NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

President Trump’s approach to summits is fueling, rather than mitigating, global instability.

The following is a guest post by David Gevarter, an intern for European studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Before the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, observers feared how President Donald J. Trump’s populist, illiberal tendencies could damage the transatlantic security relationship. These concerns proved true in many regards, but it would be wrong to assume that only U.S. populism could cause upheaval in the alliance. European politics matter too, especially in the areas that are most crucial to the Pentagon, like nuclear weapons. As part of NATO’s shared nuclear deterrent, the United States currently deploys the B61 gravity bomb in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. While nuclear weapons are not popular among the European public, technocrats in European governments have recognized that the NATO nuclear deterrent is an unpleasant but strategic imperative. However, the rise of populist and nationalist movements across Europe could damage this consensus and threaten the integrity of NATO’s nuclear mission. The Trump administration believes that the United States must deploy more tactical (non-strategic) weapons in Europe through NATO to signal to Russia that any use of tactical weapons would be met by an equivalent response. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review claims that Russia is more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons in a first strike to gain advantage because it believes the United States would not escalate with a strategic nuclear strike. As such, the Trump administration has placed great importance on expanding the United States’ arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons—such as the B61—as a way of countering the perceived Russian advantage in this field. Yet, this strategy could encounter serious obstacles as populist governments gain a foothold on the continent, exacerbated by growing anti-American sentiment. As the wave of populist governments gains popularity in Europe, instead of upholding long-standing NATO commitments, these governments might cave to the will of the masses. They could order the withdrawal of NATO—namely, U.S.—nuclear weapons from their territory, disregarding strategic necessity. The surge of populism in Germany, the backbone of the European project, can do the most damage to the shared nuclear deterrent. The current German government has thus far maintained the nuclear status quo despite opposition, but Angela Merkel’s hold on power is not what it used to be. Recent figures show that 71 percent of Germans favor banning nuclear weapons, and a change in Germany’s executive government could put NATO interests at risk. In the 2017 federal election, Merkel’s political alliance lost a significant percentage of its seats in the Bundestag, most notably to the populist, right-wing party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). In its platform, AfD explicitly calls for the withdrawal of all NATO troops and nuclear weapons from German territory. With the near collapse of the current German government over immigration, the possibility of a rise to power by AfD or a party with similar views is no longer far-fetched. Like in Germany, the specter of populism has become very real in Italy, with the anti-establishment coalition formed by the League and 5-Star parties taking power. This could spell trouble for the NATO shared deterrent, given the broad unpopularity of nuclear weapons in the country. Accordng to a 2007 survey, 70 percent of Italian respondents indicated that the use of NATO nuclear weapons would never be justified, even in the context of war. Over half of respondents indicated that they believed NATO nuclear-sharing agreements violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and that Italy should not be party to such agreements. Maintaining and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal in Italy will require significant cooperation from the Italian government, but Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte's government has shown little intention to acquiesce to President Trump's demands for NATO, such as increasing defense spending. It appears that the new, pro-Russia government in Italy is willing to do whatever it takes to appeal to public opinion, irrespective of the ramifications. Russia has always wanted the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and such a move could be part of an Italian strategy of warming relations with the Kremlin. The 2016 attempted military coup showed that Turkey is the most unstable NATO country, where the future of nuclear sharing is, at best, unsure. Since the attempted coup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populist government has further undermined Turkey’s relationship with the United States, NATO, and other Western countries as the country secures diplomatic and military rapprochement with Moscow. Erdogan has leveraged populist rhetoric to consolidate power, galvanizing support for his agenda and eroding checks and balances on his rule. Erdogan himself is no fan of nuclear weapons, and it is easy to imagine a scenario in which, as part of a pivot toward Moscow, Erdogan orders NATO nuclear weapons out of Turkey. Even if that is not the case, many experts argue that the United States should withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey, given the deteriorating political climate in the country. This, given the country’s proximity to Russia and other areas of interest in the Middle East, could jeopardize NATO’s ability to hold enemy targets at risk with its nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty throughout NATO countries prompts questions regarding the future of the shared nuclear deterrent. If U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkey or elsewhere in Europe, where else could they go? Some have suggested Poland, given the country’s desire for an increased NATO presence, but this unprecedented expansion of the nuclear deterrent to Eastern Europe could—and likely would—spark a dramatic showdown with Russia, turning the Polish border with Kaliningrad into a hot zone. The worsening wave of populism in Europe could give impetus to European popular opposition to nuclear weapons, forcing their withdrawal from the continent. If the Pentagon truly wants to adhere to its designs to expand its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as part of the NATO shared nuclear deterrent, it needs to start coming up with contingency plans. At the very least, President Trump should stop antagonizing NATO allies and try to preserve what little good will remains toward the U.S. agenda.

The totality of President Donald Trump’s statements and actions against NATO makes clear that the United States cannot be relied on to come to the defense of its European allies.

