Yemen

President Barack Obama's decision to resume repatriation efforts for Yemeni detainees held in the detention center at Guantanamo Bay presents a significant opportunity to strengthen the counterterrorism relationship between the United States and Yemen. As part of the repatriation effort, the United States should fund the establishment of a permanent terrorist rehabilitation institution in Yemen, providing a critical counterterrorism partner with a needed strategic capability to counter al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and forming the cornerstone of a strengthened intelligence-sharing relationship. While the center would initially be used to reduce the significant political and security risks of returning Guantanamo detainees, it could then serve to rehabilitate other Yemeni terrorism detainees, undermining AQAP and other militant groups threatening the security of the United States and Yemen. The Yemeni Dilemma Over 600 Guantanamo detainees have been repatriated or released, but 155 remain. The Guantanamo Periodic Review Board (PRB) determined that there is no longer a basis to hold fifty-five of the detainees from Yemen as enemy combatants and cleared them for release. Of the fifty-five detainees, there are thirty in "conditional detention." Statute prevents their transfer until the president certifies the security situation in Yemen is adequately stabilized, appropriate third-country resettlement options have been arranged, or a suitable rehabilitation program has been established. These detainees are not considered high-value detainees for intelligence purposes. The youngest Yemeni detainee is thirty-two, making indefinite detention a forty- to fifty-year proposition. The PRB determination strengthens the possibility of these detainees eventually prevailing in federal courts, forcing their release or transfer under potentially less-than-ideal terms. Resettling the Yemeni detainees in third countries would complicate reintegration and raise the risk of recidivism, which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed to be more than 25 percent for released Guantanamo detainees. Resettlement would shift this security risk to those countries—a risk few are likely to accept. The continued detention of the Yemeni detainees is straining the relationship with Yemen and is allowing al-Qaeda to delegitimize the Unites States' counterterrorism efforts. However, the recidivism risk involved with their repatriation is particularly acute in Yemen, home of AQAP, al-Qaeda's most active affiliate. The failed "underwear bomber" in 2009 and two subsequent attempted attacks on U.S.-bound cargo flights highlight AQAP's desire to strike the U.S. homeland. AQAP also radicalizes extremists in English-speaking countries through its online magazine, Inspire. Different Approaches to Risk Mitigation This recidivism risk could be reduced through different mitigation strategies, including rehabilitation, parole, and post-release monitoring. Some terrorist rehabilitation programs have focused on deradicalization, a process designed to change individuals' political or religious beliefs through dialog as a means to convince them to abandon terrorism. Other programs emphasize demobilization, a system of incentives and disincentives to convince subjects to abandon violence. Deradicalization and demobilization are not mutually exclusive rehabilitative approaches and are often used simultaneously. Parole places various conditions on the subject as a condition for release with the consequence of incarceration for violating them. Post-release monitoring can include overt meetings and clandestine surveillance to determine if the subject is meeting the terms of parole, recommits terrorist acts, or associates with terrorists. Various countries employed combinations of risk-mitigation approaches in a variety of settings, including prisons, halfway houses, military detention centers, and noncustodial settings. For example, the Pakistani military ran a deradicalization program in the Swat Valley to counter the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Indonesia's police-run deradicalization approach includes sentence reduction and financial assistance. In Yemen, the Political Security Office (PSO) used religious scholars in a prison-based program to deradicalize detainees. Post-release, the National Security Bureau (NSB) monitored the detainees, typically for only about a year. Saudi Arabia uses a model similar to halfway houses in criminal justice systems. The center encourages parolees to publicly renounce al-Qaeda, placing them at odds with the terrorist groups and keeping the detainees dependent on the security services, making them easier to monitor when released. The Early Release Scheme (ERS) in Northern Ireland was a group demobilization approach in which imprisoned terrorists were paroled on the condition that all paroled members would be reincarcerated if their group carried out a terrorist attack. Colombia's reincorporation program operated in a noncustodial setting and allowed individual paramilitaries to leave the conflict with amnesty and financial incentives. Assessing the recidivism rate for rehabilitation programs is difficult. Yemen asserted a 2 percent recidivism rate for the 364 detainees who went through its deradicalization program. Despite its claimed success, the program has not been active since 2005. Similarly, Saudi Arabia claims its program has a recidivism rate of 2 to 3 percent, but concedes that the recidivism rate for Saudi former Guantanamo detainees was about 8 percent. This outcome still compares favorably to the recidivism rate experienced with other Guantanamo detainees. These claims are hard to verify, as they are self-reported by the government agencies running the programs and based on intelligence with significant gaps. However, the ERS is independently monitored. Of the 450 prisoners who participated, only 16 were rearrested for terrorism-related activity. Recommendations The only viable option for the Yemeni detainees who have been cleared for release is to repatriate them; however, this process should be done in a manner that minimizes the risk to the United States and Yemen. While reducing the recidivism risk to zero is impossible, the most promising risk-mitigation program would include rehabilitation, strict post-release parole, and a rigorous post-release monitoring plan. The State Department should allocate International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds to establish and operate a permanent rehabilitation institution in Yemen. Based on the cost of the Saudi program, the estimated cost for initial build-out and three years of operating funds is roughly $26 million. In comparison, the United States spends over $454 million annually to run the Guantanamo detention center. An