Nuclear Weapons

Can South Korea’s Moon Jae-in broker a process for North Korean denuclearization acceptable to both Washington and Pyongyang?

Take this quiz to test your knowledge of North Korea, including its nuclear buildup, the Kim dynasty, and more.

The weeks following the Singapore summit have thus far not delivered a clear public roadmap or timeline for how and when it will be possible to achieve peace or denuclearization following the Kim-Trump summit meeting. Rather, the days prior to and following the summit have been full of signs that the Trump administration is following the North Korean model rather than the Libyan model for denuclearization. Since the North Korean model is the pathway the Trump administration is on, it is worth examining North Korean statements about where that pathway will lead. As U.S. Forces Korea Commander Vincent Brooks correctly diagnosed to the Aspen Security Forum, a major challenge facing both sides is the absence of trust, and the North Koreans have shown themselves to be nothing if not distrustful of American intentions. This has been the case despite reaping significant prestige benefits from the Singapore meeting in addition to Trump’s unexpected pledge to cancel summer U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Trump walked away from his historic meeting with Kim Jong Un saying: “I think he trusts me, and I trust him.” But Kim Jong-un was reported in KCNA following the summit to have noted “that many problems occurred due to deep-rooted distrust and hostility existing between the two countries,” and that “two countries should commit themselves to refraining from antagonizing with each other out of mutual understanding, and take legal and institutional steps to guarantee it.” In other words, Trump says “trust”; Kim says “verify.” The North Koreans appear to have taken Trump at his word by expecting the Trump administration to trust that its unilateral measures to dismantle its nuclear and missile testing sites are significant enough to count as sincere moves toward the goal of “complete denuclearization” pledged by Kim to Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and Donald Trump. But North Korea’s unilateral measures of destroying its nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in May and dismantling its missile engine testing site at Sohae have been implemented without adequate external verification, in a manner that requires the Trump administration to trust rather than verify the credibility of North Korea’s actions. On the other hand, the parts of the Singapore declaration that North Korea most distrusts and therefore most want to verify are related to the U.S. commitments to a “new U.S.-DPRK relationship” and the U.S. commitment to “peace.” As a result, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo received a stiff arm from the North Koreans during his July 6-7 visit to Pyongyang as part of Trump administration efforts to secure a rapid and concrete timetable for denuclearization. The July 7 North Korean foreign ministry statement on the occasion of Pompeo’s visit detailed its proposal of simultaneous actions, including “realizing multilateral exchanges for improved relations between the DPRK and the U.S., making public a declaration on the end of war first on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, dismantling the test ground of high thrust engine to make a physical verification of the suspension of ICBM production as part of denuclearization steps and making an earliest start of the working-level talks for recovering POW/MIA remains.” Although POW/MIA (prisoners of war/missing-in-action) remains recovery would appear to be an easy humanitarian confidence building step completely unrelated to American denuclearization demands, working-level communication regarding the handover has become an example of the depth of distrust between the two sides. North Korea’s foreign ministry statement makes clear that from their perspective, the missing piece is a Trump administration declaration of the end of war, deliverable by this Friday. This step would undoubtedly facilitate the return of POW/MIAs, and it is a step that the Moon Jae-in administration has eagerly supported, including through the Panmunjom Declaration, which envisaged an aspirational statement of the end of war by the end of the year. In fact, South Korea’s unification minister, Cho Myoung-gyon, stated at a South Korean National Assembly policy briefing: “I think we can declare the end to the war . . . before the North achieves complete denuclearization.” Cho specifically stated that such a declaration could be possible “if the North takes sincere measures” toward denuclearization, including North Korea’s dismantlement of nuclear and missile testing sites at Punggye-ri and Sohae. According to the North Korean road map, the next step would involve a Trump administration declaration of intent to replace the armistice with a permanent peace, likely accompanied by the return of some POW/MIAs via Panmunjom. Beyond these steps, the looming question over the North Korean model is not just whether the decades-long distrust of the United States by the North Korean leadership can be overcome, but also whether North Korea can build a track record of accomplishment necessary to overcome American distrust fueled by North Korea’s record of broken promises and commitments. According to Pompeo, the North Koreans recognize that the key to bridging that distrust is the achievement of a “final, fully-verified denuclearization.” But it does not mean that the North Koreans are committed to achieving that objective. Thus far, the North Korean model seems to envision a one-sided verification process in which North Korea performs on the honor system while the United States makes tangible concessions in an effort to overcome North Korea’s mistrust. But American mistrust will not dissipate just because Trump declares his trust in Kim. Rather, both sides must embark on a sustained effort to defuse tensions by building a tangible joint record of accomplishment necessary to make both the end of war and North Korea’s denuclearization a reality, not simply a declaration. In this respect, the biggest challenge to building trust on the American side will be long-term consistency beyond a single administration, while the biggest challenge to confidence building on the North Korean side will be reciprocity (i.e., offering of tangible and irreversible quid pro quos rather than pocketing concessions or breaking agreements.

