Yemen

[Note: This post was updated to reflect additional strikes in Yemen on March 2, March 3, and March 6.] As a candidate, President Donald Trump was deeply misleading about the sorts of military operations that he would support. He claimed to have opposed the 2003 Iraq War when he actually backed it, and to have opposed the 2011 Libya intervention when he actually strongly endorsed it, including with U.S. ground troops. Yet, Trump and his loyalists consistently implied that he would be less supportive of costly and bloody foreign wars, especially when compared to President Obama, and by extension, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This might be true, but nonetheless the White House is considering deploying even more U.S. troops to Syria, loosening the rules of engagement for airstrikes, and increasing the amount of lethal assistance provided to Syrian rebel groups. By at least one measure at this point in his presidency, Trump has been more interventionist than Obama: in authorizing drone strikes and special operations raids in non-battlefield settings (namely, in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia). During President Obama’s two terms in office, he approved 542 such targeted strikes in 2,920 days—one every 5.4 days. From his inauguration through today, President Trump had approved at least 36 drone strikes or raids in 45 days—one every 1.25 days. These include three drone strikes in Yemen on January 20, 21, and 22; the January 28 Navy SEAL raid in Yemen; one reported strike in Pakistan on March 1; more than thirty strikes in Yemen on March 2 and 3; and at least one more on March 6. Thus, people who believed that Trump would be less interventionist than Obama are wrong, at least so far and at least when it comes to drone strikes. These dramatically increased lethal strikes demonstrate that U.S. leaders’ counterterrorism mindset and policies are bipartisan and transcend presidential administrations. As I have noted, U.S. counterterrorism ideology is virulent and extremist, characterized by tough-sounding clichés and wholly implausible objectives. There has never been any serious indication among elected politicians or appointed national security officials of any strategic learning or policy adjustments. We are now on our third post-9/11 administration pursuing many of the same policies that have failed to meaningfully reduce the number of jihadist extremist fighters, or their attractiveness among potential recruits or self-directed terrorists. The Global War on Terrorism remains broadly unquestioned within Washington, no matter who is in the White House.

Yesterday, the White House released the readout of a call between President Donald Trump and the King of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud. The statement featured this remarkable statement: “The President requested and the King agreed to support safe zones in Syria and Yemen, as well as supporting other ideas to help the many refugees who are displaced by the ongoing conflicts.” During the presidential campaign, Trump, as well as Mike Pence, repeatedly endorsed the creation of safe zones in Syria, without adding any clarification. Trump proclaimed that unnamed Middle East countries would pay for the “big, beautiful safe zone” in Syria, while Pence during the vice presidential debate proclaimed they would “create a route for safe passage” and “protect people in those areas, including with the no-fly zone.” Five days later, when asked about his running mate’s position Trump declared flatly: “He and I haven’t spoken, and I disagree.” Political campaigns are consequence-free environments, but statements made while serving as chief of state should reflect actual government policy. If President Trump is now serious about authorizing the U.S. armed forces to implement safe zones (as indicated by his request to the Saudi monarch), he and his senior aides must clarify exactly what he means by this new, expansive, and poorly conceived military mission. I have written about no-fly zones and safe zones for more than fifteen years. But rather than re-package previous analysis, here are fifteen questions that Congress, journalists, and citizens should expect the Trump administration to answer:                                                                   What is the ultimate political objective of the safe zones? For example, will they provide temporary humanitarian refuge for internally displaced persons, or leverage for a brokered peace agreement? What is the domestic legal basis for them? As the sovereign government of Syria will presumably oppose them, what is the international legal basis? Where exactly within Syria or Yemen will they be located, and why were those locations chosen? Will non-combatants as well as rebel groups residing within the safe zones be protected? If not, how will residents be vetted, and who will do the vetting? Will those residing within safe zones be protected from all forms of harm, including aerial bombing, artillery shelling, small arms fire, sniper fire, starvation, and lack of clean drinking water and sanitation? Will those residing within safe zones be protected from harm by all perpetrators (including by Russian fighter-bombers and U.S.-backed rebel groups in Syria, or by indiscriminate Saudi airstrikes in Yemen)? Which countries will provide the military forces for the many tasks required to enforce the safe zones (suppression of enemy air defenses, logistical support, combat search and rescue, etc.)? Which groups or states will provide humanitarian assistance and be allowed access to those residing in the safe zones? Critically, who provides the ground forces to enforce and patrol the safe zones? Which nearby countries will allow safe zone forces basing and overflight rights, and for which missions specifically? Who has ultimate command authority for however many countries contribute forces? What military doctrine and rules of engagement will guide those forces enforcing the safe zones? Will force be used to prohibit arms groups from using the safe zones to shield their activities or recruit fighters, as they inevitably will try to do? Who pays, and for how long?  

