference. Canada's now looking at a potential foreign agents registry act, which is something that the U.S. has had in place for some time, the UK is moving forward on, Australia has a new legislation in place.

So Canada's looking at that as a national security domestic thing to do. But in the region I think we need to get much more serious about those relationships outside of China. It's not all about how we manage the China relationship, but for example, it's the balance in those relations. I think ten, twenty years ago we would go to Tokyo, we would go to Manila or Hanoi and we would just talk about trade. We would say, "How can we enrich our markets by trading with you?" Those conversations are unacceptable now. I mean we need to have a balanced discussion. It doesn't mean that we don't trade, trade's an important part of our engagement, but we need to understand and empathize with the real security challenges in this region too.

LINDSAY:
Well, that's one of the things that sort of struck me most about reading Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy, Jonathan, is that it has a significant military component, talks about deterrence, and I guess that leads to a variety of questions, one of which is sort of top of mind, why would Canada make this a priority at all given the disparate size between Canada and China, given the fact that even if the Canadians succeed in contributing more, that contribution's going to be outweighed by its southern neighbor the United States, and it has the potential to buy Ottawa even more trouble with Beijing? So why is it that there is a military component?

MILLER:
Well, I think there's a couple elements there. I mean there's a demand signal I think from some of our most closest allies. I would make the argument that AUKUS obviously got a lot of attention here as an agreement in Canada largely because we were un-included. Again, I think that it's not just about AUKUS and not just about the Quad, but it's a broader issue... At Five Eyes is another example of this. We're still a member. Obviously the Five Eyes still contribute closely to this.

LINDSAY:
Five Eyes being the consortium on intelligence with the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.

MILLER:
Exactly. Yeah, apologies for the acronym soup there. We are engaged in a lot of these bodies and we want to be engaged in more, but I think the challenge is that our credibility is sort of waning in some of them. The amount that we contribute versus the amount that we receive, whether it's from foreign intelligence or assessments from the United States, from Australia, from the UK, our role is weakening a bit. So I think there's a bit of a demand signal for us, not just in the intelligence world, but also in the military world to do a bit more. That doesn't mean that we need to replicate efforts of the United States or be the same as Japan for example. 

I think there's a recognition that Canada has capability limits, but I think there is a desire and a demand signal, not just from our traditional partners in the Anglosphere, but also from some of the key partners in this region. Japan is one example, South Korea. They want a balanced Canada. It doesn't mean that they expect the Royal Canadian Navy to park itself in Yokosuka and be one of the largest military players, but they do expect Canada to play that balanced role. And I think the last issue will be the credibility side. In order to be a credible player, in order to be expected at a lot of these tables, including the East Asia Summit for example, which is one of the premier sort of head of state level summits, we're not invited to that, we have to be engaged on all of the issues of the region. We can't just be focused on trade and expect that the Americans and the Japanese and the others will deal with this. I think we need to have that balance.

LINDSAY:
So it sounds like part of the motivation is a simple matter of solidarity, of being there for your friends because of the friendship and being reinforcing. Is that a fair summary?

MILLER:
I think that's one big element. I mean, the last thing I would note too that the security risks are real. One example would be a Taiwan contingency, and Canada's contribution militarily obviously would be minimal. It might not even be anything, but the reality is that we will be intimately involved if there is a serious contingency over Taiwan. And I think this is, again, getting back to that point that I mentioned, Jim, about comparing Canada to Europe. I can't speak for how the Europeans will be involved in such a contingency, but look at our geography, look at, you mentioned our trade relationship, our national security relationship with the United States. It's not only in our interest, but it's an imperative that we have the back of our neighbor and our friend, the United States, in such a contingency, if the United States is to make that decision. So I think these type of things Canada needs to be thinking about in advance.

LINDSAY:
Now, Jonathan, I'm struck by your mention of Taiwan because your foreign minister, Mélanie Joly has said that Canada is going to continue to participate in international freedom of naval operations by sending Canadian ships, frigates, through the Taiwan Strait to make clear that in Canada's view the Taiwan Strait is an international body. It is not a private lake of mainland China. How do you assess the wisdom of doing that?

MILLER:
Well, I think this is, again, part of it will be symbolic, but part of it will be the fact that we want to do meaningful things in a military sense here. It doesn't mean that we can be involved in every multilateral exercise, but things such as that bilateral passage that was done in tandem with the United States Navy, those things have meaning. So for example, the Japanese might be involved in many more exercises, many more engagements diplomatically with the U.S. and others in the region than we are, but the symbolics and the importance of standing for things legally that we think are right do have some significance. So I think that's one element. The second thing will be not just the pure military side, but what we say diplomatically vis-a-vis Taiwan.