The following is a guest post by David Gevarter, an intern for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, observers feared how President Donald J. Trump’s populist, illiberal tendencies could damage the transatlantic security relationship. These concerns proved true in many regards, but it would be wrong to assume that only U.S. populism could cause upheaval in the alliance. European politics matter too, especially in the areas that are most crucial to the Pentagon, like nuclear weapons. As part of NATO’s shared nuclear deterrent, the United States currently deploys the B61 gravity bomb in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. While nuclear weapons are not popular among the European public, technocrats in European governments have recognized that the NATO nuclear deterrent is an unpleasant but strategic imperative. However, the rise of populist and nationalist movements across Europe could damage this consensus and threaten the integrity of NATO’s nuclear mission. The Trump administration believes that the United States must deploy more tactical (non-strategic) weapons in Europe through NATO to signal to Russia that any use of tactical weapons would be met by an equivalent response. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review claims that Russia is more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons in a first strike to gain advantage because it believes the United States would not escalate with a strategic nuclear strike. As such, the Trump administration has placed great importance on expanding the United States’ arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons—such as the B61—as a way of countering the perceived Russian advantage in this field. Yet, this strategy could encounter serious obstacles as populist governments gain a foothold on the continent, exacerbated by growing anti-American sentiment. As the wave of populist governments gains popularity in Europe, instead of upholding long-standing NATO commitments, these governments might cave to the will of the masses. They could order the withdrawal of NATO—namely, U.S.—nuclear weapons from their territory, disregarding strategic necessity. The surge of populism in Germany, the backbone of the European project, can do the most damage to the shared nuclear deterrent. The current German government has thus far maintained the nuclear status quo despite opposition, but Angela Merkel’s hold on power is not what it used to be. Recent figures show that 71 percent of Germans favor banning nuclear weapons, and a change in Germany’s executive government could put NATO interests at risk. In the 2017 federal election, Merkel’s political alliance lost a significant percentage of its seats in the Bundestag, most notably to the populist, right-wing party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). In its platform, AfD explicitly calls for the withdrawal of all NATO troops and nuclear weapons from German territory. With the near collapse of the current German government over immigration, the possibility of a rise to power by AfD or a party with similar views is no longer far-fetched. Like in Germany, the specter of populism has become very real in Italy, with the anti-establishment coalition formed by the League and 5-Star parties taking power. This could spell trouble for the NATO shared deterrent, given the broad unpopularity of nuclear weapons in the country. Accordng to a 2007 survey, 70 percent of Italian respondents indicated that the use of NATO nuclear weapons would never be justified, even in the context of war. Over half of respondents indicated that they believed NATO nuclear-sharing agreements violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that Italy should not be party to such agreements. Maintaining and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Italy will require significant cooperation from the Italian government, but Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte's government has shown little intention to acquiesce to President Trump's demands for NATO, such as increasing defense spending. It appears that the new, pro-Russia government in Italy is willing to do whatever it takes to appeal to public opinion, irrespective of the ramifications. Russia has always wanted the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and such a move could be part of an Italian strategy of warming relations with the Kremlin. The 2016 attempted military coup showed that Turkey is the most unstable NATO country, where the future of nuclear sharing is, at best, unsure. Since the attempted coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populist government has further undermined Turkey’s relationship with the United States, NATO, and other Western countries as the country secures diplomatic and military rapprochement with Moscow. Erdogan has leveraged populist rhetoric to consolidate power, galvanizing support for his agenda and eroding checks and balances on his rule. Erdogan himself is no fan of nuclear weapons, and it is easy to imagine a scenario in which, as part of a pivot toward Moscow, Erdogan orders NATO nuclear weapons out of Turkey. Even if that is not the case, many experts argue that the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey, given the deteriorating political climate in the country. This, given the country’s proximity to Russia and other areas of interest in the Middle East, could jeopardize NATO’s ability to hold enemy targets at risk with its nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty throughout NATO countries prompts questions regarding the future of the shared nuclear deterrent. If U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkey or elsewhere in Europe, where else could they go? Some have suggested Poland, given the country’s desire for an increased NATO presence, but this unprecedented expansion of the nuclear deterrent to Eastern Europe could—and likely would—spark a dramatic showdown with Russia, turning the Polish border with Kaliningrad into a hot zone. The worsening wave of populism in Europe could give impetus to European popular opposition to nuclear weapons, forcing their withdrawal from the continent. If the Pentagon truly wants to adhere to its designs to expand its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as part of the NATO shared nuclear deterrent, it needs to start coming up with contingency plans. At the very least, President Trump should stop antagonizing NATO allies and try to preserve what little good will remains toward the U.S. agenda.

