Egypt

Last week the Congress passed the omnibus spending bill for fiscal years 2014 and 2015.  In one sense, this was very good news as it staves off a budget stalemate and another possible government shutdown until after the November elections.  Still, there was not much for anyone of any political persuasion to like about the bill, which seems to be a combination of unnecessary spending and gratuitous cuts. Many Egypt watchers in Washington also found a reason to groan buried deep within the 1,582-page legislation.  After the Obama administration delayed delivery of some military equipment because of the July 3 coup d’état, the Congress has paved the way for a full resumption of the assistance program to Egypt including $1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million of economic assistance.   The spending bill may have done away with the national security waiver that made it easy for an administration to overcome congressional efforts to withhold aid (see Rice, Condoleezza circa 2007) in favor of criteria that Cairo must meet to receive assistance, but it is back to business as usual.  Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), who is chairman of the Appropriations subcommittee on State Department, foreign operations, and related programs, tried to make the best of the spending bill declaring that it represented the “toughest conditions the Congress has imposed on aid to the Egyptian military.”  This seems a rather low bar given that Washington has never actually imposed any conditions on military aid to Egypt.  What Leahy does not mention, of course, is the fact that the new law exempts Egypt from Section 7008 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Law, which says that the United States will not aid governments that come to power as a result of coups d’ état. Smart people have already weighed in on the problematic details of the legislation and the outmoded nature of the U.S.-Egypt relationship—arguments to which I am sympathetic—but I am not persuaded that either reconfiguring the aid or penalizing the Egyptians is the best course right now.  This is not to suggest, as legions of Egyptians have claimed, that the military’s intervention last summer was not a coup.  It is also not to say that Egypt is on the right trajectory.  Whatever the best intentions of some Egyptians, the rationalizations of others, and even the likely fulfillment of the political roadmap that the military and the interim government promulgated last summer, Egypt’s future seems to be an authoritarian one. Given the current instability and the very real prospect for Egypt to experience demonstrations and violence for some time, the Egyptian leadership will continue to use authoritarian measures to try to establish political control. Still, there are two compelling reasons to go back to business as usual on military assistance, if only for the time being. First, if the United States is going to reconfigure its aid to the Egyptians, Washington must determine what it wants in Egypt and come to an understanding with Cairo about the future of the bilateral relationship.  There does not seem much point in changing the terms of the assistance package without a clear strategy in U.S.-Egypt relations. To do otherwise would make Washington’s approach more incoherent than it already appears to be and sow further ill will in Cairo.  Second, the United States has security interests in Egypt and the aid package is, for better or worse, the way in which Washington has bought access to Egyptian airspace, logistical support, expedited transit through the Suez Canal, and bolstered Egypt-Israel peace. There is nothing that says that the United States must use its aid this way, but these issues are important in the present, which also happens to be the short-run timeframe through which American presidents, senators, and representatives look at the world.  They simply do not want to risk placing these interests in jeopardy. Everyone wants Egyptians to realize the democratic ideals of the January 25 uprising and many would like for the United States to be able to help it achieve that inspirational goal, yet that is all quite unlikely right now. Critics of the omnibus spending legislation (and administration policy, more generally) who want the United States to dock the military aid to modify the Egyptian military’s behavior are advocating an approach that places far more weight on American diplomacy and leverage than actually exists. As noted above, all the indications run in the opposite direction of a democratic transition and to the extent that Egyptians define their struggle as an existential one, what Americans say or do does not matter. Moreover, in the apparent trauma of Mohammed Morsi’s year-long tenure and the violent aftermath, many in Egypt who were thought to be supporters of democracy have instead rallied around nationalist jingoism in the name of anti-terrorism rather than encouraging an inclusive, consensual approach to governance. Critics could make an argument that precisely because the Egyptians have so clearly veered from the democratic principles that they have vowed to uphold, now is the time to take punitive action and ramp up democracy promotion.  I do not want the United States to be complicit in enabling the worst instincts of the Egyptian leadership and its allies among the elite, but it is hard to see how punishing the military and/or devoting resources to democracy and governance programs will do much to alter the direction of politics in Egypt at this point. The basic problem in Egypt for American policymakers, legislators, and analysts is this:  No one has ever been able to answer how the United States protects its national security interests in the short run while it waits for that long run of a more stable, democratic country to emerge.  It is important to remember when looking for a solution to this conundrum that the long run is made up of a lot of short runs.  Perhaps Egypt is no longer as important to the national security of the United States.  Perhaps Washington needs to review thoroughly its entire approach to the region. Those are good debates waiting to happen. Let’s have them. In the meantime while those issues remain unsettled, Washington’s default will be to protect its security interests regardless of what is happening inside of a country like Egypt.