This blog post was coauthored with my research associate, Jennifer Wilson.  [Note: This post was updated to reflect an additional strike in Yemen in 2016, announced by U.S. Central Command on January 12, 2017.] As President Obama enters the final weeks of his presidency, there will be ample assessments of his foreign military approach, which has focused on reducing U.S. ground combat troops (with the notable exception of the Afghanistan surge), supporting local security partners, and authorizing the expansive use of air power. Whether this strategy “works”—i.e. reduces the threat posed by extremists operating from those countries and improves overall security and governance on the ground—is highly contested. Yet, for better or worse, these are the central tenets of the Obama doctrine. In President Obama’s last year in office, the United States dropped 26,172 bombs in seven countries. This estimate is undoubtedly low, considering reliable data is only available for airstrikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, and a single "strike," according to the Pentagon’s definition, can involve multiple bombs or munitions. In 2016, the United States dropped 3,028 more bombs—and in one more country, Libya—than in 2015. Most (24,287) were dropped in Iraq and Syria. This number is based on the percentage of total coalition airstrikes carried out in 2016 by the United States in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the counter-Islamic State campaign. The Pentagon publishes a running count of bombs dropped by the United States and its partners, and we found data for 2016 using OIR public strike releases and this handy tool.* Using this data, we found that in 2016, the United States conducted about 79 percent (5,904) of the coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, which together total 7,473. Of the total 30,743 bombs that the coalition dropped, then, the United States dropped 24,287 (79 percent of 30,743). To determine how many U.S. bombs were dropped on each Iraq and Syria, we looked at the percentage of total U.S. OIR airstrikes conducted in each country. They were nearly evenly split, with 49.8 percent (or 2,941 airstrikes) carried out in Iraq, and 50.2 percent (or 2,963 airstrikes) in Syria. Therefore, the number of bombs dropped were also nearly the same in the two countries (12,095 in Iraq; 12,192 in Syria). Last year, the United States conducted approximately 67 percent of airstrikes in Iraq in 2016, and 96 percent of those in Syria.   Sources: Estimate based upon Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2011-2016 Airpower Statistics; CJTF-Operation Inherent Resolve Public Affairs Office strike release, December 31, 2016; New America (NA); Long War Journal (LWJ); The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ); Department of Defense press release; and U.S. Africa Command press release.   *Our data is based on OIR totals between January 10, 2016 and December 31, 2016

Reading selections for the weekend of October 28, 2016.

Reading selections for the weekend of October 14, 2016.

Reading selections for the weekend of September 16, 2016.

Reading selections for the weekend of July 29, 2016.

Reading selections for the weekend of July 8, 2016.

Reading selections for the weekend of May 20, 2016.

Sharif Abdel Kouddous reports on the human toll of the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Christine Petre looks at Sidi Bouzid five years after Tunisian fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation that sparked the Arab uprisings. Ursula Lindsey explores public space in the Arab world and the lack of discourse on them.

