Libya

Post-Qaddafi Libya will face difficulties with rebel infighting, the anger of Qaddafi loyalists, and more, but the long-time dictator’s death also creates an opening for a more peaceful country. CFR’s Richard Haass, Ed Husain, and Ray Takeyh weigh Libya’s prospects.

A staff member of the Libyan embassy steps on a portrait of Muammar Qaddafi in front of the embassy building in Sofia July 25, 2011 (Stoyan Nenov/Courtesy Reuters). CFR.org just posted a short video interview I did on what Qaddafi’s death means for Libya and beyond. To watch this video on YouTube, please click here. Several points I would highlight: Qaddafi’s death is a mixed blessing for Libyans. It conclusively ends his more than forty year rule and opens up a new chapter for Libya. But it also robs the country of the opportunity of having him stand before his accusers, either in Tripoli or at the International Criminal Court, for the myriad crimes he committed. His bloody death could also make him a martyr down the road, particularly if Libya fails to make the transition to a better country for its people. Libya now faces a tremendous challenge. It must unite around a new regime and instill order and stability. The country lacks real institutions--Qaddafi was the state--and there is no unified military that can bring order and stability to the country, at least in the short term. Having intervened in Libya to protect civilians and then topple Qaddafi through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the international community, and especially the western powers that intervened militarily in Libya, now have a responsibility to help support Libya’s transition to a more liberal and peaceful order. Continued international engagement and support for a peaceful post-conflict Libya will send an important positive message to the rest of the region that what matters is what happens after tyrants fall. Should the international community now walk away from Libya, it risks leaving a failed state in its wake that could be a haven to Islamist radicals and other extremist forces. It could also inadvertently send the signal to many would-be activists seeking change within the Arab world that they should not take risks, lest future chaos and violence turn out to be worse than the stable autocrats they know.

South Africa's President Jacob Zuma (L) talks with Ramtane Lamamra, the African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, during an emergency summit of the AU Peace and Security Council in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa August 26, 2011. (STR New/Courtesy Reuters) On September 20, the African Union and South Africa recognized the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the government of Libya. On the same day, the UN General Assembly voted one hundred and fourteen to seventeen with fifteen abstentions to seat the NTC envoy as the representative of Libya. Nevertheless, as the vote shows, opinion on the transitional government remains divided. Though the UN credentials committee recommended that the NTC to be seated, Angola, on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), moved to defer action. That motion was defeated by one hundred and seven to twenty-two. Led by South Africa, some Africans have criticized NATO’s extended intervention in Libya as exceeding its security council mandate to protect civilians. There was also unease about the overthrow with outside support of the Qaddafi government, which has long sustained the AU politically and financially. Libyan racism against African migrant workers in areas liberated from Qaddafi has received press play and probably reduced African popular enthusiasm for the new Libyan government. As recently as August 23, the South African foreign minister said Pretoria would not recognize a rebel government. “As far as we are concerned, if this government falls, there is no government,” Maite Nkoana-Mashabane said, according to press reports. The African Union’s Peace and Security Council met in Addis Ababa on August 26 and its ad hoc committee on Libya met on September 14 in Pretoria, preparing the way for AU recognition. (As late as the day before the meeting, Zuma reiterated again the AU position of nonrecognition for the NTC.) According to the press, at both meetings the AU urged Libyans to form an inclusive government that would promote national unity, reconciliation and democracy. It also urged the transitional government to protect foreign workers, including African migrants. Some Africans have openly criticized the AU and South Africa for being slow to recognize the Libyan change of government. At a joint, on-the-record appearance in New York with Sierra Leone president Koroma, Ivory Coast president Ouattara criticized the AU’s slow response, and President Koroma agreed that the tardiness was evidence that the AU remains a “work in progress.” At least in the short term, Pretoria’s and the AU’s late recognition of the NTC will probably diminish their continental reputations. But with by far the largest and most modern economy in Africa, South Africa cannot be ignored. And the AU is the sole repository for African aspirations for transnational unity.

South Africa's President Jacob Zuma (C) greets Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi (R) before their meeting in Tripoli in this handout picture taken May 30, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters) The day before an African Union meeting in Pretoria to discuss Libya, Zuma reminded the South African National Assembly that the AU does not recognize the Libyan transitional government, despite the fact that Qaddafi is gone. These statements are part of what has been Zuma’s consistent opposition to intervention in Libya, including the NATO airstrikes and unfreezing Libyan assets for the NTC. (South Africa ultimately agreed to the later, but only after pressure). This is curious given that twenty African governments have recognized the NTC, including, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, and even Sudan. Or maybe not all that curious. South Africa commentator Greg Mills explains Zuma’s quixotic stance, one that, as some commentators have noted, risks undermining South African credibility and effectiveness as a regional leader on foreign policy. Mills identifies six “drivers”: “a visceral rejection of external involvement,” which, he notes, likely has a racial dimension considering NATO’s role in Qaddafi’s fall; that South Africa is trying to reestablish its “radical credentials,” which were damaged by South Africa’s initial support for the UN resolution that brought NATO into the fray. This approach, Mills argues, is a low cost way of doing so, at least domestically. (Internationally, South Africa has likely diminished its political capital). Mills’ third driver is the impact of the Israel-Palestinian conflict on South Africa’s Middle East policy, and its perceived similarities in South Africa with apartheid. Number four is “a predilection to replicate the South Africa negotiated solution,” which Mill’s argues the success of has been “distorted and mythologized”; and number 5 is the “misplaced notion” of a global power shift east.” Finally, and perhaps most damningly, is Qaddafi’s proclivity for “spraying money around the continent and at its politicians,” implying that at least some of the former Libyan leader’s support has been purchased. Read his article here. H/T to Asch Harwood.

