Egypt

The article below was originally published here on ForeignAffairs.com on Wednesday, December 4, 2013. The drive from Rafah, the Egyptian town that borders the Gaza Strip, down to Ismailiyya, a port on the Suez Canal, is tedious. Although the route skirts al-Arish, the capital of the northern Sinai governorate, it passes an otherwise featureless landscape for 150 miles. Toward the end of the trip, if the timing is just right, out of nowhere an oil tanker or container ship might suddenly disrupt the horizon as it appears to glide through the Egyptian desert. Nearly 150 years after its completion, the Suez Canal continues to inspire awe, living up to every cliché ever written about it. The 120-mile waterway is a vital link between Europe and Asia, a strategic asset, and a man-made wonder. But the world has evolved since 1869. Have new developments in politics, economics, and security rendered the canal irrelevant? Or does global change make it as important as ever? To some observers, three years into this turbulent chapter in Egyptian history, Cairo’s importance to the United States seems to have diminished, with power apparently shifting in the region and so many accepted truths about the Middle East refuted by all the upheaval. Whether Egypt remains vital, however, depends in large part on whether the Suez Canal is a relic of the past or an enduring hotspot in international politics. And any notion that the canal is losing its strategic or economic importance must contend with a longer view of the canal’s place in Egyptian history and a deeper understanding of how it has shaped Egypt’s relations with the world. Continue reading here...

For the first time since Mohammed Morsi’s overthrow five months ago, street protests erupted in Egypt last week that were not specifically the work of the Muslim Brotherhood aimed at restoring the deposed leader to the presidency.  The protagonists this time were another group of familiar faces.  The different groups that are commonly lumped together as “revolutionaries” or “youth” and who are associated most closely with the January 25 uprising have returned to the streets.  This time the object of their anger is not Mubarak, nor Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi’s SCAF, nor Morsi, but rather Major General Abdel Fatah al Sisi and Egypt’s interim government.  This is quite a twist given the amount of press attention the cult of al Sisi has received, but there have always been activists and analysts in Egypt who understood the false promise of the military.  Anecdotally, the Egyptian public seems to support solidly the Major General and the military-backed interim government—despite what recent polling might suggest—but Egyptian officials have given their opponents a political opportunity.  Will the revolutionaries, youth, liberals, socialist revolutionaries, and whoever else take it and develop a coherent vision for the future? Hope springs eternal, as they say, but probably not. The current controversy surrounds an anti-protest measure that interim president, Adly Mansour, signed into law on November 24.  Among a range of restrictions, the new statute requires Egyptians to secure seven different types of permits in order to demonstrate, bans gatherings of more than ten people—in public and private—and carries hefty fines, which taken together is tougher than efforts to prevent mass demonstrations during the Mubarak period.  With persistent Muslim Brotherhood street protests, a number of important anniversaries looming—January 25 and February 11—and apparent widespread support for stability, it is clear why the government took the steps it did to curb demonstrations.  Still, it is an astonishing irony (among the long list that Egyptians have produced over the last three years), an indication of creeping authoritarianism, and a superlative example of political tone deaf-ness that a government, which owes its very existence to massive street protests, is trying to snuff out the rights of Egyptians to express themselves en masse in public.  Adding to the outrage was the death of Mohammed Reda, a Cairo University engineering student, who was killed on Thursday demonstrating against the new law and the recent death at the hands of police of another Cairo University student on November 19. As the protests, which have been small by recent Egyptian standards, got going much of the commentary focused on the heavy hand of the Ministry of Interior.  “Haven’t they [the police] learned their lesson?” was a common refrain among the Twitterati and Facebook users.  The lesson that the Egyptian police should have learned, but had not, was that the use of force would not intimidate activists, but rather galvanize them and their fellow Egyptians.  That is what happened during the January 25 uprising and subsequent rounds of demonstrations. That is certainly true for the protests that brought down Hosni Mubarak, but it was not quite the same afterwards.  Besides the big Mohammed Mahmoud Street demonstrations in late November 2011 and the protests against Morsi’s November 22 decree, which morphed into anger over the December 2012 constitution, lots of Egyptians tended to stay on the sidelines when activists took to the streets.  This does not include the mass mobilization of June 30, of course, but until then (with the exceptions noted just above), people came to regard street politics and the response to it as an elite-on-elite affair that had little to do with them.  This is neither to suggest that the anti-protest law is not an affront to every Egyptian who wants to live in a democracy nor the hoary image of “the Egyptian” who just wants stability above all else is accurate, but rather that the activists/instigators lost the revolutionary thread not too long after they brought Mubarak down.  It was clear what January 25 was about; the same cannot be said about what came after it. As I have written elsewhere, because the revolutionaries never capitalized politically on their one true victory over the last three years and failed to develop a positive vision for the future, the problems of post-Mubarak Egypt have overwhelmed people.  Under dire economic circumstances and unstable politics, a fair number of Egyptians have concluded that they were better off before the uprising.  As a result, the Ministry of Interior seems to have significant public support to kick *$$. One never knows with Egypt, but it seems unlikely that this time around police brutality will galvanize the broader public to join the students from Cairo University and activists from elsewhere in opposing al Sisi.  At the time the demonstrations were getting into gear over the weekend, al Arabiya reported the existence of “al Sisi pajamas” for women who could wear them while having a late night snack of al Sisi chocolates or cookies.  Yet this kind of absurdity can be used against the military-backed government to demonstrate—along with a long list of more serious opposition grievances—just how far it has veered from its own declared principles post-July 3 and those of Tahrir Square.  This would be a potent political message on which to build an actual political agenda that could capture the imagination of Egyptians.  That is, of course, unless activists distract themselves with the romance of the barricades, leaving themselves disorganized and vulnerable to shrewder political groups who will exploit the revolutionary narrative for their own non-democratic ends.  Sound familiar?

