Middle East and North Africa

Saudi Arabia

  • Iran
    Turning Point in Bahrain
    February 14 will be the anniversary of the date when demonstrations began in Bahrain last year. More demonstrations will mark the date, and violence is feared. No events connected to the so-called “Arab Spring” have been as depressing as those in Bahrain. The tiny country (only slightly larger than the city of New York) was long viewed as a peaceful and enlightened place, but by the actual Spring of 2011 Bahrain was mired in sectarian divisions, security force violence, and errors and excesses by the government and the opposition, all worsened by the presence of foreign troops from other Gulf Cooperation Council nations. In the end, dozens were killed and communications between the Sunni government and royal family and the Shia majority had broken down. On February 11, this past Saturday, there were more demonstrations and police used tear gas to break some of them up. Bahrain’s internal situation is unquestionably complicated by the presence of larger and more powerful neighbors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. While the Bahrain International Commission of Inquiry (BICI) found no direct Iranian intervention, Iran’s broadcasting certainly tries to exacerbate tensions and its history and practice of using terrorism and intervening in the affairs of neighbors (such as Afghanistan and Iraq) gives Sunni Bahrainis nightmares. Some Bahrainis fear that if Iran loses its Syrian ally with the coming downfall of the Assad clique, the ayatollahs may seek increased power in Bahrain—or at least increased turmoil there. Meanwhile, those Bahraini officials, including in the royal family, favoring reform and compromise have faced great Saudi pressure against change—and things did not get easier when Prince Nayef became Crown Prince. For the Saudis, what we in the West might call compromise would be anathema: moving some political power away from a royal family toward elected officials, which is bad enough, and allowing for greater Shia influence in a country bordering on the Saudis’ Eastern Province with its millions of Shia. Compared to the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, the calls from the United States and United Kingdom for sensible accommodations have had little impact. Is it too late? Part of the tragedy has been that moderates among the Sunnis and Shia have too often been marginalized. There is plenty of blame to be shared, from the refusal of some Shia groups including the largest, al-Wefaq, to take up last year the Crown Prince’s offer of a serious dialogue, to the resort to force on the part of the security forces under the day-to-day command of the prime minister (an opponent of reform—and not coincidentally of strong moves to eliminate corruption). At the top the king has taken some strong and admirable moves, such as appointing the BICI and accepting its recommendations, but has failed to assert himself against the prime minister—his uncle—and bring an end to misuse of force. The Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Michael Posner, visited Bahrain last week and his statement there was thoughtfully balanced.  Here is part of it: it is a great credit to King Hamad that he initiated the BICI process, accepted its recommendations and appointed a national commission to coordinate implementation of those recommendations. It is commendable for any government to invite and participate in an independent examination of its human rights record. The government of Bahrain has taken many important steps toward the long-term institutional reforms identified in the report, such as removing arrest authority from the national security agency, drafting legislation concerning the investigation and prosecution of torture, and drafting a code of conduct for police based on international best practices. The government also has allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross access to its prisons. It has begun to rebuild religious sites, and engaged a team of qualified experts to advise on policing and legal reforms. These are signs of the government’s commitment to address the underlying cause of last year’s violence. However, more needs to be done in several key areas. First, there are hundreds of pending criminal cases stemming from the events of February and March, including a substantial number where individuals remain in detention. Second, while the Ministry of the Interior is taking steps to enhance the professionalization of the police, it needs to do more. Escalating violence in the streets points to the need for steps that will begin to integrate the police force, as recommended in the BICI report, so that Bahrain can build a police force that reflects the diversity of the communities it serves….Third, with regard to the issue of dismissed workers, we urge the government, the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions and the private sector through the Tripartite Commission to continue to clarify and verify dismissals and reinstatements to the same or comparable positions….Finally, we call on the government to continue to prosecute those officials responsible for the violations described in the BICI report. In the days leading up to February 14, we call on all Bahraini citizens to refrain from violence. We also urge the government to permit peaceful demonstrations and the right of all citizens to express their political views. We condemn the violent street actions that have escalated in recent months and that have included attacks on police with Molotov cocktails, metal projectiles and other instruments of harm. Such violence undermines public safety and further divides society. At the same time, we continue to receive credible reports of excessive force by police, including widespread and sometimes indiscriminate use of tear gas. We urge Bahraini authorities to ensure compliance with international doctrines of necessity and proportionality. Posner gets at the fundamental issues: the need for both the government and al-Wefaq to avoid violence, and for the government to keep moving forward, faster, on