Significant Developments Egypt. Egyptian state media reported today that over 95 percent of those who participated in the two-day constitutional referendum voted in favor of the new charter. Estimated turnout rates fluctuate wildly, ranging from an Interior Ministry official’s report of more than 55 percent to state media reports of just over 36 percent. The turnout for the previous constitutional referendum held a year ago under then-president Mohammed Morsi was 33 percent. Egypt’s spokesman for the presidency, Ehab Badawy, said that, “This vote represents a resounding rejection of terrorism and a clear endorsement of the roadmap to democracy, as well as economic development and stability.” The Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the vote. Final results are expected to be announced in a few days. Syria. Secretary of State John Kerry today urged the National Syrian Coalition, Syria’s main opposition group, to decide to attend next week’s Geneva II peace talks tomorrow. Earlier today, Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Muallem confirmed the Assad regime’s participation in a letter to UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon; the National Coordination Body, a centrist opposition group in Syria, announced that it would not attend. Speaking at a news conference after meeting with Muallem and Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that, “Iran must be and inevitably will become part of complex efforts to settle the Syrian problem.” Meanwhile, Ahmet Uzumcu, head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, said today that the full removal and destruction of mustard gas and the components of Sarin and VX will likely be delayed until the end of June. The agreed upon deadline was the end of March. At a donors conference in Kuwait yesterday, Kerry pledged an extra $380 million in U.S. aid for Syrian civilians. Iraq. Members of an Al Qaeda affiliate have passed out pamphlets in Fallujah over the last two days urging residents to join the fight against the Iraqi government. Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki said today that he has given a list to the United States detailing the weapons necessary to take back Anbar province from Al Qaeda militants. Maliki also said he plans to request counterterrorism training from the United States and noted that the situation in Iraq is connected to the conflict in Syria: “The whole region’s events are connected…to solve the problem in Iraq we cannot look at it in isolation from the other events in the region.” Meanwhile, more devastating car bombings struck Baghdad yesterday, killing at least sixty-four people. U.S. Foreign Policy Benghazi Report. The Senate Intelligence Committee released a report yesterday on the September 11, 2012 attack against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, concluding that the attack could have been prevented. The report faulted the State Department for not increasing security at its mission despite intelligence warnings of terrorist activities. It also criticized the intelligence community for not sharing information about the existence of the CIA annex at the compound with the U.S. military. Israel. Israeli defense minister Moshe Yaalon apologized on Tuesday after being quoted earlier in the day describing U.S. secretary of state John Kerry acting on the peace process “out of an incomprehensible obsession and a messianic feeling.” U.S. State Department spokesperson Marie Harf had called Yaalon’s comments “offensive and inappropriate, especially given all that the United States has done to support Israel’s security needs and will continue to do.” The latest episode came one day after Vice President Joe Biden visited Israel to attend the funeral of former prime minister Ariel Sharon. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Lebanon. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon opened its trial into the February 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri today. Former prime minister Saad Hariri, speaking about the trial of his father’s murder, “From now on, any attempt to try to disrupt this path will be in vain.” Nonetheless, none of the four defendants in the trial, all of them members of Hezbollah, have been apprehended. Meanwhile, a suicide car bomb killed four people and wounded at least twenty-six more today in Harmel, near the Syrian border. On Tuesday, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an Al Qaeda-linked group, vowed on Twitter to continue attacking Iran and Hezbollah, after the killing of its leader. Libya. Deputy Minister for Oil and Gas Omar Chakma announced today that oil revenues were about 20 percent less than had been projected for 2013. Chakma noted that the drop off came mostly in the second half of the year when a militia in eastern Libya declared itself an autonomous government and shut down oil terminals. On Tuesday, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan told a press conference that the Libyan government would work with mediators to try to end the dispute with the militia, saying that, “We have two solutions: Through force or peaceful means. We preferred the peaceful way.” Meanwhile, Hassan al-Droui, Libya’s deputy industry minister, was assassinated while visiting his hometown of Sirte on Saturday. It was the first assassination of a senior member of Libya’s transitional government. Bahrain. Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa met with leaders of the main opposition group, Al Wefaq, yesterday to discuss the resumption of reconciliation talks. It was the first high-level meeting since 2011, when Saudi Arabia sent troops into Bahrain to restore order after protests broke out demanding political reforms. Al Wefaq released a statement calling the meeting “especially frank and very transparent.” The National Dialogue talks were suspended last week. Yemen. Suspected Al Qaeda militants attacked Raada, a Yemeni military camp today, killing at least eight soldiers and wounding ten more. Meanwhile, a farmer was killed yesterday by a U.S. drone strike that was reportedly targeting Islamist militants. Turkey. The Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey’s largest opposition group, rejected the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) proposal to amend Turkey’s top judicial body today. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the CHP, claimed yesterday that Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan is trying to establish a “one-man rule” and “concentrate all state power to himself.” Jordan-Israel-Palestine. Jordan’s Royal Palace confirmed that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Amman today for closed door talks with King Abdullah about “developments in the peace process.” Meanwhile, Israel’s Army Radio reported today that Netanyahu has added the Beit El settlement to the list of blocs Israel intends to keep in a final status agreement. An anonymous source claiming familiarity with the U.S.-brokered negotiations said that Netanyahu cited a biblical link to Beit El.  

