Yemen

Six months ago today, the White House announced U.S. support for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen via press release: “President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations.” As is true for all interventions, U.S. officials offered a buffet of justifications and objectives for backing the GCC side in Yemen’s chaotic civil war. In an earlier piece, I counted seven. Unsurprisingly, these are no longer mentioned by officials. Rather, they call upon all parties in the conflict to halt their fighting, failing to mention that the United States military is one of the parties by providing material support, without which the GCC would not be able sustain airstrikes over Yemen for any period of time. When pushed by reporters about U.S. responsibilities, they reply “we continue to discuss with Saudi authorities….We’re in constant and close communication with them,” or simply deflect, “I would refer you to the Saudis.” First and foremost, understand that the United States undertook this obligation without any comprehension of what the Saudi-led coalition was attempting to accomplish. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said in March, “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.” He added that he was simply contacted by the Saudi chief of defense a few hours before operations began. So much for taking the time to think through the consequences of the U.S. political and military commitment. Nevertheless, since March 25, the United States has been providing in-air refueling, combat-search-and-rescue support (including the rescue of two Saudi pilots whose helicopter crashed in the Gulf of Aden), detailing forty-five intelligence analysts to help advise on target selection, and redoubling weapons exports and contractor support to the GCC countries. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States is primarily as a source of cash for weapons. Since October 2010 alone, the Obama administration has agreed to sell $90.4 billion in weapons to the Gulf kingdom, according to the Congressional Research Service. That President Obama would so enthusiastically endorse arming such a brutal authoritarian government is unsurprising, since the United States is by far the leading arms dealer (with 47 percent of the world total) to what an annual State Department report classifies as the world’s “least democratically governed states”—those in the lowest quintile based upon Freedom House’s “political rights” ranking and the World Bank’s “voice and accountability” score. Thus, the flow of weapons and contractor support sustaining the GCC intervention has not merely continued, but the Pentagon has actually sped-up preexisting orders to assure there are sufficient bombs to drop on Yemen. Two weeks into the U.S. involvement, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken proclaimed while in Riyadh that, "Saudi Arabia is sending a strong message to the Houthis and their allies….As part of that effort, we have expedited weapons deliveries, we have increased our intelligence sharing.” In total, the State Department has authorized $8.4 billion in foreign military sales to GCC countries since the start of the air war, $7.8 billion to the Saudis alone. Here is a list of major arms and logistical support sales to GCC countries since March 25: • On May 27, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control was awarded a $12,037,639 contract for post-production support services for the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor program. • On June 11, Boeing Co. was awarded a $41,146,387 contract for Apache helicopter post-production services and maintenance in Saudi Arabia. • On June 24, L-3 National Security Solutions was awarded a $95,000,000 contract for air operations center training to Royal Saudi Air Force personnel. • On July 24, Raytheon Co. was awarded a contract for 355 AGM-154 Block III C Unitary Joint Stand-Off Weapon missiles for Saudi Arabia, including associated supplies and services. • On July 13, Booz Allen & Hamilton was awarded a $12,386,000 contract for support services in the areas of training and education, engineering, technical, and management support services to the Saudi navy. • On July 29, the State Department approved the sale of $500M “for ammunition for the Royal Saudi Land Forces and associated equipment, parts and logistical support.” • On July 31, DynCorp International was awarded a $17,313,518 contract for maintenance support to the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command aviation program. • On September 24, Boeing Co. was awarded a $22,311,055 contract for 13 Harpoon lll-up round tactical missiles and seven Harpoon air launch missile containers to Saudi Arabia. Most disturbing has been the GCC’s use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, or cluster munitions, which are manufactured by the Textron Systems