implementation of the BICI recommendations. No doubt compromises always seem easier when seen from 7,000 miles away in Washington. But it should be obvious that more limits on royal absolutism must be adopted, the elected parliament must have larger say, and a sense of partnership must be created—or perhaps more accurately re-created—between the royal family and the Shia professional and commercial classes and political leadership. As we have seen in Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, a situation wherein the prime minister is not only a member of the royal family but is completely independent of and not answerable to the parliament cannot last. I have previously criticized the American role as weak, and wish we had more influence with the king. It is my view that during the Bush years we did, but the Obama Administration response is that no matter how good our relationship with him we would not have been able to overcome the negative pressure coming from the Saudis. Of course that raises the issue of why we have so little influence with the Saudi king: because this is viewed as an “existential issue” in Riyadh and part of the Saudi rivalry with Iran, or because this administration has simply not built the personal relations that would be so critical in defusing a crisis such as that in Bahrain? Neither argument can be proved, but the result has been that the king of Bahrain has taken some brave and very useful steps—but not enough of them. Meanwhile, it is essential that the United States, the British, and Western human rights NGOs press al-Wefaq strongly and publicly to refrain from and to prevent violence this coming week, and to seek a negotiated settlement. It may all be impossible: too much violence in the last year, too little trust, too little leadership. And that is why I began by saying developments in Bahrain in the past year have been depressing. If one outlines the realistic demands of Bahrainis—for more movement toward constitutional monarchy, for fuller implementation of the BICI recommendations, for justice, for an end to violence—a compromise path forward does not appear impossible. Bahrainis are suffering from plenty of interference from their neighbors designed to prevent such accommodations, and perhaps there is a place for a positive foreign role—the kind that people like Kofi Annan and Marti Ahtisaari have played elsewhere—if the next few weeks bring nothing but confrontations. Anyone who wishes Bahrainis well must hope that with a year of turmoil behind them Shia and Sunni Bahrainis, from opposition political activists to the king himself, will try again and try harder than they have in the recent past. Bahrain’s travails need not end in tragedy, but the opportunities to find a better outcome are few and the passage of time is narrowing the chances.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams February 12, 2012 Pressure Points
  • Iran
    Iran and the U.S.-Saudi Relationship
    The U.S.-Saudi relationship has become increasingly strained since the onset of the Arab awakening, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions could pose further challenges, says expert F. Gregory Gause III.
    Explainer Video with Paul B. Stares and F. Gregory Gause III February 1, 2012
  • Saudi Arabia
    Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East
    Play
    Leading regional experts Gregory Gause, III and Toby C. Jones assess the stability of Saudi Arabia, its role in the reshaped region, and the future of U.S.-Saudi relations.
    Event December 31, 1969
  • Saudi Arabia
    Saudi Arabia on the Edge
    Of all the countries in the world that are vital to the strategic and economic interests of the United States, Saudi Arabia is the least understood by the American people. Saudi Arabia's unique place in Islam makes it indispensable to a constructive relationship between the non-Muslim West and the Muslim world. For all its wealth, the country faces daunting challenges that it lacks the tools to meet: a restless and young population, a new generation of educated women demanding opportunities in a closed society, political stagnation under an octogenarian leadership, religious extremism and intellectual backwardness, social division, chronic unemployment, shortages of food and water, and troublesome neighbors. Today's Saudi people, far better informed than all previous generations, are looking for new political institutions that will enable them to be heard, but these aspirations conflict with the kingdom's strict traditions and with the House of Saud's determination to retain all true power. Meanwhile, the country wishes to remain under the protection of American security but still clings to a system that is antithetical to American values. Basing his work on extensive interviews and field research conducted in the kingdom from 2008 through 2011 under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, Thomas W. Lippman dissects this central Saudi paradox for American readers, including diplomats, policymakers, scholars, and students of foreign policy. A Council on Foreign Relations Book
    Book by Thomas W. Lippman January 2, 2012
  • Middle East and North Africa
    (Mostly) Wise Words About Saudi Arabia
