Libya

France, Britain, and other NATO nations are now heading the Libya mission, but strains among members could be amplified if NATO tries to increase support for the rebels and the coalition still hasn’t clarified its objectives, says CFR’s Charles Kupchan.  

As President Obama prepares to present his case for the Libya intervention, congressional members are squaring off over it. The president is on solid legal ground, but it could erode if Libyan operations continue for months, says CFR’s Matthew Waxman.

President Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya is hobbled by poor timing and muddled objectives, but charges that the war is illegal are unfounded, says CFR’s James Lindsay.

A boy watches as residents prepare to leave Abidjan from a bus station in Adjame March 20, 2011. (Luc Gnago/Courtesy Reuters) Despite the intense media coverage of the conflict in Libya and the relative neglect of Cote d’Ivoire, the crises are remarkably similar. Both have overwhelming humanitarian dimensions. Fighting has led to internal displacement and refugee flows as well as civilian bloodshed. But international response has been dramatically different. In Libya, western powers have engaged in military strikes while in Cote d’Ivoire, they have limited their response to diplomatic statements and sanctions. Relevant regional organizations have similarly been inconsistent. The African Union, early in the crisis, suggested intervention might be an option in Cote d’Ivoire, which it has since backed away from. The AU came out strongly against it in Libya. The Arab League came out in support of a no-fly zone in Libya, but has since begun to express reservations. The question is why has the international community reacted so differently?

[cetsEmbedGmap src=http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&ll=7.885147,13.535156&spn=101.383764,158.027344&z=3&msid=215110937314986215762.00049ec76b411dfaf6c29 width=570 height=425 marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 scrolling=no] Click on map placemarks for more details. Zoom in and out for a better look. I have been paying particular attention this past week to the following: Libya The Arab League and the African Union have taken diametrically opposed positions on a Libyan no-fly zone or other forms of foreign intervention for humanitarian purposes. With the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, we anticipate that some Western nations and possibly others will start military action this weekend. Libyan strongman Qaddafi is calling for a cease-fire, but it’s not clear what that means. We will be watching closely for the reaction from African governments to the prospect of outside military intervention, particularly any formal response from the African Union. Note, however, that the African countries currently serving as non-permanent members on the UN Security Council—Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa—all voted in favor of the resolution. Cote d’Ivoire Gbagbo is still hanging on to power, with speculation that if he can get through March he may remain in office for a long time. We continue to watch Cote d’Ivoire’s apparent descent into civil war and the high likelihood of appalling humanitarian consequences. Along with the New York Times, I continue to be concerned that Cote d’Ivoire has lost the international community’s attention. Note, however, that on March 17 UN officials requested increased “effort and funding" to deal with the worsening humanitarian situation in the country. Kenya Kibaki’s attempts to sideline the current International Criminal Court cases against Kenyan political leaders—the “Ocampo Six”—have largely failed. The Hague issued summons on March 8 for the six suspects’ Pre-trial Chamber appearances on April 7 and 8, and we will be observing the legal proceedings closely, not least because of the political effects in Nairobi. I am skeptical of claims from Kibaki’s party that the ICC trials would exacerbate ethnic conflict in Kenya.

Have you heard that all big energy sources entail risk? I can’t count the number of times in the last few days that I’ve heard some variation on the following: “Yes, nuclear involves risk. But so does oil: Don’t you remember the BP disaster just last year?” Pause for a moment and think about that. For more than a month, people have been following developments in the Middle East with rapt attention, not only because of the inspiring potential for political change, but because of the clear consequences for oil, and hence for the U.S. economy. When President Obama took to the airwaves last Friday, it was not to encourage change in Libya or reform in Bahrain – it was to tell the American people that he was monitoring their gasoline prices and would take all necessary steps to protect them. When Saudi Arabia suppressed protests last week, it might have been a moment for mourning; instead, most Americans looked at the price of oil and breathed a sigh of relief. So why on earth do we reflexively turn to the Gulf oil spill when we want an example of oil-related risk? My hunch is that the nuclear situation sends us into an “environment” and “public safety” world; the Middle East situation, in contrast, fits in the worlds of “economics” and “security”. We seem incapable of thinking about both at the same time. Part of the reason for that, I’d guess, is that many peoples’ concerns – and most experts’ expertise – doesn’t span all the areas that ultimately matter. If you care passionately about the environment, you’re probably not an aficionado of Middle East politics; if you’re focused like a laser on macroeconomics, you’re probably don’t spend that much time thinking about the environmental risks of fracking. It doesn’t help that we don’t have good analytical tools to make judgments that cut across multiple dimensions of energy risk. My 2009 study on the Canadian oil sands attempted to develop one framework; many responses predictably ignored one of the two dimensions I was looking at. This may be the natural state of affairs, but it is an awful foundation for making coherent energy policy. Until we can think about security, economics, and environmental risk at the same time, we’re going to have a lot of trouble developing an energy policy that makes sense.

