Influence Campaigns and Disinformation

  • European Union
    Could Europe's New Data Protection Regulation Curb Online Disinformation?
    European leaders are rushing to implement new laws to curb disinformation on social media. However, existing European data protection laws might actually make it harder for bad actors to spread fake news online. 
  • Cybersecurity
    Cyber Week in Review: February 16, 2018
    This week: accusing Russia over NotPetya, cyber threats to the United States, gTLDs, and more on the Equifax breach. 
  • Russia
    The Russia Probe and U.S. National Security: A Conversation With U.S. Rep. Adam B. Schiff
    Play
    Adam B. Schiff (D-CA) discusses the national security implications of Russia's U.S. election interference, and the security concerns associated with North Korea and withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
  • Russia
    Julia Ioffe on What Vladimir Putin Wants
    Podcast
    The Atlantic's Julia Ioffe joins CFR's James M. Lindsay to discuss Russian president Vladimir Putin's political goals.
  • European Union
    Cyber Week in Review: January 26, 2018
    This week: GDPR compliance, Dutch intelligence, and the woes of being a Russian telecom.
  • Russia
    Foreign Affairs Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe Biden
    Play
    Coauthors Joe Biden and Michael Carpenter discuss the article, “How to Stand Up to the Kremlin: Defending Democracy Against Its Enemies,” which appears in the January/February issue of Foreign Affairs. 
  • Russia
    Digital Discord: The View From Russia
    Play
    A panel of Russian independent journalists and founders of digital media startups will provide their perspective on U.S. coverage of the discord between the two countries, and discuss how it relates to their own experiences as online activists and entrepreneurs.
  • Russia
    Containing Russia, Again: An Adversary Attacked the United States—It’s Time to Respond
    The United States must respond to Russia's interference in the 2016 elections by pursuing a strategy of containment. Without a comprehensive response, Russia's meddling will continue.
  • Russia
    Containing Russia
    The United States has failed to elevate Russia’s intervention in U.S. elections to the national priority that it is, and it has neglected to respond to it in a way sufficient to deter future attacks, warn Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon in a new special report. They argue, “A wide range of additional measures is therefore needed in order to better protect U.S. society and political and electoral systems from further intervention.” Surveying the full scope of the “extraordinary Russian attack on the core of the American democratic system” during the 2016 U.S. presidential election and beyond, Blackwill and Gordon—who served in Republican and Democratic administrations respectively—conclude that, “The United States is currently in a second Cold War with Russia.” “The Russian effort to destabilize the United States does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, it stems from the Russian president’s strongly held view—shared by a wide range of Russians—that the spread of U.S. regional and global hegemony since the end of the Cold War threatens Russian vital national interests and deprives Russia of its rightful place on the world stage,” they explain. “There is also little doubt that Russian interventions continue—both to influence upcoming elections and to divide Americans, fanning the flames of cultural, racial, and class resentment and seeking to delegitimize institutions, the free press, and elected officials,” the authors write. The report’s prescriptions for U.S. policymakers are “designed in the first instance to deter Russia from again stoking disunity in the United States by making clear to the Kremlin and to its national security apparatus the significant cost of their activities.” The recommendations in Containing Russia: How to Respond to Moscow’s Intervention in U.S. Democracy and Growing Geopolitical Challenge include: Expanded Sanctions. Working closely with European partners, implement asset freezes and visa bans on Russian officials and entities known to be involved with election and political interference. Current sanctions have “failed to send a sufficiently powerful message to Moscow.” Electoral and Cyber Countermeasures. Strengthen the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure and support legislation to enhance transparency and update campaign finance laws to cover online activity. European Security. Work with European partners to expand sanctions, maintain the numbers of permanent NATO forces currently in Europe, and “deploy permanently an additional armored combat brigade in Poland and maintain permanent multinational battalions in the Baltic states.”
  • Digital Policy
    Year in Review: Tech Companies Grapple with Disinformation
    2017 was the year that tech companies faced a difficult reckoning over their role in spreading online disinformation.
  • Cybersecurity
    Adam Segal on Information Operations
    Podcast
    CFR's Adam Segal joins James M. Lindsay to discuss information operations and cybersecurity.
  • China
    For Clues on How to Address China’s Growing Political Influence Strategies, Look to Australia
    Part of a Series of China’s Growing Influence Within Democratic Societies In a relatively short period of time, international media attention—and attention by policymakers—has focused on Beijing’s growing efforts to wield influence within democracies’ political systems and societies. As I noted in an Expert Brief last week, this attention has been sparked by waves of revelations of Beijing’s attempts to wield influence in Australia and New Zealand, as well as growing concerns about similar efforts in Germany, the United States, Canada, and many other developed democracies. This week, the Economist even dedicated its cover story to the issue of China’s growing influence strategy, referencing an excellent report by the National Endowment for Democracy on China’s “sharp power” strategies in open societies. In part because Australia was one of the first countries to recognize the challenge of China’s expanding global influence campaign inside democracies—a recognition due in part to solid reporting by Australian media outlets—Canberra also is offering a template for addressing Beijing’s influence campaign. For one, Canberra moved relatively quickly to ban foreign donations to political parties and activist groups. Some, but not all, developed nations already have such bans in place; they would be wise to follow Canberra’s example and put such policies in place. Second, Australia has been and is strengthening its process for scrutinizing foreign investments in sectors that could have national security implications. This is a model that other states could study. The United States, too, is moving toward strengthening its Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process, as is Europe. But some other developed economies, such as Canada, appear to be moving in the other direction and applying less scrutiny to foreign investment, even when those investments could affect national security. Third, Australia’s politicians and university leaders appear increasingly aware of the challenge posed by growing funds from Beijing for cultural and educational programming at Australian universities, think tanks, and other institutions. Politicians and universities are engaging in a high degree of scrutiny, now, of China’s influence on campuses. In the United States, although the National Association of Scholars has urged universities to close down Confucius Institutes because of their potential threat to academic freedom, it does not appear many schools are taking this recommendation. Indeed, until recently the challenge of Beijing’s influence on U.S. university campuses seemed mostly ignored, according to testimony by Sophie Richardson of Human Rights Watch last week. Richardson is preparing a lengthy report on Beijing’s influence on U.S. campuses. Countries also should reconsider participating in some of the people-to-people diplomacy that Beijing has stepped up in recent years, including trainings for journalists and other people who work in media firms. These people-to-people trainings in China could, in the future, be increasingly important tools for Beijing to influence media in foreign states.