    The Council on Foreign Relations has just published an excellent Council Special Report entitled “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” by F. Gregory Gause III. Prof. Gause is, as always, worth reading on any Middle East subject. The report can be found here. I do have one argument with Greg Gause, which is worth stating. He notes that there are many important issues as to which the Kingdom and United States have common interests—nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism are examples. On other matters, such as Saudi internal politics, we do not. He concludes that “Maximizing U.S. leverage in the bilateral relationship requires a consistent U.S. focus on its most important priorities” and urges that we push the areas of disagreement to the side (though not that we abandon them). I am not so sure. Issues in this category "that should not make the top priorities list" include the gross discrimination against women in Saudi Arabia and its treatment of Christianity (not one church is permitted in the Kingdom, nor are priests permitted to minister the sacraments freely to the hundreds of thousands of Roman Catholics working and living there). Given our own beliefs about freedom of religion, it seems to me that we cannot and should not be silent about these abuses and that it is likely we’ll be more vocal about them in the future. What’s more, the refusal of the royal family to permit dissent or to allow the people of the Kingdom a say in the way it is governed are dangerous practices. We should learn from the Arab Spring that stability may be more apparent than real. The Saudi royal response to the Arab Spring has been to allocate about $130 billion to palliate the masses, which is itself suggestive: someone in the royal family realizes there are grave problems that need to be addressed and that stability is not assured without such a massive expense. Perhaps it is not assured even with such expense, over the long run, unless the royals stop treating the country as their property and start giving the twenty-five million people who are citizens a role in governance. Kuwait has a real parliament; why not Saudi Arabia? And why should we not say so? The practice of concentrating on areas where we agreed and avoiding the domestic political issues where we did not turned out pretty badly in Egypt, where millions of people resent our partnership with Mubarak over the decades while he was their oppressor. Saudi Arabia is not Egypt, for the royal family has considerable legitimacy and even greater cash reserves at its disposal. But I suspect that Greg Gause and I would differ on how loudly and how often the United States should criticize the Saudi royal family over what he calls "domestic" issues. Read his report and see what you think.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams December 15, 2011 Pressure Points
  • Political Movements
    Saudis’ New Mideast Challenges
    With the upheavals in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia must grapple with a changing political landscape, including Salafis participating in elections, says F. Gregory Gause. At the same time, he says the country remains vested in curbing Iranian influence in Arab affairs.
    Interview with F. Gregory Gause III and Bernard Gwertzman December 9, 2011
  • Saudi Arabia
    Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East
    The United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. The 1990-91 Gulf War is perhaps the most obvious example, but their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship's importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia's stability. In this Council Special Report, sponsored by the Center for Preventive Action, F. Gregory Gause III first explores the foundations of Riyadh's present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh's leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government's cause. This is not to say that Gause believes that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. He points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, Gause argues, the leadership's response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost. Turning to the regional situation, Gause finds it no less complex. Saudi Arabia has wielded considerable influence with its neighbors through its vast oil reserves, its quiet financial and political support for allies, and the ideological influence of salafism, the austere interpretation of Islam that is perhaps Riyadh's most controversial export. For all its wealth and religious influence, however, Saudi Arabia's recent record has been less than successful. It was unable to counter Iranian influence in post-Saddam Iraq, it could not prevent Hezbollah taking power in Lebanon, and its ongoing efforts to reconcile Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have come to naught. The U.S.-Saudi relationship has, unsurprisingly, been affected by these and other challenges, including Saudi unhappiness with Washington's decision to distance itself from Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the lack of progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Iran. For its part, the United States is unhappy with the Saudi intervention in Bahrain and Saudi support for radical Islamists around the region and the world. The two traditional anchors of the U.S.-Saudi relationship—the Cold War and U.S. operation of Riyadh's oil fields—are, Gause notes, no longer factors. It is no wonder, he contends, that the relationship is strained when problems are myriad and the old foundations of the informal alliance are gone. It would be far better, Gause argues, to acknowledge that the two countries can no longer expect to act in close concert under such conditions. He recommends that the United States reimagine the relationship as simply transactional, based on cooperation when interests—rather than habit—dictate. Prioritizing those interests will therefore be critical. Rather than pressuring Riyadh for domestic political reform, or asking it to reduce global oil prices, Gause recommends that the United States spend its political capital where it really matters: on maintaining regional security, dismantling terrorist networks, and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There have been few relationships more important to the United States than that with Saudi Arabia, and it is vital that, as it enters a new phase, the expectations and priorities of both countries are clear. In Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East, Gause effectively assesses the challenges and opportunities facing Saudi Arabia and makes a compelling argument for a more modest, businesslike relationship between Washington and Riyadh that better reflects modern realities. As the United States begins reassessing its commitments in the Greater Middle East, this report offers a clear vision for a more limited—but perhaps more appropriate and sustainable—future partnership.