Nearly all nuclear weapon states, as a matter of policy, remain ready to use their weapons without having first suffered a nuclear attack.

President Trump prides himself on being a "dealmaker." In one of his biggest deals yet, he brokered a joint statement between the United States and North Korea. To what extent did he use his eleven-step method from The Art of the Deal?

The Singapore summit lessened the chances of conflict in the short term, but the ultimate legacy of the summit could still be a march toward war.

Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong Un changed the trajectory of the U.S.-North Korea relationship from confrontation toward cooperation and provided dramatic images of reconciliation with their well-hyped June 12, 2018 summit meeting in Singapore. This meeting has bought time to address North Korea’s nuclear threat and reduced the risk of near-term military conflict. But the four points of the joint statement signed by the two leaders underscored the magnitude and difficulty of the work remaining to be done. The document signed by the two leaders for the first time envisioned a normal relationship between the United States and North Korea and reiterated Kim Jong Un’s commitment first made to South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the April 27, 2018 inter-Korean Panmunjom declaration to “complete denuclearization,” and pledged to renew joint work toward prisoners of war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) recovery of remains from the Korean War. It also authorized a process of follow-on negotiations to be led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and a North Korean counterpart. By normalizing Kim Jong Un as an actor on the world stage, by pledging efforts to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations,” and by pledging to curtail U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, Trump has moved dramatically in the direction of meeting longstanding North Korean demands to end the “hostile relationship” between Washington and Pyongyang and offering security guarantees as a requirement for denuclearization. But Kim Jong Un does not appear to have reciprocated U.S. concessions. This is concerning given North Korea’s track record of pocketing concessions rather than delivering quid pro quos. North Korea reiterated an aspiration to achieve “complete denuclearization” and pledged to destroy a missile engine test site, but the timeline and scope of such a process are not clear. In this respect, the United States appears to have given more than expected, while there are no concrete North Korean actions envisioned that might validate Kim Jong Un’s seriousness of purpose to denuclearize. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un is being normalized on the international stage despite North Korea’s status as an illegal nuclear weapons state. The joint statement did not directly address North Korea’s missile development, chemical and biological weapons programs, or human rights situation, underscoring the limited time and progress made during technical negotiations. Likewise, U.S. and UN sanctions will stay in place pending tangible progress toward complete denuclearization, although no additional U.S. sanctions will be added. But the symbolism of the meeting ensures that the maximum pressure campaign has peaked and that, in practice, China and South Korea will push for relaxation of economic pressure on North Korea. Nor did the U.S.-North Korea joint statement provide any sense of linkage to the processes between peace and denuclearization or to inter-Korean commitments outlined in the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom declaration. All these issues must go onto the agenda of the Pompeo-led process to come, but the likelihood of rapid progress is not high given the apparent vagueness of the commitments contained in the joint statement between the two leaders. Despite the drama and historic nature of the meeting, the outcome did not live up to the hype. As a result, Trump faces a huge challenge in selling a turn in U.S.-North Korea relations as an historic accomplishment. The best way to do that will be for Pompeo and his team to roll up their sleeves and get back to work, together with our allies, to make a real peace on the Korean peninsula.