Gamal Mubarak or Omar Suleiman?  Omar Suleiman or Gamal Mubarak?  Not too long ago this was what many Egyptians and virtually any westerner  who had an interest in Egypt  were asking.   Everyone had an answer based on the Cairo rumor mill, multiple dodgy sources like a neighbor who revealed Hosni Mubarak’s inner most thoughts based on what he had heard from his wife’s uncle who was friends with a journalist with close ties to the presidency, and sheer creativity.  We are back at it again, but this time is obviously not about Omar Pasha who died suddenly in the summer of 2012 nor Gamal who continues to languish in Tora prison, waiting for appeals to be heard in various corruption cases.  No, now everyone is asking “Will he or won’t he?”  The “he” is, of course, Major-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the man behind the July 3 coup d’état and apparently the object of much adoration among various segments of the Egyptian population and the question is whether he will run for president.  It seems that every day there is some new indication—imagined or otherwise—that the general will run. There is a case to be made for al-Sisi’s candidacy—he has captured the imaginations of many Egyptians, he represents the (momentary) consensus, he looks the part, and a distressingly large numbers of Egyptians seem to want a “firm hand” (also known as a “strong man,” as in, not necessarily democratic) guiding their country.  The calls from Egyptian notables such as Alaa al Aswany, Naguib Sawiris, and a variety of columnists, combined with huge al-Sisi posters that now adorn public spaces, the al-Sisi cupcakes, the al-Sisi sandwiches, and the al-Sisi pajamas, the man may begin to think that he has no choice but to step forward, albeit reluctantly, for “the good of Egypt.” These are superficial reasons for the Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to enter the political arena, of course. I have no idea what is in al-Sisi’s head.  No one has told me.  I am not good at reading body language.  I do not know him.  I do not know what to believe when people tell me that he will definitely run and others tell me that he will not. I do know this, however, if al-Sisi decides to run and wins it would be bad for Egypt, bad for the Egyptian armed forces, and bad for al-Sisi himself. Bad for Egypt. Egyptians understandably seem at their collective wit’s end given everything that has happened over the last three years.  Things were supposed to get better after Mubarak, there  were supposed to be brighter days after Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi’s SCAF ceded control in June 2012 to an elected president, there was going to be a light at the end of the tunnel when the military intervened on July 3 and set things straight.  Instead of a positive trajectory, political disappointment, enormous economic challenges, and a low-level insurgency are Egypt’s reality. Consequently, large numbers of Egyptians—with the encouragement of elites associated with the old order and important parts of the media—seem inclined toward an al-Sisi presidency. People are convincing themselves that Egypt needs a strong personality, if only temporarily, to put the country back on track.  They are comforted by the fact that the new constitution, which is up for referendum today and Wednesday, sets term-limits for the president to two, four-year terms.  This is an improvement in a country that has had problems with the overwhelming power of the executive, but observers should know that  1) presidential political systems are prone to the accumulation of power in the office of the presidency, and 2) there are reasons to doubt the durability of the term limits   After all, Anwar Sadat did away with them in 1980 when they became inconvenient.  The July 3 coup set a precedent that the political institutions of the state could be ignored, if powerful people and their allies agree that it is convenient to do so. One can easily imagine a scenario in which authorities override term limits in some way—security conditions, for example—to allow al-Sisi to remain in office. Another president for life is clearly not what Egypt needs. It is important to note that this is an al-Sisi-specific scenario.  It seems unlikely that Egyptians would demand that other less charismatic figures—Adly Mansour, if the “interim” label was removed from his current title or Amr Moussa, for example—stay on.  Al-Sisi is  bigger than them, though.  There is too much vested in him and his presidency before it even happens.  For his supporters, he is the man on  horseback who is going to make sure that everyone has cooking gas, the lights stay on, and the tourists come back. In ways, al-Sisi also represents for the millions who benefited from the system under Hosni Mubarak, a return to the natural order of things. Bad for the Egyptian Armed Forces. Even if Major-General al-Sisi retires from the armed forces, the fact that he will no longer be wearing epaulets on his shoulders means very little in a practical sense.  By dint of the way he rose to prominence—a coup—an al-Sisi presidency thrusts the military directly back into politics.  The military’s relationship to the political arena will be different  from the 1950s and 1960s, but at the same time the armed forces will not be able to revert to its exclusive enclaves separated from the rest of Egypt that were its hallmark in the 1990s and 2000s.  To be sure,  Mubarak came from the military and was decked out in his dress uniform when assassins’ bullets made him president and it is conventional wisdom that  the military  took a low-profile during his long presidency.  It did and it did not, lest anyone forget the prominence of Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala during the 1980s or the fact that military units—under Sami Enan—took over large swathes of Upper Egypt in the battle against terrorists after the Luxor massacre in 1997.  Still, that was a different time, before the stresses of the last three years when Egypt has come close to collapse. Even if an al-Sisi presidency would make the officers prominent politically more in perception than in fact, they would find themselves drawn into affairs they prefer to avoid.   A greater role in managing and governing the country is bad for the armed forces and runs counter to everything the officers have held dear in the almost 47 years since the 1967 defeat about the importance of avoiding the vicissitudes of politics and how the responsibilities that go with governing can be the literal death-knell for the coherence and capabilities of a modern army. Bad for al-Sisi. Great historical figures give up much for the greater good.  No doubt this is what some people are whispering in the major-general’s ear.  The multi-layered and complex problems that have engulfed Egypt, however, will likely persist despite al-Sisi’s apparent talent and charisma.  In fact, they will consume him.  As a result,  he should ignore  his current courtiers and look not to Nasser—to whom his enthusiasts have compared him—but to Hosni Mubarak.  After taking the oath of office on October 14, 1981, Mubarak gathered members of the opposition, many of whom Sadat had jailed, and promised them change and reform.  The seemingly reluctant president struck a humble tone, promising to use the Emergency Law less and allowing greater political freedoms.  It was not to be, of course, and thirty years later, General Mubarak, who was a well-liked and accomplished air force officer, languishes in ignominy in the Ma’adi military hospital.  His name will  forever be associated with authoritarian excess and Egypt’s decline. This outcome is not preordained, of course, but it is within the realm of the possible, even if al-Sisi and his supporters cannot fathom it now. For the good of Egypt, the armed forces, and himself, Major-General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi should not run for president.  