    Council Special Report by F. Gregory Gause III December 2, 2011 Center for Preventive Action
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Is Saudi Arabia Next?
    Protesters chant slogans and hold posters of prisoners during a protest in Qatif on March 9, 2011. The banner reads: "Peacefully, Peacefully," (Courtesy Reuters). Recent demonstrations and violence in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province that left four people dead and nine others wounded raise the question: Is Saudi Arabia the next country that will encounter the wave of popular unrest sweeping the Arab world? Already the Arab uprisings’ effects have been felt in Saudi Arabia. In February and March, soon after Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt, Saudi Facebook activists began calling for a revolution and declared a “Day of Rage” for March 11, emulating the youth activists in Egypt and Tunisia. However, the “Day of Rage” fizzled out, and demonstrations were held only in the Eastern Province, home to Saudi’s restive Shia minority. Since then, things have been relatively quiet, at least until recently. One reason is that unlike Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya, which are technically republics, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy run by the Al Saud family. So far, the Arab monarchies have been better suited to absorb discontent. In many of the region’s monarchies, while the king maintains ultimate control, power is more diffuse and thus the top leaders are able to deflect some criticism. Monarchies have so far proven to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of their countrymen than have the faux-republics. That doesn’t mean that they are immune to unrest, as we have seen in Jordan and Bahrain, the latter though is anomalous in that a Sunni minority rules over a Shiite majority. But they are better positioned to manage it. Saudi Arabia’s unique status as the “custodian of the two holy places,” Mecca and Medina, also confers legitimacy on the kingdom’s rulers. As the birthplace of Islam, and with an official religious establishment recognized well beyond the country’s borders, the Arabian kingdom ultimately exercises authority through religion and through the ruling family’s alliance with the Wahabi clerical establishment. But the Saudis are not taking any chances, and throughout the region’s uprisings, the royal family has employed a combination of sticks and carrots to help ensure domestic tranquility. Saudi troops have been deployed in force to deter any possible unrest. Thus far, any domestic turbulence has been contained to the Shia areas of Saudi Arabia, far from the majority Sunni population areas. At the same time, Saudi largesse has been more widely distributed through massive aid packages and wage increases. In February King Abdullah introduced a domestic aid program worth $37 billion. The King rolled out an even more comprehensive $97 billion aid package on March 18. He provided $70 billion alone for five hundred thousand units of low-income housing and sent $200 million as a reward to the religious establishment. Additionally, the king upped unemployment benefits, paid a bonus worth two months’ salary to public servants, and increased the education allowance for all students. Fortunately for the kingdom, the nine million barrels of oil Saudi produces each day provide tremendous revenue for it to dole out these kinds of subsidies. Moreover, this income, combined with Saudi’s huge cash reserves, estimated at $400 billion, allows the ruling family to maintain comprehensive security and intelligence apparatuses, the ability to wield huge influence over both domestic and international media, and the general ability to quell unrest by throwing money at problems. One key challenge for the country is the high unemployment among the young. Youth unemployment in Saudi Arabia is estimated at 25 percent or higher. Providing a promising future for these educated younger Saudis is a major challenge to the kingdom, despite its overall wealth. The other key variable that could trigger real instability centers on succession to the relatively moderate King Abdullah who is eighty-seven years-old and ailing. Abdullah has introduced some progressive policies by holding municipal elections in September and calling for women to be allowed to vote in the next municipal elections scheduled for 2015. But the recently appointed Crown Prince, Nayef, is viewed as a social conservative unlikely to adopt progressive policies for the kingdom. Despite reassuring Vice President Biden that his policy aim would be one of continuity in terms of reform and closeness with the United States, it is difficult to predict how he’ll guide the kingdom should he succeed Abdullah. At seventy-eight years-old, Nayef’s own reign is not likely to last long, if it occurs at all. And his perceived closeness to the conservative religious establishment could trigger discontent among liberals. For now, the kingdom seems stable. Through its rapid intervention in Bahrain, and deployment of troops at home, Saudi leadership has signaled that popular dissent will be met with swift resistance. And the spread of largesse and minimal reforms have served as a palliative to a largely passive population. Nonetheless, the kingdom is likely to face some significant succession challenges in the not too distant future. How the Al Saud family manages its upcoming successions will be pivotal for Saudi Arabia’s stability. Tumult in the succession process could provide an opening for popular unrest to billow out—especially if uprisings continue to ignite the broader region in the months and years to come.
