Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has reacted to the Arab Spring by pledging $4 billion in aid to Egypt, and it is expected to help Tunisia as well. Has it become enamored of youthful protests for democracy? The fact that Saudi troops remain in Bahrain, helping crush the movement for greater democracy there, suggests something else is going on. And the invitation from the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC to Morocco and Jordan to join the group points in the same direction. My theory is this: for the Saudis, it’s fine if citizens of a fake republic like Tunisia or Egypt demand a real republic with real elections and democracy. But they draw the line at monarchies: kings have to stay in charge. So they lecture the kings of Morocco and Jordan to be careful about too many reforms (if the rumors are correct), and invite them to join the Club of Kings that is the GCC. Presumably financial benefits will follow, so long as the kings don’t play around with any experiments that might give Saudi subjects ideas of their own. And in Bahrain, they put down a revolt that might have brought constitutional monarchy—though admittedly that situation appears far more complex in the eyes of  Saudi royals, as the Bahrainis who would be empowered are Shia whose success might give Saudi Shia unacceptable ideas about their own fate. Brezhnev explained himself in 1968 as follows in answering claims that after the “Prague Spring,” Czechoslovakia should be allowed to determine its own fate: “the implementation of such ‘self-­determination,’ in other words Czechoslovakia’s detachment from the socialist community, would have come into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the other socialist states.” The Saudi message may be similar: the implementation of excessive reforms by any king would conflict with his own vital interests and those of other monarchical states, so it will be resisted. Kings have to stick together. Foolish nations that long ago adopted republican forms can go right ahead with their experiments and their revolts.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad walk past the guard of honour in Damascus (Khaled al Hariri/Courtesy Reuters) Below is a piece I wrote for The Atlantic on how Syria is bringing together strange bedfellows - Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. It appeared on The Atlantic’s website today. One of the iron fisted rules of the Middle East seems to be "what an Assad giveth, an Assad also taketh away." Since protests began in his country, Syrian President Bashar al Assad has lifted the emergency law, abolished state security courts, and stepped up the repression that has been a hallmark of his now 11-year rule. No one should be surprised that Syria’s security forces have used violence against peaceful demonstrators. Still, if there was any lingering doubt about the nature of the regime, the 500 or more dead in the streets across several Syrian cities should be plenty evidence of its brutality. Many smart people, in Washington and elsewhere, have long been willing to forgive the Assad family for their many sins, going back to the tenure of Bashar’s father, Hafiz al Assad, who ruled from 1971 to 2000. The allure of bringing the Syrian-Israeli state of war to an end and the tantalizing possibility (a fantasy, it turns out) of breaking the Tehran-Damascus axis led observers to believe that Hafiz was capable of making peace and that Bashar was a reformer. Bashar has been tolerated, engaged, even supported in the hopes that the world could entice him, with the prospects of good relations with the West, to change. But there was never any real evidence that Damascus was genuinely interested in peace or reform. As the world (slowly) comes to grips with the horror of Syria and the Assads, there remains a coalition of nations that appear to be acting under the belief that the Assad regime is better than what might come next. It’s an odd group in the rather strange new world of the Middle East: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. For the Israelis, already reeling from the loss of a regional strategic asset -- Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt -- the predictability of Assad’s Syria was some consolation. Israel and Syria may be in a technical state of war, but the Syrians have scrupulously kept the armistice on the Golan Heights and it has been a long time since Syria’s military posed any significant security threat to Israel. The Israelis put a premium on authoritarian stability in the Arab world, where they fear change will almost always rebound to the benefit of hostile Islamist groups. Sitting in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, it is little wonder the Israeli leadership is having serious qualms about the unrest in Syria. Assad may be an implacable foe, but he is better than the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. From the perspective of the Israeli security establishment, at least Assad is doing what Hosni Mubarak should have done: using all available means to save his regime. For the better part of the last decade, Saudi Arabia has not had very good relations with Syria. But the Arab spring has so unnerved Riyadh that King Abdallah appears willing to let bygones be bygones. In late March, when the protests in Syria were just starting to develop beyond Daraa, the King called Assad to offer his political support. In the short run at least, Riyadh appears willing to overlook both Assad’s three decades-long strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia’s rival, Iran, as well as Syria’s growing influence in Lebanon, which comes at the expense of Saudi’s own ability to sway events there. The support for Assad is consistent with Saudi strategy throughout the Arab Spring, which has included support for Bahrain’s ruling family and King Abdallah’s offer to Hosni Mubarak that he would make up the loss of American aid if the Egyptians undertook a major crackdown. Clearly, the Saudis regard the transformation of the region as a threat to their interests and stability and will do whatever they can to help bring the uprisings to an end. The least surprising member of the region’s pro-Assad camp is Iran. Tehran has been trying to tell anyone who will listen that the unrest in the Arab world demonstrates the righteousness of the Iranian revolution and that change in the region only bolsters Iranian interests and influence. Not exactly. So far, this has been mostly a wash for Iran. There is nothing in the Arab uprisings that suggests their instigators want to emulate the Islamic Republic; though, of course, Islamist groups may yet benefit from more open systems in the Arab world. Still, Arabs are demonstrating and dying for more freedom, not for another form of authoritarianism under the guise of theological messianism. And while change in Egypt weakens the region’s anti-Iranian axis, this does not appear to augur the flowering of Tehran-Cairo ties. Both Egypt and Iran are big and important countries who maintain the pretenses of regional leadership and influence. They are more likely to be strategic competitors than partners. Change in Syria would be far more problematic for Iran. Damascus is, after all, Tehran’s most important gateway to Arab politics, the focal point through which it has been able to insert itself directly into the Arab-Israeli conflict, among other regional issues. A Syria that is less hospitable to Iran would not end Tehran’s regional influence and ambitions, but it would certainly be a setback for both. That’s why along, with Jerusalem and Riyadh, Tehran is hoping that Bashar al Assad has what it takes to hang on. Finally, the Turks find themselves in the awkward position of supporting their ally and partner, Bashar. Ankara was tough on Mubarak, wavered on Qaddafi until it became untenable for them to continue wavering, and has been noticeably hushed on Assad. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has invested a great deal of time and energy in his relationship with the Syrian president. Erdogan, it was long hoped, would be the one guy who could finally flip Assad, bring him in from the cold, and help make him respectable. The Turks have been leveraging their much-vaunted influence in Damascus to quietly counsel the Syrians to halt the violence and undertake reform, but so far they have come up empty. Late last week Erdogan sent a delegation to Damascus - supposedly with a tough message for Assad about the need for more rapid and meaningful reform -- and Ankara has joined Washington and Brussels in condemning the use of force against peaceful protestors. These are positive developments, but Turkey’s ambiguous calls for "democratization" do not include an explicit call for Assad to step down. Don’t expect Ankara to go much further than it has. The Turkish leadership likes its relationship with Syria. Erdogan’s well-known rapport with Assad helps give the Turkish prime minister the Arab world street cred he so cherishes, and the close relationship with Syria is good for both Turkish business and security. Ankara may be the most reluctant member of this virtual pro-Assad coalition, but it also has a lot to lose if Assad falls. As much as it may be uncomfortable for them, the Turks are unlikely to abandon their man in Damascus. Of course, the region’s pro-Assad team is hardly a durable coalition. These countries do not exactly like one another. But the fact that they are all in their own way hoping Bashar al Assad manages to hang tough and survive demonstrates just how much these countries fear the transforming regional political landscape. Nothing creates stranger bedfellows than a common enemy: in this case, change.

Bob McNally and I have an essay on oil markets in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. We argue that big oil price swings are here to stay for awhile, outline the consequences for economics and geopolitics, and describe some ways that the United States can cope with the situation. The issue won’t hit the newsstands until June, but I sat down with FA editor Gideon Rose to talk a bit about what’s in the article. Take a look: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGKjAry6Yjg

A woman weaves a carpet at a factory in Mashad, east of Tehran (Caren Firouz/Courtesy Reuters) Qifa Nabki on the Lebanese stalemate in forming a new government. Joshua Landis on Syria Comment discusses the "split" in Syria. Rachid Ghannouchi on the role of political Islam in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Al Jazeera: US and Saudi dynamics in Yemen. Al-Masry Al-Youm: The role of local governments in reforming Egypt.

A Kingdom of Libya flag is seen during a demonstration in support of the Bahraini people in Baghdad's Sadr city (Stringer Iraq/Courtesy Reuters) Hi folks, Below is an excerpt from my piece on TheAtlantic.com that appeared today. To read the full text, click here. A couple of days before Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was finally forced from office, it rained in Cairo. When the storm passed and the sun re-appeared, one of the protesters pointed out on Twitter that a rainbow had appeared over downtown -- a sign, she believed, of the freedom and prosperity that was to come. Caught up in the romance of the barricades, it was hard for demonstrators and democracy activists, in Egypt and beyond, not to think that way. It seemed that Middle East was on the verge of a democratic breakthrough. It was one thing for Tunisians to force a tin-pot dictator like Zine Abidine Ben Ali to flee to Jeddah, it was quite another for Egyptians to dump the Pharaoh. That’s not supposed to happen. And as Tunisians inspired Egyptians, what the revolutionaries in Cairo accomplished gave impetus to Pearl Square, where Bahrain’s own protesters have gathered, and to Benghazi, the base of Libya’s rebellion against Muammar Qaddafi. Yet the successes of Tahrir or November 7 squares have not easily translated to these other places. It seems entirely possible that the Arab spring could end on the banks of the Nile. What went wrong?

Today’s ’Day of Rage’ in Saudi Arabia fizzled, but the Saudis are tense about protests in the neighboring monarchy of Bahrain and U.S. support for the recent revolutionary wave in the Middle East, says Saudi expert Rachel Bronson.

The jump in oil prices over the past month or so has clearly been driven by what’s going on in the Middle East and North Africa. That’s why most analysts assume that when things (presumably) calm down, oil prices will drop back to previous levels too. And so long as oil prices don’t stay high for a prolonged period, the economic impact should be relatively small. But what if the geopolitical stress abates, yet oil prices remain relatively high? The standard answer is that this isn’t possible. If supply returns to previous levels, the market clearing price should too. That seems reasonable, but I’d throw out a caution, because oil prices are funny things. Producers with substantial market power (think Saudi Arabia and maybe OPEC as a collective) target certain prices (currently believed to be between $60 and $80 a barrel) based on, among other things, their judgment as to what the global economy can tolerate. (If high oil prices tank the economy, oil demand collapses, prices follow, and producers’ revenues dry up.) They aren’t always successful, but they do try, and it often works. Producers are deterred from pushing prices too high in part because of fear of the unknown. But if a freak set of events, like we’re seeing now, push prices past previous thresholds, and if the global economy seems to handle things ok, pivotal producers might decide that targeting higher prices makes sense. They would thus cut back on supplies in order to realize the new target. The temporary price hike would become self-reinforcing. This tendency could be compounded by a sense among producers that inflation, whether already realized or still on the way, was undercutting existing OPEC price targets – after all, that was part of the rationale for the original OPEC price hikes back in the early 1970s. To the extent cash poor (and hence price-hawkish) Iran has made relative gains in regional politics over the past month, that could also weigh on decision-making. This is all, of course, quite speculative. But stranger things have happened. Part of the recent price hike could thus stick.

Saudi Arabia appears to have boosted its oil production and is in talks to increase deliveries to Europe. Dan Drezner is puzzled: “Why are the Saudis being so cooperative at this point? There might be sound strategic reasons – preventing a double-dip recession, assuaging longstanding allies, etc.  It could be that the Saudi leadership is feeling secure enough to plan for long-term price stability. Still, based on the recent reportage, I’m a little surprised that the Saudis aren’t exploiting the current uncertainty to ensure the security of the current regime going forward. If I was a Saudi prince right now, I’d be making it very clear to my buyers just how important stability is in my neck of the woods.” Dan asks: “Am I missing anything?” Let me take a stab. First, the strategic incentives that Dan cites for Saudi Arabia to intervene – particularly the risk of a double-dip recession – are pretty significant. Oil prices could fall precipitously if the world reentered recession. That said, the Saudis could have waited a couple weeks to respond without running particularly high global economic risks, if they wanted to spook people. Direct economic interests can’t explain everything. What I suspect matters more is that Saudi Arabia derives much of its influence from its perceived role as the central bank of oil. If it monkeys around too much by letting prices rise considerably higher, others will start to rely on it less, which will weaken its long term influence and bargaining power. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia doesn’t take action, and a strategic stockpile release by the United States and others calms the markets, Riyadh will be shown to be less strategically important than previously believed. It has a lot of incentive to not let things come to that. I’m also not sure precisely what Saudi Arabia would be able to extract by letting things get uglier. Oil markets are behaving badly precisely because people are worried about Saudi stability. If unrest actually migrated to the desert kingdom (a development that I still think is extremely unlikely), I think you’d start to see Saudi take very different steps with its oil. At that point, Riyadh would probably impress on the world that it needed support if they didn’t want to see prices get out of control. That would be a credible threat, and could result in a very concrete set of responses. Short of a similarly acute situation, though, Saudi Arabia would seem to strengthen its influence by responding quickly, rather than by letting things get worse.

In an essay in tomorrow’s FT, I argue that ongoing oil market turmoil ought to remind us that energy policy shouldn’t just be about long-term strategy; short-term dynamics matter too. Most advocates have responded to the current situation with predictable calls to expand supply, curb demand, or develop alternatives, but none of these will do much in the next decade. The world also needs serious crisis management plans. The essay focuses on three elements: strategic reserve strategy; coordination of emergency measures with emerging markets (particularly China); and, more speculatively, possible curbs on market speculation during times of extraordinary geopolitical stress. As with any op-ed, one must leave many things out. (Also, lest you be deceived by the headline, the piece isn’t only about Saudi.) Here are a few thoughts that didn’t make it in. First, the standard line on when strategic reserves should be used confuses at least as much as it illuminates. Here’s the IEA’s David Fyfe: “Our view is this [strategic reserves] is not something that should be used in terms of price management”. But what is the line between price management and emergency response in a highly liquid global market? If distributed supply shutdowns cause prices to spike severely, but no one consumer is physically cut off, that should probably still be occasion to use the SPR. Second, my three policy examples are only a subset of the issues that we’re neglecting through our singular obsession on the long term. Take Gulf of Mexico oil production. Those who say that GoM production is insignificant vis-à-vis long term oil prices are correct. But if the mess in the Middle East takes out a few million barrels a day of production, we may wish we’d been a bit more aggressive in finding ways to safely avoid curbing short-term production. Third, the comments in my essay regarding controls on speculation are highly, um, speculative. We do not have the necessary research to properly understand how speculators would affect market response to a severe geopolitical disruption, nor do we have even a rudimentary understanding of the policy tools that might be available to respond. It behooves us, though, to think seriously about what might constitute wise policy under extreme circumstances. Finally, op-eds don’t allow one to reference other (usually deeper) analyses of appropriate policy.  If you’re interested in strategic reserve policy in particular, take a look at David Victor and Sarah Eskreis-Winkler in Foreign Affairs, Michelle Billig and David Goldwyn in a very useful edited volume (alas, full text not available online), and this primer from CRS.

The Wikileaks Cable as Literature Beam on the art of cable writing Wikileaks and the Arab Public Sphere Lynch on how Arab autocrats will confront the Leaks Confirming the “bad chemistry” Istanbul Calling on Wiki, America, and Turkey Arabs and Iran Sullivan and Goldberg duke it out over whether the Israel lobby is the only potent force advocating for war against Iran

Members of Yemen’s U.S-trained counter-terrorism force raid a house during field training near Sanaa I’ve been busy so I enlisted Marisa Porges to guest post today.  Marisa is a former international affairs fellow at CFR. Before her turn at the Council, Marisa worked at DoD and Treasury on counter-terrorism issues.  Before civilian life, she was a naval aviator, flying EA-6Bs off of carrier decks.  Extremely cool.  Enjoy… I originally intended to hijack Steven’s blog to highlight the statement Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made last week, when he noted that America’s “biggest tools, particularly with respect to Yemen, are the partnership capacity of the Yemenis themselves.” This description of Washington’s future efforts in Yemen as a partnership not just with Sana’a but with Yemenis is pivotal and worth repeating, again and again. I’ll dig further into that story the next time Steven leaves his computer unattended. Instead, I’ll focus on the three most important Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) stories that came out over the weekend: The latest issue of AQAP’s online magazine, Inspire, was publicly released on Saturday – this time, with a cover declaring that October’s attempted bombing via cargo mail had the bargain price tag of $4,200. The glossy pages and color graphics were dedicated exclusively to the incident that AQAP named ‘Operation Hemorrhage.’ The special edition included details of how the group planned the attack and showed a photo of Charles Dickens’ Great Expectations, which AQ operatives reportedly tucked next to one bomb as testament to their high hopes for its impact. More important was AQAP’s description of their goals: 1. “[T]hat the packages pass through the latest security equipment.” - DONE 2. “[T]o spread of fear that would cause the West to invest billions of dollars in new security procedures.” – IN PROCESS 3. “[T]o cause maximum losses to the American economy. That is also the reason why we singled out the two U.S. air freight companies.” – LET’S    WAIT AND SEE We’ve seen this trend coming – Al Qaeda’s new focus on smaller scale attacks not necessarily aimed at massive casualties, but intending to have  larger secondary shocks, economically and psychologically. It aligns with recent concern for Mumbai-style terrorist attacks in Western Europe. On Friday, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal reportedly told an audience at Harvard’s Kennedy School that Yemen represented a direct security threat to Saudi Arabia. In his words, “[t]he situation in Yemen . . . is making it easy for terrorists to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia and operate actively there.” This concern is anything but new, though the public admission by senior Saudi officials is novel. Friday’s remark prompted an immediate    response by Yemeni officials who protested that Prince Turki must not have been speaking on behalf of his government. At least two Arabic outlets have begun raising concerns about a deteriorating relationship between Saudi and Yemeni security services. Though it’s still unclear where this is headed, it’s a situation worth Washington’s attention. The Saudi-Yemeni relationship, which includes a deep, complicated history between Riyadh and both Sana’a and Yemeni tribal leaders, is largely a mystery to outside operators – and, in truth, to many Saudis and Yemenis. But it’s clear that Saudi influence in Yemen far outweighs that of the United States or any other Western nation. Saudi involvement is critical for combating AQAP and tackling larger issues of Yemeni state failure. A troubled relationship between the two countries is the last thing anyone needs right now. (Photo Courtesy Reuters/Khaled Abdullah Ali Al Mahdi)

Muslim Pilgrims Gather to Cast Stones at Pillars Symbolizing Satan in Mena Issandr El Amrani: Shazli Country Al-Shazli achieves in death what he would never achieve in life Preparing for Succession? King Abdullah transfers National Guard duties to son Kareem Suleiman, the first Egyptian blogger to be tried and convicted for his writings, is released Suleiman, known as Kareem Amr, has been jailed for four years for defaming the Mubarak regime The settlement freeze might happen Netanyahu says he is close to reaching a deal with the United States on a settlement freeze (Picture Courtesy Reuters/Mohammed Salem)

Four experts discuss the merits of the Obama administration’s proposed $60 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia.

President Obama and Saudi King Abdullah’s meeting on June 29 will include difficult conversations about the Middle East, where Saudis want to be convinced that the United States is serious about supporting a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, says CFR’s Thomas Lippman.

Saudi Arabia’s program to deradicalize suspected terrorists has experienced some high-profile failures but could still provide important lessons for other states, says CFR’s Marisa Porges.