U.S. President Donald J. Trump dominated last week’s NATO summit, with his criticism of the alliance's defense spending and questioning its relevance. It is no wonder that few payed attention to the cybersecurity issues that were raised in Brussels.

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The following is a guest post from Christopher M. Vassallo, an intern at Foreign Affairs at the Council on Foreign Relations. If you want to know how this week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit will likely play out, look no further than June’s European Union (EU) summit. The events of the earlier summit will still be fresh in the minds of European heads of state when President Donald J. Trump arrives in Brussels this week. Trump will likely assume the role of the skeptical populist, intent on dominating the agenda of an alliance he once dismissed as “obsolete.” To German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, the EU’s liberal stalwarts who profess that Europe is stronger together, this spectacle will seem like déjà vu. Two weeks ago, at the EU summit a mere twelve minutes down the road, five Euroskeptic heads of state—the leaders of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and Romania—derailed constructive policymaking by haggling over language. Among other tactics, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban insisted on dubbing migration an “invasion,” and Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte threatened to veto the entire slate of conclusions unless they included concrete plans to reduce refugee numbers. Trump shares the views of these two hardliners and has been working behind the scenes to support them. In April, he congratulated Orban, a fellow anti-migration crusader with whom presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama frequently tussled, after his electoral victory. He also promised a White House visit to Conte, who backed Trump’s plan to reinstate Russia to the Group of Eight (G8). Trump might also find common ground with the leaders of Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic, who comprise the rest of NATO’s anti-migration wing. For the Euroskeptics, the EU summit provided a welcome showdown between their energized forces—adherents of a populist, nationalist platform, hostile to migration and centralized European authority—and the EU’s traditionally dominant liberal core, led by Western European nations like France, Germany, and Belgium. Trump is familiar with this conflict, which is manifest throughout U.S. politics. His presence along with the Euroskeptic leaders will reveal a similar rift within NATO. While the EU summit was convened to address a host of issues—including Brexit, American tariffs, and EU expansion in the Balkans—migration monopolized discussions. Even though the flow of migrants into the EU has fallen 95 percent from its 2015 peak, division over the issue in recent weeks nearly toppled Angela Merkel’s chancellorship in Germany and helped forge an unnatural governing alliance between Italy’s radical left and right. During the EU summit, dissension between nationalists and liberals forced an all-night session that produced only a non-binding set of conclusions on migration. The EU summit made it clear that the union is a fragile entity, vulnerable to surging populism. The union is premised not on shared nationality, language, or religion, but instead bound together by a more nebulous faith in the common market, open borders, and the supremacy of democratic institutions. By agreeing to restrict open borders within the EU, Merkel and Macron indicated that a premise of the union was subject to negotiation. Like the EU gathering, this week’s NATO summit presents another occasion to discuss shared values—and for populist leaders to force similar compromises on long-established principles. It is possible, of course, that Trump will reaffirm Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which he conspicuously omitted from last year’s speech. He could also reassure allies ahead of his one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, by declaring that neither the U.S. troop presence in Poland nor NATO war games in the east are up for negotiation. But he will almost certainly pass on this opportunity. Instead, Trump will likely antagonize his already battle-weary audience. He will lecture Europeans on defense spending, repeating his recent letters to each NATO nation not yet spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. He will likely touch on tariffs, repeating his particular disgust for German luxury car imports, as he did at last month’s Group of Seven (G7) summit. What is certain is that Trump, like his Italian and Hungarian counterparts, will sit down with NATO’s weakened liberal core, which has suddenly shown a willingness to compromise on principles that were once off limits. They are increasingly negotiating by his rules, on his terms. Trump is unlikely to repeat his G7 performance, in which he stormed off, revoked support for the group’s conclusions, and condemned one leader to “a special place in hell.” Why should he, when several NATO allies share his outlook? What the summit will reveal is the degree to which Trump has transformed the alliance, by simultaneously cultivating illiberal European backers and exploiting the liberal leaders’ willingness to compromise. What is less clear is whether Trump will offer any positive vision for NATO, one that clarifies the alliance’s enduring purpose in the twenty-first century. To the deal-obsessed U.S. president, it might seem heretical to speak to NATO allies about values, rather than simply make demands. But as the imminent Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation has receded, replaced by a more diffuse threat environment, the foundations of the NATO alliance (like the EU) are fragile, resting on the more vague principle of cooperative self-defense. To survive, NATO requires steady affirmation of why it exists in the first place. If Trump refuses to invoke shared values, only then will NATO truly be obsolete.

Trump's antipathy toward the EU overlooks America’s enduring interest in a united Europe that can serve as one pillar of an open, rule-bound international system.

President Trump goes to Europe this week. Its leaders are bracing for the impact.

If the President wants to use an arms build-up to advance arms control, he should take his cues from the Reagan record.