    Blog Post by Robert Danin December 1, 2011 Middle East Matters
  • Saudi Arabia
    Guest Post: The Demise of Saudi Crown Prince Sultan
      Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Sultan (Fahad Shadeed/Courtesy Reuters) My good friend and guest blogger Rachel Bronson weighs in on Saudi Crown Prince Sultan’s death and Saudi succession.  Although the death of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdel Aziz al-Saud on Saturday has led to some speculation about the stability of Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince’s death will actually do much to settle Saudi politics. Sultan’s death will allow King Abdullah to better manage succession in the last few years of his reign. There are two crucial positions in Saudi Arabia’s succession: the crown prince (the heir to the throne) and the second deputy prime minister. The second deputy prime minister is expected to become crown prince once the crown prince becomes the king.  In 2009, King Abdullah named the powerful Minister of Interior Prince Naif second deputy prime minister.  It was notable that it took Abdullah four years to do this.  Naif has both strengths and drawbacks--he is powerful, and has been a tremendous asset in going after home-grown terrorists, but he is more comfortable with the more conservative and at times retrograde elements in Saudi politics.  It seemed that Abdullah may have been looking for a more progressive second deputy prime minister.  By 2009, either because he couldn’t find a suitable alternative, didn’t have the internal support to name an alternate, or because he had come to see the value of Naif’s iron fist, Abdullah gave his half brother the nod. This appointment is why Naif is the front runner to become crown prince. But, and an important but, in 2006, King Abdullah instituted reforms to the succession process in which he created a Bay’ah, or Allegiance, Council which purportedly gives some of his brothers, sons, and nephews greater influence in selecting the next crown prince.  In theory the Council could choose a different crown prince, but in practice this is unlikely. Here’s the good news:  Crown Prince Sultan had been sick for quite some time and his incapacity was a problem for leadership.  It added insecurity into the succession planning.  Many close observers feared that King Abdullah would die before the Crown Prince.  Today, and for the next few months, or years, however long Abdullah continues to rule, he can help manage the transition.  This will likely lead to a King Naif at some point in the future.  But let’s see who Abdullah or the Bay’ah Council positions as Naif’s successor.  The King still has considerable power to influence this very important choice. Rachel Bronson is the Vice President, Studies at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 
    Blog Post by Steven A. Cook October 23, 2011 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
  • Yemen
    Resetting U.S. Policy Toward Yemen
    Introduction Yemen is slipping into an uncertain and dangerous future. In early June 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has ruled the country for the past thirty-three years, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. The next day he flew to Saudi Arabia for emergency medical treatment, where he remained for three months before a dramatic and unannounced return to Sanaa last week. During his absence, Saleh's eldest son, Ahmed, and a quartet of nephews moved into the presidential palace, threatening open war if there is a move toward a political transition. Lined up against Saleh and his heirs is a creaky alliance of former foes and defected generals who agree on only one single point: Saleh can longer be president. Nearly half of the regular army is in rebellion under the command of Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a general from Saleh's own tribe. But this is much more than a two-sided fight between old comrades-in-arms. Various militia groups have taken advantage of the fracturing of state authority to further their own sectarian agendas. In the north, near the border with Saudi Arabia, the Huthis have solidified their control over large swaths of territory. In the southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa, fighters linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have made a frightening surge, overrunning towns and military bases. Neither military faction is willing to openly and forcefully confront the militants for fear of weakening themselves ahead of a potential civil war. In this murky mixture of competing interests, U.S. policy is adrift. Aware of the danger AQAP poses to the United States, the Obama administration has dramatically increased air and drone strikes in Yemen. At best, this is a delaying tactic designed to keep AQAP off-balance until the Yemeni military can act. Airpower alone is not enough to defeat AQAP. Indeed, AQAP may actually grow stronger as a result of strikes. Even more worrisome, this is al-Qaeda's second incarnation in the country. The gains of 2002 and 2003 have been forfeited by years of neglect when U.S. policy bounced from one crisis to the next without an overarching structure. What is needed now for Yemen is a strategic reset that has three goals: initiating a decisive political transition at the top, attacking the roots