Corporation. Those were sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in recent years, and have been used in numerous attacks that killed civilians. Cluster munitions were banned in 2008 by the UN Convention on Cluster Munitions, though Saudi Arabia and the United States have not ratified the agreement. On August 20, State Department spokesperson Rear Admiral John Kirby stated that the administration had “discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions with the Saudis” and considered them “permissible” if they are “used appropriately and according with those end-use rules.” Unfortunately, civilians have disproportionately suffered in the air war. Of the 5,239 people killed or injured by explosive weapons between January and July, 86 percent were civilians. According to the UN, between the start of Saudi operations and June 30, a total of 971 civilians were killed by GCC coalition air strikes, accounting for more than 60 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths—clearly, U.S. weapons are not being “used appropriately.” Moreover, 1.5 million people have been displaced and over 90 percent of the remaining population is in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Earlier this month, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, conveyed what was an astonishing observation about U.S. support for, and detachment from, what was happening: With respect to Yemen, we have very deep concerns. We are able, because it’s the nature of our relationship, to again provide certain types of support to the efforts in Yemen, but also, I think, to be frank, when we believe that more care needs to be taken to avoid civilian casualties. And that will be an ongoing position that we take. And look, we have to hold all of ourselves to the highest possible standard when it relates to preventing civilian deaths, and that will continue to be a part of our dialogue as it relates to Yemen. What is disturbing about such comments is that the Obama administration is establishing a troubling precedent, whereby it has no obligations for military operations conducted by other countries for which the United States is playing an essential, enabling role. U.S. officials keep “calling on all sides” to end hostilities without recognizing that the United States itself is one of these sides. Though Congress and the media appropriately monitor and evaluate uses of force when conducted by U.S. armed forces, citizens should be equally concerned and vigilant about operations for which U.S. logistical, intelligence, and weapons support are instrumental, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and air refueling to the French forces in Mali, GPS-guidance kits to the Colombian government to help fight insurgents, and drone surveillance for Turkish fighter jets bombing northern Iraq. These types of military operations, with the United States providing a crucial supporting role to partner militaries, will become far more common into the future. One research side note: The Pentagon will not reveal how much this support for Saudi operations is costing American taxpayers. On June 30, I first sent a request to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, which directed me to submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to CENTCOM. A public affairs officer at CENTCOM then suggested redirecting the FOIA to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, which has not yet responded to the request. This is not classified information, and given that CENTCOM and the Department of Defense (DOD) consistently update the total cost operations for Operation Inherent Resolve, they should do the same for DOD support to GCC forces. Finally, the United States is not bound by a mutual defense treaty to defend Saudi Arabia. President Obama’s decision six months ago to provide apparently unlimited military support for the air war in Yemen was therefore a war of choice. The air war, which the Saudis bizarrely dubbed “Operation Renewal of Hope” on April 21—a disastrous word choice—is one for which Obama is personally responsible and could stop immediately by turning off America’s overwhelming, expedited, and vital direct support. Weapons sales are supposed to build a relationship between supplier and recipient, which is supposed to provide some leverage for the supplier over how the recipient uses those weapons. Either President Obama is fine with how U.S.-supplied weapons are being used in Yemen, he is refraining from using leverage to stop their use, or there is no leverage to speak of. In which case, all the United States has gained over the past six months is participating in and extending a civil war, which has been an enormous humanitarian disaster.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has emerged as one of the most dangerous al-Qaeda affiliates, strengthening amid political unrest in Yemen. 