President Obama needs to end his ambiguity about Libya or risk losing credibility in the Middle East, where the Saudi move into Bahrain has added to volatility, says CFR’s Robert Danin.  

Zimbabwe's President Mugabe attends the 16th African Union summit in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa. (Thomas Mukoya/Courtesy Reuters) Despite Qaddafi’s use of African mercenaries and the subsequent backlash against African migrant workers, the African Union has condemned the potential use of foreign intervention in Libya. This decision contrasts starkly with the Arab League’s recent call for a no-fly zone. The AU’s decision implies some support for Qaddafi and highlights sub-Saharan Africa’s strong opposition to outside military intervention. This is not entirely surprising: Qaddafi has been an important financier of the AU in the past, and he has backing within the organization, notably from Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. There is probably some implicit support as well among at least a few African strong men who have an interest in the failure of North Africa’s popular uprisings.

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe attends the plenary session of the Africa-South America Summit in Margarita Island September 27, 2009. (Jorge Silva/Courtesy Reuters) It appears Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe has been supporting Cote d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo and Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi’s bids to hold on to power. Mugabe, who has a long and close relationship with Qaddafi, has reportedly provided fighters to assist the Libyan dictator. In Cote d’Ivoire, the United Nations is currently investigating a possible arms shipment from Zimbabwe to Gbagbo, violating the arms embargo on the country since 2004. Although I haven’t yet seen a smoking gun in either case, I find both allegations credible and not surprising. Mugabe’s support for Gbagbo and Qaddafi can be seen as strongmen circling their wagons. So where are all these places? Learn more about Africa on the map below. Zoom out for a better perspective. [cetsEmbedGmap src=http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&ll=6.83917,15.117188&spn=63.755632,108.720703&z=4&msid=215110937314986215762.00049e27436df18b662d4 width=285 height=212.5 marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 scrolling=no]

I’m hearing more and more people ask whether an early end to the fighting in Libya might bring Libyan oil back onto the market soon. I thought a quick note was in order to explain why the answer is no. If Khadaffi manages to hold on, it will be brutal. There is no way that sanctions on Libya would be lifted quickly. The West might resign itself to a Khadaffi victory, but it will not be willing to line his pockets. Non-Western oil companies would be hard pressed to fill in, both because of technical demands, and because of the tricky international politics that would be involved. In addition, regardless of who prevails, worker safety will be a lingering concern. Foreign oil companies are not going to send their workers back in until they’re confident that they’ll be safe. It will take some time for such confidence to be established. It’s also worth remembering that prices are currently elevated in substantial part because of fears that unrest will spread. Resumed Libyan production would presumably free up spare capacity elsewhere to respond to further distruptions. But it would not remove basic concerns about contagion. Any market impact would thus be limited.

Suspected African mercenaries stand in a room within a courthouse as they are held by anti-government protesters in Benghazi February 25, 2011. (Suhaib Salem/Courtesy Reuters) Numerous, credible reports suggest Muammar Qaddafi has employed sub-Saharan African mercenaries against his own people in order to hang on to power. Some commentators even say that his mercenaries will fire on civilians at Qaddafi’s behest, in contrast to Egyptian soldiers who refused to kill their fellow countrymen to protect then-president Hosni Mubarak. Qaddafi has long had sub-Saharan African ambitions, employing grandiose pan-African rhetoric and promoting national unification schemes that never materialized. He has also meddled in the internal affairs of his weak sub-Saharan neighbors. Qaddafi even took on Nigeria, the West African hegemon. When Nigeria was experiencing religious and sectarian conflict last year, he publicly advocated the division of the country in two. He has also paid a significant share of the African Union’s bills. Qaddafi’s use of mercenaries as his personal security force demonstrates the darker side of his pan-African ambitions. Apparently, Qaddafi built up his personal African mercenary corps while he starved the regular Libyan military for funds. However, even if Qaddafi is able to hang on to power, his use of mercenaries will likely greatly diminish his stature among sub-Saharan African leaders. Qaddafi’s private military force also highlights the impotence of the 1977 Anti-Mercenary Convention, a regional treaty from the Organization of African Unity (the African Union’s precursor). Qaddafi’s use of mercenaries may also provoke an ugly reaction to Libya’s large sub-Saharan migrant worker population, most of which are drawn to the availability of jobs in the oil-rich, under-populated country. Should such a reaction materialize, I suspect many sub-Saharan Africans will try to flee the country, creating another humanitarian challenge for neighboring African governments and the international community.