I remember sitting in the lobby of the Kempinski hotel in Cairo on a late afternoon in September 2011 chatting with an Egyptian friend and an American colleague when I became distracted and lost the train of the conversation.  I was hearing familiar sounds, but they were totally out of place.  In a few split desperate seconds, I asked myself, “Who?  What? Where?” until I regained my composure and thought, “Oh, that’s right...The Turks are here.”  In Cairo, where I am programmed to hear only Arabic or English, the out-of-place singsong of Turkish threw me momentarily.  This was the eve of what was billed as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s triumphant visit to Egypt and members of Turkey’s press corps were starting to fill up the capital’s hotels.  Huge posters with Erdogan’s visage and interwoven Egyptian and Turkish flags were placed around Cairo’s thoroughfares declaring “With United Hands for the Future.” It was a nice sentiment, but mutual enmity and strategic competition turned out to be the future of Egypt-Turkey relations.  Prime Minister Erdogan’s ongoing criticism of the July 3 coup d’etat and his continuing support for the Muslim Brotherhood are the immediate cause for the Egyptian decision to downgrade relations with Turkey, but this is a spat that has long been in the making. Critics of Prime Minister Erdogan will no doubt add the deterioration of Egypt-Turkey relations to the growing list of baffling statements, positions, and policies he has pursued recently.  Yet, unlike the prime minister’s demagoguery on coed college dormitories, for example, he is not entirely to blame for the Cairo-Ankara row.  The Turks now have difficult relations with every important country in the Middle East, but there are a series of underlying of political and structural issues that presaged the current dispute with the Egyptians.  My dear friend, the inestimable Bassem Sabry, captured what would be the eventual disconnect between Egypt and Turkey when, right after Erdogan left Cairo in 2011, he quipped, “The Turks don’t understand. When we say ‘Yay Ottomans!’ We mean the furniture.” Before the January 25th uprising, ties between the two countries were correct, but hardly warm. Hosni Mubarak did not like Erdogan and one got the distinct sense that the feeling was mutual. The two leaders could not have been more different from each other:  Mubarak was old, exceedingly cautious, staid, and an authoritarian, while Erdogan was young, dynamic, charismatic, and a reformer (until his authoritarian streak emerged).  Mubarak, always suspicious of Islamists, did not much care for even the Turkish variety, which the press often described oddly as “mild.”  Needless to say, Erdogan has little love lost for the professional military class from which Mubarak hailed. Beyond these kinds of personal differences, Erdogan’s active regional foreign policy and willingness to lambaste the Israelis both encroached upon what Mubarak considered to be Egypt’s natural domain and made the Egyptian leader look bad.  Much of the Erdogan mystique in the Middle East rested on the Palestinian issue and the principled stand he took against Israel’s blockade of Gaza—a policy in which Mubarak was, of course, complicit.  The Egyptian intelligence chief, the late Omar Suleiman, also harbored a grudge against the Turks for what he perceived to be Turkish “meddling” in Palestinian affairs, especially the development of relations between Ankara and Hamas.  To Omar Pasha, Turkey-Hamas ties compromised his ability to apply pressure on the organization by giving its leaders a respectable alternative to Syria or Iran.  For Mubarak and Suleiman, the proper place for the Turks in the region was on the sideline.  Whatever befell the Egyptians during the late Mubarak period, their leaders still maintained the pretension of regional influence and prestige.  They were simply not going to submit to Ankara’s effort to supplant Cairo’s traditional place. Yet Erdogan did not just grate on the Egyptian leadership.  It’s hard to believe now, especially after Mohammed Morsi’s thunderous welcome at the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) 2012  convention, but the Muslim Brothers did not much like Turkey’s Islamists even though the AKP’s political success intrigued them.  The Brotherhood, which regards itself as the granddaddy of Islamist movements, saw the AKP as a bunch of upstart Turks who were a little too liberal and a little too nationalist for its tastes.  Still, the Brothers—and many other Egyptians—were deeply appreciative when Erdogan was the first world leader to call on Hosni Mubarak to listen to his people and step down.  It was only after Mubarak’s fall that the Brothers sought to build a relationship with the Turks who could be an important source of diplomatic, political, and economic support for Egypt and themselves. From the end of 2011 through 2012 and part of 2013, Erdogan was looking like a man in full.  The AKP-friendly press and the prime minister’s supporters were jubilant.  