of AQAP's support in Yemen, and mobilizing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to energize Yemen's failing economy. The Challenge in Yemen For the past three decades President Saleh has ruled Yemen by playing different opposition groups against one another. This autocratic, patronage style of governing in which Saleh's allies were rewarded and his opponents harassed alienated large portions of the population. By 2004, it had helped spark a tribal revolt in the north. Endemic corruption and poor governance also contributed to the rise of a secessionist movement in the south three years later, further undermining Yemen's perpetually weak economy. Although cognizant of these problems, the United States has been primarily concerned with the threat posed by AQAP—the armed threat that least worries Saleh and the Yemeni government. Washington has relied heavily on air and drone strikes, which limit the immediate danger to U.S. service personnel and can be executed more cheaply than traditional military means. But such an approach has significant drawbacks: errant missiles and civilian casualties have helped radicalize a new generation of fighters and convinced many that Yemen—like Iraq and Afghanistan—is now a legitimate theater of jihad. Elements of a Broader Strategy Given the messy and deep-seated problems in Yemen, the United States must be realistic about what it can accomplish. With limited resources and an even more limited public appetite for additional foreign policy burdens at this time, the United States has to leverage the power and influence of regional actors, principally Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Although relations with the kingdom have grown increasingly contentious since the onset of the Arab Awakening, there is room for cooperation on Yemen. Much like the United States' relationship with Mexico, Saudi Arabia views its neighbor to the south as a source of instability and potential problems for years to come. As great as the threat of an unstable Yemen is for the United States, it is even greater for Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is still willing to hedge its bets, but there is a growing realization within Riyadh that despite Saleh's return he will never be able to reunite the country. The longer Saleh remains president, the worse the situation in Yemen will become. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia broadly agree on the main problems: the lack of a political transition, the danger of AQAP, and the simmering threat of Yemen's fragile economy. Neither country can solve the challenge of Yemen unilaterally, but together they can help arrest the country's downward descent. Political Transition It is impossible for Yemen to move forward as long as Saleh's sons and nephews are in a position to scuttle deals that they view as unfavorable. The United States must work with its partners in the Gulf to remove this roadblock to a political transition. Last year, the United States earmarked $75 million to assist Yemen's counterterrorism forces in the Ministry of the Interior and gave millions more to other units, including those under the command of Saleh's eldest son. The United States should, in conjunction with the GCC, inform Ahmed and his cousins that this money as well as GCC funding will be cut off and targeted UN sanctions will be applied if they do not step aside and agree to a military reshuffle and a transition council. This warning should be delivered in three stages. First, the United States, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, should convey a private message that offers a face-saving exit but assures Saleh's immediate relatives that punitive measures will be taken if they do not step aside. If this fails, the warning should then be delivered publicly. Finally, if they still refuse to step down, the money should be cut and sanctions implemented. Ahmad and his cousins are highly dependent on money to buy the continued loyalty of their troops. Without it, many in the Republican Guards will join the anti-Saleh coalition. In the event that a coordinated approach of cutting off the money and sanctions does not work, the United States should pursue a policy of forced isolation. To be successful, the United States would need to peel off Saleh's important remaining domestic allies—such as parliamentarians, ministers, and tribal sheikhs—through a process of pressure and enticements until Saleh and his immediate family are completely isolated. Attacking AQAP's Roots An al-Qaeda franchise has never been defeated by force alone. The only time an affiliate has been successfully dismantled was in Saudi Arabia, from 2003 to 2006, when the population turned on the terrorist group. To replicate that success in Yemen, the United States needs to partner with the governments of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia to counter AQAP's propaganda. Washington and Riyadh must attempt to spark a public debate about AQAP and its methods, drawing public attention to the fact that the group kills civilians and consistently violates Islamic norms. Riyadh's experience using soft power to undermine al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemeni officials' knowledge of the local scene will be vital in ensuring that militants are not replaced as quickly as they are