Today marks the nine month anniversary since the start of the U.S.-led air campaign, later named Operation Inherent Resolve, against the self-declared Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. The air war, which Secretary of State John Kerry then described as definitively not a war, but rather “a heightened level of counterterrorism operation,” shows no sign of ending. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen. Lloyd Austin told the House Armed Services Committee in March, “The enemy is now in a ‘defensive crouch,’ and is unable to conduct major operations.” The Pentagon has released a series of maps that purportedly detail the loss of territory under control by IS. However, the number and competence of Iraqi and Kurdish ground forces required to ultimately defeat IS militants on the ground, and then control, secure, and administer newly freed territory, are lacking. In an unnoticed indicator found in the prepared testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, two U.S. Air Force lieutenant generals acknowledged: “These combat operations are expected to continue long-term (3+ years).”   U.S. officials have gone to great lengths to emphasize the contribution of coalition members in conducting airstrikes against IS, and, in September, even refused to expand the scope of its targets until those partners publicly committed their support.  It is no surprise, given its vastly larger and more proficient aerial capabilities, that the United States has been the primary source of all airstrikes against IS, even while the number of participating militaries has increased from nine to twelve since September. The table below breaks down coalition support for the 3,731 air strikes. One concern relayed to me from CENTCOM officials was that the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen would cause the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coalition members to redirect their combat sorties from bombing IS toward striking Houthi militants in Yemen. It appears that this concern has not yet become a reality. Between March 25, when the GCC intervention in Yemen began, and May 7, a total of 791 airstrikes were conducted in Iraq and Syria, 74 percent by the United States and 26 percent by coalition members, according to data provided to me by the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). This is a slightly increased contribution from non-U.S. coalition members. It is possible that the slight increase in coalition contributions since March 25 reflects Canada’s April 8 decision to expand its kinetic operations into Syria—becoming the only other country, besides the United States, to do so. As of May 5, Canada had conducted 564 sorties by CF-188 Hornet fighter-attack aircraft. However, the Canadian military does not disclose how many of those sorties resulted in the actual dropping of bombs, so the percentage of overall coalition airstrikes that it is responsible for cannot be attributed. Meanwhile, the U.S. military has documented that lots of people and things are being destroyed. For a military that often claims it does not do “body counts,” it has done so repeatedly. Most recently, General Austin declared in March that 8,500 IS militants had been killed. The Pentagon lists more than 6,000 IS targets as having been destroyed. Most notably, CENTCOM press releases indicate that more than 500 “excavators” have been destroyed—as if IS is the world’s first terrorist landscaping company. All of this destruction is coming at a direct cost to taxpayers of an estimated $2.11 billion, or $8.6 million per day. How this open-ended air war will shift when the United States begins providing close air support for trained Syrian rebels in a few months is unknowable.