The 21st century was going to be a Turkish century and in the Middle East, newly empowered Islamist movements would look to Ankara for leadership.  Egypt, being the largest Arab country, was central to the way in which the AKP leadership imagined their future.  So caught up in his own mythology as master of both Turkey and the region, the Turkish prime minister grafted his party’s experience onto the Brotherhood and Egypt.  To the extent that Erdogan saw the Muslim Brotherhood as the analogue to his own party, the Turks apparently believed that the Brothers would follow the AKP’s own successful path.  Even after Morsi ran into significant opposition when it became clear that he had no real intention of upholding the principles of the revolution, the Turkish leadership refused to see what was actually happening in Egypt.  Instead, the prime minister and his advisers blamed the United States and the West for the Egyptian president’s troubles because Washington, in particular, could not tolerate the accumulation of Islamist power.  This was, of course, at variance with the vast majority of Morsi’s opponents who accused the United States along with Turkey of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood to the detriment of Egyptian society. Then, of course, came the July 3 coup d’état that ended Egypt’s experiment with Muslim Brotherhood rule.  By now, it should be clear that given Turkey’s history with military interventions and the unhappy experience of Turkish Islamists as a result of the 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 coups, Erdogan would be critical of Major General Abdel Fattah al Sisi.  Yet “the history of coups” argument is too pat and obvious.  There are more complicated and nuanced reasons for Erdogan’s seemingly pathological ire toward the new Egyptian authorities. The overwhelming Egyptian support for the July 3 coup is a rejection of the “new Turkish model,” which is inextricably linked to Erdogan.  The AKP’s leaders have been careful not to use the word “model” and have from time to time been vocal in their rejection of the term, but privately they believe in it.  They regard Turkey’s experience of political and economic liberalization under the leadership of a popularly elected Islamist party as a template for countries in the Arab world.  When Egyptians came out into the streets en masse on June 30, demanding the end of Mohammed Morsi’s rule and Egypt’s senior command obliged them, it was a significant strategic setback for the AKP’s vision for Turkey’s leadership role.  No wonder then that the Turkish prime minister is angry.  If, after all, the largest Arab country rejects Turkey’s model, Ankara’s prospects for regional leadership are greatly diminished.  And unless Turks can be convinced that the Egyptians have no capacity to determine their future and that al Sisi’s intervention was the result of a Zionist-American manipulation, this setback might have domestic political consequences for Erdogan whose supporters have previously called him “the King of the Arab Street.” The coup also revealed the widely differing worldviews of Turks and Egyptians, at least at this particular moment.  For the Turks, subordinating the General Staff to civilian leaders and making it virtually impossible for them to intervene in the political system is critical in creating an environment more conducive to democratic development (though it’s not sufficient as the Turkish case demonstrates).  Many Egyptians, in contrast, regard the military as a savior that rescued their country from chaos and almost certain collapse.  According to this view, Morsi clearly squandered his electoral mandate during his disastrous tenure in the presidency and he was overthrown with the expressed will of millions upon millions of Egyptians who took to the streets.  The military’s intervention, the argument goes, has given Egyptians another chance to reset politics and realize the democratic goals of Tahrir Square.  Needless to say, this account has lost all context, but it is what large numbers of Egyptians seem to believe rather fervently.  I suspect the Turks are correct—coups are not good for democracy—but the important point here is the significant gap between the way Turks and Egyptians view the world. Observers should not expect Egypt-Turkey relations to improve any time soon.  Sure, Erdogan engages in over-heated rhetoric and the Egyptians hold onto a regional status from a by-gone era, but these are manifestations of a deeper problem.  Prime Minister Erdogan’s narrative is deeply unsettling and politically dangerous to Egypt’s current rulers and the return of the Egyptian military and concomitant effort to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood is the AKP’s nightmare.

Sofia Fenner and Mohammed Talaat explore how Morsi’s ouster is changing Shubra. Thanassis Cambanis isn’t too worried about Lebanon. Martin Kramer hopes for the perpetuation of American power, but prepares for a “power outage."