The agreement between President Trump and Kim Jong Un may be the start of denuclearization, or another failed effort brought down by North Korean cheating. But if the United States and North Korea are to have a new relationship, it must include the human rights dimension. There’s no reason to rehearse here in detail the astonishing nature of the regime’s tyranny. The size and vicious nature of its prison camp system, the punishment of family members for what the regime appears to believe is a blood taint, the number of deaths, the murder of Otto Warmbier—all are well known. It is the most brutal regime on Earth.  The first point to make is that raising human rights issues will not destroy the effort to change North Korea’s nuclear conduct. President George W. Bush raised freedom of religion repeatedly with Chinese leaders and that did not prevent a working relationship. President Reagan put human rights issues at the center of his relations with the Soviets, and that did not prevent remarkable progress in the relationship. As George Shultz wrote in his memoir Turmoil and Triumph,  Ronald Reagan and I both gave pride of place to human rights. He took up the subject at each of his meetings with Gorbachev and with most visitors from the Soviet Union to the Oval Office.  I pounded on the subject at every opportunity....” Indeed he did, making it the first subject at meetings rather than a throwaway in the final minutes. Yet relations with the Soviets prospered. The second point to make is that the only possible guarantee that a nuclear deal with North Korea will last over the years is some change in that society. As long as there is brutal one-man rule, the only thing needed to destroy any progress that has been made is a whim by that man. If and when there are others with influence—some day, one can dream, a journalist or legislator or mayor or clergyman—there can be something called “public opinion.” It exists even in dictatorships. Shultz described Reagan’s approach to the Soviets this way: “I’m not playing games. I’m not trying to push you into a corner publicly. I understand politicians even in your circumstances have to worry about how they look and don’t want to be pushed around in public.” So pressing for change in North Korea is not utopian and foolish idealism. Shultz noted that he and Reagan “increasingly emphasi[zed] to the Soviets the advantages to them, in the emerging knowledge and information age, of changing the way they dealt with their own people.” That is the kind of argument worth making, and to some extent the Trump administration has been making it to North Korea.  The third point is that how we act toward North Korea must reflect who we are as Americans, even if the impact over there is slight. That regime killed an American named Otto Warmbier, and not in the distant and murky past: next week is the first anniversary of his death. The Trump administration must recognize that among our nation’s greatest assets is our association with the cause of liberty. Working for the peaceful expansion of the frontiers of liberty is not a sucker’s game, or a disadvantage or liability, or a waste of resources. It is in very concrete ways one of the greatest advantages of the United States in world politics. It is ultimately what ties allies like Australia, South Korea, and Japan to us: the knowledge that what we seek for them is what we seek for ourselves—peace, security, and liberty.   The alternative is to leave those allies, and others, with the sense that our relations with North Korea exclude them and their interests, which we have forgotten. That is what happened in the Obama administration's nuclear agreement with Iran: close allies situated near Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, came to believe their own interests were simply being forgotten. We saw in 2009 that the Obama administration viewed protests in Iran askance, not as the people's call for freedom but as an inconvenience to negotiations with the regime. Japan and other allies in Asia have critical security interests at stake in our relations with North Korea, and we should always give maintaining close and longstanding alliances pride of place as we undertake to open new relationships with hostile powers.  This is not to say that the President should return to Washington and suddenly blast human rights abuses in North Korea. That should be a steady, constant theme in American diplomacy, never abandoned and never diminished. When we did the nuclear deal with Libya in 2003, we did not take Qadhafi’s weapons and then turn around and commence a human rights onslaught meant to weaken or to bring down his regime. I believe we bit our tongues and actually said less than we should, but one can understand why: we were starting a relationship with Libya that we thought would lead in the medium run to a political opening there as the economy and society changed and pariah status was replaced by international engagement. But the goals and the American standards of conduct must be clear and our disgust at the Kim regime’s treatment of its people should always be equally clear. As in the Soviet case, that will not destroy our bilateral relationship; instead it will push the regime toward change and in any event will remind the regime who we are and what we believe. To put it another way, a nuclear agreement with North Korea is not a single transaction--or if it is, it will fail. It must be the start of an effort to change relations between our two countries, and to change the relationship between the regime in North Korea and both the international system and its own people. In that effort, a constant assertion of our belief in human rights is essential to success and to our own self-respect.     