Rodger Shanahan says that Shiites fighting in Syria are doing so not for sectarian reasons, but rather for reasons of geopolitics and self-preservation. Mohammed Fadel argues that Egypt has returned to the status quo of the 1950s with the Free Officers’ moves to consolidate power by destroying their opponents. Imad Mesdoua analyzes Libya’s current security situation, discussing the country’s ever expanding network of militias.  

It may be me, but I am a little surprised that much of the commentary I have read about Egypt recently is shocked—just shocked—about the current turn of events.  I was blessedly offline for about nine days before and after Christmas so it is entirely possible that I am missing something or my vacation dulled my analytic skills, but what is happening in Egypt—the violence, the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jacobin-like discourse—is perfectly consistent with the July 3 coup d’état, Major-General Abdel Fatah el Sisi’s July 24 speech, and the August 14 crackdown on Rabaa al Adawiyya Square.  It was easy enough to understand that the consequences of July would produce January or so I thought.  Thinking back over the last six months, a combination of wishful thinking, brutal realism, and the rush to comment on every twist and turn in Egypt’s ongoing drama has produced, with some notable exceptions, analytic muddle. The wishful thinking can be traced back to the fraught days of late June and early July.  This was a moment of crisis that was in many ways existential for a citizenry that had become deeply polarized (As an aside, had I used “polarized” at the time, various and sundry activists would have pilloried me). Consequently, people could be forgiven for seeing only what they wanted to see or alternatively, for recognizing what was about to happen and hoping against hope they fix things ex post facto.  That “what was about to happen” was, of course, the military’s intervention, also known as a coup.  In every sense of the term, what the military did on July 3 was a coup.  Yes, it is true that Mohammed Morsi was not much of a democrat and it is also true that he and the Shura Council were scheming to make it difficult for other parties (who were they? I don’t remember) to contest elections, and it is also true that there were serious, though never confirmed, allegations about Morsi’s victory in the June 2012 presidential election, and it is also true that Morsi’s year in office was disastrous. None of this diminishes the fact that the military stepped in and terminated the tenure of a president and government it was duty-bound to serve and in the process set a terrible precedent that Egyptians can seek redress outside political institutions if they are unhappy with their circumstances. Yet, according to someone named Khaled Shaalan, writing for MadaMasr at the time, the view that events surrounding June 30/July 3 constituted a coup d’état reflects something deeply wrong with “knowledge production about the Arab world.” In a 900 word diatribe replete with the kind of post-colonial discourse reserved for some graduate students determined to establish their authenticity while studying at elite Western institutions, Shaalan claims that the coup was only called a “coup” because of: The failure of Western media and pundits to both recognize and project the nuances of the current conflict in Egypt through their negligence of people’s agency in shaping the political outcomes is both pathetic and shameful. It is pathetic because it indicates the degree to which Western intellectual circles—especially those profiteering from Western policymaking bodies—remain willfully entrapped in an outdated and out-of-touch Orientalist worldview of the region. What he is trying to say, which is obscured by tiresome circumlocution, is that because there were allegedly 30 million people in the streets demonstrating against Morsi, the military’s intervention was not a coup because the officers were responding to the people’s will.  Shaalan, along with every pro-military Egyptian tweep on July 3, apparently never read a book on civil-military relations because all coups d’état have civilian support.  Either officers seek civilian support or civilians enlist the military to undertake a coup. I wonder what Shaalan thinks now. Given his July 3 missive, I suppose that he is surprised at the current turn of events in Egypt, though I suspect it is tempered by the fact that Western Orientalists must somehow be at fault, even if some of us warned of the dangers associated with signing up with the generals. Shaalan’s naïve and wishful thinking about July 3 is just the most egregious example of literally piles of commentary from Egyptians who desperately want a better future.  There is, of course, another version of the military-apologia genre whose authors understood precisely that the coup was inherently anti-democratic, but did not care because the Brotherhood was just as bad for democracy, but perhaps more importantly, was not likely to serve American interests.  That’s a legitimate position to take—far more so than the “it’s not a coup” claim—but the implicit analytic judgment underlying the argument is that Major-General el Sisi and his colleagues could keep things well at hand.  The attitude was, “Well, the military is not great, but we would rather have the guys in uniform than the beards. At least they share our interests.”  It was a return to the authoritarian stability argument with a disingenuous nod to a much hoped for democratic future.  I have no brief for the Muslim Brotherhood, but it was pretty clear that the coup and the subsequent crackdown would produce violence. The fact that the Egyptian elite along with Western commentators 1) seem shocked that Egypt is experiencing what can now only be described as a low-level insurgency, and 2) believe that the Brothers are solely to blame for this development suggests that there is something other than analysis going on here.  For the Egyptians this is arguably forgivable.  They have to live in Egypt, but the overwhelming cynicism in believing that a return to Mubarakism was possible is not. The other aspect of the recent commentary on Egypt that has done more to obscure than illuminate what is happening there is the very fact that there is so much of it.  I do not know how many “the new Egyptian constitution is really bad” pieces there were, but too many to count. All these articles, blog posts, and special reports were fairly accurate in that they  said basically the same thing—i.e., the new Egyptian constitution is really bad.  If you were looking for a novel fact or some interesting line of analysis that might give insight into Egypt’s trajectory beyond the fact that the new constitution is really bad, then you were disappointed. Yet precisely because Egypt commentary has become such a free-for-all—even such noted Middle East experts as Eugene Robinson, Dana Milbank, and George Will have gotten in on the great upheaval on the Nile—the effort to offer a new perspective if only because analysts want to distinguish themselves from the crowd has its pitfalls.  There was a boomlet relatively recently in the idea that generals were calibrating their crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in order to weaken them and make them more amenable to talks.  I traced the origin of this idea back to, I believe, Khalil al Anani, from the Middle East Institute. Anyone who has ever read my work understands that I appreciate a good counterintuitive argument and I am sympathetic to the innate desire among scholars to have their work noticed, but there is no reason for al Anani’s assertion other than perhaps he heard it through the active and imaginative Cairo rumor mill.  The officers have hardly distinguished themselves as political geniuses capable of this type of manipulation and the Brothers have demonstrated far more interest in resistance than negotiation because opposing the coup is a superior political strategy.  As it turns out, the military-backed government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and has moved to seize its assets.  What, honestly, is there to talk about? I don’t intend to be harsh or uncharitable, but the analytic community and policymakers are at risk of losing the analytic thread when it comes to Egypt.  Let’s be clear: There was a coup d’état in Egypt, the response to that inherently anti-democratic act has been violence, and in order to establish political control in an increasingly unstable and contested political environment, Egyptian leaders have resorted to authoritarian measures all in the name of a revolution that was for democracy.  So the next time something or someone blows up in Egypt or the next time a student is killed on a university campus, or when blood flows in street demonstrations, no one should be shocked or surprised.  The struggle continues….