Coauthored with Callie Plapinger, intern in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the world watches Syria burn, a tiny glimmer of hope shines in Yemen. Today, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed that it will use new oversight powers to more closely monitor U.S. weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, which for nine months has been carrying out a brutal campaign against Houthi rebels that’s left thousands of civilians dead. The news comes on the heels of an announcement earlier this week by Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, that he would begin a renewed push for peace talks in Geneva next week. To be sure, near-term prospects for peace are low, given the conflicting interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the growing presence of both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Even so, the United States should welcome the UN’s latest initiative. More broadly, it should consider what Yemen teaches about the limits of backing proxy interventions—and the need to build up the UN’s multilateral conflict management capabilities. First, a little context. During the Arab Spring in Yemen, many national dialogues failed to produce meaningful results, and this lack of progress is to a large extent what gave rise to the Houthis, who took advantage of the power vacuum created by stagnating peace talks by consolidating power in the northern part of the country. Like Syria, however, Yemen has fragmented into a bloody civil war largely along the faultlines of the broader sectarian struggle engulfing much of the Middle East. Shia Houthi rebels deposed Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi earlier this year, prompting a Saudi-led coalition—backed by the United States—to intervene in March. Since then, Saudi air strikes have taken a heavy human toll, killing over 2,600 civilians. Besides civilian deaths, these air strikes have stalled the delivery of food and fuel supplies, displaced nearly two million people, and rendered a whopping twenty-one million Yemenis in need of humanitarian assistance. The Saudi coalition, which includes airplanes and auxiliary support from the Gulf states, the United States, and the United Kingdom, seeks to weaken the Houthi rebels’ hold on territory and, ultimately, reinstate the government of President Hadi, now exiled in Riyadh. Meanwhile, Iran is providing the Houthi rebels with military hardware, funding, and training. Although Saudi Arabia has publicly committed to a peace process under UN auspices, it has not ceased its bombing campaign. The conflict in Yemen is further complicated by the presence of AQAP and the Islamic State, both of which have seized on the power vacuum to stage a series of deadly attacks throughout the country in their endeavor to acquire territory. Most recently, AQAP, which has long been active in Yemen, gained control of the capital city of Abyan Province, as well as smaller towns in the area. In early December, the Islamic State conducted a bombing attack that killed the governor of Aden, a crucial port city, and dozens of civilians. Over the past two years, the UN has mediated a series of inconclusive peace talks. A first such effort, in late May 2014, was aborted before it even got off the ground. The following month, delegates representing the warring sides refused to meet in person, forcing UN negotiators to shuttle back and forth between separate rooms, which ultimately proved a futile exercise. In both April and May 2015, both sides neglected to adhere to a ceasefire negotiated by the UN, intended to allow for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Meanwhile, the UN effort continues to flounder, thanks to wounds both self-inflicted and from powerful parties. Critics accuse UN mediators of undermining prospects for peace by excluding significant parties in the conflict, including southern separatists affiliated with neither the Saudi-backed government nor the Iranian-backed Houthis. But UN mediation efforts are also being stymied by the interests of outside powers. They include not only Saudi Arabia, but also its U.S. and UK backers, who view the war as part of a larger geopolitical struggle to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the region. Unless they come on board and accept Houthi participation in the Yemeni government, the UN will lack the weight to shepherd, much less safeguard, a workable peace plan. Recent events in various UN fora have only reinforced this impression. In the most recent September session of the UN Human Rights Council, the Netherlands drafted a resolution calling for a UN mission to examine potential human rights and international law violations in Yemen. Saudi Arabia blocked the proposal, offering an alternative that excluded any mechanisms to evaluate human rights violations. And although the Security Council reiterates its commitment to a peaceful settlement to the conflict, it has taken no concrete action. Saudi Arabia, for its part, continues to draw international attention to Syria, likely to draw attention away from its geopolitical agenda in Yemen. Last month, the Saudi delegation introduced a draft resolution in the UN General Assembly, cosponsored by the United States, France, and other allies, seeking to formally condemn the actions of Iran and Russia in Syria. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has declined to use its position on the Security Council to moderate the conflict—essentially giving Saudi Arabia a free hand. The time for doing so is over. Investigation into the gross human rights violations in Yemen are long past due. In this regard, the Senate’s forthcoming investigation is a step in the right direction. In the meantime, the United States should back increasing calls for an impartial UN inquiry into human rights violations in Yemen. Finally, the United States must support the negotiation and implementation of a long-term peace agreement among Yemeni parties to the conflict, as well as relevant regional and global powers. Sustained political attention and economic investments will be critical to consolidating peace and stimulating recovery in one of the world’s most fragile, poor, and water-stressed countries. Any eventual agreement must be accompanied by a major pledging conference led by the World Bank and major donor governments, so that Yemen can proceed with demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating combatants, rebuilding infrastructure, and ensuring a smooth political transition. The United States and its allies should be prepared to provide aid and resources as necessary, but in order to ensure lasting peace in the country, local political solutions should be facilitated under UN oversight, rather than reflecting the historical pattern of global powers imposing political structures in post-conflict Middle Eastern countries.