With less than one week to go before the first-ever encounter between an American president and a North Korean leader, there is all manner of speculation about whether the historic Trump-Kim summit can deliver even more meaningful firsts: Voluntary abandonment of nuclear knowhow by a relatively weak and vulnerable state, despite decades of efforts cultivating such a capability, and the melting of "the last glacier" of the cold war — that is, the frozen Korean conflict. The opening positions of both the United States and North Korea are long-standing, well-known, and seemingly non-convergent. The US must hold to its demand for comprehensive denuclearization of North Korea to uphold the validity of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), deny North Korea the ability to use the nuclear threat to intimidate South Korean and Japanese allies, and eliminate risks of nuclear proliferation to other bad actors. North Korea seeks a deterrent against more powerful adversaries to guarantee its regime survival and to establish mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States — unless the United States abandons its "hostile policy" toward North Korea and engages in mutual nuclear arms reductions — as well as to improve its strategic position and standing as a normal and "responsible nuclear state." But because the realization of a US-North Korea meeting has been so unexpected, unprecedented, and personalized, it will provide a unique opportunity for both sides to test their assumptions about the intentions and motivations of the other. Answers to the following questions can help to assess the likelihood of success or failure of the Trump-Kim summit: 1. Can North Korea accept and reciprocate Trump's gesture of reconciliation? North Korea has a reputation for pocketing rather than reciprocating unilateral concessions. By giving Kim the respect that comes with interaction on an "equal footing," Trump has front-loaded symbolic expressions of his intent to improve relations, end the Korean war, and reduce military tensions on the peninsula — presumably in return for North Korea to indicate their intent to denuclearize. Will Kim Jong Un reciprocate, and if so, how? 2. Will Kim Jong Un finally choose between nukes and economic development? As part of his consolidation of power, Kim Jong Un established a policy of simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development. Subsequently, North Korea announced a series of domestic special economic zones, while also ramping up missile testing to over twenty tests per year in 2016 and 2017. As of April of 2018, the country's party line has been amended to focus primarily on economic development on the rationale that North Korea has achieved its nuclear goals. But without additional North Korean cooperation and involvement in implementing a denuclearization process, it's too soon to say that the country has abandoned nuclear efforts. 3. Will Trump end up tacitly accepting a nuclear North Korea? A delicate aspect of the Trump-Kim summit is that the United States is meeting with a de facto nuclear state that desires détente without denuclearization, while the US wants détente in exchange for denuclearization. There is a risk that leaning too heavily into an attempt to end the Korean war and replace it with a permanent peace might change the relationship without addressing the underlying risk that accompanies a nuclear North Korea. Without defining, in detail, a mutual "action for action" process, the United States could change the window dressing around the threat — without getting at the root of the threat itself. 4. Will Trump offer or accept a reduced US commitment to the defense of South Korea? Bringing the Korean War to an end could call into question the purpose and level of American forces needed on the Korean peninsula to meet its security commitments to South Korea. Trump has already indicated that he expects allies not to be free-riders when it comes to footing security bills. As reiterated by Defense Secretary Mattis at the Shangri-la Dialogue, this is ultimately an alliance issue the United States and the Republic of Korea should manage separately from negotiations with North Korea. At the same time, though, reduced tensions will justify tangible force withdrawals if the inter-Korean border is truly to become demilitarized. As part of this process, it would be reasonable to negotiate with Seoul — not Pyongyang. 5. What role should China play in facilitating peace and denuclearization? Since Kim Jong Un's New Year's speech, which marked North Korea's turn toward diplomacy, China has more often than not stood on the outside, looking in. Xi Jinping is a partner of Trump's in sanctions implementation, but China's role in peacebuilding has not yet been clearly defined, and it is making Beijing nervous. The Korean conflict is multi-sided, with peninsular, global (nuclear), and regional dimensions, and all sides must move in tandem if a real resolution is to be achieved. 6. What will happen if the summit fails? Some analysts suggest that, rather than lead to a US-North Korea confrontation, a failed summit will result in renewed diplomatic efforts by South Korea — and possibly others — to restore stability and maintain North Korean restraint, so as to avoid the prospect of renewed escalation of military conflict. Less than two days after Trump initially cancelled his plans to meet with Kim Jong Un, the second inter-Korean summit was held on May 26, which shows the two Korean leaders are able act together, and limit the prospects of the US considering preventive military action. In the event of a Trump-Kim summit failure, the result may be to enhance North Korean dependency on Seoul and Beijing as safety valves against the prospect of renewal of US-North Korea confrontation. This circumstance in and of itself provides a new buffer against the prospect of military escalation in Korea that was not present at the end of 2017. This post originally appeared on Business Insider.