Significant Developments Syria. UN investigators reported today that the Assad regime has been conducting extensive and systemic abductions that constitute a war crime and “widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population.” Amnesty International released a separate report alleging widespread torture and executions and documenting secret prisons operated by the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) throughout rebel-held areas of Syria. A large-scale regime air offensive against the Aleppo area entered its fifth day today with raids against outlying villages. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that makeshift barrel bombs filled with TNT were dropped from helicopters on the city, and had killed as many as one hundred and sixty-one people between Sunday and Wednesday. Meanwhile, Russian and Chinese officials announced today the deployment of ships and material intended to be used in the transport, protection, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. On Tuesday, the executive council of the OPCW approved an official plan for the destruction of Syria’s chemical stockpiles, though it acknowledged that “technical factors” could cause delays in the timeline. Kurdish officials also announced today their desire for a separate Kurdish delegation to January 22 peace talks now slated for Montreux, Switzerland, arguing that the Assad regime and the rebels hold similar views with regards to Syria’s Kurdish population. Iran. Talks between Iran and the P5+1 representatives resumed today in Geneva after they were cut short last week. This round of talks between both nuclear and sanctions experts aims to translate the November interim accord into an actionable plan. The Iranian deputy foreign minister Abbas Araqachi said that while the discussions are slated to last two days, they could extend into next week. French foreign minister Laurent Fabius expressed little confidence in the prospects of success, telling the Wall Street Journal yesterday, “It is unclear if the Iranians will accept to definitively abandon any capacity of getting a weapon or only agree to interrupt the nuclear program.” Egypt. An Egyptian court acquitted former prime minister Ahmed Shafiq along with Gamal and Alaa Mubarak of corruption charges today, though the Mubarak brothers still face the same charges in additional cases. On Wednesday, ousted president Mohammed Morsi was charged with conspiring with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas and of leaking state secrets to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the “Egypt Assistance Reform Act of 2013” yesterday by a vote of sixteen to one. The act would ease tightened controls on aid to Egypt, which was significantly reduced after the July 3 coup and the subsequent military crackdown. Assistance will now be conditional to Egypt’s adherence to its peace treaty with Israel, counter-terrorism cooperation, and undertaking steps towards political  reform. The law provides the president authority to waive restrictions for 180 days should the administration determine that doing so is in the vital national interest of the United States. U.S. Foreign Policy Syria. U.S. ambassador to Syria Robert Ford said yesterday that members of the Islamic Front had declined an invitation to meet with U.S. officials. The Assad regime called Washington’s diplomatic overture to the group, which it considers a terrorist organization, “reprehensible.” The Islamic Front is an organization of six major Islamist rebel groups and was responsible for last week’s seizure of a weapons warehouse belonging to the opposition’s Supreme Military Council. The seizure of the warehouse prompted the United States to halt nonlethal aid to Syrian rebels. Iran Sanctions. Senators Robert Menendez and Mark Kirk introduced a bipartisan bill today that would increase sanctions on Iran should current negotiations fail or if Iran violates the interim agreement. The bill has twenty-six sponsors, thirteen Democrats and thirteen Republicans. The Obama administration had lobbied the Congress not to propose new sanctions lest they threaten last month’s agreement with Iran. However, supporters of the legislation claim that it will strengthen the United States’ negotiating leverage. Menendez defended the bill, saying that, “current sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table and a credible threat of future sanctions will require Iran to cooperate and act in good faith at the negotiating table.” The Senate is expected to vote on the bill in January at the earliest. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Turkey. Five high-ranking Istanbul police department officials were dismissed yesterday following controversy over the widening anti-corruption crack-down throughout Turkey. Several prominent businessmen and the sons of three cabinet ministers were also recently detained. The investigation, which was launched by the chief prosecutor’s office in Istanbul, discovered $4.5 million in shoe boxes in the home of the chief executive of the state-run Halkbank. The raids are believed to be encouraged by powerful members of the Gulen Movement that is working against Erdogan in the run-up to elections next year. Lebanon. Lebanese and Israeli military officials met on Monday in an effort to reduce tensions along Lebanon’s southern border following several cross border exchanges of gunfire. Two Lebanese soldiers were shot early on Monday by the Israeli army one day after a Lebanese sniper killed an Israeli