The expulsion of Russian diplomats by more than twenty governments is a remarkable show of unity and a deepening of Moscow’s rift with the West.

A recent article in Foreign Policy argued that NATO's new Cyber Operations Center signaled the alliance was becoming more aggressive in cyberspace. Is that really the signal NATO was trying to send?

Coauthored with Alex Davidson, intern in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. The rise of Donald J. Trump to Commander in Chief has unsettled the foundations of transatlantic security, casting doubts on the credibility of U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). President Trump has repeatedly criticized NATO member states for their chronic underfunding of the alliance, and even presented the possibility of U.S. withdrawal, only to belatedly pledge to defend Western civilization and endorse NATO Article 5. Trump’s indecision was evident at this year’s NATO and G7 meetings, where he was also at odds with his European counterparts on issues ranging from trade to climate change. European leaders remain unnerved, wondering whether the United States will end or reduce its security commitments. This uncertainty is damaging to the alliance, which relies above all on trust among its members. At stake is the cohesion and effectiveness of NATO, and the security of both Europe and United States. NATO’s strength is its unity. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all members to come to the aid of the others if one or more is attacked, is the core of the collective defense arrangement and a deterrent against external aggression. Trump’s noncommittal attitude toward NATO member states—particularly his relative reticence on Article 5—comes at a dangerous time. Russia presents the most immediate challenge. Putin, seeking to weaken the alliance and expand his country’s regional influence, could well expand Russia’s information operations, as alleged in the U.S. election and Montenegro. Or it could adopt even more provocative measures, covertly fomenting instability within the Baltic States, using similar tactics as in Ukraine in 2014. Ambiguity about U.S. intentions and the scope of U.S. commitments could risk a repeat of the disastrous U.S. policy just before the beginning of the Korean War, when vague American signals contributed to Chinese and North Korean miscalculation. Either scenario would endanger European security and place the United States in a precarious situation where both action and inaction could yield dire consequences. The United States might be drawn into violent conflict, either directly or by proxy, with a nuclear-armed adversary. Alternatively, failure to respond would leave Russia emboldened to expand its influence in Eastern Europe. To avoid this scenario, President Trump must remove any doubt surrounding the U.S. commitment to NATO—and to Europe whole and free. If President Trump cannot be trusted to honor commitments that have been in place for nearly seventy years, the credibility of his already suspect foreign policy will evaporate. It will demonstrate that “America First” means America alone, just as his repudiation of the Paris Climate Accords hinted. Unless the president reverses course, Europe could have no choice but to assume entire responsibility for its own security. Germany and France, which together contribute over 25 percent of NATO’s budget, would almost certainly form the backbone of any new arrangement. Already, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated that Europe cannot count on the United States—and that Germany will work with France to maintain European security. Clearing the way for intra-European security cooperation, a German court ruled last month that Germany could legally fund British and French nuclear programs in exchange for their protection. Indeed, it ruled that nuclear weapons from either country could be placed on German soil. There is something to be said, of course, for Europeans standing on their own feet. But it is unclear that European powers are capable, in the short or medium term, of meeting the enormous security gap left by a potential U.S. withdrawal. France and Germany, as well as the United Kingdom, would likely be called upon to fill the vacuum. Given their already substantial contributions, it is unlikely they would be capable of replacing the loss of the U.S. military capabilities, including both personnel and weaponry currently stationed in Europe. The Europeans would also need to consider their nuclear posture, given the potential removal of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on the continent—or even the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which has played an invaluable role in deterring would-be aggressors. Readjusting the balance of power, privilege, and responsibility within NATO will be an arduous exercise. Since its inception, NATO has been led by Supreme Allied Commander—always an American. If the United States reduces its NATO profile, that will change. The “America First” era also complicates NATO’s strategic doctrine, as growing U.S. retrenchment naturally leads threat perceptions to diverge between the United States and its European allies—and among the twenty-seven European members of NATO. Already, the plurality of threats facing the transatlantic world is complicating agreement on how to allocate and focus the alliance’s scarce resources. Europe finds itself contending with Russia’s growing assertiveness, growing cyber-threats, large-scale refugees flows, and an explosion of terrorism, much of it home-grown. The task of bolstering European security is further complicated by ongoing Brexit negotiations, as the United Kingdom looks to distance itself from the continent. Maintaining the United Kingdom as a partner in European security is imperative, since it boasts one of Europe’s largest militaries and possesses one of its two nuclear arsenals.  Given these realities, Europe urgently needs the United States to reaffirm its NATO obligations, even as European states must begin to wean themselves off of unhealthy dependence on the United States. Given the turmoil that has engulfed Europe in recent years, the last thing the continent needs is ambiguity about Washington’s commitment to NATO. President Trump’s unnerving assaults on the alliance has thrown its credibility into doubt and risks poisoning the long-standing, friendly relations the United States has long enjoyed with its most important allies.