killed. For its part, the United States should contribute a small team of Arabic-speaking diplomats with experience in Yemen. Together with their Saudi and Yemeni colleagues, U.S. policymakers should establish a joint center for public awareness. The center would seek to deprive AQAP of one of its main assets: unchallenged public assertions. At the moment, no entity in Yemen is speaking up in Arabic against AQAP, which means that the organization is able to shape its public message uncontested. The joint center would work to make al-Qaeda as synonymous with terrorism in Yemen as it is in the United States. Special Fund The United States should also partner with the GCC to establish a special fund to help stabilize Yemen's economy and provide humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Saleh's departure. The initial capital for the fund, which is contingent on Saleh's leaving office, should come from the more than $2 billion GCC countries pledged at the 2006 London conference but have yet to deliver due to concerns about corruption. The fund should be chaired by the director of the Arab Fund, with all donor countries and institutions represented on the board. This would do much to eliminate donor competition and coordination failures, which have often hampered efforts in the past. Once the economy is stabilized, the focus of the fund should shift to longer-term investment designed to create jobs and technical training. None of these recommendations will miraculously turn Yemen into a model democracy overnight, but together they will arrest the country's rapid downward descent and deny AQAP and other militants the opportunity to exploit the turmoil in ways that threaten U.S. security and interests in the region. However, as Yemen slips further into chaos, the opportunity to implement these measures is fast diminishing.
    Policy Innovation Memorandum by Gregory Johnsen September 27, 2011 Center for Preventive Action
  • Palestinian Territories
    The Saudis Pony Up
    Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah attends a cabinet meeting in Riyadh March 24, 2008 (Courtesy Reuters). Saudi Arabia has just announced that it will donate $200 million to the Palestinian Authority. This is very good news. First, the PA needs the money to meet payroll expenses, and in recent months has been able to pay only half salaries on two occasions. The Saudi gift should keep the PA solvent to the end of the year, when combined with other expected aid. Second, this shows a continuing Saudi commitment to Prime Minister Fayyad’s effort to build the institutions of an eventual Palestinian state. This strengthens Fayyad’s hand politically, because it is reasonable to think that were he not guiding the expenditure of this money the Saudis would be even more reluctant to give it. Third, the Saudi gift may lead others in the Gulf to be more generous as well. Why did the Saudis give this much, and why now? That remains unclear. I hope they were embarrassed by their failure to give the PA much support this year: prior to this week they had given Jordan $1.4 billion and the Palestinians only $30 million. Perhaps they thought this supported the Palestinian moves at the UN. Whatever the reason, the effect is good. The theatrics at the UN will not bring Palestinian statehood any closer. Building state institutions from the ground up will, and that requires supporting serious work by the PA.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams September 20, 2011 Pressure Points
  • Middle East and North Africa
    The Successor to Prince Saud?
    An interesting royal decree from Saudi Arabia this past week suggests who may finally succeed Saud bin Faisal as foreign minister. Saud, son of the late King Faisal (who ruled 1964-1975) has been foreign minister for thirty-five years. Appointed at the age of thirty-four, he is the world’s longest-serving foreign minister and a sharp player. But now Saud is ill (Parkinson’s among other ailments), and has several times asked to retire. There has for years been a guessing game as to who might succeed him: his brother, Turki, former Saudi Intelligence chief and once their ambassador to Washington? But Turki did not get good reviews back home for his performance here, and does not have the reputation his older brother enjoys. The current ambassador here, Adel al-Jubeir? But he is not a member of the royal family, which has been a prerequisite. Might the job be given out as part of succession deal among the rival clans in the royal family after the death of King Abdallah (who is eighty-seven years old according to official accounts but may be older, and is also not in perfect health)? It appears that the king has his own candidate and wants to line up the job for him now—while he still can. An AFP news item on July 22nd revealed that “’Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has appointed his son deputy foreign minister with the rank of minister,’ the official SPA news agency said on Friday. ‘The king appoints Prince Abdel Aziz bin Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz as deputy foreign minister with the rank of minister,’ SPA quoted a royal decree as saying.” The prince is forty-eight, and his brief resume does not suggest him as the most obvious candidate. But he has since 1989 been a close adviser to his father, who was then Crown Prince and after 1996 (due to the incapacitation of King Fahd) ruled the country as regent. Close Saudi watchers will now wish to see if in the new position the prince actually takes up new duties and begins to position himself to take over for Saud. Of course, a new king will have the right to choose his own ministers—but this move by the present king certainly gives his son a leg up on the competition.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams July 29, 2011 Pressure Points