soldier. Meanwhile, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at a Hezbollah post in Labweh on Tuesday where Hezbollah fighters have been transiting to and from Syria where in support of the Assad regime. Israel-Palestine. The Israeli military announced today that it had shot and killed a member of the Palestinian security forces, identified as Saleh Yassin during a raid in the West Bank. Yassin was wanted in connection to several recent shooting incidents with the Israeli military and reportedly fired at the Israeli soldiers. Israeli troops also shot and killed a suspected member of Islamic Jihad yesterday in the Jenin refugee camp when shooting began during a raid. Meanwhile on Wednesday, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israelis “will not stop, even for a moment, building our country and becoming stronger, and developing...the settlement enterprise” in remarks to the Likud party. Iraq. Attacks on Shiite pilgrims killed at least thirty-four people today on the road to Karbala, south of Baghdad. An attack on Wednesday killed five people, though it would likely have been more devastating had a police officer not embraced the bomber, shielding others from the explosion. A total of four attacks near Baghdad on Monday and Tuesday killed thirty-two pilgrims. Estimates by the AFP place the total number of those killed in Iraq at 6,550 this year alone. This Week in History This week marks the sixty-seventh anniversary of the collapse of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in northern Iran. While occupying parts of Iran during the second World War, the Soviet Union had built close ties with sympathetic leaders in northern Iran. Both the Azeris and Kurds held long-standing disputes with the Tehran government, and broke away in 1946 with Soviet support and encouragement. The Republic of Mahabad was established on January 22, 1946 by a number of prominent Kurdish tribal leaders, including Mullah Mostafa Barzani, father of Massoud Barzani, the current president of Kurdish northern Iraq.  The republic allowed the Kurds to exercise autonomy and to speak and teach their own language. However, Iranian troops entered Mahabad on December 17, 1946 trying and convicting the Kurdish leadership of treason. They were hanged in Mahabad’s main square in March of 1947.

Simon Allison published an article on December 15 in South Africa’s Daily Maverick entitled "Africa for Optimists: 2013 in Review." He picks five of the “most encouraging” African stories from 2013 and provides links to read more about them. They are: 1)      The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Allison points out is both an infrastructure and a political and diplomatic achievement. Sudan and Egypt–always concerned about the upstream diversion of water from the Nile, such as the Grand Renaissance Dam involves–have now come to the table to discuss the dam’s construction and to ensure equitable management of the Nile’s water. There is an intergovernmental committee to plan for any negative impact. Allison concludes that, “managed sensibly, there is plenty of water to go around.” 2)      There has been a decline in piracy off the Somali coast. Ships are better equipped with armed guards. The European Union’s flotilla has had an impact, and local Somali communities are less supportive of piracy. 3)      Madagascar, which is in many ways still a mess, has successfully held elections. They were supported by the Southern African Development Community, which has improved the security situation. 4)      The defeat of the M23 rebel group in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Allison attributes the defeat of this particularly vicious rebel group to the improved performance by the Congolese army and to the UN’s innovative peacekeeping force, which is made up of troops from Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. Unlike other UN peacekeepers, it has the mandate to go on the offensive. 5)      Nigerian businessman Aliko Dangote is planning to construct an oil refinery in Nigeria. Not only would this reduce Nigeria’s dependence on imported oil, but it would also create jobs. To me, some of these achievements are of greater magnitude than others. The defeat of M23 and a new mandate for UN peacekeepers seems to me to be unalloyed good news. So, too is the decline of piracy off Somalia, though as Allison observes, it is balanced by an upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. As for the Ethiopian Dam, I think it is too soon to tell whether the concerns of Egypt and Sudan have been permanently allayed, though for the time being, the news is positive. With respect to Madagascar, there is still a runoff election to be held. And the oil refinery to be built in Nigeria by Dangote, “Africa’s richest man,” will cost an estimated U.S.$9 billion. Dangote has found U.S.$3.3 billion so far for the project, which is a good start. Allison’s list is an important contribution, not least because it highlights how much is going on in Africa that fails to receive sustained American media attention. It is also a rebuke to overly simple narratives, whether they be “Africa Rising” or “Africa the Hopeless Continent.”

AUC Librarian Mark Muehlhaeusler, who launched a new blog called Cairo Booklore, takes a look at Egyptian-Anglophone literature. Hernan del Valle discusses how political deadlock between rebel and government forces is failing to stop lethal Polio outbreaks in Syria. Burak Bekdil, writing for Hurriyet Daily News,  takes issue with the claim that Turkey is a "great Islamic democracy."