By Hunter Marston Many analysts have noted the advantages Singapore provides as a setting for the upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. As Joshua Kurlantzick recently wrote on this blog, “Choosing Singapore reduces the expectations (slightly) of the summit, making it a (slightly) more low-key affair than if the two leaders had met in the DMZ or North Korea where the summit would have been even more dramatic.” The Singapore location, in this argument, may allow the two leaders more time to hammer out some kind of deal, while Singapore’s skillful diplomatic corps and experience with summit could help prevent any gaffes and possibly bridge any divides. But the location of the summit alone will not significantly impact the outcome of this high-stakes meeting; the choice of Singapore may not even have the modest impact on the summit that Kurlantzick predicts. Indeed, optics given Singapore’s neutral diplomatic position (it maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and has close ties with the United States) are unlikely to dictate the summit’s end result. In fact, rather than lowering expectations for the summit, if anything the location significantly elevates North Korea’s prestige by providing an opportunity for the two leaders to meet on an equal footing. Moreover, Singapore’s openness to international media means that coverage of the event will be far more intensive than if the event had been held at the DMZ or in North Korea, where Kim’s regime would have some control of the optics, along with South Korea. From a logistical point of view, Singapore indeed presents an ideal place to hold such a weighty meeting between two bitter adversaries. In 2015, Singapore successfully hosted the historic meeting between former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese president Xi Jinping, the first such face-to-face between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders. The city state has a wealth of experience in organizing high-profile conferences bringing together heads of state. The well-known annual Shangri-La Dialogue, which just wrapped up this past Sunday, this year featured a keynote address by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as well as notable speeches by U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. Yet Singapore’s eminent status as an economic and diplomatic hub—enhanced by the rush of international journalists filling the country’s hotels—ups the ante for both sides and shifts the world’s attention onto city-state. Expectations are at a fever pitch this week, as U.S. foreign policy analysts have weighed in with a litany of op-eds outlining the prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough – or failure leading to war. As Bruce Jones of the Brookings Institution warns, “The risks of war are higher now than before the drive to the summit.” As Rosa Brooks of Georgetown Law School points out, by denigrating the efforts of past presidential administrations, Trump has significantly raised expectations that he will secure a better deal and in so doing has reduced the likelihood of an agreement that favors the United States. Moreover, the divide in perceptions between Washington and Pyongyang remains acute: each side insists on its own understanding of what a satisfactory outcome for a summit would look like. The White House has doubled down on its definition of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” But the North has so far refrained from embracing this point. As such, when the two leaders show up to the negotiating table this week, there are no guardrails for the road ahead. As policy analysts have noted, lower-level meetings typically lay the groundwork for such a meeting to finalize certain details by way of a formal agreement. But without certain parameters for the leadership summit in place ahead of the discussion (not to mention the diligent policy work that must take place behind the scenes in a gutted State Department), Trump and Kim may find themselves with little guidance. If the event were to be held on the Korean Peninsula, it would entail certain tradeoffs. If it took place in Pyongyang, Trump would have to bestow Kim the honor of an unprecedented official visit (Bill Clinton had considered such a trip in 2000 but decided against it). If the event took place on the Demilitarized Zone (or DMZ), the focus would remain on the Koreas as host nations with the United States as a foreign interloper. As laid out above, Singapore presents unique advantages for the meeting: world-class security and intelligence personnel, quality infrastructure and luxury hotels, and above all a neutral political atmosphere. Nevertheless, instead of reducing expectations or lowering the potential for drama, Singapore’s attractiveness as a venue for such a high-stakes meeting only elevates the nature of the summit and intensifies the pressure cooker for high-wire diplomacy. Yet few are more adept at controlling the media spotlight than President Trump. That fact may grant some reassurance of the United States’ advantage. But anything could happen with this unprecedented meeting between two of the most unpredictable personalities in world politics. Hunter Marston (@hmarston4) is an independent Southeast Asia analyst in Washington, DC. He co-authored a chapter on Singapore in a forthcoming volume, Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).