Issandr El Amrani argues that a strong, stable Libya would not solve the migration problems in the Mediterranean. The editors at the Middle East Research and Information Project urge for a humanitarian corridor for foreign nationals and Yemenis to escape Yemen. Arash Reisinezhad discusses how recent advances in Tikrit are a victory for Iran.

Abubakr al-Shamahi’s blog post on the misuse of the terms “Sunni” and “Shia” in the context of Yemen remains as pertinent today as it was when he published it a year ago. Omar al-Jaffal finds that young film directors in Iraq are breathing new life into Iraqi cinema. Guy Taylor argues that Oman is well-suited to be the Middle East’s prime peacemaker.

The excellent New York Times journalists David K. Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim have an article tacking stock of the nine-day old Saudi-led air campaign against Houthi and Houthi-affiliated fighting forces in Yemen. On the evening of the first airstrikes, the White House revealed that the United States was aiding this intervention: “President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations.” Unclear as to why the Obama administration hastily and enthusiastically endorsed and supported the air campaign, I wrote a piece analyzing the justifications that U.S. officials were offering (I counted seven). Most disturbing were two acknowledgments by Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. Central Command—the geographic region containing the Persian Gulf. First, he said, “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.” Austin also admitted when asked when he learned of the intervention, “I had a conversation with the CHOD [the Saudi Chief of Defense] right before they took action, so it was shortly before.” So the military commander responsible for providing the logistical and intelligence support to the intervention did not know its goals or objectives, and only learned of it right before it began. It was with this background and understanding of the air campaign so far that I then came across this passage in Kirkpatrick and Fahim’s article this morning: American officials said they supported the Saudi campaign mainly because of a lack of alternatives. “If you ask why we’re backing this, beyond the fact that the Saudis are allies and have been allies for a long time, the answer you’re going to get from most people—if they were being honest—is that we weren’t going to be able to stop it,” said an American defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the official was discussing internal government deliberations. “If the Saudis were willing to step in, the thinking was that they should be encouraged,” the official said. “We were not going to send our military, that’s for certain.” So if the United States cannot stop a misguided intervention by its partners into a proxy civil war ten thousand kilometers away, the only alternative is to join them? Surely the unnamed Pentagon official is aware that the intervention is directly at odds with other, allegedly more pressing, U.S. foreign policy interests in the region: making Yemen an even more unstable country, as evidenced by the prison break that included members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and assuredly diverting the already meager GCC air assets participating in the coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Rather, since the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen was inevitable, America’s support for it was predetermined. This is especially puzzling since none of the countries bombing Yemen are mutual defense treaty allies with the United States, so there is no obligation, even under the most tortured self-defense justification, to support them. Moreover, even when allies undertake foreign military misadventures, that should not mean that U.S. support is mandatory. In 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus, President Richard Nixon was surprised but provided no support and, in 1982,  when the United Kingdom went to war with Argentina over the Falklands Islands, President Ronald Reagan remained neutral. Quotes by anonymous officials are not formal policy declarations, but they often accurately capture the honest thinking of those who work to develop and implement foreign policy. Recall the “presidential advisor” who, in the New Yorker, admiringly described the president’s actions in Libya as “leading from behind.” The defense official quoted above has articulated a far more troubling doctrine of America being led into war by a nervous Gulf monarchy, and the White House lacking the agency to do anything about it, other than to climb on board and offer the unmatched U.S. military enabling support for this war. Finally, this intervention is going terribly based upon all of the courageous reporting from those in the country. Per usual, the victims of the war will be innocent non-combatants. Just this morning, UN under secretary-general for humanitarian affairs Valerie Amos released a statement warning: “Reports from humanitarian partners in different parts of the country indicate that some 519 people have been killed and nearly 1,700 injured in the past two weeks–over 90 of them children.” Why did the White House so eagerly sign up to back the Saudi-led intervention that has such unclear goals and is causing such obvious destruction and death?

Lorenzo Kamel examines how the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia attempts to differentiate itself from the ideology of ISIS. Jay Ulfelder finds that recent events in Yemen challenges traditional conceptions of the state and the international system. Jadaliyya interviews Yemeni activist Hisham al-Omeisy about the unfolding situation in Yemen.

Rebecca Collard reports on Kurdish men who have joined ISIS and attacked their own people. Nabeel Khoury looks at who the Houthis are, their ambitions, and the options before them. Michael Koplow reflects on U.S.-Israeli relations in light of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s upcoming address to Congress.

Karl Sharro presents a satirically “simple” diagram of the Arab uprisings and their aftermath. Amro Ali looks at how the citizen contributes to the sustainability of despotism in Egypt. Susanne Dahlgren investigates the Yemeni hirak, the movement seeking to restore independence to southern Yemen.

Andrew Gilmour argues that the study of classics is useful to understanding contemporary power struggles in the modern Middle East. Cole Bunzel discusses the rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) playing out in Yemen. Mara Revkin explores lawmaking among jihadi groups.

Thomas Serres suggests that the recent police protests in Algeria demonstrate how Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s regime is “being inundated from all sides.” Fernando Carvajal reflects on the new power balance established by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Nervana Mahmoud explores what makes Egypt’s liberals so seemingly illiberal.

Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani finds that Yemen is becoming polarized between the Shia Houthi rebels and the Sunni Islah Islamist party. J. J. Goldberg looks at the rising influence of the right in Israel’s security and intelligence agencies. Bilal Ahmed explores the media’s fascination with the female soldiers of the Kurdish Peshmerga.

An old one from Eric Rouleau, who reflects on his experiences as an Egyptian-Jewish journalist. Omar el-Jaffal examines the phenomenon of militias in Iraq and its implications on the Iraqi state. Atiaf Alwazir summarizes reactions to the recent takeover of the Yemeni capital Sanaa by Houthi fighters.