There is no shortage of advice in the United States about how the Obama administration should approach Egypt.  The familiar ring of policy prescriptions bouncing around the Beltway and beyond is either a testament to a lack of creativity or limited leverage or the return of some version of the political order that prevailed under Mubarak. Take, for example, Saturday’s lead editorial in the Washington Post called, “The U.S. Must Confront the Egyptian Military’s Push for Authoritarian Rule.”  It could have been written in 2007 after Hosni Mubarak pushed through a series of constitutional reforms.  In fact, “Constitutional Autocracy” from March 2007 must have been a template of sorts for Saturday’s piece.  Don’t get me wrong, the editorial board’s criticism of Egypt’s draft constitution is spot on, but its policy prescriptions seem a bit tattered.  According to the folks over on 15th Street, now that it is clear that Egypt is not on the road to democracy (as if that has not been fairly obvious for some time) the Obama administration should “suspend aid and cooperation with the regime until it frees political prisoners and adopts a genuine democratic path.” In the collective vainglorious attempt to “get Egypt right” there is apparently a consensus within the policy community that suspending some part or all of American assistance is the way to go.  That is, of course, until the administration is confronted with the complicated reality that is Egypt.  If there ever was a time when Washington could have made a strong case for taking the Egyptians to task and cutting assistance it was immediately after the July 3 coup d’etat.  The military’s coup meant that, pursuant to Section 7008 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the United States may not provide, “directly any assistance to the government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’etat or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d’etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role.” It could not be clearer, but the Obama administration has studiously avoided using the term “coup,” despite in fact having decided to delay the delivery of some important weapons systems. But this seems to have been intentionally done in a way that would have little or no impact on the Egyptian military’s ability to operate.  Even so, it made the officers angry. The history of docking Egypt’s aid is not long. In 2002, George W. Bush refused an Egyptian request for supplemental security assistance because the Egyptian-American academic and activist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, had been imprisoned after being convicted of a variety of dodgy and politically motivated charges.  Less than four months after Bush refused the request, Egypt’s Court of Cassation coincidentally overturned Dr. Saad’s conviction on appeal.  This would seem to suggest that actually withholding aid works, though, like everything when it comes to Egypt and U.S.-Egypt relations, the reality is not so straightforward.  First, President Bush was not cutting aid, he was telling Hosni Mubarak he could not have more assistance. Second, like Obama’s delayed delivery of military equipment, Bush’s rejection of additional aid seems to prove the rule that Egypt’s military assistance package is, well, largely untouchable. For all of the Bush administration’s emphasis on democratic change, it never actually cut Egypt’s aid.  Congress tried a few times, but the administration always signed a national security waiver restoring the assistance.  President Obama has not actually reduced the dollar amount of aid flowing to Egypt, he’s merely held up weapons already paid for in 2010.  Both actions must have stung the Egyptians, but not that much. It is abundantly clear that the United States is not willing to cut aid in any meaningful sense, a fact that undermines any pretense of leverage.  This is a problem, but it does not leave the United States without options.  If the White House is looking for a constructive approach, the President would do well to start out with his own advice.  In a very good speech that went largely ignored in the Arab world, but was eagerly anticipated in Washington, President Obama made the following statement: …We must proceed with a sense of humility.  It’s not America that put people on the streets of Tunis or Cairo—it was the people themselves who launched these movements, and it’s the people themselves that must ultimately determine the outcome….We will speak out for a set of core principles—principles that have guided our response to the events over the past six months. He went on to list Washington’s opposition to violence and repression and his administration’s support for freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion.  President Obama also stressed the importance of “equality for men and women under the rule of law” and the right for Arabs to choose their own leaders. I can hear my buddy and colleague, Marc Lynch, groaning.  He is particularly allergic to “magic words” that will make the Arab world democratic.  I take his point, but let’s not give short shrift to this idea.  The evidence is largely anecdotal, I admit, but during the Bush years, the president’s forthright calls for freedom and democracy in the Middle East forced leaders like Hosni Mubarak to position themselves as reformers, which, in turn, allowed activists to pursue their reform agendas in new ways.  This helped change the discourse in the region to one that focused on political reform. Activists who were hostile to the United States and to Bush in particular admitted at the time that the United States was helping them. The political dynamics in the region are, of course, vastly different from what they were a decade ago, which means that magical words may not have the impact they once did.  It’s worth trying, though.  Almost immediately after uttering the words cited above in May 2011, President Obama forgot them, remaining largely silent while Mohammed Morsi violated the revolutionary principles of Tahrir Square. The administration has been no better when it comes to the military-backed interim government and its de facto leader, Major-General Abdel Fatah al Sisi.  The president made a tough statement from Martha’s Vineyard on August 14 after the bloody crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood sit-in at Rabaa al Adawiya Square and docked some military aid, but the Secretary of State—as the Post’s editorial writers correctly point out—keeps declaring against all evidence that the Egyptians are faithfully following the roadmap intended to put Egypt on a democratic trajectory. No one believes this stuff, yet the Egyptian leadership is getting away with it. Maybe the Egyptians would think twice about making a mockery of their own commitments (and America’s top diplomat) if the President took a page from his predecessor’s playbook and called the Egyptians out.

Ammar Abdulhamid looks at the consequences of U.S. inaction in Syria and elsewhere. Maged Atiya remembers his first Thanksgiving. Brian Whitaker on the underreported expulsion of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia.