Significant Developments Lebanon. Prime Minister Tamam Salam and speaker Nabih Berry both warned on Thursday of a return to violence in Lebanon if the country fails to resolve ongoing domestic political crises and control internal security. Their comments followed Tuesday’s suicide bombings of the Iranian embassy in Beirut that killed twenty-five people, including the Iranian cultural attaché, and wounded another one hundred and forty people. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, an al-Qaeda affiliated Sunni extremist group, took credit for the attack, which it claimed was in protest of Iran’s role in the ongoing civil war in Syria. On Wednesday, the UNHCR confirmed that at least 2,200 families had crossed into the Lebanese town of Arsal since last week, overwhelming their ability to provide support. Following the influx of refugees, Syrian helicopters attacked Arsal, killing two members of a local prominent family. Iran. The latest round of nuclear talks are underway in Geneva between Iran and the P5+1 countries and are scheduled to conclude on Friday, despite a lack of agreement so far on an interim deal. Intense diplomatic efforts have been followed by squabbling amongst negotiators in the media. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei yesterday called Israel a “rabid dog” and vowed that Iran would not give up its “nuclear rights." On Tuesday, British prime minister David Cameron and Iranian president Hassan Rouhani spoke by phone regarding the nuclear negotiations and bilateral relations, marking the first executive level talks between the two states in more than a decade. Syria. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced new plans today for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles, which could include destroying certain active nerve agents aboard ships and contracting private firms to destroy various chemicals. Meanwhile, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad announced yesterday that he will not consider handing over power to the opposition. Assad said that “there is no need to go to Geneva if this is the general idea.” Syrian deputy foreign minister Faisal Muqdad echoed Assad’s words while meeting in Moscow with Russian and Iranian delegations on Tuesday. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov reportedly pressed the Syrian regime to allow aid groups access to civilians as conditions in Syria have grown exceedingly dire in many areas. The Syrian military completed a large offensive that began last week on the city of Qara, one of the only remaining rebel supply lines between the Mediterranean and Damascus. Heavy bombardment forced thousands to flee into neighboring Lebanon and inflicted serious losses on opposition forces. U.S. Foreign Policy Iran. President Obama met with Republican and Democratic leaders from the banking, foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees on Tuesday in an effort to prevent further sanctions against Iran while negotiations are under way. Despite the overture by the president, six senators, led by Senator Mark Kirk, proposed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would further increase sanctions against Iran. With Thanksgiving recess beginning on Friday, it will be at least two weeks before the bill will face a vote, giving the administration time to try and reach an interim deal. Egypt. Speaking at the State Department Overseas Advisory Council on Wednesday, Secretary of State John Kerry said that the 2011 Egyptian uprising had been “stolen by” the Muslim Brotherhood. Kerry argued that the Brotherhood capitalized on its highly organized and hierarchical structure at a time of uncertainty and factitious opposition. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Turkey. A parliamentary commission charged with drafting a new civilian constitution has reached an impasse, with spokesmen claiming it unlikely that it will complete the task before the 2015 general election. One major point of contention has been a proposed expansion of presidential powers, a position that at present is largely symbolic. The commission has been working since 2011 to replace the 1980 version, which was drafted by the military following a coup. Libya. Militias in Tripoli continued to hand over bases and outposts to the military today following growing demand and demonstrations against violence in the capital city. On Tuesday, the government announced plans to remove militias from Tripoli, and disarm and reintegrate them into the military. This coincided with large demonstrations against the militias in response to last Friday’s shooting that left more than forty-five people dead and five hundred wounded after a militia attacked unarmed demonstrators. Egypt. In an interview on Thursday with a Kuwaiti newspaper, Egyptian defense minister al-Sisi did not rule out a run for president in upcoming elections. Interim vice president Adly Mansour, however, announced on Tuesday that he would not consider entering the race. On Wednesday, violence continued in the Sinai where a suicide car bomb killed eleven soldiers and wounded another thirty-seven. This Week in History This week marks the one hundred and forty-fourth anniversary of the inauguration of the Suez Canal on November 17, 1869. In 1854, Ferdinand de Lesseps was granted a concession to build the canal by Sa’id Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt. In 1856, the Suez Canal Company was granted the rights to operate the Canal for 99 years following its opening, though Egypt owned a 44 percent stake in the company. Construction began in 1859, with it taking over a decade to complete the 101 mile canal connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Egyptian financial woes following a broad modernization program enacted under Isma’il Pasha forced Egypt to sells its stock, which the British eagerly purchased. The Suez quickly became essential to east-west trade, cutting the journey between Europe and Asia by six thousand miles. However, Nasser nationalized the canal in 1956 after coming to power, precipitating the Suez Crisis by terminating the original 1856 agreement thirteen years early. The canal was closed for eight years, between 1967 and 1975, serving as buffer between Israel and Egypt. Since the 1979 peace accord between Israel and Egypt, the canal has remained open though a slight decline in traffic has accompanied the recent turbulence in Egypt.

