Nuclear Weapons

A collapse of this Cold War–era arms treaty, which many believe has favored the United States, could unleash a new age of nuclear weapons competition.

This year, renewed tension on the Korean Peninsula was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

Nature and technology pose a worrying array of threats to twenty-first century civilization. These global menaces and the catastrophic risks associated with them are the subject of a new International Institutions and Global Governance program blog series. 

Ramped-up diplomacy in 2018 has eased tensions on the Korean Peninsula and led to a one-year halt in missile testing. But Pyongyang has not yet taken credible steps toward denuclearization.

As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, which transformed how wars are fought and won, the world again stands on the precipice of a dramatic revolution in warfare, this one driven by artificial intelligence. While both AI and the debate about the implications of autonomous decision capabilities in warfare are only in their early stages, the one area where AI holds perhaps the most peril is its potential role in how and when to use nuclear weapons. Advances in AI are on a fast track, and the United States is indisputably in an AI arms race with two of our most formidable competitors, both nuclear powers, China and Russia — the former with a smaller but growing nuclear arsenal in size and sophistication, and the latter, which along with the U.S., possesses 90 percent of the global nuclear weapons stockpile. Early and determined U.S. leadership is essential to ensure that we are not just competing but also jointly cooperating with our nuclear-capable adversaries to ensure that AI does not destabilize nuclear command and control. The stakes are high; the consequences potentially existential. While an autonomous nuclear command-and-control program might be easily dismissed as not realistic, the past is prologue. The history of the Cold War is riddled with near misses when accident, mistake or miscalculation due to computer errors in both the Soviet Union and the United States almost triggered nuclear war. But perhaps one of the most stunning revelations of the post-Cold War period relevant to today’s AI revolution is detailed by David Hoffman in his revelatory 2009 book “The Dead Hand.” In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union actually considered deploying a fully automated retaliation to a U.S. nuclear strike, a Doomsday machine, where a computer alone would issue the command for a retaliatory nuclear strike if the Kremlin leadership had been killed in a first-strike nuclear attack from the U.S. Eventually the Soviets deployed a modified, nearly automatic system where a small group of lower-ranking duty officers deep underground would make that decision, relying on data that the Kremlin leadership had been wiped out in a U.S. nuclear strike. The plan was not meant to deter a U.S. strike by assuring the U.S. that if they attacked first, even with a limited strike against the Soviet leadership, that there would be a guaranteed nuclear response. The Soviets kept the plan secret from the United States. It was meant to ensure an all out, nearly automatic nuclear response, which would have existential consequences. As AI develops and confidence in machine learning increases, the U.S. needs to be leading the effort diplomatically by reinvigorating strategic stability talks with both China and Russia, which should include this issue and ensure that this type of nuclear planning does not make its way back into the thinking of our nuclear adversaries or our own, whether secretly or as a form of deterrence. While concerns have been raised in Congress about having the decision to use nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the commander in chief, an even more ominous, impending threat is having that command and control in the hands of AI. The potential application for this developing, powerful technology in increasing stability and the effectiveness of arms control in areas such as early warning, predictive decision-making by bad actors, tracking and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and empowering verification for further reductions is as yet unknown. Potential stabilizing applications need to be a defense-funding priority and also a private sector/university funding priority, similar to the public-private efforts that underpinned and propelled the nuclear arms control and strategic stability process during the Cold War. But the destabilizing potential needs to be addressed early and jointly among the nuclear powers — and here, U.S. leadership is indispensable. AI is projected to rapidly and disruptively change the world within a very short time frame — on the economic side perhaps even eliminating 40 percent of U.S. jobs in as short as 10-15 years. Yet, leading AI experts agree that machine learning should enhance — not replace — human decision-making. This must be a central tenet of nuclear command and control. One of the heroes of the Cold War, who later became known and honored as the man who saved the world from nuclear war, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, overrode repeated and sequential computer warnings in 1983 of a U.S. nuclear missile attack and did not pass on the warning to his superiors. In a 2010 interview with Der Spiegel, Petrov explained that the reason he did not pass the warning on, and correctly determined in the few minutes he had to make a decision that they were a false alarm, was because he factored that: “We are wiser than the computers. We created them.” We are entering this disruptive period of rapid technological change, knowing the consequences of nuclear war and the need for U.S. leadership to guide the use of technology so that it taps that wisdom and enhances the control and reduction of these very dangerous weapons. The most immediate priority for the U.S. must be to lead the process to ensure that these rapid advancements in AI strengthen the command and control of nuclear weapons — not repeat the past and relinquish it to an automatic or nearly automatic Doomsday machine.

A landmark arms control agreement concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in the final years of the Cold War is at risk of unraveling amid mutual suspicions.

Even calculating for the rising threat from China, leaving the INF puts the United States in a worse strategic position than if it were to stay in.

Can South Korea’s Moon Jae-in broker a process for North Korean denuclearization acceptable to both Washington and Pyongyang?