Significant Developments Egypt. Egypt’s Salafist Islamist party, al-Nour, announced its support today for the just completed draft constitution, despite an amendment that bans religiously based political parties. The draft constitution would remove most opposition to the current state of military rule, and has been condemned both by supporters of deposed president Mohammed Morsi as well as human rights activitists who fear that it unduly enshrines the military’s predominant position in Egyptian politics. The draft was given to interim president Adly Mansour on Tuesday by Amr Mousa, the head of the Committee of Fifty. Mousa called on the Egyptian people to approve the revised constitution in an upcoming referendum, possibly in January, to prevent further unrest and violence in Egypt. The Committee completed the draft on Sunday, approving a total of 245 articles. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, the Egyptian government delayed on a decision to accept a $4.8 billion loan from the IMF that would require economic reforms. A recent influx of $8 billion in aid from Gulf countries has allowed Cairo to take time to weigh its options. Iran. Iranian foreign minister Mohamed Javad Zarif arrived in the United Arab Emirates yesterday and met with Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai. Zarif invited UAE president Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan to visit Tehran as part of Iran’s new charm offensive towards the Gulf, launched in the wake of the interim nuclear agreement with the west. Zarif visited Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman earlier in the week. On Sunday, Zarif expressed hopes of improving ties with Saudi Arabia but said that there is no visit currently planned. The Iranian Foreign Ministry announced on Tuesday that talks on the country’s disputed nuclear program will continue in Vienna on December 9 and 10. The next round of talks will include the P5+1 countries and representatives from the IAEA, the organization responsible for overseeing the enforcement of last month’s interim deal. Syria. Syrian deputy foreign minister Faisal Muqdad announced on Monday that all Geneva II negotiations next month, slated to begin on January 22, will be run by President Assad and that the Syrian leader has no intention of turning over power. UN under secretary general and relief coordinator Valerie Amos told the Security Council on Tuesday that both rebel and regime forces have impeded aid shipments and that there has been no progress in protecting civilians or improving access to the most difficult to reach areas. Updated estimates from the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights indicate that 126,000 people have been killed in the nearly three year-old Syrian conflict. On Monday, UN high commissioner for human rights Navi Pillay linked Assad to war crimes and crimes against humanity, indicatingthat the UN has “massive evidence,” which “indicates responsibility at the highest level of government, including the head of state.” UN investigators have also found opposition groups responsible for abuses, although to a lesser extent. U.S. Foreign Policy United States-Israel-Palestine. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem today to brief him on the recent interim deal with Iran. Kerry assured Netanyahu that core sanctions against Iran would remain in place and that “Israel’s security in this negotiation is at the top of our agenda and the United States will do everything in its power to make certain that Iran’s nuclear program, the program’s weaponization possibilities, is terminated.” In his meeting with Netanyahu, Kerry discussed the Palesitnian track, and had retired General John Allen present security “thoughts” for the West Bank to Netanyahu. From Jerusalem, Secretary Kerry travelled to Ramallah where he met Palestinian president Abbas. Kerry reportedly discussed  security ideas with the Palestinians. Following their talks, Kerry commended Abbas for his commitment to negotiations “despite difficulties that he and the Palestinians have perceived in the process.” According to press reports, Palestinian officials rejected the security “ideas” claiming that they “would only lead to prolonging, maintaining the occupation.” Kerry announced that he would return for further talks, perhaps next week, and that he believed progress had been made. Syrian Chemical Weapons. The United States on Saturday offered to destroy the weapons on board a retrofitted U.S. naval vessel specially equipped for the mission in order to help rid Syria of its chemical weapons arsenal. The ship would handle five hundred tons of the chemicals weapons considered to be too dangerous for commercial destruction or transportation to another country. Ridding Syria of its chemical weapons has posed a challenge to the United Nations due to the country’s ongoing civil war. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Libya. Unidentified gunmen shot and killed an American school teacher, Ronnie Smith, in Benghazi today. Smith, a young chemistry teacher at the International School, was attacked while jogging in an upscale neighborhood near the U.S. consulate. No group has claimed responsibility. Iraq-Iran. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki arrived in Tehran yesterday to begin two days of talks about security and the civil war in Syria. This is al-Maliki’s first visit to Iran since Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidency in August. Lebanon. A senior Hezbollah officer, Hassan Laqees, was assassinated yesterday by an unidentified gunmen while exiting his car south of Beirut. Laqees had been with Hezbollah since its founding three decades ago; and was responsible for the development and procurement of weapons. Meanwhile, clashes again erupted in Tripoli between Sunni and Alawite districts on Tuesday, leading to the arrest of twenty-one fighters. Tripoli was placed under a six-month period of military rule on Monday in an effort to quell sectarian violence spilling over from the civil war in Syria that has left more than one hundred dead this year alone. This is the first time that the army has been given control of a city since the Lebanese civil war. Yemen. A suicide bomber struck the Yemeni defense ministry in Sana’a today, followed immediately by a second attack by armed gunmen. The explosion and gun battle left at least fifty-two people dead, according to a ministry spokesman. The explosion badly damaged a hospital in the compound and killed several members of the medical staff, including foreigners. Thus far no one has claimed responsibility. This Week in History This week marks the forty-second anniversary of the founding of the United Arab Emirates. The small emirates of the Gulf were known as the Trucial States, following a series of agreements with the British Empire in the nineteenth century that relinquished control of foreign policy matters to the British. The discovery of oil in the twentieth century began to revolutionize the Trucial States economically, and a Trucial Council was established in 1952 to handle the administration of the growing emirates. A 1968 attempt at unification failed following the exit of Bahrain and Qatar. However, in 1971, with Britain’s departure from the Gulf, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Dubai, and Umm al-Quwain successfully established the United Arab Emirates. A year later they were joined by Ras al-Khaymah. The UAE soon after joined the Arab League and becoming a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The UAE is presently home to a sizeable contingent of U.S. forces at the port of Jebel Ali and al-Dhafra Air Base.