Over the last week or so, there have been more than a few stinging indictments of U.S.-Middle East policy.  Whether it is Iran’s nuclear program, the civil war in Syria, or Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to push Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, the Obama administration is near universally derided as both timorous and out-classed in the face of formidable adversaries. It’s been an impressive pile-on even if some of this commentary is actually more about politics than analysis.  Among the various op-eds, columns, and articles, two caught my attention.  On November 8 in his regular column for Foreign Policy, James Traub skewered the White House for failing to talk tough to the Egyptian military about its blatantly un-democratic approach to post-Morsi Egypt.  A few days later, the Washington Post’s deputy editorial page editor, Jackson Diehl, published a stem-winder of a column that ripped Kerry on every important issue in the Middle East, including the Secretary’s apparent willingness to accommodate what is shaping up to be Egypt’s non-democratic transition. Traub and Diehl are serious and accomplished observers of American foreign policy and their contributions to the recent foreign policy debate are not politically motivated.  Yet the assumption underlying their articles that the United States can be an anchor of reform in Egypt—a view that is shared among a diverse and influential subset of the American foreign policy elite—is suspect.  Before I am accused of being a troglodyte, let me be clear: Democracy in Egypt would be a very good development, providing Egyptians with the representative government they have long sought. I have also written that Washington’s approach to Egypt over the last three years should have emphasized principles like personal freedom, non-violence, transparency, and equal application of the law.  That said, it strikes me as odd—given the available evidence—that analysts believe democracy promotion, whether in the form of actual programs designed to encourage more open and just societies or rhetorical support for progressive change, would make an appreciable difference in Egypt. My skepticism is a function of the fact that for Egyptians, the stakes are so high in their struggle to define new political and social institutions, there is very little that external powers can say or do to influence the way in which sons and daughters of the Nile calculate what is best for Egypt.  It is also based on my sneaking suspicion that in the end, the people who were central to making the January 25 and June 30 uprisings happen will not determine the trajectory of Egyptian politics.  Instead, the contours of Egypt’s new political order will likely be determined in a war of position among the military, intelligence services, police, and the counterrevolutionaries embedded in the bureaucracy.  Needless to say, this is not a propitious environment in which America’s limited resources can make much of a difference. There is a larger issue than the particulars of the current Egyptian political environment, however.  There have been reams and reams written about how and why democracies emerge.  Within the academic literature, there are essentially two different schools of thought.  The first emphasizes “prerequisites” for democracy—for example, the emergence of a middle class; a certain level of economic development; national unity; and political culture.  The second focuses on the calculations of elites.  This so-called rationalist approach posits that transitions to democracy occur when political circumstances alter the incentives and constraints of a prevailing elite seeking to survive.  This is the way that leaders who have no particular commitment to democratic ideals become democrats. I am simplifying, of course, and the work on transition to democracy is rich, but much of it is built on these two schools of thought. Now, back to Egypt.  If we take the two primary conceptions of how democracy emerges seriously, what can the United States reasonably do?  Among prerequisites for democracy, it seems that, in the abstract, the United States can actually do something about wealth.  The United States still occupies the most influential position in the global economy, calls the shots at international financial institutions like the IMF, and holds significant economic influence in Europe and Asia. Yet for all that power and prestige, America’s global economic influence seems to be eroding due to the rise of others and Washington’s dysfunctional politics.  The combination of the two makes it difficult to marshal support both at home and abroad to help Egypt economically.  Yet Washington is only half the problem. Egyptian politics and the country’s recent instability compromise the efficacy of outside assistance. If the United States has little capacity to encourage the development of what some believe to be prerequisites for democracy, its ability to shape the calculations of its leaders is also quite limited.  What incentive can Washington offer that will alter the interests and constraints of Egypt’s leaders?  It’s unlikely that even if the United States had the resources and political will to offer, for example, billions of aid in exchange for democratic change that Major General Abdel Fatah al Sisi would respond positively.  As noted above, under circumstances in which Egyptians believe they are in an existential struggle for the soul of the country, outsiders—any outsiders—will have very little influence to compel the leaders to do something they would not otherwise do.  For all the money that the Saudis, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis are providing, they are merely helping to enable what the Egyptian armed forces would have done anyway. There may be other examples, but I can only think of one instance in which an outside power had a decisive influence on the direction of politics in a country: the EU and Turkey.  The prospect of membership in the European Union altered the incentives of Turkish Islamists and placed constraints on Turkey’s senior military officers in ways that made the wide-ranging democratic reforms (which have turned out to be reversible) of 2003-2004 possible.  The Turkish relationship with the EU is unique, however.  As long as there seemed to be a credible chance for Turks to become members of Europe, Brussels had a dynamic effect on Turkish politics. The United States, in contrast, is not going to offer Egypt membership in its own exclusive club. In a world that some imagine, the United States has the moral, political, and financial authority to promote democratic change in countries thousands of miles away from its shores.  I suppose this is the burden of having made “the world safe for democracy”—even though we really did not—and facing down fascism as well as communism. Given this history, I can understand why it is difficult to accept the fact that the traditional tools of American diplomacy do not actually matter much in the struggle for Egypt.  We should get used to it.

Marwan Kabalan says that GCC countries will need to rely on their own power to ward off Iranian influence. The European Space Agency posts photos of Middle Eastern deserts from space. Nervana gives the “tale of two generals”—and why not just any military officer enjoys Egyptian public support.