Take this quiz to test your knowledge of North Korea, including its nuclear buildup, the Kim dynasty, and more.

The weeks following the Singapore summit have thus far not delivered a clear public roadmap or timeline for how and when it will be possible to achieve peace or denuclearization following the Kim-Trump summit meeting. Rather, the days prior to and following the summit have been full of signs that the Trump administration is following the North Korean model rather than the Libyan model for denuclearization. Since the North Korean model is the pathway the Trump administration is on, it is worth examining North Korean statements about where that pathway will lead. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks correctly diagnosed to the Aspen Security Forum, a major challenge facing both sides is the absence of trust, and the North Koreans have shown themselves to be nothing if not distrustful of American intentions. This has been the case despite reaping significant prestige benefits from the Singapore meeting in addition to Trump’s unexpected pledge to cancel summer U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Trump walked away from his historic meeting with Kim Jong Un saying: “I think he trusts me, and I trust him.” But Kim Jong-un was reported in KCNA following the summit to have noted “that many problems occurred due to deep-rooted distrust and hostility existing between the two countries,” and that “two countries should commit themselves to refraining from antagonizing with each other out of mutual understanding, and take legal and institutional steps to guarantee it.” In other words, Trump says “trust”; Kim says “verify.” The North Koreans appear to have taken Trump at his word by expecting the Trump administration to trust that its unilateral measures to dismantle its nuclear and missile testing sites are significant enough to count as sincere moves toward the goal of “complete denuclearization” pledged by Kim to Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and Donald Trump. But North Korea’s unilateral measures of destroying its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in May and dismantling its missile engine testing site at Sohae have been implemented without adequate external verification, in a manner that requires the Trump administration to trust rather than verify the credibility of North Korea’s actions. On the other hand, the parts of the Singapore declaration that North Korea most distrusts and therefore most want to verify are related to the U.S. commitments to a “new U.S.-DPRK relationship” and the U.S. commitment to “peace.” As a result, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo received a stiff arm from the North Koreans during his July 6-7 visit to Pyongyang as part of Trump administration efforts to secure a rapid and concrete timetable for denuclearization. The July 7 North Korean foreign ministry statement on the occasion of Pompeo’s visit detailed its proposal of simultaneous actions, including “realizing multilateral exchanges for improved relations between the DPRK and the U.S., making public a declaration on the end of war first on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, dismantling the test ground of high thrust engine to make a physical verification of the suspension of ICBM production as part of denuclearization steps and making an earliest start of the working-level talks for recovering POW/MIA remains.” Although POW/MIA (prisoners of war/missing-in-action) remains recovery would appear to be an easy humanitarian confidence building step completely unrelated to American denuclearization demands, working-level communication regarding the handover has become an example of the depth of distrust between the two sides. North Korea’s foreign ministry statement makes clear that from their perspective, the missing piece is a Trump administration declaration of the end of war, deliverable by this Friday. This step would undoubtedly facilitate the return of POW/MIAs, and it is a step that the Moon Jae-in administration has eagerly supported, including through the Panmunjom Declaration, which envisaged an aspirational statement of the end of war by the end of the year. In fact, South Korea’s unification minister, Cho Myoung-gyon, stated at a South Korean National Assembly policy briefing: “I think we can declare the end to the war . . . before the North achieves complete denuclearization.” Cho specifically stated that such a declaration could be possible “if the North takes sincere measures” toward denuclearization, including North Korea’s dismantlement of nuclear and missile testing sites at Punggye-ri and Sohae. According to the North Korean road map, the next step would involve a Trump administration declaration of intent to replace the armistice with a permanent peace, likely accompanied by the return of some POW/MIAs via Panmunjom. Beyond these steps, the looming question over the North Korean model is not just whether the decades-long distrust of the United States by the North Korean leadership can be overcome, but also whether North Korea can build a track record of accomplishment necessary to overcome American distrust fueled by North Korea’s record of broken promises and commitments. According to Pompeo, the North Koreans recognize that the key to bridging that distrust is the achievement of a “final, fully-verified denuclearization.” But it does not mean that the North Koreans are committed to achieving that objective. Thus far, the North Korean model seems to envision a one-sided verification process in which North Korea performs on the honor system while the United States makes tangible concessions in an effort to overcome North Korea’s mistrust. But American mistrust will not dissipate just because Trump declares his trust in Kim. Rather, both sides must embark on a sustained effort to defuse tensions by building a tangible joint record of accomplishment necessary to make both the end of war and North Korea’s denuclearization a reality, not simply a declaration. In this respect, the biggest challenge to building trust on the American side will be long-term consistency beyond a single administration, while the biggest challenge to confidence building on the North Korean side will be reciprocity (i.e., offering of tangible and irreversible quid pro quos rather than pocketing concessions or breaking agreements.