effective risk-mitigation initiative would include the following features: A permanent institution. The objective of rehabilitation should be to transition the detainees from long-term detention at Guantanamo into Yemeni society, making the halfway house model the most apt. The PSO should establish and administer a terrorist rehabilitation center that utilizes both deradicalization and individual demobilization approaches. Although security will be the PSO's responsibility, the center should be staffed with religious, psychological, and social-services experts from outside of government. As in the Saudi center, religious scholars should be used to deradicalize detainees. As part of the demobilization effort, the center would provide financial payments, family counseling, mental health services, basic education, and job assistance. Detainees would stay at the center for a minimum of three months prior to being paroled. After the Guantanamo detainees complete the program, Yemen would then use the center to rehabilitate and reintegrate its other Yemeni terrorism detainees, hundreds of whom are in custody. Measureable outcomes. Prior to being paroled from the rehabilitation center, PSO officials would have to certify the detainee successfully met standards measuring the likelihood of violence and of successful reintegration into society. Detainees' public renouncement of terrorism would be one such factor and should be used as part of Yemen's strategic-messaging campaign against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. ODNI would produce an annual report using qualitative and quantitative measures assessing the recidivism of the former detainees including those in rehabilitation or on parole. The classified report should include an unclassified annex for public dissemination. Rigorous post-release monitoring and parole procedures. Yemen should closely monitor the detainees via physical surveillance, home visits, and meetings with security services. The duration of the monitoring would be based on a risk assessment conducted jointly by the NSB and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). As a form of group demobilization, the detainees' tribal elders would be required to sign parole agreements acknowledging the parolees' obligation not to commit terrorist acts or join militant groups. The PSO would provide funds to tribal leaders to encourage compliance and provide intelligence. A detainee's failure to meet the terms of the parole would result in the cessation of financial assistance to the accountable elders and would subject the former detainee to incarceration or military action by Yemen or the United States. An ongoing intelligence-sharing relationship. The CIA should bolster Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities by providing the PSO and NSB with technical and paramilitary assistance (if required). In return, the PSO and NSB should regularly share intelligence on former detainees, including their status in the program, the level of monitoring, and any indications of terrorist activity. In addition, human intelligence gathered from former detainees, tribal elders, and family members would aid Yemen and the United States in undermining AQAP and other militant groups. A Significant Opportunity AQAP poses a significant security threat to the United States. While it is in the United States' interest to repatriate the Yemeni detainees who have already been cleared for release, it must do so in a manner that does not strengthen AQAP, and ideally weakens it. Critics may argue that the security risks of repatriation outweigh the gains, but there are no viable alternatives. The most promising strategy to reduce the risk of recidivism is for Yemen to combine multiple risk-reduction approaches utilized by other countries. By repatriating Yemeni nationals while aiding in the efforts to minimize the risk they pose, the Unites States has the opportunity to strengthen the counterterrorism relationship between the two countries by providing funding and security assistance in return for human intelligence.

Introduction Yemen is slipping into an uncertain and dangerous future. In early June 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has ruled the country for the past thirty-three years, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. The next day he flew to Saudi Arabia for emergency medical treatment, where he remained for three months before a dramatic and unannounced return to Sanaa last week. During his absence, Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed, and a quartet of nephews moved into the presidential palace, threatening open war if there is a move toward a political transition. Lined up against Saleh and his heirs is a creaky alliance of former foes and defected generals who agree on only one single point: Saleh can longer be president. Nearly half of the regular army is in rebellion under the command of Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a general from Saleh's own tribe. But this is much more than a two-sided fight between old comrades-in-arms. Various militia groups have taken advantage of the fracturing of state authority to further their own sectarian agendas. In the north, near the border with Saudi Arabia, the Huthis have solidified their control over large swaths of territory. In the southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa, fighters linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have made a frightening surge, overrunning towns and military bases. Neither military faction is willing to openly and forcefully confront the militants for fear of weakening themselves ahead of a potential civil war. In this murky mixture of competing interests, U.S. policy is adrift. Aware of the danger AQAP poses to the United States, the Obama administration has dramatically increased air and drone strikes in Yemen. At best, this is a delaying tactic designed to keep AQAP off-balance until the Yemeni military can act. Airpower alone is not enough to defeat AQAP. Indeed, AQAP may actually grow stronger as a result of strikes. Even more worrisome, this is al-Qaeda's second incarnation in the country. The gains of 2002 and 2003 have been forfeited by years of neglect when U.S. policy bounced from one crisis to the next without an overarching structure. What is needed now for Yemen is a strategic reset that has three goals: initiating a decisive political transition at the top, attacking the roots of AQAP's support in Yemen, and mobilizing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to energize Yemen's failing economy. The Challenge in Yemen For the past three decades President Saleh has ruled Yemen by playing different opposition groups against one another. This autocratic, patronage style of governing in which Saleh's allies were rewarded