The Syrian regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters didn’t trip the same alarm bells as Libya’s did for the UN Security Council, but the international community is gradually losing patience with Assad, says expert Edward Luck, a special advisor to the UN secretary-general.

As rebels try to strengthen their hold on Tripoli, the odds of a peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Libya are long and the need for ongoing international intervention is very likely, says CFR’s Robert Danin.

A Libyan rebel gestures at the frontline, 60 km (37 miles) west of Ajdabiyah (Esam Al-Fetori/Courtesy Reuters) My friend, Karim Mezran, the director of the Centro Studi Americani in Rome weighs in on U.S. recognition of the Libyan Transitional National Council. Last Thursday (July 14), the Washington Post ran  an editorial advocating what many have long pressed the Obama administration to do: recognize Libya’s Transitional National Council (TNC) (as the rebels’ government is called) as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people . This legal and diplomatic recognition allows the TNC to claim access to the billions of dollars of Libyan assets frozen in many Western countries.  Although many legal obstacles remain, all agree that recognition constitutes a major step  in this direction. Is this really a good idea? Most of the objections  to recognition have focused on the risk of recognizing a rebel government before it has conquered the capital of the state,  creating a dangerous precedent or emphasized the ambiguous background of some of the TNC’s members or questioned their democratic credentials.  These concerns also include potential radical Islamist influences within the Council or its relative vulnerability to the many militias that are springing up all over the eastern part of the country.  For those who have advocated for recognition, these are all valid issues, but are either easily overcome or ignored. The Post declares that the Benghazi based administration “has shown itself to be moderate and responsible” and that “it has committed itself repeatedly to an agenda of democracy and personal freedoms” despite many reports to the contrary.  Human Rights Watch, for example, has raised questions about the rebels’ commitment to basic human rights and there is credible evidence that prisoners in TNC-controlled jails have been tortured. There are, however, other reasons why the United States should not have offered official recognition to the TNC, notably the increased risks of splitting the country. The situation on the ground is stalled. The rebels in the western mountains are strong enough to control some villages, but definitely not enough to mount an attack on Tripoli. The forces in the East have made little real progress in weeks.  The recent liberation of Brega though very important does not alter significantly the situation on the ground. Defectors from the Libyan army have expressed skepticism that the rebel army can ultimately prevail. All of this, coupled with the wavering European engagement, leads to affirm that the only way to get out of this impasse is to negotiate directly with Qaddafi. Anyone who knows the Libyan leader knows that he respects only one power, the United States of America.  To be effective, the Americans should be able to exercise strong influence on both sides to force them to accept a negotiated solution, though recognition of the TNC has weakened Washington’s position. Recognizing the rebel’s government has outraged Qaddafi and his supporters, while at the same time depriving the United States of a powerful tool to pressure the TNC into accepting a possibly unpopular negotiated solution. Moreover one has to be wary that, the TNC may feel a duty to reward the people of the eastern provinces who have suffered much in the last month. In other words, while the situation on the ground remains stalled, the TNC may prefer to spend and invest resources in the reconstruction and strengthening of the liberated zones thus decreasing the war efforts to liberate Tripolitania. The unintended consequence of this policy would hasten the breakup of Libya. This would be the worst possible outcome of recognizing the TNC.

South Africa's President Jacob Zuma (L) sits next to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (R) before their meeting in Tripoli in this handout picture taken May 30, 2011. (Ho New/Courtesy Reuters) South African President Jacob Zuma, speaking at a high-level Africa Union panel on Libya in Pretoria, recently warned NATO against the "political assassination" of Muammar Qaddafi. Following the line of other African heads of state, Zuma said that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 authorized military action only for the protection of the Libyan people and to facilitate humanitarian relief -- not regime change. Zuma also called for a negotiated compromise between Qaddafi and the rebel Transitional National Council. The Libyan crisis has gone on longer than most observers expected when South Africa voted on March 17 for UNSCR 1973. Zuma must walk a fine line as he seeks the leadership of the African Union, preserves his liberation credentials -- and yet also looks over his shoulder at the Democratic Alliance (DA), which did better than many expected among black voters in April’s local government elections, despite its image as a predominately white and middle class party.    The ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), was a liberation movement during the days of apartheid and received funding and political support from Qaddafi. Further, many of Zuma’s ANC constituents will not be happy at the spectacle of NATO bombs apparently intended to bring about regime change.   On the other hand, the opposition Democratic Alliance  has welcomed Qaddafi’s indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The party’s spokesman said that Qaddafi has lost all legitimacy and only his arrest and prosecution will lead to democracy and peace in Libya. The DA called on the Zuma government to support the ICC’s indictment and recalled that South Africa’s constitution recognizes international law.   The ICC indictment may make Zuma’s way out -- a negotiated settlement between Qaddafi and the rebels -- more difficult. And the DA will take political advantage of Zuma appearing to be "soft" on Qaddafi, especially now that he is indicted.

The Obama administration’s plan to seize frozen Libyan assets and use them for Libyan aid is a dramatic, and probably unilateral, exercise of U.S. power that is likely to yield a relatively modest sum of money, says CFR’s Stuart Levey.

NATO’s failure to apply sufficient military force to oust Libya’s leader and protect civilians is a blow to the credibility of the alliance and the United States, says expert Robert E. Hunter.