Syria. The Syrian Opposition Coalition voted to attend the upcoming peace conference in Geneva, though the decision was conditional on the Syrian government allowing aid shipments to rebel held areas and the release of prisoners by government forces. According to Russian news sources, the Syrian government will send a delegation to Moscow on Monday to prepare for the upcoming international peace conference in Geneva. On Monday evening, the Syrian Opposition Coalition announced the selection of nine ministers that will be charged with administering territories currently in rebel hands. Meanwhile, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons met in The Hague today to discuss plans for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. The organization had hoped Albania would accept the stockpiles and facilitate their destruction, but in the face of domestic opposition, the Albanian government turned down the request. Egypt. The government yesterday lifted the nation-wide state of emergency and the curfew that had been in place since August 14. Police immediately began replacing military units at checkpoints, although some military forces are slated to continue to protect embassies. Meanwhile, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and defense minister Sergei Shoigu visited Egypt yesterday and met with General al-Sisi to discuss a potential arms deal worth approximately $2 billion that would include helicopters and air defense equipment. On Monday, presidential adviser Mostafa Hegazy announced that a final draft of the constitution will be issued on December 3 and could be taken to a referendum in late December or early January with presidential elections possible before the summer. Iran. Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said today that he was hopeful regarding next Wednesday’s resumed talks in Geneva between Iran and the P5+1 countries. His comments follow yesterday’s International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) quarterly report stating that there has been no expansion of Iran’s nuclear program since Hassan Rouhani took office. The IAEA reached a deal with Iranian negotiators on Monday providing a framework that would provide the nuclear watchdog information on Iran’s nuclear research and “managed access” to sites including the Gachin uranium mine and the heavy water reactor at Arak. This weekend’s failed attempt to reach an interim deal between Iran and the P5+1 group has left both sides blaming the other: Secretary of State John Kerry claimed that Iran walked away from an agreement due to the concessions Iran would have to offer while Iranian foreign minister Zarif said on Monday that discord among the western powers and French recalcitrance had ended the talks. U.S. Foreign Policy U.S. Sanctions. Secretary of State John Kerry briefed the Senate Banking Committee on Wednesday in an effort to forestall new Congressional sanctions legislation on Iran, arguing that it may damage the ongoing nuclear talks. Republican members expressed disappointment with the meeting. According to Representative Bob Corker, Kerry’s argument was “solely an emotional appeal” while Representative Mark Kirk called the classified briefing “anti-Israeli.” Kerry’s appearance before the committee was prompted by a recently passed House measure that would strengthen sanctions on Iran. UNESCO. Last Friday, the United States lost its voting privileges at UNESCO after cutting funding to the organization two years ago after the organization admitted Palestine as a full member. Per the organization’s constitution, any member state that fails to pay its dues for two consecutive years loses its right to vote. The United States was the largest benefactor of the organization providing $70 million annually, roughly 22 percent of UNESCO’s operating budget. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Libya. Libyan prime minister Ali Zeidan issued an appeal on Sunday for the populace to rise up against armed militias or else risk a foreign intervention in Libya. Speaking at a news conference, Zeidan warned that, “The international community cannot tolerate a state in the middle of the Mediterranean that is a source of violence, terrorism and murder.” Libya has been plagued by a growing number of armed militias responsible for attacks on security forces and the recent temporary abduction of the prime minister. Jordan. Jordan’s information minister expressed interest on Monday in his country possibly taking the available United Nations Security Council seat recently turned down by Saudi Arabia.  The seat is traditionally reserved for an Arab state and Jordan thus far is the most likely candidate, but the decision must be voted on by the General Assembly. Lebanon. The Lebanese government announced on Monday that it will file a complaint with the UN Security Council over the Israeli installation of surveillance equipment along the southern border between the two countries. Following a meeting of the Parliamentary Telecommunications Committee, several members of parliament remarked that the official complaint would only be the first step in dealing with an issue that “concerns our security, economy and daily life.” This Week in History: This week marks the ninth anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat in Paris, France. As a student in Egypt, Arafat headed the Union of Palestinian students and was arrested in 1954 for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1950s, Arafat established the Fatah political party and the associated armed wing. By the early 1960s, he was leading a low intensity guerilla war against Israel. Following the 1967 War, Arafat emerged as a major force in Palestinian politics, becoming the chairman of the PLO when Fatah took over the organization. In the weeks leading up to Oslo, Arafat exchanged letters with then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, recognizing the state of Israel and then signing the Oslo Accords soon after, for which he was a co-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. Soon after Arafat returned to Gaza and was subsequently elected president of the Palestinian Authority. His international standing fell with the outbreak of the second intifada after the failure of the Camp David peace summit in 2000. The War on Terror further sidelined him and the peace process, and concerns over ongoing terrorist attacks in Israel led the IDF to confine Arafat to his headquarters in Ramallah. In 2004, Arafat became ill and travelled to Paris for treatment; a month later he passed away under circumstances shrouded in controversy.