and his opponents harassed alienated large portions of the population. By 2004, it had helped spark a tribal revolt in the north. Endemic corruption and poor governance also contributed to the rise of a secessionist movement in the south three years later, further undermining Yemen's perpetually weak economy. Although cognizant of these problems, the United States has been primarily concerned with the threat posed by AQAP—the armed threat that least worries Saleh and the Yemeni government. Washington has relied heavily on air and drone strikes, which limit the immediate danger to U.S. service personnel and can be executed more cheaply than traditional military means. But such an approach has significant drawbacks: errant missiles and civilian casualties have helped radicalize a new generation of fighters and convinced many that Yemen—like Iraq and Afghanistan—is now a legitimate theater of jihad. Elements of a Broader Strategy Given the messy and deep-seated problems in Yemen, the United States must be realistic about what it can accomplish. With limited resources and an even more limited public appetite for additional foreign policy burdens at this time, the United States has to leverage the power and influence of regional actors, principally Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Although relations with the kingdom have grown increasingly contentious since the onset of the Arab Awakening, there is room for cooperation on Yemen. Much like the United States' relationship with Mexico, Saudi Arabia views its neighbor to the south as a source of instability and potential problems for years to come. As great as the threat of an unstable Yemen is for the United States, it is even greater for Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is still willing to hedge its bets, but there is a growing realization within Riyadh that despite Saleh's return he will never be able to reunite the country. The longer Saleh remains president, the worse the situation in Yemen will become. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia broadly agree on the main problems: the lack of a political transition, the danger of AQAP, and the simmering threat of Yemen's fragile economy. Neither country can solve the challenge of Yemen unilaterally, but together they can help arrest the country's downward descent. Political Transition It is impossible for Yemen to move forward as long as Saleh's sons and nephews are in a position to scuttle deals that they view as unfavorable. The United States must work with its partners in the Gulf to remove this roadblock to a political transition. Last year, the United States earmarked $75 million to assist Yemen's counterterrorism forces in the Ministry of the Interior and gave millions more to other units, including those under the command of Saleh's eldest son. The United States should, in conjunction with the GCC, inform Ahmed and his cousins that this money as well as GCC funding will be cut off and targeted UN sanctions will be applied if they do not step aside and agree to a military reshuffle and a transition council. This warning should be delivered in three stages. First, the United States, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, should convey a private message that offers a face-saving exit but assures Saleh's immediate relatives that punitive measures will be taken if they do not step aside. If this fails, the warning should then be delivered publicly. Finally, if they still refuse to step down, the money should be cut and sanctions implemented. Ahmad and his cousins are highly dependent on money to buy the continued loyalty of their troops. Without it, many in the Republican Guards will join the anti-Saleh coalition. In the event that a coordinated approach of cutting off the money and sanctions does not work, the United States should pursue a policy of forced isolation. To be successful, the United States would need to peel off Saleh's important remaining domestic allies—such as parliamentarians, ministers, and tribal sheikhs—through a process of pressure and enticements until Saleh and his immediate family are completely isolated. Attacking AQAP's Roots An al-Qaeda franchise has never been defeated by force alone. The only time an affiliate has been successfully dismantled was in Saudi Arabia, from 2003 to 2006, when the population turned on the terrorist group. To replicate that success in Yemen, the United States needs to partner with the governments of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia to counter AQAP's propaganda. Washington and Riyadh must attempt to spark a public debate about AQAP and its methods, drawing public attention to the fact that the group kills civilians and consistently violates Islamic norms. Riyadh's experience using soft power to undermine al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemeni officials' knowledge of the local scene will be vital in ensuring that militants are not replaced as quickly as they are killed. For its part, the United States should contribute a small team of Arabic-speaking diplomats with experience in Yemen. Together with their Saudi and Yemeni colleagues, U.S. policymakers should establish a joint center for public awareness. The center would seek to deprive AQAP of one of its main assets: unchallenged public assertions. At the moment, no entity in Yemen is speaking up in Arabic against AQAP, which means that the organization is able to shape its public message uncontested. The joint center would work to make al-Qaeda as synonymous with terrorism in Yemen as it is in the United States. Special Fund The United States should also partner with the GCC to establish a special fund to help stabilize Yemen's economy and provide humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Saleh's departure. The initial capital for the fund, which is contingent on Saleh's leaving office, should come from the more than $2 billion GCC countries pledged at the 2006 London conference but have yet to deliver due to concerns about corruption. The fund should be chaired by the director of the Arab Fund, with all donor countries and institutions represented on the board. This would do much to eliminate donor competition and coordination failures, which have often hampered efforts in the past. Once the economy is stabilized, the focus of the fund should shift to longer-term investment designed to create jobs and technical training. None of these recommendations will miraculously turn Yemen into a model democracy overnight, but together they will arrest the country's rapid downward descent and deny AQAP and other militants the opportunity to exploit the turmoil in ways that threaten U.S. security and interests in the region. However, as Yemen slips further into chaos, the opportunity to implement these measures is fast diminishing.