  • Palestinian Territories
    Aid Grants Reveal Saudi Priorities
    In June, Saudi Arabia granted Jordan $400 million in aid. This week, the Saudis added a billion dollars more, and this $1.4 billion is cash—not loans, not investments, but budget support. This amount almost entirely covers Jordan’s projected budget deficit for 2011 of $1.5 billion, and of course the country will receive additional aid from other governments. By contrast, the Saudis have given $30 million to the Palestinian Authority in 2011. And partly as a result, the PA is broke, has a billion dollars in debt, and has now put its public employees on half salary. These figures provide a far better insight into Saudi priorities than speeches or UN votes.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams July 28, 2011 Pressure Points
  • Middle East and North Africa
    On Palestinians, Pledges, and Budgets
    A fair measure of the dedication to the Palestinian cause on the part of Arab governments is whether they put their money where their mouth is. In that context, a news story today conveys an answer: "The Palestinian Authority will pay its employees only half their monthly salaries in July, the prime minister told reporters here on Sunday, because of what he said was ’the failure of donors, including our Arab brothers, to fulfill their pledges.’" Donors had pledged $971 million to the Palestinian Authority this year, but the year is half over and only $330 million has been delivered. It turns out that only the UAE, Algeria, and Oman have met the pledges they made years ago via the Arab League. The rest, including the vastly wealthy Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are delinquent. Despite the roughly $100 billion in extra domestic spending this year of the Arab Spring to buy off its populace, Saudi Arabia will record a budget surplus of about $25 billion. So the failure to assist the Palestinians is the product of hostility, neglect, or uninterest. By comparison, the EU significantly increased its aid to the PA this year, from 100 million to 185 million Euros, or about $275 million--and this does not count the assistance coming from individual member states of the EU. Total aid to the Palestinians from the United States runs about $600 million per year. It is probably an exaggeration to say the Palestinians would be better off if instead of all those Arab pledges they got five dollars for every speech, TV or radio program, and newspaper article in Arabic that denounces Israel and swears eternal loyalty to the Palestinian cause. Or perhaps not.
    Blog Post by Elliott Abrams July 4, 2011 Pressure Points
  • Fossil Fuels
    A Crude Predicament: The Era of Volatile Oil Prices
    There has been no shortage of reporting over the last week on the fight within OPEC over whether to expand oil production. Bob McNally and I have an essay in the forthcoming (July/August) issue of Foreign Affairs in which we argue that OPEC has largely lost the ability to moderate oil price swings. The result is the far more volatile oil market that we’ve been seeing over the past five or so years. This is a fundamentally different world from the one that Americans became used to in the 1980s and 1990s, and will require different responses from policymakers. Here’s the nut of our argument: “Much of OPEC’s influence is gone. Saudi Arabia and its partners no longer consistently hold the large volumes of spare capacity they once did. And there are no ready replacements waiting in the wings. The oil market is in for a rocky ride, with major economic and geopolitical consequences: underinvestment in the development of energy, greater economic sensitivity to geopolitical unrest in oil-producing regions and shipping lanes, and a higher risk of recessions. The United States will find it impossible to eliminate price swings in the coming years, and so it will need to learn to live with them as best it can.” We then discuss the sources of volatility (Saudi Arabia no longer has the same means or motive to stabilize markets that it once did), the potential consequences (more difficult investment decisions for individuals and firms, a trickier climate for monetary and fiscal policy, greater sensitivity to geopolitical unrest), and appropriate policy responses (which need to encourage a mix of robust and dependable supply, decreased demand, and better functioning physical and financial markets). There’s a lot more detail in the piece, some of which I’ll discuss in subsequent posts, but for now, I encourage readers to take a look. (The piece is behind a pay wall, but if you use the link in this post, you’ll get it for free, at least for a while.) I’ll also have something to say in later posts about a few ideas that we didn’t manage to squeeze in.
    Blog Post by Michael Levi June 13, 2011 Energy, Security, and Climate