When I heard that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and his colleague Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, were to visit Cairo, I dusted off my copies of Mohammed Hassanein Heikal’s The Sphinx and the Commissar and Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East since 1970 by Robert O. Freedman. I am glad I still have these books.  They remind those of us too young to remember fully the extent of Moscow’s once rather robust presence in Egypt.   Against the background of fraught relations between Washington and Cairo, an underlying theme of the press coverage—in both Egypt and the West—of the Lavrov/Shoigu visit is the potential for Russia “to replace” the United States as Egypt’s patron.  I understand why the media like this angle, but the idea that Russia will supplant Washington lacks historical context and is impractical for the Egyptians.  Those wistful for the days when Moscow financed and helped build the Aswan High Dam and provided copious amounts of weaponry to Cairo have allowed time to romanticize what was often a difficult relationship.  They also fail to grasp how important American political, diplomatic, and especially military support is for the Egyptians.  All that said, there are three important reasons why the Russian foreign and defense ministers have suddenly appeared in Cairo: 1.        Even though the Egyptians are not looking to replace the United States as their primary strategic patron, the defense establishment is puzzled by and disappointed in Washington’s post-July 3 policy. The officers cannot understand why the United States would want to punish the armed forces.  From their perspective, it was only the military that saved Egypt—a source of stability and a pillar of U.S. policy—from chaos.  Like most people who have taken a hard look at the Obama administration’s October 9 decision to delay the delivery of military equipment to Egypt, they cannot figure out the upside.  Who benefits?  What did it achieve?  The Ministry of Defense’s answer to each of those questions is “no one” and “nothing.” I agree, though my sense is that delaying the delivery of some weapons systems was the result of the White House’s desire to do something in response to the coup without actually harming the ability of the Egyptian armed forces to operate and meet current threats, which, when you look at the Sinai, are serious. The Egyptians do not look at it this way and are thus making a big deal out of their high-level Russian visitors. 2.       When the Egyptians kicked out almost 8,000 Soviet military advisers and technical personnel in the summer of 1972—over the delivery of weapons—the breach was short-lived.  Within a few months, the Soviets were back helping the Egyptians prepare for the crossing of the Suez Canal.  And even though Anwar Sadat aligned Cairo with Washington after the 1973 war, Moscow never actually went away. There was a break in diplomatic relations, but over the short-run, at least, the Egyptians remained dependent on East bloc military equipment.  Of course, Moscow was much diminished after 1973 and it has been more than a decade since the Russian foreign and defense ministers visited Cairo, but Egypt and Russia were never estranged. 3.       The Lavrov/Shogui visit reflects something more profound than Egyptian pique at the United States and the Kremlin’s willingness to use the present strain between Cairo and Washington to needle the White House.  The Egyptians are hedging, but it has little to do with the delay of Apache helicopters and other weaponry.  Observers need to keep in mind that the United States has helped to educate Egyptian military officers for a generation.  They have attended American service academies and developed a keen interest in the American political process.  I know Egyptian military officers who understand the mechanics of Congress far better than the vast majority of Americans.  The same is true for Egypt’s talented diplomatic corps. Sequestration; the government shutdown; the re-emergence of strains of isolationism within both the Democratic and Republican parties; and the fact that Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), who is opposed to foreign assistance on principle, is a presidential contender, have compelled the Egyptians to think through the next three to five years.  Without saying so directly, Cairo has begun to consider what the world looks like when Washington either no longers wants to or cannot provide Egypt with financial, political, diplomatic, and military support as a result of the generalized dysfunction that has recently overwhelmed American political institutions.  This is clearly one of the things the boss is talking about when he says that foreign policy begins at home. The Lavrov/Shogui visit is less about rekindling strategic ties between Cairo and Moscow than it is about Egypt’s concern with Washington’s trajectory.  If I am reading the Egyptians correctly, they are annoyed and exasperated with U.S. policy, but their last option would be to replace Washington with Moscow—or anyone else. They have too much vested in ties with the United States.  Ultimately, they may be pushing against the forces of political physics.  Given the changes in both Egypt and the United States, the status quo may no longer be possible.  That’s why it is good to know that Egyptian officials seem to be thinking ahead, albeit in terms of worst-case scenarios.  I cannot say the same thing about American policymakers.  

Mohamed Kasmi discusses the linguistic richness in Morocco, and the related linguistic policies the government has enacted over the years. Abubakr Al-Shamahi says that keeping the lights on in Yemen has been one of the country’s biggest problems, due to recent attacks on its power infrastructure. Cairobserver gives ten must-see videos to understand Cairo’s urban challenges.