One of the things that impressed me about this strategy for example, is not just talking about Taiwan purely in economic and cultural terms, which is often the sort of the grounds that we would normally talk about Taiwan and our relationship with them, but also talking about things such as disinformation, for example, and working with the Taiwanese to counter disinformation, election integrity, all of these issues which border into the security world, which China has tried to box us out and many other countries out in the discussion with Taiwan. So I think the Canadian side pushing back on that and saying, "No, we can have discussions with Taiwan. We're not changing our one China policy, but we're not going to have ourselves squeezed in by the limits that you impose and your continuing tightening of the box."

LINDSAY:
Jonathan, if I may, I want to shift to another aspect of the strategy's diagnosis. It is an element that probably doesn't stand out to you, but to me as an American it really stands out because it is quite different from the U.S. response to Beijing's rise and to involvement in the Indo-Pacific, and that's namely the emphasis in the Canadian Indo-Pacific strategy about developing economic ties. 

I think one can fairly say of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy that if it were a stool, it would have one and a half legs. One very well-developed leg is military commitment, showing up in the region, reinforcing military capabilities in the region, sort of a half leg from its efforts to show up at regional meetings. One of the knocks against the United States being, of course its failure to fully staff up its embassies, not just in Asia but around the world. But I think it's a big complaint, I certainly hear it when I'm in the region, that the United States is really coming up short when it comes to an economic leg of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific. 

Canada seems to have a very clear sense that it needs to be more engaged economically in the region, whole variety of steps laid out in the Indo-Pacific strategy. So maybe you could tell me a little bit about that and maybe help me understand why it is that Canada is not recoiling from its economic investment in East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia?

MILLER:
Yeah, I think that's one of the more prominent areas, and it's an area of strength I think for us going into this strategy. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, Canada being one of the lead members there, obviously we all mourn the U.S., or at least on the Canadian side, we mourn the U.S. decision to withdraw from that agreement, and at least from my perspective, we welcome you back anytime, but understanding that's a complex...

LINDSAY:
I don't see the Biden administration accepting that invitation anytime soon, regrettably.

MILLER:
Indeed. Indeed. I know it's a very thorny issue. But that being said, with the U.S. currently on the outside looking in, Canada is the second-biggest economy in the CPTPP with Japan. So I think that's an area of strength, but to be honest, I think that strength also carries some responsibility. My worry about the CPTPP going forward is its expansion. Obviously, Taiwan and China have simultaneously, near simultaneously, applied to be next in the queue. The UK obviously is waiting for its succession. So Canada has to take a leadership role, ideally in tandem with Japan, to ensure that this agreement is not held hostage by geopolitics. The Taiwan China applications I think is a clear example of how this agreement could be paralyzed as far as the future of it.

So I think that is a responsibility on Canada to move forward on that, and I think that's probably why it's identified in the Strategy. The second thing that I think is interesting, and I'm glad the Canadian government has changed its tune on this, is that it's not just about only trade agreements. So for example, the United States Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, IPEF, yes, it's not perfect, yes, there's bereft of some details, and I think, Jim, I agree with your point that the U.S. still is working with one leg of the stool, sort of not fully there, but IPEF does provide some other opportunities, and I think Canada has now shown an interest to join IPEF as well. So complimenting the CPTPP with IPEF, and then on the digital realm there's the digital economic partnership agreement, which is run by a Singapore and others in ASEAN. So I think making sure we're in much of this trade and geo-economic landscape I think is going to be very important for us.

LINDSAY:
Okay, so I will modify my metaphor and say it is an American stool with one and three-quarter legs as opposed to one and a half legs. I'm not sure I would put as much stock on what IPEF will achieve. I certainly... I think it's missing one ingredient that most of the countries in the region want, which is access to the American market, and what's going to happen is without that access, you're going to see China's economic gravitational pull on those economies grow stronger and stronger.

One of the questions I have in sort of looking at the Indo-Pacific strategy, Jonathan, is whether this is going to be sustainable going forward? And I ask that because I recently saw that Prime Minister Trudeau hinted that perhaps Canada may have elections in the not too distant future, he leads what I understand is a minority government in Canada, so prime ministerships end. I'm not wishing things one way or the other, but obviously we could see a change in Parliament in the not too distant future. Would you anticipate that the general thrust behind the Indo-Pacific strategy would survive changes in the prime minister's office?

MILLER:
That's a great question. I mean, I think the general sort of themes and the pillars and the interests that are laid out in this strategy are bipartisan in nature. Oppositions are there to criticize, so they will criticize, and they have criticized parts of this strategy. But I think the general thrust, the opposition has been actually relatively silent because they've been calling for this too. So maybe this is a similar discussion that's been happening in the U.S. over the past four or five years, but I think across parties, and this is not just the two main parties in Canada, but some of the other smaller parties, I think there's a recognition that we need to get serious, that we need it for a long time to get serious, about Asia, and this is finally delivering on that promise.

The issue of sustainability though, I think will be a couple of things. So it's not necessarily the policy itself. I think funding will be a big element of it. The thing that I have consistently advised the Canadian government on is that Indo-Pacific is not a project. It's not a special project. It's not something that you take off and say, "Oh, well great, we've made a strategy and we have a five-year plan and all of these buckets of money and everyone should be happy." This is a lifelong commitment. I think that we need to look at this in a very long term lens.

And I think the way that the funding is structured right now on this strategy, it is a sort of a five to ten year gap. That's the thing I worry about. I don't necessarily worry about the ideas sustaining themself, but I worry about attention being brought elsewhere. I mean, we have the same economic challenges and issues that the United States faces and the rest of the G7 faces coming out of the pandemic. We're obviously dealing with Russia's brutal war in Ukraine and funding our Ukrainian friends as best as we can through that conflict. So there's a number of challenges economically, and I do worry about sustaining that financial push.

LINDSAY:
Jonathan, you noted earlier that there's considerable overlap between the U.S. approach to China and the approach that Canada is taking, but they're not identical. Perhaps you could highlight for us where you see the significant differences and do you think that they might turn out to be major irritants in relations between Washington and Ottawa?

MILLER:
Well, I think one of the differences, and I think we've just spent a little bit of time talking about it, is on the economic front. I think absolutely we're interested to engage with the United States on IPEF, but I think on the CPTPP... Just to give a little context on this as well, Canada was a late participant and entry member into the CPTPP as well. One of the reasons why we actually joined the TPP, like Japan as well, was because of the United States, I mean probably like most of the members of the TPP. So that was a bit of a bitter pill to swallow. And then there's the context of NAFTA, which is a North American Free Trade Agreement that was renegotiated under the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement. On the trade issues, there are still some sensitive... some scars. The silver lining of this though, Jim, is that we've been used to dealing with the United States on trade issues for several years. We have many layers built in.

LINDSAY:
It's more than several years, and softwood lumber seems to come to mind, but we won't get into those irritants.

MILLER:
Exactly. And the good thing is when you have a neighbor, you insulate yourself and you're used to dealing with these issues, the good, the bad, and hopefully you can manage some of these risks. So I do think on the economic side is probably where we have a little bit of daylight. It'll be interesting to see as well in technology, frankly. I think that we're much more aligned with the United States than some of the worries that we see, for example, from some European friends about the heavy hand on export controls in technology, for example. I think that Canada will be much closer, but there might be some pockets of resistance on that too.

LINDSAY:
Yeah, I think that's actually going to be a challenge for the Biden administration to impose or implement those export controls, particularly in high-tech areas, in ways where it doesn't appear that they're somehow giving an advantage to American manufacturers and producers, because I would think that would be one of the quickest ways to dissolve allied unity if they feel this is really being used to promote domestic protectionism, but where the right dividing line is, there may lie in the eyes of the beholder.

MILLER:
Yeah, no, I think you're right. You're exactly right on that. I think that there needs to be a value proposition to the allies on this, and I think this is something I've heard in Japan, recently in Europe as well, and heard similar things. I mean, I think in principle, U.S. allies agree on the risks of Chinese technology, but I think that there's also a worry that their market share gets sliced off and U.S. companies profit out of this. So that's a challenge.

LINDSAY:
Well, I'm glad you mentioned the fact that you've been on the road. I know you were recently in Tokyo. Japan has come out with its own new National Security Strategy. Maybe you could share with me what did you heard when you were in Tokyo?

MILLER:
Well, I think the new National Security Strategy that was released, and so it's a ten-year gap from 2013 when the first ever Japanese National Security Strategy, I should note, was established under Abe Shinzo, the former Japanese prime minister. I think it's very significant. I think it's a sea change. It should be looked as a group, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy that Japan released at the same time, and the National Defense Buildup, which sort of talks about some of the capabilities that Japan wants to procure. I think there's massively significant things involved in these documents that one of the key elements is just the recognition of how Russia has changed the international rules-based order.

Just to go back in time to 2013, in that National Security Strategy, Japan identified Russia as a partner, a potential partner, if you can believe it or not, and we forward ten years in advance, and Russia's clearly not a partner, framed more as an adversary. Japan very concerned about Russia-China coordination, for example, with their navy's circumventing Honshu, the main Japanese island. So I think Japan is realizing they were in a severe geopolitical context in 2013, and it's gotten a lot worse in the ten years since the first Japanese National Security Strategy. So there's a lot in there. I think Japan is also realizing in the U.S. alliance context that it needs to do more, and I think you've seen some changes there as well, which I think is showing how sobering this security situation around Japan is.

LINDSAY:
Yeah, I think it's interesting that former Prime Minister Abe was fairly optimistic that he might be able to make progress with President Putin, particularly in realizing his dream of recovering the northern islands, or I guess what the Russians would call the southern Kurils, that clearly hasn't come to bear, and I think Tokyo has decided that it's not going to happen anytime soon, and they're not risking anything by being concerned about Russian behavior. 

I'm curious, you've also been recently in Brussels, Jonathan. Maybe you could give me a sense of what you were hearing there, and particularly your sense about the flurry of stories about cracks in Western solidarity in standing up to Russia and its invasion in Ukraine.

MILLER:
Well, I think there's a couple of takeaways from the discussions. One of them, obviously, everyone is worried about Ukraine, ensuring that it gets all the capabilities it needs to withstand any Russian offensives that are coming. The second element, which I think is of critical importance, is looking at not just at China, but at challenges in the Indo-Pacific and how that relates to challenges in the transatlantic. So part of the discussions that I had in Brussels was bringing those two communities together. And one of the things that I think is really interesting about Russia's war in Ukraine is the decision, for example, of Indo-Pacific allies such as Japan and South Korea to play sanctions on Russia and those who, without getting too much into the history, and Jim, you mentioned Abe's wooing of Putin, for example, over their dispute.

It's a complicated thing I think for the Asian allies to get involved in this. I think they want to hedge, they... Japan, one example is that they wanted to wedge in between Russia and China in order to make sure that those two don't get together and don't have convergences. So why did they put those sanctions in place? And I think that number one, they're of course seeing what's happening from a humanitarian perspective in Ukraine, but the bigger issue, and this is why these discussions between the transatlantic and the Indo-Pacific are important, is that there's a social contract now I would argue.

Not a legal contract, but definitely a social contract, that if there is to be a contingency in Asia, be it over Taiwan, be it over somewhere else, that there is an expectation on European allies within NATO to do something in the Indo-Pacific. It doesn't necessarily mean that they all need to be militarily involved, but I think having those discussions, understanding what those expectations are, whether it's economic sanctions, et cetera, is really, really important. So I think that was part of the discussions that we had there in Brussels, is to say, "Oh, hey, if something happens over Taiwan, we can't have you hiding under your desk and saying, 'We're already in a very tough spot with Russia's coercion on gas and energy and other things. We can't deal with cutting off the Chinese market.' We need to have real serious discussions in advance on those issues."

LINDSAY:
Do you have a sense that European capitals are genuinely seized of the issue, as they like to say in diplomatic circles? Because when you're in Paris, you're in London, you're in Berlin, China seems a very long way away, and Kiev and Moscow seem very close.

MILLER:
Yeah, I agree. I think this is going to have to be something that has constant attention to it, because my feeling matches up closely with yours is that yes, in general terms, our European friends recognize the risks, they recognize the challenges. It's varied obviously, throughout the EU. I think different states have taken different approaches. I mean, Lithuania, for example, has a different approach that France and Germany might have.

LINDSAY:
Well they felt the plight of Chinese economic coercion, so they've made up their mind.

MILLER:
Exactly, and the Czechs have and the Norwegians have before as well. So I mean, there's different examples I think, where countries have either faced that coercion or have different calculations. But I think these conversations are going to have to be consistent because the reality is with the principal member of NATO, the United States, if it is involved in a kinetic conflict in Asia, it's going to impact the alliance in one way or the other. So I think that we better have these discussions now rather than later.

LINDSAY:
On that sobering and realistic note, I'll close up the President's Inbox for this week. My guest has been Jonathan Berkshire Miller, senior fellow and director of Foreign Affairs at the Macdonald Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Canada. Jonathan, thank you for joining me.

MILLER:
Thanks so much, Jim. It was a real pleasure.

LINDSAY:
Please subscribe to The President's Inbox on Apple Podcast, Google Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you listen. And leave us your review. We love the feedback. The published materials mentioned in this episode and a transcript of my conversation with Jonathan are available on the podcast page for The President's Inbox on cfr.org. As always, opinions expressed on The President's Inbox are solely those of the hosts or our guests, not of CFR, which takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. 

Today's episode was produced by Ester Fang, with Director of Podcasting, Gabrielle Sierra. Special thanks go out to Michelle Kurilla for her assistance. This is Jim Lindsay. Thanks for listening.