The following is a guest post by David Gevarter, an intern for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, observers feared how President Donald J. Trump’s populist, illiberal tendencies could damage the transatlantic security relationship. These concerns proved true in many regards, but it would be wrong to assume that only U.S. populism could cause upheaval in the alliance. European politics matter too, especially in the areas that are most crucial to the Pentagon, like nuclear weapons. As part of NATO’s shared nuclear deterrent, the United States currently deploys the B61 gravity bomb in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. While nuclear weapons are not popular among the European public, technocrats in European governments have recognized that the NATO nuclear deterrent is an unpleasant but strategic imperative. However, the rise of populist and nationalist movements across Europe could damage this consensus and threaten the integrity of NATO’s nuclear mission. The Trump administration believes that the United States must deploy more tactical (non-strategic) weapons in Europe through NATO to signal to Russia that any use of tactical weapons would be met by an equivalent response. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review claims that Russia is more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons in a first strike to gain advantage because it believes the United States would not escalate with a strategic nuclear strike. As such, the Trump administration has placed great importance on expanding the United States’ arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons—such as the B61—as a way of countering the perceived Russian advantage in this field. Yet, this strategy could encounter serious obstacles as populist governments gain a foothold on the continent, exacerbated by growing anti-American sentiment. As the wave of populist governments gains popularity in Europe, instead of upholding long-standing NATO commitments, these governments might cave to the will of the masses. They could order the withdrawal of NATO—namely, U.S.—nuclear weapons from their territory, disregarding strategic necessity. The surge of populism in Germany, the backbone of the European project, can do the most damage to the shared nuclear deterrent. The current German government has thus far maintained the nuclear status quo despite opposition, but Angela Merkel’s hold on power is not what it used to be. Recent figures show that 71 percent of Germans favor banning nuclear weapons, and a change in Germany’s executive government could put NATO interests at risk. In the 2017 federal election, Merkel’s political alliance lost a significant percentage of its seats in the Bundestag, most notably to the populist, right-wing party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). In its platform, AfD explicitly calls for the withdrawal of all NATO troops and nuclear weapons from German territory. With the near collapse of the current German government over immigration, the possibility of a rise to power by AfD or a party with similar views is no longer far-fetched. Like in Germany, the specter of populism has become very real in Italy, with the anti-establishment coalition formed by the League and 5-Star parties taking power. This could spell trouble for the NATO shared deterrent, given the broad unpopularity of nuclear weapons in the country. Accordng to a 2007 survey, 70 percent of Italian respondents indicated that the use of NATO nuclear weapons would never be justified, even in the context of war. Over half of respondents indicated that they believed NATO nuclear-sharing agreements violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that Italy should not be party to such agreements. Maintaining and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Italy will require significant cooperation from the Italian government, but Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte's government has shown little intention to acquiesce to President Trump's demands for NATO, such as increasing defense spending. It appears that the new, pro-Russia government in Italy is willing to do whatever it takes to appeal to public opinion, irrespective of the ramifications. Russia has always wanted the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and such a move could be part of an Italian strategy of warming relations with the Kremlin. The 2016 attempted military coup showed that Turkey is the most unstable NATO country, where the future of nuclear sharing is, at best, unsure. Since the attempted coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populist government has further undermined Turkey’s relationship with the United States, NATO, and other Western countries as the country secures diplomatic and military rapprochement with Moscow. Erdogan has leveraged populist rhetoric to consolidate power, galvanizing support for his agenda and eroding checks and balances on his rule. Erdogan himself is no fan of nuclear weapons, and it is easy to imagine a scenario in which, as part of a pivot toward Moscow, Erdogan orders NATO nuclear weapons out of Turkey. Even if that is not the case, many experts argue that the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey, given the deteriorating political climate in the country. This, given the country’s proximity to Russia and other areas of interest in the Middle East, could jeopardize NATO’s ability to hold enemy targets at risk with its nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty throughout NATO countries prompts questions regarding the future of the shared nuclear deterrent. If U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkey or elsewhere in Europe, where else could they go? Some have suggested Poland, given the country’s desire for an increased NATO presence, but this unprecedented expansion of the nuclear deterrent to Eastern Europe could—and likely would—spark a dramatic showdown with Russia, turning the Polish border with Kaliningrad into a hot zone. The worsening wave of populism in Europe could give impetus to European popular opposition to nuclear weapons, forcing their withdrawal from the continent. If the Pentagon truly wants to adhere to its designs to expand its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as part of the NATO shared nuclear deterrent, it needs to start coming up with contingency plans. At the very least, President Trump should stop antagonizing NATO allies and try to preserve what little good will remains toward the U.S. agenda.

Nearly all nuclear weapon states, as a matter of policy, remain ready to use their weapons without having first suffered a nuclear attack.

President Trump prides himself on being a "dealmaker." In one of his biggest deals yet, he brokered a joint statement between the United States and North Korea. To what extent did he use his eleven-step method from The Art of the Deal?