Significant Developments Iran. Nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 countries and Iran began today in Geneva with participants voicing optimism that a deal could be reached within days. A senior U.S. official told journalists yesterday that the United States was looking for a “first step understanding” that stops Iran’s nuclear program from moving forward in exchange for “limited, targeted, and reversible sanctions relief.” Iranian foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif said that a nuclear deal may be “possible this week.” Earlier this week, Zarif told an interviewer that “Iran is prepared to call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syria.” His remarks came a day after a commander in the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard was killed in Syria after volunteering to defend the Sayyid Zanab Mosque in Damascus. Meanwhile, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu today said that a nuclear deal between Iran and the world powers would be a "mistake of historic proportions." Syria. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced today that twenty-two of twenty-three declared chemical weapons production sites have been examined. The most recent site it verified was deemed too dangerous for inspection, but was confirmed by video to be “dismantled and long abandoned.” The United States began efforts today to forge a coalition of states to aid in the destruction of stockpiles transferred out of Syria. Meanwhile, the Syrian government announced on Tuesday that it would attend Geneva II talks without preconditions. While acknowledging failure to produce a concrete date for these talks, UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi said it not mean the process has failed. Russian news agencies reported that the talks will be delayed until at least early December. Secretary of State John Kerry, speaking from Saudi Arabia, said that the United States does not have the legal justification “or the desire at this point to get in the middle of a civil war” in Syria. Israel-Palestine. Secretary of State John Kerry today announced from Amman the extension of his Middle East shuttle and his plans to return to Jerusalem on Friday to meet Israeli prime minister Netanyahu. Following several rounds of meetings with Israeli and Palestinian leader, Kerry said that both sides were committed to talks. Kerry yesterday described Abbas as “100 percent committed” to peace and called Israeli West Bank settlements “illegitimate.” Kerry’s comments came in the wake of an Israeli announcement on Monday of its plans to build over a thousand housing units in territories it occupied in the 1967 Middle East war. Kerry called harsh recriminations between Israeli and Palestinian officials this week part of the negotiation process. U.S. Foreign Policy Saudi Arabia. In an effort to ease tense relations, Secretary of State John Kerry met with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia for two hours on Monday. Kerry assured Abdullah that “the United States would not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.” Following Kerry’s meetings with the king and then Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, both Saudis and U.S. officials downplayed their recent disagreements and stressed the strength of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Secretary Kerry called the Kingdom an “indispensable partner” and guaranteed greater consultations on Iran with the Kingdom in the future. Asked about the Saudi prohibition against women driving, Kerry responded that decisions about “social structure” were a matter for the Saudis. Egypt. U.S. secretary of state John Kerry visited Cairo Sunday in his first visit to Egypt since the July 3 coup. Kerry met with Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, interim President Adly Mansour and Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Fahmy described their conversation as positive and said that the talks reduced recent stress on U.S.-Egyptian relations. Calling Egypt a “partner” and “friend,” and describing its relationship with the United States as “vital,” Kerry said the Obama Administration was committed to working with the interim government in Egypt and stressed that the suspension of aid to Egypt was “not a punishment.” Iraq. President Obama met with Iraqi prime minister Maliki in Washington last Friday to discuss cooperation between the two countries on combating terrorism in Iraq and stabilizing the violence-plagued state. U.S. officials have expressed increasing concerns over the resurgence of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that are using Iraq as a training ground. The two leaders also discussed Syria at length and both voiced support for a negotiated political solution. No comment was offered regarding requests for military aid from the poorly equipped Iraqi army. While We Were Looking Elsewhere Yemen. Following clashes beginning last week that left more than one hundred people dead, U.S. envoy to Yemen Karen Sasahara called on northern Houthi rebels yesterday to disarm and join the currently ongoing national dialogue. On Monday, a UN-brokered ceasefire between Shiite Houthis and Sunni Salafis collapsed only hours after the agreement had been formed. This was the second ceasefire to fall apart in a matter of days in the restive city of Damaj near the mountainous northern border with Saudi Arabia where Houthis and Salafis have experienced increased friction. Egypt. An Egyptian court on Wednesday dismissed an appeal of the September ban on Muslim Brotherhood activity in Egypt. Brotherhood officials announced that they will take their appeal to a higher court. The murder trial of ousted President Mohammed Morsi began on Monday but was quickly adjourned until January 8, following general chaos in the courtroom.  Morsi refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the court or trial, called for the overthrow of the military regime, and maintained that he was the duly elected leader of Egypt. Lebanon. Lebanon entered its eighth month without a cabinet yesterday as partisan disagreements continue to plague the formation process. Commenting on the ongoing crisis, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berry criticized the March 14 movement for setting withdrawal of Hezbollah’s fighters from Syria as a precondition for participation in forming a cabinet. On Monday, Hezbollah member of parliament, Mohammad Raad, echoed similar frustration with the movement’s demands and accused them of undermining the state. The current 9-9-6 proposal would grant veto power to both the March 8 and March 14 movements and assign the final six positions to non-partisan ministers. This Week in History This week marks the eighteenth anniversary of the assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. On November 4, 1995, Rabin was shot and killed at a Tel Aviv peace rally by Yigal Amir, a Jewish extremist who accused Rabin of planning “to give our country to the Arabs.” During Israel’s 1948 war of independence, Rabin had coordinated the battle for Jerusalem, and served in combat in the Negev. He served as the chief of staff of Israel’s armed forces during its lighting victory in the 1967 Six Day War. After serving as the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Rabin was elected to the Knesset in 1973 as a member of the Labor party, and became prime minister after Gold Meir stepped down in 1974. Between 1984 and 1990, Rabin served as defense minister in the Labor-Likud coalition government and was elected to become prime minister in 1992. In 1993, he oversaw secret negotiations with the then banned PLO which culminated in the Oslo Accords, an agreement that recognized the PLO and helped establish Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. ,” Rabin went on to sign a peace treaty with King Hussein of Jordan in 1994, after winning the Nobel Peace Prize along with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres.